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Guest Editor
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INTRODUCTION

The editors are pleased to announce that the *Jungian Journal of Scholarly Studies* is launching the availability of this volume on Kindle and other portable devices. Readers familiar with the journal will note significant format changes: a cover, a table of contents, and this editorial introduction.

As guest editor of this year's journal I have the pleasure of introducing the five essays and one book review included in this volume. This year we invited authors to submit papers associated with the 2013 Chicago conference titled *Psyche and Society: the work of the unconscious.* This conference was itself built upon the success of the 2012 New Orleans conference that addressed the relationship between *affect and action*. In all, these conference themes are emerging out of the JSSS community's understanding of the importance of connecting psychology more immediately to social action. This desire is the context for this volume of the Journal which seeks to present their divergent perspectives on the critical social realities of our time.

The first four papers reflect the conference theme in a variety of interesting and exciting ways. The first three explore the rich terrain of the idea of "cultural complex," starting with Tom Singer's recounting of how his thinking developed about the idea over time. He identifies how his contribution to the concept arose from his own need to account psychologically for the problems he was seeing in groups, including those of his own upbringing. Singer notes that while conflicts generated by cultural complexes often take place in the arena of politics, these complexes remain a legitimate subject matter for the study of the psychology of individuals and groups.

Singer's paper is followed by Sukey Fontelieu's that describes the way in which belief in American exceptionalism reveals a cultural complex that can be understood in relation to the Greek god Pan. Within this complex Americans' attitude toward our own unique value is recognized as having a shadow side that restricts our ability to deal effectively with our own problems and negatively influences other people's attitude toward Americans.

Mary Hackworth's article explores how American individualism may be being balanced by a sense of the Commons expressed in an emerging interest in Unicursal labyrinths. Hackworth uses the concept of cultural complex to discuss the political divisions within and fragmentation of American society. She explores the possibility that the growing interest in labyrinths represents an unconscious expression of the desire to compensate for these complexes through the power of labyrinths to balance individual and common purposes.

Susan Wyatt's paper links individual and society through an exploration of the capacity of the individual to be an agent of change. Wyatt uses the story of the Rainmaker to explore the connection between individual and social change. Her article makes use of Jungian theory to increase understanding of social transformation.

In addition to these four papers spun out of the topic of *Psyche and Society*, Matthew Fike uses a Jungian approach to understand Ernest Hemingway's "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber." Fike offers an analysis of this story that contributes to prior Freudian and Lacanian studies of this story, which further establishes the contribution of Jungian thought to literature.

Finally, Susan Rowland in an insightful book review brings a Jungian perspective to the new book, *In the Image of Orpheus: Rilke, a Soul History* by Daniel Joseph Polikoff.

Peter T Dunlap
Guest Editor

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Matthew A. Fike, Ph.D. is a Professor of English at Winthrop University in Rock Hill, South Carolina, where he teaches courses in the human experience, critical thinking, Shakespeare, and Renaissance literature. His most recent book is *The One Mind: C. G. Jung and the Future of Literary Criticism* (Routledge, 2014).

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Susan Rowland, Ph.D. is Chair of M.A. Engaged Humanities and the Creative Life at Pacifica Graduate Institute. She is author of seven books on Jungian studies and the arts, including *Jung as a Writer* (2005) and *The Ecocritical Psyche* (2012). She is currently working on a book on James Hillman and C. G. Jung and another on women's mysteries and goddesses.

Thomas Singer, M.D. is a psychiatrist and Jungian psychoanalyst who practices in the San Francisco area. He has written and/or edited several books related to society and psyche, including *The Vision Thing*, *The Cultural Complex*, *Placing Psyche*, *Listening to Latin America*, and *Ancient Greece, Modern Psyche.* Thomas Singer, Books and Articles Related to the Cultural Complex.

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Psyche and Society: Some Personal Reflections on the Development of the Cultural Complex Theory

Thomas Singer, M.D.

C.G. Jung Institute of San Francisco and Board of National ARAS
(The Archive for Research into Archetypal Symbolism)

Beginning with a review of the current development of cultural complex theory, this article discusses the notions of the "collective psyche: "thin times", the cultural complex as being like a "teratoma" and the major characteristics of cultural complexes. The article is framed in terms of "personal reflections" of Thomas Singer who places the development of the ideas in the context of his personal development as a Jungian analyst. The theory and practice of "cultural complexes" is likened to a cultural circumambulation of highly conflicted political, social, economic and environmental issues in which the search for effective action is always at issue.

> Much of what tears us apart in the world today can be understood as the manifestation of autonomous processes in the collective and individual psyche that organize themselves as cultural or group complexes—which one can metaphorically imagine as accumulating in the collective psyche much like a newly reported area in the Pacific ocean where microscopic plastic particles from around the world seem to be coming together in a massive glob that fills an area the size of Texas. Cultural complexes are every bit as real, every bit as formative, every bit as ubiquitous, and every bit as powerful in their emotional and behavioral impact on individuals and groups as are personal complexes. Indeed, cultural complexes may present the most difficult and resistant psychological challenge we face in our individual and collective life today.
>
> Thomas Singer, unpublished remarks to the Berlin Jung Society

Introduction

It has been a decade since Sam Kimbles and I co-edited *The Cultural Complex* (Singer & Kimbles, 2004). It seems timely now to reflect on how the idea has evolved in my thinking. At times, my work on the cultural complex theory has felt like what happens with a “big dream.” When you first have that dream and write it

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down, you know it has something to say to you, but it often takes a long time to work out its multilayered meanings. That has certainly been true for me with the cultural complex theory—which I sometimes refer to as a theory, sometimes as a hypothesis, and sometimes as a notion. The important thing is that over time various aspects of the project have seemed deserving of more emphasis and/or clarification. In this paper, I would like to share some of the ongoing reflections that I have had as I have lived with the idea for the past decade, explored it with others, and entertained the questions/criticisms of others.

The Collective Psyche

My first exposure to Jung was in the 1960s when I was a medical student. His deep affirmation of the inner reality of the psyche was instantaneously recognizable and convincing to me. Not only did Jung's acknowledgement of the inner reality of the individual psyche speak to me, but also his feeling for the inner reality of the collective psyche, which I intuitively knew I was swimming in from my earliest years and which was bubbling over in American society with enormous energy by my mid-20s in the 1960s. Just as we have learned to recognize special geographic locations as being "thin places," locales where, as Eric Weiner (2012) writes, "the distance between heaven and earth collapses and we're able to catch glimpses of the divine, or the transcendent or, as I like to think of it, the Infinite Whatever" (para. 2), we might also designate certain eras in history as "thin times"—when the distance between the everyday and the collective unconscious collapses and we get glimpses of all sorts of extraordinary psychic realities—good and bad.

For me and many other Jungians who came of age in the later 1960s, that was a "thin time." Potent tribal impulses sprang to life in a generation that had spent its childhood in post–World War II prosperity and adherence to convention. By looking at the clothing and hair styles of the late 60s, one can tell that something was breaking through the conventionality of the 1950s. The most ordinary event suddenly became charged with the numinous energy of the archetypal. These were, indeed, "thin times."

Jung himself was sensitive to "thin times," as he unforgettably writes in his visions of the map of Europe being covered with blood before the outbreak of World War I (1963, p. 175). Thus, Jung's receptivity to the inner reality of the collective psyche much earlier in the 20th century spoke directly to my own inner experience in the late 1960s. As Jung and his psychology matured, a focus on "the collective psyche" became less prominent and those who followed in Jung's footsteps directed more and more of their attention, like Jung, to the individuation process. When I was growing up in the Jungian tradition—in the 70s, 80s, and 90s—the collective and its psyche, including its deeply divisive social conflicts, were on the Jungian back burner, if they were on the stove at all. The collective

psyche was something one individuated out of, even though lip service was paid to rejoining the community after an initiatory excursion into the more liminal aspects of psyche.

In reflecting on my interest in "cultural complexes," I have become more and more aware in the last decade that I was returning to my own early "roots" in Jungian psychology (*Man and His Symbol*s, for instance) where the focus was as much on collective psyche as on the individuation process. I am continually surprised not only that there are different Jungs for different people, but also that there are different Jungs for the same person through various stages of development. In that regard, I have come to believe strongly, along with many other Jungians, post-Jungians, and perhaps even post-post Jungians, that individuation alone is not enough for a psychology that wants to speak fully to the multiple dimensions of human experience that Jung himself indicated in his 1926 diagram of the psyche (1989, pp. 41–42). It is clear from this image that Jung saw that "clans, nations, and large groups" constituted essential layers of the human psyche. It is not a big leap from this formulation to Henderson's notion of the cultural unconscious as a layer separate from both the personal and collective unconscious.



A = Individuals
B = Families
C = Clans
D = Nations
E = Large group (European man for example)
F = Primate ancestors
G = Animal ancestors in general
H = "Central fire"

Image Caption: Jung's 1926 diagram of the psyche from *Analytical Psychology: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1925* (1989, pp. 41–42).

By around 2000 my interests had gradually shifted back more to that part of the early Jung who was "taken" by the collective psyche. I became more involved in politics and more curious about the interface between psyche and society. However, I did not have a language and theoretical framework grounded in the Jungian tradition with which to fully express this interest and concern. I found the Jungian way of speaking of social and cultural phenomena—mostly in terms of archetypes—simplistic and reductionistic, although at times quite real and powerful. Over time I got tired of hearing about either the "hero" or the "shadow" as catch-all explanations for all sorts of collective experiences.

Appealing to the archetypes as explanatory principles simply did not get at or respect the uniqueness and specificity of individual cultures or how the archetypal level of the psyche came alive in unique ways in different places and times. I needed a real bridge between the archetypal and the specific, whether at the cultural/group level of experience or at the personal level of experience. I came to believe that one of the reasons Jung's essay "Wotan" (1936)—a favorite of mine—was so readily interpreted as a pro-Nazi declaration was because Jung went too quickly to the archetypal level and did not offer his readers a sufficient bridge of specific cultural context—history, economics, politics—by which to understand the German possession by the northern god of "storm and frenzy" (para. 3).

Complex Theory

In *The Vision Thing* (2000), which I edited on the eve of the 2000 American presidential elections, I sought to connect psyche, myth, and politics. I was still lacking a specific vehicle, however, that more clearly and precisely connected personal and collective levels of psychic reality. I had long been steeped in Jung's complex theory as it applied to the individual. This "bread and butter" conceptual framework was the San Francisco Jung Institute equivalent to the model of defenses and wishes in the Freudian tradition. I learned to use complex theory in a clinical setting to formulate my understanding of intrapsychic and interpersonal conflicts. I can still remember a series of "ah ha" experiences when the complex theory "gelled" in my psyche and helped me make sense of very difficult psychological conflicts, both my own and my patients. In the 1970s, the theory, practice, and lived reality of complex psychology (a name that Jung considered giving to the school that grew up around him) came together for me in the same way that Jung's notion of the collective psyche helped awaken me to the nature of the powerful impact that the social and political revolution of the late 1960s had on the world. Most influential in my comprehension of the complex theory was John Weir Perry's seminal paper "Emotions and Object Relations" (1970), which was profoundly integrative in terms of Jungian complex theory, object relations theory, and Eriksonian developmental theory.

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Not every Jungian training center in the world has taken up complex theory with the same rigor and investment as the San Francisco Jung Institute where Perry, Wheelwright, Henderson, Sandner, and Beebe all elaborated on the theory and practice of using complex theory to understand ourselves and our patients. Some people and regions have been more receptive to the extension of complex theory to include cultural complexes because some Jungians already have integrated that theory into their everyday teaching and clinical practice. Other Jungian traditions—perhaps such as the JAP in England—just did not use and incorporate complex theory in the same way as San Francisco, so that its extension to group psychology seems as much of a stretch as using complex theory to understand individual psychodynamics.

Over the course of his life, Jung built a constantly evolving theoretical framework. Although his complex theory came before the "discovery" of archetypes, one can say, retrospectively, that Jung placed his notion of complexes between the personal and archetypal dimensions of the individual psyche. It became a Jungian "truism" that, at the heart of every complex, was an archetype. Put another way, the archetype often made its appearance in the individual psyche through its incarnation in the complex. In that sense, the complex is the mediator or bridge between the personal and archetypal in the individual. Jung, however, never extended that role of "mediator" or "bridge" to the complex when it came to what lay between a specific group and the archetypal or collective unconscious. Therefore, Jungians naturally went to archetypal explanations of group and cultural phenomena without a "bridge." Again, this, in my mind, contributed to the problem with "Wotan"—Jung (1936) offered no bridge that could link the specific psychic forces at work at the cultural or group level of the German psyche with the deeper archetypal layer of psychic energies in the collective unconscious, a bridge by which one could begin to understand the cultural ground in which the possession by Wotan would find such fertile soil.

This lack of a "bridge" raised important questions in my mind: How can the Jungian tradition, honoring its own fine history of thoughtful speculation about the nature of psyche, find a way to tap into its considerable body of knowledge and insight to speak about group and cultural phenomena that has one eye toward the specificity of unique groups in time, place, and history while, at the same time, have another eye focused on more archetypal themes that speak to universal human experience of living in groups and cultures? Do complexes exist in the group psyche that are akin to the personal complexes in the individual? By trying to tease out those cultural complexes can we gain a perspective on the intra- and intergroup conflicts that beset human beings in groups as diverse and often conflicted as blacks and whites, Islamic and Western citizens, men and women, aboriginal and colonial populations?

Cultural Complexes

My need to get a psychological perspective on old, even ancient, group conflicts that were essential components of my own personal development fueled these questions. For decades, I was troubled by the enduring conflicts between Jews and Christians that took up residence in my psyche, in my family, and in my community. This internal split was later joined by conflicts between the Freudian and Jungian groups who competed in me for a place of primacy. They lived in my psyche as if they were my own personal problems, much in the way that a child with divorced parents assumes that the parents' conflicts originated in a fault of the child. In this case, I was a child of a split between conflicted groups rather than divorced parents. As a well-assimilated Jew in a predominantly Christian culture and as a young Jungian in a family that had deep ties to the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition, I often felt as if I lived with the divisions between enemies that seemed to hate one another inside me. Hearing what the Freudians and Jungians had to say about one another was not that different from hearing what the Jews and Christians had to say about one another. Although the Freudians and Jungians did not literally slaughter one another, each group would have been happy if the other had not existed. Of course, Christians, Jews, Jungians, and Freudians were all often quite off-base in their understandings and criticisms of one another.

When I began to think of these toxic conflicts as being deeply entrenched group complexes that had taken up residence in my psyche in the same way that Jung defined personal complexes, I began to see some light between my personal psyche and the group psyches living within and around me (Singer, 2012). Sometimes I think that cultural or group complexes are a bit like splinter personalities of the collective psyche that walk around the streets like the zombies that inhabit so many current movies. However one imagines them, differentiating a personal level of complexes from a group level of complexes became an immensely liberating and deeply meaningful psychological task. I believe that the study and knowledge of cultural complexes can be as liberating and freeing to individuals (and sometimes even to groups) as can the working through of personal complexes.

We all learn from the difficult journey of struggling with our personal and cultural complexes. We discover that the stuff of a complex is sometimes as hideous as the teratomas that I first learned to identify in medical school. *Teratomas* are tumors consisting of different types of tissue such as skin, hair, teeth, fingernails, and muscle, which are caused by the development of highly organized and totally chaotic tissue. They grow randomly together in an ugly mass that is unforgettable.

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Analogous to a teratoma, a cultural complex has bits and pieces of thought, memory, affect, and behavior that glom together in a mass that defies rationality but very powerfully influences, even takes over, the more everyday "tissue" of social reality that surrounds it. Once one has experienced a cultural complex in one's self or someone close, its reality and its influence are undeniable. Toni Morrison, in *Beloved* (1987), articulates the voice of a cultural complex, a multigenerational voice of unparalleled, cumulative, and unending anguish of the black people. In its very inarticulateness, its "mumbling" communicates the most dreadful feelings and fixed beliefs that trade on fear, hatred, and distrust as its fundamental currency:

> Stamp Paid … believed the undecipherable language clamoring around the house was the mumbling of the black and angry dead. Very few had died in bed, like Baby Suggs, and none that he knew of, including Baby, had lived a livable life. Even the educated colored: the long-school people, the doctors, the teachers, the paper-writers and businessmen had a hard row to hoe. In addition to having to use their heads to get ahead, they had the weight of the whole race sitting there. You needed two heads for that. Whitepeople believed that whatever the manners, under every dark skin was a jungle. Swift unnavigable waters, swinging screaming baboons, sleeping snakes, red gums ready for their sweet white blood. In a way, he thought, they were right. The more coloredpeople spent their strength trying to convince them how gentle they were, how clever and loving, how human, the more they used themselves up to persuade whites of something Negroes believed could not be questioned, the deeper and more tangled the jungle grew inside. But it wasn't the jungle blacks brought with them to this place from the other (livable) place. It was the jungle whitefolks planted in them. And it grew. It spread. In, through and after life, it spread, until it invaded the whites who had made it. Touched them every one. Changed and altered them. Made them bloody, silly, worse than even they wanted to be, so scared were they of the jungle they had made. The screaming baboon lived under their own white skin; the red gums were their own. (Morrison, 2012, p. 234)

That is as good a description of how a cultural complex actually lives in the individual and collective psyche that I have come across. Not only is the suffering of the black people unfathomable but Morrison also notes its toxic effect on the white psyche as well: "The screaming baboon lived under their own white skin; the red gums were their own."

It is as if cultural complexes get started with a stem cell of an idea or belief or memory or traumatic event or powerful affect that over time grows into something

monstrous by accumulating all sorts of other things that are the psychic equivalent of randomly placed hair or teeth or fingernails. The persistent, ferocious attacks on Obamacare in the United States seem, to me, to be this kind of psychic, cultural complex teratoma. These masses of affect, memory, idea, belief, and behavior operate as independent, autonomous psychic beings in the body politic—much as Jung (1935/1976) originally described an individual complex:

> The complex has a sort of body, a certain amount of it own physiology. It can upset the stomach. It upsets the breathing, it disturbs the heart—in short, it behaves like a partial personality. For instance, when you want to say or do something and unfortunately a complex interferes with this intention, then you say or do something different from what you intended. You are simply interrupted, and your best intention gets upset by the complex, exactly as if you had been interfered with by a human being or by circumstances from outside. (para. 72)

The meeting of psyche and society in the form of a cultural complex can be a terrifying phenomenon. At other times, a cultural complex can appear more well formed and rational, although often along the way it can take on a nonrational personality of its own that manages to get in the way of other social processes and interactions. For example, in the United States, cultural complexes around an unborn child's right to life versus a woman's right to choose, or gun control versus gun rights come to mind. One may argue that these are political conflicts rather than psychological issues, but in the collective psyche the intensity of emotion surrounding these "political" debates indicates that a cultural complex is deeply activated in these matters. Of course, there are other cultural complexes that are far more benign, even essential to the healthy identity of a group in the same way that Jung defined the ego-complex as a normal structure of the psyche. Therefore, one can think of cultural complexes as occurring along a spectrum, from more "normal" to more "pathological" in terms of their effect on society.

Circumambulation and Recent Developments in the Study of Cultural Complexes

The goal of the cultural complex studies I have participated in during the past decade has been to see if the notion has "legs" to stand on. Does it allow us to approach social and cultural conflicts around the world with respect for the uniqueness and specificity of time, place, and culture while, at the same time, noting psychological patterns that reflect a general way in which psyche structures itself in regard to collective or group situations? Does the notion provide a useful bridge between personal and collective, between conscious and unconscious, between individual and archetypal? Does the notion allow us to see a bit more

clearly and even respond a bit more wisely to the inherently foggy borderlands between deeply conflicted groups—whether those conflicts are based on gender, ethnicity, race, politics, economics, cultural heritage, and all the other forces that divide people in groups from one another? Clearly, no one theory can provide all the answers to these type of questions. I do think a good enough theory, however, can allow one to walk around these problems in such a way as to honor their complexity and depth. Jungians like to call this type of approach "circumambulation" and the goal of the cultural complex researches has been to encourage a circumambulation of the collective psyche of different places, times, and cultures to see if it helps us understand a bit better the world of psyche. Please note that I place psyche at the center of the inquiry. Something as subtle as psyche will not be contained by a single concept or theory—including a psychological theory. Psyche is not history. Psyche is not economics. Psyche is not anthropology. Psyche is not sociology. Psyche is not even psychology. Rather psyche is embedded in all of these areas without being confined to any one of them. Thus, the methodology of exploring the collective psyche and its complexes needs to be truly a "walkabout"—both in terms of geography and in terms of symbolic content. With that in mind, to date, I have asked colleagues in Australia, Latin America, North America, the Middle East, and Europe to think about and explore cultural complexes and collective psyche in terms of their own specific culture, history, and conflicts. The results of these researches are available in several volumes (*Placing Psyche: Cultural Complexes in Australia* (2011), *Listening to Latin America (2012), The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society* (2004)*, European Cultural Complex* (forthcoming), which I recommend to anyone interested in the topic as a way of seeing how our circumambulation has attempted to unite what is absolutely unique and specific in terms of time, place, culture, and geography to what is more universal in how the psyche of humankind structures itself with regard to the conflicts and shifting identities within individuals, the groups to which they belong, and the groups with which they find themselves at odds. I believe that the notion of cultural complexes contributes to an understanding of how the individual and collective psyche functions. I also believe that in time a neurobiological component will add another dimension to understanding cultural complexes by demonstrating in neurobiological research of the brain that historical memory of group experience will be shown to link with stereotypical ideation, primitive affect, potent imagery, and reflexive behavior—all of which are the characteristics of what are now called cultural complexes. Finally, I hope that these understandings will allow us to take more effective action in intervening in those more destructive cultural complexes that cause such havoc in society.

Cultural Complexes and Effective Action

The phrase "effective action" is a perfect segue to the final issue I want to address in this brief paper of personal reflections on the development of the cultural complex theory. For the past decade, I have not given a single presentation on the topic of cultural complexes in which the first or second question to me does not address the issue of how the theory might allow us to take more "effective action" in bringing about healing where a cultural complex has inflicted great damage on individuals and groups. Of what use is the theory if it does not suggest helpful, therapeutic interventions? Where is the healing? What is the cure? Almost before I have had a chance to describe the notion itself, people want to know how to fix it, how to do something about it. I have become resistant to the question over time, not because it is not absolutely relevant and needs to be addressed—but because many people do not actually seem to be willing or able to tolerate sitting with an exploratory question long enough to take in its dimensions and depth without immediately asking for an answer. Sometimes demanding an answer or a fix is a way out of tolerating the anxiety of not knowing the answer. The fact is that most often I do not have an answer to what will cure the toxic fog of a cultural complex. Craig san Roque (2012) of Australia writes beautifully about living in the fog of a cultural complex, where one can hardly formulate a question, much less provide an answer.

