A-442-02
A-443-02
2003 FCA 138
Pfizer Canada Inc. (Appellant)
v.
Attorney General of Canada (Respondent)
and
The Canadian Drug Manufacturers' Association
(Intervener)
A-443-02
Schering Canada Inc. (Appellant)
v.
Attorney General of Canada (Respondent)
and
The Canadian Drug Manufacturers' Association
(Intervener)
Indexed as: Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General) (C.A.)
Court of Appeal, Strayer, Nadon and Pelletier JJ.A.--
Toronto, January 29; Ottawa, March 14, 2003.
Patents
-- Patented medicines -- Health Minister refusing to list
patents under NOC Regulations, s. 4 as Canadian patent
applications not preceding date of NOC submissions --
American equivalent patents already applied for -- Meaning of
"filing date" in s. 4(4) -- F.C.T.D. Judge holding meaning
Canadian patent application filing date -- Whether ambiguity
due to minor discrepancy in English, French versions --
Appeals dismissed by F.C.A. -- International instruments not
prohibiting interpretation of s. 4(4) in Patent Act context
-- Patent Act not legislation implementing international
agreements -- No necessity for reference to international law
where legislation clear -- Requirement to file patent
application prior to NOC submission not discriminating on
nationality basis -- NOC Regulations extra administrative
process for public health protection -- Special remedies not
detracting from priority regarding Canadian patent
applications -- Requirement to apply for Canadian patent
before recourse to remedies under Regulations not
inconsistent with Paris Convention.
Construction of Statutes
-- Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations --
Meaning of term "filing date" in s. 4(4) -- F.C.A. affirming
F.C.T.D. decision term meaning Canadian patent application
filing date -- Minor discrepancy in wording of English,
French versions but case not turning on use of definite,
indefinite article -- Appellants citing international
instruments, arguing prohibit interpretation of s. 4(4) in
Patent Act context -- Presumption Parliament not intending to
legislate contrary to international treaties but inapplicable
where legislation clear -- NOC Regulations not adopted to
implement treaty -- Not discriminating on nationality
basis.
These were three appeals from an order of Blanchard J.
denying applications for judicial review of the Minister's
refusal to list certain patents pursuant to Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, section 4.
Subsection 4(4) permits submission of a patent list after a
patent is issued on the basis of an application that has a
filing date that precedes the date of filing of a submission
of a notice of compliance. In each case, listing was refused
because the filing date of the applications for Canadian
patents did not precede the filing date of NOC submissions.
In each case, an American equivalent patent had previously
been applied for. Appellants' argument, before both Blanchard
J. and this Court, was that the term "filing date" in
Regulations, subsection 4(4) is not confined to the date an
application is filed for a Canadian patent but instead means
the "priority date" of a Canadian patent based on, in these
cases, the date of filing patent applications in the U.S.A.
which, in each case, preceded the date of filing submissions
for notices of compliance.
Having reviewed the Minister's decision according to the
standard of correctness, the issue being one of law, the
Trial Division Judge concluded that the words "a filing
date", read in context and in their grammatical and ordinary
sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act and
Parliamentary intent, was exhaustive, referring only to the
Canadian patent application filing date. The Judge did
consider the argument of ambiguity in the Regulation, since
the English version speaks of "a filing date" while
the French refers to "la date de
dépôt" but indicated that the case did not
turn on use of a definite or indefinite article.
Held, the appeals should be dismissed.
There were two essential issues upon this appeal: (1) does
the reference to "a filing date" in subsection 4(4) include a
priority date based on an earlier foreign filing, or is the
provision at least ambiguous; (2) should international
conventions be resorted to and, if so, are they
determinative?
Read as a whole, it is clear that section 4 deals with a
patent list confined to Canadian patents. It is obvious that
all the references to a "patent" are to the same patent and,
given that only a Canadian patent can appear on the list, the
references must be to an application for, and issuance of, a
Canadian patent. While it is true that there are provisions
in the Patent Act in which the term "filing date"
includes a foreign filing, it is clear from the context that
a previous foreign filing was referred to. It was unnecessary
to consider the difference in the two official language
versions since, in the legislative context, the meaning is
the same.
Appellants, however, pointed to three international
instruments: Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) which, it
was argued, prohibit the respondent's interpretation of
subsection 4(4) in the context of the Patent Act.
