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The place of arts and culture in Canadian foreign policy

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Introduction

Culture is inextricable from most, if not all, aspects of society. The ubiquitous rate at which the term and concept of culture is applied, and perhaps overextended, in contemporary terms is startling—corporate culture, youth culture, coffee culture, street culture, video game culture, organizational culture, work culture, queer culture, political culture, global culture, immigrant culture, online or e-culture—to name but a few. That the word culture is used with such random ease to suggest different versions of commonality, shared meanings, values and outlooks, situates it as one of the central global concepts of our time. The cacophony of culture is widening and governments are responding in a number of ways. The response, however varied, can generally be attributed to the fact that there now exists a constant and unmediated global exchange, ‘*cultural*’ and otherwise, between citizens of the world on a daily basis.

There is huge volume of factors facilitating this new level of exchange. Traditional state boundaries are being altered by the constant flow of goods, services and people through a dominant economic system. Accordingly, issues such as global warming, international crime, security, democracy and human rights are also on the move, creating a more complex and transnational atmosphere for governments to deal with. The rapid developments and resultant low costs in technology are granting higher levels of communication and information exchange via the Internet, broadcast satellites, cable networks and other technological trinkets.

The consequences of these new technologies are twofold: we see 1) an increasingly internationalized mass media capable of dispersing news on 24-hour cycle, and 2) publics highly skilled in accessing and harnessing these information and communication technologies in order to create and expand interest and advocacy networks. In sum, these changes amount to somewhat of a ‘limitless local’—that is, to nations that are in a sense shaped, advanced and decided anywhere and everywhere, to cultures that are no longer contained by the traditional boundaries of time and space. Governments now face a greater need to communicate with publics, domestic and foreign, in order to gain support for their policies. Simply, they must invest into winning the hearts and minds of many different publics.

It would be foolish to ignore that the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 have significantly altered how nations interact. Since declaring the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the current situation has frequently resembled somewhat of a war between cultures; likewise, as a battle of ideas or a clash of civilizations. However, we must pause on such terminology to recollect its very recent origin.

American scholar Bernard Lewis first used the phrase, ‘clash of civilizations’ in a 1990 essay entitled *The Roots of Muslim Rage*. Three years later and in reaction to the sensation caused by scholar Francis Fukuyama and his book *The End of History and the Last Man*, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington published an article entitled *The Clash of Civilizations*; another three years later, he expanded this article to the now infamous book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Huntington writes the basic premise of the book is that, “clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against

world war.”¹ Further to this he writes that in a ‘multicivilizational’ world,

“the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. People and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and at the broadest level, civilizations.”²

Let us not deny that people often create identity, or rather *identities*, along some, many or a few of these lines. But let us read the words of Huntington’s fellow American, Michael Parenti from his book *The Culture Struggle*:

“Whenever anyone offers culturalistic interpretations of social phenomena we should be wary. We hear that things happen or don’t happen in some particular society because that’s just the way its culture is. Thus the thing that has to be explained—culture—is itself treated as the explanation, a kind of self-generated causality.”³

Parenti points out the bizarre form of reasoning behind ‘culturalistic’ or ‘civilizational’ explanations, often invoked in the discourse of the current GWOT. Importantly, he also offers a persuasive outlook as to why this occurs, namely that, “[cultural] explanations too often ignore material realities.”⁴ That extreme, sometimes violent, reactions against the West, and civil wars often occur in economically impoverished or politically invaded regions, should not have to be pointed out. That cultural explanations for conflict are totally incomplete should be obvious. This does not mean that culture is inadequate, only that the use of it has been somewhat misleading under the ‘clash of civilizations’ assertion.

When it comes to the management and implementation of foreign policy, we are in the process of witnessing a dynamic change. A vital component in this shift has been a renewed interest in public diplomacy; diplomacy in the traditional sense, that is, as the interaction of states between appointed officials is reopening to the public dimension of diplomacy. The new diplomacy is, essentially, **a battle over the minds of foreign publics**. Those involved in the creation and dissemination of cultural representation must formulate a response in order to position due involvement, without which, the cultural sector runs the risk of becoming a tool rather than a *component* of foreign policy. Furthermore, the response of cultural creators needs to be one that insists that culture does in fact represent and connect people in ways that certain state measures—chiefly military, economic and political—cannot.

What is Public Diplomacy?

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1996), 13.

² Ibid, 21

³ Michael Parenti, *The Culture Struggle* (Toronto: Publishers Group Canada, 2006), 22.

⁴ Ibid, 23

“Not only do we seem to be devoid of useful memory, but when we do remember accurately, it has little or no impact on our actions. It is as if, when we come to public action, our greatest desire is to generalize and institutionalize a syndrome resembling Alzheimer’s disease. One-third to one-half of the population of Western countries is today employed in administering the public and private sectors. In spite of having a larger and better educated elite than ever before in history; in spite of knowing more than we have ever known about ourselves and our surroundings, we actively deny the utility of public knowledge.”⁵

Public diplomacy is the work of governments to initiate dialogue with foreign publics in order to gain favorable opinion. If successful, public diplomacy aims to influence the policy of the target nation to the advantage of the nation installing the public diplomacy program. Hans Tuch states that it is, “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”⁶ Public diplomacy is pursued through numerous channels, primarily, international broadcasting and educational and cultural exchange programs.

In contrast, traditional diplomacy is depicted as the clearly defined interaction of states between diplomats alone, as “the conduct of relations between sovereign states through the medium of accredited representatives.”⁷ It has often been regarded as an elite system of a few, who often act in more of a symbolic rather than strategic capacity in foreign affairs. To state that these two forms of diplomacy are independent of each other would be a mistake; public diplomacy has, as Evan Potter notes, simply been regarded as “the stepchild of diplomats.”⁸ A better way to understand the difference is found in the idea that traditional diplomacy happens on a few-to-few basis, whereas public diplomacy happens on either a few-to-many or a many-to-many basis.

As noted by Philip Fiske de Gouveia, the arena of public diplomacy generates a high volume of auxiliary terminology. This includes, “cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, soft power, political communications, perception management, propaganda, intercultural dialogue, dialogue of cultures, dialogue of civilizations, crisis management, media management, media relations, public affairs, public relations, strategic communications, global communications, strategic influence, psychological operations, information operations and media operations.”⁹

Since the purpose of this paper is to situate the role of culture in public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is featured as the most important amongst these terms; however,

⁵ John Ralston Saul, *The Unconscious Civilization*, (Toronto: House of Anansi Press Inc., 2003), 5.

⁶ Tuch qtd in Evan Potter, *Canada and the New Public Diplomacy*, 3, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2002/20020700_cli_paper_dip_issue81.pdf. (April 2007).

⁷ Jan Melissen, *Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy*, 4, http://www.nbiz.nl/publications/2005/20050500_cdsp_paper_diplomacy_2_melissen.pdf (April 2007).

⁸ Potter, 1

⁹ Philip Fiske de Gouveia with Hester Plumridge, *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy*, 8, <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/657.pdf> (April 2007).

some of the other terminology intersects with cultural diplomacy. Most certainly, much of the media vocabulary will appear, since it is considered part of cultural diplomacy. The facets to public diplomacy are many; however, it has been argued that cultural diplomacy is the *most* important. Or, as the 2005 report from the *Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy* issued from the United States Department of State (DOS) asserts, it is the 'linchpin' of public diplomacy.¹⁰

Similar to the relationship between traditional and public diplomacy, it is difficult to delineate the perimeters between public and cultural diplomacy. John Holden states: "Although public and cultural diplomacy are distinct phenomena, they cannot be totally separated from one another."¹¹ American ambassador Cynthia P. Schneider outlines their co-dependency: "Public diplomacy consists of all a nation does to explain itself to the world, and cultural diplomacy—the use of creative expression and exchanges of ideas, information, and people to increase mutual understanding—supplies much of its content."¹² Because diplomats have long used culture in their dealings, extracting a point at which cultural diplomacy became a distinct and precise measure is difficult; in a way, it's always existed. An exchange between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison in 1785 offers perhaps the earliest demarcation of cultural diplomacy:

"You see I am an enthusiast on the subject of the arts. But it is an enthusiasm of which I am not ashamed, as its object is to improve the taste of my countrymen, to increase their reputation, to reconcile to them the respect of the world, and procure them its praise."¹³

Whether Jefferson was aware he was speaking in what we now consider cultural diplomacy will remain forever undetermined; yet, over 200 hundred years later, his words offer a good definition of cultural diplomacy. If cultural diplomacy is the 'linchpin' of public diplomacy, he reveals the premise: that culture can be used to affect foreign public opinion, and thus can garner support, for a nation's foreign policies.

¹⁰ United States Department of State (DOS), *Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy*, 1, <http://www.publicdiplomacywatch.com/091505Cultural-Diplomacy-Report.pdf> (April 2007).

¹¹ John Holden, *Cultural Diplomacy*, 23, <http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Cultural%20diplomacy%20-%20web.pdf> (May 2007).

¹² Cynthia P. Schneider, "Cultural Diplomacy: Hard to Define, but You'd Know It If You Saw It," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* vol. XIII (Fall/Winter 2006): 191.

¹³ *ibid*

The Evolution of Public Diplomacy in History

It is tempting to understand the renewed interest in public diplomacy as an example of history repeating, perhaps 'recycling', itself. Although history may prove helpful in appreciating the potential applications of public diplomacy, the current context of mass communications and the blurring between domestic and foreign interests is far removed from the empires of Greece and Rome, the city-states of Italy, and more recently, the Cold War. However, some reference to the past is suitable in order to trace the development of public diplomacy to current day.

In the Western world, the image development of a nation, now officially referred to as 'nation-branding', aimed at foreign publics has references that reach as far back into the past as ancient Greece and Rome. The spreading of Hellenistic culture by Alexander the Great and his successors is no doubt the most obvious example of cultural diplomacy in antiquity. During the Italian Renaissance, the city-state of Florence used a variety of diplomacy mechanisms and appears to have been well equipped in dealing with foreign publics. The practice of welcoming in neighboring publics, whether from the rather near reaches of Milan, or the rather far reaches of Spain or Germany, shows that the Florentines built much of their identity around foreign image cultivation. Richard C. Trexler surmises that in Florence,

"Diplomacy was as complex at the public level as were negotiations between single diplomats; the network of domestic and foreign alliances and antagonisms, the fears of the Florentines at the successes of allies, all mitigated against straightforward ritual expression. Committed to public expression, the commune by the nature of its multiple political commitments was forced to equivocate. It did so either by calculated insincerity in its ritual expressions, or by highly artistic ambiguity."¹⁴

Not only the Florentines were wise in the ways of early public diplomacy. The principal city-states of the Italian peninsula all participated in diplomatic relations by establishing embassies in foreign states that aided an overall balance of power. Ambassadors were responsible for inter-state negotiations, providing important information to the home and resident governments, and above all, safeguarding the honor and prestige of the city-state they represented. The Venetians in particular became experts in image cultivation to gain favorable foreign opinion. During the latter part of the Middle Ages, the Venetian diplomatic service even became skilled in distributing newsletters between their posts, encouraging consistency in their foreign relations. However, it was the invention of the printing press that ultimately advanced the importance of communiqués in the system of diplomacy.

In early seventeenth century France, those dealing with foreign publics viewed it as a primary source of power for the state and nation-building schemes reached a high point under the rule of Louis XIV.¹⁵ The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, signed by the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand III, German princes, and representatives from France, Sweden, Spain and the Dutch republic, was a meeting between early diplomats, and is

¹⁴ Richard C Trexler, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 285.

¹⁵ Melissen, 2

still considered by many scholars of diplomacy, to mark the beginning of modern international relations. Thus, it can be fairly stated that the battle for the minds of foreign publics is all but recent.

