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1.0
Introduction
2.0 Use of Pandemic
Phases
3.0 Federal Emergency
Response
4.0 The Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome Experience
5.0 Avian and Animal
Influenza
6.0 Key Response
Activities by Pandemic Phase
6.1 Interpandemic
Period
Canadian Phase
1.0
Canadian Phase
1.1
Canadian Phase
2.0
Canadian Phase
2.1
6.2 Pandemic
Alert Period
Canadian Phase
3.0
Canadian Phase
3.1
Canadian Phases
4.0 and 5.0
Canadian Phases
4.1 and 5.1
Canadian Phases
4.2 and 5.2
6.3 Pandemic
Period
Canadian Phase
6.0
Canadian Phases
6.1 and 6.2
6.4 Post-Pandemic
Period
In this Response Section of the Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan (the Plan), activities corresponding to each component (i.e. surveillance, vaccine programs, the use of antivirals, health services, public health measures and communications) are organized in a table format by each Canadian pandemic phase. The tables include the key actions necessary to facilitate a comprehensive and consistent response to pandemic alerts and an influenza pandemic. However, it is recognized that additional details and modifications will need to be added as the pandemic unfolds. For example, it cannot be determined in advance of the appearance of a novel virus when an effective vaccine might be available; therefore, all activities listed under “Vaccine Programs” in the tables may occur at different phases than the ones that are currently listed (in the tables).
The pandemic phases declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) are based on the evaluation of pandemic risk situations, with the declared phase representing the highest global risk. Therefore if there is concurrent circulation of two or more novel influenza viruses, the phase will correspond to the situation presenting the highest risk of pandemic. In April 2005, WHO published new terminology for pandemic phases, which replaced the terminology published in 1999. The new terminology includes six phases spanning three pandemic periods: Interpandemic Period, Pandemic Alert Period and the Pandemic Period. A Post-Pandemic Period has also been identified but it is not linked to a numerical phase.
To succinctly summarize the global situation and the situation in Canada, the Pandemic Influenza Committee (PIC) developed Canadian pandemic phase terminology that combines the WHO phase and an indicator of the highest level of novel influenza activity in Canada. The Canadian pandemic phases are described in the Background Section of the Plan. In general, the nomenclature is the WHO phase followed by a decimal point and then 0, 1 or 2 to indicate absence of cases, single (unlinked) cases, or localized or widespread activity in Canada (e.g. 3.1). This Response Section has been updated since it was first published in February 2004 to include this terminology.
For responders at the time of a pandemic, the focus will be on more localized “triggers” that may or may not correspond to the Canadian pandemic phase because the phase is based on the highest level of novel influenza activity observed in Canada. It is expected that differences in influenza activity within Canada will be described on the basis of surveillance data that is reported similarly to that during the annual influenza season. Planners at all levels in the health and emergency service sectors, from municipal to federal, are encouraged to think about the “phase” under which their specific jurisdictions would fall based on influenza activity within the jurisdictions. This is so they can operationalize an appropriate response for the jurisdiction, recognizing that their plans will also be affected by the epidemiology of the pandemic nationally and globally.
Other unknown factors (e.g. age distribution, severity of the illness caused by the pandemic strain, efficiency of transmission from human to human) will also affect the response measures. The Plan assumes that progression to a pandemic will occur if novel influenza activity occurring during the Pandemic Alert Period is not halted. Therefore the response to novel virus activity during the Pandemic Alert Period may need to be significantly modified from what is outlined in this Plan if the epidemiology (e.g. of a domestic AI outbreak) does not suggest the need for aggressive measures.
Planning at the federal level has resulted in the development of a generic emergency management structure. This structure, which indicates roles and responsibilities of specific groups in response to an emergency, is included in Annex L, Federal Emergency Preparedness and Response System. The specific composition, roles and responsibilities of the Advance Planning Group still need to be determined; however, members that can provide technical advice specific to pandemic influenza will be essential.
Also included in Annex L is a flow diagram that aligns response activities with the phases. This tool provides a visual overview of the response from a federal perspective.
The Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan is a disease-specific plan. It is an example of a specific, technical emergency plan that has been developed as part of much larger initiative to create plans to deal with all types of national emergencies. By creating a set of plans that are increasingly specific, i.e. range from generic emergency response issues to more specific threats (e.g. infectious diseases) and finally to detailed disease-specific threats, it is anticipated that a set of “nested” or linked documents will be available; these nested documents will be comprehensive and flexible enough to cover off any type of national emergency.
Prior to March 2003, when the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) arrived in Canada, the vast majority of health care professionals and certainly the general public had limited personal experience with large outbreaks of serious respiratory infections. The SARS outbreak caused an exponential increase in the knowledge of and experience with this type of health threat. Awareness of SARS, the severity of the illness, method of spread and the implementation of control measures penetrated Canadian society from coast to coast regardless of the actual case count in each province or territory.
