Westray Coal Mine Disaster

Pictou County, Nova Scotia

At 5:18am on 9 May 1992
the Westray coal mine exploded
killing 26 miners

John Thomas Bates
Larry Arthur Bell
Bennie Joseph Benoit
Wayne Michael Conway
Ferris Todd Dewan
Adonis Joseph Dollimont
Robert Steven Doyle
Remi Joseph Drolet
Roy Edward Feltmate
Charles Robert Fraser
Myles Daniel Gillis
John Philip Halloran
Randolph Brian House
Trevor Martin Jahn
Laurence Elwyn James
Eugene William Johnson
Stephen Paul Lilley
Michael Frederick MacKay
Angus Joseph MacNeil
Glenn David Martin
Harry Alliston McCallum
Eric Earl McIsaac
George James Munroe
Danny James Poplar
Romeo Andrew Short
Peter Francis Vickers

I make this pledge to the families. Westray will not be some vague memory of a tragic accident.  It will be a living, active presence in workplaces across Nova Scotia.  Your husbands, your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your friends, will never be forgotten.  Every time someone wants to cut a corner or bend a rule, we will remind them there can never be another Westray and this government will not allow it.
Minister of Transportation and Public Works
speaking on the floor of the Nova Scotia Legislature, 1 December 1997

Brief Westray overview

Coal – the rock that burns – is a fuel, a source of energy. Coal is composed mainly of carbon (50-98 percent), hydrogen (3-13 percent) and oxygen, with lesser amounts of nitrogen, sulphur and other elements. Some water is always present, as are grains of inorganic matter that form an incombustible residue known as ash.

A small lump of coal

Coal provides a large part of the world's energy supply (a largely unknown fact). In the 1990s and continuing into the new millennium, coal was/is the primary energy source for about 55% of all electric power generation in the United States and Canada.  In Nova Scotia, coal accounts for about 80% of all electric power generation.

One kilogram of coal contains enough energy to generate about two kilowatt-hours of electrical energy – this figure varies considerably depending on the quality of the coal but 2 kWh per kilogram is a reasonably representative average for coal burned in a modern high-pressure boiler (producing steam at about 1800 pounds per square inch) to drive a steam turbine to generate electricity.

Westray was an underground coal mine located in the tiny village of Plymouth, near Stellarton in Pictou County, Nova Scotia.  Westray was planned to mine coal from the Foord seam, long known for its high-quality coal and for being exceptionally gassy.

It has been known for centuries that methane-rich gases are trapped in most coal seams.  The quantity of gas trapped in any particular coal seam varies widely.  The Foord seam has been known since the mid-1800s as being exceptionally gassy.  Any digging or drilling activity that disturbs the Foord seam releases quantities of methane (firedamp), which doesn't matter much in an open-pit mine with lots of fresh air, but in an underground mine like Westray, methane mixed with air can be an extremely dangerous explosive.  The Foord seam contains roughly 100 to 500 cubic feet [3 to 15 cubic metres] of methane per ton of coal.

The Pictou coalfield, with its thick and gassy seams, had been mined for some 200 years.  The Foord seam, which Westray was mining, has hosted at least eight mines.  The Allan mine, the most productive and the one that lay just northwest of Westray's workings, finally closed in the 1950s, but during its 40-year lifetime, it experienced at least eight methane explosions.  This history was well-known in Pictou County when the proposal to open a new mine, called Westray, was promoted in the late 1980s.

Local historian James Cameron has estimated that 576 deaths occurred between 1866 and 1972 in mining in Pictou County and that 625-650 died "from colliery misadventures in Pictou County" since coal mining began in the early 1800s.  In the Foord pit there is special danger "on account of the liability of cutting heavy feeders of gas"... – quoted from a report by Henry S. Poole, Inspector of Mines, in the Nova Scotia Department of Mines Annual Report, 1873.

Because of the promise of a substantial number of well-paid jobs in an economically depressed area, the development of the Westray mine received considerable political support from the provincial and federal governments despite the opposition of technical experts and despite the history of mining fatalities in the area.

Charlie Angus described it well: "When Curragh Resources' mining boss Clifford Frame started talking about opening a mine in the economically depressed area of Stellarton, Nova Scotia, in the late 1980s, politicians flocked to him like seagulls at the beach."

Pictou County has been a political powerhouse for decades.  The federal electoral district of Central Nova (which included Pictou County) was represented, from August 1983 to September 1984, by Brian Mulroney.  Mr. Mulroney's next job was Prime Minister of Canada from 17 September 1984 to 24 June 1993, a time which included the promotional phase, the construction and the entire working life of the Westray Coal Mine.

From September 1984 to September 1993 – including the promotional phase of the Westray Coal Mine, its construction and its entire working life – Pictou County was represented in Ottawa by MP Elmer MacKay, a member of the federal cabinet as Solicitor General of Canada, then Minister of National Revenue, then Minister of Public Works – powerful senior ministerial offices.

The Provincial MLA for Pictou East, which included the Westray Mine, was Donald Cameron, who had been elected as MLA in 1974 and appointed Minister of Fisheries in October 1978.  By the time Frame began promoting the Westray coal mine, Cameron, then Minister of Industry and a member of cabinet for more than a decade, had a deep understanding of the levers of power in the Nova Scotia government.  Mr. Cameron was Premier of Nova Scotia from 26 February 1991 to 11 June 1993.

The Westray mine was promoted by Curragh Resources Incorporated, an Ontario company controlled by Clifford Frame.  In November 1987, Curragh incorporated a subsidiary company, Westray Coal, to construct and operate the new mine.

On 9 September 1988, Westray finalized a deal for the purchase of coal interests in Pictou County then owned by Suncor Inc. – 75% owned by Sun Oil Company (Sunoco) – and signed an agreement with Nova Scotia Power Corporation — Nova Scotia's largest electric utility, then owned by the Nova Scotia government — which agreed to purchase Westray coal for its new coal-burning electric generating station at nearby Trenton, Nova Scotia.  A letter dated that same day was sent to Westray by Donald Cameron, provincial minister of industry, trade, and technology, which committed the province to a mining lease, a loan of $12,000,000 and a take-or-pay agreement for 275,000 tonnes of coal per year for fifteen years.

After two years of protracted and difficult negotiations, on 27 June 1990 a deal was finalized, between the Federal Government and Curragh Resources Inc., to provide funding for the development of the Westray coal mine.  Construction of the mine had been going forward for some time before that date.  Early in 1989, Curragh's subcontractor, Canadian Mining Development, began driving (constructing) the main access tunnels.

The mine was financed through massive infusions of Federal and Provincial funds in the form of loans and loan guarantees.  The Federal contribution consisted of an 85% guarantee of a $100,000,000 bank loan.  The Province of Nova Scotia contributed $12,000,000 by way of a fully-subordinated loan – meaning that this loan will be repaid only after all other lenders have been paid in full, and if there isn't enough money to go around (there wasn't), the provincial loan will not be paid back.  The Provincial government also entered into a rather controversial "Take or Pay Agreement" whereby the province agreed to purchase any excess coal which was not taken by the Nova Scotia Power Corporation.

The contribution by Curragh Resources Inc. to the project consisted of a $9,000,000 cash investment plus a "deferral" of management fees allegedly owing to Curragh.

The official opening of the mine was on 11 September 1991.

