Royal Canadian Mounted Police
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Canada-United States IBET Threat Assessment 2007

Table of Contents

I. Foreword

This threat assessment is intended to provide an overview of illegal activity with a cross-border nexus, not an overview of the scope of the illegal activity nationally.

It is hoped this threat assessment will provide all IBET partners an accurate representation, based on available information, of the various threats encountered at the Canada/U.S. border.

II. Acknowledgements

This document was jointly prepared by members of the following agencies who comprise the IBET Threat Assessment Working Group:

Canada

  • Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
  • Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

United States

  • U.S. Coast Guard
  • U.S. Customs & Border Protection/Office of the Border Patrol (CBP/BP)
  • U.S. Joint Task Force-North/J2

This document was prepared with contributions from the following IBET regions:

  1. Atlantic
  2. Eastern
  3. Champlain
  4. Valleyfield
  5. Central St. Lawrence Valley
  6. Thousand Islands
  7. Niagara Frontier
  8. Windsor-Detroit
  9. Sault Ste. Marie and Superior (combined submission)
  10. Red River
  11. Prairie
  12. Rocky Mountain
  13. Pacific and Okanagan (combined submission)
  14. Yukon

The dedicated work and effort from all participants is greatly appreciated and contributed to the overall success of this document.

III. Introduction

15 IBET Regions

15 IBET regions

There are fifteen IBETs in twenty-four locations working in the land, air and marine environments between the ports of entry along the Canada/U.S. border. These multi-agency intelligence-led teams augment the integrity and security of the border by identifying, investigating and interdicting individuals and organizations that pose a threat to the security of both nations.

National security is the number one priority of the IBET program, though it should be noted that IBET is not mandated to conduct anti-terrorism investigations.

This is the second Canada/United States Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) Threat Assessment , compiled by IBET partners, concerning the land, air and marine environments of the Canada/U.S. border. This document endeavors to inform IBET partner agencies of threats to those environments.

IV. Key Findings

National Security

  • The sharing of national security information, both inside and outside the IBET domain, remains a difficult and challenging issue.

Organized Crime

  • Organized crime groups and their affiliates involved in the smuggling of narcotics, currency, firearms, contraband tobacco and people are the largest threat encountered at the Canada/U.S. border as they continue to exploit vulnerabilities in geography and enforcement.
  • IBET regions with large cities in or near their areas of responsibility encounter more illegal cross-border activity, predominately at the ports of entry.

Human Smuggling/Illegal Migrants

  • Illegal migrants are intercepted regularly at the Canada/U.S. border from coast to coast and occasionally in remote locations.
  • Human smuggling networks established in large cities close to the Canada/U.S. border often use smaller groups in border areas to assist them. These groups often provide fraudulent documents and exploit border vulnerabilities.
  • Overall interceptions of illegal migrants at the Canada/U.S. border, between the ports of entry , decreased in 2006, due in part to recent successful intelligence-led investigations.

Illicit Drugs

  • Marihuana and ecstasy are smuggled into the U.S. from Canada, while cocaine, tobacco, currency and weapons are smuggled into Canada from the U.S., with more seizures of illegal commodities recorded at ports of entry than between the ports of entry.
  • Overall in 2006, the quantity of marihuana and cocaine seized between the ports of entry decreased, however, the number of marihuana and cocaine seizures increased.
  • Successful investigations, resulting in arrests in British Columbia and Washington State, have curbed helicopter drug-smuggling activity in the Pacific and Okanagan regions, and it appears to have pushed this activity eastward. Sightings of low flying aircraft, suspected of smuggling activity, have been reported in other IBET regions.

Firearms

  • The U.S. is the primary source of firearms smuggled into Canada. CBSA reports that 92% of all firearms seized at land border ports of entry come from the U.S. Most are personal firearms of legitimate U.S. travelers. The number of firearms seized between the ports of entry increased in 2006.

Currency

  • Currency seizures between the ports of entry increased in 2006. At the Canadian ports of entry large amounts are seized, usually from couriers and are most likely the proceeds from illicit drug transactions.

Contraband Cigarettes

  • A number of organized crime groups are responsible for smuggling contraband cigarettes into Canada from the U.S., mainly through First Nations reserves.