Those involved in disease surveillance and pandemic planning saw SARS as a type of "dress-rehearsal" for pandemic influenza. They recognized that many of the response issues would be the same but on a much larger scale. Although the costs due to SARS were high in terms of morbidity and mortality and economic losses, the costs of pandemic influenza have the potential to be much greater. The response to pandemic influenza also would need to be sustained for a longer period of time and would likely include a mass immunization effort on top of the demands of acute care for patients.
The SARS experience reinforced the need for preparedness activities as cited in the Preparedness Section of the Plan. In particular, the need for resources and surge capacity within the health system to deal with public health emergencies is highlighted. Advanced preparation and removal of potential barriers in communication systems, data management technology, and the acquisition and mobilization of supplemental health care workers and settings are just a few of the other needs identified in the Plan and validated by the SARS experience.
It is with this experience behind us that those involved in drafting this Plan have identified the key action items listed in this Response Section.
Outbreaks caused by novel influenza viruses in avian or animal populations present opportunities for transmission to humans. Sporadic human infection with a number of avian (e.g. H5, H7, H9) and swine (e.g. H1N1) influenza subtypes have been documented. In addition, there may be opportunities for reassortment between animal and human influenza viruses when they simultaneously infect the same swine or human host. Such reassortment events may result in the development of a new influenza virus subtype with pandemic potential.
Since 2003, an unprecedented number of avian outbreaks of influenza have been detected worldwide. Human cases, ranging in severity from conjunctivitis to fatal cases, have resulted from these various outbreaks. The WHO global phases now include the occurrence of avian and animal influenza outbreaks and the role of these outbreaks as potential precursors to a pandemic.
As a result of the avian outbreak of H7N3 in British Columbia in 2004, a guideline document was developed by PHAC to provide recommendations for public health authorities and other stakeholders involved in the management of actual and potential human health issues related to domestic avian influenza outbreaks. This document has recently been updated and expanded to include guidance on the management of all AI events with potential human health implications (see Human Health Issues Related to Avian Influenza in Canada, on the PHAC website). Because the actions in the guideline document pertain to the new Canadian Phases 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1, the human health issues document is referenced in the tables in section 6 below. Although the control of animal influenza outbreaks is a key part of preventing the emergence of a human influenza pandemic—and there are critical animal and human health linkages—the responses to the actual animal outbreaks are best addressed in animal health guidelines and plans. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is the lead agency for AI outbreak response and animal health and food safety issues.
The key response actions listed in the following tables are organized by the component of the response to which they relate (Component) and by the phase during which each action should take place (Phase). High-level activities for emergency management and coordination have also been added to the tables. It is assumed that each jurisdiction will refer to the phase that is consistent with their respective levels of novel influenza activity. For example, if the southern part of one province is experiencing localized pandemic activity, the Canadian Phase would be 6.2 (the Canadian Phase always reflects the highest level of activity in the country) and the geographic areas or region with the activity would follow the actions under Phase 6.2. However if no other pandemic activity was occurring in Canada at that time, then the areas with no known cases would take the actions consistent with Phase 6.0 until they started to experience pandemic activity.
As previously discussed, flexibility in the response is needed because the availability of resources (e.g. vaccine, antiviral drugs) may require deviation from the proposed sequence of response actions. It is expected that many of the response actions under each phase will need to occur simultaneously. The action items have not been prioritized within each phase. More detailed actions are provided in many of the technical annexes.
Response actions and messages are organized by pandemic period rather than by Canadian phase in Annex K, Communications; therefore, readers are referred to this annex in each of the phase-specific tables below.
The tables also include Response Level designations (see legend below) that are provided for guidance only. It is likely that many response actions, especially those for which national consistency is desirable, will be led by PIC or collaborative federal, provincial, territorial processes. Other non-governmental responders (e.g. Salvation Army, Red Cross) will be likely involved in the response but have not been specifically identified in the Plan because it is anticipated that their respective roles and activities would be developed in conjunction with public health authorities at the P/T, regional and local level.
