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Notes for an address by the
President of the Privy Council and
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
the Honourable Stéphane Dion
on the second reading of
Bill C-20
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
December 14, 1999
Mr Speaker,
This bill on clarity that I have the honour of
discussing today on second reading clarifies the circumstances in which this
House would declare whether the Government of Canada would be obliged to enter
into negotiations on the separation of a province from Canada.
An eventual break-up of our country is a serious
and sad matter. But, paradoxically, it reveals how much Canada is a real
country. It is because the ties that unite us have been so closely knit over the
years, that endless precautions would need to be taken, should we,
unfortunately, one day undertake to break-up our country.
This bill is in keeping with the Supreme Court's
opinion of August 20, 1998 and gives effect to it. It defines the unavoidable
responsibilities of the Government of Canada and the House of Commons, while
respecting the prerogatives of the Government and National Assembly of Quebec
and all other political actors in our federation.
1. The obligation to negotiate if there
is clarity
If the population of a province clearly expressed
its will to secede from Canada, the Government of Canada would have to undertake
negotiations on secession. But in the absence of that clear will, it ought not
to undertake such negotiations. This is the Government of Canada's position. It
is reasonable, and it just makes good sense.
And it is good sense that has guided the
Government of Canada in the past, in 1980 as well as in 1995.
Faced with the confusing question of the 1980
referendum, Prime Minister Trudeau stated on May 14, 1980 that if the Yes side
obtained a majority, he would say to Mr Lévesque: "If you knock on the
sovereignty-association door, there is no negotiation possible."
On September 8, 1995, the Prime Minister of
Canada stated in this House: "For months and months I have asked the
Government of Quebec to ask a clear question. It is asking an ambiguous
question." He also declared that a majority of 50% plus one was not enough
to break up Canada. The day after the referendum, on November 1, 1995, the
Leader of the Official Opposition, who is now the Premier of Quebec, took note
of that position: "We will recall that [the Prime Minister of Canada] said
in this House he reserved the right not to honour a narrow yes majority in
favour of sovereignty."
On January 27, 1996, two days after I was sworn
in as minister, I was quoted in Le Soleil (Quebec City) as saying: [TRANSLATION]
"In the unfortunate eventuality that a strong majority in Quebec were to
vote on a clear question in favour of secession, I believe that the rest of
Canada would have a moral obligation to negotiate the division of the
country." I have reiterated that position in open letters to the Premier of
Quebec and his ministers.
The Attorney General of Canada also said, in
announcing the Supreme Court Reference in September 1996, that, "in the
unlikely event that the population of Quebec were to decide that they do not
want to remain in Canada, we will be negotiating (...)."
And that is exactly what the Supreme Court said
in its opinion issued two years later, on August 20, 1998. The Court wrote that
we are obliged to negotiate secession if things are clear. And the Court
assigned to the political actors the responsibility of determining what
constitutes a clear question in a referendum on secession, and what constitutes
a clear majority.
To negotiate secession where there is clarity,
and not to negotiate where there is not: this has been the Government of
Canada's position in the past, this is what the Supreme Court's opinion enjoins
it to do, and this is what it says in the bill on clarity.
This bill specifies the unavoidable
responsibilities of the Government of Canada and the House of Commons. At the
same time, it fully respects the prerogatives of the Government and National
Assembly of Quebec.
The Government of Quebec can ask Quebec voters
the question of its choice. But the Government of Canada and the House of
Commons, as political actors, have a duty to make their own assessment of
whether the question and the majority indicate a clear support for secession
before concluding that the Government of Canada is bound to enter into
negotiations on the break-up of Canada.
It is self-evident that the House of Commons
would be duty-bound to evaluate the clarity of support for secession before the
Government of Canada could undertake to negotiate secession, because the
negotiations would aim to terminate all the responsibilities, those of the House
of Commons as well as those of the Government of Canada, towards part of the
Canadian population.
Even the Bloc's intergovernmental affairs critic
and his leader have agreed with that. In fact, on December 8, the Bloc's critic
and MP for Beauharnois-Salaberry said that: [TRANSLATION] "According to the
Court's opinion, if there is a justifiable role for the federal government [...]
it is after the referendum, in determining the clarity of the question and the
majority required, so as to conclude whether there is an obligation to
negotiate." So we're not that far apart, really.
