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The Common Erasure of Space and Nature: Communication as a Bridge Between the Discourses of Designed Space and Ecocentred Identity

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Abstract

Space, as a concept of human design, has been given little consideration in the discourses on nature. In this article, I argue that the conceptual erasure of space should be addressed in conjunction with the study of nature's marginalization. I argue that the root cause of the erasure of space and nature is commonly derived from the flaws of western metaphysical construction and, therefore, we are better served by attending to both together rather than in isolation. Using a dialogic model of communicative action, the ecocentred scholar can develop means for addressing the spatial designs that influence and reinforce human misconceptions about the world. The dialogic model, by encouraging openness, compassion, affirmation, and continuity, can be used as a common language for ecocentric philosophers and critics of space and design. In this way, the ecological discourses can bring their influence within the spheres of spatial design and, it is hoped, encourage new ways of considering the human self and its relation to the spatial world.

Introduction

Within the various discourses on nature, much has been said about our cultural tradition of marginalizing or 'othering' nature.T[1] In these discussions it is clearly established that the western notions of humanity and non-humanity generate misguided conceptions of nature as separate and lesser. Additionally, the process of human perception, based on these anthropocentric conceptions of nature, lead to a unique human characteristic: destruction of our own environment. For the Deep Ecology movement, the key element in this critique of western understanding is uncovering and responding to the process of denigrating the nonhuman to that which is beneath human consideration; a process I will refer to as the *erasure* of nature.

Reflection on the connection between the erasure of nature and the similar erasure of *space*, however, has remained largely peripheral in these discussions. Although clear ties have been made, for example, between androcentrism and anthropocentrism by ecofeminists,[2] or between domination of cultures and destruction of environments by the critics of globalization,[3] few have attempted to relate the human tendency to disconnect from both space *and* nature. While 'place' has been discussed by environmental scholars with some regularity, especially in the last few years,[4] I am referring here to 'space' in the context of design (the space we exist within and build around) rather than geography (the place we come from, live in, etc.). Space, as a concept of human design, has been given little consideration in the discourses of nature. In what follows, I will argue that the conceptual erasure of space should be addressed in conjunction with the study of nature's marginalization. I will argue that the root cause of the erasure of space and nature is commonly derived from the flaws of western metaphysical construction and, therefore, we are better served to attend to both together rather than either in isolation.

Our most common conception of space is as a void, the emptiness between things. Contemporary culture constructs space only as absence, which inevitably leads to the perception of spaces as valueless emptiness. When cultural conceptions lead us to perceive something as vacant, there we find the process of *erasure*; space is thus erased in terms of human understanding.

Our designs, naturally, reflect this conception/perception/erasure of space; we design to fill voids, we design toward the elimination of space. Most of us never conceive of space at all. We simply move around within spaces as if they were not there. We move from *thing* to *thing* without any consideration at all of the space between. Our designs

in space reflect this voided perception of space. Since space is erased, designs commonly seek out to fill the absence with positive matter, the human construction of positivity.

A similar observation can be made about the way we perceive nature. We perceive nature as the void between things. In this case, *things* are only those that are human or human constructed; that is, what is not nature. Nature, then, is defined as that which is between human constructions. Nature, like space, is culturally erased when anthropocentric conceptions create human perceptions of nature as the vacancy of humanity and human import.

In this way, we perceive value in nature in the same way we conceive value in space: for its opposition to humanity, its lack. Neil Evernden has gone so far as to define wilderness—unadulterated nature—as "the *absence* of social structure."[5] Sometimes we even confuse the void of space and the otherness of nature. For example, think about nature's wide open spaces and the urban corollary of green space.

In the environmental discourse, the erasure of nature is frequently discussed within the context of the dominant social paradigm.[6] What is not discussed, however, is the common erasure of space within the dominant discussions of nature and the greater set of the social paradigm. The pervasiveness of spatial erasure in society, in fact, is illustrated by the erasure of space in what should be a space-friendly discourse: that of environment. Once it is clear that (1) nature and space are *not* vacuous others, and (2) that there is a common cause of their erasure in society, it becomes evident that there is a benefit to exploring a linked critique in discussions of remedies for natural destruction.