Legend for the Canadian Pandemic Phase TablesAcronyms for organizations CATMAT = Committee to Advise on Tropical Medicine and TravelCEPR = Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response CIHR = Canadian Institutes for Health Research CPHLN = Canadian Public Health Laboratory Network HPFB = Health Products and Food Branch NACI = National Advisory Committee on Immunization NML = National Microbiology Laboratory PHAC = Public Health Agency of Canada PWGSC = Public Works and Government Services Canada Abbreviations for response levels F = FederalL = Local P/T = Province/Territory Note: The term "animal" in the tables below is intended to cover both avian and animal species. |
Canadian Phase 1.0 |
No new virus subtypes in humans, animals outside Canada may be infected with a new subtype that is considered low risk for humans | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance | Pandemic Preparedness activities |
|
F,P/T, L |
Information sharing |
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | |
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | ||
Public Health Measures | Public education |
|
F (Lead : PHAC) |
All other components | Pandemic Preparedness activities |
|
|
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
F,P/T, L | |
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F,P/T, L |
Canadian Phase 1.1 | No new virus subtypes in humans, animal(s) inside Canada infected with a new subtype that is considered low risk for humans | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance, Vaccine Programs, Antivirals, Health Services, Public Health Measures, Communications | Veterinary Outbreak Control |
|
F,P/T, L |
Prevention of Human Infection |
|
F,P/T, L | |
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) |
Canadian Phase 2.0 | No new virus subtypes in humans, animals outside Canada infected with a new subtype that has a substantial risk for humans | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance, Vaccine Programs, Antivirals, Health Services, Public Health Measures, Communications | Pandemic preparedness, Information sharing, Public education |
|
F,P/T, L |
|
F,P/T, L | ||
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
F,P/T, L |
Canadian Phase 2.1 | No new virus subtypes in humans, animals inside Canada infected with a new subtype that has a substantial risk for humans | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance, Vaccine Programs, Antivirals, Health Services, Public Health Measures, Communications | Veterinary Outbreak Control |
|
F,P/T, L |
Prevention of Human Infection |
|
F,P/T, L | |
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
F,P/T, L |
Canadian Phase 3.0 | Human infection(s) with a new virus subtype occurring outside Canada - no or at most rare instances of human to human transmission. | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance | Establish and/or heighten existing surveillance systems |
|
F (Lead: PHAC) |
Information sharing |
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: PHAC) | |
Vaccine Programs | Mitigation of potential complications of influenza through use of current vaccine resources |
|
P/T, L |
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | ||
Antivirals | Review of preparedness status and updating of strategy |
|
F,P/T,L |
|
F,P/T F,P/T |
||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
Communication and education |
|
F,P/T,L | |
|
F,P/T,L | ||
Health Services | Evaluation of laboratory
capacity Information gathering |
|
P/T (Lead: CPHLN) |
|
F,P/T,L | ||
Public Health Measures | Information preparation |
|
F,P/T,L |
Communications |
|
||
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | |
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead: PHAC) |
Canadian Phase 3.1 | Sporadic human infection(s) with a new virus subtype occurring inside Canada - no or at most rare instances of human to human transmission. | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance | Monitoring of evolving situation |
|
F (Lead : PHAC), P/T |
Dissemination of data |
|
F (Lead: PHAC) F, P/T |
|
Vaccine Programs | Reduce potential for genetic re-assortment |
|
F, P/T, L |
Inventory and resource assessment |
|
||
Preparation (Legal, Educational etc.) |
|
F, P/T, L | |
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F (Lead: PHAC) |
||
Antivirals | Antiviral strategy |
|
F,P/T (Lead: PHAC) |
Health Services | Rapid case confirmation |
|
P/T (Lead: CPHLN) |
Guideline review and/or revision |
|
P/T (Lead: CPHLN) | |
Preparation (Legal, Educational etc.) |
|
P/T | |
|
P/T | ||
Case and Contact management |
|
F, P/T, L | |
Public Health Measures | Resource assessment and preparation |
|
|
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Communications |
|
||
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F (Lead: NML/CPHLN) |
Canadian Phases 4.0 and 5.0 | Clusters with limited human-to-human transmission occurring outside of Canada, spread is localized, no cases in Canada | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance | Establish and/or Heighten enhanced surveillance systems |
|
F (Lead : PHAC) |
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | ||
Border issues |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) | |
Plan for streamlined data collection |
|
P/T, L | |
Dissemination of data |
|
F, P/T, L | |
Vaccine Programs | Planning for vaccine distribution |
|
F (Lead: PHAC with vaccine manufacturers) |
Mass campaign infrastructure |
|
F,P/T (Lead: PIC) | |
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC/NACI) | ||
Antivirals | Supply of antiviral drugs |
|
F,P/T (Lead: PHAC) |
Planning for antiviral drug distribution and tracking |
|
F,P/T (Lead: PIC) | |
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
P/T,L | ||
Health Services | Prepare for management of suspect cases detected through enhanced surveillance |
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: PHAC) |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Preparation for increased demand on acute care sites |
|
P/T, L | |
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
Public Health Measures | Preparation of educational materials and public health resources |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) |
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Communications |
|
||
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
||
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F,P/T, L | ||
|
F,P/T, L |
Canadian Phases 4.1 and 5.1 | Sporadic infection(s) with virus that has demonstrated limited human-to-human transmission detected in Canada. No clusters identified in Canada but clusters have occurred outside of Canada | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance | Prompt identification of any secondary cases Collect,compile and distribute epidemiological data for cases reported in Canada |
|
F,P/T, L |
|
F. P/T, L (Lead: CIHR or other NGO) | ||
Vaccine Programs | Vaccine development |
|