Emerging Crime Issues

  • Organized crime is involved in the smuggling and distribution of counterfeit goods. No seizures were reported between the ports of entry, however seizures at the ports of entry are often large.
  • CBSA Border Services Officers seized an increased amount of child and suspected child pornography over the last year.
  • Changes to home prescription drug import regulations in the U.S. may increase the smuggling of prescription drugs from Canada to the U.S.

Marine

  • Threats identified in the marine environment include the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, currency, tobacco, alcohol and people. What is not known about stowaways, absconding crew, passengers on cargo or cruise ships, recreational vessels and ferries are considered potential threats.

Conveyance Modes

  • Smugglers use a variety of transportation methods in the land, marine and air environment at the Canada/U.S. border, depending on border geography and seasonal conditions. Commercial transport trucks, rental vehicles, private vehicles, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, sleds, boats, rafts, railway cars, aircraft, on foot, swimming, and backpacking are the most popular means. Couriers, transport truck drivers, transport companies, and pilots are employed by organized crime groups to smuggle a variety of commodities. They utilize the ports of entry, remote roads, unguarded roads, train tracks, trails and waterways.
  • Smugglers are using progressively more sophisticated concealment methods. Scanners, GPS devices, cell phones/blackberries, caller ID spoofing, camouflage clothing, decoy vehicles and counter surveillance tactics are all used to evade law enforcement at the border.

V. National Security

The IBET’s principal role and priority is guarding the safety and security of citizens on both sides of the Canada/U.S. border. Among the many lessons learned following the tragedy of September 11, 2001 is that no nation is immune to terrorist attacks. With terrorist organizations, foreign and domestic, becoming increasingly sophisticated, an integrated approach to policing is essential. The IBET program serves as a working model of the integrated policing approach and stands as a testament to the fact that Canadian and U.S. law enforcement can work effectively together for the common good.

The U.S. National Security Strategy 1 and Canada’s National Security Policy, 2 both recognize the fact that “terrorism” is not the only threat to national security. The narcotics trade, migrant smuggling, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, money laundering, theft, fraud and extortion, have all been identified as posing a threat to national security.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the U.S. and RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations (NSCI) in Canada have primary responsibility to conduct anti-terrorism investigations. The role filled by the IBETs is that of first responder and assistance when required. In addition to this role, they are also responsible for investigating, interdicting and/or interrupting organized crime, between the ports of entry, which impacts directly on our overall national security.

Although they are not mandated to conduct anti-terrorism investigations, national security is the number one priority of the IBET program. Statistically the vast majority of IBET investigations pertain directly to organized crime activities which have a direct impact on the security of both nations.

VI. Organized Crime and Other Criminality

This section presents the threats from organized crime and criminality at the Canada/U.S. ports of entry and between the ports of entry.

i. Criminal Groups and Organizations

Organized crime groups involved in the smuggling of narcotics, currency, firearms, contraband tobacco and people into Canada and the U.S. exploit vulnerabilities in border demographics, geography and enforcement. They are well equipped, often using counter surveillance tactics, intimidation, and may be armed. These groups include outlaw motorcycle gangs, ethnic based groups, gangs and independent local criminal entrepreneurs strategically situated near the border. Organized crime is the single largest threat encountered at the Canada/U.S. border.  

The greatest concentration of organized crime groups are established in large cities close to the border. Local groups and criminal entrepreneurs in closer proximity act as couriers and arrange transport. The transport trucking industry, companies and drivers, have been used to move large volumes of drugs in both directions, usually marihuana and ecstasy into the U.S., and currency and cocaine back to Canada. In some areas organized crime groups contract out smuggling activity.

The activity of organized crime groups is dynamic. Relationships and networks are established cross-border and over great distances ensuring that supply demands are met in a timely fashion.

Outlaw motorcycle gangs in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Québec are involved in the production, importation and exportation of marihuana, as well as the trafficking of other illicit drugs, the smuggling of currency, and money laundering. Other organized crime groups actively smuggling drugs and currency at the border are linked to these gangs. There are also a number of outlaw motorcycle gangs located in U.S. states bordering Canada.

There has been an increase in the presence of Canadian criminal groups of Asian origin who specialize in indoor marihuana grow operations. They export their product to the U.S. crossing the border by land, air and marine.