Global conditions facilitating a public diplomacy similar to the one of today first appeared around First World War. This was inevitable, since in the wake of the Great War the importance of international cooperation became the subject *du jour*. In the era between the World Wars, E.H. Carr remarked that, "power over opinion was not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them."¹⁶ Or rather, as Joseph S. Nye recently noted, the concepts of 'hard power' and 'soft power' are increasingly connected.¹⁷

To clarify, in international relations 'hard power' is defined by explicit attempts to influence the condition of another country, most often attempted through military operations, but it is also evident in trade agreements, international laws and other official agreements entered into by states. 'Soft power' on the other hand, is rather the implicit, perhaps at times 'covert', efforts of a nation to influence another. It tends to work via cultural and educational exchange and mass media, although there seems to be an increased confusion as to whether media falls under 'soft' or 'hard' power these days. Essentially, the difference is simply between coercion and persuasion. Today, diplomats and foreign ministries are assessing how to best wield 'soft power,' especially middle power countries that lack the economic and military weight of larger powers. This language of power has been but one factor in the resurgence of public diplomacy, since the overall program of public diplomacy is considered an exercise in 'soft power.'

To return to history, there is one more moment that must be noted in the evolution of public diplomacy: the Cold War. In fact, 1965 was the year in which the public diplomacy became official state vocabulary when the American diplomat Edmund Gullion coined it at the Edward R. Murrow Center at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston, Massachusetts. While the United States was bursting with dollars post-WWII, Western Europe was financially devastated, while the Eastern half was now shut behind the Iron Curtain of Soviet power. This set the stage for what was arguably the largest and most ambitious public diplomacy program ever put forth.

It was, for all intents and purposes, a propaganda program that aimed to encourage anti-Communist psychology and create allies for the cause. With the help of the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the goals were largely pursued through the dissemination of 'anti-Communist culture' directed at foreign publics, and thus was a large-scale exercise in cultural diplomacy. The U.S. government sunk large amounts of funds into the CIA's campaign to 'culturally' fight communism, culminating in the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) that was set up by 1950 and three years later in the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) that was devoted entirely to public diplomacy. The idea of the Congress and the USIA was to display art, primarily visual art, literature and music, that was directly opposed to Soviet dictates about what art should be. Art was to represent the freedom of American life, that being, the freedom of the individual as opposed to the collective ideology of Communism.

Basically, the CCF sponsored art that was banned in the Soviet Union. As an example,

¹⁶ Melissen, 2

¹⁷ *ibid*

they put on the International Conference of Twentieth Century Music in 1954, which concentrated heavily on atonal music, for the express reason that atonal music was not allowed in the U.S.S.R. In 1952 the Congress for Cultural Freedom sponsored the Masterpieces Festival of modern art, which was to display great works that could not have been created under totalitarian regimes such as Nazism or Communism. The primary art of this exhibition and a number of other widely publicized art extravaganzas during the fifties was Abstract Expressionism. According to the CIA and American government, the art of Abstract Expressionism represented the antithesis to Communism. At the same time, the USIA facilitated numerous cultural and educational exchanges, and was responsible for the allotment of Fulbright Scholarships and the international radio broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA).

American Ambassador Cynthia P. Schneider notes that this was a turning point for the instrumentality of cultural diplomacy; in fact, it was the 'heyday' of cultural diplomacy.¹⁸ America went against the Soviet Union clad with, "jazz, abstract expressionism and modern literature."¹⁹ Musicians like Louis Armstrong were sent on government-funded tours throughout the Soviet Union and to countries such as Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Egypt. In fact, American cultural centers during this time prospered in Islamic capitals. Schneider surmises that cultural diplomacy worked so well during the Cold War because it seemingly opened space for critical voices to be heard, in fact, "it even allowed and fostered dissent."²⁰ Since "[artists], actors, musicians, and writers in any culture act as the national conscience, reflecting often critically, on society,"²¹ they were the most fitting ambassadors to send abroad to promote freedom, as they embodied the ideal of democratic societies, that being, freedom of speech.

Other Western countries were also active in cultural diplomacy programs, notably the UK, France and Germany; still, nothing compared to the potency and presence of the American program. The UK recognized the need for cultural diplomacy even before the Cold War officially began, when it created the Cultural Relations Department within its foreign office in 1943; the Department operated from the twin premises of culture and youth development. Moreover, just as the U.S. used culture to undermine the authority of the Communist Party, so did the Soviets with their cultural achievements of the time. For example, the Soviets organized a momentous exhibition in New York in 1959 to display their cultural achievements and often sent their National Ballet on extensive touring programs around the world.

Public diplomacy experienced somewhat of a 'death' at the end of the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United States shut down more than 80 of its cultural centers around the world, under the rather short-sighted belief that "cultural outreach had outlived its purpose."²² This happened in combination with an anti-arts movement in the American Congress, which further led to cuts in American cultural programming both nationally and internationally and to the eventual elimination of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999. Such short sightedness failed to account for nationalist movements that would spur religious and ethnic conflict, notably in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, and in general, across much of the Islamic

¹⁸ Schneider, 192

¹⁹ *ibid*

²⁰ Schneider, 193

²¹ *ibid*

²² Schneider, 193

world and many regions of the African continent, such as Sierra Leone and Rwanda.

The Cold War era and the official entrenchment of public diplomacy is definitely an important point for a number of reasons. First, the communications revolution that has accelerated until now began after the Second World War. This allowed citizens to learn of international events faster than ever and signaled the onset of a more intrusive media into public affairs. That the media became somewhat of an added party in international affairs meant that governments had to be more in tune with public opinion in order to gain support for their policymaking.

Indeed, this reality has only continued to explode. In fact, this reality has since caused a general weakening of state legitimacy, as it no longer has a monopoly on information. The state, no longer enjoying the prestige of the past, is undermined by the multitudes of news sources, organizations, businesses, associations, educational institutions, and so forth which form contemporary civil society. Thus, communication programs have much more to consider than during the Cold War.

Jan Melissen writes that the international communications strategies during the Cold War corresponded to both conventional and public diplomacy methods, since it became, "increasingly hard to see how the former could be effective without giving sufficient attention to the latter."²³ It was the beginning of major public involvement in policymaking with the dawn of incredible communications networks. One could then state that the first *official* use of public diplomacy was characterized by few-to-many communication, in its combining of traditional and public methods. Public and cultural diplomacy programs were administered, funded and selected by the state, indeed mimicking conventional diplomacy methods; however, they were directed to multitudes of people, and represent a clear break from diplomatic tradition.

Starting in the early to mid-1990s public diplomacy has been under a constant state of revival and reassessment. There are signs that this renaissance of public diplomacy is more many-to-many communication, that it is an even further break from traditional diplomacy. This break parallels technological advancements that have proliferated communications; not only has the media increased its third party role in public opinion, but individuals and a variety of non-state actors have joined.

The enormity of communications and subsequently information exchange is impossible to gauge as communication across borders occurs across complex networks, not simply through state measures. Governments must take networks, both informal and formal, into account like never before if they are to have influence on public opinion; understanding how these public to public communications work is essential and must underline public diplomacy strategies. Public diplomacy during the Cold War had the advantage of not having such massive communications, making it easier to present positive images of a nation, as information was not as easily accessible. States must now not simply present a positive image, but also focus on creating relationships of understanding. This makes public diplomacy far more double sided than it was before, in the sense that it must use the foreign public as the starting point. Public diplomacy programs will then differ from country to country as they will be more tailored to the residing culture(s).

²³ Melissen, 3

The symbolic end to the Cold War, encapsulated in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, was also the year in which American scholar Francis Fukuyama first proposed his 'end of history thesis' in the essay *The End of History?* In 1992, this essay was expanded to a book, *The End of History and the Last Man*. The central premise to Fukuyama's work is well known: that the world will cease to experience ideological conflict like that of the Cold War due to the triumph of a secular, free-market democracy. Of course history itself would continue; Fukuyama meant only that democracy would become more dominant over time, thus lessening ideological conflict. With such thinking, it is rather unsurprising as to why much of the cultural diplomacy efforts were cut; more revealing however, is that this shows that U.S. foreign relations of the time were ultimately streamlined to economic and political gain, not to building long-term cultural understanding and trust.

Certainly, we can learn a great deal from past successes and failures of U.S. public diplomacy, particularly when we understand that the cutting of public and cultural diplomacy programs post-Cold War have not helped the U.S. in any regard. In this sense, we must look to the Cold War as a lesson of moving beyond *in situ* relations, and develop real strategies for the long run. More eloquently in 1994, Walter Laquer made the following statement:

"Nor can it seriously be argued—as some have—that these tools of U.S. foreign policy are no longer needed now that the cold war is over and America no longer faces major threats...far from being on the verge of a new order, the world has entered a period of great disorder. In facing these new dangers, a re-examination of old priorities is needed. Cultural diplomacy, in the widest sense, has increased in importance, whereas traditional diplomacy and military powers...are of limited use in coping with most of these dangers."²⁴

This is the most important, perhaps only relevant, lesson from the Cold War.

Lastly, a note about culture must be made. Since the close of the Cold War, a considerable amount of broadening in the area of 'culture' has occurred. Of special importance here is the concept of culture as adopted by the Stockholm Action Plan in April of 1998. The report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, *Our Creative Diversity*, and the following *Action Plan on Cultural Policies for Development* adopted in Stockholm, used a broad anthropological definition of culture. The consequence of employing such a term makes 'culture' more inclusive than the more instrumental definitions of culture as it is defined as an entire way of life. Carl-Johan Kleberg comments on the Stockholm definition:

"Culture is a collective consciousness that we share with other people and that is common for us. Culture is roughly what we collectively believe is true or false, find good or bad, look upon as right or wrong. Culture includes science as well as prejudices, both the arts and pornography, the morals of thieves and priests."²⁵

As stated in the introduction, the cacophony of culture is widening. We no longer live under the auspice that 'culture' is *always* good; as such, we must tread very carefully

²⁴ Laquer qtd in Schneider, 193

²⁵ Carl-Johan Kleberg, "The Concept of Culture in the Stockholm Action Plan and its Consequences for Policy Making," *The International Journal of Cultural Policy* 7 (2000): 50.

when selecting persons, devising programs, sending touring groups, and so forth to represent a country. Public, and more specifically cultural, diplomacy programs must then be far more flexible than before. In accordance with Holden, we must push further in asserting that culture *is* the operating context for *all* human activity. It is not an addition, or a tool, or a strategy; it is the most profound recess of how we live, and must be the context for how we interact.

Public Diplomacy: A Response to Globalization?

Globalization has exposed an uncanny level of interconnectivity. As major aspects of lives around the world become increasingly co-dependant, should not our governments, our ministries, our departments, and so on, expand their cooperation? The fact that there is so much inter-departmental and inter-ministerial overlap certainly does not go unnoticed. In this sense, public diplomacy provides an overarching template to unite these efforts as it is about national and international interests, about trade and development, about education and culture, communication and technology. There is, perhaps, no area of contemporary life that public diplomacy cannot play a role in. Is it then, the modern way of navigating our way through globalization? Is it a response the atmosphere of globalization?

The term (and concept) of globalization, much like culture, is pervasive and thus prone to being overextended and over-theorized. John Tomlinson better articulates the difficulty of comprehending globalization, stating that, "it is a complicated process at a very high level of generality, and this makes it difficult to grasp in its entirety."²⁶ In basic terms, globalization is a process that involves rapid change and occurs across the entire spectrum of social activity; most obviously, it appears in the economy, politics, communications, the physical environment, and *culture*. It involves various flows of capital, commodities, people, knowledge, information, ideas, fashions, beliefs and so on, across international networks. Each of these elements can (and do) interact with and transform the others. Since this is not a discussion on globalization, for the sake of simplicity, we examine globalization in three forms in the most elementary sense: economic globalization, political globalization and cultural globalization.

Economic globalization is largely the result of rapid developments in technology, information, trade, foreign investment and international business. The main actors are usually companies, investors, banks, and private service industries, as well as states and international organizations. This present form of capitalism poses a dilemma between efficiency and fairness. The former increases the wealth of those involved through rapid consolidation and expansion, and brings about the latter in its lack of attention to social justice. Thus, economic globalization has become an ominous cause of inequality among and within states. What's more, states central concern for global competitiveness limits their potential to properly address this problem.

Political globalization is characterized by the preponderance of the West, primarily the United States, and its political institutions. Secondly, it tends to be supported by a vast array of international and regional organizations and trans-governmental networks, for example the UN and the International Criminal Court. It is also marked by private

²⁶ John Tomlinson, *Resituating Culture*, 21, http://www.youth-knowledge.net/system/galleries/download/research_reports/2004_resituating_culture_co_epub.pdf (April 2007).

institutions that are neither governmental nor purely national, for example, Doctors without Borders or Amnesty International.