> … I was preoccupied with the idea of how to detect a cultural complex when embedded in it, when asleep in it myself. Intrigued by the peculiar confusion of perception which grips the mind when under the influence of a complex, I kept thinking about the mythological Medusa gaze—where eyes cross and the brain turns to stone. The paralyzed sensation is, I feel, a symptom or sign of an active complex. Medusa is the patron saint of the complex. (p. 65)

As a society, we keep demanding answers for problems that seem to be quite adept at avoiding solutions. Failure to have an answer and refusing to give into the demand to provide one is no excuse, however, for not reflecting on possible meaningful responses to the intractable social problems that remain encrusted in cultural complexes. Therefore, I turn to history to look for examples of what I call cultural complexes to try to understand what interventions or other factors led to a shift in the collective psyche, resulting over time in some progress, some resolution, some healing. In a paper called "The Transcendent Function in Society" (2010), I cited three examples in which I thought long struggle had resulted in significant change in deeply entrenched cultural complexes. This has been true in gay rights over the past several decades, in women's rights over the past century, and even a bit in racial issues over the past 300 years. Enormous personal sacrifice

and group struggle are often at the heart of a cultural complex finding some resolution. When public opinion that was in the long-term grip of a cultural complex shifts, it can feel somewhat miraculous, as if there was some tipping point in the cultural unconscious that finally released its tenacious hold on the collective psyche. A huge store of energy gets freed up for life instead of imprisonment. I think that this is how it has felt most recently to witness the profound shift in attitudes toward homosexuality and gay marriage.

In today's global climate of divisive and, at the same time, homogenizing (which can also be seen as the result of a cultural complex) forces, I believe that it is absolutely essential that we explore how the collective psyche functions if we are going to find any meaningful healing processes to the social, political, economic, and environmental problems that beset us. It is not enough, in my opinion, to "individuate"—that rarely attained Jungian state of wholeness that is often the stated goal of our work. As analytical psychologists, we need to reflect psychologically on the cultural complexes that besiege us and address them in way that both expresses our capacity to tolerate the ambiguity of seeing value on both or many sides of an issue and allows us to stand up as citizens for what we believe.

It is in the very nature of many of the cultural complexes that have us in their grips today (racism, sexism, ethnic warfare, homophobia, environmental conflicts) to generate profound splitting and polarization between groups. Both or all sides often have a firm belief in their view of "the truth" and that "human value" is on their side. It is harder for people caught in the grips of cultural complexes to see that they also may have "untruth" or "righteous dogma" on their side as well.

If you recognize a cultural complex at work and feel the urge to do something about it and you simultaneously recognize that both or all sides of a conflict are in the grips of a complex with each side having some claim of legitimate value, what do you do? Do you sit on the sidelines and watch them fight it out—like in Syria or Israel? Do you wait for the "transcendent function" to make a mysterious appearance and bring on the "third" or "fourth"? Do you try to introduce some insight about the underlying psychology of the situation, which more often than not falls on deaf ears? The collective psyche can be a

Image Caption: Brer Rabbit and the Tar-Baby from Uncle Remus. The Palestinian-Israeli struggle has educated more than one American President and English prime minister in how an international tar baby functions. (Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Br%27er_Rabbit#mediaviewer/File:Br%27er_Rabbit_and_Tar-Baby.jpg). In the public domain.

beast. Its cultural complexes often function like "tar babies"—the more you try to get involved to sort things out, the more you get stuck in the problem (Tar-Baby, 2014).

I do believe that when we recognize a cultural complex at work on an important social issue, we are obliged to take a stand and do our best not to contribute more to the splitting and polarization that seem inevitably to accompany such conflicts. The analytical psychologist part of us will want to be as objective as possible about the nature of the conflict between groups so we can see the human value that is being affirmed on all sides of a conflict. The citizen part of us needs to take a stand, often with one side or the other—because it is the nature of these kinds of conflicts that the polarization and splitting in the collective psyche requires one to choose one side or the other. As psychologists, we want to see the value and problem from both sides or multiple sides; as citizens, we often have to choose one among many possible sides.

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The Psychology of Terror, American Exceptionalism, and the Greek God Pan

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This study strives to contribute to a better understanding of contemporary anxieties in American culture by applying meanings derived from mythology to panic inducing cultural phenomena. It asks if the Greek god Pan and his retinue of nymphs metaphorically exemplify an archetypal core within an American cultural anxiety complex. The principal technical device used is Jung's method of amplification, rendering cultural material at a more psychologically substantial level.

This hermeneutic research views primary sources for and commentaries on the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the American reactions that followed. A faulty belief in American exceptionalism is examined for its contribution to the reactions by the American government and its citizens. Some consequences of American exceptionalism, as seen in reactions to 9/11, are clarified through a correlation with a metaphoric reading of Pan, the Greek nature god. Pan's compulsion into life is considered to be a symbolic expression of an archetype that was once alive in the bold spirit of America, but has rusted into paralysis due to a lack of initiative towards contemporary problems.

> It was as if the government of the Unites States, starting at the top, had decided that the terrorist outrages of September 11, 2001, meant that law, custom and decency had all been suspended *sine die*. (Hodgson, 2009, p. 127)

> History …is a nightmare from which I am trying to awaken. (Joyce, 1961, p. 34)

American exceptionalism, as described by the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville (1840), is based on the notion that "the position of the Americans is quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no other democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one" (pp. 36-37). Tocqueville echoed earlier voices, such as John Winthrop's sermon on the eve of the Puritan's landing in Massachusetts, "that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are upon us" (as quoted in Hodgson, 2009, p. 1). Exceptionalism has been reiterated by many other leaders,

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including Abraham Lincoln, who envisioned America as "the last best hope of earth" (1862, para. 3) and Barak Obama who stated "America must always lead on the world stage" (2014, para. 25). American exceptionalism can be construed as a nearly inaudible seed syllable within a cultural complex (Singer, 2004; Singer & Kimbles, 2004), anxious in nature, which formed in the early history of the US and has been triggered by recent events in American history.

American exceptionalism is a core belief based on the notion that America is fundamentally different from other nations because it was formed out of a revolution without an antecedent base in feudalism (Wood, 2011). This inspired a society believing not only in "liberty, equality, [and] constitutionalism … [but also] a special destiny to lead the world toward liberty and democracy" (pp. 2-3). It carries the belief, birthed in the Puritan faith of the pilgrims, that their purity formed a natural and close alliance with God and this destined the early Americans to be a people chosen to lead others.

This doctrine is still used to guide American policy in the post-9/11 era. The Bush administration invoked a contemporary use of exceptionalism in its response to 9/11. On the evening of the attacks President George W. Bush addressed the nation, describing the US as "the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world" (2001a, para. 4). In the appeal to the United Nations to legitimize an attack on Iraq in 2003, the US government pressed for the attacks to be sanctioned by declaring that the US must "achieve this essential victory in the war on terror to promote freedom" (Bush, 2003, para. 13). The argument included an explicit right to impose "freedom" onto other peoples (David & Grondin, 2006). For some in contemporary America there is still a lingering "belief that it is the destiny, some say the God-given destiny, of the United States to spread the benefits of its democratic system and its specific version of capitalism to as many other countries as possible" (Hodgson, 2009, p. 159).

However, the unconscious hubris in exceptionalism has resulted in the US becoming more split off from other peoples. It is a cause of projection onto the nation and causes projection within the US onto others. Further, the combination of a belief in American exceptionalism and recent increases in violence toward Americans have led to overprotective measures as well as a tendency to fall into panic and/or apathy. Perhaps these projections of shadow contents actually increase the likelihood that terrorist assaults on innocents will continue. The application of two of Swiss psychiatrist C. G. Jung's theories, the psychological functions of myth (Jung, 1951/1959a [*CW* 9i]) and the formation of complexes in the psyche (1948/1960 [*CW* 8]) when combined with the recent addition of cultural complex theory, first envisioned by Jungian analysts Thomas Singer and Samuel Kimbles (2004), may lead to a better understanding of these tendencies.

Cultural complex theory is rooted in Jung's theory of complexes in individuals in which he explores the dynamics of shadow material in the unconscious

(1948/1960 [*CW* 8]). An event or series of events precipitates a traumatic reaction, which leads to a regression, and consequently efforts are made to protect from further wounding. The traumatized "splinter psyche" (p. 98 [para. 204]), or complex, fails to thrive and becomes cut off from mediating influences because it is emotionally over-reactive, tends to see all facts as reinforcing its beliefs, interprets efforts to initiate change as threats, and has a "remarkable degree of autonomy" over the ego (p. 99 [para. 205]).

Jung acknowledged that he could not fill in "this incomplete picture" (1948/1960, p. 104 [para. 219]) and post-Jungians have subsequently added to the discourse. I will only mention Jungian analyst John Perry (1970) for conceiving of "the entire psyche as structured not only in complexes, but in their bipolar systems or arrangements" (para. 38), consisting of a protective shell and a core, which "is derived from one or more archetypes" (Samuels, Shorter, & Plaut, 2005, p. 34) and Singer and Kimbles applications of Jung's theory of complexes to the dynamics of groups (2004).

Methodological concern regarding the application of depth perspectives to studies of culture, the traditional field of social scientists, require care and attention. Violence in American culture has been studied from a number of sociocultural perspectives, such as terror management theory (Barak, 2005), social disorganization theory (Cohen, D. 1998), and grounded theory (Moustakas, 1994). These evidence-based research methods have aptly framed pertinent questions concerning anxieties about violence in the United States and have provided useful data. There is currently a trove of data available that supports and helps to facilitate the application of a depth perspective to considerations about cultural anxieties.

Recognition of the value of studying a culture psychologically through the application of myth is not new (Erikson, 1994; Jung, 1946/1978), nor are methodological concerns relating to such studies (Lu, 2013). Certain criteria are essential when using complex theory with groups. As Jungian historian Kevin Lu (2013) warns, the theorist needs to guard against reductionism and essentialism, and he points to the necessity for and challenges to adhering to the standards of both historical and depth psychological research in an interdisciplinary study such as this.

It is doubtful whether any two people in a given culture would always agree about all societal standards, let alone what symbolic material and patterns accurately map the culture. There is nothing one could say that would be true of all Americans all the time, but there are some things one can say about political and social trends and their unconscious underpinnings. A "culture is not monolithic and can contain incompatible elements, and … different cultures will have things in common" (Jahoda, 2012, p. 295). It is as critical not to stereotype Americans as it is essential to avoid seeing a person as the sum of his or her DSM-5 diagnoses (i.e., "a borderline").

Diversity exists not only between cultures but also within cultures. Nevertheless, within the loosely held perimeters of a culture, the values and "conditioning elements" (Kroeber & Kluckhorn, 1952, p. 181) influence behaviors in many ways. Some of the ways a culture conditions people are unconscious and so a fuller understanding of the behaviors of a society may be gained through an exploration of the collective unconscious in a group.

In groups there are issues, such as racial bias, that tend to resist transformation. Laws change slowly, but not compared with the saturnine pace of societal biases and prejudices. Like people, cultures that do not examine their anxieties will tend to project their blind spots onto other cultures. When shadow material (the unconscious content in a complex) is exposed, it may erupt, revolutionize, instigate regression, or promote compassionate dialogues. Regardless of how these shadow elements are expressed in consciousness, they could be understood as a compensatory move by the unconscious to restore wholeness (Jung, 1946/1978 [*CW* 10]).

Cultural complexes are formed out of fear-based oppositions to other social groups (Kimbles, 2003), and then polarize the psychic energy field of the group they fear. The polarization creates a strong potential for an opposing complex to form in the projected-upon group and leads to a rigid dichotomy between the unconscious of the two groups. The metaphor I use to envision this idea is the mechanistic revolving and interlocking of gears. Each gear is a spinning wheel with teeth, or cogs, that all together create a force that moves a corresponding cog in an adjoining wheel. The cogwheels are enmeshed and dependent on each other for motion and speed. Such a mechanistic arrangement moves parts in a rigid lockstep. Once the gears are in motion, minimal effort is needed to keep the process going, and there is no possibility for change. When one group in a culture negatively projects its unconscious fantasies onto another group the projections are then mirrored back and a process, like a cogwheel, is set in motion. Projection dangerously reinforces ethnocentric antagonism between groups and promotes the spread of negative cultural complexes.

Figure 1. Pan et Syrinx, Lavinia Fontana, 1891, Musee des Beaux-Arts de Marseille. In the public domain.

Pan as Archetypal Core in an American Complex

To the ancient Greeks, Pan was a diviner, protector of the wild, bringer of terror and panic, provider of sustenance for his cult, and *pharmakos*. He was also a trusted war ally to his friends and the carrier of the instinctive life force of fertility (Borgeaud, 1979/1988; Boardman, 1997). Pan's compulsion into life is the prominent aspect of his archetypal energy and is often represented by his aggressive chasing after the nymphs. The nymphs were found in all the beautiful places in nature. There were countless nymphs, who lived as long as the tree she lived in grew or the river that was her home ran (Larson, 2001). They were always female and cared for others in roles such as nurses, midwifes, or guardians.

In one myth, craving the nymph Syrinx's attention, Pan burst into the peace of the piney banks of Arcadia's Ladon River and chased her into the reeds (Ovid, 1955/1986). The pastoral peace was destroyed. Syrinx was cornered by Pan and chose metamorphosis rather than surrender and was transformed into the reeds (Tatius, 1917/1969). Pan, in tears, gathered up the reeds, his breath filled them and the music of the panpipes was born out of his frustration and grief.

Pan's pursuit of Syrinx exemplified the pattern of Pan's single-minded pursuit of his desires without concern for the consequences for others. At other times Pan is protective, but here he destroys innocence. A recurrent theme in Pan's myths with the nymphs is that innocence requires protection to exist and when left unprotected devolves into a lesser state of consciousness. This is an apt metaphor for the shadow side of the dogma of exceptionalism in America.

When viewed impartially, one could say that when America formed as a nation it too burst onto a bucolic landscape. The Native American cultures that were already well established were chased into submission, more and more brutally as the nation spread west (Meyer, 2005). The stories of America's birth as a nation focus on the courage and ingenuity it took to establish a continental United States, rather than on the costs to others. As Jung points out in his considerations of Nazi Germany, when a one sided attitude, such as that of Pan or the early colonists, takes hold a compensatory function is an inevitable outcome (1946/1978, p. 222 [*CW* 10, para. 453]). The progress American exceptionalism justified ignored the autonomy of innocent peoples, just as Pan's aggressive self-interest destroyed the bucolic peace of Arcadia.

The landscape of Pan's isolated wilderness in Arcadia, which he shared with the nymphs and which was a favorite location for Roman rural idylls, has much in common with the American dream of a land of wild frontiers and a bucolic land of "milk and honey." The idea of a spacious and beautiful pastoral land, well protected by natural isolation and a self-sustaining terrain, is a central characteristic in the Pan myths (Borgeaud, 1979/1988) as well as in many legends and tales that shape the national character of the United States (Guthrie, 2011; Smith, 2011).

Figure 2. Marble altar: Pan, a rustic deity with goat legs, shown in armor. Roman, 1st CE–2nd CE (probably). © Trustees of the British Museum.

Pan has as many battle myths as he does myths in which he is chasing after nymphs. These are less well remembered. He fought with Hermes to help Zeus gain power over the Titans (Kerenyi, 1996), was a general in Dionysus's army in India (Polyaenus, 1994), came to the rescue of Athens at the Battle of Marathon (Pausanias, 1961), and aided the Athenians in routing a Gallic army (Herodotus, 1921/1960). Pan's method was to infect the enemy with fear. For example, Polyaenus (1994) (born c. 100 CE in Bithynia), a rhetorician and author of *Stratagems of War*, recounted the myth of Pan's chaotic use of echoes while a general in service to Dionysus in India:

> Dionysus' [lost text] was in a hollow valley, when the scouts reported that an enemy band of 10,000 was camped against them. Dionysus was afraid, but not Pan, who at night signaled Dionysus' army to give their loudest yell. They shouted, and the rocks resounded and the hollow made the noise seem to the enemy to be that of a much greater force. Struck by fear, they fled. To honor

> Pan's stratagem we call Echo "friend of Pan," and we name the groundless fears that strike armies at night "panic." (p. 17 [1.2])

America's battle slogan for the start of the Iraq War in 2003, "Shock and Awe," would have been well suited to Pan's battle strategy, which was to outsmart the enemy by instilling fear in their hearts and to win victories for his allies without causing them casualties. Many of Pan's traits, he was a warrior and a hypermasculine hunter in his relationships with the nymphs, correspond to other modern cultures, and a case can be made for a great deal of global unconsciousness sourcing back to his archetypal domain, but the present discussion is limited to the US and terrorism. Pan's archetypal framework emphasizes the fear that an overpowering force, such as that of the US military, engenders (Sipri, 2014). The following comparison of the attack on 9/11 and the myths of Pan outlines several parallels in the ways in which the American culture has shifted its course towards a fear-based culture.

9/11

On September 11, 2001 a multipronged, suicidal terrorist attack using airplanes filled with ordinary passengers felled the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and crippled the Pentagon in Washington, DC, killing nearly 3,000 people. Americans woke that autumn day in the general state of complacency to which they had become accustomed (Colvin, 2001; Irish, 2002), but once the disbelief wore off, that complacency rapidly morphed into fear (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003, pp. 4-6). The confusion and a fear-driven mob mentality prompted many in the culture to mutely accept the government's choices both to go to war and to quickly adopt protective measures, such as the USA Patriot Act, which curtailed personal freedom. In the parlance of cultural complex theory, the trauma of 9/11 triggered a latent complex, and the government began to act as a shield or protector while the majority of the culture grouped together for a time and obediently bunkered down.

Two months later, PTSD was diagnosed in 20 percent of New Yorkers living near the WTC (Galea, Ahern, Resnick, Kilpatrick, Bucuvalas, Gold, et al., 2002). This is considerably higher than the 3.6 percent of New Yorkers suffering from symptoms of PTSD the year before the attack (Cohen, Kasen, Chen, Gordon, Berenson, Brook & White, 2006). Following the attacks, PTSD symptoms were diagnosed in one in ten of New York City residents (Marshall & Galea, 2004; Osborn, Johnson, & Fisher, 2006). In general, PTSD and panic-based reactions are unfortunate by-products of war. However, the US was not at war, making the attacks psychologically as well as literally come from "out of the blue" (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 209), like Pan, the god of panic, bursting into the bucolic landscape and creating confusion and terror.

One of Pan's epithets is Pan *Phorbas*, the terrifying one. Pan is associated with panic and all its legion of psychological burdens (Boardman, 1997), which Pan infects, using cunning and surprise, into his enemies. Panic disorder, is a "disorder," or an infection of the psyche, with mythological roots in Pan's myths.

The Greek geographer (c. 110 CE–180 CE) Pausanias (1935/1981) reported a battle between the Greeks and the Gauls when during the night a panic fell on the Gauls:

> For causeless terrors are said to come from the god Pan. It was when evening was turning to night that the confusion fell on the army and at first only a few became mad, and these imagined that they heard the trampling of horses at a gallop, and the attack of advancing enemies; but after a little time the delusion spread to all. So rushing to arms they divided into two parties, killing and being killed, neither understanding their mother tongue nor recognizing one another's forms or the shape of their shields. Both parties alike under the present delusion thought that their opponents were Greek, men and armour, and that the language they spoke was Greek, so that a great mutual slaughter was wrought among the Gauls by the madness sent by the god. (p. 503 [VIII, xxiii, 6-9])

The mythic motif of "causeless terrors" bringing panic and madness in the night to the enemies of Pan echoes the description of Panic Disorder in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (APA, 2013), the standard for diagnosing mental disorders in the United States[1]. A panic attack is defined as an "abrupt surge of intense fear or discomfort" (APA, 2013, p. 214). Symptoms include a pounding heart, sweating, trembling, sensations of shortness of breath or choking, nausea, feelings of chest pain, dizziness, derealization (feelings of unreality) or depersonalization (being detached from oneself), and fears of "going crazy" or losing control (p. 214). The diagnosis of panic disorder is given when an unexpected state of panic occurs more than once. "Unexpected refers to a panic attack for which there is no obvious cue or trigger at the time of occurrence—that is, the attack appears to occur from out of the blue, such as when the individual is relaxing" (p. 209). These symptoms are apt descriptors for the reactions to Pan by the Gauls. They were confused, felt they were going mad, and lost control.

Eyewitness examples of the panic and terror on 9/11 include the following:

> When we got to about 50 feet from the South Tower, we heard the most eerie sound that you would ever hear. A high-pitched noise and a popping noise made everyone stop. We all looked up. At th[at] point, it all let go. The way I see it, it had to be the rivets. The building let go. There was an explosion and the whole top leaned toward us and started coming down.

> I stood there for a second in total awe, and then said, "What the F_____?" I honestly thought it was Hollywood [Jeff Birnbaum recounts his experience]. (Lucy, 2003, para. 11-12)
>
> You have two 110 story office buildings. You don't find a desk. You don't find a chair. You don't find a telephone, a computer. The biggest piece of a telephone I found was half of a keypad, and it was about this big: (makes a shape with his hand about 4 inches in diameter). The building collapsed to dust [Description of what New York Fire Fighter Joe Casaliggi found in the rubble at the WTC]. (Cassaliggi, 2013)

Just as the surreal images of the airplanes, the sound of the exploding rivets, and then the overwhelming destruction disoriented the first responders, the sound of an approaching noisy, monstrous Pan created "madness" and led his enemies to panic and to run in disarray (Polyaenus, 1994). Pan forcefully dominated his landscape and is an archetypal representation of the impulse to impose oneself upon others with, as classicist Lewis Farnell (1909/1971) describes him, "rustic and uncouth" powers (p. 431). Terrorism, like the idea of Pan, creates fear.

The US has traditionally avoided the fearful side of Pan/terrorism and had become accustomed to being in control on the world stage due to its considerable military presence, most famously turning the tides in World War's I and II. On 9/11, however, the roles were reversed. Terrorists set a trap that was "suddenly and unexpectedly sprung" (Segal, 1969, p. 18). Thus, radical Islam dramatically imposed its presence, delivering in those airplane/bombs pain, anger, and fear to the American psyche. America responded with overprotective measures, scapegoating, and a childlike naiveté in the general public.

Identifying radical Islamists, the American people, or any other group, as the "Pan element," or thinking in terms of labeling one group as being Pan-like and another as nymph-like oversimplifies the archetypal and moves toward the stereotypical. Rather than freezing up the fluidity inherent in the archetypal with yet another set of labels, the objective here is to determine whether the structuring of some events in modernity are reflective of the structuring in Pan's myths and how might this be instructive.

