BUILDING CANADA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPACITY: A PROACTIVE ALL-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE-LED COUNTER-TERRORISM

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PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to formulate the architecture for an all-of-government approach to countering terrorist threats, designed to support coordinated, intelligence-led interventions into the cycle of terrorist activities.

BACKGROUND

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 catapulted counter-terrorism to the forefront of Canada's Security and Intelligence priorities. To be sure, Canada had experienced terrorist attacks previously in its history, most notably the bombing of Air India flight 182. Nevertheless, it was in the aftermath of September 11th that the Government of Canada moved swiftly to introduce a National Security Policy, enact Anti-Terrorism legislation conferring new and far reaching powers on the Security and Intelligence (S&I) services, and allocate substantially additional budgets to the departments and agencies concerned in order to build capacity to sustain their counter-terrorism efforts.[1] Yet, it is pertinent to note that these policy, legislative and budgetary initiatives were not accompanied by any review of the architecture of the Canadian S&I Community to assess its structural appropriateness for the contemporary counter-terrorism mission. Certain bureaucratic reorganizations were indeed undertaken, in particular the 2003 merger of disparate units into a singular Department of Public Safety and a Canada Border Services Agency; the formation of the Integrated Threat Assessment Center (ITAC) in October, 2004; and the creation of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSET) involving partnering with other intelligence and law enforcement services at the local, tactical level. However the core architecture and particular roles and operational principles of the various components of Canada's S&I community remained -- and remains – by and large intact and untouched by the evolving threat environment.

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[1]   On Canada's post-September 11th respond to the international terrorist threat environment, see Martin Rudner, "Challenge and Response: Canada's Intelligence Community and the War on Terrorism," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2004); David Daubney, Wade Deisman, Daniel Jutras, Errol Mendes, Patrick Molinari, eds., *Terrorism, Law & Democracy: How is Canada Changing Following September 11* (Montreal: Les Editions Thémis, Faculté de droit, Université de Montréal, 2002).

By way of contrast, Canada's principle allies in international intelligence relations, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia all undertook far-reaching reviews of their intelligence systems during the first half of this decade, prompted by intelligence failures associated with the September 11th attacks and the subsequent Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction debacle. These reviews were conducted independently of their respective intelligence communities, by a congressional committee and independent national commissions in the United States[2], and by official commissions of inquiry in Australia[3] and the United Kingdom[4]. All these reviews came forth with proposals for reforming their respective national security architecture and intelligence functions. In December of 2007, the U.K Home Office, the ministry responsible for national security, commissioned a report by DEMOS, a preeminent think-tank, exploring the transformations required to equip government and the Intelligence community to meet the challenges of the contemporary threat environment. The report stipulated a need to adopt "a holistic approach to national security based on systems-thinking" to encourage "individuals, agencies, and departments to take a much broader perspective than normal".[5] This recommended all-of-government approach to national security would presage a more comprehensive and systematic perspective on the threat environment:

> 'This includes seeing overall structures, patterns in cycles and systems rather than identifying only specific events or policy options."

An analysis of the aforementioned reports and their recommendations underscores their preoccupation with promoting a paradigm shift in the

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[2]   National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., n.d.)[2004]; Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President of the United States* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005). See also Richard Posner, *Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of* Reform (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Kittlefield, 2006); Jennifer Sims "Understanding Friends and Enemies: The Context for American Intelligence Reform," in Jennifer Sims & Burton L. Gerber, eds., *Transforming U.S. Intelligence* (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2005), Arthur Hulnick, "U.S. Intelligence Reform: Problems and Prospects**"** *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2006) and "Intelligence Reform 2007: Fix or Fizzle? ," I*nternational Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2007).

[3]   Sir Philip Flood, *Report of the Inquiry into Australia's Intelligence* Services (Canberra: Government of Australia, 2004).

[4]   The Rt. Hon. The Lord Butler of Brockwell, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction*, HC 898 (London: The Stationery Office 14th July 2004).

[5]   Charlie Edwards*, National Security for the Twenty-first Century* (London: DEMOS, 2007)

traditional architecture of national security affecting, in particular, (a) the coordination of national intelligence efforts; (b) the strengthening of analytical capabilities; (c) improving intelligence sharing among the national security system; and (d) connecting intelligence to law enforcement. Each of these proposed reforms represents a rebalancing between traditional intelligence precepts, developed since the First and Second World Wars and refined during the Cold War, and the perceived imperatives for dealing with the contemporary threat environment. Thus, the issue of "coordination" touches on the balance between centralization and decentralization of control over the activities of intelligence services. Traditionally, intelligence services in democracies retain a high degree of decentralized control over their activities, subject, of course, to ministerial direction and oversight and statutory review. Any move towards strengthening coordination over the S&I community as a whole necessarily implies a greater centralization of direction over intelligence efforts, overriding the propensities of individual agencies. Creating a more robust "analytical capability" likewise denotes a building up of centralized functions, and a diminution of analytical roles in the subordinate agencies and departments. Improved "intelligence sharing" would tend to accentuate a holistic, centralizing approach to national security while blurring the uniqueness of individual agencies and even risking compromising their respective methods and sources. Linking intelligence to law enforcement could risk subordinating the operational secrecy of intelligence collection to the disclosure requirements of prosecution in courts of law.

The policy dilemma for designing an effective national security architecture is precisely to adapt intelligence precepts and the evolving operational requirements of counter-terrorism. Just as the effectiveness of intelligence operations may seem to depend on decentralized agency control, distributed analytical capabilities, distinctly cultivated sources and methods, and lawfully secret investigations, so effective counter-terrorism may call for more centralized coordination, integrated analytical capacity, enhanced intelligence sharing, and a robust connection between intelligence collection and law enforcement.

International terrorism remains a potent, deadly threat to Western democracies.[6] Almost every major democratic jurisdiction -- Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Italy, Israel, Netherlands, the Philippines, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, the United States -- has been targeted with actual or foiled attacks.[7] The present Study explores ways to build up Canada's national security capacity to counter terrorist threats. The approach taken develops a paradigm for a re-designed national security architecture that responds to a functional analysis of contemporary international terrorism while also taking account of the mandated roles of Canada's S&I Community as a whole in addressing these threats. The commanding imperative is for Canada to act resolutely, proactively, effectively and lawfully to defeat terrorist threats to our national security and public safety, and also to friendly and allied countries.

The Study that follows will therefore focus through the analytical lens of a terrorism cycle, setting out the sequence of terrorist activities that precede and culminate in terror attacks on civilian targets. It then examines the scope for security and intelligence interventions at each stage of the terrorism cycle. Based on this analytical framework, the Study will proceed to consider the role of intelligence analysis in supporting a robust, calibrated, all-of-government approach to proactive, preventive interventions in the terrorism cycle. At the core of this all-of-government approach is the need for a coordination mechanism designed to ensure the coherent direction of the national counter-terrorism effort, consistent with the mandates and roles of the operational agencies representing the various intelligence and security disciplines.

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[6]   Cf. J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment by the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 5 February 2008 (Washington, 2008). The most recent Canadian public assessment of terrorist threats is provided by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Public Report 2004-2005* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006), esp. pp. 1-7. See also Lorenzo Vidino, "The Tripartite Threat of Radical Islam to Europe," *inFocus*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2007.

[7]   For recent surveys of international terrorist threats to countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle East and North America, see, *e.g.*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006* (Washington, DC: 2007), esp. chaps. 1 & 2; The Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service, V*iolent Jihad in the Netherlands Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat* (The Hague, 2006); Rohan Gunaratna, "Islamic Terrorism: Can We Meet the Challenge?" *Global Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2007); Lorenzo Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe. The New Battleground for International Jihad* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006); Angela Rabasa *el al*, *Beyond al-Qaeda. Part 1 – The Global Jihadist Movement*; *Part 2 – The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006).

References in this Study to religious- or ethnic-based terrorism should not be taken as suggesting that all individuals, organizations, and institutions of those communities are implicated in terrorism. Terrorists comprise a cadre of dedicated, extremist, militant individuals prone to violence. It is to these terrorist elements, and to their actions, that this Study refers.

