October 25, 2005
Ottawa, Ontario

Check against delivery

It’s a privilege to welcome you here this morning, and for Canada to be your host.

All of us recognize that the risk of a flu pandemic requires the world to act now. That is why the world is gathered at one table here today.

We come from developed and developing countries, from all regions of the globe; countries affected by the Avian Flu, as well as by those for whom it is a threat. This is in fact the first time that a global gathering of political and technical leaders has been convened to deal with this issue, at this level – with Ministers of Health conferring directly with technical experts and the relevant multilateral organizations.

Indeed, this gathering reflects, in my view, the imperative for a new multilateralism, the collaboration of developed and developing countries with a common interest, to work together toward urgent goals which no one nation can accomplish alone.

The challenge we face today is extraordinarily complex; an unprecedented task of emergency preparedness and response. Mitigating the risk of a pandemic – and responding to an outbreak, if one does occur – requires the development of new vaccines and medicines, as well as their production and distribution. It requires advances in bio-security and animal health, and the enhancement of communication networks among specialists in different fields. Among the most profound challenges we face is communication with our own citizens. Public fear, and bad information, could all too easily snowball into panic. It would complicate our collective response to a pandemic immeasurably, and magnify its potential impact. Our best antidote will be the clear, honest and consistent assessment of the risks we face; the ability to swiftly gather information, and to speak with one voice in frank and constructive terms – early and continuously.

Within our countries, and among them, each of these efforts will require co-operation and co-ordination on a scale that is unprecedented. The consequences of a world that is unprepared are simply unacceptable.

Experience with SARS has taught many of us some vital lessons. All of them relate to the key areas we’ll be discussing over the next couple of days.

The first is the importance of working with the best information available, and sharing it effectively. Second is the importance of swift, co-ordinated action -- among different orders of government, health officials and first responders – guided by a detailed plan that everyone can work from. Finally, we’ve learned that we need global co-operation and global preparedness. The more quickly we can report on the risks, the more quickly we can act, the better for all of us.

Canada has responded to these imperatives with the creation of a Public Health Agency, and a comprehensive Pandemic Influenza plan. Our national stockpile of medical supplies now includes a substantial stock of anti-virals, and we have established a contract with a domestic supplier to produce a vaccine if a pandemic does occur. Canada was in fact the first country to do so.

If many of our countries have learned the lessons of SARS, each of us has more to do – and in a global context, the work we undertake together will benefit us all.

An example from the Animal-Human interface, as much as any other, sheds light on the challenge.

One effective way to keep an animal sickness from spreading is the testing for and culling of infected animal populations. But we also have to recognize that in many countries, these preventative measures are very difficult to undertake. The simple fact is that many impoverished families and farmers may consider it too risky to report sick animals – they’re the source of their food as well as their livelihood, so it’s often customary to kill animals that get sick, to be eaten or sold. When sicknesses are reported in these areas, local officials often lack the capacity to respond.

Prevention of the spread of disease in these circumstances is very difficult, and the Avian Flu has, in fact, become endemic in a number of the regions where it was first discovered. So despite our best efforts at containment, this disease, like others, could continue to spread. And given even a limited human population to evolve in, animal viruses stand an increasing chance of developing into something that can be easily spread among us. What this means is that in regions where an outbreak is most likely to occur, we have the least capacity to respond to it. And the risk, in one form or another, is going to be with us for some time.

We have a collective obligation to mitigate this risk. This is why Canada, among other nations, is an active partner in building regional capacity, through a variety of programs and investments; and why we support a proposal to expand our projected vaccine supply with the goal of sharing these resources.

A flu pandemic has occurred three times in the past hundred years, and we must act on the expectation that there could be another. What we don’t know is how severe it will be, or when it will occur. What we do know is that the world today is smaller, more connected, and more interdependent than ever – and thus more vulnerable to the scourge of pandemic disease.

The simple fact of the matter is that our mutual health, security and prosperity depend largely on our willingness to meet this common challenge together. And not simply this challenge. Our planning and preparation for pandemic will inarguably help to put us in a better position to respond to other emerging diseases, to natural disasters and to threats of bioterrorism we may face in the future.

That is why we’re here today.

I look forward to participating in the conference this morning, and I wish all of us a productive – and ongoing – discussion.

Thank you.

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