Cerebral and behavioural asymmetries in animal social recognition

by Orsola Rosa Salva,
University of Trento, Italy

Lucia Regolin,
University of Padova, Italy

Elena Mascalzoni,
University of Padova, Italy

Giorgio Vallortigara,
University of Trento, Italy

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Abstract

Evidence is here summarized that animal species belonging to distant taxa show forms of social recognition, a sophisticated cognitive ability adaptive in most social interactions. The paper then proceeds to review evidence of functional lateralization for this cognitive ability. The main focus of this review is evidence obtained in domestic chickens, the animal model employed in the authors’ laboratories, but we also discuss comparisons with data from species ranging from fishes, amphibians and reptiles, to other birds and mammals. A consistent pattern emerges, pointing toward a right hemisphere dominance, in particular for discrimination of social companions and individual (or familiarity-based) recognition, whereas the left hemisphere could be specialized for “category-based” distinctions (e.g., conspecifics versus heterospecifics). This pattern of results is discussed in relation to a more general specialization and processing styles of the two sides of the brain, with the right hemisphere predisposed for developing a detailed, global and contextual representation of objects, and the left hemisphere predisposed for rapid assignment of a stimulus to a category, for processing releaser stimuli and for control of responses.

Keywords: social recognition, individual recognition, lateralization, comparative studies

Salva, O.R., Regolin, L., Mascalzoni, E., & Vallortigara, G. (2012). Cerebral and behavioural asymmetries in animal social recognition. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 7, 110-138. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2012.70006

Information Seeking in Animals: Metacognition?

by William A. Roberts,
University of Western Ontario

Neil McMillan,
University of Western Ontario

Evanya Musolino,
University of Western Ontario

Mark Cole,
University of Western Ontario

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Abstract

Metacognition refers to humans’ ability to monitor the state of their own learning and to judge the correctness of information retrieved from memory. Inferences about metacognition-like processes in non-human animals have been made from studies in which subjects judge the adequacy of previously presented information and from information seeking studies in which no prior knowledge exists. This article briefly reviews the former type of experiments but focuses on studies of information seeking. A number of studies now indicate that apes and monkeys will look down opaque tubes or under opaque containers to see the location of a hidden reward. They less often make looking responses when other information indicates the location of reward, such as visible baiting, transparent tubes or containers, or logical inference. Studies of information seeking in pigeons, rats, and dogs are reported that indicate they do not readily show the types of looking responses seen in primates. If given a forced choice between stimuli that do and do not yield information about the location of reward, however, these non-primates make the informative choice. It is suggested that the choice of information in these pigeon, rat, and dog experiments may be a form of secondary sign-tracking and thus different from the metacognition-like processes used by primates.

Keywords: comparative cognition, information seeking, metacognition, observing response, sign tracking

Roberts, W. A., McMillan, N., Musolino, E., & Cole, M. (2012). Information Seeking in Animals: Metacognition? Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 7, 85-109. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2012.70005

The Predictably Unpredictable Operant

by Allen Neuringer
Reed College

Greg Jensen
Columbia University

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Abstract

Animals can learn to repeat a response when reinforcement is contingent upon accurate repetitions or to vary when reinforcement is contingent upon variability. In the first case, individual responses can readily be predicted; in the latter, prediction may be difficult or impossible. Particular levels of variability or (un)predictability can be reinforced, including responses that approximate a random model. Variability is an operant dimension of behavior, controlled by reinforcers, much like response force, frequency, location, and topography. As with these others, contingencies of reinforcement and discriminative stimuli exert precise control. Reinforced variability imparts functionality in many situations, such as when individuals learn new responses, attempt to solve problems, or engage in creative work. Perhaps most importantly, reinforced variability helps to explain the voluntary nature of all operant behaviors.

Keywords: operant variability, voluntary, determinism, random, choice

Neuringer, A., & Jensen, G. (2012). The Predictably Unpredictable Operant.Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 7, 55-84. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2012.70004

Optimal and Non-optimal Behavior Across Species

by Edmund Fantino,
University of California

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Abstract

We take a behavioral approach to decision-making and, apply it across species. First we review quantitative theories that provide good accounts of both non-human and human choice, as, for example, in operant analogues to foraging (including the optimal diet model and delay-reduction theory). Second we show that for all species studied, organisms will acquire observing responses, whose only function is to produce stimuli correlated with the schedule of reinforcement in effect. Observing responses are maintained only by “good news”: “no news” is preferred to “bad news”. We then review two areas of decision-making in which human participants (but not necessarily non-humans) tend to make robust errors of judgment or to approach decisions non-optimally. The first area is the sunk-cost effect in which participants persist in a losing course of action, ignoring the currently operative marginal utilities. The second area is base-rate neglect in which participants overweight case cues (such as witness testimony or medical diagnostic tests) and underweight information about the base rates or probabilities of the events in question. In both cases we argue that the poor decisions we make are affected by the misapplication of previously learned rules and strategies that have utility in other situations. These conclusions are strengthened both by the behavioral approach taken and by the data revealed in cross-species comparisons.

Keywords: choice, optimal diet model, delay-reduction theory, observing responses, sunk-cost effect, base-rate neglect

Fantino, E. (2012). Optimal and Non-optimal Behavior Across Species. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 7, 44-54. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2012.70003

Neurophysiological Studies of Learning and Memory in Pigeons

by Michael Colombo
University of Otago

Damian Scarf
University of Otago

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Abstract

The literature on the neural basis of learning and memory is replete with studies using rats and monkey, but hardly any using pigeons. This is odd because so much of what we know about animal behavior comes from studies with pigeons. The unwillingness to use pigeons in neural studies of learning and memory probably stems from two factors, one that the avian brain is seen as radically different from the mammalian brain and as such can contribute little to its understanding, and the other that the behavior of pigeons is not seen as sophisticated as that of mammals, and certainly primates. Studies over the past few decades detailing the remarkable cognitive abilities of pigeons, as well as a newly revised nomenclature for the avian brain, should spark a renewed interest in using pigeons as models to understand the neural basis of learning and memory. Here we review studies on the pigeon’s hippocampus and ‘prefrontal cortex’ and show that they provide information not only on the workings of the avian brain, but also shed light on the operation of the mammalian brain.

Keywords: hippocampus, NCL, avian, memory, single-unit

Colombo, K., & Scarf, D. (2012). Neurophysiological Studies of Learning and Memory in Pigeons. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 7, 23-43. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2012.70002

How to navigate without maps: The power of taxon-like navigation in ants

by Ken Cheng,
Macquarie University

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Abstract

Rodents are said to have two different navigational systems, a map-like locale system and a route-based taxon system consisting of sensorimotor routines such as beaconing and turns at appropriate stimulus conditions (motor routines). Ants on the other hand are not known for map-like navigation, and seem to get by with a repertoire of taxon-like strategies. I review how this repertoire serves ants in making up for the lack of a locale system. Path integration — keeping track of the straight-line distance and direction from the starting point — operates continuously in the background, and can be called upon as necessary, or relied on in habitats in which no useful visual cues are available. Crucial to the power of a taxon-like repertoire is using the full panoramic visual context, both to guide the operation of strategies (context-modulated servomechanisms) and to guide navigation directly. The entire repertoire is backed up by systematic search strategies. I end with some reflections on the power of taxon-like strategies.

Keywords: ant, navigatio, views, vectors, taxon

Cheng, K. (2012). How to navigate without maps: The power of taxon-like navigation in ants. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 7, 1-22. Retrieved from http://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2012.70001