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Understanding Canada's "3M" (Multicultural, Multi-linguistic and Multi-religious) Reality in the 21st Century

Final Report

June 2009

PRI Project
Cultural Diversity

Canada 

**Understanding Canada's "3M"
(Multicultural, Multi-linguistic and Multi-religious)
Reality in the 21st Century**

FINAL REPORT

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

The PRI contributes to the Government of Canada's medium-term policy planning by conducting cross-cutting research projects, and by harnessing knowledge and expertise from within the federal government and from universities and research organizations. However, conclusions and proposals contained in PRI reports do not necessarily represent the views of the Government of Canada or participating departments and agencies.

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SUMMARY

In the Summer of 2006, the Policy Research Initiative (PRI), in partnership with the Multiculturalism and Human Rights Branch then housed in the Department of Canadian Heritage (PCH), undertook a policy research project on Canada's approach to multicultural diversity. Titled *Multicultural Canada in the 21st Century: Harnessing Opportunities and Managing Pressures*, this project has identified opportunities and pressures for fostering inclusive citizenship in multicultural Canada, which is growing increasingly diverse with successive waves of immigration. The project has centred on two questions:

1. In light of emerging social and demographic trends, what policies might Canada wish to adopt in the wake of growing ethno-cultural diversity resulting from immigration?
2. How can inclusive citizenship be developed in pluralistic societies such as Canada, where individuals and communities are globally connected but diverse in culture, religion, and language?

Phase One of the project consisted of roundtable consultations in eight cities across Canada on the current state of Canada's approach to multicultural diversity and policy research gaps. The results were presented to PCH management and staff working on the topic.

Phase Two of the project deepened analysis on select topics identified in the roundtable consultations, including integration of second-generation individuals, dealing with religious diversity in the public sphere, as well as spatial patterns of cultural diversity and their possible implications for policy. In addition, the project contributed to another PRI project, Canada 2017, by developing scenario analysis of Canada's "3M" (multicultural, multi-linguistic and multi-religious) future.

This report summarizes the activities undertaken as part of the PRI's project on cultural diversity and highlights its findings, including the following:

- Multiculturalism provides both a vision and a concrete framework for intercultural relations in a cohesive society. That said, the process of dealing with multicultural diversity needs to evolve as social realities change.
- Moreover, in recent years multiculturalism has become a focus for ethnic- or religious-based tensions in immigrant-receiving countries such as Canada. This is due in part to the general perception that multiculturalism is a policy to facilitate the integration of non-European newcomers and their immediate descendants. Hence, there is a need to create a wider multicultural tent by including a wider spectrum of the Canadian population in the policy dialogue.
- In particular, multicultural policies need to resonate with younger Canadians who are increasingly diverse in culture and global in outlook.
- While second-generation Canadians generally outperform their parents in terms of economic outcomes, there is significant variation across ethnic groups in this regard. While growing up Canadian, members of some ethnic and racial minorities report having disproportionate experiences of discrimination.
- Religious diversity is a reality in Canadian society. It is apparent that many of the tensions around cultural diversity derive from unease about religious diversity. How religious identities and beliefs interact with societal institutions may need to be revisited.
- Canada's "3M" reality is generally manifested in cities and neighbourhoods where people live, work, and play. There is a need to facilitate mutual understanding across all population groups through credible analysis, including a more nuanced interpretation of the spatial patterns of diversity.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Demographically, Canada has always been a "3M" society: multicultural, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious. Such diversity was initially grounded in its founding peoples: Aboriginal peoples, and French and English settlers – to which were added successive waves of immigrants from around the world. While a fundamental aspect of Canada's heritage, the "3M" nature of our population has evolved considerably in the recent decades, due in part to demographic changes that are projected to continue into the future. One of the key changes has been a sustained period of high immigration from increasingly diverse source countries – which has transformed communities, neighbourhoods, schools, workplaces, and social institutions, especially in Canada's largest cities. Canada prides itself in being the first country to adopt a multiculturalism policy. In a recent national dialogue among Canadians, multiculturalism, along with other attributes, was considered both a value and an asset for Canada.¹ Yet dealing with such diversity remains a work in progress for both Canadians themselves and their governments.

In recent years, ethnic and religion-based conflicts and debates in Europe and in Canada have renewed the interest of governments in the integration of immigrants and their descendants. In Canada, especially following a number of incidents stemming from attempts to accommodate (or to resist the accommodation of) the needs or sensitivities of religious minorities, the country's approach to ethno-cultural diversity has been pushed to the forefront of public discourse. At issue are how to foster diversity without divisiveness and whether Canada's

multiculturalism policies are in need of review in light of today's social and geopolitical realities.

It is in this context that the PRI, in partnership with the Multiculturalism and Human Rights Branch then housed in the Department of Canadian Heritage, spearheaded a pilot project to assess the need for policy research in order to clarify key issues related to rising cultural diversity induced by immigration. The project started in 2007 with a series of roundtable consultations across Canada on approaches to multicultural diversity and policy research gaps. Based upon these consultations, three policy research areas were identified to warrant further analysis, namely: the integration of second-generation Canadians; religious diversity; and the geographic concentration of ethno-cultural communities. As a conclusion to the project, this report summarizes key findings and outputs of each major component of the endeavour.

Organized around the sub-themes of the project, this report contains five sections. Section 1 reports on results from the roundtable consultations. Sections 2, 3, and 4 centre on outcomes from the PRI's exploration of three topics derived from the roundtable consultations, including second-generation Canadians (Section 2), religious diversity (Section 3), and the geographic distribution of immigrants and visible minorities (Section 4). A set of outstanding policy research questions is outlined in the conclusion of this report. A list of events that were organized and publications that were released as part of this project is provided in the appendix of this report.

1. IDENTIFYING ISSUES: REGIONAL ROUNDTABLES

In early 2007, the PRI, in partnership with the Department of Canadian Heritage, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Metropolis Project, held roundtable consultations in eight cities across Canada, including Halifax, Montréal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Calgary, and Vancouver. These consultations included representatives from all three orders of government, community organizations, business, the news media, as well as experts on the topic of immigration and diversity. The following are highlights of these consultations. A fuller description of the outcomes of the roundtable consultations is available in PRI's report titled *From Mosaic to Harmony: Multicultural Canada in the 21st Century*.

According to participants at the roundtable consultations, managing multicultural diversity is a work in progress that evolves over time as social realities change. Regardless of these changes, however, the principles that inform and guide governments' multiculturalism policies – equality, respect for diversity, human rights, and full participation in society – remain the cornerstones of inter-ethnic and intercultural relations in Canada.

Many participants argued that multiculturalism provides both a vision for Canada and a concrete framework for managing intercultural relations within a cohesive society. That said, multiculturalism is more typically understood by most Canadians as a policy to facilitate the integration of non-European newcomers and their immediate descendants. While there is general good will towards multicultural diversity, it was felt by participants that efforts to promote cultural differences should not come at the expense of overlooking what all Canadians have in common.

