The Ploughshares Monitor
June 2000, volume 21, no. 2
An unequivocal landmark: the 2000 Review of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, April 24 - May 20, 2000
By Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.
The 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
(April 24-May 20) took a big step forward through securing from
the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) "an unequivocal undertaking
to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."
For the first time in an NPT setting, nuclear disarmament has been
clearly separated from general and complete disarmament. This achievement
was termed by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), whose negotiating
skills brought it about, "an important landmark on which to
build a nuclear weapons free world." Since the NWS continue
to modernize their nuclear arsenals, the obstacles to nuclear disarmament
remain formidable. But they can no longer be considered overwhelming,
because active work leading to the goal has been politically validated.
The "unequivocal undertaking Y to total nuclear disarmament"
accepted by the NWS puts them in direct contradiction with their
own nuclear deterrence doctrines. NAC has become the central force
leading the abolition movement in challenging the NWS to live up
to their commitment to Article VI of the NPT.
The NPT Final Document B the first to carry a genuine
consensus in 25 years B has strong implications for more effective
UN work in nuclear disarmament and NATO's current review of nuclear
weapons. The conditions are now right for a grand coalition of like-minded
states and the advanced wing of civil society to work together to
press the NWS to B at last B fulfill their commitments to Article
VI of the NPT.
NAC moves; NWS responds
NAC, recognizing that it had strong support, seized
the initiative on the opening day of the Conference. Its Working
Paper, "Nuclear Disarmament," set out in Operative Paragraph
1 the "unequivocable undertaking" demand that became the
leitmotif of the conference:
"The five nuclear-weapon States make an unequivocal
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals and, in the course of the forthcoming review period 2000-2005,
to engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and to take
steps leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties
are committed under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons."
After calling for a speed up in START III negotiations,
NAC called for the "integration" of all five nuclear weapons
states into the process leading to total elimination and urged all
five to take these steps:
a) To adapt their nuclear policies and postures so
as to preclude the use of nuclear weapons;
b) To proceed to the de-alerting, to the removal of
nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles and to the withdrawal of
all nuclear forces from active deployment pending their complete
elimination;
c) To reduce tactical nuclear weapons and to proceed
to their elimination as an integral part of nuclear arms reduction;
d) To demonstrate greater transparency with regard
to their nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories;
e) To further develop the Trilateral Initiative between
the United States, the Russian Federation and the IAEA so as to
include all five Nuclear Weapon States in similar arrangements and
to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from weapons
programs;
f) To apply the principle of irreversibility in all
nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms reduction, and nuclear arms control
measures.
NAC also called for ratification of the CTBT, a fissile
ban treaty, a subsidiary body at the Conference on Disarmament to
"deal with" nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones
in the Middle East and South Asia, legally binding negative security
assurances, and measures to improve safeguards.
Recognizing that the NAC had stolen a march on them,
the NWS, led by France, responded with a joint P5 (the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council) statement which papered over
their differences on NMD and tried to respond to the "unequivocal"
demand:
"We reiterate our unequivocal commitment to the
ultimate goals of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons and
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control."
By using the word "ultimate," and maintaining
their decades-long stand that nuclear disarmament was linked to
general and complete disarmament (a linkage rejected by the International
Court of Justice), the NWS revealed that they saw the NPT Review
as business as usual. They did declare that "none of our nuclear
weapons are targeted at any State," and called for the conclusion
of START III as soon as possible "while preserving and strengthening
the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a
basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.@
The statement was widely viewed as disingenuous, since
nuclear weapons can be re-targeted at a moment=s
notice, and "strengthening" the ABM can mean whatever
you want it to mean. It was surprising that China signed on to the
statement, given its strong criticism of the US NMD program. A few
days later, China issued its own statement, once more stating that
any amendment to the ABM would undermine it. In other moves that
separated it from fellow nuclear powers, China called for a no-first-use
policy, criticized the "hegemonism and power politics"
of NATO, called for an end to Western policies of nuclear-sharing,
and regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had not started
negotiations on legally binding instruments to prevent an arms race
in outer space.