The US response to the attacks was immediate and dramatic. On September 11th President George W. Bush's first directive to his chiefs of staff was that "Everything is available for the pursuit of this war" (Clarke, 2004, p. 24). On the evening of September 11th Bush addressed the nation and employed exceptionalism in his rhetoric: "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining…. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them" (2001a, para. 4, 9). A line was clearly drawn between "the brightest beacon" and the terrorists. But this enemy added new

dimensions to war because it has no borders, no nation, and no adherence to the "rules of engagement" (Lifton, 2003). Bush was trying to define the perimeters of the war. He had the unfortunate task of trying to corral quicksilver, as al-Qaeda, the suspect at that point, was well adapted to splitting apart and reforming seemingly invisibly.

The next day Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked for an investigation into Iraq's complicity with al-Qaeda (Clarke, 2004, p. 30; Lifton, 2003, p. 9). All hesitations, and there were many even within the White House and Pentagon, were aggressively swept aside (Clarke, 2004; Woodward, 2004). A plan based on fighting wars in "multiple, simultaneous major theaters" (David & Grondin, 2006, p. 39) was immediately implemented. This plan had been drawn up in 2000, *before* the attacks, a tactic justified only by assuming that the US is entitled to convert the world to democracy. It was titled, "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century" (David & Grondin, 2006) and called for military forces to

> defend the American homeland; fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars; perform the "constabulary" duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions; transform U.S. forces to exploit the "revolution in military affairs." (p. 393)

Following the attacks, martial justice was encouraged by Bush's speeches: "This crusade, this war on terrorism" with these terrorists, who are "barbaric … [and] a new kind of evil" (2001b). This verbal prologue led the country into long, protracted battles. From the start the anger of the governing voices encouraged war as the patriotic answer. Rather than a calming influence, the government inflamed the fear and reactivity understandably being felt by many Americans at the time.

Pan's myths parallel such brutal reactivity and self-interest. In the third century BCE the poet Theocritus explained that "he's one o' the tetchy sort; his nostril's ever sour wrath's abiding-place" (Edmonds, trans., 1912/1977, p. 11 [I. 16–20]). Roman poet Valerius Flaccus wrote "Sport it is to the god [Pan] when he ravishes the trembling flock from their pens, and the steers trample the thickets in their flight" (1934/1963, p. 131 [III. 46–57]). He could be vengeful. When spurned by Echo he raged against her and "in a desperate fury, like so many dogs and wolves, tore her all to pieces and flung about them all over the earth her yet singing limbs" (Longus, 1916/ 1978, p. 163 [III. 23]). Pan is like the US in that he is a rescuer to his allies, but for his enemies, his methods of imposing his will is overwhelming and oppressive.

Pan's mythic motifs mirror both an underlying inflation and a fear-based apocalyptic vision in the US, which has developed out of America's superpower status in the world (Lifton, 2003). American psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton interpreted the plan to make the world "safe for democracy" as a messianic

message and sees modernity as caught in a "worldwide epidemic of violence aimed at massive destruction in the service of various visions of purification and renewal" (p. 1). He understands an apocalyptic vision as an impulse to destroy the world as it is, with the idealistic belief that by doing so the world will be purified (pp. 4–5). The tactics such a vision legitimizes include scapegoating and manipulation of the mainstream public through the use of euphemisms and co-opting of sentiments, as well as brutality toward the perceived enemy, all in service to a better future.

An apocalyptic vision naturally includes the ideal of a golden era, like the bucolic Arcadia of the poets (Ovid, 1955/1986; Theocritus, 1999), which is now to be restored by the believers through purification (Lifton, 2003, p. 78). It is a "response to one's enemy's pursuit of absolute purification, [and so] one seeks to purify absolutely in turn; in the name of destroying evil, each side seeks to destroy not only the other but enough of the world to achieve mystical rebirth" (p. 39).

Pan signifies underlying aggression in the pursuit of a world made safe for one's own, but not for all, regardless of the effect on the innocent. American leadership harnessed a Pan-like brutality, arrogant and self-serving, out of the protective feelings and prevailing sense of outrage in the nation. The government exploited the public's fear to achieve its own goals. Attacking Iraq was an opening for the planned overthrow of its government, with Iran, and North Korea on the list (Clarke, 2004). Bush (2002) identified these nations as the "axis of evil." As long as they could be defined as "the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them" they were fair game in a preventive, multi-theater, global war to promote democracy (Bush, 2001a).

In the months following 9/11, perceptions in America rapidly compounded to try to relieve the anxiety created by the "monstrous" (Venn, 2002, p. 121) acts by countering them with an overwhelming show of strength and willingness to do violence (p. 124). Bush sought to legitimize the political ideology, known as the Bush Doctrine, that the US has a duty to keep the world free for democracy.

> The Bush administration defends its pursuit of this unlikely goal by means of internationally illegal, unilateralist, and preemptive attacks on other countries, accompanied by arbitrary imprisonments and the practice of torture, and by making the claim that the United States possesses an exceptional status among nations that confers upon it special international responsibilities, and exceptional privileges in meeting those responsibilities. (Pfaff, 2007)

American exceptionalism was being used as justification to attempt, in effect, to create an American empire by spreading democracy (David & Grondin, 2006).

As a bold general willing to advance ingenious ideas, Pan's inflated self-worth served him. It allowed him to disregard the pain and fear of the nymphs. In other

circumstances it brought him the contempt of others. He had the "temerity to compare his music with that of Apollo, and to challenge the god of the lyre to a trial of skill" (Bulfinch, 1855, pp. 70–71). Of course, he and his panpipes lost, which speaks to his grandiose sense of self: he fancied himself a better musician than the god of music. Hubris like Pan's can be seen in the American ideology that allows for the smug belief that it has "a special destiny to lead the world toward liberty and democracy" (Wood, 2011, p. 3).

Though America is not alone in having political policy driven by hubris, it is quick to claim a top status. If exceptionalism is a component of a cultural complex and the projections of this complex are focused on other cultures, then it should not surprise Americans that other cultures, even among allies such as England and Australia, disparage the US "because of suspicions that its true goals are domination and exploitation rather than the promotion of human rights and liberty" (Glick, et al., 2006, p. 372). The same study found significant levels of contempt rather than admiration or envy toward the US (Glick, et al.). Others while would prefer to annihilate it altogether (Aaron, 2008).

Exceptionalism parallels the inflated radical Islamist belief that they are destined to "seek the destruction of Western democracy and the conversion of the world to their concept of Islam" (Aaron, 2008, p. 1). Radical Islamists vow to lead the world out of the impurities of secularism and into a new world birthed out of a revolution (2008). This perceived impurity in the west then justifies destroying the "corrupt" world through jihadist acts of terror (2008). Pan's explosive attacks and myopic objectification of the other's value based on their availability to fulfill his needs are reflected in mythic-sized dreams of grandiosity in American and radical Islamist ideologies. They mirror each other.

Jungian analyst Murray Stein (1995) stated that Jung

> felt deeply that fanatical ideologies of any sort were demonic because they depended for their existence upon identification with archetypal images and upon grandiose inflations, which crippled individual accountability and destroyed moral consciousness. Such ideologies should therefore be confronted by psychological interpretation, which would have the benefit, if successful, of restoring consciousness to its proper dimensions. (p. 20)

Understanding that there is a dynamic way in which unconscious complexes infect other cultures could be a first step toward developing understanding, tolerance, and better communication between sides.



Figure 3. Echo hiding from Pan. Attic Red Figure. 370 BCE—350 BCE. British Museum: London, England. © Trustees of the British Museum.

In myth, Pan chases a nymph, out of fear she asks for help, and is metamorphosed. She is still alive but in a vegetative form, transformed by the interaction. She devolves into a part of the landscape without the power of volition or a voice of her own. Explosions of Pan power are followed by torpor and despair in the nymphs. This same pattern developed after the attacks. The majority of the American public passively accepted political decisions with immense consequences. It would appear that a compensatory naiveté in the American public aided in the formation of post-9/11 protective visions in the US and that like the nymphs, the panicky state Americans found themselves in following the attacks led to a regression into consuming and escapism.

One response to 9/11 was the federal government's choice to implement a course of action to keep people focused on consuming as a way to relieve anxiety (Arndt, Solomon, Kasser, & Sheldon, 2004). This agenda was initiated in Bush's

first hours after the attack when he told his aids "I want the economy back, open for business right away" (Clarke, 2004, p. 24). Ten days after the attack Bush encouraged the public to "Get down to Disney World in Florida. Take your families and enjoy life the way we want it to be enjoyed" (Bush, 2001c).

The American public escaped into distraction enough to effect the statistical terrain. "Americans bought homes and cars in record quantities. They also snapped up appliances, furniture, and electronic gadgets. From October through December, consumption soared at a 6% annual rate" (Zuckerman, 2002). They worked hard at losing themselves. "People went to enormous lengths to distract themselves from the tragedy —by drinking, gambling, renting videos, watching television, and shopping" (Pyszczynski et al., 2003).

After the explosive attacks the need to feel safe overwhelmed the public, which enabled "unquestioning willingness to accept whatever the leadership said was necessary to fight terrorism" (Clarke, 2004, p. 1). Many citizens of the US, shocked and in fear that another strike was imminent, responded as the nymphs did when overwhelmed by Pan and froze, passively allowing the government to move forward with preplanned aggression, regardless of the loss of freedoms for the public (2004). Safety, it can be argued, replaced freedom as a pillar of American decision-making.

Bush told the country, "The world has changed because we are no longer safe" (2001c). The search to restore a lost sense of security aided the creation of US government policies such as the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (FinCEN, 2012), HIPPA standards for privacy (Health Information Privacy, 2012), and zero tolerance standards at public schools (Zero tolerance, 2012). The anxiety most Americans naturally felt was exploited to drive policy. The safety that was once a given became something hoped to be restored through policy-making.

Meanwhile, euphemisms began to spring up like weeds. Although the re-languaging of the "war on terrorism" often began inside Washington's beltway, the euphemisms usually came into common usage when "embedded" in the mainstream media (Slovenko, 2005). The euphemisms obfuscated the brutal reality of distant battles for the American public and reflected the "unconscious tendency to make the autonomy of the complex *unreal* by giving it a different name" (Jung, 1948/1960, p. 99 [*CW* 8, para. 206]). Acting as an aggressor was called making a "pre-emptive strike," and a "surgical strike" was the term used for bombing city streets. Friendly fire and waterboarding speak for themselves. Collateral damage meant dead people[2]. Ralph Slovenko, a psychiatrist, plays with the sanitization of initializing Weapons of Mass Destruction: "Euphemisms that mislead or deceive are known as doublespeak (or we might say, WMD—words of mass deception)" (2005, p. 533). The American public swallowed the experts' euphemisms and remained numb to the loss of innocent lives that were a consequence of Bush's war on terror.

Conversely, during the weeks and months immediately following the attacks, experts began to express beliefs essentially geared to keep the anxiety about personal safety alive. They rhetorically kept the public in a state of fear and near panic. "Today's terrorist can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon" (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 1).For a short period "unknown unknowns" were suddenly objects of concern (Furedi, 2007). An unknown unknown, an outcome that a planner could not conceive of while determining a course of action, became a news talk show item after Rumsfeld (2006) repeatedly made statements such as, "There are unknown unknowns — there are things we do not know we do not know" about the Islamist radicals. After the news of the attack broke on television and internet news sites, the message was established that the chance of another attack was possible; what was possible quickly became probable and from there morphed into inevitable (Furedi, 2007).

The rhetoric engendered by the government, and repeated in the media, and the fearful state of many Americans resulted in a projection of evil onto many Arab Americans and Muslims and a disregard for their civil rights. Kimbles (2003) states that when fear becomes the primary affect that organizes a culture's reactions to an event it can lead to scapegoating. One consequence of the Patriot Act has been widespread abuse of suspected terrorists in the US.

> Jonathan Turley, a professor of national security and constitutional law at George Washington University… an expert in prison law, said in an interview on Friday that the use of the dogs to frighten detainees in the New Jersey jail underscored "the trickle-down effect" of the disregard for immigrants' civil rights that top government officials showed after 9/11. "It trickled down through military intelligence, through low-level personnel and to sheriffs," he said. "Suddenly people who were predisposed to the use of such harsh measures thought they had license to use them, and 9/11 gave them a great appetite." (Bernstein, 2006, para. 6–7)

As Pan's presence caused a "sudden confusion and consternation of a crowd" (Plutarch, 1936/2003, p. 37 [356, D]), after 9/11 the country was infected by a mob mentality. In an anxious or even panicked state it is easier to be led into believing things one would not otherwise accept as true. Jung spoke about this in his writing on *participation mystique*:

> Practical experience shows us again and again that any prolonged preoccupation with an unknown object acts as an almost irresistible bait for the unconscious to project itself into the unknown nature of the object and to accept the resultant perception, and the interpretation deduced from it, as objective. (1948/1967, p. 204 [*CW* 13, para. 252])

The mob psychology curdled into a climate of hate in the US. "Something about the current state of America has been causing far more disturbed people than before to act out their illness by threatening, or actually engaging in, political violence" (Krugman, 2011, p. A19). Arab Americans were targeted as scapegoats. With no evidence of any connection to terrorism, hundreds of Muslim, Arab, and South Asian men were rounded up on the basis of racial and religious profiling and subjected to unlawful detention and abuse. Scapegoating resulted in "widespread labeling of opponents of the war, or even those insufficiently enthusiastic about it, as 'unpatriotic,' 'un-American,' 'traitors,' or if they were in foreign countries, 'anti-American' and 'enemies of America'" (Lifton, 2003, p. xi). Scapegoating also led to the suspension of rights and torturing of imprisoned, suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Abu Ghraib prison, and other locations (Kugler & Cooper, 2010), and to racial profiling of Muslims (Shahshahani, 2011; Swiney, 2006). As von Hippel (2002) concludes regarding the reactions to 9/11, "Humiliation can in itself cause increased levels of commitment and recruitment to 'the cause.'" An unconscious projection of the humiliation many American's felt in the wake of the attacks appears to have helped fuel even more hatred.

Bush advocated for war in Iraq as well as Afghanistan by attempting to justify pre-emptive self-defense as grounds for war in the modern era (*World Press Review*, 2012, para. 7–8). He took this argument to the United Nations. When UN General Secretary Kofi Annan was asked if the invasion was legal he stated, "I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal" (BBC News, 2004, para. 9). Bush charged ahead undeterred.

> On March 20, 2003 the US Government led an attack on Iraq using the ad slogan — "shock and awe" with "fear" as the target emotion, betting that character assassination of those who disagreed with the war and the firepower would spread the right messages at home and abroad …. In fear-based decision making, alliances, standards of conduct, and, indeed, common sense go out the window. Whether the opponent is a congressional candidate or an international terrorist, the idea is shoot him before he shoots you. (Richey & Feldmann, 2003)

This attitude is a mirror image of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's equally inflated attitude. Bin Laden mocked the US in a videotaped message in 2004: it is "easy for us to provoke and bait …. All that we have to do is to send two mujahidin …. to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al Qaeda in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses" (as quoted in Mueller, 2005).

Bush taunted the enemy, "Bring them on" (as quoted in Moore, 2002). "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those

who harbor them" (Bush, 2001a, para. 9). "I don't care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass" (Bush as quoted in Clarke, 2004, p. 24). Others in the government promoted fear mongering. "It's only a matter of time before they bomb US cities" (Rumsfeld as quoted in Moore, 2002). The government used the anxiety in the country in the same way the radical Islamists used it. Both sides express beliefs to keep the anxiety alive, and for both the control of the narrative is a component of the warfare.

One "shocks and awes" while the other "provokes and baits." Apparently the two sides are blind to their similarities. As Jung said, one *meets* one's projections (1951/1959b). "Projections change the world into a replica of one's own unknown face" (p. 9 [*CW* 9ii, para. 17]). Projection is driving both sides of the conflicts, while blinding both to their similarities. But "arrogance and stupidity are self-defeating, eventually" (Richey & Feldmann, 2003). America's self-image as protector of the weak has blinded many in the country to the projection of shadow onto other cultures. In the aftermath of 9/11, the manipulation by both sides aptly fits Jungian analyst Joseph Henderson's (1984) description of the workings of the cultural unconscious as a place of "mutual projection of unconscious factors" (p. 11).

A principle objective of terrorism is to destroy and this can be achieved psychologically by instilling fear in the imagination of one's enemies to destroy their peace of mind. Once the imagination of the country absorbed that a suicide bomber is more invincible than a tower, terrorists succeeded in seizing more power and control over the west than ever before (Clarke & Newman, 2006, p. 56). Through the media's reporting of the goading and threats, and with only occasional, unpredictable strikes, terrorism has succeeded in making Americans feel unsafe wherever they are (Glick et al., 2006, p. 364). Pan's strategy to overcome his enemies by triggering their own fears parallels this era of uneasiness and instability that now grows in the American landscape.

Conclusions and Some Thoughts about Transformation

Pan was alive in the imagination of the ancients long before his image as a split god came into being. "Not until the beginning of the fifth century BCE, and after the introduction of his cult in Athens, does the image of Pan take shape" (Eliade, 1987, p. 160). There are no extant statues of Arcadian Pan. Athenian Pan's lower half is envisioned as goat-like, with hairy haunches, cloven hoofs, and a tail (Hillman, 1988), but from the waist up he looks like a man with horns. Pan's myths and functions echoed these opposites. In Pan, the ancients worshipped the divine in the animal and the animal in the divine. The boundary between these opposites was internal and so naturally fluid and flexible.

These two sides of Pan are commonly interpreted reductively so that he is called a split god (Farnell, 1909/1971). This projection of splitting onto Pan is a

modern interpretation and thus more informative about modernity than about Pan because it indicates an oversimplification of a complex issue. Just because Pan is animal and divine does not mean he represented the dichotomy of a simple duality.

Pan embodies a forgotten link to the fluid way the ancients understood a connection between the aggressive instincts in humans and their innate divinity. Failure to understand this, the myths tell us, leads to traumatized reactions; a recurring coil of dread, panic, terror, and subsequent paralysis, which is then followed by further aggression. Going numb and running or ignoring the link between the animal and the divine in oneself, the myths indicate, leads to becoming a part of the landscape in one's own story or to an arrogant disregard for the needs of others.

Pan and the nymphs personify dangerous aspects of splitting caused by trauma. This sort of splitting, birthed in faulty notions such as exceptionalism, has resulted in a complex forming in the culture within which the vulnerable try to hide in apathy, shopping, and entertainment. This is where the shadow side of exceptionalism leads.

Accepting the animal in the divine and the divinity in the animal avoids the trauma of splitting. This suggests a psychospiritual answer is what is called for in these troubled times for America. Perhaps the myths of Pan have some instruction on how to do this. The nymphs cooled Pan's hypermasculine heat. They soothed him and helped him relax (Philostratus, 1931/1960). When Pan was not on the hunt, the nymphs were safe with him, he was their protector and they were his "dear nymphs" (Aristophanes, 2000, p. 579 [978-981]), able to get away with playing tricks on him. As a group, the nymphs were able to ensnare and subdue Pan's lusty and overly aggressive nature, but when alone the nymphs were less equipped to match Pan's power and resorted to self-destructive measures to escape him.

Night after night Pan led the nymphs in labyrinthine dances, where each followed all as the steps would flow from one rhythm to another. "Pan is not only the insistent lover in hot pursuit of the nymphs. He is also their faithful companion (*opados)*, their guide (*hegetor)* who leads them in dance on the flowery or wooded meadows, and who accompanies their rounds with his pipes" (Doniger, 1991, p. 505). Pan is symbolic of how trauma splits the psyche into complexes, but he also symbolizes how to remain vulnerable and open to the diversities in ourselves, even the monstrous parts. This choice leads to greater tolerance of diversity in others, in the natural world, and in understandings of the divine.

 [3]

Figure 4. Aegipan dancing with Echo. Red figure olpe attributed to The Underworld Painter. 330-310 BCE. British Museum: London, England. © Trustees of the British Museum.

In one version from antiquity the nymph Syrinx does not remain stuck; forever a reed. She evolves to an even freer state than she was as a naiad of the River Ladon. In Nonnos, a Greek epic poet of the fifth or sixth century, Syrinx lived on as one of the Bakhoi (1940/1062). After the panic she devolved to a vegetative state, but in this telling, Syrinx regained her freedom of speech and movement and then gained sexual freedom as well. She became a nymph in Dionysus' retinue. "Syrinx escaped from Pan's marriage and left him without a bride, and now she cries *euoi* to the newly-made marriage of Dionysos" (Nonnos, 1940/1962, p. 27 [XVI. 330-334]). In the ancient Bacchic revels, euoi (pronounced you-oh-ee) is a cry of impassioned rapture (Morwood & Taylor, 2002, p. 144).

She did not remain buried in the earth nor did she return as a virginal nymph. She was transformed into a feminine being with the right to choose her partner. In

the myth, emphasis is placed on her having a voice and sexual freedom (Nonnos, 1940/1962). She was able to enjoy running in states of impassioned rapture rather than running in a state of panic. The same story suggests that when the unmitigated phallic power, represented by Pan, experienced a vulnerable state of sadness and discovered a way to sublimate his frustration and sadness through music, the life giving nymph Syrinx was able to evolve rather than remaining frozen in a vegetative state. When the cacophony of echoes and wails of the nymphs and the pent up aggressions of Pan were transformed the result was music and rapture.

The American government, as the dominant power in the country in matters of international affairs, failed in any way to inspire the country to carry consciously the suffering caused by the terrible losses on 9/11. Instead of the government taking responsibility for having failed its people, it treated the public more like children. It is difficult to ignore the irony in Bush's reading *The Pet Goat* (Englemann & Bruner, 1995) (which he was inadvertently holding upside down) to kindergarten children when the first plane flew into the first tower. Military might and grandiose visions of a "Citty upon a hill," once seemingly invincible, are now a drag on America's future. Perhaps a lesson can taken from the nymphs, who were able to hold Pan's power and inflated tendencies in check when they grouped together to laugh, dance, and play in harmony with him. They did not exclude him, they even let him lead, but the relational kindness of those beautiful beings was able to subdue the strongest force in their universe, the Pan of nature (one meaning of the Greek pan is all), when they joined together. Perhaps, the antidote to an inflated vision of exceptionalism can emerge, as in Syrinx's story, when the aggressive forces in American culture begin to express their vulnerability rather then their might.

Currently the worst of the Pan archetype underlies a cultural complex, like an emotional disorder within the country. The US is faced with problems that are irresolvable from within this complex. Fortunately, an activated complex has greater potential to become conscious, and so containable, than when one is wholly in the unconscious; in the case of a cultural complex, if that process is to succeed, it will happen in individuals one by one (Kimbles, 2000).

Perhaps, the first step is to recognize the real and immediate fallout from faulty cultural concepts such as exceptionalism for modernity, next to ferret out the ways these concepts have unconsciously infected one's own psyche, and then to intuit how rejection of them can inspire the culture. The creative arts, and especially film, come to my mind as the vehicle through which contemporary society asserts the symbolic life of the culture, which "consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values" (Kroeber & Kluckhorn, 1952, p. 181). So much of current popular film expresses the adoration of the hypermasculine Pan archetype and how it symbolizes American strength.