3. THE TERRORISM CYCLE

International terrorism is predicated on a complex cycle of activities. The key enabling activities for international terrorist operations can be set out as follows:

- Strategic planning
- Recruitment of activists and operatives
- Training
- Communications
- Resourcing, financing, fund-raising and money transfers
- Procurement, preparation and delivery of materiel
    (including passports)
- Creating an infrastructure of safe houses, sleeper cells
- Propaganda and incitement
- Terrorist Penetration into Sensitive Government
- Department, Agencies and Institutions
- Tactical preparations
- Reconnaissance on targets
- Terrorist assaults on targets

Information about these activities is publicly available from an Al-Qaeda manual on terrorism, the *Encyclopaedia of the Afghan Jihad*,[8] which was introduced in evidence at the British trial in January, 2006, that convicted the radical Jihadist cleric Sheikh Hamza al-Masri of terrorism charges, and from other court cases and authoritative sources. In the decentralized organizational structure into which al-Qaeda and its affiliates have evolved, each terrorist cell tends to perform single functions, such as fund-raising or procurement. This compartmentalization of functions is clearly designed to protect the terrorist network against misadventure or exposure on the part of individual operatives. This beehive of decentralized and compartmentalized cells creates a network architecture that is all the

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[8]   United Kingdom court translation of the *Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad*, accessible at URL: http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/jihadmanual.html, p. 10.
    2004-2005), p. 2.

more opaque and problematic for the authorities to monitor and take down. Nevertheless, an analysis of the functional activities occurring at each stage of the terrorism cycle can reveal its points of vulnerability to coordinated, calibrated counter-terrorist interventions.

Strategic Planning: Contemporary terrorist movements have demonstrated a capacity for skilful strategic planning for achieving tactical surprise. Available evidence indicates that strategic planning by terrorist groups can become a quite protracted process, taking months and even years of preparatory work prior to an assault. Often planners will move about, meeting in different cities and even countries, to lessen the risk of premature detection. This appears to have been the case with regard to the terrorist bombing of Air India flight 182, the September 11 attacks on the United States, the 2005 assaults on the London transit system, among other terror strikes. Indeed, as the US 9/11 Commission noted, travel is of no less importance for terrorists as are weapons.[9]

Al-Qaeda strategic planning reflects a long-term, centrally directed, high-level pursuit of Jihadist goals, notwithstanding the devolution of operational command and control to decentralized cells. Al-Qaeda strategizing appears to involve a three tier process: the proclamation of Jihadist strategy, tactical planning, and preparation of plans of attack. Jihadist strategy is the domain of top-echelon leaders, primary among them Osama bin Laden, who provide theological dispensation, political justification and warning about their intended course of religious struggle. A 2004 'summit' convened in a remote village in the remote northwestern Pakistani district of Waziristan reportedly served to formulate and communicate al-Qaeda's updated strategic doctrine to operational planners.[10]

Recruitment: The recruitment of activists and operatives is a prerequisite for the existence and continuity of any terrorist group. A Danish Ministry of Justice report on *Recruitment of Islamicist Terrorists in Europe* describes "Recruitment (as) the bridge between a personal belief and violent activism."[11] Some are recruited as activists to perform the various upkeep

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9   The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Report* (New York: St. Martin's, 2004), p. 548.

10 Daniel McGrory and Michael Evans, "Net widens as al-Qaeda bomb link is confirmed," *The Times* [London], 15 July 2005

11 Michael Taarnby, *Recruitment of Islamic Terrorists in Europe. Trends and Perspectives*, Research Report Funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus (Denmark), 14 January 2005, p. 6.

functions necessary for the continued viability of the terror organization, such as fund-raising, logistics, and communications. Others are recruited as operatives for training and deployment to actually undertake terror attacks, including suicide-bombings. Terrorist recruitment actively occurs also in Canadian communities.[12]

Since terrorist organizations operate illicitly they cannot recruit openly and publicly. Recruitment to terror organizations is itself a clandestine activity. Recent indications are that much of the recruitment al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Muslim diaspora now involve self-enlistment. Individuals join through friendship or kinship ties, often under the inspiration of local religious preachers or teachers.[13] Much of the subsequent radicalization is fostered through the Internet, where a plethora of Jihadist websites foment a religious culture of militancy.

Notwithstanding this self-recruitment syndrome, there is evidence that al-Qaeda and its affiliates assign agent handlers to exercise oversight and even verification of recruitment and recruits, and to enforce discipline and militate against penetration.[14] Talent spotters are dispatched to appropriate venues, whether university clubs, communal associations or religious circles, to identify likely candidates for recruitment.[15] Universities have been targeted by al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups as especially appropriate places to talent-spot and recruit educated cadres.[16] Even in a placid country like Norway, where there is but a minimal multicultural presence, the head of that country's Police Security Service *(Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste - PST)*, its intelligence and security agency, recently noted publicly for the first time that extremist Jihadists are busy recruiting local Muslim youth to carry out terrorist attacks and holy war.[17]

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[12]   Clerk of the Privy Council, Intelligence Brief for the Prime Minister, *Radicalization and Jihad in the West*, prepared by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, S-15(1), 7 June 2006; CSIS, *Public Report*

[13]   *Vide.* Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas Sanderson, Jacqueline Harned, *Force Multiplier for Intelligence*, A Report of the Transnational Threats Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), p. 13.

[14]   Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda* (New York: Berkeley, 2002), p. 77; Taarnby, *Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe*

[15]   Daniel McGrory & Zahid Hussain, "New wave of British terrorists are taught at schools, not in the mountains," *The Times* [London], 14 July 2005; Stewart Bell, "Authorities wary of 'homegrown' terrorists: The next generation: Recruiting locals allows extremists to thwart security," *National Post* [Toronto] 14 July 2005.

[16]   UK Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, *Promoting Good Campus Relations, Fostering Shared Values and Preventing Violent Extremism in Universities and Higher Education Colleges (London,* January, 2008), esp. Annex A: "Al-Qa'ida Influenced Violent Extremism and the Recruitment and Grooming Process Used by Violent Extremist Groups," p. 20; Anthony Bergin & Raspal Khosa, *Australian Universities and Terrorism*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Paper #8, 2007.

[17]   "Extremists target local youth," *Aftenposten* [Oslo], 6 February 2008

As well, radical Islamist clerics in various countries across the world, from Britain and France to Australia, have been active in visiting prisons, promoting conversion and instilling extremist beliefs among inmates.[18] After release, ex-convict converts have been subsequently channeled to radical mosques where they are prone to virulent preaching and recruitment by militant elements.

Security authorities claim that al-Qaeda and its affiliates are deliberately "refocusing [their] efforts" to recruit youths of American, Canadian, or European background in their ranks.[19] These 'clean skin' (so-called) recruits are considered better able pass undetected through surveillance and border controls. They would also provide better camouflaged for clandestine operations against targeted countries. An up-to-date assessment by the United States Director of National Intelligence notes the al-Qaeda recruitment of Westerners capable of blending into American society and attacking domestic targets.[20]

As for the recruits themselves, an assessment of known al-Qaeda perpetrators indicates the following attributes pertaining to contemporary militant Jihadists[21]:

- Most militant Jihadists today are based in the Muslim diaspora, predominantly in Western Europe and North America. Most are engaged in the jihad outside their countries of origin, and indeed a growing number are second- or even third-generation diaspora born and/or educated.

- The preferred cell size seems to be 8 members, often composed of friends made during the formative ages of 15-30. Family bonds tend to predominant before age 15.

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18   Jamie Doward and Anushka Asthana, "Al-Qaeda threat to British prisons," *The Observer* [London], 10 February 2008; John Rosenthal , "The French Path to Jihad," *Policy Review*, No. 139 (2006); Richard Ford, "Jail 'helps to radicalise Muslims'," *The Times* [London], 13 April 2007; Jamie Doward, "Terror training in prisons as al-Qaeda targets young," *The Observer* [London], 15 July 2007; Richard Kerbaj, "Radicals brainwashing Aborigines in prison," *The Australian* [Sydney], 17 August 2006.

19   Elaine Shannon, "Al-Qaeda Seeks Canadian Operatives to get around Tighter U.S. Security. Osama Bin Laden is Trying to Recruit Disaffected Muslims North of the Border," *Time Magazine*, 8 July 2003.

20   J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment by the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 5 February 2008* (Washington, 2008). See also Mark Mazzetti, "Intelligence Chief Cites Qaeda Threat to U.S." *New York Times*, 6 February 2008.

21   Vide. de Borchgrave, et al, Force Multiplier for Intelligence, pp. 13-14.

- Most Jihadists are married, and fulfill their family responsibilities. Women tend to play an important role in promoting the small-group dynamics of the cell.

- The majority of Jihadists, and a plurality of suicide bombers, are well educated, and have university degrees or advanced technical training (except for European militants of Maghrebi descent, and suicide bombers in Iraq). The predominant profession represented among Jihadists is engineering. Computer science is another well represented professional discipline among educated Jihadists. Most members of cells have no criminal record, and they are often better off economically and socially than the neighbouring population.

- A common trait amongst Jihadist militants and leaders in the diaspora is their prior involvement in vigorous action-oriented group activities such as soccer, cricket, and other sports.