On 5 May 1992 — four days before the Westray mine exploded — the company's name was changed from Curragh Resources Incorporated to Curragh Incorporated.

The Westray mine commenced operations (began producing saleable coal) in June of 1991 amid claims of it being a veritable "State of the Art" operation utilizing the latest in mining technology and equipment with computerized safety monitoring devices which were said to be at the leading edge of current technology.  After the explosion, the claim that the mine was designed and built with state-of-the-art techonolgy was called into question.  The mine was plagued with serious ground control problems related directly to the geological configuration of the Foord seam.  This problem was exacerbated by the lack of competent planning.  The ground control problems led the Westray Mine Public Inquiry to conclude that "The cost of operating in such an adverse environment and the inherent uncertainties would suggest that the financial viability of the Westray project should have been in doubt from the very beginning".

Production was erratic during the brief (less than a year) life of Westray and production quotas were never realized.

At 5:18 Saturday morning, 9 May 1992, the mine blew up killing all 26 men working underground.  The explosion was so strong it blew the top off the mine entrance, more than a mile above, and blew away steel roof supports throughout the mine.  In the nearby towns, windows shattered and houses shook.

The mine ceased operations at the moment of the explosion and never re-opened.

Westray Coal Inc. and Curragh Inc. both went bankrupt.  Curragh's residual assets were subsequently acquired by 1235866 Ontario Inc. (which was owned by former Curragh creditors including the Yukon government).  The Province of Nova Scotia's $12,000,000 loan would never be repaid.  The Federal Government's 85% guarantee of Curragh's $100,000,000 bank loan was called by the bank after the explosion, and the government paid $85,000,000 to the bank — that money is gone forever (but, because these payments are now part of the government debt, the interest on the $12,000,000 is an expense paid every year by Nova Scotia taxpayers, while the interest on the $85,000,000 is an expense paid every year by Canadian taxpayers.)

More about the Westray Coal Mine Wikipedia

Curragh Resources Clifford Frame's website

• Nova Scotia Legislature, Halifax,   2001 May 9
• House of Commons, Ottawa,   2001 May 9:
  ...It is some time since the Justice Committee recommended that the criminal code be amended so as to make sure that the kinds of people who are responsible for these kinds of events do not literally get away with murder, as is sometimes the case...
• House of Commons, Ottawa,   2000 March 13
• Newfoundland Legislature, St. John's,   1999 December 2
• Prince Edward Island Legislature, Charlottetown,   1999 May 4
• House of Commons, Ottawa,   1997 December 2:
  ...The report released yesterday reveals a chain of obvious preventable safety problems. As project financier, Ottawa must share the blame for turning the federally assisted job project into a tomb, a mine so unsafe that eleven bodies have yet to be recovered, and a whole region in Nova Scotia remains in mourning...
• Ontario Legislature, Toronto,   1997 September 29
• Manitoba Legislature, Winnipeg,   1996 April 3
• Saskatchewan Legislature, Regina,   1996 March 15
• Yukon Legislature, Whitehorse,   1993 March 15
• Alberta Legislature, Edmonton,   1992 July 2
• British Columbia Legislature, Victoria,   1992 June 19:
  ...On May 9, 1992, just before dawn, a thunderous methane explosion roared through Westray's Plymouth, Nova Scotia, underground workings, killing 26 miners. For six long, agonizing days Canada watched and waited, clinging to the hope that some might be found alive...
• British Columbia Legislature, Victoria,   1992 May 11:
  ...I therefore propose to send a telegram to the Mines minister of Nova Scotia and the mayor of Plymouth as follows: "We share your sorrow at the loss of 11 lives in the Westray mine disaster and pray that you will reach the other fifteen while they are still alive...

July 1991

This report describes the results of an analysis of the public inquiry hearings held after the Westray Coal accident in May 1992. At the request of Mr. Justice K. Peter Richard, Commissioner, I investigated the content of the hearings in order to develop insight into the degree to which Westray employees perceived the risk of accident as imminent and why the miners either accepted or rejected the risk they perceived. While some miners terminated their employment with the mine because they were unwilling to accept the accident risk, others continued to work until the accident happened. Various factors that contributed to the employee perceptions of accident risk were identified, and it may be inferred that the perceived probability and expected seriousness of an accident was both high and general throughout the underground workforce. Moreover, the willingness to accept high levels of danger amongst those miners who did not quit may be atrributed to the operation of various factors, among which economic pressures and economic incentives played a major role. Mine management, rather than putting in place a safety-incentive programme of a type known to significantly improve cautious and accident-free performance, instituted instead a remuneration schedule with a progressive production bonus component that appears to have exacerbated risk acceptance and the frequency of imprudent practices among the miners. The pursuit of short-term economic gain may well have set the stage for the fatal explosion and the mine's premature demise.

They learned how to lie to themselves

The way we blind ourselves to honest assessment of risk goes back a long way.  I wrote an essay on risk management philosophy in general, giving Titanic as the specific example, and put it on the Web (see "The Titanic Disaster: An Enduring Example of Money Management vs. Risk Management" below) ... As individuals, we may learn from close shaves and warnings; as a society, we only learn from blood... The touchiest thing in risk management is the calculation of cost per fatality averted... Vaughn's five steps: New information would come in that signalled danger. Engineers would document the danger and express concern.  This evidence would be given close examination, but of course by a process that was aware that terrible schedule or money consequences would result from a negative decision.  However, unacceptable risks with life or mission cannot be just accepted; the positive decision would be that the risk itself was in fact tolerable.  What was a deviation at step one would, after further launches, become the new normal.  So the cycle could repeat — a few more percent of change each time... There were no lies told... It was far deeper than that.  They learned how to lie to themselves...
          (boldface emphasis added)

...The week in 1995 I wrote the original essay, thousands of semi-trailers in Canada were being pulled off the road to have their outer wheels inspected.  Two cars full of people had been killed in two weeks by semi wheels that had come loose and run wild.  It turned out that such things had been happening every month or two all along; this was just the first time that several fatalities had happened.  As individuals, we may learn from close shaves and warnings; as a society we only learn from blood... The touchiest thing in risk management is the calculation of cost per fatality averted.  It makes perfect sense to an engineer, but in public debate, such numbers can always be twisted in any direction... The problem for the engineer is to tackle these fears with his own art, which involves quantifying things.  The summary of one paper in those conference proceedings went right to the heart of the issue – he had calculated the cost per fatality averted for various different approaches of ship subdivision, so as to recommend which design to use.  This is good engineering and I wish all society thought that way; but I guarantee you that any politician or top bureaucrat will flee the room, eyes averted, if he shows them the paper; they'll want deniability in public debate... I think that all engineers face the same two kinds of problems in the end.  The junior ones have to crank out the most effective design they can, given a cost envelope and set of standards.  The senior ones have to run the calc in reverse, starting with a design that fits their conscience, to sit on the standards committees, and push for the cost envelope that will make it possible.  Sometimes they don't, or can't, push hard enough.  But to be fair, they do have a handicap – scientific people often don't communicate well with policy makers, or the general public.  They tend to argue with facts, formulas, simulations, and other kinds of sweet reason.  These don't work well.  What does work well are shameless appeals to emotion... Like baby seals covered in oil.  And always, always, casualty lists.  Best of all are individual stories of casualties, to make the deaths real.  We only learn from blood.
          (boldface emphasis added)