Jungian analyst Andrew Samuels (1993) considers that "the characteristic of late modernity to try to make use of knowledge about itself can be recast as a struggle within our culture to become self-conscious; *our culture struggles to become psychological*" (p. 8). Kimbles (2003) suggests that awareness of cultural complexes might allow for "the creation of a narrating third, a space for symbolization, and the possibility of reflection …. The existence of cultural complexes opens the possibility that as a collective we might be able to do a therapeutic type of cultural analysis" (p. 232). A culture that is ready to become more conscious of itself can readily see that acts of terror are continuing to lead to acts of terror and that walls of military defense or naive nosedives into escapism are not working. Pan's aggression is symbolically contained through group ritual, and this suggests that the aggression in exceptionalism could be contained through group participation as well.

The expansive impulses, once alive in the bold spirit of the European colonists of America, have grown rusty and settled into a paralysis and fear of initiative towards contemporary American problems. This pattern is mirrored by American reactions to 9/11 and channels problems toward certain predicable results. Radical Islamists imitate American aggression and dominate using military cunning. The bullied becomes the bully. This pattern causes cultural complexes to multiply and like cogs in a cogwheel, force each other along in a lockstep of what appear to be inevitable, negative outcomes.

The US could get out ahead of the inevitable fall that the inflation of exceptionalism, according to Jung's understanding of compensation, will engender. Exactly how to go about that needs to be a debate in which depth psychologists contribute by attempting to articulate the shadow sides of the American culture. It is not difficult to see the results of the shadow — now is the time to see into the underlying cultural beliefs that are unconsciously creating Pan's "confusion and tumult" (Artemidorus, 1975, p. 118), and to intuit how the soothing, healing nature of the nymphs might emerge. Now is the time for depth psychologists to reflect on their responsibilities, not only to the problems of the individual psyche, but also to the shadow problems created by groups.

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Notes

[1] Though some of the categories in the *DSM-5* are controversial and it has not resolved problems of reliability in diagnosing (Spiegel, 2005, p. 63), its compounded lists of symptoms for psychological disorders are accepted as accurate within the American field of psychology and psychiatry (APA, 2013).

[2] An estimated 500,000 Iraqi children's deaths were the "collateral damage" during Operation Desert Storm and the economic sanctions against Iraq (Perice, 2006, p. 121). In an interview in 1996, Leslie Stahl asked then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright:

> Stahl: "We have heard that a half-million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And you know, is the price worth it?"
>
> Albright: "I think it is a very hard choice, but the price … we think the price is worth it" (as cited in Perice, 2006, p. 121).

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The One and the Many: The Significance of the Labyrinth in Contemporary America

Mary Hackworth

Unicursal labyrinths, with a single, highly circuitous path based on a medieval design, have enjoyed an unusual amount of interest in the United States over the last twenty years. They appear in such varied settings as churches, parks, hospitals, and retreat centers, their growing popularity coinciding with a time of deep political divisions in American society. The unicursal labyrinth closely resembles a mandala, suggesting that its current appearance is compensatory to the increasing fragmentation and growing diversity in American life. The labyrinth's popularity in meditative and recreational settings expresses a deep-seated wish to walk a heroic, individual path and connect this path to a larger purpose. As socio-psychological theories of the individual's relationship to society move toward an "embedded" model, the labyrinth, too, suggests a collective, perhaps unconscious desire to find a middle way between individualism and common purpose as well as shared ground amid competing cultural values.

Introduction

The unicursal labyrinth, with its single, winding path, is an image encompassing both shared experience and a private and individual way of receiving that experience. Although the multicursal maze is often considered a more fitting symbol of modern life, unicursal labyrinths based on the medieval design have enjoyed a great resurgence over the last twenty years. The medieval labyrinth, which closely resembles Carl Jung's description of a mandala, has surfaced at a time of division and contention in American history and may be expressing a wish to integrate individualism and common purpose. It symbolizes a way out of the imbalance inevitable in a society that prizes individual initiative while relying on participation in democratic processes to thrive.

Although I believe that the labyrinth's increasing popularity worldwide is in some ways connected with the American trend, I am interested here in reasons for the phenomenon initiated in the United States largely by the work of Lauren Artress in the 1990s. In this hermeneutical study, I will outline a theory, based on recent sociological and political research on fragmentation, the Jungian conception of mandala symbolism, and the emerging idea of cultural complexes, to explain the transformation of the labyrinth from a rarity to an object numbering thousands of

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installations in the United States alone. Several factors, including the erratic blend of individualism and community that characterizes American life, seem to be implicated in the medieval labyrinth's contemporary appearance.

Individualists in Search of a Country

The United States still celebrates the pioneers, explorers, and other "rugged individualists," mythic and real, of its founding. Nevertheless, the tension between the individual and the communal reveals itself in an uneasy dance between personal rights and the greater good (Thomson 631−33). Recent popular movies have expressed this tension, which runs like a leitmotif through the nation's history. The Marvel superhero movies, including *Iron Man*, *Captain America*, and *Thor*, all depict larger-than-life heroes with strong egos who battle villains. In *The Avengers*, we see the difficulties that arise when these outsized personalities unite to fight a common enemy. The film *Lincoln* portrays a similar tension in events surrounding the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment (to abolish slavery). Two stories emerge in American life: one asserts that there is no substitute for individual action, and the other insists that differences must often be submerged in pursuit of a greater goal.

Western idealization of the heroic individual has a long pedigree. Joseph Campbell identifies the thirteenth-century *Queste del Saint Graal* as a literary exemplar of the changing emphasis from reliance on authority (especially the Church's authority) to reliance on individual trial and error as the ideal path to knowledge (*Creative Mythology* 36−37). Americans are inheritors of this ideal; admiration for individual capacities and reverence for self-reliance are part of America's character as a nation.

Thomas Singer describes a series of "cultural complexes" that define America, among them the fundamental tension between individual rights and the greater good of the community, which surfaces in political strife over issues such as gun control and health care (167). In many cases, differing views on these matters align with liberal or conservative values, revealing the psychological dynamics behind the politics. Singer acknowledges the bitter conflicts these issues engender while pointing out that such debates are part of a meaningful struggle to craft policy and chart a course as a society. A related and no less important cultural complex involves America's struggle to define its place as a world citizen, a nation among others, with responsibilities as well as rights (170−71).

These complexes—autonomous, sometimes unconscious patterns of thinking and behaving based on past, traumatic experience and involving a great deal of collective emotion—are as old as the nation's origins. The United States was founded by emigrants from other shores, many of whom came seeking liberty from one form or other of oppression. Of course, the experience of those who arrived here in bondage or who were subjected to oppression from the newcomers is also

part of the traumatic past and has shaped the story from the start, frequently giving Americans cause to question the truth of the freedom narrative.

Injustices notwithstanding, opportunity could be carved out in America, but at a cost. Settlers coaxed a living out of the land with blood, sweat, and muscle, either their own or someone else's. Hardiness, determination, ingenuity, courage, and a strong back were all required. In history and folklore, American cultural heroes embody these admired characteristics, from the inventive Benjamin Franklin, courageous Tecumseh, and self-reliant Daniel Boone to the intrepid Amelia Earhart and undaunted Rosa Parks. Despite a history replete with racial, ethnic, gender, and other forms of oppression, Americans are proud of their "self-made" men and women.

On the other hand, our political processes require a spirit of community. Our reliance on cooperation is evident in everything from the barn-raisings and quilting bees of our rural past to the jury duty of our judicial system and the volunteer spirit that brings communities together in times of crisis to do what needs to be done. By preference a nation of do-it-yourselfers, Americans have traditionally been cooperative when pressed to accomplish the bigger jobs of protecting their communities, assisting those in need, and running a democracy.

The balance between the spirit of individualism and cooperation for the greater good is never perfect. As Singer and Kimbles point out, "Individuation and whole-hearted participation in the life of the group do not fit together easily or naturally" (Introduction 4). In times of stress and division, and even in times of prosperity and complacency, the threads of common good may be stretched or even ripped apart. The 1980s, for example, famous as the "Me Decade," were a prosperous time noted by many commentators to be lacking in social activism but heavy on wealth accumulation and materialism. In post-9/11 America, sharp divisions on the best way to counter terrorism, ensure security, and conduct foreign relations seemed to cleave the country in two, following on the heels of a historically close presidential election in 2000 (and succeeded by another in 2004). Since then, the media have talked incessantly of the rifts in American political and social life, political discourse has become shrill and at times uncivil, the spirit of bipartisanship in national government has increasingly become a thing of the past, and the divide between rich and poor seems greater than ever. Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, writing on a divided America in *The Righteous Mind*, notes that

> America's political class has become far more Manichaean since the early 1990s. . . .
>
> Before 1995, congressmen from both parties attended many of the same social events on weekends; their spouses became friends; their children played on the same sports teams. But nowadays most

> congressmen fly to Washington on Monday night, huddle with their teammates and do battle for three days, and then fly home on Thursday night. Cross-party friendships are disappearing; Manichaeism and scorched Earth politics are increasing. (362−63)

Could it be that with the end of the Cold War, much of the shadow once projected outward has now fallen inward, so that Americans see it more readily in each other? Could this be why so many of our battles are now internal? Indeed, former U.S. Senator Bill Bradley has implicated the Cold War and its either/or mentality in enforcing a dualism in American psychology that has "infected our politics at all levels of thinking" (24).

Fragmentation and Diversity

In assessing the social and political landscape over the last twenty years, one finds that sociologists and political scientists do not agree on the extent to which a "culture war" or fragmenting of society has actually occurred (Fischer and Mattson 437; Abramowitz and Saunders 543). Some commentators believe that the stridency in political discourse is an inevitable by-product of democracy and a sign of its proper working (Purdum 1); other studies have indicated that the perception of a divided society may be greater than the reality (Morrill, Knopp, and Brown 29). Still others say that political divisiveness has been even greater in the past (for example, during the Civil War) and that uniformity of belief and lack of conflict create problems of their own (Fischer and Mattson 436−37), a point with which Singer and Kimbles would likely agree.

Much seems to depend on the way divisiveness is defined. A 2014 study by the Pew Research Center finds that, compared with twenty years ago, significantly more Americans are now consistently liberal or consistently conservative in their political views and that these views correspond more closely to Democratic or Republican party affiliations. Furthermore, the most partisan members of both parties are likely to view the other party's policies as "so misguided that they threaten the nation's well-being." The Pew study finds that while *most* Americans have a mix of views and support political compromise, they often "remain on the edges of the political playing field, relatively distant and disengaged, while the most ideologically oriented and politically rancorous Americans make their voices heard through greater participation in every stage of the political process."

The perception of a divided America has permeated the collective consciousness and certainly seems evident at the highest levels of leadership, where cooperation on such issues as national security, gun control, environmental policy, and more has, as of mid-2014, come to a virtual standstill. Ideological differences over such flashpoint issues as abortion and gay marriage—exacerbated by political wrangling during recent elections—point to some fundamental divisions among Americans, conditioned by cultural complexes (Singer 163−64). Conflicts over

basic values like personal rights are often the most contentious type of conflict, and debates on these issues have been highly visible, not to mention exploited, in recent years (Morrill, Knopp, and Brown 28).

The perception of a society divided, even if partly exaggerated, has likely had the force of a self-fulfilling prophecy at times. In any case, widely divergent opinions and beliefs are a fact of American life. To add to the complexity, the United States is becoming increasingly diverse in terms of ethnicity, race, and other factors and is predicted to consist of a "majority-minority" society by 2043 (Lichter 359−61). America has been called a melting pot, but that chemistry has always been questionable, and in recent years, more and more subcultures, points of view, and value systems have emerged and clashed. Rather than leading to economic and social parity, greater diversity, Lichter asserts, could lead to more disparity and friction as entrenched powers attempt to hold onto their advantages and emerging subgroups struggle for a greater share.

While political conflict has lately gotten a bad name, especially in light of the Federal government shutdown debacle of 2013, it may, in the long run, be both unavoidable and necessary, say Singer and Kimbles. "A potential way of understanding the process of individuation in the group," they write, "is to think of it as the gradual working through and integration of the group's core cultural complexes over its lifetime . . ." ("Cultural Complex and Individuation" 237). This integration necessitates a thorough airing of contending viewpoints as well as "engagement, compromise, reconciliation, and healing after generations of recurring battle" (Singer 165). While Jung did not fully develop his thinking on cultural complexes, post-Jungians such as Singer, Kimbles, and Brian Feldman now see group individuation as a vitally important ingredient of social transformation. In propounding post-Jungian theories of boundaries and "psychic skin," Feldman describes permeability, the capacity to integrate more and more perspectives into conscious experience, as the quality that opens the way for

> change, transformation and growth, for the inflow of new ideas and new discourses. . . . This capacity for a primary social skin function helps both the individual and the groups in their evolution of identities. . . . Within the context of cultural complexes, cultural identities may be forged and transformed as the tensions between past history, collective memory, and present social discourses are encountered. (257)

From this perspective, some of America's current fractiousness is evidence of growth, even though the process creates stress and loss of equilibrium. This tumult is postmodernism with a vengeance: the noisy emergence of multiple narratives in

a country searching for new guiding myths to encompass a much larger, more varied, and more inclusive society than existed in the past.

In the midst of this maelstrom of racial, gender, religious, economic, and values-based conflict, a countering tendency to establish harmony has arisen, as Jung, in "The Practical Use of Dream-Analysis," predicts it must, without the conscious awareness of those caught up in the struggle. Jung describes compensation as a necessary part of normal psychic functioning:

> The psyche is a self-regulating system that maintains its equilibrium just as the body does. Every process that goes too far immediately and inevitably calls forth compensations, and without these there would be neither a normal metabolism nor a normal psyche. In this sense we can take the theory of compensation as a basic law of psychic behaviour. Too little on one side results in too much on the other. (*CW* 16, par. 330)

Jung explains that a one-sided conscious attitude is a danger that can only be corrected by acknowledging repressed attitudes, thoughts, and experiences. The collective psyche can be unbalanced by excessively privileging one value, such as freedom, at the expense of other values, such as cooperation and responsibility. Compensation calls attention to previously unrecognized or undervalued tendencies, beliefs, and attitudes.

Searching for a Center, If There Is a Center

In "Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation," Jung describes a psychological quest for wholeness, "the process by which a person becomes a psychological 'in-dividual,' that is, a separate, indivisible unity or 'whole'" (*CW* 9i, par. 490). There is, however, a paradox in this process, as Jung explains in "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," since the Grail of this quest, the center or the Self, is located both within and without:

> A more or less superficial layer of the unconscious is undoubtedly personal. I call it the *personal unconscious*. But this personal unconscious rests upon a deeper layer . . . [that] I call the *collective unconscious*. I have chosen the term "collective" because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere . . . and thus constitutes a common psychic substrate of a suprapersonal nature which is present in every one of us. (*CW* 9i, par. 3)

Whether at the individual or the group level, the individuation process is much the same. Emma Jung and Marie-Louise von Franz describe the "widening of the continually changing horizon of awareness" of individuation, in which a meaningful connection with this greater and more inclusive consciousness—the

universal, archetypal Self beyond the personal ego—gradually emerges. They speak of "manifestations of the Self, arising from the unconscious . . . distinguished by circular and square forms," which Jung himself calls *mandalas* (98−99).

Here we have the key to a centuries-old symbol whose current popularity might otherwise prove puzzling: the medieval labyrinth. This unicursal labyrinth, with its single, circuitous but clearly delineated path, is an image that encompasses both shared and individual experience. The unicursal labyrinth is distinguished from a multicursal labyrinth (or maze) by having only a single (though winding) path to its center. While a maze may have little or no symmetry and may not even have a center, a medieval labyrinth usually has both.

Although the multicursal maze has often been used in literature and philosophy as an apt metaphor for modern life, in all of its divergence, alienation, and isolation (Peyronie 714−19; Hackworth 20−21; Baker 83), unicursal labyrinths, notably those based on the design of the medieval labyrinth in France's Chartres Cathedral, have enjoyed a great resurgence over the last twenty years. This elegant, circular, stylized labyrinth, with its curving pathway moving gracefully toward a pronounced center, closely resembles a mandala. Thus it introduces a symbolic counterweight to divisiveness, social fragmentation, and lack of cohesion.

While the current interest in labyrinths is by no means limited to America, the movement received its impetus in the United States through the efforts of Lauren Artress, an Episcopal canon whose decision in 1991 to use the labyrinth as a meditative tool was inspired by a visit to Chartres and the work of other researchers, including author Jean Houston and architect Keith Critchlow (Artress 2, 4).

Significance of the Mandala

Jung, von Franz, and Aniela Jaffé have all pointed out that mandala forms are naturally appearing symbols of healing and integration that surface in dreams and artistic productions (*CW* 14, par. 660; von Franz 230; Jaffé 266−69). In his "Commentary on 'The Secret of the Golden Flower,'" Jung describes mandalas as circular symbols incorporating a quaternary or cruciform design (*CW* 13, par. 31). They often have a central sun, star, flower, or cross, expressing a dynamic point of origin and "the ultimate unity of all archetypes as well as of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world" (*CW* 14, par. 661). In "Concerning Mandala Symbolism," Jung says that their appearance "serve[s] to produce an inner order," such that "they often follow chaotic, disordered states marked by conflict and anxiety. They express the idea of a safe refuge, of inner reconciliation and wholeness" (*CW* 9i, par. 710).

Jung saw the similarity between medieval, Christ-centered mandalas in manuscripts and rose windows, the mandalas of his patients, and those of the Eastern religions; in all of these, he found cross-cultural vindication for his views on the importance of the mandala as an organizing principle (*CW* 11, pars. 136−38, 945−48). Referencing the mandalas produced by Jung's patients during analysis as well as those Jung himself drew during World War I, V. Walter Odajnyk explains that they "appear mostly in situations of psychic disorientation or panic" and that Jung believed his own mandalas "helped him maintain his psychic equilibrium" (22). Jung's insight that "everything points toward the center," derived from his mandala drawings, gave him, in his own words, "stability" and "inner peace" (*Memories* 197). Odajnyk notes that mandalas drawn by modern Westerners often have an empty center or consist of circles "sectioned into quadrants and other radial divisions" (20−21)—not unlike the Chartrain labyrinth, with its cross arms and open center.

If political polarization, growing diversity, and fragmentation are facts of contemporary life, the labyrinth, as a mandala, suggests a focus on recentering and discerning a common path. In keeping with Feldman's ideas of permeability, the labyrinth is not a closed circle: its single path leads from the outside to the center, and from the inside out. Thus, it symbolizes openness and movement as well as wholeness; it is a dynamic, not a static, image.

A Medieval Image Goes Modern

Since the early tenth century, the Christianized unicursal labyrinth, created by monks, has been circular (indicating divine perfection) with a cruciform pattern in its lines (Wright 21, 23) and a circle or rosette at the center—but the labyrinth is much older. An ancient form of unicursal labyrinth, most closely associated with Europe and the Mediterranean world, consisted of seven elliptical circuits "unchecked" on three sides, with an unexceptional center. This "classical labyrinth" has been found in petroglyphs dating back to Neolithic times (Saward, *Labyrinths* 20). Although its exact origin and original meaning are unknown, theories connecting it with ritual, nature, warfare, and the protection of cities have been advanced. While it is not a maze, the relationship of this labyrinth to Theseus, Ariadne, the Minotaur, and the labyrinth of Greek legend has been much debated. It is possible that several traditions, including an ancient ritual dance, natural structures such as caves, the existence of large, impressive, and confusing buildings (like the palace at Knossos), the myth, and the classical design itself—originally separate ideas—became somehow intertwined in the distant past (Kern 25−26; Saward, *Labyrinths* 20−23).

The "classical design" (and variations) eventually became a common motif on coins, pottery, and other surfaces and survived into medieval times, where it appeared in manuscripts, churches, and landscape labyrinths of stone and turf

(Saward, *Labyrinths* 42−47, 82−103, 120, 138). Monks eventually changed the elliptical design, rounding it, increasing the number of circuits from seven to eleven (eleven signifying the world's imperfection), and adding the distinct cruciform pattern (by creating "checked" courses on three additional sides) to give the labyrinth a Christian meaning (Wright 20−27). While the exact uses of this labyrinth during the Middle Ages are, like much of its history, debatable, it was a fairly common design element in churches, particularly in France and northern Italy. It typically appeared on floors and pavements, as in the still existing example at Chartres. Many church labyrinths were later destroyed as the concept fell out of favor, although labyrinths also appeared in other forms, as I have discussed in *Solved by Walking*, including garden mazes, illustrations, literature, and even dance and music (141−86). A nineteenth-century revival renewed interest in medieval labyrinths, and several were installed in English, French, and other European churches at that time (Saward, *Labyrinths* 112−17).

Archetypes of the One and the Many

In classical mythology, the Minotaur and the labyrinth may have represented primordial nature mysteries once approached through solar rituals (Kern 31−33) transformed into a tale of heroism. Since then, the labyrinth has appeared in many literary guises to represent a quest or a search for truth. As I have argued elsewhere, the distinction between the two types of labyrinths is crucial: its multicursal or mazelike form, reflected in the journey of the Grail knights, Childe Roland, the crew of the Pequod in *Moby-Dick*, and William of Baskerville in Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose*, and its unicursal form, in Dante's *The Divine Comedy*, John Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress*, and many medieval labyrinths, signify different kinds of experience. The first, a trip into the unknown in which all bets are off, has a choice of paths, and the second, a guided tour, takes travelers into territory that has already been mapped (16). From Plato's philosophical labyrinth of error in *Euthydemus* to the Christ-centered medieval labyrinths in manuscripts and churches; from the garden mazes of the Renaissance to the spiritual labyrinths of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century literature and art; from the dark, labyrinthine plots of Edgar Allen Poe to the labyrinths of knowledge of Jorge Luis Borges and Eco, labyrinths have appeared time and again as signifiers of either confusion or the certain path. I argue that both are searches for truth, but they use different approaches, one based on individual experience and the other on tradition, doctrine, or common wisdom.

These very different strategies form, across time, a philosophical "oscillation" between "structure" and creative "emergence" similar to the one described by religious studies scholar Mark C. Taylor, who writes that "such thought is

perpetually transitory and forever nomadic. It is neither simply this nor that, here nor there, inside nor outside" (11). This "betwixt 'n' between" status of believers and seekers, "[s]uspended between the loss of old certainties and the discovery of new beliefs" (5), corresponds in some ways to the secular situation of the United States today, caught between old ways of defining itself and new ones now emerging.

If Americans are indeed seeking a social, political, and philosophical common ground, the appearance of the labyrinth may be one indicator of that search. Although the labyrinth is perceived mostly as a tool for individual use, its resemblance to a mandala implies a broader significance perhaps not fully recognized. Odajnyk notes that "the unconscious is limited in what it can do. The symbols through which it speaks must be consciously interpreted and applied. Otherwise the symbols fall like apples to the ground, where there is no one to pick them up and eat them" (21).