NAC responded directly to the P5 statement, stating
it "falls short of our expectations regarding nuclear disarmament."
NAC stressed that "the total elimination of nuclear weapons
is an obligation and a priority and not an ultimate goal, and even
less a goal that is linked, subject or conditioned to general and
complete disarmament."
The Non-aligned Movement (NAM) joined in the criticism
of the P5 statement, drawing on the language of the NAM Working
Paper, introduced early into the conference, stating that the NWS
"conditionalities" on their obligations to nuclear disarmament
were unacceptable. NAM insisted on its principled positions on nuclear
disarmament, which included adherence to the ICJ unanimous conclusion
that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and
bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament
in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."
The NAM repeated its familiar demand for
"The early commencement of negotiations on a
phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including
a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production,
testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear
weapons and providing for their elimination."
Out of this round of exchanges, two main points emerged.
In pulling themselves together to stave off demands for comprehensive
negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons, the NWS took the NMD
issue off the table, a distinct plus for the US. Also, in their
cohesiveness and moderation, the NAC emerged as the catalytic element
of the conference, eclipsing the NAM. The NWS would have to deal
with the NAC.
NWS negotiates with NAC
Main Committee I, dealing with the Article VI disarmament
issues, became the centre of attention. This committee was headed
by Ambassador Camillo Reyes Rodriguez of Colombia, who had chaired
the Third PrepComm and produced a 61-page final paper which, while
not going as far as the NAM desired, went well beyond what the Western
NWS would accept.
In order to break the logjam on the two thorniest
issues of the conference, nuclear disarmament and the Middle East
situation, the NAM, led by South Africa, had argued at the PrepComms
that subsidiary bodies be established at the review conference on
these two subjects. Baali succeeded in overcoming US resistance
and thus Main Committee I was charged with reviewing the past performance
on Article VI issues while a new Subsidiary Body I, chaired by Ambassador
Clive Pearson of New Zealand, would handle the forward-minded issues
of Article VI.
Pearson convened four meetings and produced a document
that went through several versions. His Chairman=s
Paper was a blend of NWS caution and NAC advances. For example,
Pearson used the NWS formulation of concluding START III while "preserving
and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of Strategic Stability."
But he also used the whole of NAC=s
operative paragraph 1 from their Working Paper.
At first rejecting Pearson=s
paper, the NWS later asked to meet with the NAC and several hours
of negotiations ensued with NAC=s
chief negotiators, Darach MacFhionnbhairr of Ireland, Peter Goosen
of South Africa, and Amb. Antonio de Icaza of Mexico. Here NAC gave
up the elements of Operative Paragraph 1 which would have the NWS
engaging in an accelerated process of negotiations in the forthcoming
NPT review period 2000-2005. Also, NAC agreed to put a number of
NWS action steps under an umbrella heading that said these steps
would be taken "in a way that promotes international stability
and based on the principle of undiminished security for all."
What exactly does that phrase mean? Does it mean that a NWS would
not have to take a step, e.g., the further reduction of non-strategic
nuclear weapons, if it felt that the step would diminish its security?
Only time will tell if the NWS inserted that umbrella to give themselves
an out. NAC agreed with the criticism of some NGOs that too much
dilution had occurred, but stated that it had agreed to compromises
so that the conference would not fail to achieve consensus on NAC=s
principal demand.
Even after protracted NWS-NAC negotiations, it appeared
that Russia and France would not agree to the compromise text. Russia
kept insisting it could not take any disarmament steps that threatened
its "strategic stability." It berated the NAC for holding
"arrogant positions." In the end, Russia acquiesced to
the text. France, insisting that NAC did not have a monopoly on
good will, said it also wanted a positive outcome and accepted the
text. China held out for a further 24 hours to get a no-first-use
clause inserted, but as the conference entered its final day, it
too agreed. Some non-nuclear Western states were chagrined that
they had been excluded from the determining NWS-NAC negotiations,
so a final round of talks was held under Norway=s
chairmanship. When efforts were made to make still more changes,
it was agreed that to open the package would be to lose it.