Training: Training prepares recruits to become terrorist activists and operatives. The skills and knowledge proficiencies sought by contemporary terrorist organizations covers a wide spectrum of learning, from flying aircraft to computer technology, biological and chemical sciences, to finance; from the preparation of explosives and explosive devises to actual combat. During the period of Taliban rule over Afghanistan some 70,000 Jihadist recruits traveled to that country from around the world for military training in camps run by al-Qaeda.[22] Since then, militant Jihadists have sought alternative venues for training, whether at secret facilities in congenial countries like Iran, Lebanon, Sudan or Pakistan, in combat zones in Chechnya or Bosnia, or at insurgent bases in Iraq.[23] There were even in training facilities set up in remote locations in Britain, Canada, Europe and the United States, and urban training camps in safe houses in British and European and also Canadian cities wherein al-Qaeda instructors imparted mission-specific skills relating to weaponry, explosives, and tactics.[24] In recent years terrorist recruits from Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Australia and North America have journeyed to Pakistan for operational training in al-Qaeda camps in that country.[25]

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22   "Al-Qaeda camps 'trained 70,000'", *BBC News* http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4146969.stm.
23   McGrory & Hussain, "New wave of British terrorists are taught at schools, not in the mountains"; Dana Priest & Josh White, "War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told," *Washington Post*, 17 February 2005.
24   Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda. Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkeley, 2002), p. 111.
25   Dirk Laabs and Sebastian Rotella, "Terrorists in training head to Pakistan A dangerous new pattern emerges, illustrated by cases in Denmark and Germany," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 October 2007. 2 (2008).

Communications: Terrorist networks, cells, and their auxiliaries and front organizations rely on communications for the sinews that bind them together, to facilitate coordination and information sharing amongst individual components of the terror apparatus, to disseminate strategic, tactical and operational information about targets, objectives, and goals; and to deliver operational instructions. The Internet plays a key role in terrorist communications by e-mail (best encrypted) and through open-access and password-guarded websites. Al-Qaeda places high priority on secure communications, and its operational guidelines insist that communicating should be concise, secret and pertinent.[26] Being aware of the vulnerability of postal and electronic systems to interception, however, terror groups tend to entrust their most sensitive communications to reliable, dedicated couriers to convey face -to-face to far flung branches of their networks.[27] These couriers may sometimes carry physical messages, whether letters, audio cassettes or videos, but often the secret messages are entrusted solely to memory.[28]

Resourcing: Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other Jihadist terror groups engage in systematic fund-raising and money-laundering to finance their widespread system of networks, cells, affiliates and auxiliaries, and their related activities.[29] Significant monies also go to pay for the terrorist propensity to travel around the world.[30] Terrorist organizations typically raise funds by soliciting private donations, by diverting revenues from quasi-legitimate businesses, Non-Governmental Organizations and fronts, and through criminal activities. Militant Islamicist groups try to exploit the charitable injunctions of Islam to elicit donations directly or through religious institutions or sympathetic ethno-cultural organizations.[31] Al-Qaeda is known to have set up charitable fronts, such as the Benevolence International Fund, to raise and transfer money to

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26 Guneratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, pp. 108-9.
27 Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 108.
28 Robert Fisk, "With Runners and Whispers, al-Qa'ida Outfoxes US Forces," *The Independent* [London], 6 December 2002.
29 Martin Rudner, "Using Financial Intelligence Against the Funding of Terrorism, "*International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 19, No.1 (2006). See also International Monetary Fund, Legal Department, *Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: A Handbook for Legislative Drafting* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003), and Stewart Bell, "Blood Money: International Terrorist Fundraising in Canada," in Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., *Canada Among Nations 2002. A Fading Power* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002).
30 US National Counterterrorism Center, *National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel* (NCTC National Counterterrorism Center, May 2, 2006), p. 17. See also Martin Rudner, "Misuse of Passports: Identity Fraud, the Propensity to Travel, and International Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No.
31 Matthew Levitt, *Charitable Organizations and Terrorist Financing: A War on Terror Status-Check*, Paper presented at "The Dimensions of Terrorist Financing", University of Pittsburgh, March 19-20, 2004; Daniel Pipes, "U.S. Court Blows Terrorists' Cover," *Chicago Sun-Times*, 15 December 2004.

finance terrorist activities. According to the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment report on *Jihad in Europe*, mosques in Germany, France, the UK and elsewhere were "hijacked" by radical elements to be used for fund-raising, recruitment, incitement and propaganda, and even for preparing terrorist assaults.[32] Militant groups have also raised substantial funds through the sale of inspirational tracts, advocacy literature, audio cassettes, videos and CDs, and other iconic paraphernalia.[33]

Terrorist organizations have also engaged in criminal activities to augment their fund-raising. The Moroccan-dominated *al-Qaeda* cells that perpetrated the March, 2004 terror attacks on Madrid commuter trains were funded by bank robberies in Spain and sophisticated ATM fraud in France.[34] In January, 2005, German police in five states raided premises and arrested 14 suspects belonging to a criminal Islamicist organization allegedly involved in smuggling, document forgery, recruitment of militants, Jihadist incitement and terrorism finance.[35]

Among the criminal activities attributed to international terrorist groups are the sale of fraudulent passports and identity documents, people smuggling, credit card fraud, drug trafficking, trade in contraband, and automobile theft and re-export.[36]

Terrorist resourcing remits substantial funds through financial systems, including informal *hawalas*, to wherever these organizations seek their deposit or use.[37] It is noteworthy as well that certain high-value, compressed forms of wealth, like diamonds, narcotics or other contraband are usually shipped with trusted couriers surreptitiously to their intended destinations.[38]

Procurement: The procurement by terrorist organizations of matèriel needed for their operations includes acquiring weapons, explosives,

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32   Netter, *Jihad in Europe*, p. 50. See also Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, pp. 89-94.
33   *Cf.* Thomas Friedman, "Giving the Hatemongers No Place to Hide," *New York Times*, 22 July 2005.
34   Damien McElroy, "Cashpoint Fraud Funded Terror Attacks in Spain," *Daily Telegraph* [London], 4 November 2004.
35   "German Police Arrest Suspected Islamic Extremists," *Washington* Post, 12 January 2005.
36   Stewart Bell, *Cold Terror. How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World* (Toronto: Wiley, 2004), pp. 197; Timothy Appleby**, "**Scam allegedly funnelled cash to Tamil Tigers, *Globe and Mail* [Toronto], 31 January 2008.
37   On terrorism finance see Rudner, "Using Financial Intelligence Against the Funding of Terrorism"; J. Millard Burr & Robert Collins, *Alms for Jihad* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
38   Douglas Farah, *Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror* (Broadway Books, 2004); *For a Few Dollars More. How al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade*, Global Witness (April, 2003).

vehicles, fraudulent passports, other equipment and supplies. Lacking a conventional industrial base of their own, terror groups are obliged to acquire this matèriel from other legitimate sources by stealth or by theft. An intercepted al-Qaeda communication cited by the Italian Divisioni Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali (DIGOS - Division for General Investigations and Special Operations) highlighted the role of logistical elements in the following terms:

> "…if the brothers want to hide, we hide them, if the brothers want documents, we take care of these documents, if the brothers want to move, we move them… if they need a weapon, you give them a weapon…"[39]

Sometimes the matèriel can be surreptitiously acquired whole. In 2005 and 2006 a UK-based Islamist terror cell shipped freight-loads of equipment to terrorist contacts in Pakistan, under the guise of assistance for earthquake victims.[40] Otherwise, terror groups have tended to procure the raw materials – the better to disguise their intentions – with which to fabricate by themselves the desired explosives or weapons. Thus, Jihadist groups in Belgium, Britain Italy, and Spain were caught with chemicals for producing explosives and chemical agents.[41]

One of the more alarming aspects of international terrorism is the evidence that al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups are attempting to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attack capabilities.[42] In a June 2002 article, al-Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Gaith insisted "it is our right to fight [the Americans] with chemical and biological weapons."[43] Jihadist groups in Belgium, Britain Italy, and Spain have been discovered with ingredients for producing explosives and chemical agents.[44] There is suspicion that terrorists will try to enroll operatives in universities and research institutes in advanced industrialized countries in order to avail themselves of training and laboratory work in sensitive, dual-use subjects like nuclear science, computer engineering, which could have terrorist applications.[45]

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39 DIGOS, *Report al Mhajoroun 1* (Milan, 2 April 2001), cited in Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, p. 77.
40 David Byers, "Gang plotted to behead Muslim soldier 'like a pig'," *The Times* [London], 29 January 2008.
41 "Suspicious Attempts Made to Buy Bomb Materials," *Globe and Mail* [Toronto], 6 January 2005.
42 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Public Report 2003* (Ottawa, 2003), pp. 2, 5.
43 MI-5 The Security Service, *The Threats*. http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page25.html
44 "Suspicious Attempts Made to Buy Bomb Materials," *Globe and Mail*.
45 Francis Elliot, "Universities Unwittingly Training 'Kitchen Sink' Terrorists," *Daily Telegraph* [London], 13 January 2003; "Science and National Security," *Washington Times*, 22 January 2003.