Cultural globalization largely stems from the technological revolution and therefore economic globalization; together, they foster the flow of cultural goods and grant a *perceived* sense of intercultural contact. As with economic globalization, there are antithetical results: on the one hand we see uniformization (often termed 'Americanization') and on the other, diversity. The former is obvious when sweeping references are made to 'Asian' culture, 'European' culture, 'Muslim' culture and in cases such as Huntington's division of the world along 'civilizational' lines. The latter can take form in the renaissance of local cultures and languages, as well as generalized attacks against (usually) Western culture. Multicultural policies, identity politics and similar movements pronounce the latter.

International models of Public Diplomacy

France

France has an extensive diplomatic network and a strong history in cultural relations and international broadcasting. In a survey by Joseph Nye in 2004, the country had the highest per capita spending in the world on international cultural relations; the 2005 Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget was 4.4 billion Euros. In addition to a strong worldwide presence, France has been instrumental within Europe in creating international cultural exchange and cooperation.

Support for international broadcasting is a government priority. Radio France Internationale broadcasts globally in 20 languages, has 45 million listeners, 811 members of staff and receives over half its budget from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁷ After French, Arabic programs receive the most airtime, and are considered the most strategically important. The government also gives public funding to the international satellite channel TV5, which has now become the third largest satellite network worldwide.²⁸

In addition to more than 650 embassies, consulates and diplomatic representation worldwide, in 2003 France also operated 166 institutes and cultural centers with 1,215 full-time staff members overseas. The *Instituts Français* are government-funded centers of language and culture abroad. French Institutes and cultural centers have a particularly strong presence in Africa, and have strong international cultural presence in countries such as Senegal, Madagascar, Chad and Namibia.²⁹

The French government also gives financial assistance to the *Alliances Françaises*, a network of centers dedicated to the spread of French language and culture beyond the borders of France. There are some 800 *Alliances* in over 130 countries that reach around 400,000 people, with the greatest concentration being found in South America.³⁰ The *Alliances* are independent, not-for-profit agencies that receive most of their income from course fees. The center in Paris, one of the biggest, is 95 percent self-funded, has an annual operating budget of 13 million Euros and teaches close to 13,000 students annually.³¹ The largest number of students comes from the United States, China, Japan, Spain, Brazil, Italy, Poland and Germany.

The French network of cultural relations has received criticism, notably in 2004 from the government's inspection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that found the network to be too costly and over-staffed. Recommendations were made to rationalize both the number of institutes and *Alliances* and, in developed countries, to rely more on cooperation with other international agencies.

Britain

²⁷ Fiske de Gouveia with Plumridge, 36

²⁸ *ibid*

²⁹ *ibid*

³⁰ *ibid*

³¹ *ibid*

Considering its colonial history, Britain has traditionally been very active in public diplomacy and almost equals the spending of the United States in this regard. Since 2002, the UK has worked to create a more coherent public diplomacy strategy. The British Council is the main domestic cultural and educational body, and is also responsible for the promotion of English language and culture abroad, and educational exchange. It tries to avoid encroaching on UK diplomatic efforts by focusing its external relations completely in cultural terms. The success of the British Council is evident when one considers that it operates in 110 countries, promoting English, British arts, education, science, and good governance.³² The British Council recently produced *Strategy 2010: Making a World of Difference*, a comprehensive public diplomacy program that works towards improving the perception of the UK abroad, fostering mutual understanding between the UK and foreign publics, and building stronger ties between nations. In maintaining its cultural core, *Strategy 2010* is focused on its role as an international cultural authority, and “releasing the creativity and potential of [its] people.”³³

The Council receives hefty funding from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the other body responsible for public diplomacy. The FCO has a designated Public Diplomacy Group that deals with the non-cultural aspects of public diplomacy: climate change, and the promotion of democracy and British business.³⁴ It has a designated Public Diplomacy Fund (PDF) that diplomatic posts may apply to for funding of projects in their assigned regions. Projects must coordinate with the UK’s International Strategic Priorities. British public diplomacy targets a number of priority countries in different categories: the developed countries, such as the United States, Japan, France and Germany, the transitional countries of China, Brazil, India and Russia, and finally key Islamic countries.

In addition, the FCO also administers scholarships and fellowships to foreign scholars, “who show potential to become tomorrow’s leaders, opinion formers and decision makers to study in the UK.”³⁵ The Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan (CSFP) leads the way in educational exchange, aiding foreign scholars from the Commonwealth nations. The CSFP has been in operation since 1959, and has accommodated over 25,000 Commonwealth citizens.³⁶ The CSFP is administered by all Commonwealth countries, including Canada and is probably the largest international exchange program in operation.

In international broadcasting, the BBC World Service is arguably the world’s most known and listened to international radio broadcaster. Worldwide listener figures are in the region of 150 million, of which half are estimated to be between Africa and the Middle

³² Fiske de Gouveia with Plumridge, 55

³³ British Council, “About Us,” <http://www.britishcouncil.org/home-about-us-strategy-2010.htm> (June 2007).

³⁴ British Council, “Strategy 2010,” <http://www.britishcouncil.org/home-about-us-strategy-2010.htm> (June 2007).

³⁵ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Scholarships and Fellowships,” <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1091891937240> (June 2007).

³⁶ Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Program, “Home,” <http://www.csfp-online.org/> (June 2007).

East.³⁷ BBC World Service broadcasts in 43 languages in shortwave, over the Internet, and in FM in around 130 capital cities. Employing over 2,200, the World Service is primarily funded by a Grant-in-Aid from the FCO, to which it is accountable.

Germany

Public diplomacy in Germany is the domain of a number of institutions often funded, but independent of the state. Plumridge notes that Germany, “highlights the importance of contributions from the different spheres of politics, culture, the media, and particularly business, in public diplomacy efforts.”³⁸

Still, German public diplomacy is very advanced and has a number of high profile and well-funded organizations, amongst which the Goethe Institute is likely the most important. Founded in 1925 as the *Deutsche Akademie*, the Goethe Institute now operates in over 120 countries promoting German language and culture.³⁹ Other major German institutes working in public diplomacy include, the Institute for Foreign Relations, which is responsible for the touring of German artists abroad and operates a library on foreign cultural policy and cultural relations, the German Academic Exchange Service, the Alexander Von Humboldt Foundation, the Educational Exchange Service, the Central Office for Foreign Education and the German Research Foundation. In 2004 via the German Academic Exchange Service, the government invested 35 million Euros on the promotion of German language and culture worldwide, 56 million on scholarships for incoming international students, and another 37 million on educational exchange with developing countries.⁴⁰

Like France, Germany is also a leader in furthering exchange programs within Europe. Aside from more traditional public diplomacy messages, Plumridge notes that Germany is keen to, “highlight its role as an important European actor and enthusiastic promoter of further EU integration.”⁴¹ For example, the Federal Culture Foundation has focused almost all of its work in the areas of Central and Eastern Europe. This desire to be a leader in the EU is also accentuated by the fact that just under half of the Goethe Institutes are within the borders of the EU.⁴²

The recent closure of the Goethe Institute in Toronto was cause for alarm to those carefully watching public diplomacy efforts. Rolf Stehle of the Goethe Institute in Beirut remarks that the Institute is in a process of creating more exchange opportunities, especially with Arab countries.⁴³ For example, the Institute has recently created the ‘Western-Eastern Divan’, a writers exchange program where Arab writers spend time in Germany working with German writers, and vice versa. Stehle says, “[this] promoted not only literature, but also day-to-day encounters.”⁴⁴ Efforts to build more public diplomacy

³⁷ *ibid*

³⁸ Fiske de Gouveia with Plumridge, 38

³⁹ *ibid*

⁴⁰ *ibid*

⁴¹ *ibid*

⁴² *ibid*, 39

⁴³ Bernhard Hillenkamp translated by Aingeal Flanagan, *An Interview with Rolf Stehle: “We Are Not in the Business of Importing Culture”*, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/c-310/nr-282/i.html (June 2007).

⁴⁴ Hilenkamp

programs in Arab countries are not limited to Germany, but can be seen in almost all Western country priorities.

The German international broadcasting program also receives due attention in public diplomacy. Deutsche Welle is a leader as an international broadcaster: it has an estimated global audience of 140 million, broadcasts in 29 languages and a very developed website accessible in 30 languages and employs 1,635 staff.⁴⁵ In 2005, as a response to the growing need for dialogue with the Arab world, the station also launched a TV news slot in Arabic.

Italy

Aside from a well-developed public diplomacy program, Italy is an important case to illustrate since it engages in what can be considered 'diasporic' diplomacy. The main efforts of this 'diasporic' diplomacy are directed at the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada, which are home to populations of people of Italian descent, but it also prioritizes countries within Europe that are home to Italian expatriate communities. In a speech in February of 2005, the Minister of Foreign Affairs singled out promotion of the Italian language as one of the Ministry's top priorities and spoke of a future project to re-launch Italian linguistic and cultural identity.⁴⁶ Linguistic protection is particularly high on the agenda in Europe as a defense against the increasing hegemony of English and French.

In addition to its network of embassies, Italy has 85 cultural institutes, co-managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also has a cultural network, the Dante Alighieri Society, which promotes Italian language and culture abroad through autonomous centers that have their own structures and programs. These societies are found throughout North and South America, Europe, Australia, and one in Hong Kong. Italy was one of the first countries involved in creating a European Area of Higher Education. In 1984 the Ministry of Education set up CIMEA, an information center to promote EU academic mobility. Government scholarships are administered abroad through the embassies and cultural institutes and in Italy directly by the Education Ministry.

International broadcasting was established in Italy in the 1930s. RAI started a service in English and Italian to North America, and then enlarged its outreach to South America with Portuguese and Spanish services. Expansion in the 1970s led to the current worldwide service, with new programs in 25 languages and a number of intercontinental TV channels.⁴⁷

Spain

Since the 1970s, Spain has fought vigorously to reject isolationism and increase its role in the international arena. The extensive Spanish language network offers vast potential for public diplomacy programs. Accordingly, the government opened the Cervantes Institute (CI) in 1991 to promote language and culture. It now operates in close to 50 countries worldwide, including Japan and China.

⁴⁵ Fiske de Gouveai with Plumridge, 39

⁴⁶ *ibid*, 42

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 43

Public diplomacy is also carried out by the State Cooperation for Overseas Cultural action, which is focused on the organization of international exhibits. The Fundacion Carolina and Minister of Foreign Affairs administer educational exchange and cooperation, especially with countries of South America and the Caribbean. Engagement with the Arab world is also high priority in Spanish public diplomacy.⁴⁸

The European Union

Although in the past, the EU has been reluctant to create a unified public diplomacy strategy, the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership accentuated the need to assert a proper strategy. What became known as the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership brought together 25 states EU members, 3 candidates for EU membership and 10 other Mediterranean countries, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Palestinian Authority. The Partnership has three main objectives: 1) to create an area of peace, stability and security, 2) to build a common economic zone, eventually leading to a free trade area, and 3) to encourage cultural understanding through civil society exchange.

In light of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the London-based think tank, The Foreign Policy Center (FPC) published a document entitled *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy*. It marked the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona process and recognized how much the Partnership had contributed, “to the development of international economic and cultural ties.” That the program had been hugely successful in the area of ‘Social, Cultural and Human Development’ indicated to the think tank the importance of public to public relations, and thus called for a repositioning of public diplomacy efforts. The FPC remarked that the EU had long remained passive in public diplomacy, and member states still sought out bilateral relations to engage with foreign publics, particularly in the case of China who appears markedly unsure of the EU decision-making process. The FPC document reported that better public diplomacy would relieve such problems, creating a better understanding for the rest of the world as to how the EU functions as a whole.

There is no doubt that the EU has substantial potential in public diplomacy when combining its member states. The EU is home to over 450 million people, contributes to 40% of the UN operating budget and makes up 25% of the world GDP.⁴⁹ The FPC report comments that EU public diplomacy remains disjointed, and will not change unless member states own public diplomacy efforts begin to coordinate efforts on a higher level. If successful, the main actors will be the European Council, Parliament and Commission will lead the way. But debate still wages on how to create an overall strategy.