As I sit down to write, it is 11:40pm, April 14th, 1995.  Ignoring the time zone difference, it was 83 years ago this minute that the RMS Titanic, on her maiden voyage in 1912, struck an iceberg... Most of the problems all came from a larger, systemic problem: the owners and operators of steamships had for five decades taken larger and larger risks to save money – risks to which they had methodically blinded themselves.  The Titanic disaster suddenly ripped away the blindfolds and changed dozens of attitudes, practices, and standards almost literally overnight.  The perception persists that the Titanic was, if obviously not "unsinkable" (though the White Star line actually never used that word in advertising), then very safe, as safe as the art could build her.  That, despite various errors, the accident was mostly enormous bad luck.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  It was amazing good luck that there had been no similar accidents years earlier. For over 50 years, safety standards had been steadily deteriorating in various ways – almost always because of pressures to be "competitive"... The first great liner, the Great Eastern, built in 1858, was designed by I.K. Brunel, England's most celebrated engineer, who got every feature he wanted.  Great Eastern was not the most profitable ship, but she was a triumph of safety.  She had an entire inner hull two feet inside the outer.  Inside that, the ship was divided by 15 transverse bulkheads, and one lengthwise into 32 compartments.  Watertight lower decks further divided those... All risks need rational consideration, and some must be accepted... Even today however, it is still often the case that money management wins out over risk management...

Abstract: Technological crises are predictable and inevitable, particularly in a high-risk industry such as mining. Corporations are advised to have a crisis communication plan to facilitate proactive behaviour. Such a plan presumes a commitment to honesty, openness, and ethical behaviour. Journalists are also encouraged to have a crisis communication plan so that they are prepared for inevitable events, informed about the industries in their area, and able to tell the story substantively, accurately, and in context. The Westray coal mine, owned by Curragh Incorporated of Toronto and located in Pictou County, Nova Scotia, exploded on May 9, 1992, killing the 26 miners who were underground. This paper analyzes the relationship between Curragh and the media, particularly during the week following the explosion. It observes that the relationship was severely tested, as is often the case in time of crisis and human tragedy. The paper also observes that neither Curragh nor the participating media had crisis communication plans, which negatively affected their performance. It concludes that Curragh did not satisfy legitimate media needs and that the company's lack of open, prompt, and accessible communication fed a media suspicion that officials had something to hide. On the other hand, journalists relied on human interest, made mistakes, and decontextualized their coverage of the story.

...the job of gouging and moving coal is much like it was in the early 18th century. Methanometers have replaced canaries as early detection systems, but the linear process of extraction and the risks of methane gas and flammable coal dust haven t changed. Why then is the fatality rate for mine workers still five times the national average for workers?

Evidence from Westray shows a long-standing pattern of safety violations: combustion engines refueled with the motors running, a "volunteer" system for applying limestone to reduce coal dust concentrations, cigarette butts and oily rags littering the mine floor.

"We found at Westray a pattern of behaviour that sociologists call mock bureaucracy – a situation in which workers fail to follow regulations and the managers fail to enforce compliance," says Hynes, whose investigation of Westray is part of his doctoral research. Rules are ignored because they are perceived as "bureaucratic paraphernalia" without legitimacy in themselves. What is remarkable at Westray though, he says, is that rules tied to workers survival, which should be deeply meaningful, were ignored.

...a network of financial and political forces pushing managers to value production results over safety rules. For instance, an agreement with the Bank of Nova Scotia linked financing to production data. Government funding also depended on a commitment to the Nova Scotia Power Corporation to produce a certain number of tons of coal per year.

Miners had their own reasons for participating in unsafe working procedures. One worker left his job to avoid dangerous conditions, and suffered penalties in his UIC claim. In job-strapped Nova Scotia, brutal labour market discipline could have stopped miners from taking action.

But why would miners make matters worse by smoking in areas where explosions were a constant and predictable danger? Hynes and Prashad point to the culture of danger that has always surrounded mining. Memorials found in many mining towns depict the miner as a tragic hero and probably incline the workers to accept higher risks as part of their occupational identity. Hynes and Prasad conclude that while managers and miners broke safety rules for different reasons, they ended up supporting each other in making Westray a dangerous place...

Using Westray as an example, at a surface level, reports of events at the mine seem contrary to common sense and raise many questions. Why did miners (who stood to lose their lives), managers (who stood to lose their business and their reputations), and inspectors (who stood to lose their jobs and their credibility) appear to ignore dangerous levels of coal dust? What were they thinking? Did the situation make sense to them? Clearly, the press, and later the Richard inquiry, were able to make sense of events by imposing a common sense framework on events, thus rendering the accounts plausible. A Weickian account, on the other hand, suggests that we need to understand events not simply through what makes sense to us but through the processes by which a dominant sense of the organization came to be enacted by those involved.

The importance of Weick's (1995) approach is that it directs us away from rational accounts of organizations that focus on coping with or reproducing hierarchical notions of organization. Instead it directs our attention to the process of organizing and the social psychological linkages that encourage a sense of organization (Weick, 1969). Thus, as important as the Richard inquiry is in establishing responsibility and discouraging a repeat of the events that led to the disaster, another disaster will occur unless we understand the social psychological processes whereby people put themselves in harm's way...

Recent studies on the antecedents of industrial crises have tended to focus on disasters in high-risk systems involving complex technologies and tightly-knit processes. This paper examines events leading up to mining disasters which past research has characterized as being typically more foreseeable and avoidable. We discuss how many mining disasters are likely to be the result of 'mock bureaucracies' or situations characterized by overt violation of safety rules at the workplace. Using the Westray mine explosion as an illustrative case, the paper traces the development and institutionalization of a mock bureaucracy in an organization. Implications for further research and understanding of industrial crises are drawn.

Communication issues in high-risk industries can be summarized as due to:
• internal resistance to safety and reputation feedback
• failing to properly participate in public debate
The case of the 1992 Westray mines accident, one of the worst industrial disasters in Canadian history, illustrates these failures.  The result of the Westray disaster was that the company and its owners became bankrupt.  Much of this can be attributed to the poor internal and external communication strategies the company employed...

The Westray Mine Disaster Case
...Coal mining is dangerous and underground mining in Pictou County has always been very dangerous. From 1838 to 1950, when it ceased due to the advent of fuel oil, aging facilities and deep seams too expensive to mine at the time, 246 miners had been killed in a series of explosions. From 1866 to 1972, another 330 were killed in other kinds of accidents (i.e. stone falls, crushing by coal cars, mangled in machinery). The Foord coal seam, of which the Westray mine was a part, while particularly dangerous, was singularly attractive. Unusually thick, with low sulfur content and high BTU rating, its reserves were estimated at 45 million tons. The location is known to exude large quantities of methane, is geologically faulted so that mine roofs will collapse, and has a problem of spontaneous combustion (even in the absence of sparking machinery.) Indeed, almost a year before the disaster, one provincial opposition politician argued, "[b]ecause of the fault structure and gas contained in the formation of coal seams in Pictou County, Westray mine is potentially one of the most dangerous mines in the world"...