A common theme emerged in all the roundtable consultations: a need to create a multicultural tent for all Canadians by including a wide spectrum of the Canadian population in the policy dialogue rather than just the “usual suspects.” Many observed that current

discussions on cultural diversity generally involve only members of visible minorities and newcomers, representing only one fifth of the population. Not present in the consultations are Aboriginal groups and those who are not visible minorities. This practice serves to reinforce perceptions that multiculturalism is only for visible minorities and further exacerbates the “us versus them” dichotomy.

Canadian society has evolved from a mosaic into a fusion of cultures where people of different cultural origins interact and contribute to the multiple communities with which they identify. A recurring theme from the roundtable consultations was that multiculturalism is a means to an inclusive and equitable society. Policy tools need to adapt to the changing dynamics of inter-ethnic relations. In particular, policies need to be communicated and implemented effectively so that Canada remains truly multicultural.

Being part of a matrix of policies, it was commonly asserted that multiculturalism policies cannot work out of sync with other domestic and foreign policies, such as employment, immigration, health, and international relations. There is a sense that government departments and many cultural communities still remain largely in their respective “silos.” It was felt that there is little dialogue across policy sectors and across cultural communities.

Much consternation was expressed that there is a “disconnect,” between the policy of multiculturalism and the reality of multiculturalism on the ground. Too often, roundtable participants argued, delivery of programs emphasized cultural differences at the expense of encouraging individuals from different cultural backgrounds to learn about one another. It was felt that this “disconnect” both contributed to the challenges posed by multicultural diversity, and resulted in cultural communities not interacting as much with other communities.

It was suggested that governments adopt a more active role to combat weak analysis and unsubstantiated or erroneous claims that, when made in a variety of fora, set the tone for debates on the practice and reality of multiculturalism in Canada. While there is a large amount of research on immigration and diversity, participants argued it needs to be better utilized for policy purposes. More importantly, significant benefits could be derived from learning about current and past practices, especially by focusing on factors contributing to success (or the lack thereof) among these practices.

Roundtable participants also insisted that the voices of younger Canadians needed to be heard. They argued that members of the "multicultural generation," who were growing up surrounded by a multicultural and global reality, often found it difficult to pigeonhole themselves into a certain ethnic group, especially those from intercultural families. These young people are more likely to see themselves first and foremost as

Canadians and/or as Québécois. Canada's approach to multicultural relations needs to reflect this shift in orientation.

It was noted that multiculturalism has become an easy target for the failings and challenges of other policies. It was almost universally argued that recent backlash against multiculturalism can be traced back to anxiety and fear about the unknown. Debates about relevant multicultural issues, such as religious diversity and the implications of what are said to be growing ethnic or religious enclaves² in Canada, were described by many roundtable participants as poorly informed and frequently simplistic.

Drawing on discussions from the consultations, the PRI devoted the rest of the project to work in three areas: the experience of second-generation Canadians, dealing with religious diversity in Canada, and, to a lesser extent, the spatial patterns of cultural diversity.

2. EXPERIENCES OF SECOND-GENERATION CANADIANS

As demonstrated throughout the PRI-PCH regional roundtables, second-generation Canadians may not share the same concerns as their immigrant parents. In particular, today's second-generation youth have grown up in a society where the principles of equality and respect for diversity are honoured in principle and both legislated and broadly applied in practice. Fluent in at least one of the official languages and technically savvy, they are often also globally-minded. While their parents may have striven to find a foothold in Canadian society, they are interested in finding their place as Canadians in a global context.³

As part of the research project, a seminar was held on existing evidence regarding the issues facing second-generation individuals, especially those from racial minorities in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. A review of Canadian and international research yielded a three-part discussion paper series.⁴ These papers synthesize existing knowledge on the economic and social integration of second-generation individuals as well as identifying research and data gaps in the area. The first paper sets out an analytic framework to assess research evidence to date on the topic. This framework is then used in the second paper to evaluate existing evidence in Canada and flag important issues for consideration by policy analysts and researchers. The third paper focuses on the international context and implications for Canada.

Second-Generation Canadians are becoming Visibly Diverse

In 2006, four million individuals aged 15 and over in Canada (representing 15.6% of the population) were second-generation Canadians (defined as those for whom one or both parents were immigrants), compared with 23.9% of the population who were first-generation immigrants.⁵ Compared with first-generation Canadians, second-generation individuals are largely of European origin, reflecting immigration trends in the decades prior to 1980 (Table 1).


Table 1: Canada's Visible Minority and non-visible Minority Population by Generation (%)

	Total	1st generation	2nd generation	3rd or more generations
Not a visible minority	85%	47%	86%	99%
Visible minority	15%	53%	14%	1%

Source: Statistics Canada, *Beyond 20/20*, 97-562-X2006010


This pattern is changing as more recent arrivals from diverse source countries settle down. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 below, while visible minorities formed 14% of the second-generation population, that proportion increased to 39% among those aged 15 to 24, especially in the large urban centres of Toronto and Vancouver. The shift in the ethnic background of first-generation immigrants will inevitably change the ethnic composition of Canada's second and subsequent generations of immigrants in the future. Such diversity is especially evident in urban areas in Ontario and British Columbia, which a majority of immigrants and visible minorities call home. Ontario has the majority (54.2%) of the visible minority population in Canada, followed by British Columbia (19.9%), and Quebec (8.8%). Nationally, visible minorities made up 16.2% of the population in 2006.⁶ For all generations combined, nearly two thirds of visible minorities (60%) live in either Toronto (42.9%), or Vancouver (17.3%).

Figure 1: Visible Minority by Generation Status (Age 15-24), 2006



Source: Statistics Canada, Census 2006 *Beyond 20/20* Table, 97-562xCB2006010.ivt

Figure 2: Second-Generation by Visible Minority Status (Age 15-24), 2006



Source: Statistics Canada, Census 2006 *Beyond 20/20* Table, 97-562xCB2006010.ivt


Compared with studies on immigrants in general, less is known about children born to immigrant parents, especially those from racial minorities. Based largely on the experiences of individuals of European origin, the existing narratives of the second generation are often described as positive, with several common threads featuring prominently. Having spent their formative years in their adopted country, these individuals are believed to have been spared the hardships their immigrant parents endured. Granted, they still needed to reconcile the values of their country of ancestry (i.e. those typically still held by their parents at least in part) with those of the country in which they grew up. Nevertheless, these individuals expected (and were expected) to achieve a higher level of success than their parents and to integrate fully into society, reflecting in part their parents' insistence on their excelling in mainstream society as well as their own perseverance. Recent research findings in Canada and other immigrant-receiving countries have revealed variants to this narrative, prompting the need to take a second look at the second generation which, because of a shift in immigrant source countries, has become more diverse with regards to racial and ethnic composition. Consequently, the pathways of integration appear to diverge depending on ethnicity, culture, and socio-economic status. Moreover, as the world becomes more connected, international events

often have domestic impacts that must also be considered within a society's integration narrative.

