

APPENDIX C

THE CROWN AGENCY HEAD QUESTIONNAIRE

The Crown Agency Head Questionnaire was designed by consultants to the Commission to elicit the perceptions of Crown agency heads in the following areas:

- the appointment and evaluation of Crown agency heads
- job satisfaction among Crown agency heads
- the roles and responsibilities of Crown agency heads and the roles and responsibilities of their boards.
- the existing system within which agency heads work, including the constraints and advantages with respect to the efficient and effective performance of the agency's tasks
- recently proposed changes to this system

The Questionnaire was sent to the chief executive officers of 65 representative Crown agencies selected from the Schedules to the Financial Administration Act, the list of government-owned corporations revised by Treasury Board Secretariat in January 1978, and the list of "Branches Designated as Departments" pursuant to Section 2 of the FAA. Forty-six agency heads returned the completed Questionnaire. The responses were processed by computer and analyzed under the following headings:

- The Respondents and Their Agencies
- The Agency Head Appointment Process
- The Agency Head's Responsibilities, Contacts, and Evaluation
- The Roles and Performance of the Board of Directors

- The Policy Relationships of Parliament, Government, and Crown Agencies
- The Management Relationships of Parliament, Government, and Crown Agencies

It was inevitable that the findings of the Crown Agency Head Questionnaire should lack the precision and clarity of the results of the Deputy Head Questionnaire (see Appendix B). Where conventional departments have a somewhat common form and similar kinds of tasks, Crown agencies have a number of forms, perform a variety of tasks, and have varying relationships with Parliament and Government. These variations should be kept in mind when considering the views of Crown agency heads presented here.

This Appendix contains the findings and analysis of the Questionnaire accompanied by charts to aid in clarifying the patterns of responses which emerged. The full Questionnaire with a tabulation of aggregated responses completes the Appendix.

Findings and Analysis

When asked to identify the reason for the special status of their agencies, the chief executive officers indicated several important considerations. Sixty-three percent responded that the major reason for special status for Crown agencies was to allow for impartial administration and decision-making, while 50% responded that special status was conferred to "provide a buffer" from political influence.

A majority of chief executive officers perceived their agency's tasks as more closely paralleling those undertaken in the private sector rather than in government. In addition, just less than half of the respondents perceived their agencies as being partially or fully in competition with private sector organizations.


Most of the respondents entered the senior ranks of Crown agency management from positions outside their own or any other Crown agency, with the greatest percentage coming from the private sector. Those who came from the federal public service were largely concentrated in "Branches Designated as Departments" and in Schedule B corporations. A substantial majority of those who came from the private sector were found in the Schedule D and mixed enterprise corporations.

Findings and Analysis

The Respondents and their Agencies (Questions A-1 to A-10*)


The chief executive officers who responded to the Questionnaire represented seven different categories of agencies.

TYPE OF AGENCY




The respondents represented agencies which vary widely in size

Agency size in terms of number of employees




* Alpha-numeric symbols indicate sections and questions in the Questionnaire.

Responses concerning the reasons for special status for Crown agencies



**Perceptions concerning the nature of the task of the agency
and the degree of competition with the private sector**


NATURE OF TASK



The 63% who identified with private sector tasks represent:


- 100% of the Mixed enterprises
- 92% of the Schedule D corporations
- 70% of the Schedule C corporations
- 60% of the "Other government corporations"
- 50% of the "Other entities and associates"

COMPETITION WITH PRIVATE SECTOR



Responses indicating the previous employment of agency heads

FROM:



Almost half of the chief executive officers had spent less than three years in their present job and only one-third had spent more than five years.

Those who came from other federal government positions were largely concentrated in branches designated as departments and Schedule B corporations. A substantial majority of those who came from the private sector were found in the Schedule D and mixed enterprise corporations.

The Agency Head Appointment Process (B-11 to B-22)

Crown agency heads are appointed by the Governor in Council. Responses indicated that there does not appear to be a consistent appointment process, and the agency heads indicated a great deal of uncertainty about who was actually involved in their selection or how the process could be improved in terms of participation.

Only 50% of chief executive officers indicated that their boards had played a role in their selection and there was a strong view that boards did not have enough influence on appointments.

Fewer than one-third of the respondents agreed that "the existing appointment process for agency heads is satisfactory". Those who disagreed were concentrated in scheduled Crown corporations. Fifty percent of the chief executive officers in these agencies did not agree that the process of appointment was satisfactory. There was also more dissatisfaction among those agency heads who felt their agency's task was "private sector" in nature. Half of this group did not agree that the appointment process was satisfactory, as opposed to 37% of the group who saw their agency's task as being governmental in nature.

A large majority of respondents, 80%, were satisfied with the consultation and information provided before their appointments.

For the most part, the chief executive officers supported the view that the system of appointments was fair and based on merit. In addition there was general agreement concerning qualifications for appointment. A large majority agreed that senior management experience was more important to success than knowledge of governmental administrative procedures. Despite the almost unanimous perception of the importance of administrative skills, over one-quarter of the respondents did not agree that "administrative skills are given sufficient consideration in making agency head appointments".

Response concerning the general attitude toward the appointment process

Response Range in Percentage*

| Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | Non-applicable |
|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| | 20% | | | | |
| 11% | | 17% | | | 9% |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | 15% | |
| | | | 28% | | |

Less than one third agreed that "the existing appointment process for agency heads is satisfactory".

B-14

* Due to rounding off, all totals do not add to 100%.

Responses concerning the consultation and information aspects of appointment

Response Range in Percentage

| Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | Non-applicable |
|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 54% | 17% | 2% | | | 7% |
| | | | 9% | 11% | |

A large majority "was satisfied with the consultation process leading up to my appointment".

B-18

Responses indicating that chief executive officers believe that the system of appointment was fair and operated on merit

Response Range in Percentage

| Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | Non-applicable |
|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| | 11% | 13% | | | |
| 4% | | | | | 9% |
| | | | 28% | 35% | |
| 9% | 13% | 26% | | | 4% |
| | | | 26% | 22% | |

A majority disagreed that appointment "is based more on who you know rather than what you do".

B-12

Agreement was concentrated among the heads of Schedule C corporations where 1/3 of the respondents agreed. Agreement was also stronger among CEOs who see their agency's task as "governmental" in nature; 50% of these were in agreement or neutral as opposed to only 20% of the CEOs who saw their agency's task as "private sector".


Slightly less than a majority disagreed that "the appointment process is too politicized". However, 26% neither agree nor disagree.

B-21

Again, Schedule C corporations was the major source of those agreeing or the uncertain. One third of the Schedule C respondents agreed, and another third were neutral.

The Agency Head's Responsibilities, Contacts, and Evaluation
(C-23 to C-31, and Sections J, K, and L)

Chief executive officers were asked to rank their top five responsibilities as they perceived them. Eighty-three percent put "achieving my agency's mission" among the top five responsibilities; 12% chose "supporting the minister".



The chief executive officers felt little direct responsibility for performance to the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Privy Council Office, or the Department of Finance. On the whole, the responses indicated that chief executive officers felt more responsible to their boards than to any other group or person. There were, however, important exceptions. For example, more chief executive officers felt responsible to the public and to Parliament when they considered that their major role was "achieving my agency mission". Substantially more respondents felt direct responsibility to the designated minister than to the board for the performance of policy-oriented roles.


The chief executive officers indicated very little regular contact with the centre—the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Privy Council Office, Treasury Board, or Department of Finance. Twenty-two percent had never had any contact with Parliament. Overall, respondents indicated that they had more sustained contact with their designated minister's political staff and departmental officials than with any other group or individual.

Responses concerning groups and persons to whom agency heads consider themselves responsible

| RESPONSIBLE FOR | The Public | Parliament | The Minister | TB Ministers | TBS | The Board | Myself |
|---|------------|------------|--------------|--------------|-----|-----------|--------|
| Achieving my agency's mission | 32% | 22% | 15% | 0 | 0 | 24% | 0 |
| Ensuring that my agency has a sound strategic plan | 0 | 5% | 27% | 0 | 2% | 56% | 2% |
| Assuring economy in operations | 17% | 7% | 5% | 12% | 5% | 34% | 7% |
| Managing my executive team | 0 | 2% | 7% | 0 | 0 | 56% | 24% |
| Making a profit | 10% | 0 | 2% | 0 | 0 | 32% | 5% |
| Ensuring that my agency is responsive to the forces of the marketplace | 22% | 0 | 10% | 0 | 0 | 39% | 2% |
| Setting up / building my agency's management capability | 2% | 2% | 10% | 0 | 2% | 61% | 10% |
| Ensuring that my agency is responsive to the policy thrusts of the government | 2% | 0 | 50% | 2% | 0 | 12% | 0 |
| Providing the government with policy advice* | 0 | 0 | 54% | 0 | 0 | 10% | 0 |

* 7% felt responsible to Cabinet

Responses concerning frequency of meetings with Individuals and groups



Percentage of Agency Heads Choosing Each Response Category

* The agency heads were also given an opportunity to comment on their frequency of contact with 10 other individuals and organizations. However, frequency of meetings in these cases was insignificant.


There is no common evaluation process for all Crown agency heads. There appeared to be confusion and uncertainty about the evaluation process. Of those who did respond, the general view was that the board, the designated minister, the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister should be more involved in the evaluation process than they were, and that the Privy Council office, COSO, and the deputy minister should be less involved. There were mixed views on the openness, fairness, and effectiveness of the evaluation process. Responses were divided on the statement "I know what my performance evaluation was for last year", but 36% of the respondents abstained from answering this question. More agreed than disagreed that "my overall performance as an agency head has been evaluated fairly".

The Role and Performance of the Board of Directors (D-32 to D-49)

Agency heads indicated that while boards played significant roles in a number of important areas, they should be playing more significant roles. It was also felt that the board should have a role as the liaison between government and the agency.

As seen in the following table, agency heads selected as the top five roles for a board an amalgam of private sector and governmental activities, with the latter predominating. They clearly felt that with respect to personnel matters the board should have greater powers to hire, fire, and decide upon remuneration levels for the agency head and the chairman. The following table summarizes their responses.

Responses concerning The Role and Performance of the Board of Directors




With respect to the role of the board in management, there was almost total agreement with the statement "I am given sufficient latitude by my board to do my job". A majority of the chief executive officers whose agencies have a board agreed that "the board is my most useful source of advice". Disagreement was concentrated in that group of agency heads who considered their agencies' tasks to be more "private sector" than governmental in character.

The usefulness of board committees was supported by a majority of respondents whose boards had committees. They agreed that "my board's committee system performs up to my expectations". Three-quarters of the agency heads agreed that "my board has sufficient competence to take on increased responsibilities".

There were divided views about the evaluation of the performance of their boards. Just over one-quarter of the agency heads agreed that "the performance of my board is adequately evaluated by the government". Disagreement was concentrated among chief executive officers who saw their agencies' tasks as being "private sector" in character. Forty-six percent of the respondents had no opinion concerning the process for evaluating their boards of directors.

The Policy Relationships of Parliament, Government, and Crown Agencies (Section I)

Responses to the first section of this part of the Questionnaire demonstrated that, in the views of the chief executive officers, the CEO himself and the board had more influence on agency policy than any governmental body or Parliament.



* The questionnaire listed 19 possible sources of influence, but only the significant results are displayed.
 ** The average imputed influence is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the positive responses to the question on influence scaled from 0 for "none" or "non-applicable" through to 4 for "very great".

The chief executive officers expressed strong agreement with the notion that Crown agencies should be seen and employed as instruments of public policy. However, they were divided on the success of the Government's efforts to date to establish objectives and priorities and to communicate them. A majority agreed that "government should develop mechanisms to ensure that Crown agency objectives are compatible with national objectives". Disagreement was concentrated among the heads of "commercial" Crown agencies.

**Responses indicating the views of agency heads concerning
Crown agencies as instruments of public policy**

Response Range in Percentage

| Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | Non-applicable |
|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 46% | 35% | 4% | | | 4% |
| 34% | 42% | 7% | 7% | 4% | |
| | | | 7% | 5% | |

F-65

A large majority agreed that "Crown agencies should be viewed as instruments for the achievement of broad national policy objectives".

However, the dissenting minority is a significantly homogeneous group. All are from agencies identified as private sector in character and completely independent financially of the government; and all but one have been in their positions for longer than three years.

F-72

There was the same measure of agreement that "government should develop mechanisms to ensure that Crown agency objectives are compatible with national objectives".

Responses indicating perceptions of government objectives for Crown agencies

Response Range in Percentage

| Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | Non-applicable |
|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 11% | 22% | 9% | | | 7% |
| | | | 13% | 39% | |

One-third of the respondents agree that "the government has conflicting objectives for my agency".

F-73

42% of those from "private sector" agencies agree, while only 20% from "government sector" agencies agree. More than 2 / 3 of those in agreement come from financially independent agencies, and more than 1 / 2 who agree were CEOs recruited from outside government.

Corporate Planning and Objective Setting

Responses indicated that chief executive officers attached a good deal of importance to corporate planning and objective setting. A large majority agreed that statements of long-range plans and objectives should be used to justify appropriation requests, that informal liaison with departmental officials is essential to the formulation of long-range plans, and that informal liaison with other departments and agencies is useful in developing a long-range strategy.

There was strong agreement that appearances before standing committees of the House of Commons provide an opportunity for useful reviews of agency objectives and spending plans. The 28% "not applicable" (N/A) response is partly explained by the fact that 22% of the chief executive officers responding have never had any working contact with Parliament.