Organized crime on reservations that are near or traverse the Canada/U.S. border is of particular concern. The unique geographical situation of the Akwesasne Territory, which borders Ontario, Québec and New York State, poses a challenge to law enforcement. Organized crime groups from major cities in Canada and the U.S. take advantage of this geography to carry out their criminal activities using numerous routes to smuggle contraband tobacco, marihuana, ecstasy, currency, firearms and people.
             
Walpole Island, situated along the Saint Clair River is a reservation situated in Canada in the Windsor/Detroit IBET region. This route is used by several known organized crime groups involved in the smuggling of narcotics and people.

ii. Human Smuggling/Illegal Migrants

Human smuggling is a highly lucrative, transnational crime, presenting low risks to smugglers, but large risks to countries when individuals enter without inspection. Some organized crime groups involved in the smuggling of people often smuggle other commodities as well.

Illegal migrants are intercepted regularly at the Canada/U.S. border. Groups of smuggled migrants are typically small (two to three people), though larger groups are interdicted as well. One human smuggling group who primarily used the two railroad tunnels that run under the Detroit and Saint Clair Rivers in Ontario, smuggled illegal migrants into the U.S. in groups ranging from two to twenty-five.  

Canada is often used as a transit point for those wishing to illegally enter the U.S. It is impossible to accurately determine the magnitude of the problem due to the clandestine nature of the crime. Nonetheless, the border apprehensions which occurred between the ports of entry in 2006 (1,113 Canada to U.S. and 79 U.S. to Canada) offer a partial indication. Apprehensions have decreased since 2005 at certain key IBET locations, such as Windsor/Detroit and Pacific, due to successful intelligence-led investigations. These investigations have also displaced human smuggling activity to other parts of the border. U.S. CBP/BP reported 1,417 apprehensions at the Canada/U.S. border in 2005, compared to 1,113 in 2006.

Human smuggling groups of various ethnic backgrounds are known to cooperate, maximizing each others’ strengths in the illegal trade. On average, groups tend to have fewer members than traditional organized crime groups. They are located mostly in large cities, are well established and use smaller groups in rural, border areas or recruit individuals to assist them.

Smuggling methods range from clandestine entry to the fraudulent use of documents (impostors, improperly-obtained genuine travel documents, counterfeit or altered passports and visas). Some immigration consultants are known to take advantage of the Internet to advertise their services, exploiting legitimate means of immigration (e.g. work and student visas, family reunion) for prospective entrants that do not qualify for these methods of admission.

Illegal migrants also cross the border using marine routes, freight trains and regularly at unguarded roads in the Québec/Vermont border area. As well, ports of entry officials have discovered individuals hidden in transport trucks attempting to enter both Canada and the U.S.

In 2007, CBSA reports that half of Canadian refugee claims are likely to come from nationals of Western Hemisphere countries. Mexico will represent the primary source for the third straight year. Although the irregular movements of Mexicans to Canada and the U.S. are distinct, U.S. southern border controls are resulting in increased numbers of Mexicans looking to move further north to Canada, mostly through airports. Small numbers of Mexicans have been apprehended attempting to illegally enter the U.S. from Canada between the ports of entry.

More migrants are attempting to find a way around the provisions for the Safe Third Country Agreement, arriving in Canada by air, ferry or illegally between the ports of entry in order to enter refugee claims in Canada inland.

iii. Illicit Drugs

Marihuana and ecstasy are the leading illicit drugs smuggled cross-border from Canada to the U.S., with cocaine, currency, tobacco and firearms returning. These commodities generate immense profits for organized crime.

Based on available information and statistics there are more drug seizures at the Canadian ports of entry, than between the ports of entry. Overall in 2006, the total quantity of marihuana seized between the ports of entry decreased, however the number of seizures increased.

Marihuana grow operations have increased over the years and the purchase of property close to the border in several regions by organized crime groups would indicate marihuana farming will continue to prosper. Production in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Québec, and more recently the rise in indoor marihuana grow operations in the U.S. supply the Canadian and U.S. market.

Cocaine transits through the Caribbean, Mexico and the U.S. and is smuggled into Canada primarily through the ports of entry, with smaller seizures between the ports of entry. Sophisticated concealment methods are increasingly used at the ports of entry. The Pacific region notes a marked increase in the quantity being seized. The total quantity of cocaine seized by IBET units between the ports of entry has decreased from 2005, however the number of seizures has increased.