NAFTA does provide that any "federal law that implements a
provision of the Agreement or fulfils an obligation of the
Government of Canada under the Agreement shall be interpreted
in a manner consistent with the Agreement" but that leaves
open the question as to what laws implement a NAFTA
obligation. While section 19.3 of the Patent Act does
authorize the Governor in Council to make regulations to
implement NAFTA, Article 1720, that Article, not here
invoked, appears to involve only transitional provisions.
This also suggests that the Governor in Council was not given
a general mandate to implement NAFTA by regulations and
further casts doubt on appellants' submission that subsection
4(4) must be interpreted as legislation implementing NAFTA.
Parliament is presumed not to intend to legislate contrary to
international treaties. But this is a mere presumption and,
where the legislation is clear, there is no necessity for
reference to international law.
Appellants cited National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada
(Import Tribunal) as authority for the proposition that
international treaties are always a proper aid in the
interpretation of domestic legislation. But that Supreme
Court of Canada decision could be distinguished as one
involving the interpretation of the Special Import
Measures Act which was intended to implement the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The
Regulations at issue herein were not adopted to implement an
international agreement. Even if any of the international
instruments relied upon by appellants were to be taken into
account, none would dictate the result suggested by
appellants. The requirement to file a patent application in
Canada prior to making an NOC submission does not
discriminate on the basis of nationality as it applies
equally to Canadian originators and those from foreign
countries. Indeed, all of the appellants are Canadian
companies. While Article 4B of the Paris Convention provides
that one filing a patent application in a member country
enjoys a right of priority based upon the date of original
filing, subsection 4(4) of the Regulations in no way
invalidates a patent first filed in another Union member
where that patent is invoked for purposes of priority in
filing for a Canadian patent. The Regulations provide an
extra administrative process connected with public health
protection. On the one hand, they assist the development and
preparation for marketing of generic drugs while, on the
other hand, protecting patentees who can prevent, for 24
months, the issuance to a generic manufacturer of an NOC just
by applying for prohibition. These special remedies in no way
detract from the priority to which Convention member patents
are entitled in Canada with respect to Canadian patent
applications. Appellants were at liberty to file patent
applications in Canada prior to filing their NOC submissions
but failed to do so. There is nothing inconsistent with the
Paris Convention in requiring the holder of a Convention
patent to apply for the same patent in Canada prior to taking
advantage of the additional enforcement rights under the
Regulations just as has to be done to be able to exercise
enforcement rights under the Patent Act generally.
statutes and regulations judicially
considered
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, Arts. 2,
3, 4.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
October 30, 1947, [1948] Can. T.S. No. 31. |
North American Free Trade Agreement Between the
Government of Canada, the Government of the United
Mexican States and the Government of the United States
of America, December 17, 1992, [1994] Can. T.S. No.
2, Arts. 1701, 1702. |
North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, S.C. 1993, c. 44, s. 3. |
Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as revised at
Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2,
1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on
June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, Arts. 2,
4B. |
Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, ss. 2
"claim date" (as enacted by S.C. 1993, c. 15, s. 26),
10(1) (as am. idem, s. 28), 19.3 (as enacted by
S.C. 1993, c. 44, s. 191), 28.1 (as enacted by S.C.
1993, c. 15, s. 33), 28.4 (as enacted
idem). |
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations, SOR/93-133, s. 4 (as am. by
SOR/98-166, s. 3). |
Special Import Measures Act, S.C. 1984, c.
25. |
cases judicially considered
distinguished:
National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import
Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324; (1990), 74 D.L.R. (4th)
449; 45 Admin. L.R. 161; 114 N.R. 81.
referred to:
Daniels v. White and The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 517;
Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 216
D.L.R. (4th) 513; 167 C.C.C. (3d) 51; 22 C.P.C. (5th) 207;
292 N.R. 250; 164 O.A.C. 354 (S.C.C.); Pushpanathan v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998]
1 S.C.R. 982; (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193; 11 Admin. L.R.
(3d) 1; 43 Imm. L.R. (2d) 117; 226 N.R. 201.
authors cited
Brownlie, Ian. Principles of Public International
Law, 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
APPEALS from the order of a Trial Division Judge ([2003 1
F.C. 423; (2002), 20 C.P.R. (4th) 193; 221 F.T.R. 130)
denying applications for judicial review of the refusal by
the Minister of Health to list certain Canadian patents on
patent lists under Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations section 4. Appeals dismissed.
appearances:
Anthony G. Creber and François
Grenier for appellants.