Infrastructure: International terror networks require an infrastructure of safe houses and sleeper cells to accommodate and service operatives on current missions, and to sustain a covert capacity for future operations. International terrorist networks typically maintain chains of safe houses in various cities and countries across the world, relocating among them at the various stages of operational planning, so as to minimize risks of discovery.[46] Sometimes the safe houses are kept dormant, or are used by unassociated third-parties, until required for operations. Sleeper cells comprise terrorist units that are kept inactive, sometimes for extensive periods of time, even years.[47] This is to enable them to escape surveillance by counter-terrorism authorities while remaining in readiness for reactivation for future missions.[48]

Propaganda: International terrorist networks typically utilize front organizations to transmit their propaganda and incite militant action. The former imam of the Finsbury Mosque in London, Sheikh Abu Hamza, was convicted in February, 2006 under Britain's Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, for soliciting the murders of Jews and non-believers and for provoking racial hatred.[49] Another British Islamist extremist, Abdullah e-Faisal, was sentenced in 2003 to nine-years imprisonment for "inciting racial hatred and incitement to murder."[50] A terror network in Germany based in mosques in various cities used to spread militant Islamic propaganda that summoned recruits to join a Jihad against the West.[51] Some groups also sponsor circuits of traveling clerics and itinerant activist-agitators who pass through local communities to radicalize the faithful and galvanize support among followers for the militant enterprise. Indoctrinated adherents would then be encouraged to go abroad to training camps to acquire terrorist skills for operations as *mujahideen*.

Terrorist propaganda and incitement against perceived enemies are intended to justify militant activities and cultivate followers and sympathizers. The goals are to mobilize broad based backing and commitment from within the religio-ethnic community and attract

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[46]   US Department of State US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005* (Washington, DC: 2006), p. 17.
[47]   Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, pp. 105-6.
[48]   Vidino, *Al Qaeda in* Europe, pp. 78-79; Gunaratna, *Al Qaeda*, pp. 105-6.
[49]   Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, "Kill and be killed: how cleric raised generation of terrorists," *The Times* [London], 8 February 2006.
[50]   US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, p. 57.
[51]   Tony Paterson, "Raids on Mosques Broke Terror Network, Claim German Police in Berlin," *The Independent* [London], 13 January 2005.

prospective recruits to the movement.[52]   Some links in the al-Qaeda propaganda chain are known to have been located in Canada. Among these were nodes belonging to the so-called Global Islamic Media Front preparing Jihadist incitement materials for dissemination across North America, Europe and the world.[53] Militant Jihadist agitprop tends to foment domestic radicalization in countries like Canada, stirring up enmity from within whilst creating an environment that encourages terrorist recruitment and activism.[54] Terrorist elements in Canada have used front organizations for advocacy purposes, and have also coerced and manipulated local homeland communities to conform and lend support to the militant agenda.[55] Within certain communities militant elements have subverted and taken over religious and ethno-cultural institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations, turning them into bastions for the militant cause. Moderates were effectively marginalized, manipulated and coerced into compliance.

Al-Qaeda has established its own intelligence capacity for ***penetrating sensitive government departments, agencies and institutions*** with agents, including sleeper agents, double agents, agents provocateurs, recruit insiders ("moles"), and fifth columnists.[56] Their objectives include:

- Infiltrating National Security secrecy to collect sensitive information and plans

- Detecting and disrupting National Security operations

- Acquiring sensitive technologies

- Strategic deception to confound the targeted organization's situational awareness

- The manipulation and distortion of public opinion in the battle for minds

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[52]   On the activities and doctrines propagated by radical Islamicist groups of various stripes see Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst & Co., 2004), pp.234-257; see also Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, esp. Chap. 1.

[53]   Graeme Hamilton, "Al-Qaeda's 'Spokesman'," *National Post* [Toronto], 1 February 2008.

[54]   Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *The Radicalizers: The Islamist Extremist Threat to Canada from Within*, Study 2006-7/09(a), 15 Dec 2006.

[55]   Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Public Report 2003*, p. 4.

[56]   Brian Fishman, *Al-Qa'ida's Spymaster Analyzes the U.S. Intelligence Community* (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2006).

Their tradecraft is said to be masterful. Targets for penetration include security and intelligence agencies, key government departments, sensitive industries, universities, human rights organizations, and the legal profession.[57] This espionage function is so important that Al-Qaeda operational doctrine treats infiltration into sensitive Government departments, agencies and institutions as the strategic equivalent of "martyrdom" attacks on the infidel enemy.[58]

Tactical preparations: Tactical preparations for terror attacks are usually vested in small, tightly knit cadres within operational cells. It is not usual for these cadres to counsel or seek advice on tactical operational details with other specially-qualified operatives in-country or even abroad. In a notorious case in the UK, known as Operation Crevice, the terror cell that conspired to attack gas and electricity plants in Britain sought technical input from an alleged co-conspirator in Canada.[59] Tactical preparations for terror operations may entail meetings of commanders and operatives staged at different times in various locations, even in different countries, in order to elude surveillance and detection. This tactical preparatory phase for major assaults can extend over many months and even years. The September 11th attackers engaged in prolonged tactical planning and preparations in various locations across the United States prior to embarking on their deadly mission.[60]

Reconnaissance on targets: Al-Qaeda and other Jihadist terror organizations usually undertake a careful, detailed and continuous reconnaissance on their intended targets. Successive reconnaissance teams may be brought to bear, along with specialized skills and methods, even accessing architectural drawings and infrastructure maps. Reconnaissance missions, with the support of local cells, aim to pinpoint target vulnerabilities, identify tactical approaches and escape routes, and guide tactical commanders and operatives in readiness for the assault.[61] Fraudulent identities can facilitate travel by reconnaissance missions and their surreptitious entry even to the most vigilant of target countries.

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57   *Cf.* Lisa Kramer & Richards Heuer Jr., **"**America's Increased Vulnerability to Insider Espionage**,"** *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2007), pp. 50-64; Stephen Wright , "Revealed: Islamist extremists have penetrated the heart of Britain," *Daily Mail* [London][, 12 February 2008; Ben Leapman, "Al-Qaeda supporters working at strategic sites," *Sunday Telegraph* [London], 29 April 2007.

58   Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, trans. William McCants, (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Centre, 2006), section 9.

59   Philippe Naughton, "Five given life for fertilizer bomb terror plot. Link to 7/7 bombers can be revealed for the first time," *The Times* (London), 30 April 2007.

60   *The 9/11 Report*, pp. 226-231.

61   Rohan Gunaratna & Peter Chalk, *Jane's Counter Terrorism, 2nd Edition* (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2002), p. 52.

Although mounting such extensive reconnaissance does involve risks of discovery, the attention to detail is expected to enhance the likelihood of a successful attack, with maximum harm to the target.

Terrorist assaults: Terrorist assaults are characterized by stealth, surprise and ruthless ferocity. A wide repertoire of tactics may be used in mounting attacks on targets, from armed attacks using bombs, firearms, or missiles, to suicide bombings, ambushes, hostage taking, assassinations, and vehicle-weapons in cars, trucks, planes, ships, trains, etc. Recent attacks on Jakarta, London, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Algiers, London, Madrid and elsewhere indicate that suicide-bombers and car/truck bombing are now becoming the terror tactics of choice.[62] Some attacks attributed to al-Qaeda or its affiliates against targets in Egypt, Great Britain, Indonesia, Morocco, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey involved primarily local, in-country cells and networks. However, it is not uncommon for Jihadist terrorists to assemble their strike force from various parts of their network, local and international. A Jihadist terror cell convicted in April, 2007, of plotting attacks on British targets, including a electricity and gas facilities, was composed of militants residing in the U.K. but also involved co-conspirators from the United States, Canada and Pakistan.[63]

4. POINTS OF VULNERABILITY TO COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERVENTIONS

In general, there are five sources and methods available to intelligence and security authorities to discern, detect and investigate terrorist intentions and capabilities:

- Planting and running agents in suspected terrorist cells and networks

- Acquiring "walk-ins," and/or recruiting "moles" as informants inside suspected terrorist cells and networks

- Deploying technical means to monitor activities of suspected terrorist cells and networks, utilizing communications, imagery, financial intelligence, and/or sensor technologies

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62   *David R. Sands, "Reading minds of suicide bombers,"* Washington Times*, 24 July 2005; Craig Whitlock, "Al Qaeda Leaders Seen in Control,"* Washington Post*, 24 July 2005*
63   "Five Given Life for Fertiliser Bomb Terror Plot . Link to 7/7 Bombers can be Revealed for the First Time," *The Times* [London], 30 April 2007.

- Interrogating captured terrorist assets, including detained operatives, captured documents, seized computer hard-drives, and/or forensic analysis

- Liaison and intelligence sharing with the security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies of allied and friendly countries.