Westray was an underground coal mine in Stellarton, near New Glasgow, Pictou County, Nova Scotia that blew up on May 9, 1992 killing all 26 people working in the mine instantaneously.  Westray was a corporation wholly owned by Curragh Resources, a company controlled by Clifford Frame and based in Ontario. The development of the mine in Stellarton received considerable political support from the provincial and federal government despite the opposition of technical experts and despite the history of mining fatalities in the area.  Local historian James Cameron estimates that 576 deaths occurred between 1866 and 1972 in mining in Pictou County and that 625-650 died "from colliery misadventures in Pictou County" since the industry's debut in the early 1800s.  The Federal MP for Pictou County was Brian Mulroney, later Prime Minister of Canada and the Provincial MLA was Donald Cameron, then Minister of Industry and subsequently Premier of the province...

What has been done about the recommendations of the Westray Inquiry?  The Nova Scotia government hired a consultant, Ian Plummer, a former Inspector of Mines of Ontario, to review the activities of the Ministry of Labour.  Plummer's report was released with no substantive recommendations to improve health and safety of workers in the province.  Instead, he hides behind bureaucratic reorganization of the department without any consideration of the lack of effectiveness in protecting workers' lives.

Ian Plummer, as a mines inspector, sat on the panel of industry experts which awarded Westray the mining industry's J.T. Ryan Award for Safety as the safest coal mine in Canada in 1991, eleven days prior to the explosion that killed 26 men...

...A result of the Westray inquiry, the study was commissioned in January (1998) by Justice Peter Richard of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.  It was conducted by Ian Plummer, retired provincial co-ordinator of mining for the province of Ontario.  Mr. Plummer reviewed the division's internal responsibility system, staff competency, training programs, internal and external communications, performance management systems and organizational structure.  Over the course of his study, Mr. Plummer interviewed division managers, staff members and officials of similar organizations in other jurisdictions...
Source: [ Government press release 16 April 1998
    http://www.gov.ns.ca/news/details.asp?id=19980416002

2003 November 7 — Legislation that the United Steelworkers has promoted for nearly 12 years became law today when Bill C-45, the 'Westray' Bill, was given Royal Assent in the Senate.  The legislation amends the Criminal Code of Canada to hold corporations, their directors and executives accountable for criminally negligent acts in the workplace...

...A safe workplace demands a responsible and conscientious commitment from management — from the Chief Executive Officer down. Such a commitment was sadly lacking at the Westray mine. Since there was no discernible safety ethic, including a training program and a management safety mentality there could be no continuum of responsible safety practice within that workplace. Complacency seemed to be the prevailing attitude at Westray — which at times regressed to a heedless disregard for the most fundamental safety imperatives. As I stated in the report, compliance with safety regulations was the clear duty of Westray management. To Insure that this duty was undertaken and fulfilled by management was the legislated duty of the inspectorate. Management failed, the inspectorate failed, and the mine blew up.

...Nothing better illustrates the incompetence with which the inspectors dealt with the dust problems at Westray than their actions after the coal dust orders were issued on April 29th, 1992 (ten days before the mine exploded). The order had four parts: The coal dust was to be removed immediately and stone dusting was to be done immediately. Within fifteen days, a stone dusting plan was to be developed and filed and within fifteen days a dust sampling program was to be developed and filed. The company was to notify the Department, in writing, when it had complied with each part of the order. As we know from the evidence, nothing was done ... What is worse, nothing was done by the Department to monitor compliance ... One reason for the paralysis of the inspectors may lie with the dominant philosophy in the health and safety division of the Department. It was, and apparently still is, a philosophy of non-engagement that in this case encouraged blind deference to the decisions of the mine operator ... There was a sinister side to the management of the mine beyond the incompetence and the neglect ... However, it would be wrong to suggest that Westray or Curragh were rogue companies that can be set aside as anomalies. They were part of the Canadian mining industry. Their executives were leading lights in that industry. In a sense, the industry as a whole must bear some responsibility for what happened here. We regret the fact that both the Coal Association of Canada and the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum refused your invitation to participate in these hearings. The Institute was the body which awarded Westray the John T. Ryan Trophy for mine safety a few weeks before the mine blew up ...

...The lack of training and education of miners and company officials in safety matters played a prominent role in the failure to develop a culture that rejects acceptance, condonation, and participation in activities which present unmanageable safety risks. We agree that we could have done more to detect that deficiency, we agree we could have done more by way of education. Policies, procedures, and safety practices should have been scrutinized more systematically for their adequacy, and more effort should have been made to determine their impact on day to day activities. We now know that the reality at Westray often did not match company records, or what the inspectors were led to believe by management, or the things they saw at the mine ...

...On the eve of our national holiday, Canada Day, July 1, 1998, government prosecutors have announced that the Westray managers, Phillips and Parry, will no longer have to face criminal prosecution for their role in the death of 26 men on May 9, 1992.  Despite the public testimony, and the two volumes of documentation of mismanagement, violations of safety regulations and practices, and failure to protect the safety of the workers from the Public Inquiry into the Westray Explosion, this is not enough to prove a crime by a corporate manager, according to the Crown Attorney in charge.  Mr.. Justice Richards was very careful in his report to describe the behaviour of the Westray managers as "willful blindness" towards what was happening and the tragic consequences that could and did result. "Willful blindness" is a standard of proof sufficient to convict you or I of any crime, but not, so it seems, managers and CEO's.  The behaviour of the office of the Crown Attorney from the beginning has been nothing more than a cover-up and a screw up. The Supreme Court of Canada had to order them back to trial! Judges at all levels have commented on the bad behaviour of the prosecution. Now we are expected to accept their judgement to give up. ...

Are accidents inevitable or can they be managed?

What, if anything, can be learned from history?

The ebullition of fire damp (methane) at the East River was similar to that of a steam boiler, with the same kind of rapidity, so that putting flame to it on a calm day it would spread over the river, like what is commonly termed 'setting the Thames on fire'; it often reminded me of that saying.  It is very common for the women to go to the river with the washing they have to perform for their families and dig a hole about ten inches deep by the river side.  This they then fill with pebbles, and put a candle to it; by this means they have plenty of boiling water.  I mention this to show how highly charged the coal was with gas.  When we first reached the seam at a depth of 180 feet [60m], the gas roared as the miner struck the coal with his pick; it would often go off like the report of a pistol.  The noise which the gas and water made in issuing from the coal was like a hundred thousand snakes hissing at each other.
    — page 44 The Coal-Fields and Coal Industry of Eastern Canada, A General Survey and Description
by Francis W. Gray, Canada Department of Mines, 1917

...documents have been withheld
through negligence, inadvertence
or design...

Statement of Justice K. Peter Richard
Commissioner

Halifax, Nova Scotia
Monday, 12 June 1995
For Immediate Release

Westray Mine Public Inquiry
Preliminary Hearing

Halifax, Nova Scotia
Friday, 30 June 1995
For Immediate Release

Westray Mine Public Inquiry Commission
Stellarton, Nova Scotia

3 days Preliminary, 12 & 13 July 1995 and 4 October 1995.
77 days In Session, from 6 November 1995 to 22 July 1996.