There was an even split of opinion on the question of whether the agency head made use of informal contacts with MPs to canvass their views about agency objectives and programs.

Budgetary Review and Approval Process

With respect to the review and approval of budgets, a majority of respondents indicated that budget and appropriation submissions were prepared in consultation with the ministers' departments. Agency heads indicated that they believed the designated minister understood the budgetary submissions. Most boards of directors approve appropriation and budget submissions before they are submitted to Government. Half of the respondents agreed that the "Treasury Board played a useful role in the approval of budgets and appropriations".

Responses concerning budgetary review and approval process

Response Range in Percentage

| Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | Non-applicable |
|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 35% | 26% | 13% | | | 17% |
| | | | 6% | 2% | |
| 67% | | | | | 20% |
| | 2% | 2% | 0% | 9% | |

There was a significant measure of agreement that the designated minister "fully understands our budgetary and appropriations submissions".

F-81

In most agencies the "board of directors approves appropriation and budget submissions before they are submitted to government".

F-76

Responses concerning budgetary review and approval process

Response Range In Percentage

| Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | Non-applicable |
|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 33% | 17% | 9% | | | 13% |
| | | | 17% | 11% | |

Half of the sample agreed that "Treasury Board plays a useful role in the approval of appropriations and budgets".

F-80

Disagreement with this statement was more concentrated in "government sector" agencies than in "private sector" agencies. Disagreement was also concentrated in the financially dependent agencies. 60% of those disagreeing came from this category.

Assumption by Government of Other Powers

Except for a directive power, the agency heads do not support the assumption by Government of other powers which would tend to strengthen the Government's hand in relation to crown agencies. A majority of respondents agreed that directives were a necessary instrument to permit the Government to communicate priorities and objectives to Crown agencies. The respondents who disagreed were concentrated in agencies with a "private sector" orientation.

Of the 59% of all respondents who found the statement applicable to their situations, less than half agreed that the creation and acquisition of subsidiaries should be more closely controlled by government. Opposition was concentrated among "private sector" oriented agencies.

The Management Relationships of Parliament, Government, and Crown Agencies

Responses in this area indicated that, in the view of the chief executive officers, the greatest influence on management practices within agencies came from the CEO himself and the agency's board. Less than a majority of respondents agreed that agency performance would improve if Government gave more autonomy to the agency. Those who wanted more autonomy were largely concentrated in the "Branches Designated as Departments" and in the Schedule B corporations.

In the area of financial management practices, the respondents appeared to be generally content with the existing relationships with government and Parliament.

Responses concerning the sources of influence on agency management

The Average Imputed Influence on Agency Management

| SOURCE OF INFLUENCE | Some | Great | Moderate | Very Great |
|---|------|-------|----------|------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| The Agency Head | | | | 3.34 |
| Board | | | 2.26 | |
| Board Chairman | | 1.53 | | |
| Treasury Board Officials | | 1.27 | | |
| Treasury Board Ministers | | 1.08 | | |
| Designated Minister | | 1.04 | | |
| Deputy Minister | .60 | | | |
| Unions (other than Public Service unions) | .57 | | | |
| Parliament | .51 | | | |
| Cabinet | .44 | | | |

* The questionnaire listed 19 possible sources of influence, but only the significant results are displayed.

With respect to levels of disclosure, agency heads appeared to be satisfied with the existing requirements but indicated an interest in moving financial reporting and disclosure practices in the direction of private sector standards. Over three-quarters agreed that annual reports provided enough information for Government and Parliament to evaluate the performance of agencies. Close to three-quarters indicated that they kept their ministers informed about management issues of importance to the agency, and about the same number felt that ministers and the government were content with the quantity and quality of their financial reports. There was unanimous agreement that "generally approved accounting and disclosure principles" were appropriate to the agency operation.

There was indication of support for the application of a governmental approach to auditing practices. Nearly half of the respondents agreed that auditing for effectiveness and efficiency could be usefully applied to their operation by their own external auditors. Almost three-quarters of the respondents agreed that the Government should be responsible for establishing codes of conduct for Crown agencies.

Most of the questions about personnel management practices, like those on financial management practices, seemed to reflect a basic satisfaction with the existing system.

Almost three-quarters of the respondents agreed that they deal effectively with unsatisfactory performers. Those who disagreed were mostly in "Branches Designated as Departments", Schedule B, and Schedule C corporations. The closer to the public service, the more negative the responses.

Significant exception was taken to present salary levels. Half of the respondents agreed that salary levels inhibited recruitment of top-flight personnel.

There was strong agreement that CEO's had adequate authority to hire their management teams, and there was almost universal disagreement with the statement that political pressure was a significant factor in making management appointments. Similarly, no one agreed that personnel systems would work better if they were integrated more closely with the public service system.

AGGREGATE RESPONSES TO THE CROWN AGENCY HEAD QUESTIONNAIRE

A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Please choose the appropriate response and circle the number associated with it for the following questions.

1. How is your agency presently categorized under the Financial Administration Act or the Treasury Board Secretariat List of government-owned and controlled corporations

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----|
| – Branch designed as a department | 5 |
| – Schedule B corporation | 5 |
| – Schedule C corporation | 10 |
| – Schedule D corporation | 14 |
| – Other government corporation | 4 |
| – Mixed enterprise corporation | 1 |
| – Subsidiary corporation | 0 |
| – Associated corporation | 1 |
| – Other entity or associate | 3 |
| – No answer | 3 |

2. How many people work in your agency

| | |
|-------------|----|
| 0 – 50 | 12 |
| 51 – 100 | 6 |
| 101 – 500 | 8 |
| 501 – 1000 | 5 |
| 1001 – 5000 | 10 |
| Over 5000 | 5 |

3. How can your agency's task be categorized. If it has more than one task please indicate

| Primary Task | | Secondary Task | | Tertiary Task | |
|------------------------|----|------------------------|----|------------------------|----|
| Coordinating | 2 | Coordinating | 1 | Coordinating | 4 |
| Operating a facility | 8 | Operating a facility | 4 | Operating a facility | 1 |
| Marketing | 4 | Marketing | 1 | Marketing | 5 |
| Granting | 2 | Granting | 2 | Granting | 1 |
| Advising | 2 | Advising | 6 | Advising | – |
| Researching | 2 | Researching | 3 | Researching | 5 |
| Funding | 5 | Funding | – | Funding | 1 |
| Producing a product | 3 | Producing a product | 2 | Producing a product | – |
| Regulating | – | Regulating | 2 | Regulating | 2 |
| Other (please specify) | 8 | Other (please specify) | 1 | Other (please specify) | 1 |
| No answer | 10 | No answer | 24 | No answer | 26 |

4. Does the nature of your agency's task more closely parallel those undertaken in the private sector or the governmental sector

| | |
|---------------------|----|
| Private Sector | 29 |
| Governmental Sector | 16 |
| No answer | 1 |

5. Does your agency compete with private sector organizations

| | |
|-----------|----|
| No | 23 |
| Partially | 13 |
| Fully | 9 |
| No answer | 1 |

6. Does your agency receive loans from the federal government to meet capital expenditures

| | |
|-----|----|
| Yes | 14 |
| No | 32 |

7. Indicate the level of financial independence of your agency in terms of the percent of last year's operating budget obtained through Parliamentary appropriations, grants or contributions

| | |
|------------------------|----|
| 0% | 17 |
| 1 - 25 } 25 - 50 } | 9 |
| 50 - 75 } 75 - 90 } | 6 |
| 90 - 100 | 14 |

8. Is your agency a separate employer with respect to the Public Service Employment Act

| | |
|-----------|----|
| Yes | 34 |
| No | 10 |
| No answer | 2 |

9. Did you enter the senior ranks of Crown agency management from

| | |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| - Within your agency | - |
| - Another Crown agency | 11 |
| - Other federal government position | 15 |
| - Other level of government | - |
| - Private Sector | 17 |
| - Other (please specify) | 2 |
| - No answer | 1 |

10. How many years have you worked in each of the following:

| | Under 1 Year | 1 - 3 Years | 3 - 5 Years | More than 5 Years | N/A |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------------|-----|
| A - Your present job | 8 | 13 | 10 | 15 | 1 |
| B - Federal public service | - | - | 4 | 18 | 24 |
| C - Other positions in your agency | - | 1 | 3 | 9 | 33 |
| D - Other Crown agencies | - | 1 | 2 | 5 | 38 |
| E - Other levels of government | - | 1 | - | 3 | 42 |
| F - Private sector | - | 2 | 3 | 25 | 16 |

B. STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE AGENCY HEAD APPOINTMENT PROCESS

In this and the remaining sections of the questionnaire, the term "Board" is used in the generic sense to identify the following bodies: a Board of Directors, a Council, or Commission.

1. Would you indicate for each of the individuals or bodies listed below whether they:

- (a) played a role in your appointment process
- (b) played too small a role in your appointment process
- (c) played too large a role in your appointment process

| | (a) Played a role | | | (b) Played too small a role | | | (c) Played too large a role | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----|---------------------|-----------------------------------|----|---------------------|-----------------------------------|----|---------------------|
| | Yes | No | Un- cer- tain | Yes | No | Un- cer- tain | Yes | No | Un- cer- tain |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Prime Minister | 22 | 9 | 9 | - | 10 | 7 | - | 10 | 5 |
| Cabinet | 23 | 9 | 7 | - | 10 | 5 | - | 10 | 4 |
| Privy Council Office | 19 | 8 | 12 | - | 8 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 4 |
| Designated Minister | 38 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 3 |
| His or Her DM | 14 | 8 | 8 | - | 7 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 5 |
| The Board | 23 | 7 | 1 | 7 | 10 | 1 | - | 11 | 2 |

For each of the following statements, please circle 1 if you agree with the statement, 2 if you tend to agree, 3 if you neither agree nor disagree, 4 if you tend to disagree, 5 if you disagree with the statement and 6 if it is not applicable.

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|---|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|-----|
| 12. Appointment as an agency head is based more on whom you know, rather than what you do | 2 | 5 | 6 | 13 | 16 | 4 |
| 13. Administrative skills are given sufficient consideration in making agency head appointments | 10 | 18 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 2 |
| 14. The existing appointment process for agency heads is satisfactory | 5 | 9 | 8 | 13 | 7 | 4 |
| 15. Policy advisory skills are important factors in the Crown agency head appointment process | 19 | 10 | 11 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| 16. The satisfactions of the agency head position are well worth the personal investment required | 21 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 1 | 4 |
| 17. A good agency head who wears out early because of job pressure is treated well | 1 | 6 | 18 | 7 | 4 | 10 |
| 18. I was satisfied with the consultation process leading up to appointment to my present position | 25 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 |
| 19. When I was appointed to this job I was told what was expected of me | 15 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 15 | 3 |
| 20. Senior management experience is more important to my success than knowledge of government administrative procedures | 25 | 13 | 2 | 3 | — | 3 |

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|--|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|-----|
| 21. The agency head appointment process is too politicized | 4 | 6 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 2 |
| 22. Agency heads generally could faithfully serve a government formed by another political party | 32 | 10 | 1 | 1 | - | 2 |

C. STATEMENTS ABOUT AGENCY HEAD PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

23. Would you indicate for each of the individuals or bodies listed below whether they:
- (a) have a good understanding of your administrative performance
 - (b) are in fact involved in your performance evaluation
 - (c) should be involved in your performance evaluation

| | (a) Have a good Understanding of my Performance | | | (b) Are involved in my Evaluation | | | (c) Should be Involved in my Evaluation | | |
|-------------------------------|--|----|------------|--------------------------------------|----|------------|--|----|------------|
| | Yes | No | Un-certain | Yes | No | Un-certain | Yes | No | Un-certain |
| Prime Minister | 5 | 20 | 14 | - | 23 | 11 | 5 | 24 | 3 |
| Cabinet | 16 | 20 | 13 | 1 | 21 | 11 | 8 | 23 | 2 |
| Privy Council Office | 18 | 15 | 16 | 10 | 14 | 9 | 8 | 22 | 2 |
| Committee of Senior Officials | 8 | 10 | 18 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 8 | 15 | 8 |
| Designated Minister | 23 | 14 | 10 | 20 | 7 | 8 | 23 | 9 | - |
| His or Her DM | 14 | 4 | 12 | 12 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 13 | 2 |
| Board | 27 | 1 | 5 | 18 | 10 | 2 | 24 | 4 | 1 |

For each of the following statements, please circle 1 if you agree with the statement, 2 if you tend to agree, 3 if you neither agree nor disagree, 4 if you tend to disagree, 5 if you disagree with the statement and 6 if it is not applicable.

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|---|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|-----|
| 24. My overall performance as an agency head has been evaluated fairly | 12 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 11 |
| 25. I understand the basis on which my performance is evaluated | 11 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 9 | 12 |
| 26. My Board's evaluation has a strong influence on my overall evaluation | 14 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 9 | 13 |
| 27. Given A.I.B., I was satisfied with the amount of my last pay increase | 16 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 12 | 8 |
| 28. Agency heads not performing satisfactorily are dealt with effectively | - | 2 | 15 | 12 | 6 | 11 |
| 29. I know what my performance evaluation is for last year | 10 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 12 | 17 |
| 30. Increases in my salary are closely tied to my evaluation | 2 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 12 | 11 |
| 31. Policy advisory skills are given substantial weight in my evaluation | 3 | 9 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 16 |

D. STATEMENTS ABOUT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

If your answer to any part of question No. 32 is "yes", then please complete the rest of this section. If it is "no", then proceed to Section E.

- | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|-----|----|----|----|-----|----|
| 32. My agency has a: | (a) Board of Directors | Yes | 30 | No | 7 | N/A | 9 |
| | (b) Council | Yes | 6 | No | 11 | N/A | 29 |
| | (c) Commission | Yes | 3 | No | 11 | N/A | 32 |
-
- | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----|----|----|----|-----|---|
| 33. My board has a separate Chairman | Yes | 21 | No | 18 | N/A | 7 |
|--------------------------------------|-----|----|----|----|-----|---|
-
- | | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------|--|----|--|--|--|
| 34. My board has the following active committees | | | | | | |
| | Executive | | 7 | | | |
| | Auditing | | 8 | | | |
| | Long range planning | | - | | | |
| | Management assessment | | - | | | |
| | Public responsibility | | - | | | |
| | Pension | | - | | | |
| | Other (please specify) | | - | | | |
| | N/A | | 31 | | | |
-
- | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|----------------|--|----|--|--|--|
| 35. My board is | | | | | | |
| | Too large | | 2 | | | |
| | Too small | | 8 | | | |
| | The right size | | 28 | | | |
| | N/A | | 8 | | | |
-
- | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|--|----|--|--|--|
| 36. My board meets | | | | | | |
| | Frequently enough | | 33 | | | |
| | Not often enough | | 4 | | | |
| | Too often | | 2 | | | |
| | N/A | | 7 | | | |
-
37. Please signify whether the Board, Council or Commission of your agency *does* have a significant role or whether it *should* have a significant role in the following activities.

| | Board <i>does</i> have a significant role | | | | Board <i>should</i> have a significant role | | | |
|--|---|----|-------------|-----|---|----|-------------|-----|
| | Yes | No | Un-cer-tain | N/A | Yes | No | Un-cer-tain | N/A |
| a) The hiring and firing of the agency head | 16 | 18 | 2 | 10 | 25 | 6 | 3 | 12 |
| b) The remuneration of the agency head | 9 | 23 | 3 | 11 | 25 | 10 | — | 11 |
| c) Interpreting the significance of government policy for agency objectives | 25 | 11 | 1 | 9 | 25 | 6 | — | 15 |
| d) The recruitment of new Board members | 7 | 27 | 1 | 11 | 22 | 9 | 6 | 9 |
| e) Advising on all major decisions to be taken by the agency | 32 | 5 | — | 9 | 30 | 3 | — | 13 |
| f) The agency's reporting relationship with the Minister | 13 | 18 | 3 | 12 | 18 | 9 | 4 | 15 |
| g) Informing the public of the agency's activities | 13 | 21 | 2 | 10 | 17 | 13 | 4 | 12 |
| h) The hiring and firing of the Chairman | 10 | 21 | 2 | 13 | 19 | 10 | 2 | 15 |
| i) The remuneration of the Chairman | 6 | 23 | 3 | 14 | 17 | 12 | 1 | 16 |
| j) Defending the agency against inappropriate government intrusion | 22 | 9 | 3 | 12 | 31 | 2 | 1 | 12 |
| k) The day-to-day administration of the agency | 6 | 30 | — | 10 | 6 | 29 | 1 | 10 |
| l) Regularly holding me accountable for the management performance of the organization | 33 | 3 | 1 | 9 | 31 | 2 | — | 13 |
| m) Interpreting the agency's mandate | 33 | 3 | 1 | 9 | 32 | — | 1 | 13 |

For each of the following statements, please circle 1 if you agree with the statement, 2 if you tend to agree, 3 if you neither agree nor disagree, 4 if you tend to disagree, 5 if you disagree with the statement and 6 if it is not applicable.

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|---|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|-----|
| 38. My board has the necessary information to hold me accountable | 28 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 |
| 39. An audit committee should be composed of outside directors | 18 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 14 |
| 40. Public servants should not be on agency boards | 13 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 10 | 7 |
| 41. My board has sufficient competence to take on increased responsibilities | 23 | 7 | 4 | 3 | — | 9 |
| 42. The performance of my board is adequately evaluated by the government | 5 | 4 | 9 | 10 | 6 | 12 |
| 43. I am given sufficient latitude by my board to do my job | 34 | 2 | — | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| 44. The board is my most useful source of advice | 16 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| 45. My board's committee system performs up to my expectation | 16 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 16 |
| 46. The minister usually consults with me on board appointments | 19 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 11 |
| 47. My board provides a satisfactory accounting to the Minister for the performance of the agency | 18 | 8 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 12 |
| 48. Appointments to boards are based primarily on expertise | 9 | 13 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 10 |

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|--|-------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----|
| 49. Having the agency head on the board creates a conflict of interest situation | 2 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 23 | 9 |

E. STATEMENTS ABOUT YOUR SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM

| | | | | | | |
|--|----|----|---|---|----|---|
| 50. I review important senior personnel decisions with my board before I take action | 29 | 5 | — | 2 | 7 | 3 |
| 51. Our organization places a strong emphasis on management training and development | 20 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 1 |
| 52. Our personnel system would work better if it were integrated more closely with the public service system | — | — | 6 | 8 | 31 | 1 |
| 53. Merit is properly reflected in the pay increases of my senior management | 23 | 12 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| 54. We deal effectively with unsatisfactory performers within our agency | 16 | 17 | 6 | 6 | 1 | — |
| 55. I have adequate authority to hire my management team | 30 | 9 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 56. Political pressure is a significant factor in making senior management appointment | — | 2 | — | 6 | 38 | — |
| 57. My chief financial officer takes part in all major executive decisions | 31 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 58. Salary levels inhibit recruitment of top-flight personnel | 14 | 9 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 1 |

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|--|-------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----|
|--|-------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----|

F. STATEMENTS ABOUT MANDATE SETTING, CORPORATE PLANNING AND BUDGETING

| | | | | | | |
|---|----|----|---|---|----|----|
| 59. The mandate of my agency has shifted significantly since its creation | 9 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 22 | 1 |
| 60. The goals of my organization are no longer adequately reflected in the legal mandate of my agency | 6 | 6 | — | 8 | 24 | 2 |
| 61. The creation and acquisition of subsidiaries should be more closely controlled by government | 7 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 19 |
| 62. An agency's mandate should only be altered by legislation | 20 | 12 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 3 |
| 63. Decisions of regulatory agencies have had the effect of altering the mandate of this agency | 3 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 22 | 4 |
| 64. Directives are a necessary instrument to permit government to communicate their priorities and objectives to Crown agencies | 13 | 13 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 4 |
| 65. Crown agencies should be viewed as instruments for the achievement of broad national policy objectives | 21 | 16 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| 66. A "memorandum of understanding" on goals and objectives between my agency and the government would help to clarify the agency's mandate | 10 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| 67. My agency has a clear set of policy objectives against which its performance can be evaluated | 20 | 15 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 |

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|---|-------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----|
| 68. Informal liaison with my minister's departmental officials is essential to the formation of long range plans | 19 | 10 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 4 |
| 69. Informal liaison with other departments and agencies is useful in developing a long-range strategy for my agency | 19 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 |
| 70. I receive adequate guidance concerning government priorities | 6 | 14 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 7 |
| 71. I make use of informal contacts with MPs to canvass their views about my agency's objectives and programs | 12 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 4 |
| 72. Government should develop mechanisms to ensure that Crown agency objectives are compatible with national objectives | 14 | 20 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| 73. The government has conflicting objectives for my agency | 5 | 10 | 4 | 6 | 18 | 3 |
| 74. Statements of long range plans and objectives should be used to justify our appropriation requests | 19 | 12 | — | 1 | 2 | 12 |
| 75. Budget discussions with the Department of Finance are worthwhile and productive | 7 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 20 |
| 76. My Board of Directors approves our appropriation and budget submissions before they are submitted to government | 31 | 1 | 1 | — | 4 | 9 |

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|--|-------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----|
| 77. Our budget submissions to government are in the same format as those we use internally | 21 | 8 | — | 1 | 9 | 7 |
| 78. Our budget and appropriation submissions are prepared in liaison with the Minister's department | 14 | 11 | — | 2 | 14 | 5 |
| 79. Treasury Board should provide more leadership in defining the form, content and support information required for appropriations submissions and budget presentations | 5 | 4 | 2 | 11 | 18 | 6 |
| 80. Treasury Board plays a useful role in the approval of appropriations and budgets | 15 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 6 |
| 81. My minister fully understands our budgetary presentations and appropriations submissions | 16 | 12 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 8 |
| 82. My appearances before Standing Committees of the House provide the opportunity for useful reviews of my agency's objectives and spending plans | 18 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 13 |
| 83. All budget and appropriation submissions should be integrated and presented to Parliament at the same time | 9 | 6 | 9 | 7 | 3 | 12 |
| 84. Requests for loans by Crown agencies should be supported by feasibility studies with respect to the agency's ability to repay | 18 | 3 | 6 | 1 | — | 18 |

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|--|-------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----|
| 85. Recapitalization through the transfer of debt into equity is an appropriate tool for establishing a realistic capital structure for a Crown agency | 9 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 21 |
| 86. My agency is not being given the freedom to apply the "user pay" philosophy where it is appropriate | 2 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 12 | 17 |
| G. STATEMENTS ABOUT THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS | | | | | | |
| 87. My agency's performance would improve if government gave more autonomy to the agency | 5 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 14 | 8 |
| 88. Approval of by-laws by the governor-in-council is an appropriate central management responsibility | 8 | 5 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 14 |
| 89. I feel personally responsible for ensuring that we have good financial controls | 43 | 3 | — | — | — | — |
| 90. Generally approved accounting and disclosure principles are appropriate for my operation | 40 | 6 | — | — | — | — |
| 91. I keep my Minister-informed about management issues of importance to the agency | 26 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 6 |
| 92. Ministerial involvement in agency affairs is sporadic | 15 | 11 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 5 |
| 93. I regularly make supplementary data (financial reports, by-laws, minutes) available to the Minister on his request | 24 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 6 |

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|---|-------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----|
| 94. The minister and the government are content with the quantity and the quality of our financial reports | 23 | 11 | 6 | — | — | 6 |
| 95. Internal auditing assists in improving management performance in my agency | 28 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| 96. TBS effectively consults with me prior to negotiating collective agreements that directly affect my operation | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 33 |
| 97. Effective management of our operation requires separate employer status | 28 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 6 |
| 98. TBS administrative directives provide useful support to Crown agency management | 9 | 14 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 13 |
| 99. The government should be responsible for establishing codes of conduct for Crown agencies | 20 | 12 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| 100. Use of government common services improves administrative efficiency and economy | 6 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 9 | 8 |
| 101. Our annual report provides enough information for government and Parliament to evaluate agency performance | 27 | 8 | 2 | 7 | 2 | — |
| 102. Auditing for effectiveness and efficiency could be usefully applied to my operation by our external auditor | 14 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 9 |

| | Agree | Tend to Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Tend to Disagree | Disagree | N/A |
|--|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|-----|
|--|-------|---------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------|-----|

103. Efficiency and effectiveness measurement systems can be applied to my operation

18 12 7 6 2 1

H. REASONS FOR SPECIAL STATUS

a) The following list contains 13 statements relating to possible reasons why your agency has been given status different from that enjoyed by a conventional department within the governmental system. For each possible reason stated, please circle 1 if it is of key importance, 2 if it is of some importance, and 3 if it is inapplicable. Add other reasons and rank them if necessary.

| Reasons | Of Key Importance | Of Some Importance | N/A |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|-----|
| 1. To remove a specific operation from overloaded department | 5 | 6 | 35 |
| 2. To highlight a new governmental activity | 8 | 6 | 32 |
| 3. To take advantage of the board form of leadership | 22 | 13 | 11 |
| 4. To avoid public service personnel controls and procedures | 18 | 4 | 24 |
| 5. To avoid public service financial controls and procedures | 12 | 12 | 22 |
| 6. To provide a buffer from political influence | 23 | 13 | 10 |
| 7. To provide legal status separate from the government | 24 | 11 | 11 |
| 8. To allow for impartial administration and decision-making | 29 | 11 | 6 |
| 9. To facilitate decentralized operations | 12 | 8 | 26 |
| 10. To allow for independent regulation | 15 | 8 | 23 |
| 11. To bring skilled, regional or constituency advice to bear | 10 | 10 | 26 |
| 12. To take on a commercial function | 26 | 6 | 14 |
| 13. To take on a joint venture with another government or the private sector | 17 | 12 | 17 |
| 14. Other (specify) | 4 | - | 42 |

b) Now would you indicate which of the reasons identified above are most important, by circling in the columns below the numbers of the three most important reasons.