From Round Table to Contemporary Quest

As we have seen, the medieval *Queste del Saint Graal* has been an especially formative myth for the modern West (Campbell, *Creative Mythology* 36−37). In it, knights of the Round Table enter the woods and search for the Grail, each in the place he judges to be right. The Quest results in the breakup of the Round Table (another mandala) and represents a shift from the unity of a shared vision and purpose to the solitary path of individual striving. There is no established path, and most of the knights take numerous wrong turns, "inevitably to err," to borrow Taylor's terminology. In protomodern fashion, *Queste* depicts individuals searching for truth, as I have suggested, armed only with their own abilities and conscience (16−17). Their challenges may sound very familiar to their modern counterparts struggling in a contemporary quicksand of changing values when strong communal ties are absent.

In *Occidental Mythology* Campbell explains how modernity measures meaning against the yardstick of individual experience. He calls the Grail Quest a trackless way, declaring that redemption of the wasteland is the errand of every individual once the certainties of tradition have been shaken and "there is no more any fixed center, any Mecca, Rome, or Jerusalem" (522). Jacques Attali concurs, arguing in *The Labyrinth in Culture and Society* that the maze is the proper metaphor for modern life and its intricate systems, including social networks, communications, the economy, and the World Wide Web (xxiii−xxiv). From this perspective, each individual is in a maze that interlocks with the mazes of others to form a larger network of mutual influence and tension.

Postmodernism's predominant intellectual position is an openness that recognizes multiple points of view, and its literature has explored the farthest reaches of individualism, seeing the maze from a subjectivist viewpoint in which

the concept of a single "center" may not even apply (Hackworth 20−21; Baker 84−85). A maze walker quoted by Artress describes her experience of mazes as being "effortful" in a way that unicursal labyrinths are not:

> As a truth seeker and pilgrim for many years, it was amazing to be on a journey that immediately revealed itself to me as a metaphor for my life. I always enjoyed mazes, knowing there was ultimately a way out but having to find it was a game I enjoyed. As I got older, the game became less fun, the mazes more twisted, the challenges more exhausting: another metaphor for my life. The labyrinth is safe, effective and inspiring. (qtd. in Artress 51−52)

As this example demonstrates, a maze is a byword for complexity and can even serve to illustrate individuation—particularly in its early stages—although today "maze" has connotations of alienation and a crisis of meaning.

So it was that in 1991, Artress became interested in medieval labyrinths after attending a workshop and then seeing the labyrinth at Chartres. She was conscious of the powerful effect—initially unsettling but increasingly "grounding"—the symbol had on her and began to think about introducing it to others as a meditative tool (Artress 1−7). The fact that her efforts to promote the labyrinth jump-started a movement suggests that, though she may have been the catalyst, the culture was ready for the concept, esoteric though it may have been.

As previously noted, medieval labyrinths (and variations, including the classical design of which the medieval style is an outgrowth) now appear across the United States in settings ranging from churches and parks to hospitals and museums; they may be painted, tiled, paved, woven into a carpet, constructed of canvas, or cut into a lawn and are usually designed to be walked on. Artress asserts that since the 1990s, the medieval labyrinth has entered public consciousness as a "blueprint for transformation" rather than "an oddity," as it was at one time (x). Moreover, labyrinths are not limited to meditative and ritual use; they also appear in secular and recreational settings and are often noteworthy for their ornamental or artistic value.

What Is the Appeal?

Advocates frequently describe benefits associated with walking in labyrinths. Helen Curry extols the labyrinth's ability to "help bring us into balance, giving us a sense of wholeness that is much needed for all of us whose lives ache with lopsided discomfort" (8). Saward describes an "increased calm" reported by labyrinth walkers as well as a "chance to walk the same pathway travelled by our ancestors, indeed to tread in the very same footsteps of countless visitors before us" (*Labyrinths* 205). Robert Ferré, who has installed over a thousand labyrinths

professionally, says that the current revival reveals an archetypal appeal, since the labyrinth "keeps appearing and reappearing in human experience," adding that, "Far from being a fad, I think the labyrinth appears periodically when it is needed. Our modern times are so far out of balance that a tool is needed that can help restore equilibrium" (11).

I suggest that the popularity of the unicursal labyrinth as a tool for meditation and recreation here in the United States expresses a wish to walk a heroic, individual path *and* connect this path to a common purpose. The two tendencies, though sometimes at odds, are not necessarily opposed. An emphasis on individual freedom can coexist with the need for a connection to something greater, a supposition given weight not only by Jung but also by the theory of embedded individualism described by Thomson (652−53), who has surveyed the changing relationship of the individual to American society across several decades of the twentieth century. A responsive, embedded individualism, though difficult to achieve and maintain, could be the balance America has long struggled to attain, as others, including James Hillman, have suggested ("'Man'" 59).

One labyrinth walker describes the paradoxical sense of individuality and commonality she experienced in walking a labyrinth: "It is amazing to me that the 'same' labyrinth . . . generates an incredible variety of experience and insights for each individual, just as we each walked 'our' path in a unique way" (qtd. in Artress 31). This description corresponds to what happens in individuation, which begins with finding one's own identity and matures into a growing connection with universal concerns.

Finding the Middle Way

Perhaps our continuing difficulty in balancing individual and community interests results partly from limitations in the way our culture defines the individual. Hillman challenges us to rethink the common American style of individualism, steeped in consumerism and "political passivity" and lacking in imagination and "aesthetic response" to the world ("Aesthetic" 144). He writes, "If we . . . seek ways to connect psychotherapy with social change, we must also *re*-imagine 'case material.' If we wish to release depth psychology from its confines in human personality and return study of soul, *logos* of *psyche*, to the larger world beyond the human, we must also draw our cases from pathologies in the culture . . . ("Psychology" 110). Hillman's sense of individuality *interiorizes* community, seeing the individual not only embedded within a social network, as Thomson and others have described, but also possessed of an interior sense of belonging. Hillman does not so much repudiate individualism as attempt to return us to the sense of citizenship he believes the founders of American democracy intended. He speaks of "widely differing individualities . . . each of whom is in pursuit of differing happiness and defends private domains" ("Right" 88). This style of individualism

implies a heady brew of diverse outlooks and opinions, very much like the contemporary scene:

> The differing individual imaginations manifesting themselves as differing religious concerns, geographical loyalties, philosophical commitments, and economic goals must be fundamentally affirmed, not dissolved in the ogre's cauldron called America, the Melting Pot. The founding documents assume these inalienable differences of imagination in the citizenry and so the Constitution had to provide means for negotiating differences—elective, judicial, legislative—as well as be amended by a Bill of Rights. ("Right" 88−89)

The type of inclusive *polis* Hillman describes may exist only imperfectly (and at best be a contentious affair), but the ever-increasing diversity of American society makes its realization more urgent. As Americans discover fewer commonalities of ethnicity, religious belief, and modes of life, the nation's founding principles of equality and opportunity may be the mechanism that provides a sense of national identity and shared ground. Without such a center, growing social divisions could result in unrest, increasing alienation among groups, and conceivably an actual fracturing along geographic or cultural lines.

The Paradox of the Labyrinth

It is hardly surprising that mazes of one type or another, with their built-in possibilities of confusion, resonate with the postmodern, multicultural experience. On the other hand, there are now more unicursal, medieval-style labyrinths being built than ever before, according to Saward, whose research encompasses the history of the subject from antiquity to modern times ("Re: Question About U.S. Labyrinths").

The contemporary fascination with the unicursal labyrinth and its proliferation in both public and private places indicates that, despite the maze of modern life—and maybe because of it—finding a center is still a desirable goal for many. This concern for a center suggests a wish for unity underlying the diverse wanderings of our highly individualistic and "self-reliant" society. Some psychologists, such as Edward E. Sampson, have questioned the possibility of successfully joining individualism and a strong communal identity in the same society, seeing them as too fundamentally different to admit of integration ("Debate" 21; "Challenge" 919); others, including Hillman, hold out the hope that the two tendencies can be balanced, albeit with difficulty. In light of this debate among American psychologists over the relationship of the individual to society, the reappearance of

the medieval labyrinth in recent years, redolent of wholeness and unity, is perhaps no accident.

Campbell and Jung agree that myths are both reactionary and revolutionary, a condition Wendy Doniger discusses in *The Implied Spider* (107). Symbols can become rigid, the way some aspects of the Christian church and its labyrinth became dogmatic in the late Middle Ages, a state Artress characterizes as "suffocating religiosity" (115). The maze, with its many choices, then began to represent not imprisonment but freedom, until at long last, it, too, by a process of reversal, became stale and confining (Hackworth 45). Prolonged pursuit of an individual path without a sense of connection to common goals and larger purposes may lead to selfishness and myopia, as it does when, in pursuit of the American dream, one strays too far into materialism (which Singer [166] has identified as another of America's most problematic cultural complexes).

Conclusion

In the contemporary world, with many voices demanding a hearing, it may be as important to recognize what all have in common as to acknowledge what makes each individual unique. America has commonly held values, chiefly, the belief in equality, freedom of thought and expression, and self-determination, so a centering point exists, at least in theory. When community is interiorized, says Hillman, "Then to ask in a therapeutic session about the political is to ask about Self. Then to pursue self-development requires community pursuits. Then one turns for confirmation of one's self-steering course—am I on track or off, am I repressing, am I centered?—to the actual community of one's actual life" ("'Man'" 59).

Doniger elucidates the dangers of pluralism carried to extremes. As she puts it, "The emphasis on individual cultures [or individual truths] . . . may lead to problems of infinite regress. . . . This emphasis tends to generate a smaller and smaller focus until it is impossible to generalize even from one moment to the next . . ." (67). This level of specificity makes a comparison of perspectives difficult. If they really have *nothing* in common, Doniger points out, there is no way to find underlying patterns and connections in what is merely a miscellany of unrelated experiences.

The unicursal labyrinth, while looking the same as it did a thousand years ago, symbolizes something different to Americans encountering it today than it did to a medieval churchgoer. While we do not know the specifics of the use of the labyrinth in the Middle Ages, the realities of modern life have encouraged a reflective, individualized approach to its use. It is no longer the single path to righteousness in a Christ-centered belief system or even the path of sin in a fallen world, alternatives discussed by literary critic Penelope Reed Doob in *The Idea of the Labyrinth*. It now represents the individual pursuit of meaning *as well as* the "universal" condition. Having experienced a welter of competing viewpoints,

Americans of the twenty-first century have a new task: recognizing the possibility of multiple truths while seeking the place where everyone meets. This search for connection is important. The health of our diverse society may depend on connecting the individual in a meaningful way to other individuals and the community—as well as to the larger world.

Should Americans lose hope in the face of the seemingly intractable political, economic, and social storms that have divided them in recent years? Despite evidence to the contrary, the answer is "perhaps not," if the appearance of the labyrinth mandala is any gauge of an impulse toward wholeness. America may weather its storms and become a stronger and more integrated society to the extent that it acknowledges its own cultural complexes and shadow, reaches out to its adversaries in a spirit of problem solving, and works toward inclusiveness in the form of greater economic and social justice. This is a tall order, most would agree—but not impossible. One need not walk a labyrinth to accomplish these goals, but its presence in our midst is a reminder: while America is a nation of individuals, its challenge is to work continually toward forming, if not a more *perfect* union, then at least a society that accommodates the tension of differences while itself remaining whole.

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So You Want to be a Change Agent

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This paper analyzes a range of theories of change agency for the purpose of exploring possible ways for individuals to practice social change that are inspired by Jungian thought. The methodology for this paper is a narration of various theories of social and organizational change. The study uses variations of the story of the Rainmaker, told by C. G. Jung, to explore the connection between individual and social change. The conclusion considers the contribution that Jungian theory can make to the resolution of the tensions that are inevitably engendered by the thoughtful facilitation of social change.

Individual Change and Social Change

Many Jungian scholars share a concern for social issues. The challenge that many of them experience when considering such issues from a psychological perspective is figuring out how their concerns can be translated into action.[1] The question of translating concern into action has resonated for me for some time, especially during the time that I was working on a degree in organization development, a field whose practitioners refer to themselves as "change agents." The exploration of theories of change agency that I undertook in an attempt to provide useful suggestions for Jungian scholars looking for a way to practice social change agency is the basis for this narrative.

We can get an idea of C. G. Jung's view of social change from the story of the Rainmaker that he used to illustrate the point that the place to seek solutions to social issues is in oneself (Jung, 1955–56, pp. 419–420). To summarize the story:

There was a great drought and when the situation looked to be catastrophic, the people called in the Rainmaker. The only thing he asked for was to be left alone in a little house where he locked himself in for three days. On the fourth day the clouds gathered into a great storm. When the people asked him how he brought the rain, the Rainmaker replied: "Oh, I am not responsible. I come from another country where things are in order. Here they are out of order, and I was not in Tao because I was in a disordered country. So I had to wait three days until I was back in Tao, and then naturally the rains came."

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Jungian theory, with its emphasis on the participation of individuals in the evolution of consciousness, is implicitly a theory of social change (Hart, 1997). However, since Jung held that the individual is the carrier of consciousness, any theory of social change based on classical Jungian thought must begin with the individual. "Jung emphasized that every change must begin with the individual himself and not with trying to improve other people; the latter he regarded as a display of the power complex" (von Franz, 2007, p. x). However, individuation is a social process because the individual becomes aware of the meaningfulness and purpose of the human journey, consciously and creatively related to the collective (Hart).

According to Renos Papadopoulos (1997b), individuation can be seen as taking place in three stages. We begin in a state of undifferentiated nature and move into a state of differentiated ego through a process of separation that establishes a collection of personal identities connecting with collective identities. The paradox is that as the ego becomes more differentiated, we become more enmeshed in collective structures. As we become more conscious, we become aware of our separation and develop a longing to return to oneness with nature. The only solution is individuation, which puts ego and nature back together again in the context of the collective.

Brazilian educator Paulo Freire has been one of the most powerful influences on post-colonial theories of change agency. In the *Cambridge Companion to Jung*, Lawrence Alschuler (1997) focused on individuation in relation to Freire's process of conscientization, the political development of the person. Conscientization also takes place in three stages (Freire, 1972). In the first, *magical consciousness*, people name the problems of their existence but feel no power or responsibility to change them. In the second, *naïve consciousness*, a person identifies problems in terms of individual oppressors. Individuals reflect on the causes of their problems in a personal context and may come to internalize the oppressor's ideology or may attempt to remove the oppressor. In the third stage of conscientization, *critical consciousness*, individuals can identity problems in the context of the community rather than just as personal problems. They are able to take collaborative action to achieve both self-actualization and transformation of the system. The goal of individuation is wholeness, while the goal of conscientization is humanization. Individuation supports conscientization in moving towards these compatible goals (Alschuler). The critical question, whether talking about individuation or conscientization is how individual change is connected to social change. In both cases, social change is impossible without individuals changing, and individuals cannot change without coming into a different relationship to the collective.

This question is both mysterious and fascinating and I have attempted to understand it through a series of metaphors. Individuation has been compared to weaving a tapestry (Moreau, 1997). The process of individuation is a process of

weaving oneself as a unique individual into the collective. The strength of the tapestry depends on the integrity of the individual threads and the care with which they are woven into the pattern of the tapestry. Individuation is also frequently compared to a dance (Moreau). Rhythm is a fundamental property of the structure of the universe, all matter and energy pulsating in continual rhythm (von Franz, 1974). All living beings follow the rhythms of biological clocks. Our own brains too have a rhythmic organization. Social change can be created (temporarily) simply by beating a drum in a repeated 1–2 rhythm. It takes only a short time before the heartbeat of every person in the room is synchronized to the beat of the drum. Individuation is an experience of the underlying rhythm of the cosmic dance, participating in the dance of life with the equilibrium of psychic wholeness, moving through ordinary activities in a natural, integrated, and spontaneous way. Social change, in this metaphor, occurs through the process of entrainment. Even if individuals can dance only to a faint echo of the cosmic rhythm, they draw others to engage simply through the power of the dance.

In thinking about the connection between individual and social change it occurred to me to ask what the Rainmaker was doing during the three days in his tent. Taoist theory would lead to a surmise that he was doing *qigong,* or "energy work." Such work might have involved calming his breath and clarifying his inner vision to achieve "an awareness of an underlying oneness through which we are connected to everything in the universe" (Bolen, 1979, p. 23). I like to imagine that he was moving his body in the motions of the *qigong* forms. These are based on the principle of circulating energy drawn up from the earth and pulled down from heaven and, thus, becoming a partner with heaven and earth in the cosmic balance. In fact, Roger Jahnke has proposed performing *qigong* as a method of social change agency. "With the widespread use of Qigong and Tai Chi, the purposeful evolution of individuals and groups is neither impossible nor costly" (Jahnke, 2002, p. 278).

Theories of Social Change

Although Jungian theory clearly connects changing an individual to social change, the dominant contemporary paradigm seems to involve the change agent in direct intervention in social systems. I have often wondered what happened to the country where the drought occurred in Jung's story after the Rainmaker departed; and have imagined a number of ways that the story might continue.

Return to Tao

Although the Rainmaker had to return to his own country, he had aligned the energy in such balance that the rains fell regularly for an entire season. However, the next year the land was again plagued by drought. The people remembered his

explanation that the rain did not fall because the country was in disorder. "If we want it to rain, the entire country must be brought into Tao," said the change agents.

Most contemporary theories of change agency aim at a transition from the present to some desired future state. However, social change has often driven toward a return to a former state to take a different path. The basic assumption is that something is broken that needs to be fixed. Although the theories are seldom based on the assumption of fixing a broken system, I have found it remarkably easy to be captured by it. Faced with the overwhelming scale of suffering in the world, we can easily get "caught up by the irresistible urge to do something" (Papadopoulos, 1997, p. 10). We start thinking that everything would be all better if we could just get rid of hierarchy, patriarchy, bureaucracy, Wall Street, exploitation, and pollution or if we could institute participation, sustainability, diversity, ecology and so on. After all, does it not seem a reasonable conclusion to the story to bring the country into Tao? However, such approaches lead inevitably to paradox and potentially to violence. What is going to be done with people who do not want to be in Tao?

For me the paradox of the return for a better start was difficult to work through. Although dissatisfied with the world and remaining committed to changing it, I also had not only to accept but to embrace the condition of the world as it is. If it is in crisis, then crisis is natural and should be faced not just with anguish but, with a full range of human emotions such as curiosity, humor, and gratitude. "The human struggle must abandon the fascinating attractions of archetypal possession in order to return to more human states of confusion, complexity, and suffering" (Papadopoulos, 1997, p. 25).

Adaptation: Change or Die

Although the Rainmaker was able to bring the rain, as soon as the year turned to the next dry season, the country again found itself in a drought. "Our climate has changed," said the change agents, "and we must adapt to living with less water. We will bring in technical experts who will show us how to plant low-moisture crops and design irrigation systems."

The basic idea of the approach of the return for a better start is to fix things and then stabilize them once we get them right. As in Plato's *Republic*, once the perfect social organization is established nothing need ever again be changed. Heraclitus, on the other hand, held that all things are in constant flux, but he also believed that change is governed by fixed laws (Hadas, 1950). The Gaia hypothesis is an expression of a similar idea in scientific language. "The Gaian idea is that life makes and remakes its own environment to a great extent" (Margulis and Sagan, 1997, p. 146). Taoist theory also sees the universe in a state of continuous change.

The *I Ching (Book of Changes)* "attempts to describe the Universe and its myriad changes and to reduce them to an ordered and comprehensible system" (de Bary, 1960, p. 192). Social change is conceived as living in harmony with such mutability.

Contemporary theories of change agency often see the reason for change not just as harmony or even effectiveness but as survival. Such adaptive theories are important because they focus on the boundaries and connections between humans and our social and physical environments. They see social change as not merely a quest to achieve human goals, but also as a search for our rightful place in relation to the Earth and the Cosmos.

However, individuals have sometimes been ambivalent towards adaptation and are often resistant to change. Although reality may be in a state of continuous change, most technological, economic, political, and cultural change is created by humans. In the endless paradox of creating change to adapt to the change we have created, we risk losing our connection with nature. Of all the tensions involved in a study of social change, I find none more troubling than the apparent polarity between human needs and the needs of the environment. I say "apparent" because humans are not really separate from nature. However, meaningful social action must constantly encompass this tension between human needs and environmental issues.

Values-Based Change: Social Construction

Although the Rainmaker was able to bring the rain, the experience of the drought had made the community aware that they did not have any way of coping with these disasters that occurred every few years. "We know we will have droughts in the future," said the change agents, "and we must find a way to distribute the water more fairly so that no one will suffer."

If reality is constantly changing then the best that social change can do is to adapt to it. However, social change can be a means of constructing reality according to certain shared values. Johnson (1982), writing on revolutionary change, offers a general methodology for these approaches in the synchronization of the structure of division of labor with the value pattern of a society (whatever those values might be). Social change since the Renaissance, for example, has often been based on humanist values such as tolerance, skepticism, and respect for complexity and diversity (Toulmin, 1990). Contemporary theories of social change often include values such as social justice or making a profit (organization development includes both). To me the most interesting models for change are those that value action based on knowledge. Examples of such knowledge-based theories include action research, active adaptation, participatory research, appreciative inquiry, and mindful inquiry.

Action Research

Action research was developed by Lewin and his colleagues, sociologists who wanted to find ways to apply their work in organizational settings. The basic elements of the method are diagnosis, intervention, and evaluation. Action research aims at simultaneously intervening in and generating knowledge about social systems. An idea often attributed to Lewin is that the best way to understand a system is to try to change it (Schein, 2012). His work has been very influential in almost all 20th century theories of social or organizational change. Most of these theories seem quite sanguine about the ethics of trying to understand a system by intervening in it.

Participatory Research

Participatory research, based on the ideas of Freire, is aimed at material well-being and socio-political entitlement without suppression of "traditional ways" by industrial culture (Park, 1993, p.18). Ordinary people who want to bring about change in their society are the change agents — the ones who both generate and use the required knowledge. Participatory research is based on the assumption that the "people's wisdom" is still accessible in the collective memory to provide a communal unity, especially in less-developed parts of the world (Park, p.19).

Mindful Inquiry

Mindful inquiry is another knowledge-based approach to social change that explicitly involves research (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998). It takes the goal from critical social theory of "expanding the scope of freedom, justice, and happiness" (p. 146) and, from Buddhism, of "the elimination or diminution of suffering" (p. 6). The focus of this approach to social change is on research that synthesizes aspects of critical social science, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and Buddhism that is linked to some project aimed at the above goals. In some respects, mindful inquiry is at the opposite end of the spectrum from action research. While mindful inquiry emphasizes ethical responsibility, it is not clear how this approach translates knowledge into a framework for action.