Regardless, the EU has demonstrated a very successful educational exchange program with the ERASMUS program that encourages transnational cooperation in higher education institutions. It consists of activities such as student and teacher exchanges, joint study programs, language courses and joint development of study programs. Since its creation in 1987, it now incorporates well over 2000 higher education institutes in over 30 countries. Implementation of ERASMUS is the responsibility of the European Commission.

⁴⁸ Fiske de Gouveai with Plumridge, 53

⁴⁹ Ibid, viii

The United States

From the informal statements of Thomas Jefferson, to tentative beginnings in World War I, through the Cold War, the United States now probably faces what will be its largest public diplomacy campaign ever. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) wrote that between 1999-2005, over 30 reports calling for a new American public diplomacy surfaced.⁵⁰ The reports coincide with two events that have affected public diplomacy: 1) the close of the United States Information Agency (USIA), and 2) the attacks of September 11th. The closure of the USIA was certainly a blow to American public diplomacy, but the latter reason has significantly accelerated the reports, as opinions of the United States around the world have drastically suffered since, creating an enormous need for image repair.

Understanding American public diplomacy demands that we understand the strong historical connection between war and large-scale U.S. government information programs overseas implemented by agencies established for these programs: the Committee on Public Information (CPI, 1917-1919) in World War I; the Office of War Information (OWI, 1942-1945) in World War II; the USIA (1953-1999) in the Cold War; and now with the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the Global Cultural Initiative (announced 2006). That the U.S. is perpetually involved in almost all major world events, has necessitated the need to 'tell its story' in terms other than military or economic.

Historically, the stated purpose of these U.S. government information programs has been to provide 'truth' about the United States and its foreign policy, often to counter the 'lies' and 'disinformation' of its opponents, most often during times of war or crises. The result has been that many argue that American public diplomacy is essentially a propaganda program. Officials working in public diplomacy have not countered the argument:

"I am not particularly concerned whether either gunpowder or propaganda have benefited or harmed mankind. I merely emphasize, at this point, that propaganda on an immense scale is here to stay. We Americans must become informed and adept at its use, defensively and offensively, or we may find ourselves as archaic as the belted knight who refused to take gunpowder seriously 500 years ago."⁵¹

So went the words of George V. Allen in 1949, then Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and later director of the USIA from 1957-1960. Equating public diplomacy with propaganda has not ceased since, as evidenced by the following statement from former U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in 2001:

"Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare or—if you really want to be blunt—propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what this war [on terrorism] is really about in the minds of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance."⁵²

⁵⁰ Susan B. Epstein, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Recommendations*, 5, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32607.pdf> (April 2007).

⁵¹ John Brown, *The Purposes and Cross-Purposes of American Public Diplomacy*, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_07-09/brown_pubdipl/brown_pubdipl.html (June 2007).

⁵² *ibid*

As such, much of U.S. public diplomacy can be largely classified as information control. This makes exacting figures on just how much America spends on public diplomacy very difficult, as tracing the line between what is and is not public diplomacy becomes difficult, especially considering that there is a high amount of private sector involvement.

Until very recently, the U.S. government, despite the numerous reports to reconfigure their diplomacy methods, struggled to reformulate a strategy. Indeed, as the *Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy* stated in 2005,

“[what] remains is an ad hoc congeries of programs, administered largely through the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) at the DOS [Department of State], with a reduced budget and staff, a diminished position in the hierarchy of diplomatic values, and a vision of cultural diplomacy incommensurate with American ideals and foreign policy objectives.”⁵³

The State Department, in which the USIA was consolidated nearly ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is taking steps to expand information activities in the Muslim world as part of its efforts in the war on terrorism. In 2005, the Department of State appointed Karen Hughes as Under Secretary and was charged to draw up a new approach for American public diplomacy in the Middle East; soon after, Dina Powell was added as Assistant to Hughes to the strategizing efforts. Efforts to reformulate remained limited at first; the biggest ‘new’ program was media outreach, which facilitated interviews between the Muslim press and U.S. officials, such as Condoleezza Rice.⁵⁴ Six years and over 30 reports later, the DOS announced its Global Cultural Initiative (GCI) in September of 2006, “to enhance and expand America’s cultural diplomacy efforts worldwide.”⁵⁵

Taking cue from the 2005 *Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy*, which issues cultural diplomacy as the ‘linchpin’ of public diplomacy, the GCI aims to expand cultural relations through partnerships with the John F. Kennedy Center for Performing Arts, the American Film Institute, the President’s Committee on the Arts and Humanities, and the Institute for Museum and Library Services.⁵⁶ The DOS writes that this is the first initiative where the public and private sectors have united to collaborate on cultural diplomacy. Proposed as a series of projects, the GCI state the following aims:

- Connect foreign audiences with American artists and art forms
- Share American expertise in arts management and performance
- Educate young people and adults in the United States and abroad about the arts and cultures of other countries⁵⁷

⁵³ DOS, *Global Cultural Initiative*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2006/72972.htm> (June 2007)

⁵⁴ Robin Wright and Al Kamen, *U.S. Outreach to Islamic World Gets Slow Start, Minus Leaders*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61213-2005Apr17.html> (June 2007).

⁵⁵ DOS

⁵⁶ *ibid*

⁵⁷ *ibid*

Canadian Conference of the Arts

In international broadcasting the Voice of America (VOA) has been heard since 1942, today broadcasting weekly over, “1,000 hours of news, information, educational, and cultural programming,”⁵⁸ with an estimated audience of 115 million.⁵⁹ VOA broadcasts in 45 languages and employs more than 1,100 individuals.⁶⁰ As reported by the VOA in 2006, the operating budget is approximately \$166 million USD.

Other services include WORLDNET Television and Film Service, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Radio Sawa, the Arabic language station that only began broadcasts in 2002. The International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), which is governed by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), administers all the above-mentioned programs; all members of the BBG are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, bar the Secretary of State. Since 1991, the BBG has been an independent federal body, thus those employed at the BBG are not considered civil servants.

The United States government did not become involved in educational exchange activity until the late 1930s, when exchanges were established with Latin America as part of FDR’s “Good Neighbor” policy and to offset Nazi and fascist influence in the region. The Department of State’s Division of Cultural Relations was established in 1938 to handle these programs, which within a few years expanded to other geographical areas. After World War II, the Fulbright Act (1946) and the Smith-Mundt Act (1948) laid the basis for large-scale global U.S. government-sponsored educational exchanges. Since its inception, the Fulbright Program has involved over 300,000 participants from over 180 countries.⁶¹ Unfortunately, educational exchange programs are hindered by the difficulties foreign students face in obtaining visas for study in the U.S., greatly reducing the number of students coming in to the U.S.

⁵⁸ Voice of America, “About VOA/Fast Facts,”
<http://www.voanews.com/english/about/FastFacts.cfm> (June 2007).

⁵⁹ *ibid*

⁶⁰ *ibid*

⁶¹ <http://exchanges.state.gov/education/fulbright/ffsb/>

Public Diplomacy in Canada

Canadian foreign policy is at an important crossroads: it is confronting the challenges of relating and communicating to foreign publics in new ways, expanding current foreign policies and also initiating new ones. Likewise, it faces the same challenges in communicating with its domestic audience. Many of the challenges it faces will not be solved by military, economic or political might alone, no matter how multilateral or multicultural the approach. Public diplomacy has a crucial role to play: it is a resource, and not one that should rest solely in the hands of diplomats and foreign ministries. Multilevel cooperation, between institutions, organizations, government and individuals must be encouraged nationally, as should a more transparent transnational exchange between foreign equivalents.

The rest of this paper reviews the current task of finding a balance in Canadian foreign policy between culture and politics, and also between national and international interests. It is a call to cultural creators and curators to understand the immensity of the situation we all face, and it is hoped then, that it will be able to understand its position better and then be able to make a case for its role. Given Canada's international reputation as a leader in multilateral, 'soft' politics, it is important to evaluate the extent to which Canada has resituated a public diplomacy agenda.

This year Canada would do well to reevaluate its 'pillars' of foreign policy. The year 2007 marks both the 50th anniversary of Lester B. Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize and the 95th anniversary of the Battle of Vimy Ridge. Both of these events are well survived by Canadian foreign policy, as the values and principles they represent have become cornerstones of the Canadian image abroad. But today, the Canadian mission in Afghanistan is facing increased criticism:

"The war in southern Afghanistan is increasingly a war of promises and perceptions. In order to regain a stronghold in the south of Afghanistan the international community must address the needs of the population living in the region by establishing a grassroots strategy that will address such issues as poverty and displacement of the local population. What is needed is a Hearts and Minds strategy that will in practice actually win the hearts and minds of local Afghans."⁶²

But the most immediate circumstance for the repositioning of public diplomacy has been the announcement of the current federal government in September 2006 that it was initiating federal expenditure cuts totaling over one billion dollars. As reported by the Canadian Conference of the Arts, this translated to an almost \$12 million dollar reduction in public diplomacy funding within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), "a program that has funded academics and cultural organizations for their international work."⁶³ Further affecting the arts and culture sector, the budget reduction also imposed a \$4.63 million cut to the Museums Assistance Program at the Department of Canadian Heritage (DCH).⁶⁴

⁶² http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/HM_c1

⁶³ CCA Bulletin, September 2006

⁶⁴ *ibid*

It is crucial to understand the relationship between these cuts. The representation of Canadian culture abroad will only be as strong as Canadian culture at home. Moreover, although these recent spending cuts are extremely disappointing, especially in light of the fact that the cuts paralleled a reported \$13.2 billion surplus⁶⁵, we must understand that they exist on a much broader continuum of similar trends in cultural funding, at both the national and international level. If we examine the history of Canadian cultural relations, it becomes evident that the current government is not the first to push around the role of culture in foreign affairs.

The Pearson Legacy

Canadian foreign policy is just shy of its 100th birthday. In 1909 Canada created the Department of External Affairs, in order to provide some level of autonomy in the world arena, as Canada was still under the legal control of Britain. With the *Statute of Westminster* in 1931, Canada was granted full legal control over its external affairs; however, not until 1956 did Canada gain any kind of international reputation in foreign affairs.

The Suez Canal crisis of 1956 was a time of high tension between Egypt, Israel, Britain and France. Essentially, the conflict transpired from a long list of events involving these countries. When Egypt declared it was nationalizing the canal, Britain and France, who had invested significant amounts of money into its construction, erupted in anger. This reaction was largely due to the fact that neither country wanted to lose influence and control in the area, as it was a major oil supply route. As the conflict escalated, Canada eventually intervened to diffuse the situation. Foreign Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson developed the idea of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), now known as peacekeeping, and sent a force under this title. In 1957 Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in creating the UNEF. Success in handling global conflicts in such a diplomatic and multilateral manner gave way to the Canadian tradition of being a leader in peacekeeping; over the next ten years Canada was engaged in numerous operations in countries including Lebanon, Congo, Yemen, New Guinea, Cyprus, and India and Pakistan. This involvement solidified Canada's role in global affairs; it has since been the cornerstone of Canadian diplomacy, even identity.

Putting Culture on the Agenda

Over the years, Canada has entered into numerous agreements and conventions that secure an international cultural role. Some of these include, but are not limited to: Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, UNESCO, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Universal Copyright Convention, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Commonwealth of Learning, and more recently, the 2005 UNESCO *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*, where Canada has played a major leading role and which it was the first country to ratify. This is but an annotated list; the full scope of Canada's multilateral and bilateral relations is much more extensive.

During a federal review of Canadian foreign policy in 1995, John Ralston Saul wrote that Canada's profile abroad *is* largely its culture:

⁶⁵ *ibid*

“That is our image. That is what Canada becomes in people’s imaginations around the world when the time comes for non-Canadians to buy, to negotiate, to travel. Canada’s chance or the attitude toward Canada will already have been determined to a surprising extent by the projection of our culture abroad.”⁶⁶

Today all aspects of Canadian culture can be found abroad: performing and visual artists, writers, film makers, broadcasters, journalists, musicians and festivals all benefit from cultural grants that take them to diverse regions of the world. For Saul, such activity abroad is essentially the crux of the Canadian image abroad; hence, the role culture has to play in Canada’s foreign policy should not, at any point, be sacrificed. One must ask, if just over a decade ago we witnessed a *plea* for this point to not be ignored, what has the past looked like? Simply stated, when did culture and cultural relations become a feature of Canadian foreign policy?