The total quantity of ecstasy seized by IBET units between the ports of entry in 2006 increased from 2005, however there was no change in the number of seizures.

Historically, heroin is very rarely encountered along the Canada/U.S. border. From 1999 to 2006, there were eleven heroin seizures in the Pacific region. According to the RCMP, Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin is the most prevalent form of heroin available within Vancouver, British Columbia. Rarely do RCMP officials encounter black tar heroin. This is in contrast to the U.S., where black tar heroin is the most prevalent.

It is not unusual to discover a variety of illicit drugs smuggled across the border in one shipment, as drug smugglers adapt quickly to current market demands.

Drug-related criminal activity typically emerges on the West Coast and makes its way across the country. The appearance of methamphetamine labs in New Brunswick in early 2006 is a prime example of this. Analysts were predicting its appearance, given previous methamphetamine trends in other regions. The number and quantity of methamphetamine seizures at the border in Canada has remained small, even though methamphetamine has become an increasing problem.

Successful investigations resulting in arrests in British Columbia and Washington State have greatly curbed helicopter drug-smuggling activity in the Pacific region. Smugglers now appear to prefer fixed-wing aircraft. While suspects are using the same remote routes to gain access to the U.S., the landing locations are further inland. Ultra-light and kit aircrafts are also being used.

Sightings of low flying aircraft, suspected of smuggling activity, and the interception of aircraft smuggling illicit drugs have been reported in other IBET regions.

iv. Firearms

Firearms that are smuggled cross-border are mainly coming from the U.S. destined for the Canadian market, with more seizures made at the ports of entry than between the ports of entry.

Individual criminals and members of organized crime drive this illicit firearms market as consumers, and occasionally in random individual sales to other criminals. U.S. associates are making multiple purchases of handguns from licensed dealers in the U.S. A number of these guns have been seized in Canada from persons not legally entitled to possess them. The possession of firearms by drug smugglers is seen in many cross-border instances across IBET regions, from the Yukon to the Atlantic.

CBSA reports that 92% of all firearms seized at the border came from the U.S. at land border crossings, and most were the personal firearms of legitimate U.S. travelers.

The number of firearms seized between the ports of entry increased in 2006.

v. Currency

The smuggling of any commodity is a lucrative business, and the transportation of the proceeds across borders can be problematic. The usual method is to separate the commodity and proceeds. However, there are instances when this is not done, which provide a glimpse into just how much money is being made through the sale of illegal commodities. For example, during a routine traffic stop in August 2006, Pennsylvania State Police seized 20 lbs of high-grade marihuana packed in nine large plastic bags, $1.1 million in cash, two assault-type pistols, 50-caliber ammunition and replacement barrels for assault rifles and pistols after pulling over a pickup truck towing a flatbed trailer on Interstate 81.

Large amounts of money are seized at the border, both at the ports of entry and between the ports of entry, usually from couriers and most likely the proceeds from illicit drug transactions.

Currency seizures between the ports of entry increased in 2006, and this trend is expected to continue.

vi. Contraband Cigarettes

The demand for cheap cigarettes continues to support a contraband tobacco market. The sales contribute to a major underground economy worth billions of dollars. Traditionally seen as a victimless crime, tobacco trafficking is now regarded as a significant source of income for all levels of organized crime.

There are two primary sources of contraband tobacco: First Nations reserves, which have large distribution capabilities; and imports of counterfeit and other illicit tobacco products, which arrive in Canada via marine containers.

A number of organized crime groups are responsible for smuggling cigarettes into Canada from the U.S. for distribution across the country. The cross-border trafficking is most prevalent in the Central St. Lawrence Valley (Cornwall) region. It occurs on a daily basis, and in significant amounts, on the Mohawk Territory of Akwesasne. Organized crime groups are involved in the smuggling of tobacco in this area. These groups are also involved in the smuggling of other commodities – drugs, firearms, currency, alcohol and people.

vii. Emerging Crime Issues/Trends

This section is included to create awareness around issues/trends that emerged or expanded in 2006 at the Canada/U.S. border.

