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A Survey of the World's Oceans International Approaches to Managing Diversity and Implications for Second Generation Acculturation

Discussion Paper

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Third of a three-paper series
on the second generation in Canada and
international experience

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


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Concepts and Definitions

The three papers of this study analyze research on the second generation; while analysis to date is somewhat limited in depth, findings are sufficient to inform a discussion on emerging issues and highlight research gaps. As well, research on the integration of the children of immigrants, second-generation or not, is also useful within certain contexts. These findings will be reflected in the analysis when appropriate, within the confines of the definitions and connections described below.

Second Generation Canadians

The term “second-generation Canadian,” rather than “second generation immigrant,” is used throughout the three papers. This is an arbitrary decision on the part of the author; the term “second-generation immigrant” is a misnomer. An individual is either an immigrant or not – if they are born here, they are Canadian. In common usage, however, the terms “second-generation Canadian” and “second-generation immigrant” are interchangeable.

1.5 Generation Immigrants

The distinction between “second-generation Canadians,” who were born here, and “1.5-generation immigrants” is complex. The 1.5 generation consists of individuals who were born elsewhere but who have spent most of their formative years in Canada. Typically this means that they immigrated to Canada before their early teens. This inclusive definition captures individuals from a number of different backgrounds with different characteristics. This presents a number of challenges. Cohort issues must be accounted for. Studies may also use different age categories to define those who are 1.5 generation. This is significant, since age at immigration has been found to affect how well some members of the 1.5 generation integrate initially.

Nevertheless, in spite of these complications, research to date indicates that many 1.5-generation Canadians, particularly those who have spent a significant portion of their youth in Canada, appear to have attributes and outcomes similar to those of the second generation.

Visible Minorities

As defined by the *Employment Equity Act*, the term “visible minority” refers to persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-White in colour. The story of the second generation is not simply an immigrant story. Visible minority status appears to be a defining characteristic of the second-generation in future. Such a marker appears closely associated with second-generation Canadians experiencing challenges, as well as with those who are not. As a result, research findings pertaining to visible minorities are applicable to this study, particularly when one examines the challenges that the second generation faces.

Introduction

The immigrant story contains two broad narratives: the experience of adult immigrants and that of their offspring. Much has been written about the barriers that newcomers face in adapting to their country of settlement, especially in regards to a frequent lack of proficiency in the official language(s) of the host country, cultural differences, devaluation of credentials and experience acquired in their home country, and a lack of social networks.

In contrast, the narratives of the second generation (i.e., those born to immigrant parents) and the 1.5 generation (i.e., those who immigrated at a very young age, typically before their early teens) are often positive, and share several threads.* Having spent their formative years in their adopted country, these individuals are believed to be spared from the hardships their immigrant parents endured. Granted, as youth they still need to reconcile their parents' ancestral-country values with those of the country in which they live. This is a significant challenge, particularly since they must learn to balance these influences at the same time as they begin to experience the complications and challenges of growing into adults. Nevertheless, on the whole, the second generation are expected to achieve greater success than did their parents and to fully integrate into society. This is due to their parents' insisting on their children excelling in mainstream society as well as the perseverance of many who are second generation. This is the expected storyline.

In the last few years, however, the experiences of the second generation have become an issue of some debate. The racial and ethnic composition of this group is changing due to shifts in immigrant source countries. As well, recent research in Canada and other immigrant-receiving countries has revealed that the integration narrative described above is not always accurate. In particular, it fails to recognize broader social integration challenges faced by second-generation Canadians who are members of visible minorities. On the whole, it appears the pathways of integration for this group move beyond the narrow confines of the immigrant experience and diverges across ethnicity, culture, and socio-economic status. Moreover, as the world becomes more connected, international events tend to have domestic impacts within the integration narrative. This is particularly applicable to youth, considering their familiarity with information technology. It is clear that the time has come for a second look at the second generation.

This is the third of three PRI discussion papers that examine the “new” second generation in Canada and survey international developments that can inform our understanding of the situation here. The first paper presented an integration framework for assessing existing research, which was then used to examine the integration environment in Canada. The second paper used the framework to review what is known about how the second generation is currently integrating into Canadian society, with an emphasis on the children of immigrants from non-European countries. While much had been written on this topic previously, a structured analysis which identifies common threads had not been completed.

* This paper expands on “A Second Look at the Second Generation” by Jean Kunz and Stuart Sykes, published in *Canadian Diversity* vol. 5:1.

Building on the previous two papers, this paper examines the situation in other countries to provide additional context and inform policy discussions by showing what has worked in various national contexts.

An Evaluative Framework†

The first paper in this research series presented an evaluative framework that detailed how members of the second generation integrate. When evaluating the challenges that the second generation faces, it is useful to define the process of personal adaptation and broader social integration (a process described from this point forward as “acculturation,” as described in Subject Box 1) as the product of interactions between two factors: internal personal characteristics and external environmental influences.

Subject Box 1: The Concept of Acculturation

Acculturation is a concept rooted in the fields of psychology and sociology that refers to how individuals in a society and the society itself adapt to reach a positive equilibrium. It is a two way process. Individuals adjust aspects of their identity to reflect broader societal influences and norms. The host society adjusts its structure to make clear expectations and paths to broader social incorporation. Over time, characteristics of the individual, or groups of individuals, may alter these broader societal expectations.

It is commonly accepted that there are diverse patterns of acculturation and adaptation. Cultural loss by individuals is not predestined, nor is the homogenization of the larger society. For the individual, adaptation typically takes place in regards to two spheres of identity. The first is psychological adaptation, which refers to characteristics that are internal, such as few psychological problems, a sense of self-esteem, and life satisfaction. The second is socio-cultural adaptation, which refers to the quality of the relationships between the individual and their socio-cultural contexts, such as attitudes towards school, lack of problem behaviours in communities, and similar interfaces.

As explored in detail within paper one, certain environmental conditions and forms of social interaction influence how individuals acculturate. Often this process is portrayed as a “strategy”, where an individual chooses their path in response to inputs. Without passing judgement on this interpretation, this and the other papers of the series will instead describe acculturation processes and outcomes as “patterns”, which does not indicate one way or the other whether an individual has conscious control over the acculturation process.

Source: John Berry, Jean S. Phinney, Kyunghwa Kwak, and David Sam. John W. Berry, Jean S. Phinney, David L. Sam, and Paul Vedder, Immigrant Youth in Cultural Transition: Acculturation, Identity, and Adaptation across National Contexts. Mahwah. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. 2006. pp 3-14

The importance of personal characteristics, such as emotional maturity, intellect, coping skills, and knowledge (including “human capital”), should not be underestimated. These characteristics define how an individual perceives and reacts to his or her external environment. As a result, even if external influences encourage the adoption of a specific form of acculturation, this does not mean that such influences are destiny.