Economic Outcomes of Second-Generation Individuals vary Across Ethnic Groups

Education and labour market outcomes are often used to evaluate economic integration of second-generation Canadians in relation to their parents and to their non-immigrant peers. Research indicates that, on the whole, second-generation Canadians are doing well in terms of educational attainment and labour market outcomes. The educational attainment of second-generation Canadians is marginally higher than that of Canadians of three or more (3+) generations. As noted by Aydemir, Chen, and Corak, 11.1% of 3+ generation men receive a bachelor's degree compared with 17.2% of men who have two immigrant parents.⁷ At the graduate level, second-generation men with two immigrant parents are more likely to hold a graduate degree compared with 3+ generation men. A similar pattern is observed among women. However, differences exist in completion rates across ethnic groups. In 2001, 40% of second-generation Chinese Canadians received a bachelor's degree compared with only 11% of the second generation of Latin American immigrants (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Percentages with Bachelor's Degree or Higher, Second-Generation by Visible Minority Status, Age 20-29, living in CMAs, 2001



Source: Boyd, Monica. "Variations in Socioeconomic Outcomes of Second-generation Young Adults." *Canadian Diversity*. Spring 2008. Vol. 6, No. 2.

As a whole, labour market outcomes for the second generation are better than those for immigrants who arrived after the age of 12. Further, their earnings are very similar to or even higher than those of the 3+ generations. Employment rates for the second generation are slightly higher than those of the 3+ generations and their unemployment rates are slightly lower. The most pronounced differences are found among second-generation women, who have both higher average weekly earnings and higher rates of

participation in the labour force than the 3+ generations (Table 2).


Differences in educational attainment appear to be linked to differences in occupational status across ethnic groups. Among second-generation Canadians between the ages of 20 and 29, 34% of those of Chinese descent worked in high-skilled occupations (i.e. those requiring a university degree), compared with 14% of those of Latin American descent (Figure 4.)

Table 2: Labour Market Outcomes by Birthplace and Parental Birthplace, 2000 (ages 16–65)

Labour force status		3 rd or more generation	1 st generation (age of migration 12 years or older)	2 nd generation		
				Only father immigrant	Only mother immigrant	Both parents immigrants
Employed	Male	77.51%	76.07%	76.75%	78.15%	77.94%
	Female	68.52%	60.05%	68.55%	69.70%	71.80%
Unemployed	Male	6.36%	5.58%	5.53%	5.39%	5.14%
	Female	4.96%	5.54%	4.40%	4.59%	4.43%
Not in labour force	Male	16.12%	18.35%	17.71%	16.46%	16.92%
	Female	26.51%	34.41%	27.04%	25.71%	23.77%
Mean weeks worked	Male	37.9	37.10	37.3	38.2	37.8
	Female	32.5	28.70	32.6	33	34
Average weekly earnings	Male	848.5	868.10	885.9	905.1	872.4
	Female	576.4	603.0	600.1	610.6	629.2

Source: Aydemir, Abdurrahman, Wen-Hao Chen, and Miles Corak 2005. Tabulations based on 2001 Census data, catalogue no. 11F0019MIZ - no. 267.

Figure 4: Percentage with High Skill Occupations, Second-Generation by Visible Minority Status, Age 20-29, Living in CMAs, 2001



Source: Boyd, Monica. "Variations in Socioeconomic Outcomes of Second-Generation Young Adults." *Canadian Diversity*. Spring 2008. Vol. 6, No. 2.

Discrimination may Continue to Act as a Barrier to Social Integration of Second-Generation Canadians

Compared with research on economic integration, work on social integration remains inconclusive. Civic participation, sense of belonging, and life satisfaction are some of the indicators for measuring social integration of second-generation Canadians. Research by Reitz and Banerjee indicated that, compared with their non-visible minority peers, second-generation visible minorities were more likely to report lower levels of life satisfaction and sense of belonging to

Canada, and were also less likely to identify themselves as Canadians and to vote. These communities appeared less likely to feel a sense of belonging to Canada than even first-generation, visible minority immigrants⁸ (both recent arrivals and those in Canada for some time). However, in a separate study using the same data source, Jedwab found that while visible minorities as a whole had a stronger sense of belonging to ethnic or cultural communities than did non-visible minorities, the sense of belonging to ethnic or cultural groups decreased with each generation (Table 3).⁹

Table 3: Strength of Sense of Belonging to Ethnic or Cultural Groups, by Generation

(percentage giving a rating of 4 or 5 on a five-point scale measuring the strength of sense of belonging)

	Total	1 st generation	2 nd generation	3 rd or more generations
Not a visible minority	42.7	46.4	43.0	41.3
Visible minority	58.6	60.4	58.8	36.9

Source: Jedwab, Jack. "The Rise of the Unmeltable Canadians? Ethnic and National Belonging in Canada's Second Generation." *Canadian Diversity*. Spring 2008. Vol. 6, No. 2.

Moreover, according to Jedwab, age of respondents is important in determining the salience of identity. The majority of visible minorities in Canada are in their early 20s whereas the non-visible minority population is largely in its early 40s. Jedwab argues that in order

to properly compare indicators of social and political integration, one must control for age. The study found that, once age is controlled for, the gap between visible and non-visible minorities was eliminated (Table 4).

Table 4: Strength of Sense of Belonging to Ethnic or Cultural Groups for Selected Groups Aged 35–44, by Generation, 2002

(percentage giving a rating of 4 or 5 on a five-point scale measuring the strength of sense of belonging)

	Total	1 st generation	2 nd generation	3 rd or more generations
Not a visible minority	40.6	46.6	40.3	39.5
Visible minority	56.0	60.2	41.0	35.7

Source: *ibid.*

Some research has suggested that the feedback one receives from the immediate environment influences one's sense of belonging to a place. Negative feedback such as discrimination can reduce sense of belonging to the broader society.¹⁰ While the majority of Canadians report experiencing no discrimination in Canada, differences appear between visible minority and non-visible minority populations. Only 5% of non-visible minorities in Canada report experiencing discrimination sometimes or often, compared with 20% of the visible minority population (Table 5). Upon further analysis, additional differences are found

between ethnic communities – e.g., with 32% of Blacks reporting discrimination, compared with 21% of South Asians, and 18% of Chinese.¹¹

In a separate research study, Reitz and Banerjee found that second-generation visible minorities report the highest levels of perceived discrimination (42%), compared with recent (33.6%), and earlier visible minority immigrants (35.5%).¹² Reitz and Banerjee suggest that the experience of perceived discrimination may be a contributing factor to a lower sense of belonging among visible minorities.

Table 5: Population Reporting Discrimination or Unfair Treatment in Canada in the past Five Years because of Ethno-cultural Characteristics, by Generation in Canada and Visible Minority Status (%)

	Sometimes or often	Rarely	Did not experience discrimination
Total population	7	6	86
Not a visible minority	5	5	90
Visible minority	20	15	64
1st generation	13	10	77
Not a visible minority	5	6	89
Visible minority	21	14	65
2nd generation	6	5	89
Not a visible minority	5	5	90
Visible minority	18	23	59

Source: Statistics Canada. 2003. "Ethnic Diversity Survey: Portrait of a Multicultural Society." Catalogue no. 89-593-XIE.

Knowledge and Data Gaps

As noted above, Canada's second generation as a whole does well, compared with the 3+ generation, in terms of education and labour market outcomes. While significant differences are observed across ethnic groups in this regard, there is yet only limited research explaining why these differences appear. Further research is required in order to fully understand the existing differences between ethnic community, gender, and age cohorts.

