Introduction
From the perspective of many international institutions and development agencies, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have the potential of bridging the inequality gap between the information-rich and the information-poor at both national and global levels if properly adopted. The arguments in support of this proposition were popularized in consultancy papers, feasibility studies, and policy reports such as The World Bank’s 1994 World Development Report on infrastructure for development and the 2006 report, which looks at information and communication for development. The appropriation of ICTs was also proclaimed among the foundational pillars for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were set at the 2000 United Nations (UN) summit in New York City, U.S. However, if there was any lesson learnt from the diffusion and deployment of communication technologies in international development in the last 50 years, the lesson was that the relationship between communication technologies and national development is neither linear nor cumulative.
In the 1960s, the UN assumed that there would be a positive trickledown effect on national development in the global South through technology transfer and governments’ massive investment in communication technologies and mass media. But, as empirical evidences and scholarly research have showed, the trickledown effect did not manifest (e.g., Ojo, 2004; Rogers, 1976). “That lesson was largely forgotten in the 1990s, swallowed in the metaphors of a new economy, a new society, a new world order, and a new human personality born with a dispensation from the past” (Carey, 2005: 446-447). Although situated within the neoliberal agenda that organizes human activities and social change through the institution of markets, the contemporary ICTs for Development (ICT4) agenda is a remix version of the mass media for development agenda of the 1960s and 1970s. The trajectory patterns, missions, and principles underpinning both agendas are similar.
In the 1960s and the 1970s, the emphasis was on “sending radio and TV transmitters, cinema projectors and newspaper printing systems to Africa” and other developing countries of the world (Alhassan, 2004: 97). Now, the new mission (i.e., ICT4D) is the digitization and “computerization” of developing countries, based on the persuasive promotion of computers, mobile phones, and the Internet as essential tools for development under the doctrine of free market economic philosophy (e.g., Alhassan, 2004; Nulens, 2003; Ojo, 2004). The recurring pattern is rooted in what Carey and Quirk (1970) called “rhetoric of the electrical sublime”—a quasi-religious faith in the power of technologies to fix the problem of development. Within this rhetoric of electrical sublime, technologies and international development are abstractly interlinked, without due consideration of the wider contexts of history, politics, economy, culture, and human agency that underpinned challenges of national development practices and governance. In so doing, there is an underlying assumption that the diffusion and deployment of ICTs would naturally “leapfrog” national development.
Grounded within the canon of neo-Gramscian perspectives, this paper discusses the agenda-building roles of international organization in the hegemonic construct and legitimatization of ICT4D as an international development agenda for the 21st century. In this context, the roles of international institutions and state actors in agenda building are interrogated, particularly in the formation of the global intellectual hegemonic bloc on the ICT4D agenda.
ICT4D Agenda as an Ideological Discourse?
The leapfrogging power of ICTs in the international development praxis emerged from the process of determination that is firmly rooted in the ideological terrain (e.g., Carey, 1989; Slack, 1984; 1989; Webster, 1995). Pragmatically, this involves construction of a “new sort of common sense” around ICTs to legitimize available “choices and distinctions” within the terrain of social change and different levels of social formation—political, economic, technological, and ideological (Mattelart, 2003: 2). Althusser (1971) called this dynamic process “interpellation”, which is the way in which the dominant class, institutions, and power structure gets consent for their dominance.
Drawing on semiotic approach, Slack (1984) argues that ICTs are mere “hollow signifiers” that only become meaningful when framed around the social relationship and cultural materialism. Consequently, the ICT4D is a meaningful and powerful discourse because it is:
[P]art of a certain system of signifiers, which are arranged or structured in such a way that they make sense of, define, and render intelligible the world. Thus, a signifier like “information revolution” means in relation to a system of signifiers, and only in relation to that system. It is that system of representation that I am calling ideology.
(Slack, 1984: 248)
Such representation is manifested in individuals, groups, and institutions in their advocacy of a particular worldview through various ideological apparatuses such as media, schools, and policy think tanks. Though, in the Althusserian perspective, “ideology is not a static set of ideas imposed upon the subordinate by the dominant classes, but rather a dynamic process constantly reproduced and reconstituted in practice” (Fiske, 1998: 306). The ideology of the ICT4D agenda is perpetuated through processes of systematic organization and articulation within the cluster of bureaucratic ideological apparatuses of the UN agencies, transnational corporations, and civil societies. The hegemonic ideology does not need a spiritual existence; it only needs a material existence (Hall, 1983). As such, through the production and circulation of antidotes and myths such as “the ability of African farmers to access global market price on their mobile phones for market information”, ICT4D is normalized as a “new” reality in the international development praxis by the international development agencies and intellectual bloc. Also, embedded in this material representation of “new imaginary reality of African farmers” is the rhetoric of leapfrogging and market based ideology of social progress, which underwrote the ICT4D agenda on the epistemological logic of “a new progress social order—economically, morally and politically progressive”—for nation-states (Carey, 1997: 68). In a nutshell, it becomes a system of representations in which all forms of social thinking and relations are imaginary organized (e.g., Hall, 1983; Slack, 1984).