F. B. Woyiwada for respondent.
Edward J. B. Hore for intervener.
solicitors of record:
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP, Ottawa, for
appellants.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
Hazzard & Hore, Toronto, for intervener.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in
English by
[1]Strayer J.A.: These three appeals were heard at the
same time. They are from the same order of Blanchard J.
[[2003] 1 F.C. 423 (T.D.)] dismissing applications for
judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Health
refusing to list certain Canadian patents on the patent lists
pursuant to section 4 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133 (as amended by
SOR/98-166, s. 3) (the Regulations).
[2]In each of these cases the sequence of relevant events
was as follows.
1. Filing of a U.S. patent application for a drug.
2. Filing in Canada, of a submission for that drug in
order to obtain a notice of compliance (NOC).
3. Filing in Canada of a patent application in respect of
the same drug.
4. Issue in Canada of an NOC in respect of the drug.
5. Issue of the Canadian patent.
6. Submission to the Minister of National Health and
Welfare of the Canadian patent within 30 days of its issue
for addition to a patent list under subsection 4(1) of the
Regulations.
[3]In each case the Minister refused to list the Canadian
patents because the filing date of the applications for those
Canadian patents did not precede the filing date for
submissions for NOCs.
[4](It is not explained in the material who applied for
the U.S. patents nor the relationship of those applicants to
the Canadian appellants in these appeals. Nothing appears to
turn on this detail.)
[5]Section 4 of the Regulations provides in part as
follows:
4. (1) A person who files or has filed a submission
for, or has been issued, a notice of compliance in respect of
a drug that contains a medicine may submit to the Minister a
patent list certified in accordance with subsection (7) in
respect of the drug.
(2) A patent list submitted in respect of a drug must
. . .
(b) set out any Canadian patent that is owned by
the person . . . that contains a claim for the
medicine itself or a claim for the use of the medicine and
that the person wishes to have included on the register;
. . .
(4) A first person may, after the date of filing of a
submission for a notice of compliance and within 30 days
after the issuance of a patent that was issued on the basis
of an application that has a filing date that precedes the
date of filing of the submission, submit a patent list,
or an amendment to an existing patent list, that includes the
information referred to in subsection (2). [Emphasis
added.]
[6]The Minister takes the position that, pursuant to
subsection 4(4), he can only list a Canadian patent where an
application was made for such patent prior to the filing of a
submission for an NOC. In all of these cases there had been
an application for a U.S. equivalent patent prior to the
filing of a submission, but in each case the application for
the Canadian patent was not made until after the filing of
NOC submissions.
[7]The appellants all sought judicial review of the
Minister's refusals. In one set of reasons and identical
orders the applications judge, Blanchard J., dismissed these
applications.
[8]The argument which the appellants made before the
Applications Judge and made in this Court is that the term
"filing date" in subsection 4(4) of the Regulations is not
confined to the date an application is filed for a Canadian
patent but instead means the "priority date" of a Canadian
patent based on as, in these cases, the date of filing
applications in the U.S. for patents which in each case
preceded the date of filing submissions under the Regulations
for notices of compliance.
[9]The Applications Judge, correctly in my view, held that
the standard of review of the Minister's decision was
correctness, the issue being a question of law.
[10]His main conclusion was as follows, at paragraph
51:
I therefore conclude that the words "a filing date", read
in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary
sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act and the
intention of Parliament, should be interpreted to be
exhaustive and refer solely to the filing date for an
application for patent in Canada.
He did consider the argument that there was ambiguity in
subsection 4(4) of the Regulations because the English
version refers to "a filing date"[emphasis added]
preceding the drug submission while the French version speaks
of "la date de dépôt"
[emphasis added] of the application. He concluded that the
French version was narrower and must be taken to refer to
"the" filing date which in context must be confined to one
possible date, the date of filing of an application for a
Canadian patent. He chose this meaning as the one common to
both versions, being the narrower meaning. However, he also
said (at paragraph 43) that determination of the main issue
would not turn simply on the use of a definite or indefinite
article: "it is a factor to be considered". He then went on
to find that looking at the Patent Act [R.S.C., 1985,
c. P-4] and Regulations as a whole, the meaning of "an
application date" was clear and unambiguous, referring only
to the application filed in Canada for a Canadian patent. In
the light of this conclusion he found that he did not have to
resort to international conventions as aids to
interpretation, as urged to do by the appellants. He
observed, however, that he could find no conflict between his
interpretation of subsection 4(4) and the international
instruments relied on by them.