Often, integration outcomes are viewed in largely economic terms and as resulting from a variety of causal factors, many of which are themselves economic (or otherwise measurable) in nature. Many harder-to-gauge social or cultural factors tend to be overlooked, however. One of these factors is "ethnic capital" – i.e., the social and economic resources that individuals can draw on from within their community. Canada has conducted very little research into the potentially positive and negative effects that particular

elements of ethnic capital may have on the integration process. These elements extend beyond the measurable financial resources available within individuals' extended families and broader communities to include social resources in the form of value systems, beliefs, and norms through which one interprets and engages with the broader mainstream society, including distinctive attitudes toward and arrangements within families.

As noted above, there are important differences between the social integration of visible and non-visible minorities in Canada. These differences warrant further research as Canada's second and future generations will increasingly belong to visible minority communities. Specific research on attachment to ethnic communities and perceptions of discrimination suggests these may exert important influences on the integration process. However, little is known about how these elements influence individuals' attachment to the larger national society or influence their personal identity.

3. DEALING WITH RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Many participants in the roundtables observed that it is religious diversity that lies at the core of many of the cultural “flashpoints” driving current debates about multiculturalism. It is increasingly apparent that, contrary to earlier predictions by academic scholars, religious identities are not fading away as a source of distinctiveness in modern society. As a result, long-held presumptions about how religious identities and beliefs interact with societal institutions may need to be revisited, particularly with regard to the formulation of public policy. It appears that religious diversity is asserting itself as a key dimension of public policy and discourse to which current conceptions of multiculturalism are ill-prepared to respond. The PRI’s research project accordingly focused on how to better integrate religious diversity into the contemporary discourse and practice of multiculturalism.

Dealing with religious diversity is inherently a horizontal issue, touching on a number of policy domains both domestically and internationally. Throughout the spring of 2008, the PRI – in collaboration with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) – conducted interviews with public servants in the National Capital Region. The purpose of the interviews was to gain a better understanding of where and how religious diversity is taken into account in the design and delivery of federal government policies and programs. A series of seminars and roundtable discussions were held by the PRI on specific issues relating to religious diversity, and insights gleaned from these exercises informed the development of a framework for future policy research and analysis in this area. Premised on the realization that religious diversity is a demographic reality that is here to stay, the framework argues that policy responses to issues arising out of religious diversity must succeed simultaneously at three distinct levels:

- a “macro” level: society as a whole may want or need to develop a credible public discourse on how it interacts with citizens from a variety of different religious backgrounds;
- a “meso” level: governments need to decide when and how to adapt their policies to respond to the particular needs of these same citizens; and
- a “micro” level: governments may need to work out whether and how to facilitate the kinds of private actions by citizens through which many (and perhaps most) of the accommodations are made to ensure the social inclusion of citizens from different religious backgrounds.

The framework was subsequently discussed at a roundtable of national and international experts in the field of religious diversity.

To facilitate further discussions on religious diversity among policy practitioners, the PRI devoted the March 2009 issue of its flagship publication, *Horizons*, to exploring “Religious Diversity in Canada” through articles written by Canadian and international experts. The issue centres on three questions: What is the extent of religious diversity in Canada and internationally? How do societies and public institutions deal with this diversity? How should public policies (and the broader societal discourse) adapt to increasing religious diversity?

Canadians hold Increasingly Diverse Religious Identities

In spite of declining attendance among Canada’s mainline churches, evidence shows that most Canadians continue to express religious identities. According to the 2001 Census, a large majority of Canadians (76.6%) continue to identify with various Christian denominations, although the number of adherents to other faith traditions has grown over the past decade. While still small in number, the overall percentage of Canadians from non-Christian religious backgrounds grew from 3.8% of the population in 1991 to 6% in 2001. In 1991, Judaism was the only non-Christian religion in Canada to account for more than 1% of the population. By 2001, however, the Muslim,

Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, and Sikh religions all accounted for 1% or more of Canada's population. In 2001, the Muslim community became the largest non-

Christian community, accounting for 2% of the total population (Table 6).¹³

Table 6: Growth of Religious Adherents in Canada

Religious Community	1991 Census	2001 Census	Percentage Change
Roman Catholic	12.2 million	12.79 million	4.8
Protestant	9.43 million	8.65 million	-8.2
Christian Orthodox	387,395	479,620	23.8
Jewish	318,185	329,995	3.7
Muslim	253,265	579,640	128.9
Christian not included elsewhere*	353,040	780,450	121.1
Hindu	157,015	297,200	89.3
Sikh	147,440	278,415	88.8
Buddhist	163,415	300,345	83.8
No religion	3.33 million	4.80 million	43.9


*Includes those who reported "Christian" but did not specify Catholic, Protestant, or Christian Orthodox faith, as well as those who reported "Apostolic," "Born-again Christian," and "Evangelical."

Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census: Analysis Series. "Religions in Canada." Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001015.

Immigration is the main factor contributing to growing religious diversity in the country. Prior to 1980, the majority of immigrants who arrived in Canada came from Christian European countries. However, beginning in the 1980s, Canada began to receive growing numbers of immigrants from non-Christian

parts of the world, including Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The highest proportions of immigrants with non-Christian religious beliefs are found among those immigrants who arrived after 1986 (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Immigration Contributes to Growing Religious Diversity: Canada



Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Population, *Beyond 20/20* Professional Browser 97F0022xCb01004.IVT

In 2001, 46% of the Canadian-born population identified themselves as Roman Catholics while 32% were Protestants. During the same year, only 32% of immigrants identified themselves as Roman Catholic and 20% as Protestant. Due to shifting immigration patterns, the fastest-growing religions in Canada between 1991 and 2001 were Islam, Christian faiths not included elsewhere, and Hinduism. In addition to posting among the fastest rates of growth between 1991 and 2001, non-Christian religions are projected to increase the fastest between 2001 and 2017 as well, with adherents to Islam projected to increase by 145.2%, Hindus by 92.3% and Sikhs by 71.5%.¹⁴

Dealing with Religious Diversity has been a Growing Issue Among all Western Liberal Democratic Countries

Many Western countries are struggling with the challenges of how to strike an appropriate balance among the various rights and freedoms – including those relating to religious belief – promised to all of their citizens through their constitutions. In recent

years, Canada’s religious diversity has been highlighted by news media coverage of events that challenge the largely Christian status quo within the country. Media attention has focused on how to balance religious and public safety concerns in relation to the practices of baptized Sikh men wearing their kirpans (strapped swords) at all times and of Muslim girls who wear hijabs during organized sports events. In addition, media attention has highlighted a variety of different efforts (sometimes by public authorities, sometimes by private citizens) to accommodate the needs of members of religious minorities. These debates have sought to determine whether it is the responsibility of both citizens and governments to accommodate a minority within their population or whether it is the responsibility of a minority population to fit in with the majority. Such debates about public safety and accommodation are not specific to Canada but have also been the subject of sometimes fierce debate in many other countries.