Agent running, whether planted agents, "walk-ins" or "moles," and the interrogation of detained suspects, constitute so-called "Human-source" intelligence (HUMINT). In Canada, HUMINT generally falls within the jurisdiction of CSIS, RCMP, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and other law enforcement agencies.[64] Certain of the technical means are the mandated responsibility of functionally specialized agencies, most notably the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) for communications and electronics intelligence collection, and the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Canada (FINTRAC) for financial intelligence. However, these and other technical means of intelligence collection can also be deployed by CSIS, RCMP and other law enforcement agencies as provided by law. International liaison with allied and friendly countries has become an increasingly important source of shared intelligence in this age of globalized terrorist networks, yet any dependency on external sources can render our national security efforts vulnerable to the mishaps, manipulations, malfeasance or travesties of others.[65]

An examination of the terrorist operational cycle reveals certain points of vulnerability, potentially, to counter-terrorism interventions by intelligence, law enforcement and national security agencies to protect against threats of attack. These interventions entail a broad array of operational capabilities involving all the relevant security and intelligence disciplines: HUMINT -- collected by domestic, foreign and criminal intelligence organizations, SIGINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), financial intelligence, border control, regulatory authorities, intelligence

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[64]   Though somewhat dated by now, the publication of Canada's Privy Council Office, *The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community. Helping Keep Canada ad Canadians Safe and Secure* (Ottawa, 2001) offers a survey of the roles and responsibilities of various intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies. For a more recent academic study see Rudner, "Challenge and Response: Canada's Intelligence Community and the War on Terrorism."

[65]   *Cf.* Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National* Security *Activities* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006), p.431-2. See international liaison and counter-terrorism see also Stéphane Lefebvre, "The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation**,"** *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol**.** 16, No. 4 (2003); Martin Rudner, "Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2004); Jennifer E. Sims, "Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details**,"** *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 19, No. 2, (2006)

analysis and threat assessment. Not all the postulated interventions are necessarily being pursued currently by the responsible agencies, however these interventions are presumed to be consistent with their respective mandates and appropriate to their operational roles.

Strategic Planning: The characteristic propensity of al-Qaeda and its affiliated networks to engage in extensive discourses about Islamic legal precepts regarding their strategic planning, including the issuance of *fatwas* (juridical permissions) for operations against specified targets, provides a window of insight into their planned intentions, tactical capabilities, and operational doctrines. Since this discourse and the ensuing *fatwas* must necessarily be shared with operatives, sympathizers and supporters, their communications by electronic or print media, or even orally through selected preachers and messengers, are inherently vulnerable to interception. Moreover, *Shariyah* (Islamic law) obliges Muslim warriors to issue warnings to targets of attack, which Jihadists often do. To be sure, these warnings may not always be cast in a form, language or terminology familiar to non-Muslims.

For security authorities to gain access to the high-level planning intentions of al-Qaeda and its affiliates would therefore require both a capacity to access their communications and the capability to analyze and interpret the embodied messages. Signals intelligence capabilities can be deployed to intercept and decipher Internet communications and also penetrate password-protected websites. Security intelligence may penetrate religious circles in order to collect human source information on extremist preaching. However, it will remain for intelligence assessment to contribute an understanding of the actual substance and implications of terrorist strategic planning and operational doctrines. Assessment of strategic intent could be further reinforced and enhanced by the commissioning of related research studies by experts in the academic and consulting communities to contextualize the militant Jihadist ideology and mindset so as to help discern the adversaries' purposes in advance.

Recruitment: Once there are reasonable grounds to suspect that particular groups are engaged in terrorist activities, they may be lawfully investigated and their activities monitored, also by infiltrating intelligence agents into their midst. A primary objective of the ensuing investigation should be to identity the membership of the suspected terrorist cell or network, including recent recruits. Along with this investigative effort, security intelligence services and law enforcement agencies may be

expected to also try to determine the scope and methodologies of terrorist talent-spotting and recruitment efforts. Moreover, the SIGINT monitoring of suspected terrorist websites should permit the tracking of prospective self-enlisting recruits to the militant Jihadist movement

Training: The security intelligence/law enforcement surveillance of suspected terrorist cells and networks would also be expected to detect and monitor their training activities. In so far as al-Qaeda networks resort to more advance training abroad, as they tend to do in camps in Pakistan, it would be for border controls to detect the movements of suspected trainees and trainers based on shared information from domestic and international intelligence sources.

Communications: Terrorist communications by Internet or telephone are vulnerable to lawful interception by security intelligence or law enforcement agencies, domestically under warrant, or by the SIGINT agencies internationally. To be sure, signals intelligence faces massive challenges, technologically and in quantum terms, in seeking to track and intercept terrorist communications. The ever increasing sophistication of communications technologies, coupled with the ready availability of highly capable information security applications, renders the SIGINT task considerably more intricate. Furthermore, the sheer volume of communications traffic makes the targeting of specific, suspect messages very demanding. Nevertheless, SIGINT has come to play a vital role in counter-terrorism, with international SIGINT alliances and partnerships providing mechanisms for burden sharing and information sharing.[66] For its part, the terrorist network's use of couriers for the inter-personal transmission of message is itself vulnerable to detection through the intelligence/law enforcement surveillance of local suspected networks and cells, reinforced by border controls.

Resourcing: Terrorism financing, fund-raising and money transfers are vulnerable to scrutiny and tracking on the part of specialized financial intelligence units, like FINTRAC, as well as by security intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Government revenue agencies can vet charitable organizations, including religious institutions, to counteract the inappropriate use of charitable donations. Border controls may be applied to prevent the illicit importation of undeclared monetary instruments.

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[66]   *Vide.* Martin Rudner, "Canada's Communications Security Establishment, Signals Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2007).

Procurement: The procurement by terrorist elements of supplies and materièl is difficult to track and control in open, democratic societies, except where the transaction actually involves a legal transgression. Alas, much of what terrorists wish to procure for their operations may be acquired lawfully, even explosives. In these circumstances, in most democracies it falls to several key regulatory authorities and law enforcement agencies to try to counteract the unlawful acquisition of materièl and supplies for terrorist purposes. Thus, for example, Natural Resources Canada has regulatory authority over explosives, and Passport Canada over the issuance of passports, while the Canadian Border Service Agency is responsible for border controls and for monitoring the import of dangerous cargoes. It was an alert British port official who detected members of the UK cell with a shopping list of sophisticated equipment sought by terrorist contacts in Pakistan.[67]

Infrastructure: The terrorist infrastructure of safe houses and sleeper cells is deliberately designed to withstand detection and surveillance in order to remain available for future operations. A well-ensconced network of safe houses and sleeper cells can be very hard for the authorities to unravel. Patient, careful, sustained intelligence and police work over a prolonged time frame would be required to uncover most or all of these clandestine terrorist infrastructures.

Propaganda: Terrorist incitement, propaganda and indoctrination efforts typically make use of the Internet and the preachings of radical clerics to convey their belligerent messages. These media can be and often are followed by the authorities, through communications intelligence, security intelligence, or criminal intelligence/law enforcement, and also by non-governmental research organizations. Thus, the Global Islamic Media Front, including suspected propagandists based in Canada, was reportedly detected and interrupted by Austrian SIGINT authorities, which shared the evidence with Canadian counterparts.[68] Sometimes the messaging conveyed by al-Qaeda and other militant Jihadist pronouncements will allude to intended actions or targets, so as to gainsay religious jurisprudential sanction for future operations.[69] Their agitprop, therefore, demands serious attention. Often, however, the messaging is conveyed in obscure, nuanced terminology or allusions to Islamic phenomena

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67 David Byers, "Gang plotted to behead Muslim soldier 'like a pig'," *The Times* [London], 29 January 2008.
68 Hamilton, "Al-Qaeda's 'Spokesman'", p. A1.
69 Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), *The Radical Dawa in Transition* (The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007), p. 11 *et passim*

unfamiliar to the uninitiated. These pronouncements must therefore be subject to careful, ongoing analysis and assessment by knowledgeable experts in order to fully appreciate the ideological significance and operational implications of the militant Jihadist propaganda effort.