Active Adaptation

Theories of active adaptation provide approaches to change within a humanist framework. One example is the socio-ecological approach developed at the Tavistock Institute (Trist, Emery, and Murray, 1997). The key to this approach is replacing representative democracy with participative democracy, using methods such as decentralization and debureaucratization. The Tavistock authors expose the negative effects of representative democracy but do not voice any misgiving that participative democracy may have a dark side.

The authors of the socio-ecological approach have described a phenomenon they call *hyperturbulence,* which emerges when the environmental demands finally exceed the collective adaptive capacities of members who share the environment (McCann and Selesky, 1997). In a state of hyperturbulence, population growth and technological innovation drive increasing demands of social interaction as resources become increasingly scarce. The authors argued the need for radically different social institutions to deal with the hyper-complexity in our social environments. "To raise institution building to a new level of consciousness is a primary task of the present era" (Trist, 1997, p. 560). They pointed out, however, that such solutions can only be effective if the individuals using them are faring well in managing their own complex personal environments. So active adaptation explicitly intertwines individual and social change. Trist concluded that individuals are more adaptive to turbulence than the social systems in which they are embedded. "We must, therefore, put our trust in the resilience of individuals and their capacity to change systems and invent alternatives" (Trist, p. 560).

Appreciative Inquiry

The goal of appreciative inquiry is health and vitality in a social system (Whitney, Trosten-Bloom, & Cooperrider, 2010). Rather than taking problems as a starting point, appreciative inquiry focuses on a life-giving past to envision a preferred future. The methodology includes valuing the best of what is, envisioning what might be, dialoguing what should be, and innovating what will be. Although at first glance it is not a Jungian method, the inspiration for the approach is explicitly attributed by Cooperrider, the originator of appreciative inquiry, to a quotation from Jung (1967, p. 15).

> All of the greatest and most important problems of life are fundamentally insoluble. They can never be solved, but only outgrown. Some higher wider interest appeared on the horizon and through this broadening of outlook the insoluble problem lost its urgency. It was not solved logically in its own terms but faded when confronted with a new and stronger life urge.

With its emphasis on positive discourse, appreciative inquiry can be seen from a Jungian perspective as turning away from the shadow. This is often what has happened in the hands of practitioners who rigorously follow standardized models. However, quite the opposite can be seen when appreciative inquiry has been implemented without preconceived judgments of what constitutes "positive discourse." When members are asked what gives an organization or community health and vitality, they quite often find these qualities in the very capacities that have been suppressed and devalued. "Shining the light on people's strengths created an awareness of how many people in the organization were not affirmed for

what they were contributing to the organization's goals. They expressed a deep sense that there were many unsung contributors who had made the company the success it is today" (Fitzgerald, Oliver, & Hoxsey, 2010).

Paralyzed by Paradox

While change agents have had some success in implementing each of these values-based models, the intentions of the theories are not necessarily translated into outcomes. The results of many social change efforts have been constantly increasing demands by organizations on individual's time and energy. While I have found inspiration in knowledge-based change models, whenever I examine their assumptions in any depth, I become mired in paradox. How can we change a system without intervening in it; but how can we ethically intervene in a system that we do not understand? In fact, paradox seems to be embedded in every model of change agency—whether based on problem-solving, adaptation, values, or creating entirely new patterns.

Handy has pointed out that we live in "the age of paradox." The paradox of justice, for example, is that being treated fairly can be interpreted as being given what we deserve or as being given what we need. Is it fair, for example, for the people in the story to give the most water to the cities where the majority of the population lives, or should it be diverted to the farmers who grow food for everyone? And who should make such decisions? Julia Kristeva has highlighted another dilemma—the difficulty of dismantling the centralization of power that leads to injustice without taking over that power oneself (Oliver, 1993).

Examining the models through the lens of dynamical systems theory reveals yet another paradox. Social change can take place on a continuum ranging from adaptive modification *in* a system to radical transformation *of* a system (Sztompka, 1993). If the intention is transformation, then it does not make sense to engage in adaptive change because it merely brings a system into a new equilibrium and allows it to avoid fundamental change. On the other hand, radical transformation cannot be planned because the state of a system after such a bifurcation cannot be predicted or controlled. "The final state of a system cannot be predicted with certainty if there is any error (no matter how small) in the measurement of initial conditions. It isn't even possible to make a rough guess about the system's ultimate fate" (Peterson, 1998).

Few planned change efforts produce lasting social change because they do not is that they do not take into account the power of the unconscious. Theories of organization development and social change include dimensions such as structures, functions, boundaries, and environments (Sztompka,1993) but seldom refer to images, metaphors, and myths. Synthesizing elements of Jungian theory offers an approach that overcomes this limitation. Several authors have made attempts at a Jungian social change theory based on extending the Jungian model of the

individual to the collective psyche. In *Mapping the Organizational Psyche* (2003), for example, Corlett and Pearson derived an organizational analogue of the Jungian model of the psyche. I recognized from the conclusions of dynamical systems theory about the dependency of the outcome of change efforts upon the initial conditions that a theory of planned radical change was not a possible outcome. However, my efforts at a synthesis really came up against a wall when I came upon this quotation: "Nothing good can come into the world without at once producing a corresponding evil" (Jung, 1964, p. 77).

At this point I was so deeply mired in paradox that I considered giving up on theory entirely and went back to reread the *Bhagavad Gita,* which instructs that engagement in action should be an act of devotion and service. Values should be the ground of social action rather than the goal. So the question I might ask as a Jungian scholar is not how I can resolve social issues or achieve outcomes such as freedom or justice, but how to serve the process of evolving consciousness. "We know we want to get somewhere, but we have to relinquish control over the place we might end up in, and even consider the possibility of arriving nowhere at all" (Beck, 2012, p. 92).

Although the *Bhagavad Gita* provides some of the best advice I have been able to find for a change agent, it still left me in the grip of paradox. "Be intent on action, not on the fruits of action" seems to be in direct opposition to the guiding principle of "do no harm." And it is in dealing with tensions such as these that Jungian theory can be of immense value to any change agent. Whatever paradoxes one faces, they can be contained within the form of a mandala. I have always been drawn to the Celtic knot version of the mandala and conceiving of change agency in this way has allowed me to envision weaving together many strands that might be seen as opposites. My own mandala is always a work in progress. The form and content of the mandala is likely to be unique for any individual trying to come to terms with the paradoxes involved in the practice of change agency. "Each will ultimately write their own book for facilitating change" (Corbett & Pearson, 2003, p. 106).

The Practice of Social Change

Although my explorations did not result in a synthesis, they did discover a convergence. I found that many fields ranging from sociology to management have reached the conclusion that change agency requires a narrative approach. Postmodern theorists in particular have emphasized the small narrative: "a common story that promotes a bond between individuals in their daily life" (Rosenau, 1992, p. 85). Sztompka (1993) has found that narrative offers possibilities for mediating the tensions in agency in sociology. In organization development, Schein (2012) and Polkinghorne (1988) have both suggested rewriting stories as a change methodology. The change agent can assist "in the emergence of a new narrative that is more integrative and that addresses the tensions of the organization better than the old one" (Polkinghorne, p. 123).

Jungian practice is also based on a narrative approach. "Most psychotherapeutic systems, in effect, offer various forms of re-storying experiences so that they acquire a wider validity" (Papadopoulos, 1997, p. 21). The psychoanalytic approach has often been aimed at helping people to adapt their story within the narratives of their society. However, when the dominant myths of a society no longer give any meaning to human experience, it makes no sense to help people adapt to soulless myths. Instead, the attention of the change agent must shift to adapting social narratives to the need of individuals for meaning. The approach suggested by Papadopoulos is facilitating the construction of narratives that take into account the oppositionalities that are repressed in the collective shadow. It is the archetypes that provide the underlying unity that makes collective narrative and metanarrative possible (Gray, 1996). The system is brought back into balance by the activation of archetypes in the collective unconscious that appear as powerful images and symbols. In a culture that has split itself to become hyperrational, for example, they intrude to insert irrationality into our lives (Papadopoulos, 1998). A coherent narrative derives meaning from the whole of our experience and accounts for as many dimensions, including shadow aspects, as possible. The story gains coherence from metaphor, symbol, image, and art.

Conclusion

All change agents must discover and create a personal story for their practice. In my story, engagement in social change tries to balance action and knowledge. It is grounded in service, even when the intention is to bring about some desired outcome. It is particularly important to me to find ways to practice social change in a way that brings humans into harmony with their environment. It is also important to help individuals resist exploitation by organizations.

Although I sometimes become involved in interventions, these are usually projects that involve the use of narrative. One example is an organization that

provides storybooks to be used in drug prevention programs for children. I am particularly fascinated by exploring organizations to help them become aware of how their underlying narratives influence their behavior. One engineering organization, for example, was unable to make sound business decisions because their most valued narrative was that of technical heroism.

I also bring narrative into my research and teaching practice. For example, instead of using anonymous surveys for evaluation, I ask participants for a short narrative that lends coherence to their experience of the process. I have found that, for me, the best way to deal with the excruciating paradoxes of change agency is through creating, collecting, and telling stories.

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Endnote

[1]These observations are based on a number of papers presented at the 2012 Jungian Society for Scholarly Studies Conference, New Orleans, *Affect and Action: Psyche in a Time of Crisis*, which addressed such concerns.

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Hemingway's Francis Macomber in "God's Country"

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In 1925−26, C. G. Jung's Bugishu Psychological Expedition journeyed through Kenya, the setting of Ernest Hemingway's "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber." Although the two authors went to Africa for vastly different reasons, Jung's insights into the personal and collective unconscious, along with the discoveries he made while there, provide a lens through which to complement previous Freudian and Lacanian studies of the story. Francis, a *puer aeternus* and introverted thinker, overcomes his initial mother complex by doing shadow work with his hunting guide, Robert Wilson. As the story progresses, Francis makes the unconscious more conscious through dreaming and then connects with the archaic/primordial man buried deeply below his modern civilized persona. The essay thus resolves two long-standing critical cruxes: the title character makes genuine psychological progress; and his wife, whether she shoots at the buffalo or at him, targets primordial masculine strength.

In *Death in the Afternoon*, Ernest Hemingway states: "If a writer of prose knows enough about what he is writing about he may omit things that he knows and the reader, if the writer is writing truly enough, will have a feeling of those things as strongly as though the writer had stated them. The dignity of movement of an ice-berg is due to only one-eighth of it being above water" (192).[1] "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber," one of two stories that arose from Hemingway's African safari, is a fine illustration of the "ice-berg" principle. Since what lies beneath its action and dialogue are the characters' psychological dynamics, C. G. Jung's insights into the personal and collective unconscious, along with the discoveries he made while himself in Africa, are especially relevant. In the two previous decades, studies by Michael Vannoy Adams, Anthony Stevens, and Blake Burleson have identified Jung's African expedition as the provenance of many assumptions within his model of the psyche, but the trip-theory nexus has relevance to Jungian literary criticism as well. Like most studies of the story, the present essay is "traditional" rather than postmodern, though it *is* post-Jungian in acknowledging the essentialism and misogyny of Jung's statements about the feminine, along with the racism of his view of the primitive. Jung is useful in many

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respects, including the way his theories participate in some of the problematic cultural assumptions that animate Hemingway's story.

The Jungian rubric, however, is surprisingly absent from previous psychological approaches to "Francis Macomber" that sound much of the submerged seven-eighths.[2] To begin with Horst Breuer's view, Francis plays the role of the child who rejects "mother-imago" Margot and embraces father-figure Wilson (193−94). Joseph DeFalco also sees Wilson as "not unlike an authority-father figure" (203), and Richard B. Hovey views him as a surrogate father (126). Kenneth W. Harrow tracks Francis's progress through Lacan's three stages of the Oedipus complex—desire for the mother, repression of desire because of fear of castration, and accession to paternal authority. In another Lacanian study, Bennett Kravitz sees "the Macombers' marriage as a symbiotic relationship" in which husband and wife fill each other's "void of 'ego incompleteness'" (84). Using Penelope Brown's concepts of polite linguistic discourse to analyze the dialogue's psychological significance, Donald E. Hardy suggests that Francis forsakes "not his rational faculties . . . but the control of his own positive face" (132). Finally, in the study most relevant to my own, Michelle Scalise Sugiyama uses evolutionary psychology to analyze the dynamics among the three central characters. Margot's "female reproductive value" (143), Wilson's prowess in hunting, and Francis's ability to make money come into conflict, generating infidelity, sexual jealousy, and possibly murder. Although Sugiyama does not mention Virgil Hutton's well-known study, her evolutionary approach to Margot—that she is trying to maximize her options—sensibly augments his claim that "being upset over her husband's display of weakness" means that Margot does not really wish "to be the dominating female" (248−49). Instead, she simply wishes to be well cared for by the fittest male.

Although Sugiyama generalizes about "the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness" (143), there is no mention that the African savanna, as Jung knew well, is the place where our species evolved (a connection that Hemingway perhaps implies by setting his novel *The Garden of Eden* in Africa). As Burleson notes in his definitive study, *Jung in Africa*, that continent is "the ancestral home of the human brain"; it is "an established fact of paleontology [that] *Homo sapiens* originated in East Africa. We now know that we are all Africans" (18, 62).[3] The story's description of "the parklike wooded rolling country on the far side" and "the untracked, parklike country" makes it clear that the setting is the savanna where humans evolved (21). Thus Hemingway's modern characters enact ancient drives in the very place where evolution etched them permanently into the human psyche.

Along with complementing Freudian/Lacanian and evolutionary readings of "Francis Macomber," a Jungian psychological approach challenges the doubt that various scholars have expressed with regard to the title character's psychological

state in the moments prior to his death. They believe that his change from cowardice to bravery is "much too improbable" (Gardiner 188), that "the fate of Macomber's manhood [is] undecidable" (Strychacz 18), and that he "illustrates no dramatic change from boyish cowardice to heroic manhood" (Hutton 248), perhaps because his happiness is not "an integrative form of development, but [merely] an abrupt re-cathexis" (Breuer 195). The equivalent of these claims in Jungian psychology would be that Macomber's change is impermanent because he experiences *enantiodromia*, a swing between the opposites of negative inflation and positive inflation. DeFalco, however, correctly identifies Francis's experiences as "the journey toward individuation" (206), though the statement's Jungian resonance is left unexplored. For Jung, individuation means a movement toward psychic wholeness, or the Self, when the unconscious becomes conscious; in this fashion, greater psychic integration leads out of the inflationary cycle toward sustainable well-being. Hemingway hints that Francis's change is genuine and permanent, and this essay will argue that his individuation becomes clearer if the story is read through a Jungian psychological lens. In brief, Francis, a *puer aeternus* and introverted thinker, overcomes his initial mother complex by doing shadow work with his hunting guide, Robert Wilson. As the story progresses, Francis makes the unconscious more conscious through dreaming and then connects with the archaic/primordial man buried deeply below his modern civilized persona. Like the reader who must infer the seven-eighths below the story's surface, Francis discovers psychic resources that lie below the veneer of his comfortable lifestyle, "the fairytale world of high society" (Gaillard 32).

It is hard to imagine two more diverse figures than Hemingway and Jung—the macho sportsman and the learned doctor; but both visited east Africa, though for vastly different reasons. Hemingway went on a three-month safari in the summer of 1933, published an account of the hunt in *Green Hills of Africa* in 1935, and used some of the book's details in "Francis Macomber," which appeared in the September 1936 issue of *Cosmopolitan*. Jung made two trips to Africa: the first was to Tunis and Algiers in 1920; then for five months in 1925−26 his "Bugishu Psychological Expedition" (BPE) journeyed through Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and Egypt. Although his main objective was to study Africans' dreams, the trip afforded him the opportunity to observe what happened to himself, a white European, in a remote third-world setting. The resulting experiences and insights provide a relevant lens through which fresh perspectives on "Francis Macomber" may be discovered.

Jung believes that consciousness is not original to our species but rather that consciousness emerged in prehistory and is still developing. In his autobiography, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, he identifies the "original state of twilight consciousness" in which humans "had existed from time immemorial" and from which they emerged "to become aware of their own existence," that is, to achieve

consciousness as we know it (240). A lyrical passage in *Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious* describes how that transformation may have occurred:

> . . . I believe that, after thousands and millions of years, someone had to realize that this wonderful world of mountains and oceans, suns and moons, galaxies and nebulae, plants and animals, *exists*. From a low hill in the Athi plains of East Africa I once watched the vast herds of wild animals grazing in soundless stillness, as they had done from time immemorial, touched only by the breath of a primeval world. I felt then as if I were the first man, the first creature, to know that all this *is*. The entire world round me was still in its primeval state; it did not know that it *was*. And then, in that one moment in which I came to know, the world sprang into being; without that moment it would never have been. All Nature seeks this goal and finds it fulfilled in man, but only in the most highly developed and most fully conscious man. Every advance, even the smallest, along this path of conscious realization adds that much to the world. (*CW* 9i, par. 177; emphases in the original)

Noting the contrast to the natural world, which "was still in its primeval state" and "did not know that it *was*," Jung, in an imaginative reverie, experiences the moment when consciousness emerged from primordial twilight. The last three sentences of his statement evince both the primitive's movement from twilight to consciousness (the world's spring into being) and the aware person's journey toward maximal consciousness. In other words, progress continues in the present within each conscious person. It is as if the evolution of human consciousness and the individual person's individuation are not separate achievements. Rather one person's movement toward greater awareness mirrors the species' emergence from semi-consciousness, much as, for Loren Eiseley, the growth and development of a human being imitate "the long march" of evolution up through the eons: "Even so does every man come upward from the waters of his birth" (147).[4]

Although Africa is the locale where consciousness emerged, Burleson notes that Jung understood the continent to represent the unconscious (200). It follows that the human awareness that Jung observed there diverges markedly from his own highly rational European way of thinking. Unfortunately, some of his further conclusions about the psychology of indigenous peoples are in sync with racist assumptions. He believes, for example, that Africans, like children or adolescents, are dominated by emotion—"these people live from their affects" (*MDR* 239−44). As well, he considers them child-like in their *participation mystique*, a term borrowed from Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.[5] It is a magical mentality in which two things obtain: events are attributed to "so-called supernatural powers" rather than natural causes (*CW* 10, par. 113), and there is no distinction between the perceiving subject and the perceived object. Jung states: "For primitive man . . . the psychic and the objective coalesce in the external world. . . . Psychic happenings take place outside

him in an objective way" (*CW* 10, par. 128). Whereas modern persons achieve psychic differentiation, "primitives" are less differentiated (*CW* 7, par. 156). Being "primitive" means projecting inner content onto the world and blurring the difference.[6]

Perhaps *participation mystique* fosters the ability to see the basic unity of all life rather than divisions like the one between hunter and hunted. Jung's experiences, reported in his *Visions* seminar, bear out the point. One morning he was astonished to discover that a lion that lived nearby had left tracks outside his tent. The natives told him, "'It is not bad, it is *our* lion.'" Additional evidence came when Jung realized "the fact that leopards go hunting with you provided you carry your shotgun and not your big caliber gun; when you carry your big gun no leopard will appear." When his company shot a guinea fowl, the leopard made off with it before the hunters could reach it. The latter experience implies an almost intellectual process on the leopard's part, as well as partnership—human and big cat working together. Commenting on these episodes, Jung suggests, "It is quite possible that *participation mystique* with the non-ego means a certain change, not only in yourself, but also in the surrounding conditions" (qtd. in Burleson 135−36).[7] In other words, when one perceives the world in human terms, the observed animal returns the favor. A lion or leopard—dangerous prey—is no longer Other but brother. Of course, the main characters in "Francis Macomber" wish only to hunt and destroy great game, but the narrator describes the agony of the shooting from the lion's point of view. Although Hemingway went to Africa to take life and fancied himself a great white hunter, including the lion's point of view suggests that he may have developed some sense of life's overarching unity. As Carey Voeller states, "The beast's humanized, dying moments function as the key factor in forging the connection of humankind with the animal world" (232).

Participation mystique, however, is problematic when applied to an indigenous people because it implies a linkage between their race and their psychology.[8] A more fundamental, less controversial element of the primitive is that we as civilized persons have "those historical layers in ourselves" that link us to primitive times (Jung, *MDR* 244). In "Archaic Man" (1931), Jung states: " . . . it is not only primitive man whose psychology is archaic. It is the psychology also of modern, civilized man, and not merely of individual 'throw-backs' in modern society. On the contrary, every civilized human being, however high his conscious development, is still an archaic man at the deeper levels of his psyche" (*CW* 10, par. 105). Burleson explains that when humans evolved out of "the ubiquitous unconscious," they carried with them "an undifferentiated layer of the human (and animal) psyche" (16). This layer can be observed, Jung believes, in the daily lives of modern-day primitives such as those he encountered on the BPE (*CW* 18, par. 18, 1288). But because the ancient wellspring is deeply buried, a modern civilized

person like Francis suffers from malaise, psychic fragmentation, and a loss of vital wholeness.

In the decades when Jung's BPE and Hemingway's safari took place, journeying to Africa was considered therapeutic precisely because it threw the archaic in human psychology into bold relief. As Margaret Torgovnick states in her book *Primitive Passions*, "'The primitive' was widely valued as a way station or spa for men suffering from cultural alienation and psychic distress'" (qtd. in Burleson 15).[9] She adds that André Gide, D. H. Lawrence, and others including Jung visited the continent. Jung emphasizes the positive effect: " . . . these seemingly alien and wholly different Arab surroundings awaken an archetypal memory of an only too well known prehistoric past which apparently we have entirely forgotten. We are remembering a potentiality of life which has been overgrown by civilization, but which in certain places is still existent" (*MDR* 245−46). As regards accessing the archaic in the civilized person, Jung biographer Barbara Hannah notes that encounters with indigenous peoples and animals mean that "in Africa you are in a way meeting those layers *outside*. . . ." Her sense that Africa "is the country of the Self, not of the ego" has particular significance for Jung in light of his No. 1 and No. 2 personalities (172). Whereas No. 1 is "the ego-centered, time-bound person," No. 2 is "the Self-centered, timeless person of the collective unconscious" (Burleson 61). Jung went to Africa to seek relief from the stress of his clinical practice, the province of the ego, by researching the unconscious in others and by exploring its nether reaches in himself.

Such exploration of the deep unconscious can be perilous, as the Swahili word *shenzi* attests. In *Green Hills of Africa*, Hemingway translates the word as "a wild man" (180). Burleson states that it means "'uncivilized'" and identifies a series of English equivalents: "Going *shenz*i meant 'going black', 'going primitive', 'going native', 'going insane'" (188). In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung states that "going black" means sleeping with black women (262). Cleary *shenzi* has racist undertones to the contemporary ear; but Adams, in his helpful study of race, understands that the term, which is British in origin, also means "to revert . . . to an earlier and lower state. . . . To go black is to 'go back'—in time and space" (51−52). For example, Jung interpreted his dream, in which his African American barber in Chattanooga, Tennessee, applied a curling iron to Jung's hair (in order to make it "kinky" like "Negro hair"), as a warning that his No. 1 personality was in danger of *shenzi* because his No. 2 personality was reverting to an earlier, more unconscious state by succumbing to *participation mystique* (*MDR* 272). Although a more positive interpretation of the dream can be advanced, it was not possible for Jung who pulled back, forewarned.