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | N/S |
|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|-----|
| 1 Most Important | 2 | 1 | - | 1 | - | 7 | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 3 | 16 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| 2 Second Most Important | - | 3 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 8 | - | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | - | 5 |
| 3 Third Most Important | 3 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 1 | - | 4 | - | 5 |

I. DEGREE OF INFLUENCE

Below are 19 officials or bodies with varying degrees of influence on your agency. Please estimate the degree of influence each possible source has on your agency, by circling one score under policy influence and one score under managerial influence.

| | DEGREE OF INFLUENCE | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|------|------|----------|-------|------------|--|------|------|----------|-------|------------|
| | Influence on agency policy (except administrative policy) | | | | | | Influence on agency management (including administrative policy) | | | | | |
| | N/A | None | Some | Moderate | Great | Very Great | N/A | None | Some | Moderate | Great | Very Great |
| 1. Parliament | 8 | 7 | 12 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 12 | 17 | 12 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Prime Minister | 12 | 15 | 11 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 12 | 23 | 7 | 3 | - | 1 |
| 3. Cabinet | 9 | 8 | 14 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 13 | 18 | 10 | 4 | - | 1 |
| 4. Privy Council | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Office officials | 9 | 19 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 22 | 9 | 2 | - | 1 |
| 5. Political staff of PM | 11 | 28 | 6 | - | - | 1 | 14 | 29 | 1 | - | 1 | 1 |
| 6. Treasury Board Ministers | 8 | 6 | 17 | 4 | 10 | 1 | 9 | 14 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 1 |
| 7. Treasury Board officials | 7 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 7 | 3 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 4 |
| 8. Public Service Commission | 18 | 23 | 4 | 1 | - | - | 19 | 17 | 5 | 1 | 4 | - |
| 9. Department of Finance | 9 | 12 | 18 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 11 | 21 | 12 | 1 | - | 1 |
| 10. Your minister | 5 | 2 | 7 | 14 | 8 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 16 | 12 | 2 | 2 |
| 11. Your minister's staff | 8 | 16 | 12 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 24 | 14 | - | - | 1 |
| 12. Your minister's DM | 8 | 6 | 18 | 8 | 3 | 3 | 10 | 12 | 18 | 6 | - | - |
| 13. Your minister's department | 9 | 9 | 16 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 17 | 16 | 4 | - | - |
| 14. Relevant regulatory agency | 28 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 6 | - | 28 | 10 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 15. Your Board of Directors, Council or Commission | 7 | - | 3 | 4 | 7 | 25 | 9 | 1 | 5 | 7 | 11 | 13 |
| 16. Your Board Chairman | 16 | - | 1 | 8 | 7 | 14 | 19 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| 17. Public service employee unions | 22 | 17 | 6 | 1 | - | - | 22 | 10 | 10 | 4 | - | - |
| 18. Other unions | 23 | 9 | 10 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 22 | 7 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| 19. Agency head - yourself | 1 | - | - | 3 | 17 | 25 | 4 | 1 | - | - | 10 | 31 |

J. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

Please estimate the frequency of work-related verbal communication (either face-to-face or over the telephone) that you have with each of the following contacts, by circling the appropriate score:

| | FREQUENCY | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|--------------------|-------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------|
| | Never | Less than annually | Once a Year | 2 or 3 times a year | Every couple of months | Once a month | About twice a month | Just about every week | 2 or 3 times a week | About daily | Not applicable |
| 1. Parliament | 11 | 8 | 11 | 8 | - | - | 2 | 2 | - | - | 4 |
| 2. Prime Minister | 21 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | 4 |
| 3. Cabinet | 20 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 4 | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | 3 |
| 4. Privy Council Office officials | 7 | 11 | 2 | 10 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | - | 3 |
| 5. Political staff of PM | 25 | 6 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 1 | - | - | - | 3 |
| 6. Treasury Board Ministers | 8 | 13 | 8 | 10 | 2 | 1 | - | - | - | - | 4 |
| 7. Treasury Board officials | 3 | 5 | 5 | 11 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 2 | - | 3 |
| 8. Public Service Commission | 24 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | 6 |
| 9. Department of Finance | 14 | 10 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 2 | - | - | 1 | - | 3 |
| 10. Your minister | 1 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 12 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| 11. Your minister's staff | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 10 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| 12. Your minister's DM | 4 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 13. Your minister's department | 2 | 1 | - | 3 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 8 | 7 | 2 | 5 |
| 14. Relevant regulatory agency | 7 | 1 | - | 5 | 2 | - | 4 | 1 | - | - | 26 |
| 15. Your Board of Directors, Council or Commission | - | - | 1 | 4 | 9 | 13 | 10 | 2 | 1 | - | 6 |
| 16. Your Board Chairman | - | - | 1 | - | - | 1 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 28 |
| 17. Your senior management team | - | - | 1 | - | - | 1 | 3 | 10 | 3 | 25 | 3 |
| 18. Public service employee unions | 14 | 4 | - | 4 | 2 | 2 | - | 1 | - | - | 19 |
| 19. Other unions | 8 | 4 | 1 | 8 | - | 2 | 2 | - | - | - | 21 |

K. STATEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Please select the five most important of your responsibilities from the 15 statements listed below. Then rank the five by putting a 1 beside the most important responsibility, a 2 beside the second most important, a 3 beside the third most important, a 4 beside the fourth most important, and a 5 beside the fifth most important, under the column heading "My Selection and Ranking of the Top 5". Please give us your view of how others would rank your responsibilities by repeating the ranking process under each column heading:

| Responsibility | My Selection | My guess at the selection and ranking that would be made by: | | | | |
|--|--------------|--|-------------|----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| | | My Board | My Minister | Treasury Board | Dept. of Finance | Privy Council Office |
| 1 Achieving my agency's mission | 37 | 29 | 26 | 18 | 17 | 20 |
| 2 Ensuring that my agency has a sound strategic plan | 26 | 20 | 18 | 13 | 12 | 12 |
| 3 Assuring economy in operations | 20 | 19 | 10 | 21 | 13 | 6 |
| 4 Making a profit | 16 | 15 | 8 | 9 | 11 | 3 |
| 5 Ensuring that my agency is responsive to the policy thrusts of the government | 12 | 9 | 19 | 14 | 13 | 19 |
| 6 Exercising adjudication/regulation authority assigned directly to my agency by statute | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 7 |
| 7 Following centrally developed administrative policies | 1 | 0 | 2 | 11 | 5 | 8 |
| 8 Managing my executive team | 23 | 15 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 9 |
| 9 Ensuring that my agency is responsive to the forces of the marketplace | 15 | 13 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| 10 Performing the role of leader for my agency's employees | 11 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| 11 Protecting the integrity of my agency from inappropriate political action | 10 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 |

| Responsibility | My Selection | My guess at the selection and ranking that would be made by: | | | | |
|--|--------------|--|-------------|----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| | | My Board | My Minister | Treasury Board | Dept. of Finance | Privy Council Office |
| 12 Providing the government with policy advice | 11 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 7 |
| 13 Setting up/building my agency's management capability | 17 | 13 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 4 |
| 14 Supporting the minister | 5 | 3 | 12 | 1 | 2 | 6 |
| 15 Maintaining a strong and effective Board | 9 | 13 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 2 |

L. RESPONSIBILITY RELATIONSHIPS

Please indicate to whom you think you are most responsible by circling one response only for each of the 15 responsibility statements

| | Responsible to | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------|------------|----------------|----------|---------|----------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------|----------------|--------|----------------------|
| | The public | Parliament | Prime Minister | Minister | Cabinet | Privy Council Office | Dept. of Finance | Treasury Board Ministers | Treasury Board Secretariat | Public Service Commission | Com. of Senior Officials | Board | Board Chairman | Myself | Not a responsibility |
| 1. Achieving my agency's mission | 14 | 11 | - | 6 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 11 | - | - | 3 |
| 2. Ensuring that my agency has a sound strategic plan | - | 2 | - | 12 | 1 | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | 25 | - | 1 | 4 |
| 3. Assuring economy in operations | 7 | 4 | - | 2 | - | - | - | 5 | 3 | - | - | 18 | - | 3 | 4 |
| 4. Making a profit | 4 | 1 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | 15 | - | 2 | 22 |
| 5. Ensuring that my agency is responsive to the policy thrusts of the government | 1 | - | 1 | 22 | 4 | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | - | 5 | 1 | - | 10 |
| 6. Exercising adjudication/regulation authority assigned directly to my agency by statute | 2 | 6 | - | 8 | - | - | - | 2 | - | - | - | 5 | - | - | 23 |
| 7. Following centrally developed administrative policies | - | 1 | - | 7 | 2 | 1 | - | 5 | 8 | - | - | 4 | - | - | 18 |

| | Responsible to | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------|------------|----------------|----------|---------|----------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------|----------------|--------|----------------------|
| | The public | Parliament | Prime Minister | Minister | Cabinet | Privy Council Office | Dept. of Finance | Treasury Board Ministers | Treasury Board Secretariat | Public Service Commission | Com. of Senior Officials | Board | Board Chairman | Myself | Not a responsibility |
| 8 | - | 1 | - | 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 25 | 2 | 12 | 3 |
| 9 | 9 | 1 | - | 4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 18 | 1 | 1 | 12 |
| 10 | - | - | - | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 23 | 1 | 14 | 4 |
| 11 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 18 | - | 2 | 9 |
| 12 | - | 1 | - | 25 | 3 | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 | 4 | - | - | 11 |
| 13 | 1 | 2 | - | 4 | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | 27 | - | 5 | 6 |
| 14 | - | - | - | 21 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7 | - | 5 | 13 |
| 15 | 5 | 3 | - | 14 | 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5 | 2 | 4 | 10 |

Agencies that Received the Questionnaire

Agriculture Stabilization Board
Air Canada
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.
Atomic Energy Control Board
Bank of Canada
Canada Council
Canada Development Corporation
Canadair Limited
Canadian Arctic Producers Ltd.
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Canadian Commercial Corporation
Canadian Dairy Commission
Canadian Film Development Corporation
Canadian Livestock Feed Board
Canadian National Railways
Canadian Patents and Developments Ltd.
Canadian Saltfish Corporation
Canadian Wheat Board
Canarctic Shipping Company Ltd.
Cape Breton Development Corporation
Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation
Crown Assets Disposal Corporation
Defence Construction (1951) Ltd.
The deHavilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd.
Economic Council of Canada
Export Development Corporation
Farm Credit Corporation
Federal Business Development Bank
Forest Engineering Research Institute of Canada
Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation
International Joint Commission
International Development Research Centre
Lakehead Harbour Commission
Loto Canada Inc.
Medical Research Council
Metropolitan Area Growth Investments Limited
Municipal Development and Loan Board
National Arts Centre Corporation
National Capital Commission
National Farm Products Marketing Council
National Film Board
National Harbours Board
National Library
National Museums of Canada
National Parole Board
National Research Council
Newfoundland and Labrador Development Corp. Ltd.
Northern Canada Power Commission
Commissioner of Official Languages
Pacific Pilotage Authority

Petro-Canada
Polysar Limited
Public Archives
Public Works Lands Co. Ltd.
Royal Canadian Mint
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
St. Lawrence Seaway Authority
Science Council of Canada
Société de parc industriel et commerciale aéroportuaire de Mirabel
Société des transports du Nord Ltée.
Standards Council of Canada
Teleglobe Canada
Telesat Canada
Toronto Harbour Commissioners
Via Rail Canada Inc.

- **SUBMISSIONS TO THE COMMISSION**
- **MEETINGS OF THE COMMISSION**
- **STAFF AND CONSULTANTS**

SUBMISSIONS TO THE COMMISSION

Government

Bank of Canada. *Bank of Canada: Management and Accountability.*

Commissioner of Official Languages. "Brief to the Commission".

Department of Finance. "Statement to the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability".

Department of National Health and Welfare. "Brief to the Commission".

Department of National Revenue. J. P. Connell, Deputy Minister.

Department of Supply and Services. J. M. Desroches, Deputy Minister.

Foreign Investment Review Agency. "Some Characteristics of FIRA".

Privy Council Office. *Responsibility in the Constitution.*

*Background Paper on Senior Personnel in the Public Service:
Deputy Ministers.*

*Background Paper on Non-departmental Bodies of the Government
of Canada.*

The Functioning of the Privy Council Office.

Public Service Commission. *Accountability and the Public Service Commission.*

Organizations

Business Council on National Issues (including submissions from member organizations)

Canadian Bankers' Association

Canadian Certified General Accountants' Association

Corporation House Ltd.

Financial Management Institute

Maclean-Hunter Limited

Noranda Mines Limited

Society of Management Accountants of Canada

Teleglobe Canada

Individuals

Crow, Stanley

Farthing, E. G.

Fergus, M. J.

Gibson, R. B.

Grossman, Edward

Hegewald, C. H.

Henderson, Maxwell

Hicks, Barry E.

McCormick, John

McCulloch, J. A. W.

Muir, Keith W.

Payette, Raymond

Quittner, J. K. A.

Reid, J. M., MP

Rowe, J. Y.

Roy, Dewey D.

Salyzyn, Vladimir

Wornell, K. and F. Schwartz

MEETINGS OF THE COMMISSION

In addition to its private working sessions, the Commission met with the following groups and individuals:

December 19-20, 1976, Ottawa

Mr. P. M. Pitfield
Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to
the Cabinet
Mr. R. G. Robertson
Secretary to the Cabinet for Federal-Provin-
cial Relations
Mr. G. F. Osbaldeston
Deputy Minister, Industry, Trade & Com-
merce
Dr. M. LeClair
Secretary of the Treasury Board

February 1977, London, England

Sir Peter Carey
Secretary, Department of Industry
Sir Douglas Allan
Head of the Home Civil Service and Perma-
nent Secretary to the Civil Service Depart-
ment
Rt. Hon. Lord Armstrong of Sanderstead
(former Head of the Home Civil Service and
Permanent Secretary to the Civil Service
Department)
Sir Douglas Henley
Comptroller and Auditor General, Exchequer
and Audit Department
Sir David Pitblado
(former Comptroller and Auditor General)
Mr. R. W. L. Wilding
Civil Service Department
Mr. L. Pliatzky
Second Permanent Secretary, H.M. Treasury
Mr. F. Jones
Deputy Secretary, H.M. Treasury

February 21, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. D. R. Yeomans
Associate Executive Director
Anti-Inflation Board
Mr. P. C. Dobell
Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs
Mr. M. Héroux
Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs

February 21, 1977, Ottawa (cont'd)

Mr. W. R. Teschke
Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Plans)
Mr. B. A. MacDonald
Deputy Secretary, Planning Branch
Treasury Board Secretariat
The Honourable C. M. Drury, P.C., M.P.

