Chapter 7
Decision

This discussion began with the assertion that the fight for a flag was a

fight to save Canada. Our Liberal caucus recognized the separation of

Quebec from Canada, the collapse of Confederation, as one of the

distinct possibilities of the future. With the exception of Ralph Cowan

(YorkHumber) every Liberal member bore this dread possibility in

mind.

The perspective of John Diefenbaker, and his hard core of western

supporters, was different. In charity one may say that Diefenbaker did

not apprehend the danger, but this inability to see was partly a resolve

not to see. Like Nelson at Copenhagen he applied his glass to his blind

eye.1 When in midJanuary 1963 he knew that Confederation was in

grave trouble, his solution was a "Round Table." Arthur Blakely wrote

from Ottawa:

A proposal for a great national conference to "round out

Confederation" was advanced by Prime Minister Diefenbaker

at the Conservative Party annual meeting.

He told cheering delegates, however, that he rejected utterly

the theory that the Canadian Confederation "is about to dis-

integrate" as being the counsel of despairing defeatism.

"I am not a defeatist," he said yesterday.

In a dramatic, eleventhhour addition to his speech, how-

ever, he replied at length and in some detail to Premier Lesage

and National Union Leader Daniel Johnson, who had agreed in

the Quebec Legislature Thursday that Confederation has failed

to achieve the aims and objectives the Fathers of Confederation

had set forth almost a century ago and that "the hour of the

last chance" was already at hand.

Mr. Diefenbaker mentioned neither of the Quebec leaders by

name in this untexted speech in which he replied on scribbled

notes.

The reference, however, was crystal clear. . . .

Some there were, Mr. Diefenbaker said, who were spreading

the creed of separatism "for their own purposes"—purposes

not necessarily related to separatism as a solution to French

Canada's problems.

"The idea that Canada is about to disintegrate," the Prime

Minister declared warmly, "has no place in my thinking or in

that of my colleagues in the Cabinet today."2

Not sharing Diefenbaker's optimism, others in Canada were anxious

and insecure, and they believed that Canada was well into the decade of

discontent. The Diefenbaker government was defeated in the ensuing

general election of 8 April 1963. The standing of the parties revised as of

February 1964 was 129 Liberals, 95 Progressive Conservatives, 24 Social

Crediters and 17 New Democrats in a House of 265. 3

It thus became Pearson's challenge to preside as Canada's first

minister when Quebec was exhibiting serious symptoms of discontent. It

was his opportunity and his duty to nurse French Canada through her

crisis—a crisis of identity. He offered a healing image, the maple leaf,

living evidence of the land universally beloved. The symbol spoke to all

Canadians, not of empire nor of powers or principalities, but of soil. The

symbol reminded French Canada of what was undeniably and incredibly

dear—their native land!

I believe that most Canadians knew that Canada was in trouble. Commencing

in 1963 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had been concerned

about the activities of the Front de Libération du Quebec (the

Quebec Liberation Front). On the night of 20 April 1963, the FLQ,

realizing that the RCMP was a dangerous hindrance to its movement,

threw a bomb through the window of "C" Division headquarters in

Montreal. That same night a watchman died when a bomb exploded in a

garbage container. During the following months police and army experts

dismantled numerous bombs which had been placed in mailboxes.4 The

movement, which finally drew Canada into the "October Crisis" of

1970, showed purpose and muscle. Its declared objective was to establish

a socialist state, separate and distinct from Canada, and to do so by

force.5

From the government's point of view, Mr. Diefenbaker owed a moral

duty to Canada to approach the flag question with this threat to national

unity in mind. His parliamentary support was by no means entirely from

the west. With 8 seats in Quebec and 27 and 4, respectively, in the

neighboring provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick 6 he ought to have

assessed the danger and joined forces with the new prime minister, Lester

Pearson, to combat that danger. The fact is that some Tory members

were acutely anxious. While many of their numbers were fearful of the