† For more information on this model and the research underpinning, please see the first paper in this research series (“A Story of Reefs and Oceans: A Framework for the Analysis of the “New” Second Generation in Canada”).

Societal contextual factors may be understood as the ocean in which a fish resides, while the social milieu is the reef on which the fish experiences life.

Nevertheless, research has determined that certain external factors frequently exert powerful effects. In general, these factors can be broken down into two separate but related categories: societal contextual factors, which form the backdrop and give context to the lived experiences of the second generation, and the “social milieu,” the more immediate environment in which the second generation directly encounters external stimuli. Put another way, societal contextual factors are akin to an ocean in which a fish resides, while the social milieu is similar to a reef on which the fish experiences life.

The Ocean: Societal Contextual Factors

Societal contextual factors establish the confines and norms that dictate what is favoured within society. As do currents in an ocean, social attitudes and expectations regarding the concept of citizenship and how cultural groups should associate with society figure prominently and strongly encourage certain paths of integration. These attitudes are primarily a product of two factors: history and current events.¹ A country’s history defines its character and attitudes. Current events then refine governmental and societal attitudes, which can differ greatly between specific groups.² Domestic and international policies also likely contribute to defining the societal context of the host country. From these factors, new stresses and social cleavages can arise, either through the expression by broader society of the attitudes described above or through mainstream support of values that do not align with the cultural beliefs of some members of minority groups.

A particularly important societal contextual factor is the perception of discrimination. This can exert powerful influences on the acculturation process, particularly if the discrimination is perceived as endorsed or at least tolerated by mainstream society. Such perceptions may be the greatest factor contributing to poor acculturation patterns.³

The Reef: The “Social Milieu”

The social milieu consists of the influences and attitudes one experiences within the relationships and activities that define one’s daily life. This includes attitudes and ideas that can be heard in the home, school, or workplace from family, friends, peers, and co-workers. The media is also a component of the social milieu. Conceptually though, the media is unique, since it is not only an actor itself, but also a channel of communication between other actors in society and the milieu.^{4‡}

The milieu filters broad societal factors as well as incorporates the specific social and economic environment in which the second generation resides. This helps define their attitudes to and expectations of both their parents’ cultural heritage as well as mainstream society.[§]

The milieu, however, is constantly evolving. In part, it is influenced by mainstream society. In addition, the aggregated effects of many individuals can not only influence the individual

[‡] These attributes are worthy of study. The media’s role in Canadian multiculturalism figured prominently in PRI regional roundtables exploring the future of multiculturalism in 21st century Canada.

[§] It is necessary to note that perceptions of what is “mainstream” can vary significantly from place to place.

but shape the milieu itself. For example, the language skills and labour market outcomes of the parents of the second generation affect hierarchical relationships within the home that are associated with delinquency and integration into groups at the margins of society.⁵

“Ethnic capital” is a uniquely influential part of the social milieu.

“Ethnic capital” has been found to be a uniquely influential part of the social milieu.⁶ Identified within research on acculturation as a factor that can either positively or negatively affect acculturation, it is an issue that has, as of yet, only been considered obliquely by policy researchers through studies on the effects of changing source countries on the recognition of foreign credentials and work experience acquired overseas.⁷

The Framework: Patterns of Acculturation

Second-generation outcomes are a product of interactions between personal expectations and broader societal attitudes.

This combination of factors, consisting of both social influences that affect personal attitudes and societal characteristics that affect how the second generation is received by society, interact in a manner that defines how a member of the second generation integrates (see Figure 1). In

short, different factors interact in a number of ways to trigger the adoption of different acculturation patterns:⁸


Selective Acculturation – Strong support from parents and ethnic communities and robust exposure to mainstream societal influences results in individuals’ selecting, on a continual basis, characteristics of each culture when defining their identity. This pattern is associated with strong psychological and socio-cultural adaptation and upward social integration.

Consonant Acculturation – Restricted exposure to mainstream societal influences, coupled with strong connections with ethnic communities and, frequently, parental pressure, results in individuals’ orienting themselves toward their ethnic community. This form of acculturation produces relatively positive measures of psychological adaptation (self-esteem, etc.) but poorer socio-cultural integration and distorted integration within mainstream society.

National Acculturation – Frequently driven by parental and cultural expectations of full integration and “success” within mainstream society, and often supported by strong societal preferences for assimilation results in individuals’ focusing on integrating into the national mainstream society. Those who follow this path were found to be significantly less well integrated both psychologically and socio-culturally than those who followed the selective integration model.

Dissonant Acculturation – Hostility from mainstream society, frequently coupled with the breakdown of hierarchical relations within the home and weak cultural attachments, results in individuals’ integrating into a societal underclass. This pattern causes the poorest psychological and socio-cultural outcomes. It is also associated with delinquency and hostility towards broader society (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: The Acculturation Process - Factors, Patterns and Outcomes



Of the four patterns, selective acculturation results in the most positive outcomes by far.

Conclusions from Papers One and Two Regarding Canada’s “Acculturation Environment” and the Experiences of the “New” Second Generation in Canada

The first paper in this research series applied the model described above to analyze what forms of acculturation are supported by Canada’s approach to managing diversity. It was concluded that the Canadian approach of embracing diversity and the nature of Canadian ethnic communities appears conducive to positive acculturation patterns, particularly selective acculturation.

The second paper built on these findings by re-examining recent social and economic research on the new second generation through the lens of the acculturation framework. In keeping with the findings detailed above, the situation of the new second generation in Canada is broadly positive, though with pockets of concern. As the framework predicted, research on educational and labour market outcomes differ markedly along ethnic lines, likely due to positive or negative ethnic capital effects and the effects of real or perceived discrimination. Further, economic integration does not always result in social integration. This may be reflected somewhat in the ambivalence among some members of the second generation toward the concept of Canada and other elements of Canadian society, but there is fundamental debate about this issue at the methodological, analytical and philosophical levels.⁹

A number of knowledge gaps and policy implications were identified by these surveys. While the first and second papers focused on different issues, both reached similar conclusions: to build on the fundamentals of Canada's approach to managing multiculturalism, greater effort should be placed on both understanding and acting on the social milieu. In particular, ethnic enclaves, ethnic capital, and discrimination require more research and analysis. The papers also revealed that we need to pay more attention to how to utilize the policy levers associated with action in these areas – that is, the “institutions of integration” (churches, sports teams, the workplace, and other institutional settings that encourage positive interaction between individuals outside of cultural or familial networks).