Penetration: Terrorist infiltrations into government departments, security and intelligence agencies, sensitive industries, or civil society organizations can create an insider threat that can effectively undermine the overall capacity of democracies to defend themselves. This insider threat derives from the insidious exploitation and manipulation of human susceptibilities to betray institutional vulnerabilities. These terrorist attempts at insider espionage are themselves vulnerable to the classic counter-intelligence approaches to detecting penetrations:[70]

- Anomalies and Inconsistencies approach

- Litmus Test approach

- Motive approach

- Cost Accounting approach

- Predictive Test approach

To protect against terrorist penetration efforts and insider threats, counter-intelligence disciplines must be enlisted in counter-terrorism. Thus, by virtue of vigilance, the UK Security Service is reported to have detected and thwarted "dozens" of al-Qaeda attempts to infiltrate its ranks during its recent surge in recruitment.[71]

Tactical preparations: The tendency of terrorist networks to assign tactical preparations to small, tightly-knit groups of operational cadres makes it difficult for intelligence or law enforcement agencies to penetrate into their terror planning initiatives with informants, even if the cell is itself under surveillance. Nevertheless, terrorist communications with co-conspirators and leaders in Pakistan are more likely to be vulnerable to interception, while the international movements of key planners and

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70   Kramer & Heuer, **"**America's Increased Vulnerability to Insider Espionage," pp. 50-64.
71   "Al Qaeda Fanatics in Bid to Join MI5," *Daily Express* [London], 8 May 2007.

their co-conspirators may be monitored by border controls. Details of actual tactical plans may be more problematic for intelligence agencies to discern, without having successfully placed a human source within the cadre clique. Be that as it may, the propensity of terror tacticians to commit their operational plans and to computer hard-drives has tended to make them accessible to the authorities during the course of a subsequent investigation.

Reconnaissance: The terrorist propensity to undertake detailed reconnaissance of prospective targets exposes them to certain points of vulnerability. Terrorist operatives embarking on reconnaissance missions must to some extent make themselves and their intentions liable to discovery as they reconnoiter their indicated target. In the case of a group already under surveillance, a reconnaissance mission should well be treated by intelligence or law enforcement agencies as an early warning signal. Reconnaissance represents, indeed, a pre-indicator of intention to attack. Where critical national infrastructure is being targeted, a vigilant regimen for protective security on the part of owner/operators should be alert to any attempt at reconnaissance.

Terrorist Assault: A terrorist assault comprises the most perilous phase of the terrorism cycle. To be sure, a terrorist attack can possibly be interdicted in the course of the operation by the authorities, if advance warning is available. Otherwise, by the time a terrorist squad or explosives-laden vehicle arrives at the target site the immediately relevant response shifts from prevention to mitigation, so as to try to limit the potential casualties and mitigate the damage. Guards, gates, emergency preparations and resilience planning catapult to the forefront of the counter-terrorism intervention. In the aftermath of a terrorist strike, advance planning for managing consequential damage, emergency repairs, and resilience represent the ultimate security antidote to the worst efforts of terrorists to harm our core national interests

An overall matrix portraying intelligence-led interventions in the terrorism cycle citing Canadian Security and Intelligence capabilities is outlined in Table 1:

Table 1
INTELLIGENCE-LED INTERVENTIONS IN THE TERRORISM CYCLE

Terrorism Cycle Phase	CSIS	RCMP	Other Support	Key Discipline
Strategic Planning	X		CSE, IAS, ITAC	Analysis
Recruitment	X	X		HUMINT
Training	X	X	CBSA	HUMINT, BORDER CONTROL
Communications		X	CSE, CBSA	SIGINT, BORDER CONTROL
Resourcing	X	X	FINTRAC, CRA, CBSA	FININT, BORDER CONTROL
Propaganda/ Incitement	X	X	CSE	HUMINT, SIGINT
Infrastructure	X	X		HUMINT
Tactical Planning	X	X	CSE	HUMINT, SIGINT
Reconnaissance	X	X		HUMINT, IMINT
Assault		X	LOCAL GUARDS	HUMINT, CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
Penetration	X	X	Security Officers	Counter-Intelligence

Key: *Agencies*: CSIS: Canadian Security Intelligence Service; RCMP: Royal Canadian Mounted Police; CSE: Communications Security Establishment; CBSA: Canadian Border Service Agency; FINTRAC: Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Canada; ITAC: Integrated Threat Assessment Centre; IAS: International Assessments Staff, Privy Council Office.

Disciplines: HUMINT: Human Source Intelligence; SIGINT: Signals Intelligence; FININT: Financial Intelligence; IMINT: Imagery or visual Intelligence.

5. TOWARDS ANALYSIS DRIVEN INTELLIGENCE

The traditional, primary role of intelligence analysis in the Canadian S&I Community has been to draw on the results of domestic intelligence collection coupled with shared information from allies in order to produce assessment products for dissemination to interested clients across government. Over time, Canada has evolved a complex web of multiple, centralized and decentralized intelligence assessment units, most of them relatively small in size –- the largest have 30-40 staff, except for Defence Intelligence which is far larger --- and having mixed mandates for producing strategic, tactical and operational intelligence analyses.

Most components of Canada's S&I community possess their own intelligence analysis capabilities. This is certainly not inappropriate, as it meets their respective requirements for analytical products germane to their mandates and missions. Thus, CSIS has its Intelligence Assessments Branch, the RCMP its Criminal Analysis Branch, FINTRAC its internal analytical resources, the Canadian Forces Defence Intelligence (J2), and law enforcement across the country have access to Criminal Intelligence Service Canada as well as their local analytical units. As well, other security-related departments and agencies also possessed their own capacity for analyzing internally-generated intelligence inputs, including the Canada Border Services Agency, Canada Revenue Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of National Defence (Directorate of Strategic Analysis –D Strat-A), Department of Public Safety, Department of Transport, and Natural Resources Canada. Two high-level organs have been created to provide all-source strategic intelligence assessments for government clients. The central agency of government, the Privy Council Office has its International Assessment Staff (formerly known as the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat) producing intelligence assessments for Cabinet and inter-departmental policy-makers. In 2004, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) was established as a national fusion centre for all-source intelligence assessments relating to terrorism and counter-terrorism for all levels of government, intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and first responders.

In this complex institutional context characteristic of the Canadian S&I Community the intelligence analysis function tends to be driven by

intelligence collection. Accordingly, their analytical production by and large consists of interpretations, syntheses and assessments relating to the perceived threat environment, strategic and tactical, for policy makers and managers. This form of analysis would not usually serve to directly support ongoing national security operations or investigations. In the Canadian S&I Community, intelligence analysis rarely, if ever, drives intelligence collection.

This traditional paradigm of intelligence analysis contrasts sharply with the more contemporary, integrative, actionable role assigned to intelligence analysis in the reports of the U.S. 9/11 Commission, the British Butler Committee, and Australia's Flood Inquiry. The new approach was reflected in the creation of so-called "fusion" centres as a centralized, integrative mechanism for all-source intelligence assessments.[72] The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, the British Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), the Australian National Threat Assessment Centre, and, indeed, Canada's Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) represent prominent examples of this centralized, integrative, "fusion" function in intelligence analysis. While these fusion centres might continue to produce intelligence assessments for policy makers and the political leadership, their distinct and innovative role would be to contribute all-source, actionable analysis to support proactive operational interventions against terrorist threats. The conceptual foundation has been laid, and it remains to be seen whether policy leadership and appropriate resourcing will eventually succeed in transforming intelligence analysis into operationally relevant and actionable prescriptions for intelligence-led interventions in terrorism cycle.[73]

A counter-terrorism strategy aimed at preemptive interventions in the terrorism cycle must be grounded on reliable, all-source, well-crafted and actionable intelligence analysis. The analysis function should be expected to produce operationally-relevant assessments of terrorist activities, in their detail, apropos each stage of the terrorism cycle as it pertains to targeted groups. These assessments would be fed back to intelligence and law enforcement agencies as prescriptions for further investigative operations, signaling where lacunae exist in available information.

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72   *Vide.* Martin Rudner, "Intelligence Analysis and Counter-Terrorism: How Lies the Landscape?" in Magnus Ranstorp, ed., *Mapping Terrorism Research,* Studies in Intelligence series (London: Routledge, 2007); Stéphane Lefebvre, "A Look at Intelligence Analysis," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2004).

73   *Vide.* Mark Lowenthal, "Intelligence Analysis: Management and Transformation Issues," in Jennifer Sims & Burton L. Gerber, eds., *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*.

Already in the UK, the JTAC role encompasses the preparation both of strategic-level assessments for policy-makers and government leaders, and actionable analyses in direct support for Security Service (MI-5) and Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) counter-terrorism operations.

Compared to the traditional approach which in analysis represented the trailing edge of collection, in this new paradigm intelligence analysis emerges as a driver of intelligence collection. A coordinating mechanism, to be discussed below, would orchestrate the ensuing efforts on the part of the agencies concerned to conduct their investigations and share information so as to fill in the missing gaps and thereby complete the intelligence picture. Whereas the intelligence disciplines, like HUMINT, SIGINT, and financial intelligence can paint the details, intelligence analysis projects the big picture.