By holding to a bottom-line position on "total
elimination," NAC obtained a significant advance when the NWS
dropped the word "ultimate" in qualifying nuclear disarmament
and agreed for the first time to de-link nuclear disarmament from
general and complete disarmament. Though giving up a time period
for negotiations, NAC obtained a clear-cut commitment from the NWS
that "systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article
VI" would include:
"An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon
States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals
leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed
under Article VI."
Other practical steps agreed on include:
$
A moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending entry into force
of the CTBT
$
Obtaining a negotiated fissile ban treaty within five years
$
A subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament with a mandate
to deal with nuclear disarmament
$
The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament
$
The conclusion of START III "while preserving and strengthening
the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.@
Under the "undiminished security" umbrella,
these further steps were agreed upon:
$
Further unilateral disarmament
$
Increased transparency by the NWS
$
Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons
$
Concrete measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear
weapons systems
$
A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies
$
The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the NWS in the process
leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
Finally, the forward-minded document also called for
$
All fissile material no longer required for military purposes to
be placed under IAEA or other relevant international verification
$
Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective in the disarmament process
is general and complete disarmament under effective international
control
$
Regular reports on progress of the 1995 Principles and Objectives,
and "recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court
of Justice of 8 July 1996"
$
Further development of verification capabilities.
The euphoria of agreeing on the forward-minded document
gave way to a replay of bickering when delegates returned to the
Main Committee 1 report, reviewing the past five years. Whereas
Chairman Reyes had inserted a sentence in the draft calling attention
to the threat to humanity posed by weapons which remain on high
alert, the US objected to this language and the text was diluted
to express concern at the "continued risk for humanity represented
by the possibility that these nuclear weapons could be used."
Reyes had inserted a section noting Secretary-General Annan=s
proposal for a major international conference that would help to
identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers. Mexico called this
a worthy initiative and Canada recommended that the idea of the
conference be considered at the Millennium Summit in September,
2000. The US allowed this indirect recommendation to go forward.
Again, Reyes had a section noting "the unanimous conclusion
of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion
that there exists an obligation to pursue, in good faith and bring
to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in
all its aspects under strict and effective international control."
The US refused to let this description of the ICJ Opinion go forward,
allowing only a reference to the title of the Advisory Opinion,
"Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons." Malaysia
was aghast that the US would not even agree to descriptive language.
Conclusion: forward from the >landmark=
What conclusions can we draw from the remarkable Sixth
NPT Review? What steps can the informed leaders of civil society
now take to move forward on the long journey to the elimination
of nuclear weapons?
Certainly many NGOs appear unimpressed and if one
can judge early public opinion at the local level from the editorial
in the Edmonton Journal (my home city), some think the NPT
Review amounted to not much more than a rearranging of words. The
writer of this editorial wanted to see a time-bound program for
real nuclear disarmament B
and who can blame the writer? It is not an easy task to mobilize
public opinion by pointing to an "unequivocal undertaking."
The nuances of change, real but cloaked, at the NPT Review will
doubtless be lost on many. Nonetheless, a new moment in nuclear
disarmament has occurred.
First, we must recognize that we now have a momentous
opportunity. The final document is worth far more that a grudging
acknowledgment. True, it does not include the necessary steps of
a no-first-use pledge, de-alerting, or a commitment to legally binding
negative security assurances. It certainly does not have a time-line
for nuclear disarmament or even an explicit commitment to comprehensive
negotiations. But it has something that gives the nuclear weapons
abolition movement the strongest political base it has ever had:
the door to the longstanding NWS doctrine of nuclear deterrence
has cracked open. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is now
accepted by the NWS. If total elimination, not merely reductions,
is lifted off the pages of the final document to become the operative
policy, then nuclear deterrence cannot remain as the permanent justification
for the retention of nuclear weapons. Whether the NWS fully accept
it or not, the principle of "total," not "ultimate,"
elimination is institutionally formalized. When to that is coupled
the "unequivocal undertaking" to accomplish it, the dawning
of a new day is achieved.