March 22-23, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. S. Mensforth
Deputy Secretary
Financial Administration Branch
Treasury Board Secretariat
Mr. T. E. Reid
Acting Deputy Secretary
Planning Branch
Treasury Board Secretariat
Mr. R. Giroux
Director General
Staffing Branch
Public Service Commission
Mr. R. Dale-Harris
Partner
Coopers & Lybrand

April 5, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. G. S. Smith
Senior Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
(Machinery of Government)
Mr. D. P. Gracey
Privy Council Office

April 12-13, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. D. Morley
Deputy Secretary
Personnel Policy Branch
Treasury Board Secretariat
Mr. I. Smyth
Assistant Secretary
Policy and Program Development Division
Personnel Policy Branch
Treasury Board Secretariat
The Honourable R. L. Stanfield, P.C., M.P.
Mr. P. M. Pitfield
Dr. M. LeClair

April 26, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. A. W. Johnson
President
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Mr. E. Gallant
Chairman
Public Service Commission
Ms. A. Szlazak
Commissioner
Public Service Commission

April 26, 1977, Ottawa
(cont'd)

Mr. J. Edwards
Commissioner
Public Service Commission
Mr. R. G. Robertson
Mr. A. Lawrence, M.P.
Chairman
Public Accounts Committee

April 27, 1977, Toronto

Dr. J. Fleck
Deputy Minister
Industry & Tourism, Government of Ontario
Mr. W. Anderson
Management Board, Government of Ontario
Mr. B. Karman
Executive Director
Programs and Estimates, Management Board
Government of Ontario
Mr. John B. Cronyn
Director & Consultant John Labatt Ltd., and
Chairman of the Committee on Government
Productivity, Province of Ontario

May 3-4, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. C. R. Nixon
Deputy Minister, National Defence
Mr. J. S. Hodgson
Deputy Minister, National Revenue, Taxation
Mr. J. M. Desroches
Deputy Minister (Supply), Supply & Services
Mr. J. A. H. MacKay
Deputy Minister, Public Works
Mr. R. Tassé, Q.C.
Deputy Solicitor General
Mr. T. M. Eberlee
Deputy Minister, Labour

May 5-6, 1977, Ottawa

Commissioner M. J. Nadon
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Deputy Commissioner R. H. Simmonds
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Dr. W. G. Schneider
President, National Research Council
Mr. A. Kroeger
Deputy Minister, Indian Affairs and Northern
Development
Mr. J. D. Love
Deputy Minister
Regional Economic Expansion
Mr. B. Ostry
Secretary-General
National Museums of Canada

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| May 5-6, 1977, Ottawa (cont'd) | Dr. W. Hopper President International Development Research Centre Mr. M. Dupuy President Canadian International Development Agency |
| May 10-11, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. G. F. Osbaldeston The Honourable J.-P. Goyer, P.C., M.P. Minister of Supply and Services Mr. J. L. Fry Deputy Minister (Services) Supply & Services Mr. M. F. Yalden Deputy Minister Communications Mr. J. J. Macdonell Auditor General of Canada Mr. J. P. Connell Deputy Minister National Revenue, Customs & Excise |
| May 16, 1977, Ottawa | The Honourable J. Roberts, P.C., M.P. Secretary of State |
| May 17, 1977, Ottawa | The Honourable M. Sharp, P.C., M.P. |
| May 19, 1977, Ottawa | Dr. J. Kates Chairman Science Council of Canada |
| May 24, 1977, Ottawa | Dr. G. Post Vice President Economic Council of Canada |
| May 25, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. R. Labelle Executive Secretary National Parole Board Mr. P. E. Maillard Director, Finance Division National Parole Board |
| May 26, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. C. Lussier Director Canada Council |
| May 27, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. A. Therrien Commissioner Canadian Penitentiary Service |
| May 30, 1977, Ottawa | The Honourable O. Lang, P.C., M.P. Minister of Transport |
| May 31, 1977, Montreal | Mr. A. Lamy Government Film Commissioner and Chair- man of the National Film Board |

May 31, 1977, Montreal
(cont'd)

Mr. M. D. Spencer
Director
Canadian Film Development Corporation

June 6-7, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. B. Rawson
Deputy Minister
National Health & Welfare
Mr. A. Fortier
Under-Secretary of State
Mr. G. Lussier
Deputy Minister
Agriculture
Mrs. S. Ostry
Deputy Minister
Consumer & Corporate Affairs
Mr. W. B. Brittain
Deputy Minister
Veterans Affairs
Mr. W. Baker, M. P.
Opposition House Leader
House of Commons
Mr. T. K. Shoyama
Deputy Minister
Finance
Mr. L. D. Hudon
Secretary
Ministry of State for Science and Technology

June 15, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. G. Choquette
Chairman
Canadian Dairy Commission

June 16, 1977, Ottawa

Dr. A. T. Prince
President
Atomic Energy Control Board

June 17, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. N. M. Ediger
President
Eldorado Nuclear Limited

June 20-21, 1977, Ottawa

The Honourable J. W. Pickersgill, P.C.
The Honourable D. D. Everett
Chairman
Standing Senate Committee on National
Finance
Mr. S. S. Reisman
Chairman of the Board
Reisman and Grandy Limited
The Honourable A. J. MacEachen
Deputy Prime Minister and President of the
Queen's Privy Council for Canada
Mr. J. M. Reid, M.P.

June 20-21, 1977, Ottawa
(cont'd)

Professor K. Wiltshire
Senior Lecturer on Public Administration
University of Queensland
Brisbane, Australia
Dr. P. Kirkham
Chief Statistician of Canada
The Honourable R. Andras, P.C., M.P.
President of the Treasury Board

June 27-28, 1977, Toronto

Mr. H. A. Hampson
President
Canada Development Corporation
Mr. R. A. Bandeen
President
Canadian National Railways
Mr. M. F. Strong
Chairman of the Board
Petro-Canada
Dr. D. Hartle
Professor of Economics and Associate of the
Institute for Policy Analysis
University of Toronto

July 4-5, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. J. A. MacDonald
President
Export Development Corporation
Mr. G. W. Baldwin, M.P.
Mr. J. C. Corkery
Deputy Postmaster General
Mr. W. Teron
Secretary
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs and
Chairman, Central Mortgage and Housing
Corporation

July 7-8, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. A. E. Gottlieb
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Mr. H. B. Robinson
Commissioner
Northern Pipeline Commission
Mr. S. D. Cameron
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Transport
and Chairman of the Board
Northern Transportation Co. Ltd.
Mr. L. R. Montpetit
President
Northern Transportation Co. Ltd.
Mr. B. H. Kristjansen
Chairman
Farm Credit Corporation

July 7-8, 1977, Ottawa
(cont'd)

Mr. M. Crowe
Chairman
National Energy Board
Mr. F. Kearns
President
Canadair
Mr. P. Taschereau
Chairman of the Board
Air Canada
Mr. C. Taylor
President
Air Canada

July 12, 1977, Toronto

Dr. H. Smith
Chairman of the Board
The deHavilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd.
Mr. R. Bannock
President
The deHavilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd.

July 15, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. D. S. Thorson
Constitutional Adviser to the Prime Minister
Mr. G. Howarth
Commissioner
Foreign Investment Review Agency

July 19-20, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. H. J. Boyle
Chairman
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommuni-
cations Commission
Mr. J. J. Carson
Dean of the Faculty of Administration
University of Ottawa
Mr. R. Campbell
Chairman of the Board
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
Mr. J. C. Delorme
President
Teleglobe Canada
Mr. P. Normandeau
President
St. Lawrence Seaway Authority

July 22, 1977, Ottawa

Mr. M. Saltsman, M.P.
Mr. P. Juneau
Chairman
National Capital Commission
Mr. S. Cloutier
Deputy Minister
Department of Transport

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|-------------------------------------|---|
| July 22, 1977, Ottawa (cont'd) | Mr. R. V. Hession President Central Mortgage & Housing Corporation |
| August 15-17, 1977, Ottawa | Members of the Auditor General's Staff Mr. G. M. MacNabb Deputy Minister Energy, Mines & Resources Mr. S. Knowles, M.P. Mr. J. L. Manion Deputy Minister Employment and Immigration and Chairman of the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission Mr. D. A. Golden President Telesat Canada Mr. P. Franche Chairman National Harbours Board |
| August 19, 1977, Toronto | Mr. D. N. Kendall Chairman Enterprise Development Board and Director of Canadian Patents and Developments Limited Mr. K. C. Fincham Executive Director Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Mr. G. H. Cowperthwaite President Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants |
| August 30—September 2, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. G. S. Smith Mr. D. P. Gracey Mr. H. R. Balls Mr. G. Ross Partner Coopers & Lybrand |
| September 19, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. C. Halton Secretary to the Department of Transport Australia |
| September 21, 1977, Ottawa | The Honourable D. Jamieson, P.C., M.P. Secretary of State for External Affairs |
| October 14, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. J. H. Brown Chairman Public Service Staff Relations Board The Honourable E. J. Benson, P.C. President Canadian Transport Commission |

| | |
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| October 27, 1977, Ottawa | The Honourable M. P. O'Connell, P.C., M.P. Mr. R. Perreault Chairman and Director General Canadian Livestock Feed Board |
| November 7, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. A. W. Johnson Mr. R. Murray President Federal Business Development Bank Mr. G. Lavigueur Executive Vice President Federal Business Development Bank |
| November 10, 1977, Toronto | Mr. S. Kanec Chairman of the Board Federal Business Development Bank Mr. Maxwell Henderson |
| November 21-22, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. M. Lapointe, Q.C. Chairman Canada Labour Relations Board Mr. D. J. MacSween Director General National Arts Centre |
| December 2, 1977, Ottawa | Mr. E. Gallant |
| January 12, 1978, Ottawa | Members of the Interdepartmental Committee on Program Evaluation |
| January 16, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. R. B. Bryce |
| January 19 and 26 | Senior managers in the Public Service |
| February 2, 9, and 16, 1978, Ottawa | |
| February 21, 1978, Ottawa | Dr. M. LeClair |
| March 6, 1978, Vancouver | Mr. E. Veitch, M.L.A. Chairman Legislative Committee on Crown Corporations Province of British Columbia Regional staff of federal departments Mr. P. V. O. Evans Chairman Pacific Pilotage Authority |
| March 7, 1978, Edmonton | Members of the Federal Institute of Management Mr. J. Smith Chairman Northern Canada Power Commission |
| March 8, 1978, Regina | Mr. D. M. Wallace Deputy Minister of Finance Government of Saskatchewan |

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| March 8, 1978, Regina (cont'd) | Mr. G. Beatty Managing Director Government of Saskatchewan Finance Office |
| March 9, 1978, Winnipeg | Members of the Federal Institute of Management |
| March 20, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. G. K. Bouey Governor Bank of Canada Mr. D. Fullerton |
| April 12, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. P. Smith Director General Audit and Review Public Service Commission |
| May 5, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. M. F. Yalden Commissioner of Official Languages |
| May 9, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. D. B. Mundy Air Industries Association of Canada |
| May 15, 1978, Ottawa | The Honourable J.-P. Goyer, P.C., M.P. |
| May 22-23, 1978, Washington, D.C. | Mr. R. T. Griffin, D.C. Deputy Administrator General Services Administration Mr. H. Messner Assistant Director for Management Improvement and Evaluation Office of Management and the Budget Dr. R. Levine Deputy Director Congressional Budget Office Mr. L. D. Schaeffer Assistant Secretary Management and Budget Department of Health, Education and Welfare Mr. H. S. Havens Director Program Analysis Division General Accounting Office Mr. D. R. McComber Assistant Director for Budget Review Office of Management and the Budget |
| June 5-13, 1978, London, England | Mr. J. D. Culverwell Assistant Secretary Personnel Management Civil Service Department |

June 5-13, 1978, London, England
(cont'd)

Sir Ronald McIntosh
The Honourable P. Martin, P.C., Q.C.
High Commissioner for Canada
The Rt. Hon. E. du Cann, P.C., M.P.
Chairman
Public Accounts Committee
House of Commons
Mr. J. Boyden, M.P.
Chairman
Expenditures Committee
House of Commons
Mr. D. A. M. Pring
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House of Commons
Mr. C. B. Winnifrith
Clerk of the Select Committee on National-
ized Industries
House of Commons
Mr. J. Gardiner
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Sir John Herbecq
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Sir John Hunt
Secretary of the Cabinet
Sir Leo Pliatzky
Permanent Secretary
Department of Trade
Sir Anthony Rawlinson
Second Permanent Secretary
H.M. Treasury
Sir Douglas Henley
Mr. J. R. Stainton
Acting Chairman
British Airways
Sir Peter Carey
Permanent Secretary
Department of Industry
Sir Robert Armstrong
Permanent Under-Secretary of State
Home Office
Dr. B. Donoghue
Senior Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister
Mr. K. C. O. Shann
Chairman
Public Service Board of Australia

| | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| June 15-16, 1978, Washington, D.C. | Mr. D. Ink Executive Director of the President's Task Force on the Public Service Mr. H. S. Havens Mr. J. W. Vincent Chief, Planning and Analysis United States Civil Service Commission |
| June 20, 1978, Halifax | Members of the Federal Institute of Manage- ment |
| June 23, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. P. M. Pitfield Mr. R. G. Robertson |
| July 17, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. H. G. Rogers Comptroller General of Canada |
| August 23, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. J. J. Macdonell |
| October 5, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. G. D'Avignon, Chairman and Mr. W. B. Brittain Mr. D. F. Davidge Special Committee on the Review of Person- nel Management and the Merit Principle in the Public Service |
| December 16, 1978, Ottawa | Mr. R. Huntington, MP Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee |

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N. E. Paget, Director of Research
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R. J. Schultz
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P. Thomas
O. Tropea
D. J. Walsh

**SUMMARY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS**

PART I: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Introduction to the Report

PART II: CENTRAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Chapter 5: *Setting Limits: The Fiscal Plan*

The Commission recommends that

- | | | |
|------|---|---|
| 5. 1 | each year the Minister of Finance present to Parliament, on behalf of the Government, a five year <i>Fiscal Plan</i> which provides estimates of revenues, sets expenditure ceilings, and reflects the expected surplus or deficit. The Plan would be based on the existing tax structure and clearly stated economic assumptions. | Minister presents Fiscal Plan to Parliament— p. 77 |
| 5. 2 | the Fiscal Plan contain ceilings on expenditures for specified functions of government within the ceiling set on expenditures for each of the five years covered by the Plan. | Ceilings on expenditures—p. 83 |
| 5. 3 | for the first three years covered by it, the Fiscal Plan contain departmental and agency expenditure ceilings, within the total expenditure limit for each of those years. | |
| 5. 4 | an annual update of the Fiscal Plan be developed jointly by the Department of Finance, the Privy Council Office, and the Financial Management Secretariat of the Board of Management, and that the Minister of Finance, supported by the President of the Board of Management, submit it to the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning. | Update of Fiscal Plan to Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning—p. 85 |
| 5. 5 | the Government set out clearly the effects on the Fiscal Plan of the Estimates, Supplementary Estimates, and the Budget when it tables these documents. | Effects of Estimates and Budget on Fiscal Plan—p. 89 |
| 5. 6 | legislative proposals be accompanied by five-year projections of their financial implications and a statement of any consequent adjustments necessary in the Fiscal Plan. | Legislative proposals accompanied by five-year projections— p. 89 |

Chapter 6: Planning Expenditures and Accounting for Results

The Commission recommends that

- Specific purposes to be stated in Estimates—p. 96
6. 1 each program, activity, and sub-activity displaying resource requirements in the Estimates have a specific stated purpose and, in so far as possible, a measurable result.
- Consolidated Estimates submitted annually—p. 99
6. 2 Consolidated Estimates presenting government-wide information and the important features of departmental and agency Estimates be submitted annually to Parliament.
- Consolidated Estimates contain comparisons of proposed expenditures with expenditure limits—p. 99
6. 3 the Consolidated Estimates contain a comprehensive comparison of the total expenditures proposed in them with expenditure limits set out for the Estimates year in the most recent Fiscal Plan.
- Separate Estimates of expenditure for each department—p. 98
6. 4 separate Estimates of expenditure for each department and agency be tabled at the same time as the Consolidated Estimates, and that such separate submissions be drawn up in accordance with centrally-determined standards of disclosure and accounting practices, with decisions pertaining to detail left to each department and agency.
- Detail to be provided for statutory programs—p. 100
6. 5 legislation be amended or enacted to require that details of expenditures to be incurred under statutory programs be fully identified and quantified in the Consolidated Estimates and updated in the Supplementary Estimates; and, that the same level of detail as is provided for non-statutory expenditures be provided for statutory expenditures.
- Funding lapse after 5 years for new statutory programs—p. 102
6. 6 legislation for all new statutory programs, except those relative to interest on the public debt, require that funding lapse automatically at the end of the fifth year following introduction, and that renewal of such funding be authorized only after parliamentary review of the current and projected costs and benefits of such programs.
- Ministers to evaluate existing statutory programs and report to Parliament—p. 103
6. 7 with respect to existing statutory programs, legislation be enacted to require the responsible minister to evaluate once in the next ten years and thereafter every five years the current and projected costs and benefits of all these programs, except those relative to interest on the public debt, and that a report thereon be tabled in Parliament and be automatically and permanently referred to the appropriate standing committee for its consideration and recommendations.
- Minister's report referred to appropriate standing committee
- Discontinue vote-netting—p. 103
6. 8 the practice of vote-netting be discontinued.
- Prepare annual reports by September 30—p. 107
6. 9 all departments and agencies be required to prepare complete annual reports by September 30 following the end of the fiscal year to which they relate, that these reports be immediately tabled in the House of Commons or, if the House is not sitting on that date, within 10 days of the time the House next meets, and, that they be automatically and permanently referred to the standing committee that reviews the Estimates of the department or agency concerned.

- 6.10 Volume II of the Public Accounts contain departmental financial statements and other financial data required by the Financial Administration Act, signed by the deputy minister as chief administrative officer and by the senior financial officer, and that it continue to be referred to the Public Accounts Committee. Volume II of the Public Accounts—p. 105

Chapter 7: Consolidating the Management Function of Government

The Commission recommends that

7. 1 the Financial Administration Act be amended to rename the Treasury Board the *Board of Management*, that the new Board be chaired by a senior minister with the title *President of the Board of Management*, and that one of the other five ministers be appointed *Vice-President of the Board of Management*. Structure of the Board of Management—p. 114
7. 2 the Board of Management have the responsibilities set out in Sections 5 and 7 of the Financial Administration Act for general administrative policy, organization of the public service, financial management, and personnel management. Responsibilities of the Board of Management—p. 114
7. 3 with regard to financial management, the Board of Management have responsibility to review annual and longer term expenditure plans and programs of departments and Crown agencies requiring appropriations from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, and that these plans and programs be reviewed to ensure that they are in accordance with the priorities and expenditure ceilings approved by the Cabinet in the Fiscal Plan, and that they have been prepared with due regard to the economical and efficient use of personnel and money. Board of Management review of annual and longer term expenditure plans—p. 114
7. 4 the Public Service Employment Act be amended so as to transfer the authority of the Public Service Commission for staffing the public service to the Board of Management, while leaving with the Public Service Commission continuing responsibility for the preservation and monitoring of the merit principle. Board of Management responsible for staffing—p. 118
7. 5 the Board of Management have responsibility for reviewing the effectiveness with which departments and agencies administer the programs and activities set out in their annual expenditure plans. Board responsible for reviewing effectiveness of departmental management—p. 130
7. 6 the Board of Management be supported by two secretaries of the Board, one, the *Secretary for Personnel Management*, and the other, the *Comptroller General*. Two secretaries of the Board—p. 115

Responsibilities of the Secretary for Personnel Management—p. 118

7. 7 under the direction of the President of the Board of Management, the Secretary for Personnel Management have the central management responsibilities for government-wide policies on manpower planning; appraisal of personnel at the senior management level, and career development of the senior management cadre; collective bargaining; administrative policies relating to personnel, official languages, and training; and, that the Secretary for Personnel Management ensure that positions are correctly classified, departments are staffed in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act, and that departmental organization is monitored and reviewed.

Responsibilities of the Comptroller General—p. 126

7. 8 under the direction of the President of the Board of Management, the Comptroller General have the central management responsibilities for the screening of departmental plans and Estimates; advice on departmental expenditure ceilings and man-year ceilings in the Fiscal Plan; program evaluation policies and procedures, including performance measurement standards; the preparation of the Consolidated Estimates and the Public Accounts; accounting principles and practices, including standards of disclosure required in annual reports and financial statements; the organization of financial services and internal audit in departments; the training and development of financial officers; and, administrative policies concerning contracts and the procurement of matériel and services.

Joint responsibilities of the Secretary for Personnel Management and the Comptroller General—p. 130

7. 9 the Secretary for Personnel Management and the Comptroller General together be responsible, on behalf of the Board of Management, for reviewing the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness with which departments and agencies administer the financial and human resources authorized by Parliament.

Personnel Management Secretariat and Financial Management Secretariat—p. 115

7.10 two secretariats for the Board of Management be established, the *Personnel Management Secretariat* to be headed by the Secretary for Personnel Management and the *Financial Management Secretariat* to be headed by the Comptroller General.

Support staff for the Board of Management—p. 116

7.11 the Secretary for Personnel Management and the Comptroller General draw from their respective secretariats a common staff support group for co-ordinating the preparation of agendas, the recording of minutes and decisions of the Board of Management, and for communicating to departments and agencies the action required of them.

Staffing authority delegated to Secretary for Personnel Management or deputy heads—p. 120

7.12 the Public Service Employment Act be amended to give the Board of Management the authority to make appointments to and within the public service, and to specify that the Board of Management delegate this authority only to the Secretary for Personnel Management or to deputy ministers and their counterparts in Crown agencies.

Secretary for Personnel Management to appoint ADMs—p. 122

7.13 the Secretary for Personnel Management be responsible for appointing assistant deputy ministers and their equivalents, including senior personnel officers and senior financial officers, on the recommendation of the deputy head concerned.

- 7.14 the Board of Management reassume the Treasury Board's full responsibility for training, and delegate the authority for carrying it out to the Secretary for Personnel Management. Responsibility for training—p. 122
- 7.15 training services be provided through a separate, revenue dependent organization reporting to the Secretary for Personnel Management and subject to the accountability régime set out for common service organizations. Mechanism for training—p. 122
- 7.16 the Public Service Commission be reconstituted as a *Parliamentary Department* with the duty of ensuring that selection and appointment to the public service are made on the basis of merit, and that the Public Service Commission report annually to Parliament those instances where personnel policies, procedures, and actions fail to support the merit principle. Public Service Commission reconstituted as a Parliamentary Department—p. 123
- 7.17 the autonomy of the Public Service Commission be assured by providing that the appointment of Commissioners by the Governor in Council be for ten years during good behaviour and be subject to ratification by the Senate and the House of Commons, and that removal be upon address of both Houses of Parliament. Appointment and removal of Public Service Commissioners subject to joint resolution of both Houses—p. 124
- 7.18 the Public Service Commission have the power to direct the Secretary for Personnel Management to cause appointments to be revoked and to institute new competitions or other selection procedures. Power to direct Secretary for Personnel Management—p. 124
- 7.19 the Program Branch of the Treasury Board Secretariat be transferred to the Financial Management Secretariat. Transfer Program Branch—p. 129
- 7.20 the Comptroller General be responsible for screening and recommending the approval of departmental Estimates to the Board of Management. Comptroller General screens departmental Estimates—p. 130
- 7.21 the Comptroller General be empowered by the Board of Management to require that departments conduct specific program evaluations in problem areas identified by the Board, that the Comptroller General set standards for these evaluations, and that the Comptroller General recommend to the President of the Board of Management that action be taken where program evaluation is hindered by jurisdictional disputes. Comptroller General to require program evaluations—p. 131
- 7.22 the Board of Management direct the Comptroller General, as required, to conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of any program or program component, or of the economy and efficiency with which a program or component is managed. Comptroller General to conduct economy, efficiency, or effectiveness evaluations—p. 132
- 7.23 authority and responsibility for the format and content of the Consolidated Estimates and the Public Accounts be assigned to the President of the Board of Management, and that he be supported in these responsibilities by the Comptroller General. Consolidated Estimates and Public Accounts the responsibility of the President—p. 134

- Comptroller General recommends standards of disclosure and accounting—p. 134 **7.24** the Comptroller General recommend standards of disclosure and accounting to the Board of Management for use in all Estimates, the Public Accounts, and annual reports submitted to Parliament, and that he ensure that the standards approved by the Board are adhered to.
- Chief Accountant of the Government of Canada—p. 135 **7.25** a *Chief Accountant of the Government of Canada* be appointed to assist the Comptroller General in determining the format and content of the Consolidated Estimates and the Public Accounts, in setting standards of disclosure and accounting to be used in Estimates, Public Accounts, and annual reports, and in ensuring that approved standards are maintained.
- Accounting systems division in the accounting branch—p. 136 **7.26** the accounting branch of the Financial Management Secretariat include an accounting systems division charged with planning, controlling, and monitoring the development, introduction, and maintenance of cost-based accounting systems in departments.
- Professional development responsibilities—p. 138 **7.27** the Comptroller General determine the requirements of government for financial and accounting skills, and be responsible for the identification and development of the necessary people to meet these requirements.
- Comptroller General determines scope and standards of internal auditing—p. 139 **7.28** the minimum scope and standards of internal auditing, including auditing for compliance with central agency directives and guidelines, be determined by the Comptroller General.
- Internal audit programs and reports to be submitted to Comptroller General—p. 139 **7.29** departmental internal audit programs and reports be submitted to the Comptroller General for his review, and that the Comptroller General also have the authority to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal audit work performed by departmental and agency audit staff.
- Audit Services Bureau of DSS disbanded—p. 140 **7.30** the Audit Services Bureau in the Department of Supply and Services be disbanded and its staff transferred to individual departments and to the Financial Management Secretariat.
- Staffing Financial Administration Branch—p. 140 **7.31** the Financial Administration Branch in the Financial Management Secretariat be staffed to conduct internal audits of departments without an internal audit capability.
- Comptroller General assists departments in preparation of work plans—p. 140 **7.32** the Comptroller General and his staff work with departments to assist them in the preparation of annual work plans for improving financial management and control, and that they monitor and assist in the satisfactory implementation of these plans.
- Annual departmental management performance reviews—p. 141 **7.33** the Comptroller General and the Secretary for Personnel Management conduct an annual in-depth review of each department's management performance.
- Assessment of departmental performance sent to minister, President, PCO, and COSO—p. 144 **7.34** the assessment of departmental performance, prepared jointly by the Comptroller General and the Secretary for Personnel Management, be submitted to the responsible minister, the President of the Board of Management, the Privy Council Office, and the Committee of Senior Officials on Executive Personnel.