While in Africa, Francis Macomber connects with the archaic psyche that is buried beneath his life as a socialite and sportsman. Before the trip and in its early stages, however, the ego dominates his superficial life. As Jung states, "The

predominantly rationalistic European [or American] finds much that is human alien to him, and he prides himself on this [difference] without realizing that his rationality is won at the expense of his vitality, and that the primitive part of his personality is consequently condemned to a more or less underground existence" (*MDR* 245). The duality has some of its intellectual roots in Friedrich Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, about which Jung comments in *Psychological Types*, chapter 2 (*CW* 6, par. 101−222). Schiller argues that civilization has diminished creativity, feeling, imagination, instinct, intuition, matter, and the senses in favor of analysis, empiricism, intelligence, reason, societal control, speculation, spirit, and understanding. He suggests that beauty and the "instinct of play" (part 2, letter 14) can be instrumental in uniting the opposing sets of qualities; and he sounds like Jung in stating, "It will be quite possible, then, that in remote corners of the world humanity may be honoured in the person of the negro, while in Europe it may be degraded in the person of the thinker" (part 2, letter 7). Schiller's interest, however, lies in classical antiquity, the Golden Age of Greece and Rome, not in prehistory or archaic man. A more personal gloss may have greater relevance: Jung's own dream of a multi-story house in which each lower floor depicts an earlier age. A stone age cave dwelling, "that is, the world of the primitive man within myself—a world which can scarcely be reached or illuminated by consciousness," lies beneath the cellar floor (*MDR* 160).

Francis's connections to the outer world through sports and other activities signal disconnection from this "underground existence," the archaic elements within the collective unconscious. The narrator enumerates these wide-ranging interests:

> . . . he was thirty-five years old, kept himself very fit, and was good at court games, [and] had a number of big-game fishing records. . . . He knew . . . about motor cycles [*sic*]—that was earliest—about motor cars, about duck-shooting, about fishing, trout, salmon and big-sea, about sex in books, many books, too many books, about all court games, about dogs, not much about horses, about hanging on to his money, about most of the other things his world dealt in, and about his wife not leaving him. (6, 18)

Ben Stoltzfus describes the statement about "court games" and other activities as summing up Francis's "essence before he goes to Africa" (220); and Carl P. Eby, who identifies guns as phallic symbols, "suspect[s] that Hemingway's guns were seldom *just* guns" (283−84 and n. 4). Similarly, Breuer understands "sex in books" as signaling "phallic deficiency" (194). Jung too would see the canalization of sexual libido in Francis's hobbies: "In men, sexuality if not acted out directly, is frequently converted into a feverish professional activity or a passion for dangerous sports, etc., or into some learned hobby, such as a collecting mania," like saving

money (*CW* 3, par. 105).[10] Not only do Francis's activities substitute for the inner work he needs to do; they also fall short of Jung's idea of American sports, which, being ruthless, brutal, savage, and gladiatorial, suggest "a glimpse of the Indian" and manifest, in spectators, "ancient instincts that are akin to bloodlust" (*CW* 10, par. 100 and 977).

Although Francis is now thirty-five years old, his list of hobbies implies a sense of arrested development. Wilson underscores his client's status as a boy-man by calling him "'laddybuck'" (20) and by thinking that "his American face . . . would stay adolescent until it became middle-aged" (8). "It's that some of them stay little boys so long, Wilson thought. Sometimes all their lives. Their figures stay boyish when they're fifty. The great American boy-men" (25−26). Although Burleson is not writing about the story, he helpfully brings together Hemingway and Jung via a key concept that applies to the immaturity that Wilson recognizes in Francis: "There is exhilaration in living life on the thin line between life and death, and Africa, as Ernest Hemingway discovered, provided the perfect masculine playground for this edge. From a Jungian perspective, this phenomenon might best be understood as the problem of the *puer aeternus*" (32). Some of the characteristics of the eternal child that Jung's associate Marie-Louise von Franz enumerates fit Francis well. Such a person is between thirty and forty-five years of age, has a mother complex, and engages in dangerous sports in an attempt to separate from the mother (1). Flying is the example given, but big game hunting can be equally fatal.[11] Francis does engage in hunting and does have a mother-wife, but other characteristics of the *puer* do not fit him precisely. He does not fantasize ineffectually about future plans but merely knows that Margot will never leave him. Insofar as Jung understands that work is the cure for *puer aeternus* (5), Francis seems poised, despite his past attraction to "court games" and "sex in books," to make psychological progress toward greater maturity.

The passage's resonance with Jungian typology yields further insight into Francis's personality. Knowing about "sex in books," along with emphasis on many "books, too many books," implies that Francis, although "very tall, very well built . . . [and] considered handsome" (6), is not a man of deep sexual experience and that he would really rather just read. Being certain that Margot will not leave him suggests that she might want to, perhaps because of sexual inadequacy that motivates her frequent promiscuity. The narrator states, "If he had been better with women she would probably have started to worry about him getting another new, beautiful wife" (18). Francis's problem is at least, as Hovey suggests, "a timidity whose mark is lack of self-assertion" (124). Together, the information about "sex in books" and awkwardness with women suggests that Francis is an introverted thinker, which makes him easy prey for manipulation by extroverted Margot, whose beauty "had, five years before, commanded five thousand dollars as the price of endorsing, with photographs, a beauty product which she had never used"

(6). Further evidence of her extroversion is that she kisses Wilson on the mouth in front of her husband, something an awkward introvert would be loath to do.

With proper caveats in place, an educated guess as to Francis's full personality type is possible: ISTP, which represents introverted, sensing, thinking, and perceiving. According to "Portrait of an ISTP," such a person has an adventuresome spirit, thrives on action, and is attracted to dangerous activities like riding motorcycles. ISTPs tend to be good athletes and have good hand-eye coordination ("kept himself very fit, and was good at court games"); follow through with a project, especially one that involves logical analysis ("hanging on to his money"), and are good at a variety of tasks (motor cars, duck-shooting, fishing, sports, dogs). Also, ISTP is loyal, trusting, and patient—qualities that the narrator implies at the end of the "sex in books" paragraph: " . . . he had always a great *tolerance* which seemed the nicest thing about him if it were not the most sinister" (18; emphasis added). If Francis as ISTP is an educated guess, Margot's type is merely a guess—it is harder to pin down because the narrator comments on so little of her interior life; however, ENFJ (extraverted, intuitive, feeling, judging) captures some of her characteristics. ENFJs are people persons first and foremost, but "Portrait of an ENFJ" suggests a shadow side: they are manipulative and controlling and can easily get under people's skin; they can also be fussy and may judge too quickly. Although the two portraits seem to match Francis and Margot, an exact, reductive identification is neither possible nor desirable, for they are rounder characters than case study allows. The more important point is that they are mismatched and have married for the wrong reasons. Francis's money and Margot's beauty ("His wife had been a great beauty" [18]) bring them together, and significant friction is inevitable between a man and a woman who approach the world differently. Francis's interest in dangerous action brings him to Africa, and Margot dutifully accompanies him; but when inexperience results in an atypical failure to handle a crisis, consequences ensue: his wife becomes picky and judgmental; he in turn becomes over-stressed and angry.

Francis, an introverted *puer*, has arrived at chronological adulthood without achieving full manhood. Instead, sports and his other interests function as an avoidance mechanism—the American equivalent of failure to participate in tribal rites of passage. Jung knows that, in "primitive" societies, chronological age is an insufficient marker of adulthood. A male must also separate from the mother and abandon his childish ways while undergoing "initiation into the 'men's house' and ceremonies of rebirth"; afterwards a mother is sometime not allowed to speak with her son (*CW* 7, par. 314; 18, par. 363). Here one may reprise the criticism of Robert Bly's promotion of "'male initiations' to wean boys from the dangerous contaminations of maternal influences" (Rowland 17). In other words, Bly overlooks gender's cultural subjectivity in order to promote the essentialist idea that a man achieves the authentic Masculine by eschewing the authentic Maternal.

Still, there is some value in tribal initiation rituals for modern men, and Jung predicts the consequences of improperly navigating the path to individuation.

> The modern civilized man has to forgo this primitive but nonetheless admirable system of education. The consequence is that the anima, in the form of the mother-imago, is transferred to the wife; and the man, as soon as he marries, becomes childish, sentimental, dependent, and subservient, or else truculent, tyrannical, hypersensitive, always thinking about the prestige of his superior masculinity. (*CW* 7, par. 316)

Marital dysfunction arises when the order of individuation is violated. For Jung, "If the encounter with the shadow is the 'apprentice-piece' in the individual's development, then that with the anima is the 'master-piece'" (*CW* 9i, par. 61). A tribal youth does his shadow work in the men's house and weds only after achieving full manhood. Otherwise, he is ill-equipped to deal with his mate. Perhaps with Circe in mind, Jung emphasizes the need for such preparedness in stating that "when animus and anima meet, the animus draws his sword of power and the anima ejects her poison of illusion and seduction" (*CW* 9ii, par. 30). The statement works if standard definitions of "animus" and "anima" are held in mind, but he appears to be referring simply to male strength and female seduction. Without the sword of masculine power, a man succumbs to feminine illusion, which in Francis's case involves a mother complex. Lacking the masculine strength of Odysseus, he has attempted the "master-piece" in marriage with Margot before laying the foundational "apprentice-piece" with other men. As a result, their marital interaction sounds at times like a whining son and a long-suffering mother.

> "You won't leave me."
>
> "No," she said. "I won't leave you and you'll behave your self."
>
> "Behave myself? That's a way to talk. Behave myself."
>
> "Yes. Behave yourself."
>
> "Why don't *you* try behaving?"
>
> "I've tried it so long. So very long." (20)

Hemingway modeled Margot after Jane Mason, with whom he had had an affair in Havana (Flora 76) and whom he considered the "'worst bitch'" he had ever known, though she possessed an admirable "eagerness to get laid" (Gardiner 188). Jane is no doubt in the background when Wilson reflects on "American female cruelty": "They are, he thought, the hardest in the world; the hardest, the cruelest, the most predatory and the most attractive and their men have softened or gone to pieces nervously as they have hardened." He goes on: "She's damn cruel but they're all cruel. They govern, of course, and to govern one has to be cruel sometimes. Still, I've seen enough of their damn terrorism" (9−10). Hutton aptly

points out "that Wilson criticizes Margaret for what he himself practices on the native boys" (241). The guide's statements, therefore, are examples of projection. In addition, Hemingway/Wilson is not a solo voice; Jung, another adulterous man of his time, sounds the same misogynistic note that accompanies the story.

> I asked myself whether the growing masculinization of the white woman is not connected with the loss of her natural wholeness (*shamba*, children, livestock, house of her own, hearth fire); whether it is not a compensation for her impoverishment; and whether the feminizing of the white man is not a further consequence. The more rational the polity, the more blurred is the difference between the sexes. (*MDR* 263−64)[12]

The statement also illustrates Jung's essentialist position that there is a standard Feminine from which individual women deviate at their peril. That said, it is true that the Macombers are childless. Lacking children of her own, perhaps Margot treats her husband like one. As well, the further away from the men's house a modern male strays, the more feminine he becomes. As humans become more "rational" (conscious) and more distant from the archaic layer, traditional gender roles become redefined. Although feminists would not necessarily favor such conclusions, misogynistic thinking does illuminate the dysfunctional Macombers to some degree. Jung's statement is relevant to Hemingway's story precisely because both men reflect the sexism of their time.

Hovey notes that Margot "is a Goneril-Regan in her bitchhood, more monster than woman" (126). Trouble arises when Lear makes his disrespectful daughters his surrogate mothers, and they mistreat him because doing so aligns with self-interest. Something similar happens in "Francis Macomber," but this time, in Breuer's words, "mother and wife merge as 'bitch'" (196). The formulation *mother + wife = bitch* is a function of Francis's psychology as much as of Margot's. Their psycho-dynamics, however, involve not only Francis's mother complex but also Margot's animus possession. In describing the condition, Jung could not have been more accurate if he had had the Macombers—or Lear's elder daughters—in mind: "Turned towards the world, the anima is fickle, capricious, moody, uncontrolled and emotional, sometimes gifted with daemonic intuitions, ruthless, malicious, untruthful, bitchy, double-faced, and mystical. The animus is obstinate, harping on principles, laying down the law, dogmatic, world-reforming, theoretic, word-mongering, argumentative, and domineering" (*CW* 9i, par. 223).[13] Statements like this underlie Susan Rowland's critique of "Jung's erotic anima [as being] dangerous when substantiated into fantasies of female deviousness and power" (17). As Richard Fantina speculates, "While the misogyny is unmistakable, perhaps Hemingway had more in mind than the portrait of a simply vicious woman" (157). Perhaps bitchery is to the tip of the iceberg as Margot's "animus possession" is to the submerged seven-eighths. Even worse, in terms of Jung's "stages of eroticism,"

Margot merges not only Mary (mother) and Eve (wife) but also Helen (whore).[14] DeFalco rightly calls Margot a "dangerous mother-temptress" (203). How can Francis as husband-son successfully relate to Margot as wife-mother, especially when she also plays the role of whore? The final feminine figure in Jung's quartet of stages, Sophia (wisdom), plays no part in the inner life of the story's lone female character, who appears not to be the sympathetic and "heroic" figure whose reputation Nina Baym tries to rehabilitate (118).

There are four types of women in Jung's stages of eroticism and four "persons" in his quaternity (Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and Satan). The number four is also central for Jung in a group setting that requires prolonged, purposeful action. He comments in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* on "the archetype of the triad, which calls for the fourth to complete it, as we have seen again and again in the history of this archetype" (261). The BPE was originally conceived as a triad—Jung and his associates Peter Baynes and George Beckwith, a group that would probably have imploded if an English woman named Ruth Bailey had not joined the expedition. Francis, Margot, and Wilson—as a triad—have no fourth to round out the group and relieve the tensions that arise when Francis (son) disappoints Margot (mother) through cowardice, Wilson (father) fornicates with her, and Francis's values begin to shift toward Wilson's. In this Freudian interpretation of the story, Wilson functions as a father figure to Francis in order to help him separate from the mother-wife. Jungian theory, however, places greater emphasis on a male's accomplishment of the "apprentice-piece," shadow work with another man: Francis projects his shadow onto Wilson; as a result, his interaction with Wilson brings to consciousness an important aspect of himself.

Vastly different though the two men may be (Francis, a boy-man; Wilson, a professional killer and probably a World War I veteran), they share a common typology: introverted thinking. As previously noted, Wilson thinks about Francis's boyishness and Margot's bitchery. Wilson also thinks about killing, a matter on which he "had his own standards" (21) so that, when Francis proposes allowing the lion to die on its own, Wilson "suddenly felt as though he had opened the wrong door in a hotel and seen something shameful" (15). The narrator registers the hunter's visceral reaction as an analogy because even when Wilson *feels*, he *thinks*. When Francis's act of cowardice sours relations with Margot, Wilson makes a decision that signals an introversion reminiscent of Francis's knowledge of "sex in books": "He would eat, then, by himself and could read a book with his meals" (8). Lack of feeling, which is implied by "his flat, blue, machine-gunner's eyes" (8), veers into cruelty as he thinks about the fornication with Margot: "Well, it was the poor sod's own bloody fault." She makes the same point with equal lack of feeling: "'Yes, darling. That's the way I meant it to be [she had promised not to sleep with other men on the safari]. But the trip was spoiled yesterday [when Francis acted like a coward; therefore, her behavior is his own fault]'" (19). Then, in a moment

of twisted logic, Wilson justifies his behavior by thinking that "their standards were his standards as long as they were hiring him" (21). Since Francis is paying for the trip, his standard (no adultery) ought to be foremost in the guide's mind.[15]

Francis's panicked cowardice, his flight from a lion, is put in terms of another animal: "'I bolted like a rabbit,' Macomber said" (8). The image resonates with Margot's image a page later when she describes the eland he has killed: "'They're big cowy things that jump like hares, aren't they?' 'I suppose that describes them,' Wilson said." Macomber's rejoinder—that eland "'are very good meat'"—indicates that he does not grasp the parallelism of *bolted like a rabbit* and *jump like hares* or the implication of hunting prey that are "'not dangerous'" unless "'they fall on you'": namely, that he, in his cowardice, is a big cowy thing himself. The image of the fleeing rabbit takes on further significance in light of Hope B. Werness's statement that in art "the rabbit symbolized lust, and the image of a knight fleeing from a hare was a Medieval symbol of cowardice" (340). Francis's use of the rabbit image condenses the cowardice of his flight and the sexual desire that he feels for mother-Margot. What of the lion? In Jung's *Collected Works* the lion is indexed as a symbol of the Self, and it also "stands for the danger of being swallowed by the unconscious" (*CW* 9i, par. 315; 5, par. 277). The image of fleeing *like* a rabbit *from* a lion, then, suggests that Francis's initial response to the shadow work he must do with Wilson is to flee back to the comfort of the mother figure, followed by negative inflation (self-loathing).

Francis's lapse into cowardice is also a sign of a hyperactive imagination. Hemingway once stated, "'Cowardice . . . is almost always simply a lack of ability to suspend the functioning of the imagination'" (qtd. in Young 72). Overactive imagination may be the psychology behind "the Somali proverb that says a brave man is always frightened three times by a lion: when he first sees his track, when he first hears him roar and when he first confronts him" (11). Francis's panic simply illustrates the point. If lions frighten even brave men, his problem may be not that he is a despicable coward but that he is simply a novice big game hunter, as the narrator suggests: "He was dressed in the same sort of safari clothes that Wilson wore except that his were new . . . " (6). Even Jung, who went to Africa to explore the unconscious, panicked on two occasions. In one instance, fearing injury, he had to crack a whip and yell curses in German to get a group of dancing natives to end their festivities. In another that Adams calls "a paranoid delusion," he spent thirty minutes in the bush feeling as if unseen eyes were watching him (73). As Jung would agree, the point is that being frightened by a lion, dancing natives, or unseen eyes is not a badge of dishonor unless a man first pretends to be something he is not. Or as Hutton rightly states, "fear does not necessarily indicate cowardice" (247).

Whereas Francis's flight seems to indicate fear of the unconscious, he accomplishes some genuine inner work when he dreams "of the bloody-headed lion

standing over him, and listening while his heart pounded" (18). To say merely that the "lion symbolizes death," as Stoltzfus does, is an oversimplification (221). In Hovey's view, the dream is part day residue and part a reaction to fear of being "killed or hurt by the father" (226, n. 16). For Bert Bender, the bloody lion is "an image not only of primitive suffering, courage and violence, but also of the red-faced Wilson who is at this moment 'standing over' Francis by cuckolding him" (96). Breuer considers the dreamer's subordinate vantage point to indicate a feminine position, and he notes that Francis awakens to discover a Freudian "primal scene" (194). A Jungian interpretation begins with the distinction Jung discovered on the BPE between Africans' big dreams and little dreams. Big dreams are significant for a whole clan; they are archetypal, collective, God-sent, mythological, numinous, and prophetic. Little dreams are significant merely to individual persons. Francis's dream is a little dream whose most important characteristic is its anticipatory quality. The bloody-headed lion harkens back to the events of the day (Wilson blew part of the charging lion's head off; Wilson has a red face), but it also looks ahead to the final scene in which Margot shoots Francis in the head. Jung is quite clear about "the aid of warning dreams" (*MDR* 245) and their role in both anticipating danger and identifying the need for inner work. Sometimes even a little dream can participate in the numinous:

> . . . in normal people, archaic dream-products with their characteristic numinosity appear mainly in situations that somehow threaten the very foundations of the individual's existence, for instance in moments of mortal danger, before or after accidents, severe illnesses, operations, etc., or when psychic problems are developing which might give his life a catastrophic turn, or in the critical periods of life when a modification of his previous psychic attitude forces itself peremptorily upon him, or before during, and after radical changes in his immediate or his general surroundings. (*CW* 3, par. 566)[16]

Francis's lion dream, then, represents his fear of the lion (his pounding heart), Wilson's superiority in hunting and sex, and Francis's ultimate fate. But since the lion is a symbol of wholeness, the dream of a bloody-headed lion also implies that blood sport will bring him closer to the Self and that he will end up a dead lion rather than a live rabbit—that his final moments will constitute a short, happy life.

Francis's dream also moves him closer to the archaic layer whose vitality is a crucial element of his brief happiness. The *East African Standard*, a Nairobi newspaper that reported on Jung's BPE, supports this archeological role of dreams: "'The primitive in man in the European has been found to become active when the individual is asleep . . . '" (qtd. in Burleson 142).[17] The dream nudges Francis's psyche in that deeper direction; but there is an intermediate step between dreaming and connecting with his hidden primordial strength: anger at Wilson for

"'topping'" Margot (19). Breuer accurately describes Francis's transformation as "the repudiation of the mother, and an unqualified embracing of the father's mental world" (194−95). Of course, Francis is clearly not embracing father-Wilson (he refers to him as "red-faced swine" and "had no fear, only hatred of Wilson" [20, 22]); but Francis does shift to Wilson's "mental world" by setting aside thought and imagination in order to funnel his rage into the hunt, becoming at this moment a more complete man. When an introverted thinker embraces emotion (Jung's term is the "inferior function" because it is secondary to thinking), psychic progress is possible. As a result, the next time he shoots he "felt a drunken elation" and "had never felt so good" (23). The transformation is especially significant because he is hunting a "Cape buffalo, known in East Africa for its fierceness" (Oliver 331). After the admission that he was frightened during the pursuit, fear simply lifts: "For the first time in his life he really felt wholly without fear. Instead of fear he had a feeling of definite elation," "delight," "a wild unreasonable happiness," and "pure excitement" (24−25). Before, he canalized his sexual libido into sports and other activities; now, as he channels his rage at Wilson into the hunt, the strength of the deep unconscious, "'the *primordial man*, the two million-year-old man within us all, the positive shadow," awakens (Stevens qtd. in Burleson 61; emphasis in the original).[18] Now when he shoots at the second pig-eyed buffalo—as "he shot again at the wide nostrils and saw the horns jolt again and fragments fly" (27)—he is shooting not just to kill Wilson, the swine, but also to blow the cuckold's horns off himself. Several lines later, Margot's bullet hits the back of his head and blows his face off.[19]

Hemingway provides several hints that Francis's new mental state is not a temporary cathexis, positive inflation, or *enantiodromia* but instead a permanent condition. Wilson thinks of it this way: "More of a change than any loss of virginity. Fear gone like an operation. Something else grew in its place. Main thing a man had. Made him into a man. Women knew it too. No bloody fear" (26). For Francis, the experience is akin to "a dam bursting" (25). Surgical removal, loss of virginity, and a bursting dam are one-way trips that allow no going back. In place of fear there now grows "something else," a primordial strength that will brook no more infidelity. Margot knows genuine masculine strength when she sees it and is now "very afraid." When she comments on his bravery, "Macomber laughed, a very natural hearty laugh," which bespeaks self-esteem, well-being, and wholeness. When she asks if it is not "'sort of late,'" and he replies, "'Not for me,'" she knows that he may leave her; he will no longer tolerate her bitchery and infidelity because, presumably, he is now "better with women" (26, 18). The "apprentice-piece" is over. He has achieved a synthesis of what Jung calls the No. 1 and No. 2 personalities: the shadow, no longer an opponent, becomes a source of strength; modern ego melds with archetypal hunter. Hamlet (another introverted thinker with a mother complex), rejuvenated by his sea voyage, declares, "This is I, / Hamlet the

Dane" (5.1.257−58). Francis, had he lived, might have cried, "This is I, Francis the American!"