In 2003, the French government published findings from its *Commission de réflexion sur l'application du*

principe de laïcité dans la République, chaired by Bernard Stasi. The commission was asked to investigate how the principle of *laïcité* should apply in practice within a country that has witnessed increased religious diversity through immigration. In 2004, the British government released a report, "Working Together: Co-operation between Government and Faith Communities," that sets out recommendations for how governments can work more effectively with faith communities when their perspectives are relevant, as well as examples of best practices in the area of government and faith community co-operation. In 2007, the government of New Zealand released its "Statement on Religious Diversity," intended to provide "a framework for the recognition of New Zealand's diverse faith communities and their harmonious interaction with each other, with government and with other groups in society." In 2008, Australia's human rights commission released a discussion paper, "Freedom of Religion and Belief in the 21st Century," that sets out a two-year timeline for taking stock of developments in religious freedom over the last decade in Australia, as well as steps governments should take to advance the nation's social and cultural prosperity.

Policy Responses to Religious Diversity need to Succeed at Three Levels

In general, policy responses to increasing religious diversity need to succeed simultaneously at three distinct levels. First, at what can be thought of as the "micro" level, individuals and organizations typically negotiate their differences through mutual accommodations that make it possible for a diverse society to live in harmony. Second, at the "meso" level, governments of all orders develop policies and deliver programs and services tailored to the various needs of citizens from religious and non-religious backgrounds alike. The principles set out in a society's foundational documents offer guidelines and parameters for accommodating the needs of its citizens and regulating behaviour by setting rules for the common good. Third, at a "macro" level, diverse societies generally

feel the need to tell a coherent and compelling story about how, as a society, they treat all citizens justly and with respect. To this end, societies need to balance sometimes competing interests as well as rights and principles set out in their foundational documents.

At the "micro" level, the majority of issues arising from religious diversity are typically resolved by individuals and organizations through private mutual accommodations and do not end up as the focus of media attention. Accommodations can take various forms – from mutual avoidance and voluntary self-exclusion to joint activities and ecumenical outreach. In some cases, however, individuals may not be able to resolve issues privately, governments may be asked to step in and mediate or, in some cases, formally set or clarify legislated rules governing private relationships. In rare cases where issues are not (or cannot be) resolved either privately or by governments, they end up before the courts.

Two notable Canadian examples that have received national attention in recent years have involved the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice in Ontario and a YMCA in Montreal's Mile End district.

In 2003, the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice was to begin offering arbitration in family disputes in accordance with Islamic legal principles and Ontario's Arbitration Act of 1991. However, objections to the establishment of this arbitration system were raised by Muslim women's groups and mainstream feminist groups who felt decisions would violate the equality rights of Canadian women. The Ontario government and provincial legislature were drawn in to help resolve what appeared to be conflicting rights of the organization to establish itself in accordance with Sharia law principles and the laws of Ontario and the equality rights of women. In 2006, the Ontario government amended its Arbitration Act to disallow all faith-based arbitration in matters of family law within the province of Ontario. This decision not only pre-empted the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice from offering arbitration in family disputes, but also removed this right from Jewish, Christian and Ismaili

Muslim groups that had established arbitration boards in accordance with their religious principles after 1991. The second incident took place in 2006 at the YMCA in Montreal's Mile End district. In 1994/1995 the YMCA installed blinds on its windows facing the street so that members of a neighbouring orthodox synagogue would not be able to "peer too easily inside the fitness facility and see scantily clad exercisers"¹⁵ when attending synagogue or religious classes. In 2005, the blinds stopped functioning and were subsequently replaced with frosted windows paid for by the members of the synagogue. The frosted windows led to objections from YMCA members and resulted in further discussion between religious and non-religious communities in Montreal. The debate in this case focused on issues of accommodation and whether it was the responsibility of the YMCA to accommodate their Jewish neighbours or whether the synagogue should adapt to the clear windows in the YMCA. Subsequently, the YMCA removed the frosted windows in 2007 and replaced them with clear windows and functioning blinds.

At the "meso" level, all governments are expected to develop and deliver public policies, programs, and services tailored to the various needs of their citizens. These programs and services may at times require adaptations to ensure that they are accessible to citizens from religiously diverse backgrounds – although such adaptations typically need to keep in mind certain core values set out in the country's constitution and other foundational documents that may set limits on them. As noted by Gaye,¹⁶ policy adaptations to accommodate religious diversity can include, inter alia, such things as flexibility on the days

that services are provided, ensuring that one has information on the religious affiliation of individuals to receive services, and providing religious orientation training to service and program providers.

While meso-level adaptations are often uncontroversial, they occasionally prompt resistance from citizens. The level of resistance to policy adaptations will depend on the extent to which they are perceived to run counter to fundamental principles of the society. Policies and programs that are least likely to prompt resistance are those that do not involve the exercise of state authority over Canadians, such as consultations with stakeholders and services offered to all residents on essentially the same basis. However, adaptations that involve exemptions from legal obligations that either prescribe or proscribe behaviour (such as changes to criminal, civil, or family law) or that are seen as undermining important national or historical symbols are likely to generate the most resistance.

Most societies also want or need to adopt a "macro"-level discourse to "set the tone," that is, to help guide the decisions taken by individual citizens, governments, and the courts, and to more generally explain how they treat all citizens justly and with respect while at the same time safeguarding the core values of the society overall. In the analytical framework developed by the PRI with a view to identifying the different perspectives shaping the public discourse on religion, four broad, alternative visions are sketched out, describing (in stylized terms) the relationship between societies and the religious identities in their midst: "faith-based societies," "faith-averse societies," "faith-guided societies," and "faith-

neutral societies.” Each of these stylized models of society combines different assumptions regarding private beliefs of citizens and decision-makers,

justification of actions by decision-makers, and attitudes toward minority beliefs (Table 7).

Table 7: Alternative Stylized Models of Society that Shape Public Discourse Over the Role of Religion in Society

	“Faith-based” society	“Faith-averse” society	“Faith-guided” society	“Faith-neutral” society
Assumptions regarding private beliefs of citizens and decision makers	Citizens and decision makers both guided by religious principles and doctrines presumed to be shared by all	Citizens and decision makers expected to profess secular views only (keeping any religious views private)	Citizens and decision makers expected to profess religious principles and doctrines (even if they do not adhere to them strictly or at all)	Citizens and decision makers are free to hold and express religious or secular beliefs publicly and privately (without interfering with rights of others)
Assumptions regarding justification of actions by decision makers	Justification based on religious principles and doctrines	Justification based solely on secular principles	Frequently draw on religious principles and doctrines, but may be reinforced by references to secular principles (especially in heterogeneous societies)	Justification based mostly on secular (and sometimes ecumenical religious) principles reflecting extensive public dialogue among different views
Attitudes toward minority beliefs	Generally intolerant of other religious and secular beliefs (especially when the society feels itself threatened)	Generally intolerant of religious beliefs (especially if publicly manifested)	Hierarchical tolerance structure (especially when threatened), with heterogeneous societies tending toward ecumenism	Generally tolerant of wide range of beliefs (though still subject to limits reflecting dominant community beliefs)

As noted by participants at a November 2008 PRI roundtable, these models remain very much stylized – that is, no country is ever likely to fit neatly into one specific model, but can instead be expected to play host to populations and even institutions that possess characteristics of a variety of these models. It was agreed that while Canada would appear to most closely approximate a “faith-neutral” society, it does maintain legacies of its more homogeneously religious

past (some of them having become important national symbols) and there may be some circumstances under which the country will want and need to set limits on certain practices linked to religion, especially when these practices conflict with fundamental values such as equality.¹⁷ Thus, the relationship between religion and the broader society is not carved in stone, but remains fluid, with societies having the ability to adapt to shifts in prevailing political and societal attitudes.

