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Fishermen have always been entrepreneurs. The act of fishing can be seen as the sum of numerous skills and tasks which results in an income. From repairs to baiting to knowing where to fish, fishers knew their industry like the backs of their hands. The numerous Cape Island boats which once formed the mainstay of the Digby Neck fishery each represented a small business. This remains true today although the number of boats and therefore businesses has declined radically.
Rural Canada has always been economically bound to small business, and these businesses are largely dependent on natural resources. Digby Neck reflects this chain of dependencies perfectly and the current fisheries crisis clearly illustrates the turmoil and hardship caused when a link in this chain breaks.
In the days prior to the introduction of small boat dragger technology an informal system of apprenticeship existed which culminated in the expectation, or at least the strong hope, that the apprentice would become the captain of his own vessel. Learning the ropes as a worker on someone else's boat, the apprentice gained skill and confidence until he could afford and operate his own vessel. It is a testament to the onetime vitality of Digby Neck that many fishers, once educated in the ways of fishing, were capitalized (loaned) money by local fishers or fish-plant operators to purchase their own boats and gear, becoming franchised members of the fishing economy. Small Boat Draggers have largely eliminated this system, they are vastly more expensive than the Cape Island boats used in handlining and lobstering.
In order to afford a dragger a person needed a huge sum as capital and enough experience to inspire confidence in the person or institution which was to lend him the rest of the money. All costs escalate in this new venture and the small business of an independent fisher on a Cape Island boat measuring 20 to 30 feet is transformed into a medium sized business based on the Small Boat Dragger of 50 to 60 foot beam. The stakes were raised and the risk increased, not just for the owner, but for the community as a whole.
The economy of scale of the Small Boat Dragger could not be challenged by the traditional techniques of longlining or handlining. Though the costs incurred by the traditional approach were lower, the capacity of the Dragger allowed market prices to fall, and catching the same species of fish as a smaller boat, their impact on the small independent fisher was devastating. This impact, inevitable though it may have been, pales in comparison to the long-term impact on fish stocks that Dragger technology ushered in. Arguably this was a preventable effect.
During the late 1960s to the mid-1970s there was a decline in the landed weight of groundfish. (Cod, Haddock, Pollock and Hake). If a Dragger doesn't catch to its capacity the cost is the same as if they had caught a full load. In contrast the capacity of a Cape Island boat was modest enough not to further the decline of fish stocks and its captain covered his costs. In the late 1970s and early 1980s fish stocks were recovering from their recent decline. The Dragger fleet returned to offshore waters and was again heralded as the most lucrative way to fish on Digby Neck. 'Millionaires were created during those years' is a notable quote from a resident and illustrates not just the income capacity of the Dragger, but also the lure of it.
Looking at the Atlantic Fishery as a whole, dragging technology increased in popularity from 1960 to 1980, at which point, under the guise of conservation the Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans instigated a quota system based on observations made of a system already operating in New Zealand (L.Theriault).
Quotas transferrable from person to person or from person to corporation, limited the total allowable landed weight of groundfish species to the total allowed by all accumulated Individually Transferrable Quotas (ITQs) held by the fisher/owner.
In Digby, a company formerly called Maritime Fish now National Sea Products, had always been a buyer and processor of fish. Now, under the quota system they became a purchaser of 'rights' to fish by buying ITQs from the smaller fishers who owned them and amalgamating the production to feed their large centralized, subsidized, processing plants.
This development had 2 major consequences. First, there was a lower total landed weight of fish for processors on Digby Neck to buy, therefore, fewer processing jobs for residents, and ultimately, fewer and fewer processing plants. Secondly, when capital for fishing a quota is hard to come by, selling it is both easier and more lucrative. In the end this leads to the migration of capital from the rural community (small business) to the urban (big business), placing profits on ITQs in the hands of corporations like National Sea Products. It has also led to unemployment in the community and a social stratification between ITQ holders (sellers) and those previously employed by them.
With fish stocks seriously endangered once again there may be a return to the smaller Cape Island boat fishery. This end-run around the Dragger industry is hampered by a decaying, sometimes non-existent infrastructure – boats, wharves and plants damaged or destroyed by years of obsolescence. Can a sustainable fishery rise from these ashes? Will the fish stocks return? Government and Industry regulations will in large part determine the shape of any future fishery – let us hope that the lessons of the past are, at last, well-learned and remembered.
J. Rodgers
Digital Collections Project Staff