While more research is required to determine what, if any, action is required, such a shift in thinking would likely require governments (both federal and provincial) to adopt a more holistic approach to designing and delivering policy and to deepen government presence within communities.

International Experience: A Cautionary Tale

This paper analyzes what is known about the situation in other countries. Because the experiences of the second generation vary greatly between nations, direct comparisons are difficult. Nevertheless, a brief review of developments and policy activities in other countries is illuminating for two reasons. First, it puts the Canadian situation in a different perspective and highlights factors identified in the previous two papers that are worthy of additional attention. Second, while experiences and actions in one country can rarely be duplicated in another, a consideration of responses elsewhere may inform Canada's efforts to formulate solutions.

These reviews focus on broad contextual factors (the “ocean”) to show how the acculturation environment may affect acculturation practices in each country. Where possible, the social milieu is discussed as well, as is the experiences of second-generation members of visible minorities. Data on these outcomes, however, is not always available or comparable. Policy responses (if any) are then reviewed to determine if they can contribute to the findings from the first and second papers in this series.

Western Europe and the European Union: A Turbulent Sea

It is useful to first consider Western Europe and the European Union (EU) as a whole. Attitudes and policies at this level deeply influence broad contextual factors within European states.

Europe constitutes a nearly perfect laboratory in which to study the effects of broader contextual factors and the social milieu within the context of different approaches to managing multiculturalism.

Western Europe is of particular interest to Canada, since many countries in that region have been experiencing significant visible minority immigration for much longer than has Canada. Where Canada has been accepting large numbers of visible minority immigrants since the 1970s, they have been a defining characteristic of Western European immigration since just after the Second World War, when European migration policies favoured low-skilled “guest workers”, from former colonies.¹⁰ As a result, Europe constitutes a laboratory in which to study the effects of broader contextual factors and the social milieu in various approaches to managing multiculturalism.

The EU’s efforts to remove restrictions on people’s mobility and expand access to the rights of common citizenship has opened up debates on immigration and identity. These two issues have merged in a larger debate about “civic integration,” which addresses how immigrants and their children integrate into society. This varies greatly from country to country – from France, where citizenship is a closely guarded privilege and virtual assimilation is the expected outcome of such status, to the United Kingdom, where citizenship is much more accessible and multiculturalism has flourished (see below).

Following European integration and expansion, shifts in migration patterns fuelled debates about the validity of past approaches. In general, immigrants are being encouraged to more fully integrate into the countries in which they live.¹¹ This attitude parallels public opinion in Canada – though not necessarily our public policy.¹²

Policy discussions at the European level have not focused specifically on the second generation; rather, they address “cultural compatibility” (for want of a better phrase). However, this debate has, in large part, grown out of events in the Netherlands that involved the second generation.

The Netherlands: The Accidental Multicultural State

Dutch multiculturalism is more the product of developments on the ground than the result of a coherent policy.

Is the Netherlands a canary in the multicultural coal mine?

The Netherlands has been a country of immigration since the 1960s, but in those early days the country had no official policy of integration. Incoming migrants were expected to work in the Netherlands for several years and then return to their country of origin. Thus, the Dutch saw no need for newcomers to integrate.

By the late 1980s, the idea took root that all cultures have equal value, and multiculturalism became a social fact that informed policies rather than a formal policy in and of itself.

Reflecting this, individual supports were put in place to facilitate participation in Dutch life and culture, but integration was not actively pursued. Guest workers from Turkey and Morocco, both Muslim countries, constituted a large number of these predominantly agricultural and blue-collar workers who eventually came to call the Netherlands their home.¹³

Thus, in the post-9/11 world, the Netherlands was poorly equipped to evaluate the situation it found itself in; multiculturalism was largely an inherited concept without a coherent, commonly accepted policy foundation. The rise of an anti-immigration movement led by populist Pim Fortuyn began to influence public opinion concerning the effectiveness of Dutch multiculturalism in general and Islamic culture in particular. Fortuyn's death in 2002 caused his movement to collapse, but his critical position with respect to Islamic culture was taken up by others. One such person was Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who produced a controversial film on the place of women in Islam. Then, in 2004, van Gogh was murdered by a Dutch-born Islamic extremist of Moroccan origin. This brought a number of long-simmering issues into the open, including questions about the Dutch model of multiculturalism, the rapid growth of the Muslim community in the Netherlands, discrimination, and the place of religion in the public sphere.¹⁴

Following a period of activities and reform initiatives that could easily be described as reactionary, these debates are now starting to mature and adopt a more measured tone. This was recently demonstrated in national elections held in 2007 when proponents of further reform to Dutch immigration and citizenship practices suffered significant electoral defeats to those who argued that such initiatives had gone far enough.¹⁵

Events have placed the Dutch at the centre of many European debates about multiculturalism in general and the second generation in particular.

These events have placed the Dutch at the centre of many European debates about multiculturalism in general and the second generation in particular. Other states regularly examine innovations that the Dutch have adopted. In particular, the practice of having prospective immigrants view videos of the liberal lifestyle and heritage of the Netherlands has garnered much attention. Such exposure, it

is hoped, will discourage those who cannot abide Dutch practices and norms from migrating to that country.¹⁶

More active approaches have also been proposed. In particular, the merits of citizenship tests have been debated a great deal. While in principle not much different than the tests used in Canada and the United States, the possibility of their introduction in many European states has triggered heated debate. This is mainly because many policy actors in Europe advocate that the tests be used to screen out those who do not share the values of the host country. This differs fundamentally from the North American view that the tests are a tool to encourage familiarization with the country and its people. So far, only some European countries have adopted these tests. The ultimate effectiveness of this approach remains uncertain.¹⁷

The United Kingdom: Division and Debate

After years of official multiculturalism, the UK is now at the forefront of evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of that approach and identifying the lessons learned.

