VIII
THE PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability in the system derives directly from the
responsibility of ministers. Ministers answer before Parliament and are
challenged to defend the way in which they or their officials have
exercised the power that is made legitimate by their constitutional
responsibility as ministers. Parliament expects and requires that
ministers be responsible, and enjoys ready access to ministers for the
purpose of holding them answerable. Deputy ministers derive almost all
of their authority from ministers. They are loyal to their ministers and
are required actively to support and participate in the policy and
administrative decisions taken by ministers individually and
collectively. Put simply, deputy ministers are responsible to ministers.
1
This paper has traced the line of authority flowing from
the Crown and the way in which power has been harnessed to the
requirements of a representative system of government. Henry Parris has
summarized the history that has made the concentration of responsibility
in the hands of ministers the bedrock of parliamentary government.
If the advice of the Crown originated with a permanent
official, what was the proper course for opponents of that policy to
take? To attack the minister would miss the target. If, on the other
hand, they attacked the official, they would not be able to get rid of
him, because of his permanent status. The difficulty was eventually
resolved by an extension of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility.
In extreme cases, ministers resigned while officials stayed on. Maitland
pointed out that "royal immunity coupled with ministerial
responsibility". Lowell turned the coin over to read the
inscription on the other side: "The permanent official, like the
King, can do no wrong." 2
But, of course, just as the Crown must act on
"advice", so officials must subordinate themselves to
ministers, and these are the considerations that create and fasten on
ministers their constitutional responsibility.
It is, however, a matter of observation that government
is a large enterprise. It is not a modern phenomenon that ministers
cannot know everything that is done under their authority; the
phenomenon is merely more acute today than it was 200 years ago, and not
prima facie proof of the irrelevance of ministerial
responsibility. Ministers spend much of their time providing information
to Parliament, indicating a need for the minister’s ability to answer
and provide information to be shared without, however, sharing his or
her responsibility. Parliament has recognized this need, and, without
prejudicing its right to hold the minister responsible, it has
increasingly accepted that officials should answer for matters that at
first glance at least are unlikely to involve the House’s confidence
in the ministers. This development is best observed in the practices
that have grown up in Parliament’s standing committees.
The essential principles of accountability are,
therefore, that power flows from the Crown and is exercised by ministers
who are responsible to Parliament. Officials advise ministers and
they are accountable to ministers. The accountability of
ministers to Parliament may, however, be divided into those matters that
directly involve or in the course of debate come to involve the House’s
confidence in ministers, and those which do not or are unlikely to
involve that confidence. The distinction having been drawn, and bearing
in mind the importance of ensuring that ministers can effectively hold
officials accountable, it is noteworthy that current practice indicates
that parliamentary committees play (or have the potential to play) a
significant role in holding officials accountable before them,
thereby assisting ministers to ensure sound management of the
public service and making more effective the direct and formal
accountability of officials to ministers.
Parliamentary committees may play a role in the
accountability of deputy ministers, but it is the responsibility of
ministers to ensure that deputies, who are their agents, are accountable
to ministers. When all is said and done, the fact is that in our system
ministers are elected to decide whereas officials are appointed
to administer and advise. The accountability of deputies should
reflect harmoniously the relationships with Prime Minister, minister,
and ministry that devolve upon deputies by virtue of their
responsibilities to support the individual and collective
responsibilities of ministers.
Accountability depends upon systematic means of
assessing performance. In this, a distinction should be drawn between
the roles of deputies as policy advisers and as administrators. The
assessment of the deputy’s policy role is essentially a matter of
subjective judgement and an appreciation of his or her success in
fulfilling any previously stated specific policy goals. Assessment for
administration is, however, more amenable to objective evaluation based
on the deputy’s success in the application of management standards and
other relatively objective criteria. In this, deputies should be given
an adequate voice in the establishment and operation of the centrally
prescribed management practices and procedures, which govern the use of
the resources that are essential to the fulfillment of the policy and
program objectives of the government.
Deputies should understand (and wherever possible
participate in determining) the criteria according to which they will be
judged and held accountable. This is particularly true in the
formulation and management of programs and the administration of their
departments. It is also important in the area of policy development and
the setting of policy objectives, where deputies must ensure that they
have taken advantage of their opportunity to explain their views and set
out any administrative or other constraints that may hinder the
fulfillment of particular objectives. Deputies should not be held
accountable on a piecemeal basis. Management and finance are integral to
policy, and although the deputy’s performance in these areas initially
may be assessed separately, conclusions and career decisions must be
determined on an overall basis. The performance of deputies should be
assessed as objectively as possible, and their accountability should
depend on the judgement of those to whom they are responsible (the
minister and Prime Minister) based on the best specific expert
assessments that can be provided.
Conclusion
Accountability that takes account of these
considerations depends on an understanding by Parliament, ministers, the
public service, and above all by deputies and central agencies of the
complex role played by the deputy in reinforcing the constitutional
responsibilities borne individually and collectively by ministers. The
accountability of deputies, based on the constitutional responsibility
of their ministers, sharpened by the convention of collective
responsibility, made more effective by their administrative
answerability before Parliament, must be rendered to those from whom
they hold their appointment, to whom they are responsible, and who will
determine their future.
1
Pickersgill has noted "... while
bureaucrats should not be partisan, they do not have the right to
be neutral between government and opposition. Public servants owe
loyal service to the government in office whether they like its
politics or not. Governments are put in office by the electors,
and public servants have no right to sabotage or even to obstruct
the decision of the voters. For the best public servants it is not
enough to avoid obstructing the political will of the minister and
the government. The best of them will try to contribute to the
limit of their abilities to the formulation, amelioration, and
implementation of new policies or changes in policy of the
government of the day, since the government, not the public
service, is answerable to the legislature and the public";
"Bureaucrats and Politicians", pp. 426-427. Lord
Armstrong, when he was head of the British home civil service,
echoed similar views on the link between loyalty and
responsibility in testimony to a select committee of the House of
Commons: "The impartiality of the civil service lies in its
loyal support to the particular party which happens to be in power
and the impartiality does not extend to impartiality between the
Government on the one hand and the Opposition on the other."
See Maurice Wright, "The Professional Conduct of Civil
Servants", Public Administration spring, 1973,
pp.1-15. On the desirability of permanent and relatively anonymous
senior officials, see Sir William Armstrong, "The Role and
Character of the Civil Service" published for the British
Academy, (Oxford, 1970) pp.13-16.
2
Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy,
pp. 104-105.
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