Mr. Justice K. Peter Richard, Commissioner
John P. Merrick, Q.C., Commission Counsel
Jocelyn M. Campbell, Associate Commission Counsel
Deirdre Williams-Cooper, Chief Administrator

Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report issued 1 December 1997 Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, Contents Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, Executive Summary Prelude to the Tragedy: History, Development, and Operation The Explosion: An Analysis of Underground Conditions The Regulators: Departmental and Ministerial Responsibility The Aftermath: Rescue Efforts and the Inquiry Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, In Conclusion Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, Consolidated Findings Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, Consolidated Recommendations

A Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Chronology was available in 1998 at http://www.gov.ns.ca/legi/inquiry/westray/about.htm but for some reason was removed in 1999 from the Government website. The Wayback Machine has archived copies of this document: Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Chronology Archived: 1998 June 26 http://web.archive.org/web/19980626055633/http://www.gov.ns.ca/legi/inquiry/westray/about.htm Archived: 1998 December 05 http://web.archive.org/web/19981205195603/http://www.gov.ns.ca/legi/inquiry/westray/about.htm Archived: 1999 April 27 http://web.archive.org/web/19990427065611/http://www.gov.ns.ca/legi/inquiry/westray/about.htm

The Report of the Westray Public Inquiry Commission

Statements in the Legislature
as reported in Hansard, 1 December 1997

Premier's Office
Westray Response Committee
List of Committee Members

Department of Transportation & Public Works
Westray Response Committee

Prosecute Westray 'cowards, tricksters,'
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Public Inquiries Act
    http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/300/nova_scotias_electronic_attic/07-04-09/www.littletechshoppe.com/ns1625lawpuin.html

Order In Council, 15 May 1992
establishing the Westray Mine Public Inquiry Commission
    http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/300/nova_scotias_electronic_attic/07-04-09/www.littletechshoppe.com/ns1625wroic1992.html

Index to Transcript Westray Public Inquiry, Stellarton
    http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/300/nova_scotias_electronic_attic/07-04-09/www.littletechshoppe.com/ns1625wrpindex.html

Media Advisory — Westray Mine Public Inquiry

Media Advisory — Westray Mine Public Inquiry

Media Advisory — Westray Mine Public Inquiry

Steelworkers Welcome Westray Inquiry

• The union wants the Westray inquiry to:
• Ensure that all facts about the establishing and operation of the Westray mine are exposed, and that all those responsible for the unsafe conditions at Westray are held publicly accountable;
• Identify as precisely as possible the circumstances that led to the explosion;
• Look closely at the actions of the politicians, who lobbied for the establishment of the Westray mine, and the public servants responsible for ensuring it was developed and operated safely;
• Work with the Commissioner to develop recommendations for effective health and safety regulations that will provide protection for people who work in mining and in industry in general.

Westray Motion Just a First Step:
Steelworkers Continue Fight to Change Criminal Code

Westray Criminal Trial
Pictou, Nova Scotia

44 days in session, from   6 February 1995   to   9 June 1995

Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 6 March 1995

Courtroom Rules, Westray Criminal Trial

Phillips v. Nova Scotia
(Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy)

versus

Brief Overview of the Westray Criminal Trial

versus

Cameron Passes Buck at Westray

Westray Charges Stayed

Administration of Justice Brought into Disrepute

versus

This court decision contains a detailed timeline of the legal proceedings associated with the Westray Criminal Trial.  The timeline begins following this: "To appreciate the complicated background and procedural activity that occurred throughout the course of this case it is helpful to follow a time line..."

Heightened Expectations, 1982-2004

...The Westray mine disaster of 9 May 1992, which killed 26 miners, revealed a legal apparatus seemingly incapable of bringing to justice the corporate agents alleged to be responsible for the deaths.  The constitutionalization of criminal procedure in the wake of the Charter demanded a heightened level of expertise and professionalism from police and prosecutorial authorities, one they found difficult to attain while labouring under at times severe resource constraints.  Negotiating the co-existence of a public inquiry with the laying of criminal charges proved to be a legal nightmare, as other provinces were finding out at the same time.  The NSSC (Nova Scotia Supreme Court) itself was not the main problem in the Westray prosecutions, but a mistrial on the criminal charges occurred when it was revealed that the trial judge, Justice Robert Anderson, had secretly telephoned the head of the prosecution service in an attempt to get the lead Crown prosecutor on the case removed.  The problem this time was not, as in the past, excessive deference to corporate capital, but an excess of zeal on the part of a judge who believed the Crown prosecutor was not up to the job.  The Court of Appeal found that there were grounds for an appearance of bias against the Crown, and ordered a new trial, but one was never held...
Source:
Heightened Expectations, 1982-2004 Nova Scotia Barristers' Society (NSBS)
    http://www.nsbs.ns.ca/SR-archives/SRv22no5-HeightenedExp.htm

(Note: For some unknown reason, the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, which used to have this valuable document publicly available in its website, decided (late in 2005) to remove it.  We are fortunate that the Wayback Machine in San Francisco has archived copies, and makes them available to us.)

Emerging from the Dark Ages

...Crown Attorneys (in Nova Scotia) have emerged from the dark ages before 1999 when, upon exiting from the court room, the tight-lipped "no comment" was a common response to a reporter's question.  Today, Crown Attorneys are more apt to look for reporters and ask if they need clarification on what happened in the court room.  It's not unusual these days to see a Crown Attorney walking comfortably into a media scrum and confidently answering questions about the case at hand.

Prior to 1999, that sight would have been a rare one.  The policy covering media interaction then wasn't clear.  And many Crown Attorneys, sensitive to an internal climate that encouraged silence, chose not to risk getting themselves into hot water by saying something to the media that could raise the ire of their bosses.

So, what happened to change things?

During the 1990s a series of headline-grabbing events resulting in major prosecutions focused unprecedented public scrutiny on Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys and the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service.

National media and, in some cases, international media landed on the steps of our court houses.  And they wanted answers.  So did the public.  In fact, the public – primed by the glut of popular cops and lawyers shows on American television – had every expectation of hearing the prosecution's side.

While the defence was quick to walk into a scrum and offer up their side, the Crown was hesitant.  They didn't want to compromise their case and weren't always sure about how to talk with the media without risking that.  And, they were mindful of being closely watched by a management that, at the time, seemed to express a general disdain for the media.

The public was dissatisfied with the prosecution's performance before the television cameras and voiced that dissatisfaction loudly to the politicians.  (The difference between court room performance and performance before television cameras was lost to the public.) That public outcry was partially responsible for the government's initiation of an independent review of the Public Prosecution Service as well as an independent review of the Westray prosecution.

Retired Judge Fred Kaufman made a series of recommendations to help the Public Prosecution Service improve its operations.  Several recommendations focused specifically on communications.  Judge Kaufman said the PPS should "educate the citizens of Nova Scotia about the role played by the Public Prosecution Service in the administration of criminal justice."

He said the PPS should be telling Nova Scotians just what it does on their behalf and work to keep them in the loop during prosecutions.

Coincidentally, just as Judge Kaufman was getting his review underway, the PPS experienced a change in leadership.  The new Director of Public Prosecutions was receptive to changing the way Crown Attorneys interact with media.

So, when Judge Kaufman issued his findings the PPS revised its media policy accordingly.  The current policy is clear.  It says in part:

"Crown Attorneys should view media inquiries as opportunities to speak to Nova Scotians.  Response to inquiries are to be made in such a manner that they educate the public about the role of the Public Prosecution Service and the Crown Attorneys in the justice system, as well as informing the public about the Crown's position in the case in question.

"When responding to media inquiries, Crown Attorneys are to use common sense and refrain from any comments that could jeopardize the accused's right to a fair trial, reveal undisclosed elements of the Crown's case or strategy, violate any bans imposed by the court, or be interpreted as arguing the Crown's case in the media."

At around the same time, the Public Prosecution Service revised its media policy, it hired a Director of Communications to provide advice and guidance on communications with all its key audiences, including media.  Media training was one of the first priorities of the new director of communications...