The decision that the Government of Canada must
undertake negotiations on secession would be a major one for this House. It
could not ignore the enormous consequences for Canada's population as a whole. A
referendum on secession is not just an ordinary election. Voters would not have
the opportunity to review their choice four years later. Negotiating the
dismantling of a modern, democratic country is an enormous, unprecedented task.
A number of
difficult and complex questions would be raised,
affecting the rights and interests of all the country's citizens. This House
could not conclude that the Government of Canada can impose such an ordeal on
Canadians unless there were a clear will in favour of breaking-up.
We, Quebecers, have the same rights as other
Canadians to have our two constitutionally authorized governments, our
provincial government and our federal government, fully respect our right to
Canada.
In tangible terms, this means that if we clearly
indicated in a referendum that we wished to stop being part of Canada in order
to make Quebec an independent country, our federal government would have an
obligation to undertake negotiations to terminate our belonging to Canada, to
terminate its constitutional responsibilities toward us. But in the absence of
this clear desire for secession, our federal government has the opposite
obligation: the obligation to maintain peacefully the constitutional
responsibilities it has toward us, and to safeguard all our prerogatives as
Canadians, in Quebec, throughout Canada and around the world.
This is our right to Canada. For its part, the
Government of Canada intends to respect that right of Quebecers. That is the
reason for this bill.
2. The criteria for assessing the clarity
of the question
No one can seriously maintain that the Government
of Canada would be obliged to negotiate no matter what the question was. The
question must clearly be about secession. A confusing question would make any
negotiations impossible. It is only reasonable that, to trigger negotiations on
secession, you need a clear question on secession.
The question would have to state clearly that the
province would cease to be part of Canada and would become an independent state.
That's what the bill stipulates.
The notion of the "will" to effect
secession is essential. The Supreme Court speaks of "no longer wish[ing] to
remain in Canada." It doesn't speak of the "will to confer a mandate
to negotiate." You undertake negotiations on secession because you want to
secede, not to find out whether that might be what you want.
The bill indicates that a clear question must
address secession exclusively. That's obvious. Introducing other elements would
make it impossible to know whether voters really want secession or not. No
negotiations could result from a question such as the one in 1980 or 1995,
referring to the notions of association or an offer of partnership with Canada,
because it would be impossible to know if the Yes supporters really wanted to
secede from Canada.
3. The criteria for assessing the clarity
of the majority
Under both Quebec law and Canadian federal law, a
referendum is a consultation. The political authorities assess the importance of
such a consultation on the basis of, among other things, the clarity of the
question and the clarity of the result. Accordingly, Quebec's Referendum Act
sets no threshold, be it 50% + 1 or anything else. The White Paper on referenda
(1977) stated that [TRANSLATION] "the fact that referenda are a
consultation makes it unnecessary to include provisions about a required
majority or a level of voter participation."
It is customary in democracy to require a clear
referendum majority before proceeding with a radical change whose consequences
would be virtually irreversible. This is the case with a vote that could lead to
negotiations on secession. Such negotiations should never be undertaken on the
basis of an uncertain majority that might not hold firm in the face of the
inevitable difficulties engendered by the break-up of a country. It's not worth
imposing that risk on everyone, because the chances that such an attempt at
secession will succeed are slim to none in the absence of a clear majority.
That's accepted in Quebec.
You don't break up a country with support of 50%
plus one. That's just never happened. On the contrary, outside the colonial
context, referenda held as part of a successful process of secession have always
garnered majorities of over 70%. Separatist leaders around the world say:
"Let my people vote under fair conditions and you'll see that they want to
separate." They're not saying: "Half of my people want to
separate."
Quebecers have already said no twice to secession
even when they were asked questions designed to artificially boost support for
the Yes side. And each time, the PQ government promised it would be back with
another referendum. It said "See you soon!", "See you next
time!", instead of taking into account the will of the voters. The PQ
government has indicated that it wants to hold a third referendum on secession
by the end of its current mandate. And it's not saying it will accept
"three strikes, you're out," either.
As long as the Quebec population answers no, the
separatist leaders intend to keep proposing their secession plan. But if they
ever chanced to get a Yes, no matter how slim, they'd try to effect secession.
That would have irreversible consequences, because it is almost impossible to
rebuild a country after breaking it up. The No supporters would have no
opportunity to say "See you soon!" or "See you next time!"
So the consequences of saying Yes to secession
are very different from the consequences of saying No. No means not now, but Yes
means forever. Only a Yes can give rise to an irreversible change that is
binding on future generations. There must be a clear majority before
negotiations are undertaken on the possibility of effecting such a change.