The European challenges discussed above have been felt acutely in the UK. In particular, concerns about national identity have coloured debates about cultural diversity. Debate about the labour-market effects of a wave of immigration from Eastern Europe (particularly Poland) have similarly coloured the immigration issue.¹⁸

Incidents both before and after September 11, 2001, however, have increasingly dominated the political landscape and caused the second generation to figure prominently as an issue in its own right. During the 2001 “Summer of Violence,” as it has come to be known, people rioted in the cities of Oldham, Bradford, Leeds, and Burnley. Because these incidents involved many members of visible minorities (primarily from Asia) who had been born in the UK, they were seen to highlight the tension within multicultural UK, and debate was launched about whether multiculturalism was working.¹⁹ The London Underground bombings on July 7, 2005, escalated this debate. The spectacle of three second-generation UK citizens committing suicide attacks against London shocked many British people and made immigration numbers and integration even more of a public concern.²⁰

Today British multiculturalism is challenged by main street and in the corridors of academia.

Significant debate surrounds the issue of how much British multiculturalism policy should emphasize the maintenance of cultural distinctiveness and to what degree individuals should conform to UK values and norms.

This concern is expressed through two separate debates. On the one hand, among the general population, there is a pronounced concern about the decline of “Britishness.” Concern about identity is common in many countries, but the sense of a loss of identity appears particularly acute in the UK where, as the Commission for Racial Equality discovered, it has been exacerbated by multiculturalism’s encouragement of immigrants to retain their culture.²¹

A separate intellectual debate is also underway, articulated most recently by Amartya Sen. He argues that the UK’s multiculturalism policies focus too much on cultural conservation at the expense of individual freedom and social integration. In Sen’s mind, if cultural distinctiveness is supported too much, individuals will find it impossible to break out of their cultural mould and explore other aspects of their identity.²² As discussed in the first paper in this series, this aligns with the logic underpinning the positive psychological and socio-cultural outcomes of selective acculturation – a balance must be struck that does not favour one cultural heritage over another. Coupled with concerns about the health of the British identity, this concern is powering highly divisive debates on the future of multiculturalism and immigration. These debates dominate the political landscape in a manner unfamiliar to us in Canada.

This environment is not conducive to positive acculturation outcomes or the forging of a shared sense of citizenship. Instead, by emphasizing differences between groups, these debates and attitudes may be widening and reinforcing existing cleavages.

Little concrete information is available about the experiences of the second generation. In general, second-generation youth of Caribbean, Black African, Indian, and Chinese descent are more successful than their white third-plus-generation counterparts with similar educational credentials in moving up from the working-class standing of their parents to the professional/managerial class. In regard to religion, second-generation Jews and Hindus are more successful in moving up than are their Christian counterparts with similar credentials. However, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are less successful than their white third-plus-generation counterparts, as are Muslim and Sikhs relative to their Christian reference group. In keeping with the acculturation framework, ethnic capital and parental influences are prominent reasons for these disparate findings.²³

These findings appear to echo the Canadian situation, inasmuch as some groups appear to do better than others for similar reasons. Nevertheless, because intergenerational earnings mobility is significantly lower in the UK than it is in Canada, actual mobility is likely less in the UK.²⁴

Canada and the UK also differ in regard to the neighbourhoods where many second-generation members of visible minorities come of age. The UK has a number of racially defined ghettos that are marked by deep-rooted segregation. Bradford residents asserted that the 2001 riots there were largely due to the lack of progress in employment, educational attainment, housing, and other issues that were blamed for previous riots in 1995.²⁵

This finding was echoed in a report completed for the Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council, Greater Manchester Police, and Greater Manchester Police Authority on the situation in Oldham. That report went further, however, saying that in addition to physical segregation, distrust between communities had become deeply engrained over decades of tension. Indeed, the mistrust ran so deep that a number of myths, such as imagined “no-go” zones within the Borough and a belief that there was a disproportionate sharing of resources within the city, had been allowed to take root and were commonly believed.²⁶

Whether this is a common experience across the UK is unclear. Nevertheless, ethnicity is an underlying source of tension in UK communities, one that intersects with other tensions associated with class, the urban-rural divide, the expansion of the EU, and generational differences. As a result, it is reasonable to speculate that the above findings describe the experiences of many second-generation visible minority citizens, particularly those in smaller urban centres who are the children of immigrants who arrived as low-skilled labour after the Second World War.²⁷

Despite the rhetoric, current responses are largely an extension of previous efforts, the challenges of multiculturalism are to be managed, not solved.

Perhaps in part due to a lack of concrete information on the second generation at the national level, the debates and challenges described above have not yet shaped national policy. Instead, current policy is largely an extension of previous efforts, which focused on community engagement in conjunction with social cohesion strategies, such as anti-racism initiatives and educational curricula, to instil an

understanding of Britishness.²⁸

Nevertheless, in response to these diverse challenges, British policy thought appears to be on two separate tracks. On the one hand, in line with previous efforts to engage communities, the UK government launched the Commission on Integration and Cohesion in August 2006 to examine the challenges associated with diversity and multiculturalism. This body was intended to build on work completed following the riots of 2001 to identify how communities can manage internal tensions.²⁹ In July 2007, the Commission released its final report, along with case studies detailing best practices. Among other things, this report detailed intersections between various social and economic challenges, described the conditions under which community-based approaches are most effective, and identified key players to engage.³⁰ Intriguingly, and of relevance to conclusions articulated in the first and second papers of this discussion series, most players identified were rooted in the social milieu and included key institutions of integration, such as schools and sports organizations.³¹

On the other hand, as this commission was being launched, it was also indicated that higher-level talks would be carried out on how to address more fundamental challenges, particularly regarding “ideology.”³² The meaning of this reference was unclear, but subsequent events are informative. In October 2006, Jack Straw, the leader of the British House of Commons, announced his belief that the Muslim practice of women wearing face veils in public was incompatible with norms and expectations in the United Kingdom and encouraged cultural divisions. Igniting a firestorm of debate, Straw’s assertion was later supported by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who argued that it was time for a dialogue on the limits of multiculturalism and tolerance in British society.³³ His successor, Gordon Brown, has made similar assertions about the need to define what “unifies” the British.³⁴ In February 2008, Gordon Brown unveiled his proposals on immigration and citizenship with an emphasis on “earned citizenship and British values”, pairing rights with responsibilities.³⁵ Whether this marks a fundamental shift in UK multiculturalism policy remains uncertain, but it appears that debates about diversity and multiculturalism in the UK are entering a new phase.

France: The Multicultural Monocultural State

The situation in France is both different and similar to that of the UK.