Knowledge and Data Gaps

Developing appropriate responses at all three levels would appear to require a better understanding in a number of areas. The PRI's work identifies a number of knowledge and data gaps that could usefully be addressed in order to better inform policy development.

First, there needs to be better recognition and understanding of the diversity that exists *within* faith traditions. Canada's Census asks about religious beliefs among Canadians only every 10 years. Moreover, results are often presented in broad categories such as Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and so on. While this may be adequate for most statistical purposes, it makes it difficult to study the complex interactions between religious identity and other phenomena of interest to scholars and policy makers alike (such as self-identity, success in economic and social integration, etc.). Combining individuals of one religion into a unified community limits policy researchers' ability to take into account the rich ethnic, linguistic, and cultural background of each religion's adherents. For example, statements that can be made about an ostensibly homogeneous "Muslim" community in Canada (i.e. one that includes people of South Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and South-East Asian origin) are likely to be no more useful than those purporting to describe a

homogeneous Canadian "Catholic" population with French-Canadian, Filipino, Eastern European, African and Latin American origins.

Second, the role of religious identity in social and economic inclusion requires further analysis. Although tolerance and accommodation have been two common approaches to dealing with religious diversity, various faith communities continue to feel excluded in public policy discussions and in the marketplace. Are certain groups more susceptible to social and economic exclusion than others? Is religion a contributing factor to their exclusion (or self-exclusion)? Or are there other factors, such as race, ethnicity, immigration status, that are more salient?

Third, more needs to be done to explore the feasibility and effectiveness of options for new policy instruments and governance arrangements on religious diversity, including an understanding of best practices both in Canada and abroad. Increasingly, governments and the courts are asked to arbitrate tensions between minority religious communities and the broader society. An increasingly significant question is: When are these tensions best addressed privately or by governments, and when are they best deferred to the courts? Given that Canada is not alone in addressing these issues, it may be worthwhile to compare notes with other countries.

4. UNDERSTANDING DIVERSITY ON THE GROUND

The reality of cultural diversity plays itself out primarily at the local level – and primarily in our major cities – where diverse groups interact in the communities in which they live, work, and play. Successive waves of migration have especially transformed Canada's urban landscape. Over the past two decades, shifts in the origins of immigrants to Canada have resulted in our cities becoming more visibly diverse. The vast majority (95.9%) of Canada's visible minority population resides in census metropolitan areas (CMAs), compared with 68.1% of the total population that lives in these areas. As indicated in Figure 2 above, compared with other cities in Canada, Toronto and Vancouver have the highest share of the visible minority population.¹⁸

Spatial patterns of ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity have captured public attention both in Canada and abroad. As the social landscape of neighbourhoods in the CMAs evolves, concerns have arisen over the potential impact of these changes on the cohesion of the society as a whole. Some consider immigration-induced diversity to be a critical source of economic growth and prosperity in the 21st century.¹⁹ On the other hand, studies in the United States also suggest that ethnically diverse neighbourhoods tend to be associated with reduced social capital as residents "hunker down" in the short term because of the presence of individuals of different ethnic backgrounds.²⁰ Throughout the regional roundtables, participants observed that discussions on neighbourhood concentration of ethnic groups in Canada tended to focus exclusively on visible minorities and, to a lesser extent, on recent immigrants. It was noted that commentators often draw conclusions on anecdotal evidence or results from other countries. Less was known about the neighbourhood dynamics as a result of migration in Canada. In the context of PRI's project, a number of seminars were organized to identify knowledge gaps on this topic.

Ethno-cultural Diversity Extends Beyond the City Core

In general, immigrants tend to gravitate to large urban areas where there already exists a well-established community of their own ethnic group in which they already may have family or other networks before they immigrate. Traditionally, immigrants often start in downtown areas where ethnic communities of recently arrived immigrants were often located (*inter alia*, to take advantage of the typically less expensive housing in these areas). As their economic conditions improve, these individuals would move to the suburbs with better housing and more mixed neighbourhoods. In Canada, this typical settlement trajectory has been changing as more immigrants bypass the city core upon arrival and settle in the suburbs where they could find their co-ethnics nearby. Consequently, a larger number of neighbourhoods in metropolitan areas are seeing a rise in ethnic minorities, as both residential and commercial districts in suburban areas become more diverse.

Studies have shown that, between 1981 and 2001, there has been a substantive increase of neighbourhoods where one visible minority group has a strong presence – especially in Toronto and Vancouver and, to a lesser degree, in Montréal.²¹ In Toronto and Vancouver in 1981, only 1% of census tracts had populations of a single visible-minority ethnic group exceeding 30% of the total. By comparison, by 2001, this had increased to 15% of census tracts in Toronto, and 29% in Vancouver, most of them involving significant concentrations of Chinese and South Asians. (See Figures 6 and 7). Most of these neighbourhoods were in the suburbs (giving rise to the term "ethno-burbs"), with only a few found in traditional downtown settlement areas. Consequently, shopping malls and plazas in some suburbs began to take on heavily ethnic characteristics (such as the McLaughlin Village Plaza in Brampton, within the Greater Toronto Area, and the Aberdeen Centre in Richmond, B.C., within the Greater Vancouver Area).

Figure 6a: Vancouver CMA - Census Tracts 2006




Figure 6b




Figure 7a: Toronto CMA - Census Tracts 2006





Figure 7b



Responses to Cultural Diversity on the Ground are Often Mixed

Often decried as “ethnic segregation,” “ethnic enclaves,” or “ethno-burbs,” ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods have their advantages and disadvantages.²² On the positive side, they enrich the urban landscape. As a source of social networks, they provide a gateway for newcomers to ease their way into the mainstream society. However, spatial concentration of ethnic groups often evokes negative reactions associated with perceived ghettoization, self-exclusion, rejection of mainstream Canadian society, and barriers to the integration of newcomers. A challenge over the past decade has been to encourage the development of ethnic communities while reducing the risk of spatial marginalization.²³

Proximity to families and friends is undoubtedly one of the primary reasons for newcomers’ choice of place of residence. Immigrants, regardless of country of origin, generally turn to their ethnic kin at the initial stage of their settlement. Recent discussions in Canada, however, generally cast a concerned spotlight on the rise of neighbourhoods with a strong representation of a single visible-minority ethnic group. (See the text box below). Of particular interest are the implications of such concentration for the economic as well as social integration of ethnic minorities and newcomers. Some are concerned that such patterns may lead to “parallel communities” (or worse, dysfunctional “ghettos” mirroring those in some US cities or the *banlieues* of Paris) that may undermine social cohesion.

