

APPENDIX C
The Myth of Security At Canada's Airports:
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National
Security and Defence

Recommendations¹

Section I

- I.1 Transport Canada should, by March 31, 2003, finalize and issue training standards programs to equip cabin crews to deal with terrorists and/or terrorist materials. All flight crews should have completed training by September 30, 2003.
- I.2 The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and Immigration Canada should, by June 30, 2003, offer substantive evidence to the Committee that they have addressed the Auditor General's recommendations to improve training that will help airport personnel identify persons "likely to engage in criminal activities or endanger the safety of Canadians." They should also demonstrate that they have made arrangements to gain access to police databanks that would assist in such identification, and have provided their employees with the training and technology required to take advantage of these databanks.
- I.3 Transport Canada should, by September 30, 2003, ensure that all Canadian passenger airlines are providing training courses to maintenance personnel and other personnel working in proximity to aircraft to help them identify potentially dangerous situations and materials.

Section II

- II.1 All flight crew should be informed when an Aircraft Protective Officer (APO) is on board.
- II.2 Transport Canada should, by June 30, 2003, require design completion of a double door system or systems to protect cockpits, and order air carriers to complete the installation of such systems by December 31, 2004.

¹ Exhibit P-171, pp. 143-149.

- II.3 APOs should be instructed by the RCMP to be prepared to intervene in violent disruptions in passenger cabins, and certainly be prepared to intervene if crew or passengers' lives are threatened, and not necessarily to restrain themselves until the very moment that any assault is launched on the cockpit.
- II.4 Pilots should not be armed.

Section III

- III.1 Dedicated and trained personnel should immediately begin carrying out random and targeted screening of all checked baggage, parcels, mailbags, and cargo.
- III.2 CATSA should implement full multi-layer screening (vapour detection supplemented by x-rays and other kinds of searches) of all checked baggage, mailbags and cargo by January 1, 2004.
- III.3 The practice of offering blanket security shortcuts on the basis of being a "known shipper" shipping by air carrier should be discontinued. The Committee encourages the development of a protocol for shippers based on their known reliability, similar to the one currently being introduced under the Smart Borders arrangement with the United States.
- III.4 People, cargo and aircraft coming from small airports without sophisticated screening systems should receive a full screening when they arrive at an airport under CATSA's jurisdiction.

Section IV

- IV.1 CATSA should issue national passes for air crew and all other persons who fall more naturally under a national, rather than a regional, jurisdiction. If local airport authorities are permitted to continue to issue passes allowing access to restricted areas at their airports, these local passes should be
 - Of national, uniform design, based on national configurations defined by the Canadian Air Transport Security Association,
 - Cancelable by CATSA
 - Validated through CATSA's national database.
- IV.2 All Canadian airports, by December 31, 2003, should introduce new electronic airside access passes, containing biometric identifiers, that
 - Are encoded to prevent access to zones beyond any employee's work area
 - Expire automatically after three years
 - Can be deactivated by a central control mechanism at any time

- IV.3 CATSA should be the issuing authority for passes for all employees, contract workers, other personnel and vehicles permitted airside access.
- IV.4 CATSA should be responsible for assuring that these persons and vehicles are physically searched on entry to restricted areas at Canada's airports. Persons and vehicles leaving those areas should be searched on a random basis, with provision for more extensive exit searches whenever extraordinary threats are perceived.
- IV.5 The current 5-point background check for restricted area passes: Canada Police Information Centre (for criminal record), CSIS (for potential security threats), and Transport Canada (domicile, employment background and credit records) should be conducted every three years, replacing the current schedule of every five years.

Section V

(This Recommendation repeated from Section IV)

- IV.4 CATSA should be responsible for assuring that these persons and vehicles are physically searched on entry to restricted areas at Canada's airports. Persons and vehicles leaving those areas should be searched on a random basis, with provision for more extensive exit searches whenever extraordinary threats are perceived.

This Recommendation Repeated from Section IV)

- IV.5 The current 5-point background check for restricted area passes: Canada Police Information Centre (for criminal record), CSIS (for potential security threats), and Transport Canada (domicile, employment background and credit records) should be conducted every three years, replacing the current schedule of every five years.

(This is a New Recommendation Contained Only in Section V)

- V.1 Transport Canada should require that private aircraft departing airports under CATSA's supervision should not leave until aircraft, passengers and their baggage have been screened. Private aircraft departing from any air facility not supervised by CATSA should be searched on arrival, whether they arrive from private air fields in Canada or any locations in foreign countries in order to ensure the integrity of security at Canadian airports.

Section VI

No recommendations at this time.

Section VII

- VII.1 All airport policing directly related to air travel security be removed from the airport authorities and assigned exclusively to the RCMP under contract to CATSA.
- VII.2 Local police forces and security guards contracted by airport authorities be responsible for criminal offences that are not related to air travel security.

Section VIII

- VIII.1 Transport Canada should continue to be responsible for the development of policy and standards for aircraft and airport security and should be responsible for verification that security policies are being implemented to its standards by CATSA, airport authorities, airlines, and police or other security personnel;
- VIII.2 CATSA should be responsible for the design and delivery of all mechanisms and training to assure air travel security, including the management and security screening of the restricted areas of the airport and the security screening of all persons and things boarding aircraft in Canada.
- VIII.3 National standards be effectively and consistently implemented. CATSA should develop an intelligence capability in order to effectively carry out its responsibilities.
- VIII.4 CATSA should be given the authority to contract the RCMP to supervise all policing at airports as it relates to passenger, cargo, aircraft and airside security.
- VIII.5 The Auditor General of Canada should conduct audits – including value for money audits – of security expenditures both by the federal government and airport authorities (the Minister of Transport should make this possible through new legislation.)

Section IX

- IX.1 The Government of Canada detail how much money is being collected from the \$12 air travellers security charge – better known as the departure tax – and from which airports;
- IX.2 The Government of Canada account for how much of the \$12 air travellers security charge, is being spent by CATSA, and how much is being spent by other departments and agencies and how much is being spent at each airport and for what;

- IX.3 That CATSA fully report the amounts that it is spending on its internal administration and report annually how much it has spent at each airport for: passenger screening, mail and cargo screening, airside searching of non-passengers, policing; and
- IX.4 That the Government of Canada introduce legislation providing the Auditor General of Canada with the power to audit each airport authority for accuracy, and value received for all security revenues and expenditures made by the authority, which would complement ongoing auditing and supervision by Transport Canada of security expenditures by airport authorities.

Section X

- X.1 The federal government should design and implement air travel security measures that provide transparency and full financial accountability to the Canadian public.
- X.2 Airport authorities and the airlines must recognize that security of air travel is the public's business and be forthright in explaining the measures they are taking to protect against terrorist or criminal activity, on the ground, and in the air.