Where the UK’s approach to diversity is multiculturalism, the French approach is to insist that such differences be reduced, particularly in the public sphere. For example, faith-based schools, which are a central feature of cultural and religious pluralism in the UK and receive state funding, are not supported by France.³⁶ Even the wearing of religious symbols in

schools and other institutional settings is highly restricted. This was vividly demonstrated by the debate about the wearing of head scarves in educational institutions; despite vocal opposition from many Muslims and those from other religions in France, the scarves were banned.³⁷

Unlike people in the UK, the French do not appear to have concerns about national identity; to many, it is established and well understood.³⁸ Within this conception, however, immigrants have traditionally been viewed as outsiders and have faced multiple barriers to citizenship. For many second generation individuals in France, citizenship has historically been difficult to obtain. Today the situation has been improved somewhat by a loosening of rules. Nevertheless, even now, if one parent is not a citizen, second-generation children born in France are unable to obtain French citizenship until they turn 18, and then only after a complex application process. This remains a highly restrictive model which means that, even though an individual may have been born in and grew up in France, they are still not officially recognized as French or as holding the rights of citizenship.³⁹

In has been observed that visible minority second generation French often are viewed as visitors in the land of their birth.

By themselves, these barriers to citizenship would likely amount to little more than an irritant; while somewhat difficult to get, citizenship is obtainable. Nevertheless, this largely symbolic division is reinforced by economic and spatial barriers that often reinforce one another. Policies following the Second World War that brought low-skilled labour, often from former French colonies in North Africa, to fill job vacancies in France resulted in low-skilled workers typically being associated with visible minorities. This affects the opportunities of the second generation; many people in France see second-generation members of visible minorities the same as they see low-skilled immigrants, even though the second generation individual may never have visited their parents' country of origin and could be very highly educated.⁴⁰

Attitudes such as these, coupled with the closed nature of the French labour market, have likely contributed to poor economic outcomes for those who are second generation visible minorities. While official statistics pertaining to ethnic heritage are not collected in France, it has been estimated that unemployment among visible minorities in France is three times the national average. In addition, studies of labour market processes and the behaviour of recruiters indicate that many with North-African sounding names are screened out of job application processes far more often than those with non-ethnic names.⁴¹ Given that many second generation individuals in France are of North African descent and that youth in general have difficulty finding permanent employment under the best of circumstances, it is clear that the second generation in France, particularly if their parents are from North Africa, are likely disadvantaged economically.⁴² Their employment opportunities are restricted by a class barrier reinforced by associations with physical markers (such as skin colour, a name or the wearing of religious symbols).

On the whole then, the context in France is not conducive to a shared sense of national identity or the intercultural dialogues that underpin selective acculturation. Cultural differences are not recognized as legitimate and discrimination appears to make economic success elusive. This is not conducive to positive acculturation outcomes.

Unfortunately, the social milieu in which many second generation visible minority individuals in France come of age appears to further exacerbate the corrosive effects of these influences. Reflecting their class and ethnic distinctiveness, most migrant workers in France cluster together in communities around the edges of major urban centres. Called “immigrant suburbs” by the French, their poverty and ethnic composition qualify them, colloquially, as ghettos.

An example of one such suburb is Clichy. Transit infrastructure in Clichy is highly limited – it typically takes an hour and a half to reach downtown Paris ten miles away. There is no police station or employment office in the suburb and few jobs. In 2005, 20 percent of the population was unemployed, but in many suburbs the number is closer to 50 percent.⁴³

It is in these suburbs that many visible minority individuals in France, already denied formal citizenship and identified by employers as low-skilled immigrant labourers, come of age.⁴⁴ With few apparent opportunities to escape this existence due to the rigidities of French society, it is clear that these immigrant suburbs are an ideal incubator for less positive acculturation patterns (such as dissonant or ethnic patterns) to flourish and for anger and resentment to take hold.

The resulting tension from this situation exploded in summer 2006. Triggered by the accidental deaths of two local teens while being chased by police in a Paris suburb, riots broke out in several immigrant suburbs. In general the rioters, consisting largely of members of the second generation, targeted property and symbols of wealth. Originally expected to burn out in only a few days, the unrest instead spread and lasted several weeks.⁴⁵

A double-pronged approach to immigration and the plight of the second generation has been introduced.

Commentators and analysts argue that the riots were an effort by immigrants and their children to speak out about their disfranchisement and exclusion in French society. Even before the riots, action on these issues had been taken. In particular, efforts to improve conditions in some ghettos had yielded positive social results.⁴⁶ Following the riots these efforts were stepped up and made more aggressive. Significant investments in improved social housing were made and employers are being strongly encouraged to build office

towers in the suburbs. It has been observed, however, that transit infrastructure and basic services, such as police stations and employment offices, often remain to be put in place in suburbs such as Clichy. Those living within the suburbs also remain unsatisfied; in their eyes much more is required and the underlying social and political attitudes that created the atmosphere within the suburbs in the first place remain to be addressed.⁴⁷

Other action taken since the riots have also been greeted with mixed reviews. Garnering much attention have been reforms of the migration policies that contributed to the formation of the immigrant suburbs where the riots took place. In some respects, this legislation is quite radical; previous policies that favoured low-skilled labour have been replaced with much more restrictive standards that favour those with good qualifications. In this regard France is approaching the Canadian immigration model’s focus on skills in hopes of better employment outcomes. Mandatory lessons on French language and society also

echo the Canadian context; while their mandatory nature is cause for pause, they are a marked departure from the past when such support was limited.⁴⁸

In other respects, however, this new legislation appears to confirm attitudes underpinning French migration policy. In particular, the elimination of long-term residence permits, previously granted to anybody who had lived in France for 10 years or more, appears to confirm the French view that immigrants are visitors, not future citizens. Indeed, even the high-skilled immigrants favoured by the new legislation may obtain only three-year limited residence and work permits.⁴⁹ On the whole, this new immigration initiative mixes the old and the new, and its eventual effectiveness can only be speculated on. Given the role that traditional attitudes to citizenship played in creating the current situation, however, their continued prominence in French society and policy is cause for concern.

Initiatives introduced to assist members of the second generation in France are also controversial. In March 2006, the French parliament adopted a law on equal opportunities that would promote youth employment, provide career advice and training, and combat discrimination. In and of itself, this French commitment appears robust, with an emphasis on measures that target youth in vulnerable geographic areas.⁵⁰

However, this initiative appears to do little to improve social mobility. Educational supports are largely neglected – efforts focus primarily on trade internships.⁵¹ The act seems positioned to facilitate movement within the blue-collar class, but not to help the second generation move up into another class. In addition, the act's additional elements addressing law and order issues, coupled with resistance from social partners representing employers and employees in the trades, indicates that old attitudes regarding visible minorities, including the second generation, remain deeply engrained. Only time will tell to what extent the French government's efforts will succeed.