For good reason did the NWS stoutly resist the first
NAC resolution at the UN First Committee. They saw it (as the French
Ambassador openly admitted) as an unacceptable challenge to the
underlying doctrine of nuclear deterrence. NAC has always realized
that if the fallacy of the nuclear deterrence doctrine could be
exposed as the immoral, illegal, and militarily unsustainable policy
it is, then the whole framework supporting nuclear weapons could
crumble.
Of course, given the tenacity with which the NWS are
holding onto nuclear weapons as the core of their military doctrine,
it would be totally unrealistic to think that the NWS will immediately
implement that to which they have signed onto. Nothing in their
record over the 30-year history of the NPT could provide any confidence
that they will suddenly honour their obligations. Indeed, the first
signs of resistance emerged a day after the conference ended when
New York Times correspondent Barbara Crossette quoted an
unnamed US official as saying that the agreement did not represent
a significant shift in United States policy. Nonetheless, from this
point forward, the NWS cannot escape the fact that they joined with
the international community in a consensus statement making "an
unequivocal undertaking Y
to total elimination."
Two institutions are immediately affected by this
commitment: the United Nations and NATO.
In recent years, the UN has been somewhat marginalized
in nuclear disarmament work. The Final Document of the First UN
Special Session on Disarmament (the "bible" of disarmament)
has been pushed so far back on governments=
library shelves that it is scarcely referred to any longer. The
UN First Committee annually adopts resolutions, which reflect the
views of the world community, but the UN=s
operating disarmament body, the Conference on Disarmament, has been
virtually paralyzed for the past few years. But the UN is the repository
of global security and its role in disarmament issues is foremost,
the bilateral arrangements of the US and Russia notwithstanding.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (which, as everyone says, is the most
important disarmament treaty in the world) is a UN instrument. Indeed,
the present Under Secretary-General for Disarmament is Jayantha
Dhanapala, who was himself President of the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference.
The time has arrived to restore the UN to paramountcy
in disarmament work. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called
for a major world conference to identify ways to eliminate nuclear
dangers. The active body of NGO specialists in nuclear disarmament
should promote this idea with their governments so that they would
respond affirmatively when this idea is discussed at the UN Millennium
Summit in September, 2000. In fact, NGOs have an opportunity to
advance such a global conference by holding seminars and workshops
around the world, which could be a form of a civil society "PrepComm."
The role of the UN as the gathering place for the growing aspirations
of the worldwide community calling for the total elimination of
nuclear weapons should now be highlighted.
The second institution affected by the NPT Review
is NATO. With the greatest reluctance, and dragging their feet,
the NATO leadership accepted Canada=s
plea that NATO=s nuclear
weapons policies be reviewed. Prior to the NPT Review, practically
no substantive work had been done, and, so hostile is the leadership
of NATO to any change in their policies that they had begun to call
Canada the "nuclear nag." Nevertheless, four days after
the NPT Review ended, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy went
to a NATO ministerial meeting in Florence and bluntly told his colleagues
that they had to stop contradicting themselves on nuclear weapons
policies:
"In the NPT and in the Conference on Disarmament,
we are confronted regularly with the argument that if nuclear weapons
are good for NATO, then they are good for others too. The contradiction
in our declaration policy undermines the credibility of our non-proliferation
and disarmament efforts."
Axworthy called on NATO to make its nuclear policy
"coherent" with the posture adopted at the NPT Review.