- 7.35 the authority and responsibility for the operations of the Consolidated Revenue Fund and all other aspects of day-to-day cash management be clearly vested in and fulfilled by the Department of Finance. Department of Finance responsible for all aspects of cash management—p. 145
- 7.36 all funds deposited in authorized depositories in the name of the Receiver General be credited immediately to the account of the Government of Canada, and that amounts in excess of minimum balances established by contract earn interest as from the following business day. Funds deposited in the name of the Receiver General to earn interest immediately—p. 149
- 7.37 charges for all banking services rendered in connection with transactions relating to the government be made on a fully competitive basis. Competitive charges for all banking services—p. 149
- 7.38 plans for daily minimum cash balances, receipts, and disbursements be made by the Bank of Canada in the light of information provided by the Department of Finance. Bank of Canada plans for daily balances, receipts, disbursements—p. 150
- 7.39 subject to election by recipients, repetitive payments to individuals, such as those for salaries, pensions, and family allowances, be made by automatic transfer through the central clearing system to designated depositories, thus obviating the costs of cheque issue and distribution. Repetitive payments to individuals made by direct transfer—p. 150

Chapter 8: Common Services

The Commission recommends that

8. 1 common service organizations be funded through a system of revenue dependency on a full-cost basis. Revenue dependent system for funding—p. 162
8. 2 all common service organizations offer their goods and services at rates based on a full-cost approach, and that all goods and services provided by common service organizations be unit-priced. Rates based on full-cost approach—p. 164
Unit pricing of goods and services—p. 164
8. 3 funds for common services, including, annual rental costs for accommodation, be provided in the Estimates of the user departments, and that all transactions between common service organizations and client departments be actual transactions. Funds for common services provided in departmental Estimates—p. 165
8. 4 the Comptroller General annually conduct public hearings with respect to the fees charged by common service organizations with the full participation of common service organizations, program departments and agencies, and interested private sector groups, and that, on the basis of these hearings, the common service fee structures be recommended to the Board of Management for approval and communication to all departments and agencies. Annual hearings re fees charged—p. 166
8. 5 the Bureau for Translations and the Government Telecommunications Agency be transferred to the Department of Supply and Services under the direction and control of the Minister of Supply and Services. Bureau for Translations, Government Telecommunications Agency transferred to Supply and Services—p. 168

One deputy for Supply and Services—p. 169

8. 6 all the functions of the Department of Supply and Services be brought together under one deputy minister.

CADC subject to common service policies and departmental accountability régime—p. 169

8. 7 the Crown Assets Disposal Corporation continue to be responsible to the Minister of Supply and Services, be governed by the common service policies of the Board of Management, and be subject to the proposed management and accountability régime recommended for all departments.

Design and construction capabilities in departments to be constituted as Other Designated Departments—p. 169

8. 8 the branches within the Departments of National Defence, Transport, and Indian Affairs and Northern Development which provide design and construction capabilities be specifically and separately identified and organized as *Other Designated Departments*, and made revenue dependent on a full-cost basis.

PART III: DEPARTMENTS

Chapter 9: Responsibility and Accountability for Departmental Management

The Commission recommends that

9. 1 departmental plans and performance goals be developed for the minister's approval by the deputy minister in his capacity as *Chief Administrative Officer*, and that the achievement of these program and performance objectives be monitored and later reviewed by the Board of Management in a manner that would permit the deputy to defend departmental performance. Review of departmental performance—p. 188
9. 2 deputy ministers be liable to be called to account directly for their assigned and delegated responsibilities before the parliamentary committee most directly concerned with administrative performance, the Public Accounts Committee. Deputy head accountability before Parliament—p. 189

Chapter 10: The Appointment and Appraisal of Deputy Heads

The Commission recommends that

10. 1 on appointment, a deputy head be expected to serve in his department for a period of three to five years. Deputy appointments for 3-5 years—p. 193
10. 2 the views of the Secretary for Personnel Management and the Comptroller General be sought with respect to all deputy head appointments. Management potential of deputy head candidates—p. 194
10. 3 on appointment of the deputy, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the official serving as adviser on senior appointments, and the two secretaries of the Board of Management meet with him to discuss departmental problems, issues, and performance expectations, and that individual objectives be agreed between the minister and the deputy, submitted to the Prime Minister, and serve as the continuing basis for performance evaluations. Setting objectives for deputy heads—p. 197
10. 4 these statements of objectives be reviewed annually by the deputy head and the minister, and any changes deemed necessary be communicated to the Prime Minister, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the adviser on senior appointments, and the two secretaries of the Board of Management. Annual update of objectives—p. 199
10. 5 the Committee of Senior Officials on Executive Personnel, comprising the Secretary to the Cabinet, the adviser on senior appointments, the Comptroller General, and the Secretary for Personnel Management as permanent members, and four other deputy ministers appointed on a rotational basis, be responsible for preparing for the Cabinet appraisals of the performance of all Governor in Council appointees who are involved in the management of departments. COSO, composition and role in appraisal—p. 199

- Deputy comments on evaluation—p. 200 **10. 6** the deputy head have the opportunity to comment on the evaluation before it is forwarded to the Cabinet Committee on the Public Service and the full Cabinet.
- Reporting appraisal results to deputy head and minister—p. 201 **10. 7** following the final decision by the Cabinet, the annual evaluation of a deputy's performance be discussed personally with him by the adviser on senior appointments.
- Evaluation reviewed by minister—p. 201 **10. 8** the COSO evaluation of the deputy be reviewed and, if necessary, commented upon by the minister before its submission to the Cabinet.
- Deputy secretary to the Cabinet for senior appointments—p. 202 **10. 9** a deputy secretary to the Cabinet be assigned full-time responsibility for supporting the adviser on senior appointments.

Chapter 11: The Preparation and Review of Departmental Plans

The Commission recommends that

- Departmental responsibility centres to be related to resources and measurable outputs—p. 205 **11. 1** deputy heads of all departments ensure that their organizational structures clearly reflect that responsibility centres are directly related to programs, activities, or sub-activities that can be identified with particular resources and, where possible, with specific measurable outputs.
- Accountability of responsibility centre managers—p. 206 **11. 2** such responsibility centres be under the control of managers who can be accountable for establishing plans and achieving results.
- Departmental management committees set objectives and goals—p. 207 **11. 3** each departmental management committee place priority on developing strategy and plans by setting medium-term departmental objectives, by approving challenging goals for managers, and by communicating these objectives and goals clearly to managers of responsibility centres.
- Discontinue Program Forecasts—p. 208 **11. 4** the preparation and submission of Program Forecasts be discontinued.
- Departmental Strategic Plans—p. 209 **11. 5** departments be required to prepare *Departmental Strategic Plans* each year for submission to the Board of Management in support of the Estimates, and to the Department of Finance and the Privy Council Office for their information and consideration.
- Operational goals memorandum—p. 211 **11. 6** the departmental Estimates submission to the Board of Management be accompanied by a memorandum outlining the key operational goals to be achieved by the end of the Estimates year.
- Screening departmental plans—p. 213 **11. 7** the screening of departmental plans be concluded by the transmittal of a letter to each minister from the President of the Board of Management, and that this letter comment on the results of the screening and report any unresolved or other important issues.

11. 8 the minister responsible for the Departmental Strategic Plan and Estimates, accompanied by the deputy head, appear before the Board of Management to explain and justify his Estimates submission, and that the Comptroller General and the Secretary for Personnel Management attend these meetings to respond to any questions from the Board about their interpretation of, or recommendations on, the plans and the Estimates. Approving Estimates submissions—p. 215
11. 9 the Financial Management Secretariat monitor the implementation of recommendations made by the Board of Management for any changes in departmental plans or Estimates. Comptroller General monitors implementation of Board's recommendations—p. 216

Chapter 12: The Deputy and the Departmental Management Team

The Commission recommends that

12. 1 the Board of Management require the deputy to ensure that goals are set for each manager reporting directly to him, that goals focus attention on the most important problems and priorities in the manager's area of responsibility, and that they provide an objective basis for measuring the manager's performance. Senior departmental managers, goals and evaluation—p. 221
12. 2 deputy heads be delegated the authority for approving organization, classification, and staffing decisions affecting all positions below the level of assistant deputy minister or equivalent within existing complements. Deputy has authority for staffing below ADM level—p. 222
12. 3 the deputy's recommendations for the classification of positions at the level of assistant deputy minister and equivalent, and changes in organization involving positions at this level, be subject to approval by the Board of Management. Deputy's recommendations for classification of positions at ADM level subject to Board of Management approval—p. 223
12. 4 for assistant deputy minister and equivalent positions, the deputy head select a candidate from a list drawn up by the Secretary for Personnel Management and recommend that candidate for appointment by the Secretary for Personnel Management. Secretary for Personnel Management appoints to positions at ADM level—p. 224
12. 5 deputy heads establish similar procedures for delegating authority for and approving classification, organization, and staffing decisions within departments. Staffing decisions within departments—p. 225
12. 6 the Board of Management ensure the effective discharge of these fundamental personnel management responsibilities by deputy heads through audit procedures and annual departmental performance reviews. Board to ensure effective personnel management—p. 224
12. 7 Parliament enact legislation to introduce unsatisfactory performance as grounds for discipline or release, subject to the present appeals process and review by the Public Service Commission, and to simplify the process for disciplining or releasing consistently below-par performers at all levels. Unsatisfactory performance as grounds for release—p. 226

- Deputy's authority to dismiss, demote, transfer employees— p. 228
12. 8 the Secretary for Personnel Management of the Board of Management delegate to deputy heads who have established acceptable performance appraisal procedures the authority to dismiss, demote, or transfer employees below the level of assistant deputy minister.
- Placement and counselling service— p. 228
12. 9 the Secretary for Personnel Management operate a placement and counselling service to assist employees who have been dismissed.
- Career development plans—p. 229
- 12.10 deputy heads establish and follow a management succession and career development plan that systematically identifies candidates for senior positions in the department and for promotion to other positions within the public service.
- Secretary for Personnel Management consolidates plans— p. 231
- 12.11 the Secretary for Personnel Management review the departmental plans with the deputy heads and consolidate them to establish a managerial career development plan for the government as a whole.
- Developing managers an important part of deputy's evaluation— p. 231
- 12.12 the performance of deputy heads in developing managers be made an important part of the deputies' own performance evaluations.
- Senior personnel officer to report to deputy— p. 232
- 12.13 the senior personnel officer in the department report directly to the deputy head and be a full and active member of the management committee.

Chapter 13: Departmental Financial Organization and Personnel

The Commission recommends that

- Training of senior managers in financial management—p. 235
13. 1 staff courses, temporary secondment to the private sector, temporary assignment programs, and other career development arrangements for senior managers be developed in such a way that they lay strong emphasis on practical explanations and demonstrations so that participants develop a better understanding of the nature and purposes of financial management in government.
- Senior financial officers involved in planning, budgeting, evaluation in departments—p. 236
13. 2 deputies be required to manage and organize their departments so as to permit senior financial officers to make a significant contribution to their planning, budgeting, controlling, and evaluation activities.
- Senior financial officers, goals and evaluation—p. 239
13. 3 each senior financial officer be required annually to establish measurable goals for his personal performance, that such goals be agreed to by the deputy minister and the Comptroller General, and that his subsequent performance evaluation by the deputy be based on a measurement of achievement against these goals.

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| 13. 4 | for senior financial officer positions, the deputy head select a candidate from a list drawn up by the Comptroller General and recommend that candidate for appointment by the Secretary for Personnel Management. | Appointment of senior financial officers— p. 239 |
| 13. 5 | the senior financial officer in the department report directly to the deputy head and be a full and active member of the management committee. | Senior financial officer reports to deputy— p. 240 |
| 13. 6 | the Comptroller General, if his discussions with the deputy head concerned produce no satisfactory result, be required to report to the Board of Management those instances where financial management in a department is unsatisfactory because of badly defined and/or ineffective functional authority of senior financial officers over financial staffs reporting to program or regional managers. | Comptroller General reports instances of unsatisfactory financial management—p. 242 |
| 13. 7 | on receipt of a report of unsatisfactory financial management, the Board of Management be empowered to direct that all financial staff of the department concerned report directly to the senior financial officer for a period to be specified by the Board. | Board of Management empowered to direct financial staff to report directly to senior financial officer— p. 243 |
| 13. 8 | the Secretary for Personnel Management of the Board of Management revise the classification benchmarks for financial and clerical positions to ensure that only those positions requiring formal accounting training are placed in the FI group; and that he ensure that all FI position descriptions accurately reflect the skills and duties required of the incumbent. | Secretary for Personnel Management to revise classification scheme for financial and clerical positions— p. 243 |
| 13. 9 | the Secretary for Personnel Management of the Board of Management work closely with the Comptroller General to develop courses that meet both modern standards and financial management requirements in the federal government, and that satisfactory completion of such courses be appropriately tested and recognized. | Development of courses for financial management in government—p. 245 |

Chapter 14: Accounting and Auditing

The Commission recommends that

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| 14. 1 | comprehensive cost-based accounting systems be developed and used in all federal departments and agencies, and that these systems meet the criteria of capturing all costs on a timely and accurate basis and be integrated with costing systems capable of analyzing the data thus obtained. | Cost-based accounting systems for all departments and agencies—p. 250 |
| 14. 2 | accounting systems in departments and agencies incorporate independent financial control over all non-cash assets, and particularly over fixed assets and inventories. | Accounting systems incorporate financial control over non-cash assets—p. 251 |
| 14. 3 | the federal government take the lead in setting up a joint task force with the provincial governments to determine the accounting standards that should be recognized, accepted, and used in the presentation of government financial information. | Joint task force to determine accounting standards for government—p. 255 |

- Departments responsible for accounting systems—p. 257
14. 4 departments be fully responsible for the design and upkeep of their own accounting systems.
- Systems to meet requirements of central agencies—p. 259
14. 5 departmental accounting systems be designed to provide the information required by central agencies accurately and promptly.
- Systems formally approved by Comptroller General—p. 259
14. 6 departmental accounting systems, and any subsequent changes therein, be formally approved by the Comptroller General before being brought into use.
- Broadening the scope of internal audit in departments—p. 260
14. 7 the internal audit responsibility of departments and agencies be based on a comprehensive approach to all financial, operational, and management auditing, and that it therefore cover adherence to all centrally-prescribed financial, personnel, official languages, data processing, and other administrative policies and procedures, as well as the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness with which resources are used.
- Departmental Audit Committees—p. 263
14. 8 *Audit Committees* be formally created in all departments and that they comprise at least the deputy head and two members from the ranks of senior executives of major corporations and organizations in the private sector.

