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Pascal’s/The Fukushima-Factor Wager
Pascal was one of the most brilliant minds ever alive, who spent the best part of his later life – he died at 39 – dedicated to the cause of religion. One of the founders of game theory, a decision theoretical genius, he introduced an argument for God’s existence (more precisely: for belief in a Catholic-Christian God) which in time came to be known as Pascal’s Wager, the idea of which is this.
In a bet on whether God exists or not, we should unalterably bet on that he does since, if he does, our reward is infinite (infinitely infinite: we’ll be part of his eternal [time] and boundless [matter] bliss – as you can see from this, by betting on what Pascal means is choosing to be believe) and any sacrifice compared to that is negligible; if on the other hand we bet on that he doesn’t, if he does we’ll suffer endlessly in hell, and any pleasures we’ve enjoyed during our life compared to that are trivial. (Pascal in fact doesn’t explicitly spell out this second option, though it’s an obvious implication – in any case it doesn’t influence his overall result.) If God does not exist, whether we bet on that he does or that he doesn’t remains neutral: we’re not rewarded but we also don’t get punished for our choice. There are the virtues of a pious life, in Pascal’s view, vs. the damage of a bad one; or, if you will, the joy of living vs. pains of abnegation – i.e. in sum what you could call matters of taste. Pascal contends that, since we can’t know whether God exists or not, the odds in favor and against should be held equal (this, of course, doesn’t sound honest: from that as far as we can know God might as well exist as not, it doesn’t follow that he does with probability 0.5), but then goes on to say that even if the chances were remote our bet on any account should be for his existence, because the prize in case we’re right is infinitely infinite and that outweighs any degree of adverse odds – this, when computed in a classical decision theoretical matrix, comes out good. In the context that we have here it’s absurd.
Besides the weakest argument for God’s existence that you’ll find – so bad, in fact, that you’re inclined go with Richard Dawkins who suggests that Pascal must have meant it mainly as a joke (not the impression that you get reading the corresponding passage in Pensées, where it originally appeared, however) – apart from this, in terms of game theory it sucks. Game theory calculus are valid for a large number of runs, whereas in this case we are playing only once: we get to choose if we believe in God or not and there it ends. Say that some bookie offered you the chance to bet all that you own against a 1 to 10100.000 chance to win, you bet this once and the return is, let’s say 50 trillion bucks [all numbers random] (reads: there’s not a chance that you will win, but if you do – or if you did – the prize you’d get beats all description), if what you own is anything above some lousy final bucks you won’t so much as even think of taking it on (and, even then, why would you give away the last few bucks you’ve got rather than spend them on, let’s see, maybe a beer?). If that’s a strategy for gambling, you’ll be ruined in a wink. Quite apart from the sheer fact that God is nothing you could bet on: you believe in him or don’t, what you decide yourself, your choice won’t have an influence on that. In Mathematics, Pascal rendered work of unconditional beauty; his intellect produced such deeply truthful quotes as this: “Men never do evil so completely and so cheerfully as when they do it from religious [any kind of categorical] conviction.” (bracketed comment added). Coming from him, the proposition of the Wager seems outrageous.
Bertrand Russell said, I think, that no one cares what will occur a million years or so from now. People may actually think they do, but no one does – although they know the suffering will be as hard, just as unbearable and ruthless as it’s now, nobody thinks of consequences when we’re moving on that scale. The space of time involved is simply too unfathomable. Pascal, in building up his proof, moves in that realm of infinites. The funny thing is, when we turn his line of argument around, applying it to nuclear power risk assessment (to take a pregnant case in point), it does attain the force of evidence it manifestly lacked. The situation that we face then is as follows. In case we win we have the gains that nuclear power can provide, a much-desired, steady energy production and supply (the precondition for our economic growth: the indicator, in its turn, of our wellbeing), whereas against it there’s the risk, infinitesimal at best, of losing endlessly/complete extermination; this time we don’t play only once but infinitely in the future, and the choices as they stand are well-defined: it’s our decision hour by hour, from one instant to the next, if we maintain the power plants running or we don’t. The probability we get of losing all is 1.0 (there’s a 100% certainty that some time something fails once and for all): the slightest chance measured on endlessness of time/an endlessness of repetitions gives us that. Ten years, a hundred years from now; a thousand years, ten thousand years, at some point, somewhere something crucially goes wrong, some basic safety algorithm blows to bits – We couldn’t possibly, not possibly have foreseen this event! – and when it does everything’s over, it all ends. Nothing remains. (The nuclear power plants store, typically, enough destructive force to wipe out any trace of life present on earth, should it escape at once, without further control; the effects remain some hundred thousand years after the blow, only in case there should still be some kind of doubt – this as a counterpart to Pascal’s somewhat doctored infinitely infinite.) If people long enough ago had made the bet described above, we wouldn’t be here – not one of us, not one of us would be here now. Then again, what’s it to them (cf. Bertrand Russell).
Arndt Britschgi: Born and raised in Finland, Arndt Britschgi spent the best part of his life
in Madrid, Spain, and in 2006 completed his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Zürich, Switzerland
- his book on Newcomb's Paradox/Free Will is available in English from Philosophia Verlag in Germany.
Besides in Ascent Aspirations, writings of his have appeared in Literary Fragments, Kulttuurivihkot
(Finnish), Southern Cross Review, the EOTU E-Zine, milk magazine, Slow Trains Literary Journal,
The Modern Review, and Feathertale.
Email: Arndt Britschgi
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