Intellectual Property Rights (Counterfeit Goods)

Copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting are growing international phenomena.   Previously, consumers knowingly purchased counterfeit clothing, video recordings and luxury goods at flea markets, and seizures were small. Currently, counterfeit goods are infiltrating legitimate supply chains, often unbeknownst to major retailers and consumers.

Organized crime is involved in the smuggling and distribution of counterfeit goods. No seizures were reported between the ports of entry, however seizures at the Canadian ports of entry are large and often measured in container loads.

Counterfeit goods are coming to Canada from North and South America, Europe, Asia, Australia and Africa. These goods are diverse (pharmaceuticals, cigarettes, household goods, auto parts, food products, batteries, electrical products, clothing, DVDs).

Child Pornography

CBSA Border Services Officers seized an increased amount of child and suspected child pornography over the last year. Child pornography is a concern at the U.S. ports of entry as well and is generally discovered on personal laptop computers. As perpetrators become educated regarding law enforcement tactics and with new advances in technology, child pornography will become increasingly difficult to detect.

Prescription Drugs

The purchase of cheaper prescriptions by U.S. citizens from “Canadian” pharmacies 3 via the Internet and/or mail order is prohibited.  Canadian government price controls on many brand name prescription drugs are 30 to 80% lower than in the U.S. 4 Since U.S. CBP/OFO officials began intercepting prescription drugs at the border in November 2006, they have seized more than 34,000 packages which did not have U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval. Changes to home prescription drug import regulations in the U.S. may have an impact on the smuggling of prescription drugs.

The abuse of prescription drugs, specifically oxycontin, has been established in the Atlantic IBET region for quite some time. The pills are smuggled from Canada into the U.S., New Brunswick to Maine, mostly through the ports of entry. Organized crime groups already involved in the smuggling of marihuana and ecstasy, and local criminal entrepreneurs, are active in the distribution.

viii. Conveyance Modes

Smugglers use a variety of transportation methods in the land, marine and air environment at the Canada/U.S. border, depending on border demographics, geography and seasonal conditions. Commercial transport trucks, rental vehicles, private vehicles, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, sleds, boats, rafts, railway cars, aircraft, on foot, swimming, and backpacking are the most popular means. Couriers, transport truck drivers, transport companies, and pilots are employed by organized crime groups to smuggle a variety of commodities. They utilize the ports of entry, remote roads, unguarded roads, train tracks, trails and waterways.   

Pacific and Okanagan IBET region report a decrease in land smuggling between the ports of entry by backpacking, all terrain vehicles, and snowmobiles, though there are still groups backpacking marihuana and ecstasy south and cocaine north. One noteworthy incident during the winter of 2006 demonstrates how seasonal conditions can lessen border vulnerabilities. An individual was rescued after spending four days in the North Cascades (Washington State) in winter conditions. He had crossed the border into the U.S. from Canada carrying marihuana in a backpack, but had no food or camping equipment. His GPS device failed and he became disoriented in a whiteout. His message of “HELP” written in the snow was seen by a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter who rescued him. 5

There was also a shift towards air smuggling in the Pacific and Okanagan regions, particularly in the remote forested areas in North Idaho and Northwest Montana. With the completion of one successful investigation in 2006, much of the helicopter drug smuggling activity appeared to have stopped and more fixed wing activity occurred.

The marine environment is particularly susceptible to smuggling activity. Recreational vessels, large vessels, rubber rafts, zodiacs, and even swimming and diving appear to be preferred means of conveyance. Suspect vessels operating without navigational lights at night are also a common occurrence.

Canadian Pacific (CP) Rail Police report smuggling activity taking place on rail cars. Numerous seals, bolt cutters, hacksaws and broken seals have been found, and there have been substantial seizures of marihuana and ecstasy.

The use of fraudulent documents, paying for information on how to cross the border surreptitiously, the use of technology and sophisticated concealed compartments are several smuggling methods encountered by border officials. Concealment methods range from sealed tires, airbag compartments, rear fenders and modified compartments, to drugs and currency concealed on the body, marihuana hidden in wood chips and cocaine hidden in hair products.