[11]The appellants argued before us that the Applications
Judge was in error on all of these conclusions.
Issues
[12]I believe the essential issues are:
(1) Does the reference to
"a filing date" in subsection 4(4) of the Regulations
include a priority date based on an earlier foreign
filing, or is the provision at least ambiguous? |
(2) Should international
conventions be resorted to in order to determine the
meaning of "a filing date", and if so are they
determinative? |
Analysis
(1) Intrinsic meaning of "a filing date" in subsection
4(4)
[13]I am satisfied, like the Applications Judge, that the
meaning of "a filing date" in subsection 4(4) is amply clear
and that it refers to the filing date of an application for a
Canadian patent.
[14]If one reads section 4 (supra) as a whole it is
clear that it deals with a patent list confined to Canadian
patents. Paragraph 4(2)(b) makes it clear that only
Canadian patents may be included. Subsection 4(4) provides
that the patentee may
4. (1) . . .
(4) . . . within 30 days after the issuance of a
patent that was issued on the basis of an application
that has a filing date that precedes the date of filing of
the submission, submit a patent list . . .
[Emphasis added.]
It is obvious that all of these references to a "patent"
are to the same patent and, as we know that only a Canadian
patent can be on such a list, they must refer to the
application for, and issuance of, a Canadian patent.
[15]The appellants argue that there are other uses of
"filing date" in the Patent Act where the term
includes a foreign filing. They cite subsections 28.4(2) [as
enacted by S.C. 1993, c. 15, s. 33] , 28.4(4) [as enacted
idem], paragraph 28.1(1)(b) [as enacted
idem], and subsection 10(1) [as am. idem, s.
28]. Suffice it to say that in the first three provisions it
is clear from the context of these provisions that a previous
foreign filing is being referred to. I do not understand the
reference in their factums to subsection 10(1) which is said
to use the term "filing date" twice. I cannot find the phrase
in that subsection.
[16]On the other hand, the term "claim date" [as enacted
idem, s.26] is defined as follows:
2. . . .
"claim date" means the date of a claim in an application
for a patent in Canada, as determined in accordance with
section.
Section 28.1 provides that the date of a claim in a
Canadian application is the filing date of that application
unless the applicant asserts priority of its claim on the
basis of previously filed applications in Canada or abroad in
respect of the same subject-matter. This further confirms the
view that where the term "filing date" is used alone without
qualification it refers to the date of filing an application
in Canada.
[17]I find it unnecessary to consider the difference in
language between the two official language versions. I
believe the meaning is the same in both because of the
context of the Regulations and Act.
[18]For these reasons I am satisfied the meaning of
"filing date" in subsection 4(4) is clear and unambiguous and
is confined to the filing of an application in Canada in
conformity with the Patent Act.
(2) Must international conventions
nevertheless be consulted and given effect?
[19]The appellants resort to three international
instruments which, they say, prohibit this interpretation of
subsection 4(4) in the total context of the Patent
Act.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property [828 U.N.T.S. 305]
Article 2
(1) Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as
regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all
the other countries of the Union the advantages that their
respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to
nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially
provided for by this Convention. Consequently, they shall
have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal
remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided
that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals
are complied with.
. . .
Article 4
B. -- Consequently, any subsequent filing in any of the
other countries of the Union before the expiration of the
periods referred to above shall not be invalidated by reason
of any acts accomplished in the interval, in particular,
another filing, the publication or exploitation of the
invention, the putting on sale of copies of the design, or
the use of the mark, and such acts cannot give rise to any
third-party right or any right of personal possession. Rights
acquired by third parties before the date of the first
application that serves as the basis for the right of
priority are reserved in accordance with the domestic
legislation of each country of the Union.Article 4
North American Free Trade Agreement [Between the
Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican
States and the Government of the United States of
America, December 17, 1992, [1994] Can. T.S. No.2]
Article 1701: . . .
2. To provide adequate and effective protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights, each Party
shall, at a minimum, give effect to this Chapter and to the
substantive provisions of:
. . .