F (Lead: PHAC HPFB, manufacturers) |
Preparation for mass immunization clinics |
|
P/T, L | |
Implementation of targeted immunization clinics |
|
||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead: PWGSC) | ||
Antivirals | Localized use of antivirals (treatment and prophylaxis of contacts) for containment purposes |
|
P/T, L |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Health Services | Use of optimal infection control practices to prevent spread |
|
|
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) | ||
Public Health Measures | Resource and risk assessment |
|
P/T,L |
|
P/T,L | ||
Case and Contact management |
|
P/T,L | |
Advance planning |
|
P/T,L | |
|
P/T,L | ||
Communications |
|
||
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
F,P/T,L | |
|
F,P/T,L |
Canadian Phases 4.2 and 5.2 | Localized cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission occurring in Canada but spread is localized, suggesting that the virus is not yet well adapted to humans or fully transmissible | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance | Timely collection, compilation and dissemination of epidemiological and clinical data |
|
F (Lead: PIC) |
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: CIHR or other NGOs) | ||
Vaccine Programs | Vaccine development |
|
F (Lead: PHAC HPFB, manufacturers) |
Preparation for mass immunization clinics |
|
F,P/T (Lead: PIC) | |
|
P/T, L | ||
Implementation of targeted immunization clinics |
|
||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead: PWGSC) | ||
Antivirals | Localized use of antivirals (treatment and prophylaxis of contacts) for containment purposes |
|
|
|
P/T,L | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
Health Services | Use of optimal infection control practices Management of increased demand on health care system |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) |
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
Public Health Measures | Outbreak control and containment |
|
F, P/T, L |
|
F, P/T | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Communications |
|
||
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
Canadian Phase 6.0 | Outside Canada, increased and sustained transmission in the general population has been observed (i.e., pandemic activity). No cases have been identified in Canada | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance | Timely collection, compilation and dissemination of epidemiological and clinical data |
|
F (Lead: PHAC) |
|
F (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F. P/T, L (Lead: CIHR or other NGO) | ||
Vaccine Programs | Vaccine development |
|
F (Lead: PHAC HPFB, manufacturers) |
Preparation/Implement ation of mass immunization clinics |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | |
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
|||
|
|||
|
F,P/T (Lead: PWGSC) | ||
|
P/T,L | ||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead: PWGSC) | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Antivirals | Strategic and controlled use of antivirals |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) |
Health Services | Use of optimal infection
control practices Preparation for increased demand on health care system |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) |
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
Public Health Measures | Preparation of implementation of public health response |
|
|
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Communications |
|
||
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
Canadian Phases 6.1 and 6.2 | Pandemic virus detected in Canada (Phase 6.1 – single case(s) occurring, Phase 6.2 – localized or widespread activity occurring) | ||
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance | Timely collection, compilation and dissemination of epidemiological and clinical data |
|
F, P/T, L |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: possibly PHAC, PIC and/or CIHR) | ||
Monitoring the progress of pandemic |
|
||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: PIC) | ||
Vaccine Programs | Vaccine development |
|
F (Lead: PHAC HPFB, manufacturers) |
Preparation/Implement ation of mass immunization clinics |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | |
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
|||
|
F,P/T (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
P/T,L | ||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead: PWGSC) | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Antivirals | Strategic and controlled use of antivirals |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) |
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: HPFB) | ||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: NML) | ||
Health Services | Management of increased demand on health care system | Mostly Phase 6.2 actions: |
|
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L (Lead: PHAC) | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
Public Health Measures | Implementation of public health response |
|
F, P/T, L |
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
Communications |
|
||
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
||
|
F | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F | ||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
|||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F (Lead : PHAC) | ||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
F,P/T,L | ||
|
F,P/T,L |
The following actions that pertain to the Post-Pandemic Period have been retained in this section of the Plan pending completion of the Recovery Section (anticipated for next edition of the Plan).
Component | Focus | Actions | Response Level |
Surveillance | Review, evaluation and return to routine operations |
|
F, P/T, L |
|
F, P/T | ||
|
F, P/T | ||
Vaccine Programs | Review, evaluation, resumption of routine programs |
If vaccine was available and administered in earlier phase(s) |
F, P/T (Lead: PIC / NACI) |
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC / NACI) | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
Antivirals | Review and evaluation |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PHAC) |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | ||
|
F (Lead: NML) | ||
|
F (Lead: HPFB) | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | ||
Health Services | Review, evaluation, return to routine operations |
|
P/T, L |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Public Health Measures | Review, evaluation, resumption of routine programs |
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) |
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T (Lead: PIC) | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
Communications |
|
||
Emergency Management and Coordination |
|
F, P/T, L | |
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L | ||
|
F, P/T, L |
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