Smugglers are using scanners, GPS devices, cell phones/blackberries, camouflage clothing, decoy vehicles and counter surveillance tactics to evade law enforcement. Smugglers are possibly using caller ID spoofing to communicate without being traced. Caller ID spoofing is a service that allows a caller to masquerade as someone else by falsifying the number that appears on the recipient's caller ID display. Just as e-mail spoofing can make it appear that a message came from any email address the sender chooses, caller ID spoofing can make a call appear to come from any phone number the caller wishes .

VII. Marine

The marine environment as it pertains to IBET areas of responsibility, between the ports of entry, includes the Atlantic Ocean between Nova Scotia and Maine, the Pacific Ocean in the British Columbia and Washington State region and the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway system (see map below) and several other marine environments in the Atlantic, Eastern and Red River IBET regions.

Map of Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway

Map of Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway

The marine environment is viewed as particularly vulnerable and porous to smuggling activity due to unique challenges that do not exist in the land environment. There are numerous commercial and recreational vessels operating in the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway and along the East and West Coasts, as well as ferries and cruise ships on both coasts. Threats identified in this environment include the smuggling of narcotics, firearms, currency, tobacco, alcohol and people. What is not known about stowaways, absconding crew, passengers on cargo or cruise ships, recreational vessels and ferries are considered potential threats. Furthermore, in winter other conveyances (snowmobiles, airboats, vehicles, foot traffic) over frozen navigable waters (also known as “ice bridges” or “hard water”) are used to predominately smuggle illicit drugs, currency, tobacco and people.

Unregistered recreational vessels are a particular concern in the IBET marine environment. Due to past registration practices in Canada where files were not kept electronically, the total number of recreational vessels is unknown. However, there are approximately 4.6 million U.S. registered private vessels (small boats) and it is estimated there are approximately 1 million Canadian registered private vessels operating in the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway region. Along the St. Lawrence River there are areas where a smuggler can travel between Canada and the U.S. in just a few seconds. In the Pacific region there are an estimated 100,000 recreational vessels accessing the marine border.

Small residential docks and inland canal systems on the St. Lawrence River are also suspected to be used by organized crime to transport contraband, especially tobacco, and facilitate currency exchange.
   
The boundary between Canada and the U.S. runs on water for 3,830 km/2,380 miles.  Anyone seeking to avoid inspection at a port of entry may choose surreptitious entry through accessible shorelines (which could be considered the marine equivalent to an unguarded road), or one of the many marinas/boat launches in close proximity to the border. On Lake Ontario alone there are many privately owned waterfront properties with residential private docks or commercial marinas.  Both remote areas, which may be subject to little scrutiny, and locations with a high volume of vessels, which could inadvertently provide cover for criminal activity within legitimate traffic, can present risks. 

VIII. Conclusions

IBETs have made tremendous progress since their inception in advancing cross-border cooperation between partner agencies, locally and internationally. The coordination and continued sharing of criminal information and intelligence by IBET partners has led to the ongoing success of IBET and the dismantlement of cross-border crime between the ports of entry on the Canada/U.S. border.

The results of this successful cooperation include the initiating and undertaking of many successful intelligence-led investigations.

Organized crime will continue to be the most prevalent threat encountered in the air, land and marine border environments. It is a common threat to Canadian and U.S. societies, our economies, and our institutions. Investigations to combat cross-border organized crime are a critical contribution to overall national security.

Criminals will continue to exploit the border using increasingly sophisticated concealment methods, technological aids, counter surveillance and intimidation tactics and in some cases carry firearms. Commodity interceptions are expected to continue at a steady rate, with occasional increases and decreases based on the disruption of organized crime groups. A number of successful intelligence-led IBET investigations in 2006 displaced criminal activity to other parts of the border, which neighbouring IBET units identified and countered. Where exactly displacement activity is likely to occur is not easy to predict, however existing IBET partnerships provide the capacity to respond effectively.

1 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America , March 2006, page 47

2 Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy , April 2004, page 7

3 According to a U.S. Food and Drug Administration press release dated December 16, 2005 the majority of drugs promoted as “Canadian” and originating from “Canadian” pharmacies, actually come from 27 countries around the world. A number of products were also found to be counterfeit.

4 Drug Imports from Canada Set to Be Eased, Lara Jakes Jordan, Associated Press Writer - Washington (AP) – September 21, 2006

5 www.komotv.com/news/4832406.html