(c) the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, 1967 (Paris Convention);
. . .
Article 1702: . . .
A Party may implement in its domestic law more extensive
protection of intellectual property rights than is required
under this Agreement, provided that such protection is not
inconsistent with this Agreement.
This agreement has been implemented by the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C.
1993, c. 44 (NAFTA). Section 3 of this Act provides:
3. For greater certainty, this Act, any provision
of an Act of Parliament enacted by Part II and any other
federal law that implements a provision of the Agreement or
fulfils an obligation of the Government of Canada under the
Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with
the Agreement.
It will be noted that it is a federal law which
"implements" or "fulfils an obligation of the Government of
Canada" which shall be interpreted consistently with
NAFTA. This falls far short of making NAFTA part of domestic
law. It also leaves open the question as to which laws can be
said to implement or fulfil a NAFTA obligation. Nowhere in
the Regulations nor in the Regulatory Import Analysis
Statements issued in 1993 or 1998 is such an intention
stated. While section 19.3 [as enacted by S.C. 1993, c. 44,
s. 191] of the Patent Act, specifically authorizes the
Governor in Council to make regulations to implement Article
1720 of NAFTA, that Article is not invoked by the appellants
here and appears to involve only transitional provisions.
This also suggests that the Governor in Council was not given
a general mandate to implement NAFTA by regulations
(expressio unius est exclusio alterius) and it further
puts in doubt the appellants' assumption that subsection 4(4)
of the Regulations must be interpreted as legislation for
implementing NAFTA generally or some other convention.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights [Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994, 1967 U.N.T.S. 3] (TRIPS
Agreement)
Article 2
Intellectual Property Conventions
1. In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement,
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article
19, of the Paris Convention (1967).
. . .
Article 3
National Treatment
1. Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to
its own nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual property, subject to the exceptions already
provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention (1967), the
Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.
. . .
Article 4
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
With regard to the protection of intellectual property,
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of
all other Members.
[20]First, I am of the view that there is no need to
resort to these instruments in this case. I base this
conclusion on the long-established jurisprudence that while
Parliament is presumed not to intend to legislate contrary to
international treaties or general principles of international
law, this is only a presumption: where the legislation is
clear one need not and should not look to international law.
(See, e.g. Daniels v. White and The Queen, [1968]
S.C.R. 517, at page 541; Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney
General) (2002), 216 D.L.R. (4th) 513 (S.C.C.), at
paragraph 50). The appellants nevertheless say this principle
has been modified by the Supreme Court in National Corn
Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2
S.C.R. 1324. They take that case to mean that "international
treaties are always a proper aid to be used to interpret
domestic legislation". But in that case Gonthier J. put it
thus, at pages 1371-1372 [citing Principles of
International Law, 3rd ed.]:
If the convention may be used on the correct principle
that the statute is intended to implement the convention
then, it follows, the latter becomes a proper aid to
interpretation, and, more especially, may reveal a latent
ambiguity in the text of the statute even if this was `clear
in itself'.
(See also Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at
paragraph 51.) In that case the Court was interpreting the
Special Import Measures Act, S.C. 1984, c. 25 which,
it was agreed by the parties, was specifically intended to
implement the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[October 30, 1947, [1948] Can. T.S. No. 31] (GATT). Therefore
resort was had to the GATT in interpreting the powers given
to the Tribunal under the Act.
[21]That is not the situation in the present case. It has
not been demonstrated to me that the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations were adopted for the
purpose of implementing any of the international instruments
on which the appellants rely as set out above.
[22]If I should be in error in this respect, however, I am
also of the view that none of the instruments relied on, even
if applied directly to override the clear language of the
Regulations, would dictate the result insisted upon by the
appellants.
[23]Some of these instruments require "national
treatment", that is treatment as favourable for nationals of
other parties to the conventions as is accorded to a member's
nationals by that member. This is the essence of paragraph 1
of Article 2 of the Paris Convention and paragraph 1 of
Article 3 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Subsection 4(4) of
the Regulations as the Applications Judge has interpreted it
in no way conflicts with this obligation. The requirement
which it imposes on an originator, to file a patent
application in Canada before making a submission for an NOC,
is in no way tied to nationality. It applies equally to
Canadian originators as to originators from any of the
countries who are members of the Paris Convention or TRIPS.