The Conceived Void of Space and Nature

I will mention some of the numerous arguments made for nature's intrinsic value to illustrate how a similar case can be made for space. Of the arguments detailing the othering, erasure, or devaluation of nature, deep ecology is most dutiful to critical evaluation, because it is fundamentally based on the idea of deep questioning, Arne Naess's form of critical exploration. Deep ecology, in the philosophical sense,[7] defines itself (negatively) as the critic of anthropocentric ideologies and (positively) as an ecocentric, or holistically, non-centred means for overcoming human oppressive tendencies.[8] Philosophically, deep ecology's prime critique is of the way our paradigm of rationality and hierarchy forms human identity—how we are taught by our culture to perceive the individual self. In order to realign the human condition with the natural condition, deep ecological thought advocates a wholly

new construction of the self. Centring the argument for an ecocentred alternative on anthropocentric social norm, deep ecologists argue that the root of our erasive tendency towards the natural 'other' is actually based deep within our paradigm of human selfishness and our ideological conception of a wholly separate, individual self. Thus the construction of the human self is central in discussions of why nature is culturally erased and of how to remedy subsequent environmental destruction.

In an interesting parallel argument for the consideration of designed space, the communication scholar Amardo Rodriguez argues that spatial isolation is redefining and reinforcing our identities in ways which promote selfish behaviour. In an article discussing our societal trend towards separation of individuals through *hypersuburban* housing development, Rodriguez not only outlines the environmental degradation caused by expanding suburbs into self-enclosed rural enclaves[9], but also makes the link between spatial separation and psychological separation:

> Our increasing physical separation is making for a new kind of identity and psychology. Identity is being increasingly defined in terms of success . . . our increasing physical fragmentation also demands a psychology that also disconnects us from the suffering of those left behind in ghettos and barrios. Our supposed success must be psychologically legitimized in a system that must also produce losers . . . So the identity of many poor people is increasingly being defined in terms of failure.[10]

The result of spatial separation on our identity is, according to Rodriguez, "a diminished understanding of who and what we are as human beings."[11] Identifications of the roots of spatial erasure and condemnation of societal structure are not unlike the discussions underscoring human self-identification made by deep ecologists.

Freya Mathews' *Ecological Self*, written as a cosmological exploration of dominant and alternative metaphysical archetypes, approaches this identification problem from a deep ecological perspective with great theoretical rigour. Her lengthy investigation of philosophical and scientific tradition articulates the founding framework of the dominant archetype and the historical mechanisms which brought it from intellectual incipience to the cosmological domination of self-definition (as well as the definition of separate others, especially nature). Mathews writes:

> Individualism, or, as I shall call it, substance pluralism, is a metaphysical archetype, an archetypal representation of the basic structure of the world. It

> portrays the world as a set of discrete, logically and ontologically autonomous substances. Its rival is the archetype which represents the world as a single universal substance - substance monism.[12]

The use of substance pluralism, or, acute individualism, has moved from a "metaphysical presupposition" to become the fundamental framework, not only of our self, but also for our science-based processes of rationalizing the otherness of nature. In other words, conceptual othering is the basis for perceptual erasure. The problem with founding our cosmology on a mechanistic system, Mathews points out, is that it constructs nature as wholly devoid of value.

> The insistence on mechanism, along with the emphasis on the primary/secondary quality distinction in the Cartesian philosophy, produces a consistent effect in the portrayal of matter: matter is seen as 'dead'—as inert, passive, homogeneous *stuff* endowed with no inner principle of action. This version of matter receives its definitive expression in Descartes' famous mind/body dualism, a doctrine whose ramifications saturate every aspect of our western culture.[13]

Our "cosmology," Mathews maintains, "furnishes the indispensable context for the social and normative thinking that informs a culture, and even for the individual's own experience of his or her self"'[14] and, thus, the site where identification of nature and self must be contested is within the cosmological use of mechanistic substance pluralism (and acute individualism).[15]