He listed a number of penetrating questions NATO must explore:
$
ACan we not be more transparent
about how many nuclear gravity bombs we have left, and where they
are located?@
$
ACan NATO not unilaterally
reduce the number of remaining bombs further, and call for proportional
parallel action by the Russian Federation?@
$
AShould we not prepare
a new comprehensive public statement of the Alliance=s
arms control and disarmament policies that is relevant to today
and tomorrow, rather than for yesterday?@
In the same speech, Axworthy directly challenged the
US on its NMD plans. "A new arms race could be set in motion,"
he said; "one that would undermine the stability that we have
all come to take for granted." He urged the US to take all
the time needed to assess the potential impact on the international
security system.
Axworthy=s
strong message gives heart to all who recognize the impediment that
NATO is to genuine nuclear disarmament. But if his voice is recorded
as lonely and unsupported, NATO will ride out this criticism. To
date, other non-nuclear states within NATO have not been noted for
their bravery in challenging the three Western NWS, their brothers
at the NATO table. The active NGOs in many of these NNWS countries
now have an opportunity to press their governments to demand a change
in NATO=s policies consistent
with the NPT Review final document.
Although not formally an institution, the New Agenda
Coalition has acquired, almost overnight, the status of a powerful
force. The days of the NWS either patronizingly dismissing NAC as
irrelevant or trashing it because of its upstart attitude are over.
The NWS themselves signaled NAC=s
new status in the world community by requesting a meeting with them
to negotiate the final document of the NPT Review.
But what of the future of NAC? Will the heads of government
and foreign ministers of these seven countries remain strongly committed
to their cause B or will
they succumb to the pressure from the Western NWS to stop rocking
the boat. In politics and diplomacy, leaders like to get along with
one another; all sorts of pressures, subtle and otherwise, are used
by the stronger on the less strong. NAC leaders may be bold but
they are not supermen and superwomen. They need an immediate manifestation
of support from civil society, particularly within their own countries
so that they can rebuff the importuning to stop upsetting the NWS.
NAC should proceed with its annual resolution at the
UN, suitably modified to take account of the gains made. But NAC
should not expect instant gains in numbers of supporting votes,
particularly in the fall of 2000 when the NATO Review will not yet
be complete, and NATO countries may hold to their abstention for
the time being. But by planning a long-range strategy, pursued with
relentless determination backed by an increasingly vocal civil society,
NAC can take a commanding lead of the international community on
the way into the 2005 NPT Review.
Finally, it should be obvious that the gains in nuclear
disarmament, modest as they are, would not have occurred without
the push exerted by civil society. Some have taken to saying that
nuclear disarmament is off the radar screen, so let=s
get on with something else. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The abolition of nuclear weapons is at the centre of world politics.
The gathering momentum of world figures in the military, politics,
religion, women=s groups,
and civil society have put it there. The fallacies and dangers of
NWS policies are being exposed. World consciousness is growing.
These conditions make it ripe for a new grand coalition
B of like-minded governments
and the advanced wing of civil society B
to be formed. Such a powerful combination can not only dent but
pierce the NWS self-serving, protective armour. The NWS, by their
actions at the NPT Review, proved they are not impervious to the
organized voices of the world community. The Anti-personnel Landmines
Treaty came about as the result of the "Ottawa Process,"
in which like-minded governments, in this case led by Canada, and
highly knowledgeable, dedicated NGOs formed a working partnership.
The partnership worked because both wanted the same goal B
the elimination of the pernicious evil of landmines. Such a coalition
of mutual interest can work again. True, the relative weight of
the armaments is different. Nuclear weapons, unlike landmines, are
central to the NWS doctrines. But the strength of the world community,
working together and employing all the mechanisms to build public
opinion around the world, can isolate the NWS and move them forward
to take active steps to implement their "unequivocal commitment
Y to total elimination."
The unequivocal landmark represented by the 2000 NPT
Review makes such a worldwide coalition possible.
This article is taken from Senator Roche=s
report. Click here
for the full report.
|