

APPENDIX E

Canadian Security Guide Book 2007 Edition - Airports

APPENDIX III¹

Index of New Recommendations

Problem 1(a): Insufficient Airport Policing

- A1. The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada increase the size of the RCMP by between 600 and 800 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in order to provide the RCMP with the capacity to:
- Execute a new mandate of oversight and responsibility for security at airports and,
 - Expand its investigative and analytical capabilities at airports within the National Airport System.
- A2. The Committee recommends that Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada conduct tests to ascertain the level of cooperation of multiple police forces operating at major Canadian airports. These tests should be conducted within the next year, and the results should be made public and recommendations acted upon six months after they are issued.

Problem 1(b): Inadequate Background Checks

- A3. The Committee recommends that the ratio of airport employees with background checks/pass escorting or supervising employees without background checks/pass be 1 to 5.

Problem 1(c): Inadequate Control of Access to Restricted Areas

- A4. The Committee recommends that the level of random checking on departure be set at a minimum of 10 percent daily, or at a higher level so as to ensure that the smuggling of contraband is deterred.
- A5. The Committee recommends that by December 31, 2008 airport restricted area identification cards should be augmented with geofencing to detect irregular employee behaviour.

Problem 2: Checking the Legitimacy of Flight Crews and Ground Crew

No change – see Appendix II

¹ Exhibit P-172, pp. 91-94.

Problem 3: Unscreened Airmail and Other Cargo

No change – see Appendix II

Problem 4: Screening Checked Baggage

A6. The Committee recommends that since all passengers are searched for liquids, gels and weapons, all materials being loaded onto aircrafts should also be checked for weapons and potentially volatile liquids and gels, which in combination could be explosive. This includes searching airline catering service carts.

Problem 5: Vulnerable Cockpit Doors

- A7. The Committee recommends that all future aircraft used by Canadian airlines should be outfitted with a comprehensive bulletproof divider between the cockpit and the cabin.
- A7a. The Committee recommends that once these dividers are installed, the use of Aircraft Protection Officers (APO) should be discontinued on all flights other than flights to Reagan Airport in Washington.
- A7b. The cost of APOs on flights to Reagan should be incurred by the airlines, not Canadian taxpayers.

Problem 6: Alerting Air Crews

- A8. The Committee recommends that as long as the Aircraft Protection Officer program exists, Transport Canada make it a requirement that all crew members be briefed as to who the APOs are, their seat location, and how the crew is expected to respond in the event of an attempted hijacking.

Problem 7: Security Training for Maintenance Workers

No change – see Appendix II

Problem 8: Who's In Charge of Security at Canadian Airports?

- A9. The Committee recommends that Transport Canada be relieved of its responsibility for security at airports and that this responsibility be transferred to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada.

Problem 9: “Known Shipper” System Lessens Aircraft Security

- A10. The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada take the appropriate steps to expedite this study on air cargo security to bring forth results by Spring 2008.
- A11. The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada use the results of the study to create a fail-safe system that will fill the gaps in air cargo security within a year after the study’s results are identified.

Problem 10: Lack of Security at Fixed-Base Operations

- A12. The Committee recommends that all individuals and vehicles, including private aircrafts, be searched at all fixed-base operations that are attached to the current 89 designated airports.
- A12a. The Committee recommends that aviation facilities in the core of municipalities such as Victoria and Vancouver be immediately designated for CATSA supervision.

Problem 11: Small Airports are Weak Links in the Aviation Security Net

No change – see Appendix II

Problem 12: The Canadian Air Transport Security Intelligence Gap

- A13. The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada ensure that CATSA has access to all available intelligence related to aviation safety.
- A14. The Committee recommends that in partnership with the RCMP and CSIS, CATSA develop its own intelligence analysis capabilities.

Problem 13: Unnecessary Secrecy over Security

- A15. The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada make public results of “intrusion tests” within six months of the tests being conducted by the airport, or that the Government of Canada put into effect a plan that would make the results public on a regular basis after a longer, but reasonable, period so that it has sufficient time to remedy the deficiencies uncovered by the tests.

Problem 14: Air Travellers Security Charge

No change – see Appendix II

Problem 15: Lack of Transparency over Security Expenditures Generally

- A16. The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada invite the Auditor General of Canada to conduct a “Value-for-money” audit on security expenditures such as the Air Traveller Security Charge to ensure that the money collected from passengers is in fact going to technologies and activities that are protecting them effectively.