Margot's shooting of Francis is the critical crux that has generated the most widely divergent opinions. On the positive side, it has been considered an accident (Baym 116) and an attempt to save his life (Lynn 436). Being shot in the head is a sign of "'Francis' forsaking of his rational faculties'" (Seydow, qtd. in Hardy 132), and the act signifies Margot's "inability to recognize the freedom of the husband-son figure" (DeFalco 206).[20] Perhaps the shooting is "a monumental 'Freudian slip'" in which she aims at the buffalo but shoots him accidentally on purpose (Young 73). "And what she cannot dominate, she must destroy" (Hovey 126). Nor are Hemingway's own statements helpful in reaching a definitive conclusion. In a 1953 interview with Jackson Burke, the author stated, "'Francis' wife hates him because he's a coward. But when he gets his guts back, she fears him so much she has to kill him—shoots him in the back of the head'" (qtd. in Myers 65). In 1959 he was more tentative: "'I don't know whether she shot him on purpose any more than you do. I could find out if I asked myself because I invented it and I could go right on inventing. But you have to know when to stop . . . '" (qtd. in Flora 78−79). Of the possible interpretations, the most likely based on the evidence in the story is that Margot cannot tolerate the idea that her boy-husband has transformed into a man who might leave her, so she shoots not to save him but to save herself from divorce and poverty. The point is akin to James Gray Watson's conclusion that "'her primary motive is neither to murder her husband nor to save him but to save herself'" (qtd. in Sugiyama 148).[21] The imagery supports this reading. When he is under her thumb, she calls him "'Francis, my pearl'" (9). "The pearl is white, lily-livered, she implies" (Flora 77). After he attains his manhood and becomes, in Wilson's opinion, "a ruddy fire eater," Margot's face was white and she looked ill" (25). When Francis "felt a sudden white-hot, blinding flash explode inside his head and that was all he ever felt" (27), the transfer of whiteness back to him indicates Margot's lack of tolerance for his new vigor and her unwillingness to let Francis live except in his No. 1 personality. Having connected with the primordial hunter within him, Francis has incorporated an aspect of the No. 2 personality and can look forward to a life of sustained individuation. Insofar as the shooting denies him the opportunity to enjoy his progress and symbolically returns him to No. 1, the ego-centered boy-man, Margot's motherhood becomes predatorial.

An analogy to the concept of "bush-soul" may illuminate the shooting in an additional way. Jung states that the bush-soul is "a 'soul' that splits off completely and takes up its abode in a wild animal" (*CW* 10, par. 133). In a more extended comment, he gives examples of what happens when such an animal is slain:

> This projection of psychic happenings naturally gives rise to relations between men and men, or between men and animals or things, that to us are inconceivable. A white man shoots a

> crocodile. At once a crowd of people come running from the nearest village and excitedly demand compensation. They explain that the crocodile was a certain old woman in their village who had died at the moment when the shot was fired. The crocodile was obviously her bush-soul. Another man shot a leopard that was lying in wait for his cattle. Just then a woman died in a neighbouring village. She and the leopard were identical. (*CW* 10, par. 129)

Francis bears a similar relationship to the animals he hunts at the end of the story. First, his anger displaces his fear like a surgical removal. Then his happiness replaces his rage, which comes to rest in the buffalo, meaning that the buff and Francis are one-in-the-same. The first buffalo "bellowed in pig-eyed, roaring rage," and the second is "coming in a charge" at him (23, 27). Given this identification of man and prey, it no longer matters whether Margot shoots at Francis or at the charging beast; either way, the primordial strength of hunter and hunted, which would have seen her divorced, is the target. Of course, in a modern story, there is no primitive causality such as Jung observed in Africans' "magical mentality"—Francis dies because he is shot directly, not because his bush soul departs. The key issue is not Margot's specific aim, which is impossible to discern despite the narrator's indication that "Mrs. Macomber . . . had shot at the buffalo" (28), but the more general effect, which is to destroy masculine strength.

Francis Macomber's temperament, childish pursuits, mother complex, and animus-addicted wife have conditioned him to panic during the lion hunt. Subsequently, through shadow work with Wilson, dream, and a connection with the ancient hunter within, he develops a more integrated psyche by forging a permanent connection to mankind's primordial vitality. Africa thus functions for Francis much as it did for Jung, who looked deeply into the collective unconscious during his BPE and enhanced the connection with his No. 2 personality. Neither the fictional character nor the famous psychologist fell prey to the type of tourism that Jung criticizes. "Jung saw the Westerner's obsession with world-travel to 'primitive' places, which for some meant 'going black' in Africa, as symptomatic of the culture's abiding illness. Travel was . . . a form of 'evasion' . . . " (Burleson 225).[22] Travelers should not make a full-hearted transformation from a civilized Western mentality to *shenzi*, insanity, by falling prey to the unconscious, as Kurtz does in *Heart of Darkness*. Travel must instead be part of one's process of individuation, as it was for Jung on his BPE. His friend Laurens van der Post sums up Jung's achievement and his prescription to the modern masses: "The task of modern man was not to go primitive the African way but to discover and confront and live out his own first and primitive self in a truly twentieth-century way" (51). Macomber and Jung, however, approach this task in contrasting ways—violent blood sport versus conversation and psychological observation. Francis makes

progress toward individuation the hard way, oblivious to the attitude Jung tried to cultivate, one of calm openness to what the unconscious may reveal. As an old Englishman advised Jung early in his journey, "'You know, mister, this here country is not man's, it's God's country. So if anything should happen, just sit down and don't worry'" (qtd. in Hayman 267).[23] If Francis had done so, he might have lived to enjoy the fruits of his inner work.

Notes

[1] The passage is reprinted in a helpful source for readers of "Francis Macomber": John M. Howell's *Hemingway's African Stories: The Stories, Their Sources, Their Critics* (New York: Scribner's, 1969), 51.

[2] For an annotated bibliography of criticism on "Francis Macomber," see Kelli A. Larson, "On Safari with Hemingway: Tracking the Most Recent Scholarship," *Hemingway in Africa*, ed. Miriam B. Mandel (Rochester, NY: Camden, 2011), 323−83. All of the important articles are anthologized in "'The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber,'" *Short Story Criticism*, ed. Jelena Krstovic, vol. 137 (Detroit: Gale, Censage Learning, 2010), 90−237. The volume is available through Literary Criticism Online.

[3] See also Anthony Stevens, *The Two Million-Year-Old Self* (College Station: Texas A&M UP, 1993). Stevens states: "To him [Jung], the two million-year-old was a vivid metaphor for an age-old dynamic at the core of personal existence, there by virtue of the evolutionary heritage of our species. . . . The two million-year-old was another such personification: this archaic presence does not have a physical existence inside our heads, any more than the 'soul' or the 'unconscious,' but as the phenomenological embodiment of our evolutionary inheritance, it can be understood as playing an indispensable role in the drama of our personal lives, 'personating' as a companion whom it is possible, as I have learned, to recognize, cherish, and befriend" (3−4). In chapter two, Stevens explores how the two million-year-old man speaks to us in dreams, which have "phylogenetic links" (37). In chapter three, the author explores "the ways in which the two million-year-old human being within becomes frustrated, frightened, or discontented" (57). Stevens's emphasis, however, is not on literary criticism but rather, as David H. Rosen states in the foreword, on "connections between analytical psychology, anthropology, behavioral biology, dream psychology, psycholinguistics, psychiatry, and alternative modes of healing" (xi).

[4] For Eiseley, evolution, and other matters, see my article, "The Literary Matrix of Loren Eiseley's 'The Secret of Life,'" *CEA Critic* 72.3 (2009): 17−36.

[5] *CW* 6, 692/417−18 is also relevant to this discussion. Lévy-Bruhl uses the term "collective representations" to describe primitive people's "collective feeling-value" (Jung's words). However, the linkage of idea and affect is a more broadly human phenomenon, as the passage goes on to acknowledge: "Among civilized people, too, certain collective ideas—God, justice, fatherland, etc.—are bound up with collective feelings." The difference—and it is a racist difference—seems to be that, in primitives, the linkage is "'mystical'" (Lévy-Bruhl's word).

[6] Michael Vannoy Adams offers a helpful summary of the difference between "primitive" and "civilized." Being primitive, in his words, involves concrete percepts, attachment to sense perceptions, and emotion; it means being prelogical and mythical; it emphasizes the

collective; and it involves the law of participation or subject-object unity. Being civilized means dealing with abstract concepts, detaching from sense impressions, and engaging the intellect; it is a logical, causal, and individual way of thinking that emphasizes the law of contradiction or subject-object duality (54).

[7] See Jung's two-volume *Visions: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1930−1934 by C. G. Jung*, ed. Claire Douglas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1997), 1.470−71.

[8] I critique this shortcoming in *A Jungian Study of Shakespeare: The Visionary Mode* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 89−98. See also Adams in note 6 above.

[9] Mariana Torgovnick, *Primitive Passions: Men, Women, and the Quest for Ecstasy* (New York: Knopf, 1997), 23.

[10] In an *Explicator* note, Cecil D. Eby rightly states that Francis must make a definitive transition to manhood through hunting dangerous prey. But Eby is probably incorrect to identify him as a varsity letterman. Of the mentioned activities, only "court games" are varsity sports; it is unlikely that Francis lettered in four of them. "Four-letter man" is a euphemism for various pejorative four-letter words, as Hemingway's own use of the phrase in *Green Hills of Africa* indicates (84, 95).

[11] Burleson uses Alan Cobham as an example of *puer aeternus* probably because von Franz's example is Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's *The Little Prince*, in which flying is an important motif. Cobham was attempting the first trans-African flight when Jung encountered him (182).

[12] A similar statement appears in *CW* 5, par. 272: "Mother complexes are extremely common in America and often very pronounced, probably because of the strong maternal influence in the home and the social position of women generally. The fact that more than half the capital in America is in woman's hands gives one something to think about. As a result of this conditioning many American women develop their masculine side, which is then compensated in the unconscious by an exquisitely feminine instinct, aptly symbolized by a Sphinx."

[13] Jung also states: "A woman possessed by the animus is always in danger of losing her femininity, her adapted feminine persona, just as a man in the circumstances runs the risk of effeminacy. These psychic changes of sex are due entirely to the fact that a function which belongs inside has been turned outside. The reason for this perversion is clearly the failure to give adequate recognition to an inner world which stands autonomously opposed to the outer world, and makes just as serious demands on our capacity for adaption" (*CW* 7, par. 337).

[14] As Jung observes, "The whore (*meretrix*) is a well-known figure in alchemy. She characterizes the arcane substance in its initial, 'chaotic,' maternal state" (*CW* 14, par. 415). Jung comments on the "stages of eroticism" in *CW* 16, par. 361.

[15] A view of Wilson as a thinker is in sync with previous comments on the character. Flora states, "He is an incomplete man—unable to merge his life successfully with that of another person" (80). Also, George Cheatham notes in Wilson "an inadequacy, an incompleteness, suggested by his incomplete tan. Significantly, moreover, it's the top of his head that's missing, the distinctively humanizing part, a detail underscored by Wilson's clipped, fragmented, unratiocinative speech." Cheatham concludes: "Wilson, in short, lacks full humanity" (113). Hutton's statement about Wilson's eyes begins with the right formulation but veers into caricature: the character's eyes "suggest the deficiency of human warmth one

finds in the technicolor movie stereotype of a specialist in torture" (239). I suggest that Wilson's speech is not so much "unratiocinative" as introverted and unfeeling. Yet Wilson is not wholly without feeling, as the narrator tells us after Wilson shares his Shakespearean motto: "He was very embarrassed, having brought out this thing he had lived by, but he had seen men come of age before and it always moved him" (25). It is just that feeling is his inferior function.

[16] Adams adumbrates the five types of Jungian dream interpretation: phenomenological, amplificatory, compensatory, subjective, and prospective (77).

[17] "WHAT DREAMS REVEAL: Scientists Come to Kenya to Study Native Mind: RESEARCH AMONG THE BAGISHU: Psychological Connection Between European and Africa: Primitive Survival in Man," *East African Standard*, 19 Nov. 1925: 5.

[18] Anthony Stevens, *Private Myths: Dreams and Dreaming* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1995), 122.

[19] When Wilson says to Margot, "'I wouldn't turn him over,'" he is implying that Francis's face is missing. Wilson then "knelt down, took a handkerchief from his pocket, and spread it over Francis Macomber's crew-*cropped* head where it lay" (28). The language echoes Prince Hal's words to Hotspur: "And all the budding honors on thy crest / I'll *crop* to make a garland for my head" (*1Henry IV* 5.4.72−73; emphases added). The detail is overlooked in previous studies of Hemingway's use of Shakespeare by John J. McKenna and Marvin V. Peterson, and Gary Harrington. Harrington does note "Hal's using his 'favors' to 'hide [Hotspur's] mangled face' (*1 Henry IV* 5.4.96)" (153). The word "favors" appears in Hal's promise to "wear a garment all of blood / And stain my favors in a bloody mask" (3.2.135−36). Hutton also does good reading of the Shakespearean motto, but his unawareness of the motto's personal significance to Hemingway weakens the critique (243−44). As Young notes, a British officer taught Hemingway the motto in 1917 (73). My reading also diverges from Hutton's sense that "Macomber's moment of 'heroism' resembles that of the soldier who temporarily goes berserk in battle" (248).

[20] John J. Seydow, "Francis Macomber's Spurious Masculinity," *Hemingway Review* 1.1 (1981): 40.

[21] James Gray Watson, "'A Sound Basis of Union': Structural and Thematic Balance in 'The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber,'" *Fitzgerald/Hemingway Annual* (1974): 216.

[22] Burleson is quoting Jung's words to Laurens van der Post, as reported in *Jung and the Story of Our Time* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 53.

[23] When Hannah states (above) that Africa "is the country of the Self, not of the ego" (172), she is interpreting the old man's words to Jung.

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Polikoff, Daniel Joseph. *In the Image of Orpheus: Rilke, a Soul History*. Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications, 2011, ISBN 9781888602524.

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In the Image of Orpheus is an important book not only because it addresses the scholarship of literature, art, archetypal psychology, and religion but also because it transforms the terms of their engagement. The poet Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926), born in the same year as C. G. Jung, belongs to that broad cultural resistance to Enlightenment rationalism and modernity that includes the poetry of W. B. Yeats, quantum physics, modernist art, and the discovery of the unconscious as vital to human existence. In a long and lively treatment of Rilke's life, passions and art, Polikoff makes a unique and significant contribution to *our* time examining Rilke through the lens of James Hillman's as yet too little known Archetypal Psychology. *In the Image of Orpheus* examines and tries to heal deep psychic deficits in who we have become.

Above all, the book explores how James Hillman restores the term "soul" to its ancient tripartite connection to body (matter) and spirit. "Soul" is the medial term between material body and ethereal spirit - the realm of images, of imagination. Soul is psyche not bound to an earthen body but rather mediating its relation to the cosmos. Soul is body and psyche conjoined; its matter is images, and they *matter* as the expression of divinities or archetypal powers. Imagination is therefore a divine rite; poetry that aspires to this soul-making through imagination's images is both authentic art and religion. The two are indissolubly wed.

Yet as this comprehensive and fascinating work of cultural history demonstrates, such a notion of soul and art has been radically suppressed from the Western tradition. A particularly cogent analysis of this suppression occurs in chapter four of *In the Image of Orpheus* where Polikoff looks at Hillman's criticism of Augustine as one of the "Fathers" not only of theology but also of psychology. Augustine's apparently benign insistence on the "feeling heart" shifts religious concern for the fate of man to something that will become Hillman's *bête noir*, the human personality as "psychological" in the sense of being structured predominantly through "personal" factors and relationships.

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Such a focus on the "personal" becomes what Hillman dislikes as an overly subjective sense of feelings clustered around egoic inflation above all else. Such a valuing of ego-linked emotions has the power to shut down imagination, the wilderness of soul. For imagination as soul needs *not to be limited by the personal* if it is to embody in images its archetypal and divine dimensions. Augustine, by contrast, constructs feeling as anti-imagination. His only true images come from religious tradition. He substantiates that foundational severing of soul into the dualistic binary of body and spirit. For him the feelings of man can only find genuine imaginal expression in the rites and symbols of the Church.

To Augustine, images made by the imagination can have no religious essence because they are not genuinely creative. Augustine's dualistic God is *creator ex nihilo*, creating out of the void. Humans do not possess any divine creative powers, for they are material and sinful bodies with an immaterial spirit that must "accept" God's divinity via the received symbols of his book and his Church. God creates the universe; human images have no authentic creative participation in the divine. By contrast, Archetypal Psychology's "soul-making" is an assertion of the human imagination as intrinsically religious in the sense of participating in making what is real. To Hillman, the heart is a place not so much of personal feeling but of true imagining. The heart is where essences of reality are transformed by the imagination into archetypal images.

In the Image of Orpheus carefully demonstrates that Hillman's remarkable revisioning of psychology is an illuminating frame for Rilke's art. In so doing, the whole book is a testimony to a profound cultural revolution, begun by those modernists, Freud and Jung, then arguably crucially developed by Archetypal, and now expanded to challenge traditional disciplinary paradigms by depth and literary scholars such as Polikoff. For Rilke was dedicated to combatting the modern secularization of consciousness of his age. In his congruent sense of the divine roots of the imagination with Hillman, poetry and religious being are one. As Polikoff says:

> [In Rilke]… we are invited to enter a specifically aesthetic sphere-one that may… be rooted in and emerge from the author's personal psychology, but, at the same time attains a critical degree of independence from it. We are invited, that is, into the transpersonal poetic sphere of images themselves, the imaginal realm that counts as the proper domain of both art and archetypal (not merely personal) psychology. (142)

Elaborating Rilke's soul-history, later chapters of *In the Image of Orpheus* look at two founding mythic plots that emerge from the work. Orpheus, who loses his Eurydice to the underworld and ends as a dismembered singing head, is entwined for Rilke with the ostensibly happier story of Eros and Psyche. Polikoff argues that there is a deep congruence with the sadness of Orpheus's final song and

the divine consummation of the marriage of Eros and Psyche among the gods. Archetypally, the Orphic dismemberment is fundamental to the returning of soul to the world. The way of the soul *is,* as Hillman so often insisted, the way of the underworld and psychic death. Rilke shows that poetry or "song" needs to pass through Hades.

So finally *In the Image of Orpheus* is a book about restoring the soul to the world of today. The scholarly disciplines of art, religion and psychology were built on the dualism of body and spirit that produced a notion of psychology as overly "personal." Art and psychology have attempted to care for "personal" passions while dividing themselves off from eternal, archetypal, transpersonal domains of disembodied spirit in religion. Rilke and Hillman, through the wonderful imaginal mediation of Daniel Polikoff, show that we need to assert yet again the divinely creative powers of soul in imagination.

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Journal of Jungian Scholarly Studies is calling for papers for the 2015 volume.

The Journal of Jungian Scholarly Studies, *JJSS*, seeks to publish interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary scholarship that interprets, expands, applies, critiques, and/or theorizes Jungian and post-Jungian concepts so as to illuminate not only psychology, but also other areas of study. These areas include but need not be limited to the sciences, religion, philosophy, history, culture, myth and fairy tale, literature, art, sculpture, music, film, architecture, the environment, gender, sexuality, race, politics, and theory.

The Guest Editor for this volume is Peter T. Dunlap. The General Editor is Inez Martinez. This journal is only published on-line at www.jungiansociety.org.

Submissions will only be accepted electronically. Send the document as an attachment (MS Word only) to: centerpd@gmail.com.

Submission deadline is Dec. 15th, 2014. Submissions will be acknowledged.

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The *Journal of Jungian Scholarly Studies* is a peer-reviewed, academic journal. Papers should include a theoretical framework or literature review that situates the piece in the midst of existing academic dialogue. In fields other than Jungian studies, what does a Jungian orientation bring to the field that other perspectives do not? Such material may be addressed in conventional or creative ways.

In terms of content, it has been JJSS practice to:

1) welcome articles addressing Jungian and/or post-Jungian thought in an original way;

2) welcome the use of visual images (copyright must be obtained by author);

3) welcome well-argued critiques of Jungian and/or post-Jungian concepts; and

4) require that articles using personal experience do so in service of establishing or illuminating psychological/theoretical concepts.

Manuscripts will first be evaluated with regard to suitability for submission to peer review. Those suitable will be forwarded for blind peer review to at least two reviewers.

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Include an abstract of up to 150 words.

Include brief biographical information of 25-50 words.

Nowhere in the content of the paper should the author's identity be noted. Authors should submit as a separate file a cover sheet that includes the following: name, paper title, affiliation, e-mail address, mailing address, and phone contact number.

The cover letter should also briefly indicate what the author considers to be the significance of his or her paper for the field of Jungian studies.

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Essays should be prepared according to guidelines in either the *MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers*, 7th edition, or the *Publications Manual of the American Psychological Association*, 6th edition. Care should be taken not to blend documentation styles. When writing about texts, for example, authors should be sure to follow their handbook's suggestions regarding verb tense. Note that https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/ provides a helpful guide to MLA and APA format.

Specific requirements:

- Times New Roman 12-point with one-inch margins; ragged right margins
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- No contractions or second person
- Italics, not underlining
- Hyphens to join words or parts of words (-), en dashes to join numbers (−), em dashes to join parts of sentences (—)
- Space between initials (e.g., C. G. Jung, not C.G. Jung)
- Single spaces after periods and colons
- Endnotes
- Regarding commas, authors should observe the following convention: A and B; A, B, and C. For example, Jung states and emphasizes; but Jung states, emphasizes, and criticizes.

In MLA format, citations should be formatted as follows: (*CW* 9i, par. 5−6). If citations are to more than one volume, *CW* should appear as follows on the Works Cited list:

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