Massey-Levesque and UNESCO

The event that receives the most attention in the early landscape of Canadian cultural policy is the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences of 1951, otherwise known as the Massey-Lévesque report. The report set a foundation for a more coherent Canadian cultural sphere that was buttressed by government support and the development of national cultural institutions. Massey-Lévesque was the catalyst for the establishment of several national institutions, including the Canada Council and the National Library of Canada, now staples in the cultural terrain. The subsequent list of 146 recommendations covered a wide range of topics: broadcasting, television, the CBC, the National Film Board, aid to universities, liberal arts in post-secondary education, national scholarships in the creative arts, humanities and social sciences and scientific research.

In addition, it addressed the importance of international cultural relations and UNESCO, and thus represents the first instance of the role of culture in Canada’s international relations. Specifically, the report stated that a body be created, “to foster Canada’s cultural relations abroad, to perform the functions of a national commission for UNESCO, and to devise and administer a system of scholarships.”⁶⁷ As Zoe Druick notes, the emphasis placed on cultural relations abroad came about in part due to the fact that, “[although] they were Canadian nation-builders...everyone involved in the Massey-Levesque Commission was also engaged with international affairs, most of them involved directly or indirectly with UNESCO.”⁶⁸ In 1957 the Canadian Commission for UNESCO was officially established, premised on both Massey-Levesque and the discourse of international relations that swept through the early Cold War period. Or as Durick states, “the emphasis on culture by UNESCO and the Cold War pressure to be aligned with the United Nations helped to give the government the rationale it required to direct funding to the arts.”⁶⁹

Although Massey-Lévesque did recognize the importance of culture as a facet of

⁶⁶ Saul quoted in Potter, 7.

⁶⁷ Zoe Druick, “International Cultural Relations as a Factor in Postwar Canadian Cultural Policy: The Relevance of UNESCO for the Massey Commission,” *Canadian Journal of Communications*, 31 (2006): 8.

⁶⁸ *ibid*

⁶⁹ *ibid*

international relations, as Mary Halloran states, “[little] was said about the ways in which culture could be used to serve Canadian foreign policy interests.”⁷⁰ Still, in the years following the 1951 report, cultural activity overseas did occur. Activities were lead mainly by the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, now Radio Canada International (RCI), the National Gallery and the National Film Board. The Department of External Affairs dispatched diplomatic agents to implement these efforts and coordinate cultural exchanges. Halloran comments that, “the work remained improvisational in nature, the resources allocated comparatively scarce, and an overall strategy non-existent.”⁷¹

Not until the 1960s under the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson did cultural relations become a focus that merited priority status at the federal level. This response was, at least in part, related to the Québec government’s work to advance cultural exchange with France: “Québec’s campaign to establish industrial and technical exchanges with France prompted the Liberal government...to undertake, in 1963, its own program of academic and cultural cooperation with the governments of France, Belgium and Switzerland.”⁷² As Québec put more resources into its relations with France, Ottawa also increased its cultural relations abroad. Subsequently, by the end of 1965, Halloran documents that the budget for Canadian cultural exchanges with French-speaking countries went from \$250,000 to \$1 million.⁷³

Trudeauvian Times

Cultural relations under Prime Minister Trudeau detoured from being a response to the activities of the Québec government, to an attempt to create a comprehensive image of Canada abroad. In 1970 *Foreign Policy for Canadians* was published as a set of six booklets outlining the, “general principles by which foreign policy was to be governed, and approaches for dealing with specific areas.”⁷⁴ The report acknowledged that cultural activities were an integral part of foreign policy and emphasized the, “use of cultural exchanges with francophone countries to promote the French fact.”⁷⁵

Under this premise, Canada expanded relations with French-speaking countries, as well as pursuing cultural relations with the francophone world in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. Europe remained the chief pillar of cultural relations, and plans were made to strengthen relations with Britain, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The Trudeau government restated the importance of cultural relations in another foreign policy statement by Mitchell Sharp, then Secretary of the State for External Affairs. The statement became known as the ‘options paper’⁷⁶, and focused on strategies to empower the Canadian economy while simultaneously lessening the reliance on the United States economy. The paper stressed the importance of cultural relations abroad as a means to project Canada’s cultural (and linguistic) distinctness, and also as a way to expose Canadians to the broader world.

⁷⁰ Mary Halloran, *Cultural Diplomacy in the Trudeau Era: 1968-1984*, DFAIT, 1996, 2.

⁷¹ *ibid*

⁷² *ibid*, 3

⁷³ *ibid*

⁷⁴ Halloran, 4

⁷⁵ *ibid*

⁷⁶ Halloran, 5

Little doubt lingered that the main body accountable to cultural activities abroad was the Department of External Affairs. The question remained one of whether or not a department trained primarily in political and economic affairs could extend itself adequately to the realm of cultural affairs that had occupied nothing less than minority status within the department. Nonetheless, the department's Cultural Affairs division, established in 1966, seemed invigorated by the new challenges to expand Canada's cultural activity abroad. Agreements were made with Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland to further cultural exchange; likewise, already well-established relations with France and Belgium were reiterated and extended. The Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris was established, and officially opened in April of 1970 and was to function as a, "European showcase for Canada's cultural achievements."⁷⁷ Additionally, the division worked to arrange and support tours for Canadian artists, art exhibitions and literature presentations at numerous foreign posts. Canada also received international attention in cultural relations when it hosted the International and Universal World Exhibition of 1967 (Expo '67) in Montréal.

In May 1971, Prime Minister Trudeau visited Moscow, culminating in the General Exchange Agreement between Canada and the Soviet Union; the Cultural Affairs division followed accordingly as it worked to infuse the agreement with artistic, academic and scientific exchange. Another instance of cultural relations adjusting to the federal foreign policy agenda was achieved when Canada officially recognized China; this stimulated the founding of academic exchange and scholarship programs between the two countries.

Despite this activity in the cultural field, coherency and finances plagued the endeavours. There was a growing unease within External Affairs toward the lack of an over-arching direction in the Cultural Affairs department that was only further compounded by lack of funds. Countries that had been identified as priorities in the foreign policy reviews, especially non-European ones, did not develop cultural programs. Halloran remarks that, "[budgetary] restrictions were a particularly sensitive issue in the wake of the reductions imposed on the department in 1969-1970, which saw a budgetary decrease of \$7.5 million, the closure of seven posts, and the firing of 60 foreign service officers and 110 support staff."⁷⁸

Financial instability coupled with the general lack of direction did not stand well against the insistence in foreign policy reviews that culture had a decisive role to play in international relations. By the mid 1970s there was a feeling that too much emphasis was being placed on Canada's cultural relations with Europe, so much that it seemed to exclude the rest of the world, bar the United States. However, some stability emanated from the cultural scene at home; "[as] one of the foreign service officers who helped to frame cultural policy has put it, 'the tremendous explosion of cultural creativity and achievement in the 1950s and 1960s made it possible to plan with some assurance.'⁷⁹ The framework was there; what was not happening was a coherent and coordinated effort to showcase these talents abroad.

The construction of a new policy again began in 1972 and was not concluded until 1974. An initial outline of the new plan was drafted by early 1973, calling for the expansion of

⁷⁷ Halloran, 7

⁷⁸ Halloran, 8

⁷⁹ Halloran, 9

the department's cultural programs into new countries, an increase of \$4 million dollars in the budget over five years, and the recognition that external cultural affairs need coincide with internal cultural activity. Even with an eventual price tag of \$12 million, the plan to expand cultural relations between 1975-1980 was approved, on the condition that it would be subject to an annual review by the Treasury Board. The objectives of the program were put forth as follows:

“[To] support effectively foreign policy objectives, taking fully into account Canada's domestic cultural policies; to promote abroad Canada's domestic, economic, social and political interests; to reflect internationally the growing creativity and scope of Canadian culture and promote, as an extension of domestic cultural policy, the export of Canadian cultural manifestations abroad; to improve professional opportunities abroad for Canadian artists and scholars.”⁸⁰

It was added that in order for these objectives to flourish, some adaptation of the current geographic application of the cultural programs was in order. Disappointingly, the agreed \$12 million to expand cultural relations was eventually reduced to little over \$5 million in 1979-1980, of course, due to government cut backs. But the late seventies still saw considerable expansion in cultural affairs: in addition to the Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris, centres were opened in London, Brussels and New York, and cultural affairs administered programs in Bonn, Mexico City, Moscow, Rome, Tokyo and Washington.⁸¹

Multiculturalism

Also noteworthy to cultural policy development during the Trudeau era was the official adoption of a multicultural policy in 1971, formalized by the Canadian *Multicultural Act*. Addressing the existence of numerous cultures living in Canada had been discussed in Massey-Levesque, but it was not until this time that the multicultural character of Canada was formally acknowledged federally.

Ken Lum remarks that, “[multicultural] diversity was designed to be the basis of the cultural pillar of Canada's foreign and domestic policy.”⁸² This was somewhat in contrast to Massey-Levesque, which as Lum writes, “was about building institutions that would unify a compartmentalized nation and about underlining Canada's historical roots in Europe, primarily Britain and France,” while multiculturalism was about, “fostering and servicing Canada's compartmentalization by diluting the primacy of Canada's English and French roots.”⁸³ Undoubtedly, these contrasting narratives to Canadian life have long plagued the nation, creating what many feel is a lack of coherent identity. Nonetheless, the relevance of the 1971 Multiculturalism Policy to foreign policy is extremely important. Lum summarizes: “[multiculturalism] came to parallel Canada's multilateralist voice on the international stage of politics; the former would strengthen the legitimacy of the latter.”⁸⁴

Canada World Youth and Katimavik

⁸⁰ Halloran, 11

⁸¹ Halloran, 16

⁸² Ken Lum, “Canadian Cultural Policy: A Problem of Metaphysics,” *Canadian Art*, 13 (1999): 77.

⁸³ *ibid*

⁸⁴ *ibid*

The Trudeau era left Canada with another vital public diplomacy tool: youth engagement initiatives. In 1971, Jacques Hébert founded Canada World Youth (CWY) with the vision to expose Canadian youth to aiding in peace efforts around the world. Between 1972-1973, the first groups of participants were sent abroad to Cameroon, Malaysia, Mexico, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.⁸⁵ By its 10th anniversary, CWY was active in more than 25 countries. Since then, it has been involved in the formation of numerous conferences and projects, has worked together with Team Canada trade missions and has presented work to the UN. Similar youth programs have been established around the world on the CWY model, such as in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. Cultural relations have infused much of the programming: in 1992 twelve participants collaborated with Nicaraguans to produce a documentary on intercultural relations and international development, and in 1997 a certificate program in community development and intercultural relations was developed within Québec's Cegep system, which has now further expanded with other Canadian colleges and universities.⁸⁶ Today, CWY continues to thrive and is active in over 60 countries worldwide.

Jacques Hébert also launched Katimavik in 1977 alongside Trudeau. It was conceptualized as a volunteer service for young Canadians from all walks of life to discover the diversity of the Canadian landscape through community involvement and education in the two official languages. Given the diversity of the country, Hébert wanted to create intercultural exchange on a national level, based on his belief of the need for people to communicate constructively at an early age. In 1986, all funding for the program was cut, prompting Hébert to go on a hunger strike for three weeks, but not until 1994, which ironically coincided with the Chrétien government's review of foreign policy, was the program fully restored. Today, nearly 1,200 young Canadians participate annually throughout all regions of the country.⁸⁷ These programs are indispensable for Canadian public diplomacy: they offer the foundations for the creation of cultural ambassadors, encourage young Canadians to be aware of different cultures, and thus cultivate valuable citizens who understand the importance of effective intercultural relations and communication strategies.

The Trudeau era was undeniably a time of enormous growth for international relations in Canada. Granted, cultural relations abroad had been identified as important prior to this time, but it was Trudeau who officially fixed cultural relations in foreign policy. Overall, we see certain positive trends emerge: the use of cultural relations as a legitimate exercise of foreign affairs; the attempt to synchronize international cultural relations to the national cultural community; and the desire to expand relations beyond Europe. The pitfalls were: that the goals of international cultural relations weren't explicitly oriented towards national or international ends; that no long-term strategy was put in place, despite efforts; and that cultural relations programs remained heavily focused on Europe. Despite many shortcomings, Canada and especially Canadian cultural institutions are indebted to the efforts of Trudeau and company to establish public diplomacy methods in Canadian foreign policy. Certainly, much of this activity cleared the path for the 1995 review that set culture as the third pillar of foreign policy.