Neo-Gramscian Approach to International Cooperation
and Development Communication
Within the framework of critical international communication studies and political economy, the neo-Gramscian approach is useful in gaining insights into the complexity of international relations and structure of governance. It delves into the dynamic of political persuasion, compromise, and collaboration in the formation of international regime and hegemonic leadership. It problematizes the complexity of relationship between structure and agency, and the “intricate connection between state, capital and social institutions” in the process (Okereke & Bulkely, 2007: 23). As Hall aptly noted, Gramsci’s works generally deal with:
[T]he much-neglected areas of conjunctural analysis, politics, ideology and the state; the character of different types of political regimes; the importance of cultural and national popular questions, and the role of civil society in the shifting balance of relations between different social forces in society.
(Hall, 1996: 415)
Blended with international regime theory, neo-Gramscian conceptual approach provides an analytical lens for a critical evaluation of historical events and global cooperation that transforms ideas such as ICT4D into a dominant social order of an epoch. Among the puzzles for neo-Gramscian approach is the political alliance among state and non-state actors, particularly the international and supranational organizations, in the transnationalization of norms that contributes to the creation of a mechanism of consent or what Hattori (2003) describes as “ethical hegemony of capitalism”. In essence, neo-Gramscian perspective is applied in this paper to provide interpretative nuance to the understanding of the geopolitics of global communication and the ICT4D agenda.
International Regime for ICT4D
Krasner defined international regime as the “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in given areas of international relations” (1983: 1, emphasis added). Regime is aimed at consensual order for a common problem through collaboration and cooperative arrangement. Keohane (1983) made an analytic distinction between an international regime and international agreements. While agreements are ad hoc and often a one-shot arrangement, regimes facilitate structural order, agreements, and cooperation by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for negotiation. Actors in international regime include nation-states, transnational companies, civil society groups, and international organizations.
The interests of powerful actors with more economic, political, and cultural bargaining resources shape the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that are embodied in an international regime (e.g., Krasner, 1991; 2009). The case of Britain’s influence in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in the 19th century is exemplary in this regard (e.g., Hills, 2002; Hugill, 1999). Britain, through its alliance with power blocs such as the U.S. and France, was very influential in the creation and alteration of rules for its geopolitical interests in the international telecommunication. The first regulations that cartelized world submarine cable communications were based on the “British model of state telegraph ownership, with tariffs giving a press discount and the exclusion of ‘leased’ lines” (Hills, 2002: 16). This gave an undue advantage to the British cables and telegraph firms in the international telecommunication for much of the 19th century. According to Thussu, until 1904:
22 of the 25 companies that managed international networks were affiliates of British firms. . . . As a result, the British supremacy over the undersea networks was overwhelming; in 1910, the Empire controlled about half the world total, or 260,000 kilometres.
(Thussu, 2006: 8)
In the contemporary context of ICT4D, the American transnational companies partly dominate the global ICT industry because of the U.S.’s influential roles in the geopolitics of the international trade rules, global governance, and knowledge production.
In 1994, the U.S., by means of its political and ideological leadership in the global hemisphere, used the platform of international institution to call for the development of the global information infrastructures (GII). Delivering the keynote address at the first ITU’s World Telecommunication Development Conference (WTDC) in Buenos Aires in 1994, Albert Gore—the U.S. Vice-President at the time—put the GII on the global agenda. He called on all countries to work together to build the global information infrastructure, which he termed the pillar for the global economy and an inclusive global information society.
At the conference, the U.S. proposed the following core norms and principles, which were abridged versions of its NII, for the GII (e.g., Borgman, 2000; Brown et al., 1995; Raboy, 1999):
- encouraging private sector investment
- promoting open competition
- providing open access to the network for all information providers and users
- creating a flexible regulatory environment that can keep pace with rapid technological and market changes
- ensuring universal service
These U.S. proposed principles and norms became the core parts of the WTDC’s final declaration, which is popularly known as the “Buenos Aires Declaration on Global Telecommunication Development for the 21st Century”. At its February 1995 meeting in Brussels, the G7 leaders endorsed the GII project and its guiding principles by adding the needs for promotion of equal access, content diversity, and international cooperation to the U.S.’s initial proposal (e.g., Borgman, 2000; Raboy, 1999).