Australia: Challenges of a Different Sort

Of the countries surveyed in this paper, Australia is perhaps closest to the Canadian situation.

Australians generally embrace the concept of multiculturalism, but they routinely express concerns about identity and the effects of multiculturalism on that identity.⁵² As in Canada, the presence of large numbers of visible minority immigrants is a recent phenomena, one that began in the 1970s. Before then, much like in Canada, selection criteria favoured those with cultural backgrounds similar to or deemed compatible with their British heritage.⁵³

Among the children of more recent cohorts, the educational and labour market experiences and outcomes in Australia generally mirror those in Canada. English language fluency rates are high, regardless of source country. This is vitally important if members of the second generation are to move out of ethnic community economies. Post-secondary education participation patterns are strong, with levels typically exceeding those of their third-generation peers. As in Canada, second generation Australians of Asian descent enrol at particularly high rates. Labour market outcomes in terms of earnings and employment are also quite good, again often exceeding the experiences of those who are third generation or more. As in Canada and the UK, some groups do exceptionally well, while others do worse

than those who are third generation or more. Finally, it is interesting to note that, as in Canada, members of the second generation who are of Oceanian origins, as well as those of Lebanese and Turkish descent (where Islam is a predominant religion), are experiencing difficulties despite their strong English skills.⁵⁴

The prevalence and role of racism is often debated.

On the whole then, the situation appears markedly similar to that in Canada. At the very least, our histories are similar, as are our traditional measures of socio-economic integration, such as labour market integration. Therefore, the racially charged riots that erupted on the streets of Cronulla, a beachfront suburb of Sydney, in December 2005 are cause for pause.

Unlike in the UK and France, the incident was not initiated by the second generation, immigrants, visible minorities, or others who could be described as being on the margins of society. Instead, groups of “white” mainstream Australians initiated the conflict after two volunteer lifeguards were assaulted by Arabic-speaking youths. Retaliatory responses over the next few days involved people belonging to visible minority groups as well as people who were not members of such groups.⁵⁵ Descriptions of the events sounded similar to a conflict between rival gangs. It appears that far-right gangs and political organizations were involved in inciting the violence, and the incidents, while appearing spontaneous, were frequently marshalled through Internet-based communications.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, despite evidence of outside manipulation, these incidents did highlight tensions that exist in multicultural Australia.

How this situation came about is somewhat uncertain. It has been argued that immigration and refugee policies have increasingly been used as wedge issues in Australian politics and media.⁵⁷ It is unclear how the public is interpreting this; a recent survey of young Australians, conducted at about the same time as the Cronulla riots, found a great deal of disdain toward the media.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, as the acculturation framework makes clear, such polarization within the political sphere would negatively shape broad contextual factors within society. In part, Australians appear to recognize and are concerned about this; an ACNielsen survey completed for the *Sydney Morning Herald* following the riots found that 75 percent of respondents perceive underlying racism in Australian society.⁵⁹

Reflecting their situation, responses focus on all aspects of Australian society.

Policy strategies following the riots focused on discussion and debate. At the state level, immediately following the riots, extra police patrols were assigned to beaches in New South Wales (where Cronulla is located), but this enhanced police presence was stepped down within a month with few arrests made. At the national level, attention has focused on improving relations between communities. Even before the riots, the national government had made efforts to work with Muslim community leaders to avoid the type of alienation perceived as being a factor behind the July 7, 2005, bombings of the London Underground. These efforts parallel recommendations for Canada presented in the first and second papers of this series.⁶⁰

As in Canada, the degree of racism in Australian society is a subject of debate. Prime Minister John Howard, while denying widespread racism, has called for a “root and branch renewal of the teaching of Australian history in schools.” He linked this call to the ongoing

“war on terror” and education’s role in achieving the right balance between community interests and individual civil rights. The subject of history figures prominently in such efforts, but educators in New South Wales replied that their primary and secondary curricula were already quite strong in the teaching of history. Many educators believe that such educational programs and community based anti-racism initiatives could be expanded.⁶¹

Finally, the role of the media in promoting social cohesion is regularly debated.⁶² How the state or national governments could better incorporate the media into their policy efforts remains unexplored, however. As indicated in the first paper in this series, this area requires further study.

The United States: Race, Class, and Segmented Integration

With scholarship going back more than a decade, the United States has perhaps the best body of research on the process of second-generation acculturation.* While an “immigrant society” like Canada and Australia, the US is traditionally described as using a “melting pot” approach to integration intended to encourage assimilation. This creates a strong sense of identity, but it can also isolate those who do not fit into the mould of mainstream norms. As a result, it is easy for society to be separated into “segments,” with the “mainstream” majority occupying the centre of life and incorporation in the United States and with “underclasses” of disadvantaged individuals living at the margins.

Integration is not the issue in the US. Rather, the question is into which class or social group integration will occur.

Portes’s “segmented” integration model is the classic description of how the second generation can interact with this situation. Within this social model, the question is not whether integration will take place, but into which segment an individual assimilates: the mainstream or an underclass. Dissonant acculturation patterns are a distinct possibility. Typically, whether this happens depends on the factors discussed in the acculturation framework.⁶³

Societal-contextual factors must be considered, however: poverty and exclusion in the United States remain highly racialized, and racially defined ghettos are not uncommon. In this environment, immigrants and their children are vulnerable to integration into a social underclass. According to Portes, such integration is complete; in the face of peer influence, individuals adopt the ethos and attitudes of the underclass, making the exclusion and challenges of the underclass the challenges of the second generation national.⁶⁴

The experiences and outcomes of the second generation can vary widely. In general, despite the predominance of non-English languages (usually Spanish) in many immigrant households where the second generation have come or are coming of age, second-generation Americans of every background speak English well. This is vitally important for successful social and economic integration. Such fluency is also a foundational element for the acquisition of education. Reflecting this, the majority of America’s newcomers and their

* While a great deal of work has gone into studying the psychological and sociological aspects of second-generation acculturation in the United States, it had been noted that limitations of the US Census and other data collection tools makes the actual size and composition of the second generation still a matter of some conjecture. This is because data sources have not asked respondents about the place of birth of their parents. While several innovative techniques have been developed to create reasonable estimates and define the parameters of research, more work on this issue is required.

children achieve rates of social and economic mobility comparable to those of earlier waves of European immigration.

