Animal Metacognition: Problems and Prospects
J. David Smith
Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, SUNY Buffalo
Michael J. Beran
Language Research Center, Georgia State University
Duke University
Justin J. Couchman, Mariana V. C. Coutinho, Joseph B. Boomer
Department of Psychology, SUNY Buffalo
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Researchers have begun to evaluate
whether nonhuman animals share humans’ capacity for metacognitive
monitoring and self-regulation. Using perception, memory, numerical,
and foraging paradigms, they have tested apes, capuchins, a dolphin,
macaques, pigeons, and rats. However, recent theoretical and formal-modeling
work has confirmed that some paradigms allow the criticism that
low-level associative mechanisms could create the appearance of
uncertainty monitoring in animals. This possibility has become
a central issue as researchers reflect on existing phenomena and
pause to evaluate the area’s current status. The present
authors discuss the associative question and offer our evaluation
of the field. Associative mechanisms explain poorly some of the
area’s important results. The next phase of research in this
area should consolidate the gains achieved by those results and
work toward a theoretical understanding of the cognitive and decisional
(not associative) capacities that animals show in some of the referent
experiments. |
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Published by the Comparative Cognition Society
How to reference this article:
Smith, J. D.,
Beran, M. J., Couchman, J J., Coutinho, V. C., Boomer, J. B. (2009). Animal
Metacognition: Problems and Prospects
Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4 , 40-53. Retrieved
from
http://psyc.queensu.ca/ccbr/index.html
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