Institutionalization of ICT4D Agenda through the Multilateral Frameworks
Through the multilateral institutional space provided by the ITU and later on the G7 nations’ forum, the U.S.1 achieved hegemony by consent in the case of the GII. Its National Information Infrastructure (NII) principles were merged with the GII principles, which have been reproduced in national ICT policy plans and initiatives of several other nations across the world. In the end, the GII initiative simply “traverses a continuum connecting public purposes and private enterprise by mobilizing such concepts as free trade, industrial development, modernization and technological advancement” (Raboy, 1999: 299). In the Gramscian sense, consensual knowledge that emerged from these global and regional forums in the form of communiqué and resolutions were not only causal factors in the formation of hegemonic historic bloc for ICT4D, they also created new common-sense around the notion of technological revolution and global village that appeals to those both within and outside the dominant alliance of social forces.
It is simply more than an imposition of the particular worldview, but rather a facilitation of a structural order around 21st century global development agenda. The 1995 keynote speech of Thabo Mbeki, then vice president of South Africa, at the G-7 meeting on the global information society in Brussels, Belgium, resonated across political capital cities of many African countries and countries in the global hemisphere because it evoked emotional awe and appeal for “Marshall” ICT4D plan in the sub-Saharan African region. In the speech, Mbeki painted a dramatic picture of global digital inequalities between Africa and the rest of the world as well as the problematic issue of digital divide within the geographical boundary of South Africa. He said:
These technological developments once more serve to highlight, emphasize and further enhance the disparities between the developed and the developing countries. All of us present in this room know, for instance, that access to basic telephony is far from being a reality in many parts of the world. More than half of humanity has never made a telephone call. There are more telephone lines in Manhattan than in all of sub-Saharan Africa.
We also see similar disparities within our own country—between the developed and the underdeveloped parts of our society. In the city of Durban, for instance, telephone penetration among white households stands at 75 percent. In contrast, it stands at 2 percent as far as the black households are concerned.
(Mbeki, 1995, emphasis added)
His obtrusive reference such as “Manhattan as having more telephone lines than the whole of sub-Saharan Africa” had more reception and resonance with the global community. Specifically, the fourth paragraph of the speech (cited above) was quoted extensively in global media reports, international conferences, and scholarly works. It became a symbolic reference point on the need to develop global communication infrastructure and integrate Africa into the global digital economy. The more exposure the issue of digital divide in Africa got in the international media and global forums, especially with the degree of particularity in Mbeki’s speech, the easier it became to build an intensified appeal and an urgency for the global ICT4D agenda.
His speech was a statement of collective concern as well as a concerted policy statement that diagnosed the inequalities in access and use of ICTs as a social disease for the global communities. It “scientized (or “medicalized”) the condition and defined it as a social crisis, an ailment to be remedied” (Drori, 2007: 303). In the larger context of consensual hegemonic order for the ICT4D, Mbeki’s speech fostered the intellectual and moral unity for the globalized ICT4D agenda through linkage of collective mutual interest and shared concerns. Given global hegemonic projects such as ICT4D and global information society must consolidate themselves locally within a nodal national setting for take-off, the international agreements, charters, and resolutions are among the conduits and nodes for the persuasion of the national governments to adjust their internal structures for the transformation of these global charters and agreements into national policies and practice. Examples can be seen with the UN’s millennium goals and ICTs, Okinawa Charter, and Digital Opportunities Task force (DOT Force) in which ICTs were structurally framed as the magic multiplier effect for “the poorest of the poor” in the developing countries (e.g., Ogan et al., 2009; Ojo, 2013; Shade, 2003).
Whereas subject normalization was achieved through Christianity and commerce in the colonial era, subject normalization in this context is done through supranational organizations, and development-oriented civil society groups. Within their constituted intellectual and material orbits, they carefully articulate “what exists”, “what is good”, and “what is possible” through the appropriation of ICTs for development to fit in well with common-sense descriptions to stimulate political actions at the national and regional levels (e.g., Cogburn, 2004; Ojo, 2004; Therborn, 1982). They mobilized knowledge, information, and advocacy resources necessary to influence the national policy decisions in the integrated global system (e.g., Cogburn, 2003; Mkandiwire & Soludo, 1999; Stone, 2000). For example, to assist the developing countries in policy formulation and capacity building, The World Bank launched the infoDev program, and The World Bank funded the “Global Development Gateway” database, which targeted the civil society groups, donor foundations, national policy makers, and social entrepreneurs. All of these “Messianic-like” intervention activities inherently authenticated the meta-discourse of development that rationalized the imaginary positivistic relationships between development outcomes and ICT diffusion, particularly in the developing countries (e.g., Murphy & Carmody, 2015; Ojo, 2013).
In a sense, without any coercion, nations are induced for compliance with the top-development priorities, trade agreements, and action plans that function as constitutive of social ontology and governance mechanism in the localization of the global agenda.