Indeed the appellants who complain herein are all Canadian
companies. Similarly the most-favoured- nation treatment
required by Canada under Article 4 of TRIPS is in no way
denied by subsection 4(4) of the Regulations, for the same
reason. Its provisions apply to all "first persons" who want
to make submissions for an NOC in Canada, regardless of
nationality.
[24]The other important international obligation invoked
by the appellants is found in Article 4B of the Paris
Convention. This is based on the right of priority
established by Article 4A. A person filing an application for
a patent in any member country enjoys a right of priority for
its patent, based on the date of original filing, in respect
of any subsequent filing (within prescribed time limits) in
another member state. Article 4B (quoted in full
supra) goes on to provide in part:
Article 4
. . .
B. -- Consequently, any subsequent filing in any of the
other countries of the Union . . . shall not be
invalidated by reason of any acts accomplished in the
interval, in particular, another filing, the publication or
exploitation of the invention, the putting on sale of copies
of the design, or the use of the mark, and such acts cannot
give rise to any third-party right . . . .
By Article 1701(2) of NAFTA, Canada is obliged to give
effect to this Convention and is bound to comply with these
articles by paragraph 1 of Article 2 of TRIPS.
[25]Now subsection 4(4) of the Regulations as interpreted
by the Applications Judge in no way "invalidates" a patent
first filed in another member of the Union where that patent
is invoked for purposes of priority in a filing for a
Canadian patent. That priority is specifically protected by
section 28.1 of the Patent Act. Nor do the Regulations
give rise to any third-party patent rights that could detract
from the priority based on a foreign filing. The owner of a
foreign patent can prosecute his Canadian patent application
with his priority recognized, as long as he does it within
one year. He has access to our courts to withstand challenges
to his application, to object to other conflicting
applications, and to seek redress for infringement of his
patent once it is issued in Canada.
[26]Instead, the Regulations provide an extra
administrative process tied to the protection of public
health, designed, on the one hand, to assist the development
and preparation for marketing of generic drugs at a time
prior to issue of an NOC when their sale would still be an
infringement of a current patent. At the same time it gives
patentees extra protection: by merely applying for
prohibition they can normally prevent the issue of an NOC to
a generic for 24 months. This system is, not surprisingly,
confined to the protection of patents which have, or will
have, force in Canada. The universe of special remedies is
confined to existing or potential Canadian patents. But this
in no way detracts from the priority to which Convention
member patents are entitled in Canada in respect of the
prosecution of Canadian patent applications. All that is
required to achieve recognition in the Canadian regulatory
system under consideration is to file a Canadian patent
application prior to filing a submission for a notice of
compliance. The appellants were at liberty to file such
patent applications in Canada prior to filing their
submissions but they did not do so.
[27]In spite of what the appellants seem to imply, the
Paris Convention does not, as I understand it, confer
immediate enforceability in Canada of a patent applied for or
obtained in another member country. While it gives certain
priorities to its holder in prosecuting a Canadian patent
application, that holder or its affiliate must still apply in
Canada for a patent before being able to enforce it here. The
Regulations are in no way inconsistent with this principle.
Article 1702 of NAFTA provides that a party may provide more
extensive protection of patents than already required (by
e.g. the Paris Convention), and such protection "must not be
inconsistent with this Agreement" (inter alia
inconsistent with the Paris Convention incorporated by
subparagraph (c) of Article 1701(2)). While arguably the
Regulations represent "more extensive protection", there is
nothing inconsistent with the Paris Convention in requiring
the holder of a Convention patent to apply for the same
patent in Canada before being able to enjoy the extra
enforcement rights under the Regulations just as he has to do
to exercise enforcement rights under the Patent Act
generally.
[28]Therefore even if resort should be had to the
international conventions to interpret subsection 4(4), that
provision is correctly understood to require the filing of a
Canadian patent application prior to delivery by a first
person of a submission for a notice of compliance.
Conclusion
[29]I am therefore satisfied that the Applications Judge
correctly interpreted subsection 4(4) of the Regulations. The
appeals should all be dismissed with one set of costs to the
respondent. The appeals having been dismissed as sought by
the intervener there is no need to deal with its request for
grant of status to seek leave to appeal in the Supreme
Court.
Nadon J.A.: I agree.
Pelletier J.A. : I agree.