The 1980s, 1990s, and Beyond

⁸⁵ <http://www.cwy-jcm.org/en/aboutus/history>

⁸⁶ *ibid*

⁸⁷ <http://www.katimavik.org/section/index/id/1>

Another comprehensive review focused solely on Canadian arts and culture, similar to Massey-Levesque, transpired in the 1980s under the government of Joe Clark. The Trudeau government, despite budgetary restrictions, had solidly established cultural relations within the Department of External Affairs and had established the International Cultural Relations Bureau (ICRB) in 1979. A committee was assembled in 1980 within the ICRB, and was to outline a direction for federal cultural policy in *all* areas of cultural activity, including the international arena. Known as Applebaum-Hébert, the report of the committee was published in 1982.

When it came to international cultural relations the report, “seems to have been largely a defensive exercise, that is, building a case for its continued responsibility for external cultural policy.”⁸⁸ The report was to chart both national and international cultural policy on the pretense that it was best to make sure that national cultural policy worked parallel to external cultural policy. As with previous reviews, Applebaum-Hébert asked for increased funding in order to implement long-term development of the cultural programs abroad and asked that an independent agency be established for the sole purpose of promoting Canadian talent overseas.

The result of the report is abrupt: nothing came of the Applebaum-Hébert proposal to create an independent body. Still, the Department, as Halloran notes, exerted a great deal to defeat it.⁸⁹ The ICRB regrouped for a second round of long-term planning strategies, but was interrupted as the Department again found itself in the throes of another foreign policy review, this time under the Mulroney government.

Issued as a ‘Green Paper’, the foreign policy review under Mulroney was published in 1985 under the title *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada’s International Relations*. The paper was guided by six objectives: sovereignty and independence; peace and security; justice and democracy; economic prosperity and integrity of natural resources.⁹⁰ On promptings from DFAIT, the review also recommended that annual summit meetings between the Prime Minister and American President become policy. Deficit reduction, fiscal restraint, free trade and international competitiveness characterized the Mulroney era; this translated to friendlier relations with the United States, a relationship that had become rather cold under Trudeau, since he considered the U.S.-Soviet relationship to be ‘parlous’.

Cultural relations in DFAIT did not fare well during this time, and almost took a complete cut in 1992. The only remarkable work in international cultural relations during the Mulroney era was a report issued by the ICRB in 1991 entitled *International Cultural Affairs: An Exploratory Survey*. Research was conducted over 1989-1990 and largely focused on the cultural diplomacy and cultural relations programs of other countries. The results were inconclusive and can be summarized by the following statement from the document: “The exploratory survey uncovered a number of unresolved definitional problems in international cultural affairs.”⁹¹

⁸⁸ Halloran, 20

⁸⁹ *ibid*

⁹⁰ John Noble, *Do Foreign Policy Reviews Make a Difference?*, 43, Policy Options <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/feb05/noble.pdf> (June 2007)

⁹¹ Findings Report, *International Cultural Affairs: An Exploratory Survey*, 1989-1990, 1991, 2.

Still, it did report that Canada lagged behind in cultural spending; compared to West Germany that spent \$128.6 million and the UK that spent \$1,146.1 million, Canada spent the lowest dollar amount on cultural relations abroad.⁹² Importantly, it articulated the interconnectedness of cultural relations at the federal level; it stated that in any given country, cultural relations abroad are the shared responsibility of national arts councils, cultural organizations and institutions, public broadcasting agencies, the ministries of culture, education, communications, environment, external or foreign affairs, heritage or conservation, sports and recreation, trade, industry and tourism, and various cultural relations corporations institutes and foundations.⁹³ Taken as a whole, the survey was rather inconclusive, stating that much future research was to be done.

Though the primary purpose of this historical outline is to emphasize the location of culture in Canadian foreign policy, it must not be forgotten that throughout these years, Canada continued to participate in a long list of peacekeeping operations abroad, namely under the lead of the United Nations. To name a few, Canadian involvement abroad proceeded as follows: elections supervision in South Korea in 1947-48, the UN Military Observer Group starting in 1949 on the India-Pakistan border that would last for 30 years, the UN Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine, the UN Observation Group in Lebanon in 1958, the UN operation in the Congo in 1960, one in West New Guinea in 1962, another in Yemen in 1963, and to round out the list, a long-term peacekeeping mission in Cyprus starting in 1964.⁹⁴

The result, as Denis Stairs says, “was becoming habitual” and because “Canada had done the interventionist job so often before, it was naturally assumed abroad that it would be willing to do it again.”⁹⁵ Foreign service, or peacekeeping, was reviewed both by the Pearson and Trudeau governments in their reviews of Canadian foreign policy, however, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the role of Canada as peacekeepers became almost *too* routinely declared as a source of national pride. Indeed, in 1991, Stairs points out that the Department of External Affairs started describing the expansion of UN capacity to deal with international conflict, “as an objective commensurate with ‘the promotion and protection of Canadian interests and *values*.’”⁹⁶ The problem, as voiced by Jack Granatstein at the time, was that “for too many Canadians peacekeeping [had] become a substitute for policy and thought.”⁹⁷

These sentiments, when taken against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War and rather symbolically against the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, were well timed to say the least. The atmosphere that unfolded during this time is well known: new opportunities for progress, economically, politically and socially, seemed abound as new areas suddenly opened to mass exchange, and issues such as human rights and democracy fanned out more rapidly than ever.

The immediate concerns that had plagued the Cold War era, chiefly, human security,

⁹² Ibid, 17

⁹³ Ibid, 2

⁹⁴ Denis Stairs, “Canada in the 1990s: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig,” *Policy Options* (January/February 2001): 45.

⁹⁵ Stairs, 46

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷ Stairs, 47

seemed fulfilled, at least in the developed world. However, new security concerns emerged, mainly “failed and disrupted states”⁹⁸, and governments recognized that dealing with them required more than military presence. The reaction in Canadian foreign policy was a transformation from peacekeepers to *peace-builders*, and more coordination with NGOs and an array of social engineers.⁹⁹

Perhaps in response to these concerns (although it is difficult to gauge such causality) in 1994 the Jean Chrétien government initiated a large-scale federal review of foreign policy that indicated a departure from its predecessors. The findings were published in the 1995 document *Canada in the World* and placed Canadian values and culture as the ‘third pillar’ of foreign policy, thus properly opening a place for true public (and cultural) diplomacy. That it was listed at third should not be wrought over much, since in theory, it was to be equal to the first two pillars of economic growth and international peace and security. Like previous foreign policy reviews, it emphasized broad objectives, such as economic wealth and prosperity, and the promotion of human security. It was, in fact, the attachment of the ‘third pillar’ that was strikingly different, a change the cultural sector surely welcomed after the Mulroney era.

The International Cultural Relations Division upgraded its evaluation standards for cultural grants:

“Grants will be awarded on the basis of relevance to the three pillars of Canadian foreign policy, as laid out in the Government statement on foreign policy ‘Canada in the World’ and particularly in reference to the third pillar, the promotion of Canadian culture and values abroad.”¹⁰⁰

Those people looking for the cultural grants had to illustrate their relevance to Canada’s foreign trade policy. This was an important statement to make, since previous foreign policy reviews failed to address how cultural relations served foreign policy. This allowed the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to position itself alongside national cultural institutions as well as the newly created Department of Canadian Heritage. Geographic location was also an important factor for the cultural grants system. DFAIT listed priority countries to be, China, India, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, the United States, Japan, Mexico and Brazil. The list highlights the traditional European and American relations, but added certain emerging powers (China, India, Mexico and Brazil). The long cry for cultural relations to move beyond Europe was then well articulated in *Canada in the World*.

It appears that the renewed emphasis on public diplomacy mechanisms came from the Canadian public itself. The Chrétien government stated it had received this message from Canadians during consultations for the review: “Canadians are confident in their values and in the contribution these values make to the international community. As the Special Joint Committee noted:

“Foreign policy matters to Canadians. They have deep-rooted values that they carry over into the role they want Canada to play. Our principles and values - *our*

⁹⁸ *ibid*

⁹⁹ *ibid*

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arts/guide-en.asp>

culture [emphasis added]- are rooted in a commitment to tolerance; to democracy, equity and human rights; to the peaceful resolution of differences; to the opportunities and challenges of the marketplace; to social justice; to sustainable development; and to easing poverty. Canadians wish these values reflected and advanced internationally. They also understand that culture helps to bind societies together at a time of rapid change and of the emergence of new threats to security such as ethnic strife rooted in exclusionary visions of civic life.¹⁰¹

This statement is indicative of a move toward public-to-public, or many-to-many communication, characteristic of current public diplomacy methods. Previously, public diplomacy programs were characterized by a combination of traditional and public diplomacy, since they were largely administered on a few-to-many basis, especially in the case of the United States during the Cold War as individual cultural ambassadors were strategically selected to represent America to the world. Many-to-many communication also began to flourish under Team Canada trade missions that combined various sectors of activity, including the cultural sector, and further involved provincial representation abroad.

Unfortunately, at the moment when public diplomacy appeared to receive due attention, and more importantly when cultural diplomacy officially appeared at high ranking, the government entered into a major budget-cut in order to reduce the federal deficit. Still, between 1995 and 1998, DFAIT renovated the Canada House in London and the Canadian Cultural Center in Paris, and even managed to retain its cultural grants program.¹⁰² More surprisingly, Potter notes that by 1999, DFAIT's \$4.7 million budget devoted to culture, "assisted both established and emerging artists and cultural groups to perform and display abroad, supported visits to Canada by film and book distributors and agents, and [undertook] specific cultural projects to promote key foreign policy themes such as 'Children and War.'¹⁰³ Still, effort was made to further solidify cultural relations in 1999, when the Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International trade met and published *Canadian Culture in a Global World: New Strategies for Culture and Trade*.

A list of cultural actors that were supported during this time included: Nexus, the Montreal Symphony, the NAC Orchestra, Tafelmusik, Nouvel Ensemble Moderne, Inuit and Native Singers, the Rankin Family, Tim Brady, the Flyin Bulgar Klezmer Band, the Canadian Opera Company, Cirque du Soleil, Robert Lepage, Brad Fraser, O Vertigo, Les Grands Ballets, Lynda Gaudreau, Carbon 14 and Anjali.¹⁰⁴

That cultural relations were stepping outside Europe was most evidently witnessed in the 'Think Canada 2001' campaign in Japan. Essentially, it was a 're-branding' exercise for

¹⁰¹ *Canada in the World* (1995 Foreign Policy Statement), introduction, under heading 'There is a Strong Consensus for an Active Canadian Foreign Policy' http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap1-en.asp

¹⁰² Potter, 8

¹⁰³ *ibid*

¹⁰⁴ Fleming, Louis K. "The Business of Promoting Canada Overseas: Canadian Image Makers." *Performing Arts and Entertainment in Canada*; Spring 1995, Vol. 29 Issue 2, p. 10.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9504246057&site=ehost-live> (accessed April 14, 2007)

the Canadian image in Japan, since in the late 1990s it was felt by both governments that their economic relationship was not reaching potential. In 1998, the Canadian embassy in Japan started extensive research to try to uncover the weak points in the Canada-Japan relationship. As noted by Potter, the findings produced a momentous revelation: “[according] to the survey, the *single most important* determinant for Japanese interest in another country *was its culture* [emphasis added].”¹⁰⁵ Potter further remarks that the research revealed the Japanese to be well informed about certain aspects of Canada, namely Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, but tended to view the country as lacking sophistication.¹⁰⁶

Consequently, the venture was initiated primarily to, “[convey] a modern image of Canada as a diverse, culturally sophisticated and technologically advanced society with a vibrant economy,” and secondly, “to increase awareness of Canada in the short-term and to increase trade, partnerships, joint ventures between Canada and Japan over the long-term.”¹⁰⁷ The result was a festival that ran between March and May of 2001, consisting of nearly 200 events organized by the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo and the Consulates throughout the country. The final evaluation from DFAIT reports the events ranged from, “artistic performances, receptions, demonstrations, booths, seminars, symposia, etc.”¹⁰⁸ Reportedly, a similar ‘Think Canada’ campaign was to be held in India as announced in 2001 by Mr. Peter Sutherland, Canadian High Commissioner to India.¹⁰⁹

In 2003, then Foreign Minister Bill Graham initiated *A Dialogue With Canadians*, which invited Canadians to inform the government what they wanted from foreign policy. His public consultations revealed the desire of Canadians to strengthen cultural ties and to remain involved in the agenda making process:

“During the consultations, my own activities included leading town hall meetings across Canada, a session of the National Forum for Youth, and many expert roundtables. [...] I have also been struck by the strong desire among Canadians to make our country better known abroad in all of its diversity, opportunity and expertise: through educational and cultural channels, through trade promotion and diplomatic outreach, and through the concrete achievements of a reinvigorated foreign agenda. And finally, the widespread engagement in town halls, on the Web site and in written submissions reaffirmed for me how strongly Canadians believe that direct citizen involvement must remain central to sound government, in the making of our country’s foreign policy as well as in the reform and renewal of multilateral forms of governance.”¹¹⁰

Such an initiative was well in line with the ‘new’ public diplomacy, as it emphasized many-to-many communication for policymaking. The result was not particularly spectacular, as Graham announced that the three pillars of foreign policy should remain

¹⁰⁵ Potter, 17

¹⁰⁶ Potter, 17

¹⁰⁷ Evaluation of the Think Canada Festival in Japan, 2002, <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/auditreports/evaluation/evalThinkCanada02-en.pdf>

¹⁰⁸ *ibid*

¹⁰⁹ “Think Canada campaign this year”, from *The Hindu* (Online edition), Tuesday July 24, 2001. <http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2001/07/24>

¹¹⁰ http://www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca/en/final_report/index.html

intact with some minor adjustments. However, it is important to acknowledge the effort that was put forth to engage the public dimension of policymaking.

