Applying Signal Detection Theory to Contingency Assessment

by Shepard Siegel,
McMaster University

Lorraine G. Allan,
McMaster University

Samuel D. Hannah,
McMaster University

Matthew J. C. Crump,
Vanderbilt University

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Abstract

In most studies of contingency assessment participants judge the magnitude of the relationship between cues and outcomes. This judgment is a conflated measure of the participant’s sensitivity to the cue-outcome relationship, and his or her response bias. A psychophysical model (signal detection theory, SDT) can be used to dissect the independent contributions of sensitivity and bias to contingency judgment. Results of an experiment concerning cue-interaction (blocking) illustrate the utility of applying SDT to understanding contingency assessment. Most accounts of such assessment are associative (derived primarily from Pavlovian conditioning experiments with non-human animals). A psychophysical analysis of contingency assessment is not an alternative to such associative accounts. The SDT analysis supplements (not replaces) learning principles with psychophysical principles.

Keywords: associative learning, blocking, contingency assessment, cue interaction, psychophysics, signal detection theory

Siegel, S., Allan, L. G., Hannah, S. D., & Crump, M. J. (2009). Applying Signal Detection Theory to Contingency Assessment. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 116-134. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40012

Why Can Birds Be So Smart? Background, Significance, and Implications of the Revised View of the Avian Brain

by Toru Shimizu,
University of South Florida

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Abstract

In the early twentieth century, the anatomical nomenclature of the avian telencephalon (cerebrum) was developed on the basis of flawed assumptions about homology to mammals. The classic terminology implied that the majority of the avian telencephalon was basically composed of nuclei forming massive basal ganglia which controlled only simple, unlearned behavior. Later research revealed that this assumption was inaccurate and that the avian telencephalon contains a welldeveloped pallium in addition to basal ganglia. The avian pallium is equivalent to specific mammalian counterparts (e.g., neocortex, claustrum, and/or amygdala) that are responsible for complex and sophisticated behavior. In 2002, based on a revised interpretation of the avian brain organization, the new nomenclature was proposed by comparative neuroscientists who participated in the Avian Brain Nomenclature Forum. This paper presents the general background and significance of the revised view of the avian brain, as well as implications for understanding the remarkable cognitive abilities of birds.

Shimizu, T. (2009). Why Can Birds Be So Smart? Background, Significance, and Implications of the Revised View of the Avian Brain. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 103-115. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40011

Associative Basis of Landmark Learning and Integration in Vertebrates

by Kenneth J. Leising,
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston

Aaron P. Blaisdell,
University of California, Los Angeles

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Abstract

Early work on spatial navigation evaluated what stimuli (kinesthetic or extra-maze) support small-scale navigation and the nature of the underlying learning (place versus response) process. Contemporary research has focused primarily on how cues interact to determine spatial search. This review covers three general findings from research on landmark-based spatial search in vertebrates. First, pigeons and rats encode simple spatial maps in both open-field and touchscreen environments. Second, a nascent literature shows how simple maps can be integrated into complex maps through higher-order associative processes. The spatial-integration hypothesis provides an associative mechanism for spatial mapping that serves as an alternative to a previously posed configural mechanism. Finally, the evidence for associative cue-competition phenomena in landmark learning is reviewed—focusing on blocking and overshadowing. These findings support a role for associative learning in spatial tasks and provide a powerful explanatory framework for understanding cue integration and competition effects in landmark learning.

Keywords: spatial learning, navigation, cognitive map, spatial map, integration, cue competition, overshadowing, blocking, higher-order conditioning

Leising, K. J., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2009). Associative Basis of Landmark Learning and Integration in Vertebrates. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 80-102. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40010

Elephant cognition in primate perspective

by Richard W. Byrne,
School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews

Lucy A. Bates
School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews

Cynthia J. Moss,
Amboseli Trust for Elephants

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Abstract

On many of the staple measures of comparative psychology, elephants show no obvious differences from other mammals, such as primates: discrimination learning, memory, spontaneous tool use, etc. However, a range of more naturalistic measures have recently suggested that elephant cognition may be rather different. Wild elephants sub-categorize humans into groups, independently making this classification on the basis of scent or colour. In number discrimination, elephants show no effects of absolute magnitude or relative size disparity in making number judgements. In the social realm, elephants show empathy into the problems faced by others, and give hints of special abilities in cooperation, vocal imitation and perhaps teaching. Field data suggest that the elephant’s vaunted reputation for memory may have a factual basis, in two ways. Elephants’ ability to remember large-scale space over long periods suggests good cognitive mapping skills. Elephants’ skill in keeping track of the current locations of many family members implies that working memory may be unusually developed, consistent with the laboratory finding that their quantity judgements do not show the usual magnitude effects.

Keywords: Loxodonta, Elephants, cognitive maps, social knowledge, social memory, tool-use, classification learning, quantity discrimination, empathy, mirror self-recognition

Byrne, R. W., Bates, L. A., & Moss, C. J. (2009). Elephant cognition in primate perspective. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 65-79. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40009

The Curious Incident of the Capuchins

by J. David Smith,
Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, SUNY Buffalo

Michael J. Beran,
Language Research Center, Georgia State University

Justin J. Couchman,
Department of Psychology, SUNY Buffalo

Mariana V. C. Coutinho,
Department of Psychology, SUNY Buffalo

Joseph B. Boomer,
Department of Psychology, SUNY Buffalo

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Abstract

In the mystery Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes draws the detective’s attention to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time. The detective reminds him that the dog did nothing in the night-time. Holmes replies: That was the curious incident. The incident is an important clue to the mystery’s solution. We draw everyone’s attention to the curious incident of the capuchins.