As the assembly of arguments detailing the downfalls of substance pluralism and individualism are intricate and lengthy, I will leave further argumentation to the adept work of such deep ecological scholars as Naess[16] and Mathews,[17] as well as complementary works by Fox,[18] Plumwood,[19] and others.[20] Here, it is sufficient to say that, with a cultural cosmology based on the conceptual premises that the only place for value lies in the human individual, and that all other substance (matter, nature) is *inert, passive, and insignificant*, it is no wonder that our civilization has come to perceive nature as the vacuous absence of (valued) humanity. It is also no wonder that the philosophy of deep ecology concludes that only by rejecting the individualistic cosmology can we reconcile our relations with the non-human "void" that is nature.

We can use this same critique to address the similar (vacuous) perception of space. Just as the atomistic system reduces nature to an inert state of lifelessness, so too does this same system leave the space between things without value. Because the Newtonian perception of the world centres itself on the primacy of matter, our culture has evolved a worldview that also centres itself on solidity, the most easily identifiable form of matter. Here, though, is where science has managed

to fold in upon itself. Since Einstein moved the reality of matter to the relativity of energy, the foundations of material-centred science has been forced to recognize the *space* that is within *things*.

Relativity theory, Quantum physics, and the like, have *re*conceived the world, not as a void where things exist, but as a continuum, a field of unified substance—a single space. This turns our dominant ideology on its head. As Mathews writes:

> Twentieth-century humanity finds itself then, if Einstein's vision is in outline correct, not standing on the brink of an infinite abyss of whirling atoms, but rather eddying in an all-pervasive medium, a medium analogous to a fluid, in which the currents and waves are forces, and the vortices are “matter.” We ourselves are complex ripples propagating in its depths. Substantively speaking, we are identical with the universe: it is into its substance that the pattern that is our signature is written.[21]

So we find the falsity of spatial erasure as well as our mechanism of erasure common for both nature and space. We can no more be individuated from a unified space than we can from an ecologically interdependent nature. Nature, too, is unified in space, and space is interdependent with nature. In the abstract, this may seem an unqualified leap; in fact, this is not the case. The space we design and live and exist within is a medium of interdependence; the soup of energy that pervades the universe is dramatized by the life supporting functions of earth bound space. Whether as breathable air, transporter of mineral, seed and contagion, or as the warm blanket of atmosphere, the space around us not only connects us in the metaphysic but also in the interdependent. In this form, as a medium for earthly life, space is also a form of nature; space is nature’s *thingness*, nature has no prejudices against the interconnected state.

Re-defining Self

Naess, the principle architect of deep ecological philosophy, argues that the primary human purpose is *self-realization*, the process whereby the individual comes to identify with other beings and systems in an ever-expanding development of self. [22] The construction of this extended self (also called the “ecological self” by Naess or the “transpersonal self” by Fox)[23] calls upon the individual to move beyond simple knowing *of* others to personally identify *with* others. Identification with others, including them within the construction of self, places notions of self-preservation in the extended individual, rather than weaker sentiments of sympathy or pity for others used for

justification of natural conservation by anthropocentric environmentalists. As Naess explains:

> The greater our comprehension of our togetherness with other beings, the greater the identification, and the greater care we will take. The road is also opened thereby for delight in the well-being of others and sorrow when harm befalls them. We seek what is best for ourselves, but through the extension of the self, our "own" best is also that of others. [24]

What Naess refers to as the *ecological self,* where the individual self understands and, more importantly, identifies with others, leads the individual to seek the benefit of others as a benefit of self. The realistic advantage to such an approach to self is the alignment with other beings without any sense of hierarchy, power, or divisive difference. The problem in defining a self with extended identification, and this is by no means a small problem, is overcoming our own dominant and pervasive ideology of extreme individualism.

Despite the difficulty of extending human self-identification, there are calls for doing just that, even beyond the discourse of deep ecology. Retuning to Rodriguez, we find that he too looks toward separation and unity in identification as the principal struggle in human existence. Additionally, in a surprisingly monistic approach to identity, Rodriguez uses an argument nearly identical to Naess's.