Measuring Ethnic Neighbourhood Concentration

A number of methods are used to measure the concentration of ethnic groups in a neighbourhood. A simple way is to count the percentage of an ethnic group in a small geographic area (*a census tract*²⁴) within large urban centres that have an urban core population of 50,000 or more. In Canada, Statistics Canada defines a visible minority neighbourhood as one where over 30% of the population in a census tract comes from a single visible minority group.²⁵ A similar measure is *location quotient* (LQ), which demonstrates on a map the proportion of a particular attribute, such as ethnicity, relative to the overall population in an area. *Index of Segregation* (IS) measures the relative isolation of a group in an area ranging from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating complete dispersion of a group in an area while 100 means that a particular group is concentrated in one location. Similar to IS, *Index of Dissimilarity* (ID) measures the residential distribution between two groups. The higher the score, the greater extent of separation between the two groups under study.²⁶

Concerns have also been expressed about the long-term consequences of ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods on the integration of immigrants and their descendants.²⁷ Well-established ethnic services and communities may enable newcomers to get around in their own language within their ethnic community. Hence, there may be less contact with individuals outside their ethnic group and less opportunity or necessity to speak English or French. Consequently, it may take longer for immigrants to learn the official language and actively participate in mainstream society. Others raised concerns that while Canada is becoming multicultural as a country, its neighbourhoods are becoming more mono-cultural:

“Large districts are evolving into areas dominated by individual ethnic groups that have chosen to live apart from those who do not share their ancestry. Meanwhile, most white Canadians would confess that the vast majority of their friends look a lot like they do and that they tend to stay within their own communities, rarely venturing into the ethnic enclaves that are burgeoning, especially in suburban Canada.”²⁸ Others still have raised concerns about the impact of ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods on the economic outcomes of their residents. Based upon research showing the overlap of visible minority/immigration status and low income, some

have warned about the spatial marginalization of visible minorities and recent immigrants. Studies using recent censuses suggest that immigrants and racial minorities have tended to concentrate in poorer neighbourhoods.²⁹ In 2001, for example, one third of Toronto's visible-minority family population lived in the city's poorer neighbourhoods. A similar observation was made for immigrant families.³⁰

A more Nuanced Interpretation is Called for

In spite of the concerns voiced above, researchers are increasingly suggesting a more nuanced and less alarming interpretation of the neighbourhood concentration of visible minorities and immigrants. Studies in Canada's three largest metropolitan centres demonstrate that the increased geographic concentration of visible-minority ethnic groups is mostly due to immigration trends in recent years (i.e. with more individuals coming from non-European countries, especially China and India). Toronto and Vancouver, as well as the suburbs surrounding these areas, attract most of the newcomers. Hence, the increasing representation of certain ethnic groups in neighbourhoods of these cities is hardly surprising. Given that many are admitted under the skilled-worker category, many would have been able to settle in the suburbs due to their higher economic status upon arrival, compared with the earlier cohorts of immigrants.³¹ Although exposure to members of the same ethnic group slightly increases the likelihood of occupational segregation, statistically speaking, such associations are often weak or insignificant.³²

Linking spatial concentration to the risk of social cohesion, according to some, could be unhelpful or even misleading. Notwithstanding claims made to that effect in relation to the US, Canadian studies show that cultural diversity in neighbourhoods does not appear to reduce one's sense of trust in others.³³ Moreover, social interactions often extend beyond the boundaries of one's residential neighbourhood: in particular, where people live is often very different from where they work. While many newcomers clearly do work in ethnic establishments in the vicinity of their residential neighbourhoods, many others are employed further afield and in organizations that are ethnically diverse.³⁴

Comparative analysis of ethnic concentrations among cities in Canada with those in other English-speaking countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand consistently show that Canada does not have the kind of segregation seen in the Black and Hispanic communities in the US.^{35,36} Instead, research has shown that most of the urban neighbourhoods in Canada are highly diverse in terms of culture and ethnicity. Although there are low-income neighbourhoods in urban areas where visible-minority recent immigrants reside, these are hardly unprecedented in Canadian history and in any event most of the areas with high concentrations of immigrants and visible minorities are mixed with low- and middle-income households. In other words, "the existence of enclaves of poor immigrants, or poor visible minority groups, where individuals would only encounter others in this situation, is exceedingly rare in Canadian cities."³⁷

Knowledge and Data Gaps

Residential patterns constitute only one of many aspects of inter-ethnic and intercultural dynamics. Before labelling census tracts or neighbourhoods as "ethnic enclaves" or "parallel communities," one needs to understand "the internal dynamics and everyday lived experience of these areas and the people who live within them."³⁸ A number of areas warrant further research, including: the diversity within the broader social networks of minorities and recent immigrants (for example, at work and at school); the comparative residential patterns and economic and social experiences of immigrants who are not visible minorities; and the role played by immigrants' assets in determining their residential choices. Individuals may live in one neighbourhood and have friends in other parts of the city. Of interest would be the ethno-cultural composition of these networks. Finally, the role of wealth needs to be taken into consideration. As demonstrated in the study by Hiebert, Schuurman, and Smith, even in areas with high-cost housing, one can still find low-income households. This suggests the need to include measures of wealth – and not just income – when examining residential patterns.

Conclusion

The 21st century will continue to witness growing ethno-cultural diversity and increasing international migration. These mega trends of super diversity and super mobility, along with the increasing role and importance of civil society, are changing the “3M” realities of Canada and other countries. As illustrated

in Table 8 below, Canada’s approach to cultural diversity has evolved over the past decades, and it will continue to evolve in the future.

Table 8: Evolution of Multiculturalism Policies in Canada

	Ethnicity multiculturalism (1970s)*	Equity multiculturalism (1980s)*	Civic multiculturalism (1990s)*	Integrative multiculturalism (2000s)
Focus	Celebrating differences	Managing diversity	Constructive engagement	Inclusive citizenship
Reference point	Culture	Structure	Society building	Canadian identity
Mandate	Ethnicity	Race relations	Citizenship	Integration
Magnitude	Individual adjustment	Accommodation	Participation	Rights and responsibilities
Source of challenges	Prejudice	Systemic discrimination	Exclusion	Unequal access, “clash” of cultures
Solution	Cultural sensitivity	Employment equity	Inclusiveness	Dialogue/mutual understanding
Key metaphor	“Mosaic”	“Level playing field”	“Belonging”	“Fusion/jazz”

*Source: Fleras, Augie and Jean Kunz. 2001. *Media and Minorities: Representing Diversity in a Multicultural Canada*. Thompson Education Publishing.

This research project has identified a number of areas worth exploring in this regard, especially the integration of second-generation individuals, dealing with religious diversity, as well as neighbourhood dynamics.

While the project has begun to examine some of the issues concerning these areas, significant policy research gaps remain (Table 9).

Table 9: Knowledge Gaps

Second-generation integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent do gender, age, and ethnic community influence labour market outcomes and educational attainment among the second generation?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What role does ethnic capital play in the Canadian integration process?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do perceptions of discrimination and ethnic community attachment influence the integration process of visible and non-visible minorities?
Religious diversity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do differences within a religious community influence self-identification and integration success?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent does religious affiliation contribute to the voluntary self-exclusion of communities? (And when do situations of voluntary self-exclusion raise concerns for social cohesion)?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When should tensions arising from religious diversity be resolved privately or by governments and when should they be referred to the courts?
Diversity on the ground	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What level of diversity exists within individual networks such as social or professional networks?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the residential patterns of non-visible minorities (and what do they tell us about the relative strengths and challenges facing different minorities in achieving integration)?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What role does wealth play in the residential patterns of immigrants?