Keywords: uncertainty monitoring, metacognition, comparative cognition, decision making

Smith, J. D., Baen, M. J., Couchman, J. J., Coutinho, M. V. C., & Boomer, J. B. (2009). The Curious Incident of the Capuchins. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 61-64. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40008

Reinforcement and Metacognition

by J. Jozefowiez,
Universidade do Minho

J. E. R. Staddon,
Duke University

D. T. Cerutti,
California State University-East Bay

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Abstract

We return to the issue of reinforcement addressed by Smith, Beran, Couchman, Coutinho & Boomer. We argue that their concerns are unfounded because (a) reinforcing the ‘uncertain’ response need not undermine an otherwise convincing demonstration of animal metacognition, even for skeptics, (b) with or without metacognition, in the absence of the appropriate reinforcement contingencies, animals will not choose at all.

Keywords: Metacognition, comparative metacognition, uncertainty monitoring, metamemory, quantitative modeling

Jozefowiez, J., Staddon, J. E. R., & Cerutti, D. T. (2009). Reinforcement and Metacognition. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 58-60. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40007

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Focusing the uncertainty about nonhuman metacogntion

by Robert R. Hampton,
Emory University

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It is clear that there is no shortage of uncertainty about metacognition in nonhuman animals. The four papers in this special issue have raised questions about the evidence for metacognition from many perspectives, ranging from concerns about whether existing control procedures unambiguously specify sources of stimulus control, to models that appear to generate metacognitive patterns of performance without explicitly metacognitive components, to critiques of the entire effort on the grounds that there is no mechanism specified for metacognition. The area cannot be criticized for a shortage of critical thinking. Many of the critiques put forward direct attention to aspects of this problem that need more attention, but some of these concerns are more central than others.

Keywords: awareness, cognitive control, confidence, consciousness, declarative,explicit, introspection, memory, memory monitoring, metacognition, metamemory, perception, self-awareness, self-control, self-regulation, uncertainty

Hampton, R. R. (2009). Focusing the uncertainty about nonhuman metacogntion. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 56-57. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40006

Metacognition in animals: Trends and challenges

by Jonathon D. Crystal
University of Georgia

Allison L. Foote,
University of Georgia

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Abstract

There is widespread agreement that metacognition is not demonstrated if alternative explanations account for putative meta cognition data. However, there is less agreement on which studies are protected from alternative explanations. We have argued that existing experiments on uncertainty monitoring can be explained by low-level explanations without assuming metacognition (Crystal & Foote, 2009). The field would benefit from the development of accepted standards for what is required to produce a convincing example of metacognition in animals.

Crystal, J. D., & Foote, A. L. (2009). Metacognition in animals: Trends and challenges. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 54-55. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.1017/S0140525X03000086

Animal Metacognition: Problems and Prospects

by J. David Smith
Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, SUNY Buffalo

Michael J. Beran,
Language Research Center, Georgia State University Duke University

Justin J. Couchman,
Department of Psychology, SUNY Buffalo

Mariana V. C. Coutinho
Department of Psychology, SUNY Buffalo

Joseph B. Boomer
Department of Psychology, SUNY Buffalo

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Abstract

Researchers have begun to evaluate whether nonhuman animals share humans’ capacity for metacognitive monitoring and self-regulation. Using perception, memory, numerical, and foraging paradigms, they have tested apes, capuchins, a dolphin, macaques, pigeons, and rats. However, recent theoretical and formal-modeling work has confirmed that some paradigms allow the criticism that low-level associative mechanisms could create the appearance of uncertainty monitoring in animals. This possibility has become a central issue as researchers reflect on existing phenomena and pause to evaluate the area’s current status. The present authors discuss the associative question and offer our evaluation of the field. Associative mechanisms explain poorly some of the area’s important results. The next phase of research in this area should consolidate the gains achieved by those results and work toward a theoretical understanding of the cognitive and decisional (not associative) capacities that animals show in some of the referent experiments.

Keywords: uncertainty monitorying, metacognition, comparative cognition, decision making

Smith, J. D., Beran, M. J., Couchman, J J., Coutinho, V. C., & Boomer, J. B. (2009). Animal Metacognition: Problems and Prospects. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 40-53. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40004

Metacognition in animals: how do we know that they know?

J. Jozefowiez,
Universidade do Minho

J. E. R. Staddon,
Duke University

D. T. Cerutti,
California State University-East Bay

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Abstract

Research on animal metacognition has typically used choice discriminations whose difficulty can be varied. Animals are given some opportunity to escape the discrimination task by emitting a so-called uncertain response. The usual claim is that an animal possesses metacognition if (a) the probability of picking the uncertain response increases with task difficulty, and (b) animals are more accurate on “free-choice” trials —i.e., trials where the uncertain response was available but was not chosen—than on “forced-choice” trials, where the uncertain response is unavailable. We describe a simple behavioral economic model (BEM), based on familiar learning principles, and thus lacking any metacognition construct, which is able to meet both criteria in most of these tasks. We conclude that rather than designing ever more complex experiments to identify “metacognition,” a necessarily ill-defined concept, knowledge might better be advanced not by further refining behavioral criteria for the concept, but by the development and testing of theoretical models for the clever behavior that many animals show in these experiments.

Keywords: metacognition, comparative metacognition, uncertainty monitorying, metamemory, quantitative modeling

Jozefowiez, J., Staddon, J. E. R., & Cerutti, D.T. (2009). Metacognition in animals: how do we know that they know? Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 29-39. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40003