However, while intergenerational mobility (economic and social mobility between generations) appears comparable to historic levels, some downward mobility is apparent for all immigrant groups. Low parental human capital, family disruption, and poor acculturation patterns driven by discrimination and illegal migrant status are driving this decline.⁶⁵

Poor parental outcomes have lasting effects. For example, if the second generation (or 1.5 generation) have a strong grasp of the English language but their parents have poor English skills, the second (or 1.5) generation's acculturation may be hindered. This situation has been observed to undermine hierarchical relations within the immigrant household, making it difficult for the parents of second-generation youth or other members of an ethnic community to prevent dissonant acculturation patterns.⁶⁶ National acculturation patterns are also a possibility within this household and community environment, although a survey of second-generation youth in Southern California and Southern Florida found that only 17 percent of the total sample felt embarrassed by their parents' cultural ways – this lack of disdain toward their heritage seems to largely preclude the cultural rejection required for national acculturation patterns to take place.⁶⁷

In stark contrast to Canada, pronounced ethnic differences have been found in educational expectations. In general, second-generation students expect to at least finish college. Perhaps reflecting the lower educational levels of their parents' ethnic community, however, a majority of second-generation Americans of Mexican, Laotian, or Cambodian descent do not aim for a college degree.⁶⁸ In many cases, this has been attributed to ethnic capital. In addition, discrimination also appears to be a significant barrier, with over half the children of Black immigrants – Haitians, Jamaicans, and other West Indians – expecting discrimination to continue even after their education years.⁶⁹ It is clear that both broad societal contextual factors and influences within the social milieu – namely economic barriers, the weight of ethnic capital, and perceptions of discrimination – put up significant roadblocks to realizing goals of high educational attainment.

As in Canada and elsewhere, discrimination may also be affecting feelings of attachment to the United States. Seventy percent of second-generation Americans of Laotian and Jamaican descent feel discriminated against. This sense of discrimination runs so deep that many belonging to this group believe that even if they become highly educated they will not be given a fair chance in American society. This has been associated with the fact that only a minority of second-generation Americans with these backgrounds display positive attitudes towards the United States, particularly in comparison to other countries.

Members of other groups also feel discrimination, but apparently not so deeply. Two in three second-generation children of Mexican, Haitian, Filipino, and Vietnamese immigrants or refugees also report feeling discriminated against. However, those experiences have generally not soured their opinions of the United States to the same extent as for the people of Laotian and Jamaican origins. Solid majorities of the second generation of Vietnamese and Filipino descent proclaim the United States to be “the best country in the world”.⁷⁰

It is easy to understand how this array of influences and barriers could result in disparate outcomes and the formation of multiple segments in society. On the whole, visible minority second-generation Americans in South Florida and Southern California are outperforming their third-plus-generation peers in school, speak English well, and are working.⁷¹ Others, often belonging to certain groups, are far less successful. For example, as could be expected from the findings detailed above, many second-generation Americans of Mexican, Haitian, and other West Indian descent appear trapped in menial jobs with low incomes, are frequently young parents, and frequently have confrontations with the law.⁷² As Rumbaut and Portes observed, this reinforces racial and ethnic stereotypes that contributed to this situation in the first place.⁷³

Despite significant research, wide spread policy responses are not apparent.

While significant research has been completed on the second generation, this group is not viewed as a policy priority in the United States. Much more attention has been placed on the issue of illegal migration at the national and state level, in large part due to concerns about border security. Nevertheless, research in the

United States has revealed that there is a role for supports to assist second-generation youth. In particular, Zhou et al. have shown that access to rigorous academic programs and after-school resources can significantly improve outcomes because of the skills and networks they enable students to develop. Such supports, they observe, often make the difference between those who succeed and those who fail in the American context.⁷⁴ These findings could inform policy in the Canadian context.

Implications of International Experience for Canada

Despite marked differences between countries, policy debates appear to closely parallel one another. Due in large part to “incidents” involving second-generation citizens, debates in Europe are often wrapped up in broader discussions regarding multiculturalism, immigration levels, and identity. This is both similar and different to the Canadian, US, and Australian contexts; it is similar in tone, inasmuch as the topics being discussed are similar, but very different in intensity, with a greater sense of urgency surrounding policy discussions in the European context. This is particularly marked in regard to the second generation. In Canada, the US, and Australia, discussions regarding the second generation remain relatively muted. In the Netherlands, France, and the UK, however, multiple and spectacular incidents involving the second generation have fed a debate that, along with other policy debates concerning diversity, is proving highly divisive.

Is Europe’s Present Canada’s Future?

From this discussion on disparity, a key policy question emerges: will the types of events that happened in France and the UK happen here? If they do, we could expect that divisive debates similar to the ones taking place in those countries would also arise here.

There are still too many unanswered questions for one to determine whether Canada has or will perfect the integration of immigrants and their children.

Some say that this type of situation could develop in Canada if we do not address issues of discrimination, vulnerability, and social exclusion. Michael Valpy, citing the work of Jeffery Reitz (discussed in paper two) regarding discrimination, social exclusion, and identity among second-generation members of visible minorities in Canada, argues that these socio-economic factors are laying the groundwork for social dissonance. Valpy argues that these pressures are not more apparent at present only because, comparatively speaking, large waves of visible-minority immigration are new to Canada and that ethnic-enclave communities remain rare and are not yet synonymous with poverty.^{††} Nevertheless, Valpy argues that as the second-generation visible minority population increases in size and current disappointments and frustrations become entrenched in ethnic communities, similar resentments to those that emerged in France will bubble to the surface here and cause unrest.⁷⁵

Valpy's assertions, however, are based on Reitz's findings – which have yet to be confirmed. Indeed, Jack Jedwab has presented evidence challenging key aspects of Reitz's findings (also discussed in paper two). In addition, Canada's acculturation environment appears quite different than those in France and the UK. For example, Canada's strong record of educational achievement, labour market outcomes, and intergenerational mobility demonstrate how immigrants and their children are viewed differently here than in the UK and France. Such arguments, however, are relevant only so long as these positive structural factors remain in place.

At present, there are too many unanswered questions for an accurate picture of Canada's future to be developed. It is possible only to observe that Canada has not yet demonstrated that it has perfected the integration of the second generation. Thus, Canada must learn from the debates and experiences of other states. The cost of failure would be too high and too difficult to reverse due to the powerful role that life experiences play in shaping acculturation strategies. Patterns set in youth are frequently difficult to undo as time passes.

The Australian Experience: Lessons from Down Under?