PART IV: CROWN AGENCIES

Chapter 16: A Proposed Re-ordering of Crown Agencies

The Commission recommends that

16. 1 the Schedules to the Financial Administration Act be replaced by a more comprehensive set of schedules in accordance with four categories:
- 1) *Ministerial and Other Designated Departments*
 - 2) *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies*
 - 3) *Crown Corporations*
 - 4) *Shared Enterprises*
- and that when any re-scheduling occurs such decisions be tabled for the information of Parliament.
- Categorization for departments and Crown agencies—p. 279

Chapter 18: Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies

The Commission recommends that

18. 1 every constituent act of an *Independent Deciding and Advisory Body* designate one official as chief executive officer who will be responsible for the supervision and direction of the work and staff of the agency and be held accountable for the administration of the agency.
18. 2 unless specifically exempted in the constituent act, the authority of the Board of Management with respect to financial and personnel management in departments apply to Crown agencies in Category II, *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies*.
18. 3 when *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies* are established, the goals and public policies they are to implement, or be guided by, be clearly set out in their constituent acts.
18. 4 in cases where *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies* are authorized to make regulations, these be subject to Governor in Council approval before being promulgated.
18. 5 the constituents acts of *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies* contain provisions allowing for policy directives from the Governor in Council.
18. 6 prior to the issuance of a policy directive to an *Independent Deciding and Advisory Body*, the Government refer the matter to the agency, which may request public submissions thereon and shall make a public report within ninety days or such longer period as the Government may specify, and further, that such directives be published in the *Canada Gazette* and tabled in the House of Commons.
18. 7 the right to appeal individual decisions of *regulatory agencies* to designated ministers or the Governor in Council be abolished.
- Constituent act to designate one official as chief executive officer—p. 312
- Departmental accountability régime applies—p. 313
- Goals to be clearly set out in acts—p. 314
- Regulations subject to Governor in Council approval—p. 315
- Policy directives from Governor in Council—p. 316
- Directives to be made public, published in the *Canada Gazette*, and tabled in Parliament—p. 317
- Abolish political appeals—p. 318

- Transfer of functions requires parliamentary approval—p. 319
18. 8 without abrogating the powers granted to the Governor in Council in the Public Service Rearrangement and Transfer of Duties Act, the transfer to a department or agency of government of any function assigned by statute to an *Independent Deciding and Advisory Body* require parliamentary approval.
- Members subject to removal for cause—p. 321
- For regulatory agencies removal subject to joint resolution—p. 321
18. 9 all constituent acts of *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies* clearly stipulate that members shall be subject to removal only for cause and that in addition, for *regulatory agencies*, such action be subject to a joint resolution of both Houses of Parliament.
- Chief executive officers appointed for three-year terms and evaluated by COSO—p. 322
- 18.10 the members of *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies* designated as chief executive officers be appointed to such positions for three-year terms, subject to renewal, and that their administrative performance be evaluated by the Committee of Senior Officials on Executive Personnel, and its reports be submitted to the Cabinet when it is considering re-appointment.
- Chief executive officers undertake annual performance evaluations of members—p. 323
- 18.11 chief executive officers of *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies* undertake annual performance evaluations of the members of their agencies and that such evaluations be forwarded to COSO and the Cabinet.
- Annual reports referred to standing committees—p. 324
- 18.12 the annual reports of *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies* be automatically and permanently referred to the appropriate standing committees of the House of Commons, and that they provide a thorough description of the activities of the preceding year including both achievements and problems, a record of reports issued and directives received, and plans for the coming year.
- Minister to review functions and operations—p. 325
- 18.13 the designated minister be required to undertake a review of the functions and operations of *Independent Deciding and Advisory Bodies* not less than once every ten years, and further, that the results of such reviews be tabled in the House of Commons and be automatically and permanently referred to the appropriate standing committee.

Chapter 19: Crown Corporations

The Commission recommends that

- Clear statements of task, purposes, objectives and powers of Crown Corporations—p. 333
19. 1 in the constituent act, or letters patent issued under the Canada Business Corporations Act, for each *Crown Corporation*, the mandate provide a clear definition of the task, purposes, objectives, and powers devolved upon the corporation, and, where letters patent are used to constitute the corporation, that these automatically be tabled in Parliament.
- Creation or acquisition of Crown Corporations or subsidiaries—p. 334
19. 2 the creation of a *Crown Corporation* or subsidiary or the acquisition of a company by a *Crown Corporation* or subsidiary require express parliamentary sanction in the relevant departmental or *Crown Corporation* constituent act and prior Governor in Council approval.

19. 3 the chief executive officer be responsible for preparing a *Corporate Strategic Plan* for the approval of the board and for the information of the designated minister. Preparation and approval of Corporate Strategic Plan—p. 335
19. 4 directives issued to a *Crown Corporation* by the designated minister be subject to Governor in Council approval, be tabled forthwith in Parliament, and be duly recorded in the annual report of the corporation. Ministerial directives to be tabled in Parliament, recorded in annual report—p. 336
19. 5 directives issued to a *Crown Corporation* be binding on the corporation but that they relieve the directors of their responsibility in the matter, and that, where directives result in additional costs to the corporation, compensation on an agreed or independently arbitrated basis be awarded. Directives binding on the corporation—p. 337
Compensation—p. 338
19. 6 directors of *Crown Corporations* be appointed for three-year staggered terms by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the designated minister, after consultation with the chairman of the board of directors. Appointment and terms of directors—p. 339
19. 7 the chairman of the board of directors of a *Crown Corporation* be appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation with the board. Appointment of chairman—p. 340
19. 8 subject to confirmation by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the designated minister, the chief executive officer of a *Crown Corporation* be appointed and removed by the board of directors of the corporation. Appointment of chief executive officer—p. 341
19. 9 the president of a *Crown Corporation* be chief executive officer, and that his remuneration, together with that of the chairman of the board, be fixed by the board of directors within ranges approved by the Governor in Council, such ranges to be determined on the recommendation of independent advisers. President is chief executive officer—p. 342
Remuneration of president and chairman fixed by board—p. 342
- 19.10 the board of directors of a *Crown Corporation* be responsible for establishing the form and contents of the capital and operating budgets based on the highest accepted standards. Board of directors responsible for form and contents of budgets—p. 342
- 19.11 the capital budget, when appropriations are not required, be approved by the board of directors, submitted to the designated minister and the Minister of Finance for review and approval, and thereafter be submitted to the Governor in Council for approval and subsequent tabling in Parliament at the same time as the Estimates. Approval of capital budget when appropriations not required—p. 342
- 19.12 the capital budget, when appropriations are required, be approved by the board of directors, submitted to the designated minister, the Minister of Finance, and the Board of Management for review and approval, and thereafter be submitted to the Governor in Council for approval and subsequent tabling in Parliament with the Estimates. Approval of capital budget when appropriations are required—p. 342
- 19.13 the operating budget, when appropriations are not required, be approved by the board of directors, be presented to the designated minister for information, and be assigned to the chief executive officer for implementation. Approval of operating budget when appropriations not required—p. 344

- Approval of operating budget when appropriations are required—p. 344 **19.14** the operating budget, when appropriations are required, be approved by the board of directors, and forwarded to the designated minister for his approval and subsequent transmission to the Board of Management and the Governor in Council for their approval prior to tabling in Parliament, and that all approval procedures be completed before the budget is assigned to the chief executive officer for implementation.
- Bylaws effective upon board approval—p. 347 **19.15** *Crown Corporation* bylaws take effect on approval by the board of directors, but that they require subsequent ratification by the Governor in Council and tabling in Parliament.
- Codes of conduct and systems of compliance are board responsibilities—p. 347 **19.16** codes of conduct and a system of compliance be prepared by *Crown Corporations*, approved by the board of directors, and agreed with the minister, and that monitoring of compliance be the responsibility of the board.
- Audit committees—p. 349 **19.17** all *Crown Corporations* appoint audit committees made up of outside directors.
- Appointment of external auditor—p. 349 **19.18** the Governor in Council appoint the external auditor on the recommendation of the board of directors, except where the auditor is already named in constituent legislation.
- Auditor General has access to audit reports of outside auditors—p. 349 **19.19** the Auditor General, where he is not named as the external auditor, have access to the audit reports of outside auditors of *Crown Corporations*.
- Every subsidiary listed with its parent corporation—p. 352 **19.20** every subsidiary be listed with its parent in the *Crown Corporations* category, and that the financial statements of all subsidiaries on both a consolidated and unconsolidated basis be included in the parent corporation's annual report.
- Minister to review operations and functions every ten years—p. 353 **19.21** the designated minister be required to undertake a review of the mandate and operations of *Crown Corporations* not less than once every ten years and further that the results of such reviews be tabled in Parliament and referred automatically for study and appropriate action to the relevant standing committee.

Chapter 20: *Shared Enterprises and Quasi-public Corporations*

The Commission recommends that

- Shared Enterprises and subsidiaries included in revised schedules to the FAA—p. 356 **20. 1** *Shared Enterprises* be listed as such for purposes of identification in the revised schedules to the Financial Administration Act, and that the subsidiaries of *Shared Enterprises* be directly accountable to their parent corporations and identified by and listed with their parent corporations.
- Accountability of Shared Enterprises—p. 359 **20. 2** accountability with respect to the delegated public responsibility of *Shared Enterprises* normally be subject to appropriate federal or provincial corporate law, and, in addition, that provision be made for appropriate reporting and disclosure to Parliament.

20. 3 the designated minister as trustee shareholder for the Crown accept the rights and responsibilities of any shareholder under the applicable corporate law, except where those rights and responsibilities have been clearly modified by a specific constituent act. Rights of designated minister—p. 359
20. 4 the designated minister be the accountability link between a *Shared Enterprise* and Parliament. Accountability to Parliament—p. 359
20. 5 the annual reports of *Quasi-public Corporations* that receive grants or contributions from the Government be tabled each year at the same time as the tabling of the Estimates. Annual reports of Quasi-public Corporations—p. 364
20. 6 the Government undertake to hold the officers of *Quasi-public Corporations* accountable in a manner commensurate with the degree of governmental sponsorship or encouragement of those corporations. Accountability of Quasi-public Corporations—p. 364

PART V: ACCOUNTABILITY TO PARLIAMENT: CLOSING THE LOOP

Chapter 21: Rights and Responsibilities

The Commission recommends that

21. 1 the deputy minister as chief administrative officer account for his performance of specific delegated or assigned duties before the parliamentary committee responsible for the scrutiny of government expenditures, the Public Accounts Committee. Deputy accountable before Public Accounts Committee—p. 374
21. 2 there be established a committee of the House of Commons to be known as the *Standing Committee on Government Finance and the Economy*, that the annual Fiscal Plan presented to Parliament be automatically and permanently referred to this committee, that the committee report to the House on its study of the Plan, and, that the Government respond formally to the committee's report during a subsequent debate. Fiscal Plan automatically and permanently referred to a new Standing Committee on Government Finance and the Economy—p. 381

Chapter 22: Instruments and Procedures

The Commission recommends that

22. 1 the total number of standing committees of the House of Commons be reduced and that, with the exception of the Public Accounts Committee, membership on them be limited to 15 or fewer. Reduce number and membership of standing committees—p. 389
22. 2 Standing Order 65.(4) be amended to provide for prior notice of votes in committees and the establishment of alternates lists from which to draw substitutes for committee members. Prior notice of votes and alternates lists—p. 397
22. 3 the chairmen of standing committees be elected by each committee for the life of a parliament, and receive remuneration for performing their duties, such remuneration to relate to that received by parliamentary secretaries. Term and remuneration of standing committee chairmen—p. 399
22. 4 each standing committee of the House of Commons be allotted a budget to which all expenses associated with the operation of the committee are charged, that the budget include an allocation for hiring staff but that the selection of staff be at the discretion of the committee, and, that staff be at the service of the whole committee but under the direction of the chairman. Budgets and staff for standing committees—p. 400
22. 5 the annual reports of departments and agencies be automatically and permanently referred to the appropriate standing committees of the House of Commons. Automatic and permanent reference of annual reports—p. 401
22. 6 Standing Order 58.(16) be re-interpreted to make clear that substantive reports from House committees are desirable whether or not they are to be debated. Substantive reports from committees—p. 403