> This emergent psychology of separation is making for an identity that only perpetuates separation. In reality, we can have no real separation from the plight and misery of others. We are inextricably connected to each others actions (or lack thereof) always affect the condition of others.[25]

Of specific concern to Rodriguez is the rapid growth of the hypersuburb in America. These exclusive developments "carved deep within rural districts," have not only created "a hegemony of private spaces" in our culture, but also create new forms of social fragmentation which "diminishes our humanity by pitting us against each other."[26]

> This trend seriously undermines the quality of our humanity and thereby undercuts the moral development of our society. It does so fostering and legitimizing a deep fear and suspicion of others who appear either racially or economically different to us. Our differences are exaggerated so as to mask our common humanity . . . The result is a diminished understanding of who and what we are as human beings.[27]

Although specifically concerned with human relations, Rodriguez' statements sometimes read almost identically to the discussions outlined above by Mathews and Naess. Rodriguez, like deep ecologists, understands that disunity in human identity is inexorably linked to human dominance, oppression, and destruction. In fact, Rodriguez does

make overtures to the unity of nature in his remarks. It becomes clear, when read from an ecocentred perspective, that Rodriguez' discussion of human separation and spatial design, although routing itself through human-to-human fragmentation, inevitably finds itself in the realm of universal substance monism, a socio-spiritual need for humans to begin identifying themselves beyond the alienated prison of the exclusive self. He writes:

> We are focusing on symptoms to block interrogation of the origins of the many problems that increasingly bedevil the human condition. This kind of politics has serious moral, existential and spiritual consequences and implications it makes for a psychology and sociology that distort our identity as human beings belonging to one race and life world.[28]

Fear, and Designing Perceived Safety through Isolation

Turning now to the discourse of spatial critique, there are, in some studies of space and design in western culture, discoveries which uncover an interesting, albeit ultimately disturbing, tendency for western spaces to direct a cultural desire for personal safety. Weisman's feminist study of space,[29] for example, uncovers the tendency for designs to emphasize the perception of safety at the expense of community, or communicative interaction. Discussing shopping malls, for example, Weisman reveals the enclosed, controlled environment of malls as attempts to secure space at the expense of personal contact and heterogeneity.[30] The irony of these spaces, not only malls but many western designed spaces—including the hypersuburbs discussed above and the gated communities introduced below—is that, in actuality, they are not really offering any greater safety, they are only producing a false *perception* of safety.

Similarly, Blakeley and Snyder's *Fortress America*[31] connects the perceived safety of mall space to the attempt by housing developers, particularly in gated communities, to secure neighbourhood space. The ultimate result, again, is not necessarily a safer space but individual isolation.[32] Whether in the homogeneous spaces of the mall, or in the hyper-separatist domains within the walls of a gated community, western culture, led by American marketing, is trending into deeper spaces of isolation—a lack of meaningful communication in favour of individual *perceptions* of safety. Blakeley and Snyder write:

> Fear comes from a feeling of powerlessness and vulnerability. Gating, as an attempt to exercise control over the environment, lessens that feeling, irrespective of the reality of the threat or the actual effectiveness of the gates.[33]

Of course, because the safety of malls and exclusive housing developments is simply a perceived notion, we must look at the motivation for accepting such a perception, especially when it seemingly leads to personal isolation. It seems, in fact, that isolation is not the dissuasive force we might have thought it should be—it does not seem to lead individuals into seeking contact, but, in fact, to even further separations. It seems that isolation, from a perspective of increasing individualism, might be an end in itself. Individualism, in the extreme form found in western culture, breaks from the natural human needs for community and interpersonal relationship.