This has been a dominant trend in the continent of Africa since 1980s, starting with “policy lending [mechanism] under the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and the increased donor coordination under the Paris and London clubs of creditors” (Soludo & Ogbu, 2004: 119). Consequently, many post-colonial African nation-states have surrendered their national development agenda and policy choices to international development agencies and “ever-changing ideas of international experts” (Mkandiwire & Soludo, 1999: 138). It is one of the subtle consensual ways in which periphery and semi-periphery countries are “inducted” into the modern neoliberal world system.
Granted hegemony is a form of dominance2, it is also a negotiated process that becomes a consensus order within the complex interlinked political, economic, ideological and cultural spaces by allowing a limited concession to the interests of subordinate groups (e.g., Cox, 1983; Gill, 1986; 1993; Gramsci, 1971; Morton, 2007; Okereke & Bulkeley, 2007). This concession, which includes the appropriation of symbols within the consensual order, provides a safety net for the balance of social forces (Egan, 2001). In other words, hegemony is not “the hegemony of a party or of a subject, but a vast ensemble of different operations and interventions that crystallize, however, in a certain configuration (Laclau, 1990: 189-190). The intertwined relationship between consent, political legitimization, and power foster the formation and stability of hegemonic bloc, which articulates and justifies a particular set of interests as general interests (e.g., Cox, 1981; Morton, 2007). Therefore, hegemony is not imposed; but rather it is a negotiated process that occurs within complex interlinked political, economic, ideological, and cultural spaces (e.g., Cox, 1983; Gramsci, 1971; Keohane, 1984; Ojo, 2013).
In view of the symbolic relationship between transnational hegemony and political alliances, the organizational structure for the international institutions, especially those within the UN system, frequently evolves to correspond with dominating ideas and values in the world system order. The transformation of the ITU is illustrative in the context of ICT4D. In early 1990s, the ITU realized that “reforming the standard process alone would not be enough to preserve” its relevance in the global communication and international relations (Drake, 2000: 154-155). This is due to the emergence of new technologies that collapsed the boundaries among television, radio, telephony, railway, satellite, and other means of global communication (e.g., Cowhey & Aronson 1991; Rutkowski, 1991). To maintain its relevance and structural power in the new global information economy and ICT4D agenda, the ITU embraced the neoliberal policy mantra. This strategic change in the policy orientation was also partly motivated by the dramatic change in the distribution of power in the global telecommunications policy that saw “a broad shift in the power from the public to the private sector, with the U.S.-based TNCs (transnational companies) and U.S.-originated ideas and policy discourses leading the way” (Drake, 2000: 154).
The sudden ascendancy of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an influential force in global communication was another motivating factor for the ITU’s strategic rethinking in value and engagement. It needed to become a “bridge between the WTO and the wider telecommunication community” (Tarjanne, 1998). The ITU linked up with civil society groups, development agencies, academic scholars, and other international institutions to provide moral and intellectual leadership for the issue of digital divide in global information society regime, as witnessed in the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva and Tunis in 2003 and 2005, respectively. The summits were the only major UN conferences that actively involved the civil society groups in the collaborative global governance (Raboy, 2004). Based on the summits’ collaborative and multi-stakeholder frameworks, the ITU cemented the hegemonic social structure for ICT4D agenda through the nation-states’ bureaucratic authority, civil society’s consensual legitimacy, and the dominance of neoliberal order in the global economic realm.
Since then, it has further consolidated its structural power in the global ICT4D governance and digital economy with its now yearly worldwide telecommunication forum, “ITU Telecomm World”, that frequently features representatives of civil society organizations, transnational companies, nation-states’ policy makers, business entrepreneurs, technocrats, and academic scholars. In retrospect, through asymmetrical cooperation, WSIS was “communal” forum for the engagement of social forces to legitimatize ICT4D as an important global agenda as well as to reassert the ITU’s structural power in the wider context of digital information economy of the 21st century. The significance of all these is the super-structural constellation of political authority in the orbit of multilateral institutional space that promotes particular model of social intervention, policy frame, and regulation, with the broad goal of market-oriented transnational expansion of network infrastructure, and telecommunication/ICT industries.
Conclusion
In situating the ICT4D agenda in the geopolitical context, this paper highlights the discursive structure and institutional framework that positioned the ICT4D agenda within the geometries of power relations and international development agenda, particularly in view of a growing call for a multi-stakeholder approach to the global governance. As the paper illustrates, ICT4D governance and praxis are byproducts of political cooperation and alliances among the state and non-state actors. In this process, the Bretton Woods institutions, ITU, and other UN agencies have been institutional spaces for assimilation and absorption of various social and political forces that pragmatically construct, what Laclau (1990) called, “a hegemonic centre” where social-economic discourses and logic around ICT4D are articulated—giving rise to the universalization of ICT4D agenda. Overall, the key insight from this analysis is the web of hegemonic structure and power relation in which ICT4D organically evolved as a global agenda in international development and global communication. |
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