The most abrupt change came to the three pillars in 2005 when Prime Minister Martin published the foreign policy review *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Culture as a pillar of foreign policy was completely absent, and cultural relations make few appearances throughout the entirety of the document. But, public diplomacy was articulated as a 'new capacity':

“complete an internal restructuring and consolidation of Foreign Affairs, including a more focused North America branch, a global issues branch concentrating on multilateral reform, more strategic management of bilateral relations and international security, and a stronger emphasis on strategic foreign policy development and public diplomacy.”

And again:

“pursue a more robust and aggressive public diplomacy strategy, to ensure that Canada’s voice and ideas are clearly heard and understood, enabling us to build the coalitions we need to achieve our goals.”¹¹¹

Considering that many experts and academics in diplomacy solidly acknowledge that cultural relations are perhaps *the* most crucial feature of public diplomacy programs, one is left wondering how Prime Minister Martin hoped to achieve a more “robust and aggressive” program as he eradicated the ‘third pillar’ of the previous statement. Not surprisingly then, the seven pages dedicated to ‘Strengthening Canada’s Overseas Networks’ are dedicated to the strengthening of economic exchange.

Arts and culture are not completely absent from the document. In the diplomacy section, it is stated that in the pursuit of democracy and human rights,

“Canada can play a role in demonstrating how institutions can be shaped to ensure that universal standards are respected, while upholding cultural, ethnic, and religious expression. We can do this in part by showcasing Canada’s diversity internationally, including through arts and culture.”¹¹²

This is indeed noble, but it is rather questionable considering that the review makes no reference to increasing funding for cultural relations.

In December of 2004, before the review was published, Martin was interviewed on the program *As It Happens*. When discussing foreign policy, he boasted of Canada’s presence in elections monitoring overseas, and informed the public that Canada would continue to send peacekeepers where needed, but would also do more to train others in peacekeeping. Further into his foreign policy comments he stated the following: “My view is, you begin with military security, but you can’t leave it there. What you’re got to do after that is to begin to put in place the institutions that will allow those democracies (sic)

¹¹¹ *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_ipr_2005-04_ips_key_messages.pdf

¹¹² *ibid*, 17

to grow.”¹¹³ After such a statement, the cultural sector should have been well aware of what was to come. Of course, taken against the backdrop of heightened conflict in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan that the statement was heavily focused on defence and other military intervention is not surprising.

As already mentioned, in September of 2006 the Harper government announced a massive budget cut across all federal spending. The newly elected minority government broke tradition by not releasing an overhaul report on foreign policy, although there has been internal review. The style of foreign relations is taking a draconian turn. Most notably, Prime Minister Harper appears to be asserting a rather tough direction in international relations; since being elected, he has increased Canada’s leadership role in Afghanistan, and suspended aid to Palestinian Authority after the election of Hamas. Cultural relations are disturbingly absent at DFAIT, as is any mention of a public diplomacy strategy. In the 2007-2008 *Report on Plans and Priorities*, there is neither mention of a public diplomacy strategy nor of cultural activity. It is essentially, an economic and military document.

Regardless, public diplomacy channels still remain open, albeit quite narrowly. In international broadcasting there is Radio Canada International (RCI); Internet sites such as culturescope.ca and the Canadian Cultural Observatory; Trade Routes, which plans to expand cultural relations strategies; the International Council for Canadian Studies; and staple players such as Telefilm Canada and the Canada Council, which administers touring grants and is active in foreign audience development. The hosting of the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver also offers an opportunity for public diplomacy in the upcoming years. Although these players offer opportunities for Canadian culture abroad, there is still no state-level commitment to public diplomacy. In fact, it currently seems dubious that Canada is even in the business of public diplomacy. If these programs continue to remain piece-meal and under-funded, Canadian public diplomacy will cease all together, and sadly, Canadian culture will be in danger of fading silently into that cacophony of culture.

Nonetheless, the Department of Canadian Heritage recently presented cultural interests abroad as a top priority:

“Canadian Heritage is committed to working in close cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to lead initiatives to support its key international objectives, to showcase Canadian excellence abroad, to expand foreign opportunities for Canadian cultural trade and expertise, to ensure effective representation of Canadian cultural interests and policy in international trade negotiations, to promote the importance of the diversity of cultural expressions, and to foster democracy and pluralism by sharing Canadian experiences and best practices in the areas of culture, sport, identity, and governance.”¹¹⁴

The Department also plans to create a cultural trade strategy, promote the recent

¹¹³ Paul Martin in Roger Annis, “Paul Martin in Canada in the World,” from website *Autonomy and Solidarity* (http://auto_sol.tao.ca/)

http://auto_sol.tao.ca/node/view/1055

¹¹⁴ http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0708/pch/pch02_e.asp

UNESCO *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*, and prepare for Canada's participation in the Shanghai international exposition in 2010.¹¹⁵

Looking for a moment beyond our institutions, the work of individual Canadians abroad, is often invaluable. Rena Sharon, a University of British Columbia professor of music and concert pianist was, "[inspired] by a passionate plea from Romeo Dallaire, who called not for soldiers but an army of artists, teachers, and caregivers"¹¹⁶ to come to the side of the Rwandan public. General Dallaire, known as having served as Force Commander of UNAMIR (the United Nations peacekeeping force) in Rwanda between 1993 and 1994, understood the need for a wounded people to heal through humanity, not through economic or military involvement. Although the Canadian Consul invited Sharon, she paid her way to Kigali, Rwanda. Her concerts are premised around the "somatic benefits of music for the sick and dying."¹¹⁷ Her time in Rwanda is spent in hospitals, orphanages and the local university.

It is easy enough to see activities like Sharon's as slightly colonial or imperialist in nature; the West coming to the aid of the developing world with its cultural masterpieces of classical music. But, being distrustful of what motivates people to act in such a capacity will not help the case for advancing arts and culture in public diplomacy, foreign relations, and so forth. What we must learn from the story of Sharon is the importance cultural stimulation plays in mending the hearts and minds of a broken nation. Deborah Kirshner writes in her article about Sharon of the loss of the cultural pulse of Rwanda:

"Albert Byron, a guitarist, was one of the first artists to return after the war. He began trying to resuscitate the local culture, but while I [Kirshner] was in Kigali I couldn't find a single club with live music or a pocket of alternative artists. Most of the music heard today is imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or South Africa. I also couldn't find a McDonald's, which is more significant than it sounds, because I discovered the absence of images from corporate America has a dramatic affect on the psyche."¹¹⁸

Rwanda is but one country that faces the danger of falling into cultural silence. If left too long, one can only assume that the absence of McDonalds and Western images will fade. From examples like this, it is clear that public diplomacy does not have to start from nothing; successful public diplomacy will identify current activities of individual Canadians and organizations already active in the business of hearts and minds of foreign publics. Funding cuts are disheartening, but we must go beyond how much or how little our institutions are capable of handing out and recognize that 'best practices' in public diplomacy are already occurring.

¹¹⁵ http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0708/pch/pch02_e.asp

¹¹⁶ Deborah Kirshner, "A Pianist in Rwanda," *Walrus* 4, 4 (May 2007): 59.

¹¹⁷ *ibid*

¹¹⁸ Kirshner, 61

Educational Exchange and Canadian Studies

“Canada is still rarely viewed abroad as a distinct country where our society, whole history, politics and literature merit serious intellectual examination. A few of the old ice and snow myths linger on and the epithet of ‘the unknown country’ may have acquired a new meaning. In large measure, this lack of knowledge about Canada results from our own failure to make the country better known and understood abroad.”¹¹⁹

So stated *The Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies* (the Symons Report) in 1975, the same year in which Canadian Studies was officially inaugurated at the University of Edinburgh. The opening of the program in Edinburgh was not cheap: with a final cost of 180,000GPD¹²⁰, secured from Canadian and British sponsors, Canadian Studies immediately set a high price tag.

Canadian Studies have since been a permanent fixture of public diplomacy efforts, promoting knowledge and understanding of the Canadian experience. The Trudeau government had started promoting the idea of Canadian Studies early in 1974, and officially established a government program in April of 1975. The program was to be included in the five-year plan to expand cultural relations between 1975-1980, and included a variety of scholarly activity, from visiting professorships, academic exchange, research of Canadian topic, the spread of Canadian publications, to the organization of conferences.¹²¹

Also in 1975, the U.S. concocted a strategy to stimulate Canadian Studies programs, which would eventually become the Faculty Enrichment Program. It was to proceed as such: American academics would be financially aided by the Canadian government to pursue research in Canadian Studies, and in return, those involved and their respective universities, would promise to bring in Canadian Studies courses for the three following years.¹²² Ottawa was pleased by the proposal and the program launched in 1976, with a budget of only \$15,000; this sum jumped to \$60,000 between 1978 and 1979, and continued to build in following years. The Canadian embassy in Washington believed the program to be the most successful tool in the promotion of Canadian objectives.

Such success has led to further expansion in the repertoire of Canadian Studies as today DFAIT reports Canadian Studies programs in over 50 countries, with more than 7000 academics in the teaching and researching of Canada.¹²³ Potter writes that today, Canadian Studies is made up of, “associations and centres, research and study awards, travel grants and assistance to university libraries.”¹²⁴ The triumph of the programs has been the relatively low costs it incurs; “[the] approximately \$12 million annual expenditure on academic grants and scholarships represents less than one per cent of DFAIT’s annual budget.”¹²⁵

¹¹⁹ Halloran, 13

¹²⁰ Halloran, 14

¹²¹ Halloran, 13

¹²² Halloran, 14

¹²³ http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-europa/united_kingdom/academic08-en.asp

¹²⁴ Potter, 9.

¹²⁵ *ibid*

Amongst the 26 national and multinational associations, the International Council for Canadian Studies, “is the umbrella organization for Canadian studies associations, and also acts as administrative agent for most of the Government of Canada Canadian Studies Programs.”¹²⁶ Further adding to this is the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Program, numerous exchange programs that operate within most of Canadian universities, and the vast quantities of foreign students that come to Canadian universities every year.

International Broadcasting

After cultural relations and educational exchange, the third most useful instrument of public diplomacy is international broadcasting. Potter remarks that this facet of public diplomacy has not been adequately funded throughout Canadian foreign policy strategies,¹²⁷ a rather unfortunate shortcoming, considering that the development of Canadian cultural policy has strong historical roots in domestic broadcasting. Radio Canada International is the voice of Canada on radio stations worldwide, but Canada does not have an international television service like the BBC in Britain and the *Deutsche Welle* in Germany.