Figure 1: Cycle of Western Individualism



If the modernist rationality of the individual is to remain intact—and that is certainly the objective of the modernist hegemony—then there

need to be cultural forces that reinforce the individualist norm. Fear of other has been discussed in many contexts as one (of many) cultural force (including the context of deep ecology).[34] In lieu of a complex discussion of fear in maintaining hegemony, we can at least posit that the trends for perceived safety are a function of the fear created to enforce individualism. Interestingly, the safe spaces we perceive to have made also enforce this individualism through increasing isolation. Ecologically speaking, there is something akin to a positive feedback loop (Figure 1) created by increasing fear through isolation, which increases the spaces, which encourage isolation and, in turn, that isolation increases the fear of other, all of which increase the unnatural extremity of western individualism. As Blakely and Snyder have noted in their examination of gated communities, "in socially isolated environments, social distance leads to stereotyping and misunderstanding, which in turn leads to fear and even greater distance."[35]

As noted above, Blakely and Snyder, through a series of qualitative and quantitative studies, demonstrate that security concerns overarch the accelerating trend toward gated communities, white flight, and suburban sprawl.[36] Exclusionary organizations and the controlled spaces of shopping malls, corporate skyscrapers, and department stores also demonstrate the effects of cultural fear.[37]

Remediating Fear with Ecosophy and Communication

Fear is a negative reaction to and a reinforcing parameter of isolation. Yet fear is not the focus of deep ecological scholars. In an attempt to bring a constructivist approach to the destructive—particularly self-destructive—western cultural paradigm, deep ecological thought seeks to counter the anthropocentric root cause of irrational human behaviour in the development of an alternative self. Fear is a mechanism whereby the dominant paradigm maintains the isolationist self, the extreme individual. Thereby, the westerner is incapable of developing any alternative sense of self. Deep ecology, although not often expressed as such, seeks to counter fear rather than reformulate it. In other words, while some forms of environmentalism promote fear of ecological devastation, deep ecology frequently takes the positivist role of reconstructing a fearless self. Self-realization requires the removal of fear because fear is based in the separation from other.

In addition to ecosophy, inter-individual communication as a process of self-expansion is equally the basis for changing our relationship to fear. Self-realization is necessarily a fearless state, and communication is the creation of courage through interaction with other—the displacement of

fear. As such, communication is an efficient means of addressing human isolation as it seeks expressions of courage and all forms of assurance. In a space then, if we are to foster the conditions where courage and assurance are encouraged, there must not be fear. A space that cultivates the confidence to recognize others as one with the self—the pathway to self-realization—is the only space we should seek. Spaces which cultivate confidence allow for fearful individualists to engage others in communicative acts, thereby reversing the individualist cycle; through an encouraging space, communication leads the individual towards identification with others. The question remains, of course: how do we create a space which cultivates courage and dismisses fear?

To find the answer we need only return to the source of our criticism, the erasure of space. Where there are spaces that seek to deny the existence or importance of space as a medium for existence, we find fear. Because our fears are based on the separation of individuals, that space has become the void of erasure, a void placed between individuals as a means for disconnect. Reciprocally, our designed space not only represents our fear but reinforces it socially. *Our space fulfills our conception of other and regenerates it.*

Where we see space between individuals, we see isolation rather than unity. Private space, personal space, the need for "space" in a relationship, these are all telling of the phenomenon of individualism. Putting space between ourselves has become the identifying symbol of our othering. This is the same with nature; we remain spatially removed from nature as a symbol of our civilization, our difference. The construction of space by humanity has been characterized by the enclosure of humanity from the outside world. The shopping mall, the gated community, and the cubicle are but manifestations of this phenomenon. All of these isolating spaces not only isolate the individual from community, but also from engagement with nonhuman nature. As such, it becomes clear why entering into discussions of spatial erasure should be considered as crucial to the discourses of an ecocentred scholar.

Dialogic Communication, Space, and Nature

Rodriguez links the importance of redefining communication to the redefinition of space and design. While Rodriguez promotes the "evolution of a more constitutive understanding of communication" as a precursor to bringing "space and design within the pantheon of communication and rhetorical theory,"[38] I believe that adapting his approach can also help us introduce the design of space to the

discourses of ecological thought. As noted above, communication can act as a mechanism for counteracting the individualist tendency towards isolation and fear of other. Since we have also identified individualism, isolation, and fear of other as the common oppositions of both deep ecological proponents and critic's of designed space, it is sensible to support attempts to use communication as a common language for combining the discussions of the erasure of space and nature. Rodriguez writes:

> I push forward an emergent understanding of communication that promotes union and communion rather than separation and fragmentation. Such an understanding assumes that our redemption resides in our embeddedness in the world and each other. We help embrace this embeddedness through the promotion of spaces and designs that help foster practices that expand our humanity by making us less afraid of the world and each other.[39]

As a communication scholar, Rodriguez limits his expansion of the self to a common humanity while the ecocentred scholar goes farther in seeking the monistic substance of self unity. This does not preclude his effort's usefulness to the ecocentred scholar. What Rodriguez has done in his attempts to redefine communication and designed space is simply separate out the intra-human unity from the unity of human and nonhuman nature.