APPENDIX: LIST OF EVENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

EVENTS

The following are roundtable consultations, seminars, and workshops (organized by topic) that were carried out in the context of the project on cultural diversity:

Approaches to Multicultural Diversity in Canada:

Regional Roundtables: Approaches to Multicultural Diversity in Canada

- Ottawa: January 25, 2007
- Calgary: February 7, 2007
- Vancouver: February 8, 2007
- Toronto: March 5, 2007
- Montréal: March 7, 2007
- Halifax: March 9, 2007
- Winnipeg: March 22, 2007
- Saskatoon: March 23, 2007

Presentation of Roundtable Results at the Invitation of the Multiculturalism and Human Rights Branch, then Housed in the Department of Canadian Heritage

- Multiculturalism Champions Network – October 25, 2007
- Meetings of PCH Regional Managers – December 5, 2007

Conference Plenary Session

- A Social Common for All: Integration, Identity, and Belonging: A Plenary Session at the Third Annual Symposium of the Population, Work and Family Policy Research Collaboration (December 13, 2007)

Interdepartmental Discussion

- A Conversation with Michael Adams on the State of Canadian Pluralism (November 14, 2007)

Integration of Second-Generation Canadians:

Coordinating Committee of Deputy Ministers (Social Inclusion and Justice Subcommittee) luncheon

- Reflections on the New Second Generation: Equality, Identity, and Social Inclusion (August 23, 2007)

Seminars

- Perspectives of Integration: The Global Experiences of the 2nd Generation and Implications for Policy (August 23, 2007)
- You Can't Tell a Book by its Cover: Religion and Socio-cultural Orientations Among Second-Generation Immigrant Young Adults in Canada, Peter Beyer, University of Ottawa (October 1, 2008)

Dealing with Religious Diversity:

Seminar

- Youth Radicalization and Religion: A Five Country Comparison, Catherine Fieschi, Demos, U.K. (June 24, 2008)

Interdepartmental Roundtable

- Living with Religious Diversity: An Analytical Framework for Policy Research (November 3, 2008)

Conference Workshop

- How Does Religion Contribute to Immigrant Integration and Public Policy? 11th National Metropolis Conference, Calgary, Alberta (March 19–22, 2009)

Spatial Patterns of Cultural Diversity:

Seminars

- How Putnam Might Get It Wrong: Diversity, Minority Concentration, and Trust in Canadian Urban Neighbourhoods, Feng Hou, Statistics Canada (April 10, 2008)
- Geographic Information Systems and Social Policy Research, Dan Hiebert, University of British Columbia (July 22, 2008)
- Immigrant and Visible Minority Group Distributions and Concentrations in Canadian Metropolitan Areas, Brian Ray, University of Ottawa (July 22, 2008)
- Immigration and the Changing Canadian City: New Patterns Of Settlement And The Evolution Of New Urban Landscapes, Daniel Hiebert, University of British Columbia (July 22, 2008)

PUBLICATIONS

- *From Mosaic to Harmony: Multicultural Canada in the 21st Century: Results of Regional Roundtables*, Jean Kunz and Stuart Sykes, PRI. 2007.
- "A Story of Reefs and Oceans: A Framework for the Analysis of the 'New' Second Generation in Canada: Discussion Paper," Stuart Sykes, PRI. April 2008.
- "Life on the Reef in the Canadian Ocean: The 'New' Second-Generation in Canada: Discussion Paper," Stuart Sykes, PRI. May 2008.
- "A Survey of the World's Oceans: International Approaches to Managing Diversity and Implications for Second-Generation Acculturation: Discussion Paper," Stuart Sykes, PRI. May 2008.
- "Religious Diversity in Canada," *Horizons*. March 2009. Vol. 10, No. 2.

NOTES

- 1 Canada's World. 2009. "Beyond Borders: A Citizens' Vision for Canada in the 21st Century, Draft 6.0." <<http://www.canadasworld.ca/whatsnew/reports/newnarrati>>
- 2 The term "enclave" is often unhelpfully equated with the idea of a "ghetto" (with the latter's overtones of involuntary or forced segregation and permanent social exclusion and economic deprivation, which generally does not describe the situation of most geographically concentrated ethnic or religious communities in Canada). From a research perspective, the term "enclave" is typically used in a more neutral sense to refer simply to the statistical over-representation of particular ethnic groups in a neighbourhood.
- 3 Kunz, Jean, and Stuart Sykes. 2007. *From Mosaic to Harmony: Multicultural Canada in the 21st Century*, Results of Regional Roundtables. Ottawa: Policy Research Initiative.
- 4 The three working papers are:
 - (i) Sykes, Stuart. April 2008. "A Story of Reefs and Oceans A Framework for the Analysis of the 'New' Second Generation in Canada." <http://www.policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/DP_div_Syke_s01_200804_e.pdf>;
 - (ii) Sykes, Stuart. May 2008. "Life on the Reef in the Canadian Ocean The 'New' Second Generation in Canada." <http://www.policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/DP_div_Sykes_02_200805_e.pdf>; and
 - (iii) Sykes, Stuart. May 2008. "A Survey of the World's Oceans: International Approaches to Managing Diversity and Implications for Second-Generation Acculturation." <http://www.policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/DP_div_Sykes03_200805_e.pdf>.
- 5 Statistics Canada. 2008. "Canada's Ethnocultural Mosaic, 2006 Census." Ottawa. Catalogue No. 97-562-X.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Aydemir, Abdurrahman, Wen-Hao Chen, and Miles Corak. 2005. "Intergenerational Earnings Mobility Among the Children of Canadian Immigrants." Ottawa. Catalogue No. 11F0019MIE-No. 267.
- 8 Reitz, Jeffrey G., and Rupa Banerjee. 2005. "Diversity, Inequality, and the Cohesion of Canadian Society: Research Findings and Policy Implications." Paper presented at the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) conference, Diversity and Canada's Future: Recognition, Accommodation, and Shared Citizenship. Montebello, Quebec. October 13-15, 2005.
- 9 Jedwab, Jack. "The rise of the Unmeltable Canadians? Ethnic and National Belonging in Canada's Second Generation." *Canadian Diversity*. Spring 2008. Vol. 6, No. 2.
- 10 Mulgan, Geoff. 2009. "Feedback and Belonging: Explaining the Dynamics of Diversity." Migration Information Source. <<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=718>>.
- 11 Statistics Canada. 2003. "Ethnic Diversity Survey: Portrait of a Multicultural Society." Ottawa. Catalogue No. 89-593-XIE.
- 12 Reitz, Jeffrey, G., and Rupa Banerjee. 2007. "Ethnocultural Communities: Participation and Social Cohesion." In *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*. Edited by K. Banting, T.J. Courchene, and F.L. Seidle. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. p. 489-546.
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