For intelligence analysis to take on and fulfill this expanded, prescriptive role will require some far-reaching capacity building in the Canadian S&I Community. Three major issues will need to be addressed: (a) the institutional locus for an expanded, prescriptive intelligence analysis capability; (b) the professionalization of intelligence analysis in the Canadian S&I context; and, related to this, (c) the training and professional development requirements for enhanced intelligence analysts. Currently in Canada, even high-level strategic intelligence analysis is decentralized and fragmented among multiple organizations, ITAC, IAS, CSIS, D Strat-A, with sub-optimal staffing levels; except at DND. In most of these organizations the analysis function is performed mainly by officials seconded from other duties, and very few are actually career analysts. Moreover, training opportunities for intelligence analysts in the Canadian S&I Community are limited to barely rudimentary offerings at the elementary, entry level.

In these circumstances, there would seem to be distinct locational and operational advantages to relocating the national intelligence assessment fusion centre to the Privy Council Office through a merger of ITAC with IAS. A merged ITAC-IAS would create the critical mass, in terms of staffing and coverage, for building a more robust, more synergetic, more comprehensive and higher profile intelligence fusion centre at the central agency of the Government of Canada. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the United States and Australia both locate their high-level intelligence assessment organs in their respective central agencies, the US National Counterterrorism Center in the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence, and the Australian Office of National Assessment in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Such a merged ITAC-IAS fusion centre could expand the capacity for intelligence analysis in Canada, while its identification with PCO would lend gravitas --- if not leverage --- to its assessment products. This combined central intelligence fusion center should be made accountable to the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. Its assessment products would be disseminated to clients across government, and would also be fed back to the intelligence and security agencies to help support the more proactive, calibrated strategy for countering terrorism.

The creation of a more robust and comprehensive national intelligence fusion capability would require an enhanced professionalization of Canada's intelligence analyst community. Currently, there is no professional career stream for analysts in the Canadian S&I Community, unlike in other jurisdictions. Except for D Strat A, FINTRAC and the smallish analytical units in some government departments, which do recruit analysts directly, most Canadian intelligence analysts are seconded from operational ranks for short-term assignments in analytical units. Little or no opportunity is available for career development in intelligence analysis. In order to build up its institutional capacity for intelligence analysis the Canadian S&I Community must create a professional cadre of career analysts possessing the aptitudes, skills, and commitment appropriate to this work. This implies the introduction of a professional career path for analysts, with appropriate incentives and rewards for expertise and promotions. What is called for is a transformation of the management culture of the Canadian S&I Community writ large, a cultural shift in favour of analytical tradecraft as distinct from the other dimensions of the intelligence enterprise.

The building of analytical capacity in the Canadian S&I Community and the achievement of professional standards would necessitate, in turn, the establishment of a specialist training and professional development regimen for career analysts. Currently, no such training or professional development program exists in Canada, other than a very basic entry-level module for newly assigned analysts organized under the auspices of IAS. By way of contract, the United States supports a wide spectrum of specialized training and professional development courses and programs for analysts, delivered through such institutions as the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis at the CIA University, the National Security Agency's Analysis Training Program, the FBI Academy, and the National Defence Intelligence College.

Although the Canadian S&I analytical community may be too small in size to afford a dedicated professional school of its own, at least at present, this should not inhibit the introduction of high-quality training and professional development programs for intelligence analysts through other available channels. Surely, with appropriate resourcing and political will it should be possible to design and deliver a curriculum and courses for the professional development of intelligence analysts under the aegis of existing government training institutions, such as the Canadian Police College or the Canada School of Public Service, either singly or in combination with university-based programs in Intelligence and Security Studies.

6. COORDINATING AN ALL- OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE-LED COUNTER-TERRORISM

A move towards a proactive, intelligence-led approach to counter-terrorism is predicated on the effective coordination of the national security and intelligence effort. Coordination from the centre is intended to promote seamless interaction between the producers of threat assessments, based on all-source intelligence, and the operational application of appropriate, calibrated security measures to counteract terrorist threats at each stage of the terrorism cycle. The coordinating mechanism constitutes the institutional centre-piece of a proactive, intelligence-led, proactive, calibrated all-of-government response to terrorist threats. It furthermore should serve to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of inter-departmental plans to safeguard vital national assets, mitigate consequential damage, and ensure resilience. The Netherlands Office of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) represents one such central coordinating organization for some 20 Dutch agencies and departments engaged in the national counter-terrorism effort.[74]

The salience of the coordination function implies that it must be assigned to a suitably high-profile central agency of government. In Canada, probably the most appropriate locus for this enhanced coordination function would be with the office of the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, whose formal role at PCO includes that of coordinator

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[74] The Netherlands, Department of Justice and Department of the Interior and Kingdom Affairs, *The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb)* (The Hague: 2005). Note that the Office of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism is located in the Netherlands Department of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

of the security and intelligence community. Under the proposed new arrangement, intelligence assessments from the national fusion centre at PCO would flow up to the National Security Advisor, to serve as the basis for coordinating the intelligence machinery to deal with specified threats. This proactive, intelligence-led approach implies a significant enhancement of this coordination function in order to ensure policy coherence, inter-agency cooperation, and effective synergy among a wide array of security, intelligence and law enforcement organizations, relevant government departments (at all levels), and even private owner/ operators of critical national infrastructure. It is noteworthy that the recently elected Government of Australia announced its intention to proceed with the creation of a new office of National Security Advisor with authority to promote operational coordination among that country's intelligence and security community.[75]

To perform this enhanced coordination function effectively, this proposed new institutional arrangement would equip the office of National Security Advisor with three potent, instrumental resources to promote coordinated, calibrated, analysis-driven interventions:

- Supplementary budgetary appropriations

- Additional personnel allocations

- Moral suasion

Additional budgetary and personnel resources could be dispensed by the National Security Advisor to operational agencies in order to endow them with the incremental capacity needed to focus more attention on particular targets and objectives, albeit without infringing on their autonomous roles.

Of course, security and intelligence agencies, like all components of government, tend to be fully stretched, financially and staffing-wise, in performing their present tasks. Any additional assignments must call forth incremental resources, financial and personnel, to sustain operational effectiveness. The office of the National Security Advisor

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[75]   Sushi Das, "US-style security chief to fight terror," *The Age* [Melbourne], 28 January 2008; see also Anthony Bergin and Mark Thomson*, An Office of National Security: Making it Happen* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2007).

would be allocated, each year, a modest number of personnel positions and budgetary funds for dispensing to the intelligence and security agencies or departments to enable coordinated operations against targets, at the instance of the National Security Advisor a intelligence and security coordinator. To be sure, each operational agency receiving supplementary resources through this route would still be accountable to Treasury Board, at the end of the financial year, for their full and proper utilization. The moral suasion emanating from the office of the National Security Advisor at the central agency of government should offer further leverage to the resource dispensations. Be that as it may, this resourcing incentive for intelligence-led counter-terrorism should make the proactive, all-of-government approach operationally viable.

The coordinating mechanism represents, in essence, the key enabler for this holistic, all-of-government approach to national security. It is the coordinating body, the office of the National Security Advisor, that would be responsible for bringing the vital elements of intelligence analysis to bear in support of proactive, calibrated interventions on the part of intelligence and security authorities to counteract the terrorism cycle. Ultimately, effective counter-terrorism requires that institutionalized excellence be built in to the architecture of the national security system.

7. AFTERWARD: BUILDING COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPACITY IN NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE

The sustainability of any system for national security in a democracy depends, in good measure, on building and maintaining public confidence in the necessity, propriety and efficiency of the national security machinery being deployed. Public acceptance is reflected in the existence of a security culture, a broad societal recognition of the need for statutes, policy initiatives, and actual national security institutions to protect public safety against perceived threats. Security culture, in democracies, underwrites the values of human security writ large. Three core elements of a security culture will be addressed here, as being pertinent to the development of a proactive, intelligence-led architecture for counter-terrorism:

> (a) the assurance of intelligence and natural security accountability; (b) the education of citizens about national security and intelligence matters; and (c) the fostering of public awareness about the country's experience in protecting its national security.

Whereas Canada has put in place some generally respected accountability mechanisms for some components of its S&I Community, this country has been laggard, if not negligent, regarding the educational and public awareness aspects of building a national security culture. Yet, the very multicultural character of Canadian society places particular demands on a security culture especially in the current threat environment.

Many democracies, including Canada, have introduced accountability systems for their national security machinery to monitor and report on its compliance with policy, performance and statutory requirements, and thus contribute to public confidence. This accountability element of national security machinery has become all the more salient at a time when the secret services need to intervene more intrusively in domestic society to defend against threats of terrorism.[76] Up to now, public accountability for Canadian security and intelligence services has emphasized executive inspectorates and review over parliamentary oversight. This accountability system is compartmentalized by agency and also by function. CSIS is subject to scrutiny by an Inspector-General and by the independent Security Intelligence Review Committee, and CSE by a CSE Commissioner. The Auditor-General of Canada, Privacy Commissioner and Human Rights Commissioner all monitor the entire S&I Community along with other government departments and agencies in accordance with their respective functional mandates.[77] However, there is no specific accountability mechanism applicable to the RCMP national security activities, other than the more general 'complaints' process. The recommendations of the O'Connor Commission of Inquiry (Arar Commission) for establishing a more comprehensive set of mechanisms for national security accountability that would also encompass the RCMP in its national security role, along with other pertinent security agencies like CBSA and FINTRAC, and departments like Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, still await a government decision on implementation.[78]

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[76]   Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and Liberal Democracy*. (London: Macmillan, 1999); Rudner, "Challenge and Response," pp. 31-34.