As far as the formulation of Rodriguez' expansion of communication theory, he offers an insightful discussion of our current focus on monologue and the more inclusive new communicative ideology of dialogue:

> Monologue undermines the full expression of the human condition by focusing on the suppression of conflict and differences. It is primal in nature and characterized by punishment, fear, suspicion, distrust, deception and apathy . . . We promote monologue through spaces and designs that aim to limit the intensity of communication, mostly through the suppression of conflict and diversity.[40]

Whereas:

> Dialogue stresses negotiation, interpretation, and collaboration. It emphasizes openness, compassion, affirmation, and continuity because only such practices promote negotiation, interpretation, and, ultimately, mutual understanding. Dialogue also assumes that diversity rather than homogeneity is the order of the world.[41]

Citing David Bohm's conception of dialogue, [42] Rodriguez emphasizes the moral implications of a dialogic definition of communication and space. Similarly, we can see that dialogue's assumption of diversity connects for us the ideological common ground between space and

nature. The dialogic approach to communication as a common ground for understanding the erasure of space and nature allows us to take a constructivist approach to entering designed space into the discourse of ecological thought. Dialogue presents the ecological critic with a means of constructing extended self-identity in discussions of space and nature.

Just as Rodriguez seeks to bridge rhetorical theory and designed space through dialogic communication, so too can we use the concept of dialogue to assess the ecological implications of designed spaces. Additionally, as a dialogic process, space and design will necessarily evolve concurrently with ecologic thought. For Rodriguez, designed space influences our communicative understandings and vice versa. There is no reason to doubt the same might be true of our understandings of nature.

> New spaces and designs will promote, among other things, new conceptions of who we are, which will make for new and different ways of perceiving, understanding, and relating to others, and new conceptions about our place in the world and the cosmos. As much as identity is social in nature, it is no doubt ontological in origin. We need to know who we are, and come to partially know so through the organization of our spaces and designs.[43]

Likewise, while deep ecologists seek to reconstruct the human self-identity through the redefinition of western ontological misassumptions, so too can dialogic understandings of spatial design aid in the process of reconstructing the self by displacing the individualist tendency toward fear and isolation. Thus the entry of space and design into discussions of ecological thought can aid in the goal of rejoining the unity of substance with the human self. If the discourse of ecologic thought can promote the types of spaces that dispel fear through dialogue, then the cycle of individualism can be broken. Entering new concepts of design and the corollary construction of new forms of designed space into the cycle of individualism removes the increased need for individual safety, which, in turn, alleviates the tendency for isolation (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Dialogic Space in the Cycle



Conclusions

All of this is, of course, complementary to the ecocentrists' project. New spaces and the discussion of new spaces in the ecologic context promote precisely the forms of transformation sought by deep ecologists and other ecocentred scholars. Reconstructing the individual self through the alleviation of isolation, decreased fear of other, and evolving understanding of the world are all central to the ecocentred

agenda. Thus, we find that considerations of space and design are vital to fully realizing the potential of ecologic discourse.

Using a dialogic model of communicative action, the ecocentred scholar can develop means to address the spatial designs that influence and reinforce human misconceptions about the world. The dialogic model, by encouraging openness, compassion, affirmation, and continuity, can be used as a common language for ecocentric philosophers and critics of space and design. In this way, the ecological discourses can bring their influence within the spheres of spatial design and, it is hoped, encourage new ways of considering the human self and its relation to the spatial world.