Source: Media Training 101 by Chris Hansen,Director of Communication, Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service
pages 16-17, The Society Record, v24 n4 August 2006
Nova Scotia Barristers' Society

The Kaufman Report on Nova Scotia's Public Prosecution Service
Kaufman's Final Report Released, Public Prosecution Review
Government media release, 9 June 1999

The Kaufman Report on Nova Scotia's Public Prosecution Service
Kaufman Recommendations To Be Implemented
Government media release, 4 November 1999

Interim Report on Nova Scotia's Public Prosecution Service
To recommend appropriate means and mechanisms for...communication.
Kaufman Interim Report

Comments by the Minister of Justice

...Judge Kaufman conducted an exhaustive review of the service and submitted his report on the general operation of the service last June.  He made 29 recommendations on a number of issues...

He recommended a significant public information campaign to educate the citizens of Nova Scotia about the role played by the Public Prosecution Service in the administration of criminal justice.  That recommendation is in process.

A long-term strategic communication plan is in the development phase, media relations programming has been made the first priority with respect to the following: the media policy has been revised to encourage Crown Attorneys to participate in media interviews; a system of logging media enquiries to ensure prompt and accurate response; all public announcements are coordinated through Communications Nova Scotia; a basic website has been established and remains under construction; a staff member has been trained as web master; internal communications have been improved by more consistent communication with staff on issues that affect them...

Source: Subcommittee on Supply 1 May 2000

All prosecution and administrative policies of the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service are now available on the service's website...
Public Prosecution Policies Now Online
Government media release, 16 June 2004
"The policy manual can be viewed at http://www.gov.ns.ca/pps/."

Policy on Media Inquiries and Public Statements
Public Prosecution Service Communications Strategy
...As the public has a legitimate interest in hearing the Crown's side in cases currently before the courts, Crown Attorneys are encouraged to respond to media inquiries about cases in which they are involved...

Corporate Liability: The Westray Mining Disaster

Balancing Free Press and Fair Trial in Criminal Trials

The Dawn of Corporate Criminal Responsibility

Bill C-45: Criminal Code Amendments
Affecting the Liability of Corporations

Corporate Criminal Liability Proclaimed
Westray Bill C-45 Now Law

Besides prompting a judicial inquiry and the Criminal Code amendments now before the House of Commons, the Westray mine disaster has spawned non-fiction books, in-depth magazine articles, academic studies, poems, songs, websites, a play and a National Film Board documentary...

Life After Westray:
A Study of the Longterm Impact of the Explosion

National Film Board Documentary: Westray

Books About the Westray Coal Mine

From fields as diverse as public relations, criminology, and journalism, select experts tackle the difficult issue of the underlying causes of the explosion at the Westray Mine in Nova Scotia and how it was subsequently handled by the government, the corporation, and the media.  The analysis is firmly based in criminology but the forays into media analysis, politics, law, and engineering will expand the reader's awareness of how such a tragedy could happen.  Graphs, charts, news articles, transcripted interviews.

...Corporate crime is rooted in the nature of capitalism, and the costs of corporate crime are extensive, ranging from injuries received on the job, to workplace exposure to environmental pollutants.  Not only is a person exposed to risk at work, but the likelihood is far greater than being a victim of crime in the streets.  The overall costs of corporate crime are high, in both monetary terms, and in their cost to human safety and dignity.  Corporate crime is quite varied, and can involve damage to property and to injury or loss of human life.  Violations of safety standards in the workplace, pollution of the environment by companies unable or unwilling to properly treat waste, and industrial accidents due to negligence can all be classified as corporate violence...

"Shaun pulls no punches and gives no quarter to those responsible for what took place on May 9th, 1992. This is a book that Canadians will want to read. The company, as Shaun states in his book, tried to pull the wool over the eyes of the public. They were not fooled. Shaun's book gives the screaming truth of the incompetency and lack of regard for human life by company officials and politicians."
— Mike Piche, United Steelworkers

At 5:20 in the morning on May 9, 1992, a miner working in the Southwest section of the Westray mine was using a continuous miner to cut coal. As he cut into the coalface, the picks on the cutting head struck some pyrite embedded there, causing a shower of sparks. He had seen the sparks before, but this time they ignited some methane gas seeping from the coal seam. He jumped down off the miner, terrified at what he saw as he tried to put on his survival equipment. In moments he was dead...

Frame and Pelley refuse to testify

The issue of full faith and credit was argued in Ontario before Justice Sheard of the General Division in relation to the Westray Inquiry.  Two former executives of Curragh Resources were subpoenaed by the Commission of Inquiry.  It sought to have Clifford Frame and Marvin Pelley, residents of Ontario, called as witnesses in the Nova Scotia Inquiry.

Hon. Wilfred P. Moore: In November of 1995, the commission of inquiry began its hearings into the Westray Mine tragedy of May 9, 1992.  It involved an underground explosion killing 26 miners, 11 of whom are still entombed in the mine.  The commissioner of the inquiry, Mr. Justice Peter Richard, requested the appearance of two key witnesses in the matter, Mr. Clifford Frame, former president and chief executive officer of the now defunct mine owner, Curragh Resources Incorporated in Toronto; and Mr. Marvin Pelley, Executive Vice-President, corporate development and coal, and President of Westray Coal in Toronto.  Both refused to testify.

The commission of inquiry was appointed under the Nova Scotia Public Inquiries Act and the Coal Mines Regulation Act.  These statutes authorize the commissioner to summon witnesses in the Province of Nova Scotia, to require them to give evidence on oath, and to produce any documentation necessary for the investigation.  However, Mr. Frame and Mr. Pelley were both Ontario residents, not Nova Scotia residents.

Consequently, in April 1996, the Province of Nova Scotia passed legislation to permit the enforcement of subpoenas interprovincially.  This occurred while the inquiry was still ongoing.  The Province of Ontario already had this type of statute in place, namely, the Interprovincial Summonses Act.

The Nova Scotia act is described as an act respecting the interprovincial enforcement of subpoenas.  Under this statute, a person may apply to a court of a province in order to obtain a certificate signifying that a judge of that province is satisfied about three matters: first, that the attendance of a particular person who is resident in another province is necessary for the adjudication of the proceeding in which the subpoena is issued; second, that the attendance of the person is reasonable and essential; and third, that the subpoena is accompanied by witness fees and travelling expenses.

The certificate must then be sent to a court in the province in which the person whose attendance is sought is resident in order to obtain judicial authorization to have the subpoena enforced in that province.

In the case of Westray, a number of technicalities were put forward by Mr. Frame and Mr. Pelley that frustrated the inquiry's mandate.  One of the arguments they raised was that the interprovincial subpoenas legislation in Ontario did not apply to commissions of inquiry but was limited to courts of law.  Mr. Frame and Mr. Pelley appealed the enforcement of the subpoena against them on this ground as well as on a number of other grounds.

Because of these delay tactics, the inquiry was unable to hear from them.  The commissioner of the inquiry had a deadline to meet, and had to decide whether to report without the testimony of these two key witnesses, or not to report at all and wait until all possible appeals were exhausted.  Mr. Justice Richard decided to meet his deadline and report without the testimony of Mr. Frame and Mr. Pelley.