Similarities between Canada and Australia are worthy of attention. In regard to multiculturalism, both are relative newcomers to diversity from immigration. Concerns about discrimination have also been expressed in both countries. As a result, Australia's focus on improving education curricula and reviewing the role of the media are of interest; both subjects were flagged in the first and second papers in this series as areas on which to focus our attention. Since those papers also identified the importance of the social milieu in the Canadian context, Australia's efforts in engaging communities are also worthy of note (as are those in the UK).

Of additional interest is that any action Australia takes on these issues will have to navigate the same complex jurisdictional issues that exist in Canada. As in Canada, jurisdiction over educational matters resides with sub-national entities (called "states") within a federal

^{††} Instead, while studies in Canada have found that poverty is overrepresented in visible-minority communities, ethnic enclaves in Canada are not necessarily impoverished and many visible minorities live outside ethnic enclaves.

structure. Should Canada decide to take policy action on the challenges facing the second generation or on discrimination generally, Australia's efforts will be worthy of study. Even if the content of Australian policy is not applicable in the Canadian context, their experience in framing and implementing such policies within their federal system could inform efforts here.

Community Engagement or a Targeted Approach? Complexities Stemming from Distinct National Models

Reflecting on the experiences and debates of all the countries surveyed here, a broader question appears: how should initiatives be targeted? Should programs target individuals directly or focus on the communities in which they grow up and live? The first and second papers in this series, based on the acculturation framework and findings about where Canada is strong (broad contextual factors) and weak (the social milieu), argued the latter. However, this conclusion is not shared everywhere. Both the UK and Australia place a great deal of emphasis on engaging community partners to improve connections between communities. France, however, appears to focus on the individual, although services may be delivered via community-based entities. Similarly, in the US context, the forms of support that Zhou et al. consider effective also target the individual.

The question of targeting individuals or engaging communities requires that additional dimensions be considered: what approach fits with the country's approach to managing diversity?

At the operational level, there is no reason why both approaches might not be used in conjunction. Within the context of multiculturalism and social cohesion, however, the question of targeting individuals or engaging communities requires that additional dimensions be considered. In particular, it would be necessary to decide how supports fit with overarching approaches to managing diversity within a specific country.

For example, French authorities have not, as a policy, reached out to engage communities as has been done in the UK. Initiatives targeting community infrastructure have been observed. Community effects also figure prominently in their policy diagnostic and strategy. Nevertheless, a much greater reliance on individually targeted supports is apparent. This decision may have been influenced by the French focus on social uniformity; institutional processes and structures required for community engagement may simply not currently exist. In addition, it is possible that the very concept of positively engaging ethnic groups within French society towards the goal of social inclusion may be alien to socio-political norms that revolve around the concept of social solidarity.

In short, engaging community actors may be an approach that is incompatible with the French social model. The implication of this for Canada is that when policy makers determine if they should focus on individual supports or community engagement, they must first determine what approach would fit Canadian society and approaches in this country to managing diversity.

Framing the Questions Right: The Meaning of Citizenship

Finally, this review of international experiences and developments suggests one last dimension to consider when addressing the challenges that the second generation faces in

Canada. The prevalence and tone of the debate in both Canada and abroad suggests that it would be beneficial to consider the concerns people express about citizenship, multiculturalism, diversity, and the second generation within a broader context.

The concern people feel about multiculturalism may not be a reflection of the strength of that policy and the identities it creates; rather, it may be more a reflection of the weakness of traditional national identities.

Debates about multiculturalism are often linked to concerns about a perceived “loss” of national identity. This conceptual connection is clearly evident in discussions in Canada, Australia, and the UK. In France the debate is different, but it could easily be argued that preservation of the French identity lies at the centre of many of their citizenship policies. The second generation, in turn, is associated with this conceptual connection through the hypothesis that, if multiculturalism policies are effective, the children of immigrants should be fully acculturated

and integrated members of society. It is often believed, at a fundamental level, that the concept of being “Canadian” should be the core component of the identity of second generation individuals. This assumption is the reason why apparent findings of weak attachment to the state and Canadian society, coupled with social unrest and other incidents both here and abroad, incite such passionate debate. To those concerned about a loss of national identity, the acculturation patterns and attitudes of the second generation would appear to confirm their fears.

The problem with this conclusion is that it does not hold up under scrutiny. Using data from a number of different countries, researchers have confirmed that the most positive forms of psychological and socio-cultural acculturation are associated with individuals who retain strong connections to their cultural heritage. Thus, it is necessary to consider an alternative hypothesis; perhaps people’s concerns about identity, which currently deeply flavour debates about multiculturalism, are the result of pressures and strains from other quarters. In particular, concerns about second-generation integration must be balanced against the fact that many in the Western world, regardless of generation or country of origin, are debating the meaning of concepts such as “citizen” and what it means to be a citizen in the 21st century.

From this perspective, it is necessary to realize that the concern people feel about multiculturalism may not be so much about the strength of that policy and the identities it creates as about the weakness of traditional national identities. Within this different conceptual framework, the second generation would appear to be particularly vulnerable – torn between two worlds, they would be the first to show these stresses. If this is so, then for the countries discussed in this paper, initiatives that explore and define national, or post-national, identities may be an appropriate response, not only to the challenges that the second generation face but also to the debate about multiculturalism. Hypothetically, this conclusion would also apply to Canada.

Conclusion

In regard to what international experience can tell us about the “new” second generation in Canada, we must exercise a great deal of caution. This survey has revealed that approaches to managing diversity and social cohesion must not only reflect the challenges that exist in each country, but also must be in keeping with the social context and norms that define the

country's approach to managing diversity. From this perspective, Canada may find itself more closely aligned with the UK and Australia than with the US and France. In particular, this can affect the degree to which policies target individuals versus the community, as well as how supports are delivered to improve outcomes for the second generation.

With these caveats in mind, a number of approaches are worthy of examination, should the completion of diagnostic research confirm a need for action. Australia's focus on education and anti-racism communications products is interesting, particularly since Australia is also a federal state where education is a sub-national responsibility. Efforts to engage communities and improve relations between communities figure prominently in many states, particularly those that appear most similar to Canada. Nevertheless, France's internship programming and the effectiveness of skills and networks acquired through advanced educational programs in the United States suggest additional avenues for policy research.

Lastly, the issue of how to frame the challenges that second-generation youth face must be carefully considered. In many countries, significant concerns have been expressed about the health of national identities. But, if the "Canadian" identity is poorly articulated and defined, should we be surprised that the second generation may associate with other identities? In addition, fears regarding the health of national identities may be feeding unconstructive debates about multiculturalism. Therefore, a dialogue or other initiative to further define the Canadian identity in the 21st century may be an appropriate response.

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