It is doubtful whether ecological spaces can ever be designed to transform the cultural disconnect between humans and nonhumans. It is more likely that cultural understanding of universal unity will necessitate the creation of ecological space, in much the same way that modernist disconnect seems to necessitate the columns, high walls, gated communities, giant mall-spaces, and extreme solitude of modern design. Still, shifts in cultural understanding are never so simple as to generate from single sources, no matter how powerful the truth they proclaim may be. Real transformations in human self-definition will require changes in the conditions of our existence on many levels, be they philosophical, political, or spatial.

Nevertheless, discursive reformulation of deep ecological philosophy to include the common erasure of space and nature *can* have an impact on our cultural conceptions. For example, discussion of the need for dialogic communication as a pathway to renouncing our western extreme individualism could begin to impact the worldly realm of architecture and community design in much the same way our previous discussions of deep ecology influenced the realm of environmental activism. We should, after all, view not only the natural world as ecologically interconnected, but our thoughtful and active worlds as well. Such is the legacy of our own deep questioning: not only to develop the individual self, but our Selves in the world—natural and spatial.

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Endnotes

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[1] Berry 1999; Botzler and Armstrong 1998; Callicot 1995; Devall 1988; Devall and Sessions 1985; Drengson 1996; Eckersley 1992; Eckersley 1994; Evernden 1985; Fox 1990; Plumwood 2001; Sessions 1994.

[2] Diamond and Orenstein 1990; Green 1997; Murphy 1995; Plumwood 1997 Spretnak 1993; Spretnak 1990; Warren 2000; Warren and Erkal 1997.

[3] Escobar 1999; Evernden 1989; Hughes 1998; Merchant 1992; Sale 1985; Worster 1994; Zimmerman 1994.

[4] Light and Smith 1997; Smith 1997; Smith 2001; Spretnak 1997.

[5] Evernden 1985, 32, italics in original.

[6] Abram 1995; Abram 1996;. Cantrill and Oravec 1996; Dryzek 1997; Eder 1996; Evernden 1985.

[7] Deep ecology is a broad term. Some have placed themselves under the banner of deep ecology because they seek to actively pursue the political ideology of wilderness protection and natural rights (Devall and Sessions 1985). The philosophical basis for this deep ecology movement, however, is adamantly ungrounded by specific policy implications (Katz, Light, and Rothenberg 2000). The philosophy of deep ecology, via Arne Naess, is about deep questioning and the fulfillment of life (Naess and Rothenberg 1989; Sessions, 1992).. This is the deep ecology I refer to in this discussion.

[8] Drengson 1996; Mathews 1994; Sessions, 1992."

[9] Rodriguez 2001, 9

[10] Ibid., 11

[11] Ibid., 6

[12] Mathews 1991, 8

[13] Ibid., 17

[14] Ibid., 43

[15] Mathews traces the evolution of our cosmological construction of the world and self through the phases of substance pluralism from Newtonian atomism to Cartesian dualistic mechanism and on to the socialization of the system via Locke, Hobbes, etc. (Mathews 1991).

[16] Naess 1998; Naess and Rothenberg 1989.

[17] Mathews 1994; Mathews 1991.

[18] Fox 1990.

[19] Plumwood 2001.

[20] Eckersley 1992; Evernden 1985; Evernden 1989."

[21] Mathews 1991, 91.

[22] Naess 1998; Naess and Rothenberg 1989.

[23] Fox 1990.

[24] Naess and Rothenberg 1989.

[25] Rodriguez 2001, 12."

[26] Ibid., 2.

[27] Ibid., 6.

[28] Ibid., 24.

[29] Weisman 1992.

[30] Ibid., 62

[31] Blakely and Snyder 1997.

[32] Ibid., 98.

[33] Ibid., 108.

[34] Devall and Sessions 1985; Evernden 1989; Merchant 1992; Naess 1997.

[35] Blakely and Snyder 1997, 138.

[36] Blakely and Snyder 1997.

[37] Weisman 1992.

[38] Rodriguez 2003, 7.

[39] Ibid., 6.

[40] Ibid., 10.

[41] Ibid., 14–15.

[42] Bohm 1996; Bohm 1994.

[43] Rodriguez 2003, 21