Although this decision is certainly justifiable, and I do not take issue with the way in which the inquiry was handled, the end result is that two witnesses succeeded in avoiding the giving of evidence.  This occurred despite the fact that they were clearly an important part of the tragedy, and the people of Nova Scotia, in particular the families of the victims of the tragedy, had a right to hear from them, and to have the events of the tragedy completely aired and the truth told.  In my view, this is a grave injustice.  The Senate should support any action that would prevent such a situation from occurring in the future.

One of the technical problems of which Mr. Frame and Mr. Pelley took advantage in order to delay the progress of the inquiry was the ambiguity in the Ontario Interprovincial Subpoenas Act with respect to its application to commissions of inquiry.  The definition of the term "court" in the Ontario Interprovincial Summonses Act does not explicitly include commissions of inquiry; it refers only to any court in a province.  This is the case with many of the other provincial and territorial acts dealing with the interprovincial enforcement of subpoenas.  Therefore, while all of the provinces and territories have such statutes, many of these laws, like the Ontario statute, define the word "court" ambiguously, and leave doubt as to whether the term includes commissions of inquiry.  The provincial and territorial acts which require amendment would include Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, British Columbia and the Yukon.

In summary, the Senate should encourage these provinces and territories to amend their respective acts to broaden the definition of "court" to include other quasi-judicial bodies so that the problem that occurred in the Westray inquiry is less likely to occur again in the future.

In Nova Scotia, for example, the definition of "court" includes any court in the Province of Nova Scotia or another province of Canada, and includes a board, commission, tribunal or other body of that province or another province of Canada.

The matter is also something that should be discussed at the next Uniform Law Conference, if possible.  It is a subject that is of great importance, especially in light of the whole purpose of establishing commissions of inquiry.  They are created to shed light on events that have occurred, where problems and difficulties have arisen, and where there is some concern that things could have been done better.  Such commissions are an opportunity to learn from our mistakes by gathering the facts that will help us discover the truth respecting events and occurrences.  Such truth can be drawn from written and oral evidence and from key witnesses who have personal knowledge about the matter.

When a tragedy occurs that kills dozens of people, the Canadian public has a right to know what really happened.  This right should not be frustrated because of technical legal arguments that are put forward to deliberately avoid the matter being properly aired and the truth being told.

Source: Applicability of Subpoenas Issued in Relation to Commissions of Inquiry
Hansard: Debates of the Senate, 2 April 1998
    http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/chambus/senate/deb-e/
          053db_1998-04-02-E.htm?Language=E&Parl=36&Ses=1

• 1975   Manitoba
• 1976   British Columbia
• 1976   Northwest Territories
• 1977   Saskatchewan
• 1979   New Brunswick
• 1979   Newfoundland
• 1979   Ontario
• 1981   Alberta
• 1981   Yukon Territory
• 1987   Prince Edward Island
• 1996   Nova Scotia

Dr. Susan Dodd, testifying before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights in Ottawa, on 22 May 2002
...When I first started thinking about this, it didn't seem possible that...the burden of holding the culprits responsible would fall to bereaved relatives of the dead. But not only was it possible, it's exactly what happened...ten years ago when the highly subsidized Curragh Resources (Westray coal mine) management intimidated workers, bullied compliant inspectors, and then evaporated into bankruptcy with millions of dollars in taxpayers' money...

We need to recognize organizational culture as something people make and remake on a daily basis, and that deaths like those in the Westray mine are not the inevitable outcomes of things left undone. It's not a matter of neglect, but of the consequences of positive acts, of choices made in pursuit of profit, and these days, of increasingly deregulated workplaces.

Often the authors of those choices are hidden within the black box of the corporate hierarchy, and this black box is a culture within which corporate decision-makers decide on the priorities of the organization. If this government wants people to believe there is justice in this country, it will need to draw on the rich literature on corporate criminology and develop ways to either shed light on the contents of such black boxes or to compensate for this lack of transparency by finding means to discipline the corporation as if it were an agent in its own right...
    http://www.parl.gc.ca/infocom/PubDocument.asp?
        DocumentID=652687&Language=E

After Westray

Coal dust, a recognized mining hazard for decades, played no role in the deadly explosion more than five years ago at the Westray mine, Clifford Frame claims.  That's among the assertions the Westray inquiry will hear if it manages to force the defiant Toronto mine promoter to testify.  In exclusive, wide-ranging interviews with this newspaper, the man who built and operated the Pictou County mine offered his views on key events and issues surrounding the 1992 explosion that killed 26 workers.  Among them is his fervent belief — despite the findings of mining experts and the sworn testimony of dozens of his former employees — that coal dust was not a problem at the mine or a factor in the explosion.  "That crap about them trying to call it a dust explosion," Frame, former chairman of Westray's parent company, Curragh Inc., said in disgust, "they are never going to prove that." The allegation that dust fuelled the explosion goes to the heart of charges of manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death filed against now-bankrupt Curragh and former Westray officials Gerald Phillips and Roger Parry.  Coal dust is combustible and can fuel a powerful explosion if it becomes suspended in the mine air in the presence of open flame. The most common source of flame is methane — a flammable gas that seeps from coal.  In a scenario that has been played out in many mine disasters, a methane fire or explosion stirs up coal dust, which fuels a powerful explosion capable of wrecking an entire mine ... He did not follow the inquiry's proceedings closely and displayed little detailed knowledge of evidence presented during 77 days of hearings in 1995 and 1996.  For instance, he claimed some victims suffocated when fire sucked oxygen out of the air — they were actually overcome by carbon monoxide produced by the methane fire — and suggests this proves the explosion did not cause their deaths.  "The 11 that were killed up in the area where the detector was tampered with, they suffocated.  But what do they care — I'm sorry to put it this way — but the coal dust or the gas explosion or whatever wouldn't have anything to do with their deaths." All of this leaves Frame with a clear conscience.  "Christ, I'm sitting up here in Toronto ... How in the name of God would I know that anybody was adjusting a methane detector? How the hell would I know that? And if I didn't know that, how could I have any feeling of guilt, other than the fact that I shouldn't have developed the Goddamned mine in the first place." Frame was asked about other allegations — what he calls "all those extraneous things" — such as men threatened with suspension or firing if they complained about unsafe practices.  "That's where Gerald and Roger will have to stick up for themselves," he responded. And he distanced himself from Phillips and Parry, who stood trial in 1995 and face a retrial...

Clifford Frame is a busy man. Just last month his bid to escape testifying at the Westray inquiry was squashed by an Ontario court. Mr. Frame brought the case to Ontario after being ordered to testify by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, he has made it clear he will now take the matter to the Ontario Supreme Court. For families of the Westray victims, the process has been frustrating. It has been five years since the disaster and officials are still waiting to speak with the man who held the final authority at the Westray Coal Mine.

With the Westray Inquiry stalled out, Clifford Frame has set his sights on getting back into the coal mining business. As the president of an aggressive little company, he is trying to wrest control of a coal project in West Virginia from its Australian owners. Frame is mounting a hostile takeover bid of Australian listed Greenfields Coal Company. Greenfields' executives say they only recently became aware about Frame's involvement at Westray. Now the accusations are flying and the situation has gotten nasty enough to attract the attention of the Australian Securities Commission and regulators of the Toronto Stock Exchange.

When Curragh Resources' mining boss Clifford Frame started talking about opening a mine in the economically depressed area of Stellarton, Nova Scotia, in the late 1980s, politicians flocked to him like seagulls at the beach. The Foord coal Seam had been mined intermittently since the 1830s. With its high levels of methane and poor ground conditions, the Foord Seam had already claimed 244 lives.