As far back as the 1930s, there was talk in Canada of creating an international radio presence in order to spread the Canadian perspective to the world. During the Second World War, Prime Minister Mackenzie King proposed a shortwave radio station program, for the purpose of keeping Canadian troops abroad informed of news at home. Taken from Arthur Siegel’s history of Radio Canada International, the Department of Canadian Heritage remarks that, “its broadcasts would hasten the German surrender and bolster the spirits of people in occupied countries, by telling enemies and friends about the ongoing battles, the Canadian contribution to the war, and the bright future for world peace that would be shaped under the auspices of the United Nations.”¹²⁸ Test broadcasts began in late 1944 to troops in Europe, both in English and in French.

By the mid 1940s, CBC International Service was broadcasting regularly in Europe in 15 languages, including Czech, Dutch, Italian, Swedish, Danish and Norwegian; however, many of these programs were shut down in 1961. In 1946, broadcasts started in the Caribbean, Cuba, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Brazil. The CBC International Service teamed with the newly assembled UN in 1947; UN broadcasts were transmitted through the Canadian service up to 1952 when they were transferred to the Voice of America.

Potter comments that the service has a difficult history, markedly lacking in government support at crucial moments of its development.¹²⁹ This was certainly true of CBC International Service attempts to broadcast inside the Soviet Bloc. Aimed to inform publics of the Soviet Union what was going on around them, Russian language services ran into difficulties during the 1950s and 1960s, and were completely discontinued in 1967. The Service was restructured in Ottawa in 1968 and officially became part of the CBC; this change also meant that the CBC had to consult with the Department of External Affairs in order to properly fulfill its mandate to, “[continue] expression abroad of

¹²⁶ *ibid*

¹²⁷ Potter, 10

¹²⁸ http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/em-cr/eval/2003/2003_04/3_e.cfm

¹²⁹ Potter, 10

Canadian identity.”¹³⁰

In 1970 the Service was renamed Radio Canada International (RCI), and had by this time, initiated French language broadcasts in parts of Africa and Asia. When the Trudeau government officially recognized China in 1971, both English and Mandarin programs were aired. This was a huge success for RCI, as an estimated audience of 20 million tuned in. Not long after, Arabic broadcasts began in the Middle East; this also coincided with the American operation Desert Shield, which Canada participated in.

The following decades experienced further expansion, and RCI did not run into any significant trouble until 1991, when government initiated a large-scale budget cut across every ministry and Crown Corporation. At this point, CBC decided it could no longer afford RCI, unless more federal funding was allotted. In an effort to save the service, then Program Director Allan Familiant initiated a major restructuring, starting in March of 1991. Despite the setback, RCI survived, and as noted by Potter, by the end of 1998 had a weekly audience of approximately six million.¹³¹

Noteworthy of RCI is that if we examine the mission statement that was set out in 1980 by the CBC, it rather perfectly echoes the aims of public diplomacy on the whole. Stated by DCH, the purpose of RCI is to, “provide a service designed to attract an international audience in order to further develop international awareness of Canada and the Canadian identity.”¹³² The programming was to display to the world Canadian life and culture, “Canada’s national interests and policies, and Canadian viewpoints on national and international affairs.”¹³³ Secondary in the statement was the commitment to give Canadians abroad, mainly those serving foreign posts but also travelers, better access to Canadian news and events.

Later, it became understood in Ottawa that the reality of Canadian life, economic, social, cultural and so forth, was not well known overseas, and that, “it is not represented on foreign newsstands by Canadian daily or weekly press, nor by any but the most superficial coverage in foreign media.”¹³⁴ Thus, a policy shift was made in 1994 to ensure that the programming of RCI reflected awareness of this problem, and it was further added that programs were to reflect Canada’s national interests, policies and multitude of viewpoints.

Today RCI operates via analog and digital shortwave, the Internet, satellite, and is also available through various public, private, community and university radio stations.¹³⁵ It operates in 9 languages, a considerably low number when one looks at the language proficiencies of similar international broadcasters. Programs run weekly in these 9 languages: English, French, Spanish, Russian, Ukrainian, Mandarin, Cantonese, Arabic and Portuguese. RCI runs programs specifically directed at language training to young children and their parents: “[through] traditional Canadian legends, nursery rhymes, songs and games, this series combines entertainment with education to teach a second

¹³⁰ http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/em-cr/eval/2003/2003_04/3_e.cfm

¹³¹ Potter, 10

¹³² http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/em-cr/eval/2003/2003_04/3_e.cfm

¹³³ *ibid*

¹³⁴ *ibid*

¹³⁵ RCI <http://www.rcinet.ca/>

Canadian Conference of the Arts

language.”¹³⁶ These programs are run as part of RCI’s mandate to service new immigrants in Canada, as is ‘RCI Viva’, which broadcasts in 8 languages and touches on topics of interest for new immigrants. RCI also produces a Cyberjournal, a free daily synopsis of Canadian news stories that is sent via email to those subscribed.

¹³⁶ RCI

Difficulties for Canadian Culture Abroad

Canada v. America

The most obvious dimension of this discussion is the fact that Canada sits largely in the shadow of the United States—politically, economically, in military strength, and so forth. Thus, a major hurdle in properly executing a public diplomacy campaign will be avoiding American cultural imperialism. Since it is so wealthy, the U.S. is allowed to be, as Kevin V. Mulcahy states, “the great cultural exception, with a regnant popular culture that is able to indemnify its costs over a populous and prosperous society that is largely immune to cultural expressions that do not project an American sensibility.”¹³⁷ Essentially, America can afford to have a ‘cultural open-door policy’ since it has little to fear from foreign competition.

For Canada, however, cultural free trade raises the problem of standing more or less unprotected against the forces of American cultural annexation. The size and aggressiveness of the American cultural industries, especially in the areas of film, television and publishing, are in fact very threatening to Canadian cultural sovereignty, and thus may stand in the way of a ‘sovereign’ Canadian cultural diplomacy.

The United States and Canada have very different ideas about the *nature* of culture:

“Americans typically accept the market as the determinant of cultural values...culture is the equivalent (basically) of entertainment and is a good that is properly allocated by the market. In Canada...culture is an expression of national identity and as such is to be promoted and protected as a public responsibility.”¹³⁸

From these different viewpoints, it is easy to see where room for misunderstanding arises, especially concerning exemption status for cultural industries in free-trade agreements. American entertainment is one of its chief exports and Canada *is* a major profit country. Not surprisingly then, some of the more contentious issues around Canada-U.S. free-trade agreements have revolved around the production and dissemination of cultural products.

To clarify, cultural products, as defined by NAFTA involve, “the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or newspapers; music in print of machine-readable form; the production distribution, sale, or exhibition of film or video, audio, or video music recordings; radio communication, TV, cable, and satellite programming.”¹³⁹ The NAFTA treaty provides that these cultural industries are governed by the terms of the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the treatment of culture is identical in both treaties.¹⁴⁰ However, Article 2005 (1) provides that cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of the agreement.

¹³⁷ Kevin V. Mulcahy, “Cultural Imperialism and Cultural Sovereignty: U.S.-Canada Cultural Relations,” *Journal of Arts Management, Law and Societies*, 31 (Winter 2002): 265.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, 269.

¹³⁹ *ibid*

¹⁴⁰ *ibid*

Cultural exemption has been the subject of competing interpretations between Canadians and Americans. The United States has never contested Canadian cultural protectionism as a violation of NAFTA; however, it did seek a ruling in 1996 by the World Trade Organization (WTO) concerning Canadian discrimination against split-run magazines such as *Sports Illustrated*, *People Canada* and *Elle Québec*. The WTO ruled in “Canada—Certain Measures Relating to Periodicals” that several Canadian measures were not permissible because magazines were judged to be a goods, not services.¹⁴¹

The U.S. and the issue of cultural exemption will only be a problem when it comes to distinguishing Canadian culture from American culture. Without being blatantly un-American, Canada must choose wisely in what it selects to represent itself abroad.

Culture v. Values

“Our principles and values - *our culture* [emphasis added]- are rooted in a commitment to tolerance; to democracy, equity and human rights; to the peaceful resolution of differences; to the opportunities and challenges of the marketplace; to social justice; to sustainable development; and to easing poverty.”¹⁴²

The above statement, which appeared in the 1995 foreign policy review, is vaguely confusing. If the ‘third pillar’ was about values *and* culture, should they not be treated separately? The terms appear as interchangeable substitutes: Canadian values equal Canadian culture, and vice versa. This confusion seems to re-invoke the thought of Granatstein: “for too many Canadians peacekeeping has become a substitute for policy and thought.” Similarly, and in light of the statement, Granatstein’s statement seems also to say that for too many Canadians *values* had become substitutes for *culture*.

Certainly, extrapolating the lines between values and culture is difficult, perhaps impossible, as they embody and infuse each other to varying degrees. Of course, the commitment to values is worthy of a high amount of attention, but it does beg the question, what is the role of culture in foreign policy if it is only adjunct to values? Given that such Canadian values have been pursued mainly through military (or should we say ‘diplomatic’) presence and/or assistance, it makes it difficult for culture, in terms of visual and performing arts, other creative processes, and perhaps to a lesser extent, Canadian scholarship abroad, to find a place in these Canadian values that are pursued internationally. If Canadian truly believed in creating cultures of peace around the world, they would support more peaceful international relations, like through arts and culture instead of blindly believing that everything the state does abroad is peaceful in nature.

Cultural Democracy and the Image Problem

Cultural democracy gained popularity during the 1970s. Cultural democracy emphasized decentralization; as such, it would represent a policy shift in Canadian cultural policy away from the overarching goal to create a national culture to one that encouraged the growth of ‘local’ cultural activity. In 1970, Gerard Pelletier formally announced at the Canadian Conference of the Arts’ national conference the adjusted directions for federal cultural policy toward, democratization, decentralization, pluralism,

¹⁴¹ Mulcahy, 270.

¹⁴² Canada in the World http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap1-en.asp

federal-provincial cooperation, and international cooperation.¹⁴³ The result was more provincial and municipal participation. Better stated by Joyce Zemans, federal cultural policy now, “became significantly engaged with the empowerment of regional voices.”¹⁴⁴ Between 1970 and 1975, regional departments responsible to culture were set up in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, and British Columbia.

General worry over the projection of a coherent national image or identity is well entrenched in Canadian history. The area of international cultural relations has addressed the problem. Notably, in the late 1970s, international relations were enlisted to the cause of national unity. Halloran notes this occurred alongside the, “victory of the Parti Québécois in the provincial election of 1976 and the federalist victory in the referendum of 1980.”¹⁴⁵ Europe, the U.S. and Japan voiced concerned over the legitimacy of Canada as a viable place of investment. The Department of External Affairs took on a role to advance an image of Canadian unity, and funds were opened to support the task.

This is an interesting point, since Canada originally entered into cultural diplomacy methods largely to counterbalance similar efforts of the Québec government. Ottawa curbed its reactionary measures throughout the 1970s by investing in its own programs, but these programs, along with Québec’s activity abroad spurred interest in other provinces to engage in their own cultural diplomacy programs. Although Ottawa generally welcomed such interest of the provinces to engage abroad, especially in terms of economic interests, provincial activity abroad has created some confusion in foreign audiences about the Canadian image.

Generally speaking, the federal and provincial governments are cooperative in working abroad, and they appear to be working together in trade negotiations and promotions. DFAIT has granted co-location agreements with a number of provinces to place provincial trade officers in certain Canadian embassies. Potter weighs in on the matter: “Team Canada trade missions around the world are a manifestation of this attempt to mine the synergies of federal and provincial activities abroad and to promote a single, unified image of Canada.”¹⁴⁶

Whether Canada really has an image problem or not is questionable. Canada is a large country that has and always will present difficulty in the presentation of a national image. But Canadians should revel in such ambiguity rather than reject it; transnationality, hybridity, multicultural identities are powerful concepts that states can use to their advantage. If we agree that identity, and in an increasingly multicultural country, nationality, are not longer constrained by traditional geographical boundaries, the issue of national identity becomes immediately more fluid and open to possibility. This should be the direction of the Canadian image abroad.

¹⁴³ Joyce Zemans, *Where Is Here: Canadian Culture in a Globalized World*, Tenth Annual Robarts Lecture, 1996.

¹⁴⁴ *ibid*

¹⁴⁵ Halloran, 16.

¹⁴⁶ Potter, 16.