[77]   Gary Filmon, "The Canadian Model of Security and Intelligence Review," in *Accountability of Intelligence and Security Agencies and Human Rights* (The Hague: Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services {CTIVD} & Faculty of Law, Radboud Universiy Nijmegen, 2007); Martin Rudner, "Contemporary Threats, Future Tasks: Canadian Intelligence and the Challenges of Global Security," in Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., *Canada Among Nations 2002. A Fading Power* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[78]   Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National* Security *Activities* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006).

Parliamentary oversight of the S&I Community is relatively weak in Canada as compared to the more cogent role played by American, British or Australian counterparts. Indeed, Canadian governments and intelligence services have tended to minimize their exposure to parliamentary scrutiny. Consequently, the Canadian Parliament has not emerged as a forum for deliberations on intelligence policy, finance, or operational accountability. The committee structure of the Canadian Parliament has, paradoxically, militated against effective oversight of the S&I Community. While the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence has conducted hearings on wide array of national security issues, the House of Commons' committee structure is organized around specific departmental portfolios, thereby dispersing deliberations on Security and Intelligence matters amongst a host of separate committees and sub-committees. There has been some discussion in recent years about creating a proper Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and National Security, however it remains to be determined whether this will come to pass. For the Parliament to become an effective player in upholding national security accountability, it is clear that Canadian legislators will need to demonstrate the same breadth of purview, continuity of committee membership, and access to intelligence sources that exemplify their American or British counterparts.

An educated public represents a vital asset for creating and sustaining a vibrant security culture. Despite the heightened public attention directed at National Security and Intelligence matters especially since September 11th, the capacity of Canadian institutions of higher education to exercise knowledge leadership in these fields remains grossly inadequate. Canadian students have demonstrated an extraordinarily strong interest, in their numbers and in aptitude, in pursuing undergraduate and post-graduate studies on Intelligence and National security subjects.[79] Yet, Canadian universities have been painstakingly slow to respond to societal demand. Very few university courses or programs dealing with Intelligence and/ or National Security studies are currently on offer in Canada. Carleton University stands out as host to Canada's only graduate program in Intelligence and National Security under the aegis of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, while also offering dedicated

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[79]   Mark Cardwell, "Intelligence Failure," *University Affairs* [Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada], February, 2008, pp. 25-27.

undergraduate courses in History and Political Science. It remains to be seen whether the new graduate schools of international studies recently announced at the universities of Ottawa and Waterloo/Wilfrid Laurier will choose to include Intelligence and Security in their repertoires. One especially shameful facet of the present educational lacunae is the paucity of learning material on Canada's own intelligence history. Other than singular books and a few scholarly articles in international journals, Canada's distinguished intelligence history remains virtually unknown to students and people in this country.

We should note, parenthetically, that the prospective expansion of Canada's intelligence analysis/assessment capabilities would require recruits with specialized academic qualifications. It would be incumbent on Canada's universities, and their programs in Intelligence and Security Studies, to help generate the high-level expertise likely to be needed. Among the disciplines likely to be most in demand are international area studies and languages, conflict analysis, mathematics, finance, sociology and anthropology, psychology, law, computer science, and engineering, as related to intelligence, security, and terrorism.

Existing deficiencies in Canada's higher education system also reflect themselves in a weak national capacity for academic research into vital issues of national security interest, including terrorism. In 2002 Carleton University established the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, Canada's first -- and so far only -- dedicated research centre focusing on Security and Intelligence topics. While valuable work has been done, by all accounts, research remains grievously constrained by a dire lack of financial support, even from the official funding councils, coupled with acute staff shortages. It is indicative of the absence of priority that out of more than 1,800 Canada Research Chairs established in Canadian universities since 2000 under that federal initiative to promote academic excellence in priority fields identified by the universities themselves, not a single one was dedicated to Intelligence Studies. Not one. Just one Canada Research Chair relating to terrorism studies was recently established at Université Laval in Quebec City. Compared to the rather more dynamic situation in American, Australian and British universities and research institutions, Canada's educational and research capacity in these fields of vital national security concern remains woefully under-strength.

Despite their few numbers, and notwithstanding their being scattered among a dozen or so universities across the country, the small coterie of Canadian academic specialists has made a signal contribution to building up one of the world's foremost organizations in the field, the Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS). This association is run jointly by Canadian academics and practitioners. It convenes annual conferences, alternating between venues in Ottawa and in elsewhere across Canada. These conferences attract a large attendance from academics, government officials, journalists, private sector representatives, students, and others, from Canada and abroad. Issues addressed at these CASIS conferences are highly topical, presented by renown authorities, and are often well covered by the media. Still, for all of its success in bringing knowledge about Intelligence and Security matters to Canada and to Canadians, CASIS continues to subsist with barely minimal administrative and financial support. Public awareness and knowledge building about Intelligence and National Security are still not priorities, neither for Canadian governments nor for private foundations, so that even a globally acclaimed CASIS is left to endure hand-to-mouth, year to year.

Fostering public awareness about national security matters is vital for the sustainability of a security culture in a democracy. Ordinarily, public awareness in most spheres of governance, like the economy or social policy, rests on some degree of policy transparency. Understandably, transparency is inherently problematic with respect to security intelligence activities, and especially with regard to operational matters that must remain secret. Other means must therefore be used to acquaint the citizenry with Security and Intelligence issues in order to build trust. Media relations certainly have an important role to lay in purveying reliable information to journalists and through them to the public. A high standard of media reportage and comment can contribute invaluably to promoting greater public familiarity with, and knowledge of, Intelligence and National Security affairs. Likewise, the opening and declassification of historical intelligence archives can contribute invaluably to the extension of public knowledge about this country's experience in Intelligence.[80] It would also reinforce the point that Intelligence has long been a legitimate arm of Canadian statecraft. Ironically, Canada's intelligence archives

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[80]   Wesley Wark, "The Access to Information Act and the Security and Intelligence Community in Canada," Research Study #20, Report of the Access to Information Review Task Force, *Access to Information: Making it Work for Canadians* (Ottawa, 2002).

dating back to the Second World War remain classified and therefore closed. Opening access to that material would surely help encourage the writing of histories that augment the knowledge resources available to educators and to society at large.

Museums can also play a valuable part in enhancing public familiarity and understanding of complex and remote phenomena. Certainly, the Secret War gallery at the Imperial War Museum in London, and the privately supported International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. have helped inspire a greater public awareness and appreciation of the role of intelligence and security services in responding to contemporary threats to the national security. These exhibits have been immensely popular, by all accounts. There is no museum in Canada that exhibits the artifacts of our own Intelligence and Security experience, conveying our distinguished record to a mass public. If there is ignorance abroad among Canadians, the cause may be a failure to consider the importance of investing resourcefully to publicize our Intelligence and Security legacy through institutions of mass culture.

Security culture can be an enabler of sustainable intelligence reform. Just as security and intelligence machinery in democracies needs to be lubricated with an appropriate level of public confidence, so transforming the S&I architecture calls for an even greater degree of public awareness and understanding of the parameters of change. Fostering a broad based security culture grounded on public confidence in the accountability mechanisms, on knowledge of national security matters, and on civic trust in the appropriateness of security and intelligence measures, would make Canadians all the more amenable to, and supportive of new initiatives aimed at dealing with sensitive issues like counter-terrorism. It behooves government to be mindful of the importance of security culture as a key enabler of sustainable capacity building in addressing the prospective transformation and revitalization of Canada's Security and Intelligence Community.

Martin Rudner is a Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus at The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, and was founding Director of the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies at Carleton. Professor Rudner was born in Montreal, Quebec, and was educated at McGill University, the University of Oxford, and Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he received his doctorate. He is author of over ninety books and scholarly articles dealing with international affairs, Southeast Asia, and Intelligence and Security studies. Recent publications include: "Protecting North America's Energy Infrastructure Against Terrorism," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* (2006); "Canada's Communications Security Establishment, Signals Intelligence and Counter-terrorism," *Intelligence and National Security* (2007); and "Misuse of Passports: Identity Fraud, The Propensity to Travel, and International Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2008). Professor Rudner has consulted and lectured on security and counter-terrorism issues to various departments and agencies of government, and has given expert testimony before courts, commissions of inquiry, and parliamentary committees. He served on the Advisory Panel for the Policy Review component of the Arar Commission of Inquiry under Mr Justice Dennis O'Connor.