Curragh talked brightly of using new technology to make the operation safe and viable. Politicians predicted the mine would bring steady development to the region for decades. The only stumbling block was that in order to make the plan viable lots of government grants and concessions would have to be forthcoming. Premier Donald Cameron tied his own political aspirations to the success of the mine and the regulatory green light was given at every step of the way. The Feds and the Provincial government sank almost $100 million in getting Westray off the ground.

Publicly, the Westray operation was a model of safety and mining ingenuity, an example of what government and industry could do when they worked together. Inside the mine, however, life was far from rosy...

To get some idea what had been available to the Greenfields management when they did their Internet search, on 8 September 1997 a search was done on the whole Internet, for the name Clifford Frame.  The two top-rated Internet search engines were used.

The number one search engine at that time was HotBot, operated by Wired Magazine of San Francisco.  The number two search engine was AltaVista, operated by Digital Equipment Corporation.  (This was September 1997, well before Google became the dominant search engine.  The domain google.com was registered on 14 September 1997, and the company was incorporated as Google Inc. on 7 September 1998.  HotBot and AltaVista remained the top search services through 1999 and into 2000.)

AltaVista returned two hits, and HotBot returned nine.  Three of HotBot's hits, and both of AltaVista's hits, were on http://www.alts.net/ns1625/, the site you are now looking at.  Details follow:

Canadian Newspaper Association
1997 National Newspaper Awards
Business Reporting: Runner-Up

• Resolution 1 — to place 10,350,000 redeemable convertible cumulative preference shares of 20 cents each at issue price of 26 cents each to Vilo Resources, an independent company introduced by the Victor Smorgon Group.  This will raise $2.6 million.
• Resolution 2 — to apply up to $3.14 million from the Greenfields share premium account.  Greenfields now plans a pro-rata rights issue on a 2 for 5 basis at 13 cents per share, with 7 cents per share being met from the share premium account. This will raise $5.2 million.

* Greenfields nomination
# Mineral Resources Corporation nomination
Valid votes and proxies available at meeting   74,624,185
Present at the meeting: 139 Members and 61 Visitors (200 total)

So where is Greenfields Coal Company now?
On 6 May 2001 I tried to find out the current status of this company, but it seems to have disappeared.  There are occasional references to "Antaeus Energy Ltd., previously Greenfields Coal" and "Antaeus Energy, a U.S. subsidiary of Greenfields Energy Corp. of Sydney, Australia" but little else.  There was a passing mention of a new website at
    http://www.anten.com/company.htm
but it contained no information.

Westray Coal Mine in General

Westray miner's appeal pans out
The Globe and Mail, Monday, 15 December 2003 — A former Westray miner and rescue worker forced to pawn his medal of bravery after losing his worker's compensation, has been awarded a payment and pension after all...

The United Steelworkers union, which tried to organize the mine before it blew up, fought the case on the man's behalf after a representative heard his story of hardship at gathering marking Westray's 10-year anniversary, said Shaun Comish, a former miner and part of the rescue team. He wrote a book about the event, The Westray Tragedy, published in 1993.

The man, who has not been able to hold down a regular job, will receive a lump payment of $101,000, plus a monthly pension of $675, beginning in January 2004, the union announced Monday.

"I remember him back at the reunion telling me about being cut off and having to hawk his medal of bravery," Mr. Comish said Monday. "He'd been cut off for some time. They [the Nova Scotia Compensation Board] had sent him to a psychologist who said he wasn't crying so he couldn't have been that affected. So the union said they'd fight it for him." Steelworkers spokesman Lawrence MacBrearty said the miner has been unable to work, plagued with thoughts about what he had seen underground during the rescue attempt, but was cut off compensation.

The worker, who still lives in New Glasgow, N.S. and is 56 years of age, worked on the rescue team as a "bare face" – a crewmember that went into the mine after the air was clean and the bodies removed. The man's life fell into disrepair after the disaster, Mr. Comish said. He developed a drinking problem and his marriage fell apart...
    http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20031215.wmine1215/BNStory/National/

2003 December 15 — United Steelworkers National Director Lawrence McBrearty announced Monday that the union has won a compensation claim for a former Westray miner who was so disadvantaged that he was forced to pawn the medal he received for his part in the attempt to rescue the 26 miners killed in the 1992 Westray mine explosion.  "The worker, a lifelong miner, had been cut off compensation for post-traumatic stress and had been unable to work," said McBrearty. "He was plagued with thoughts about what he saw underground in the rescue attempt." McBrearty said the union took up his case before the Nova Scotia Compensation Board, which now will pay the worker a total of $101,000 and, beginning in January 2004, he will receive a monthly benefit of $675...

Curragh Inc. Suspends Operations
at Yukon Lead and Zinc Mines

Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 5 March 2004 and 8 March 2004
(The identical item appeared in both issues)

The Globe and Mail, Wednesday, 3 March 2004 — Nova Scotia Premier John Hamm has ordered government officials to look for ways to block controversial mining executive Clifford Frame from opening a zinc and lead mine in the province.

Mr. Frame was chairman of Curragh Inc., the owner of the Westray coal mine, where a coal dust and methane explosion in May, 1992, killed 26 miners.

Mr. Frame never accepted responsibility for the tragedy and repeatedly refused to testify at the inquiry into the deaths of the miners. But the probe headed by Mr. Justice Peter Richard, who conducted an inquiry into the disaster, found that the Curragh chairman, who he characterized as an "uncompromising and abusive negotiator" in his relations with the provincial government, failed to provide a safe workplace while pushing for greater production from the ill-fated mine.

Mr. Frame is now chairman of junior mining company OntZinc Corp. of Toronto, which, through its subsidiary ScoZinc Ltd., is proposing a $1.1-million exploration and development plan for a zinc and lead mine that is to be located about 50 kilometres northwest of Halifax...
    http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/
        20040303/RWEStrAY03/TPBusiness/TopStories

Nova Scotia Business Journal, April 2004

B.C. Mining Task Force The Ralph Sultan Report, July 2003
...Ralph Sultan studied engineering at the University of British Columbia and economics at Harvard University.  His mining background commenced in 1980 when he became Senior Vice President, Global Energy and Minerals Group of The Royal Bank of Canada, headquartered in Calgary.  With a lending portfolio in the $5 billion range, he was responsible for promoting the Bank's oil and gas and mining banking interests with representatives placed in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Denver, Dallas, Houston, London England, and Singapore.

He left The Royal Bank to become Executive Vice President of Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Company, affiliated with Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, with interests in oil and gas operations in Alberta, copper mining in Arizona, industrial minerals in Saskatchewan, and diamonds, as well as the large Hudbay mining and refining complex at Flin Flon, Manitoba.

Subsequently he became a principal in Curragh Resources, a mining company which purchased the Faro Mine, a large lead-zinc open-pit operation in the Yukon, from Dome Petroleum in 1986.  Curragh shareholders included the Hunt Family from Texas, and Boliden Mining Company of Sweden, as well as Korean interests.  He played a significant role in the development of a road transportation link from Yukon to Skagway Alaska.  He successfully negotiated of economic agreements with the Ross River Band, Kaska Dene, and the Fort Ware Band of northern British Columbia...
    http://www.ralphsultan.com/Newsltr-2003/newsltr-0307/pnews0307-02.html

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