The Supreme Court requires the political actors
to assess the clarity of any future majority in favour of secession. It used the
expression "clear majority" no fewer than 13 times in its opinion. The
qualifier "clear" obviously means that more than a slim majority is
required. But the Court also added that there is a qualitative dimension to
assessing clarity, requiring a political evaluation and a full understanding of
the actual circumstances.
It is therefore impossible to determine what
constitutes that clear majority at this time, in the calm atmosphere of a united
Canada, outside the turbulence of a referendum, because the circumstances in
which that political assessment would have to be made are unknown to us.
The government of the province would first,
following a referendum in which a clear question had been asked, need to seek to
enter into negotiations on secession. It is conceivable that, faced with a
majority that was not clear, the government itself would conclude that it was
better not to proceed. It would be ridiculous, for example, to have such a grave
decision hinge on a judicial recount.
But in the eventuality that the Government of
Canada were called on to negotiate, the House of Commons would proceed to
consider and, by resolution, set out its determination as to whether, in the
circumstances, a clear majority had expressed itself in favour of secession,
again taking into account the other points of view that would be expressed.
4. Negotiations in accordance with the
opinion of the Supreme Court
The final subsection of the bill stipulates that
no minister of the Crown can propose a constitutional amendment to effect the
secession of a province from Canada unless the Government of Canada has
addressed, in the framework of negotiations, the terms of secession expressly
mentioned by the Court, such as the division of assets and liabilities, any
changes to the borders of the province, the rights, interests and territorial
claims of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the protection of minority
rights.
While the Court requires the parties to such
possible future negotiations to address these issues, it also requires them not
to determine any results in advance. Here again, the bill respects the Supreme
Court's opinion.
With respect to borders, for example, the Supreme
Court had this to say: "Nobody seriously suggests that our national
existence, seamless in so many aspects, could be effortlessly separated along
what are now the provincial boundaries of Quebec."
Borders could be subject to negotiation. To be
sure, under Canada's Constitution, a province's borders cannot be modified
without the agreement of the province's legislative assembly. It may be,
however, that democracy and a sincere quest for justice for all would make an
agreement on separation contingent on modifying the borders. But the bill
provides no certainty about that, to any party.
So the bill does not reiterate the position once
advanced by the Bloc's intergovernmental affairs critic, to the effect that the
Aboriginal peoples living in Quebec would have the right to continue to remain
in Canada, in the event of the province's secession. (C.D. Howe, 1992; and the
Bélanger-Campeau Commission, 1991)
Aboriginal populations in Quebec have twice
demonstrated through referenda, in 1980 and 1995, their clear will to stay in
Canada. If Aboriginals were to express such a clear will once again, the
Government of Canada cannot guarantee in advance what fate would await them, but
it is committed to taking that factor into account during negotiations on
secession. The Government would have all of its responsibilities to all
Canadians at heart.
The House of Commons, every member of this House,
would have the opportunity to assess the way in which the Government conducted
these infinitely painful, serious and difficult negotiations.
Conclusion
This bill is reasonable, and is in everybody's
interest, including that of my fellow Quebecers who desire Quebec independence.
They can and must acknowledge that their plans for political independence can
only be realized in clarity and legality. To act otherwise, to try to reach
independence through ambiguity, with no legal safety net, is to show disrespect
for Quebecers and to doom the independence initiative to failure, to an impasse
that would be disappointing and costly for everyone.
In this matter, the separatist leaders do not
defend the rights of Quebecers. None of our rights as Quebecers are threatened
by this bill, quite the contrary. No one in this country wants to keep Quebecers
against their clearly expressed will. No, what the separatist leaders defend is
their capacity to maintain confusion on their project. They are upholding their
so-called right to confusion.
So far, the Government of Quebec has reacted to
the announcement of this bill with a most regrettable display of polemic frenzy.
Among other niceties, it has said that the bill is of Soviet inspiration,
designed to turn Canada into a prison, and to dishonour Canada in the eyes of
other democracies.
Well, if Canada is to be described as a
"prison" for not contemplating its own divisibility other than through
legality and clarity, just how would we describe all those democratic countries
that declare themselves to be indivisible? And how would we describe the
indivisible country into which the separatist leaders want to transform Quebec?
A prison?
The truth is that, by obliging itself in law to
negotiate secession under circumstances of clarity, Canada is displaying
unprecedented openness in the democratic world, in the face of the secessionist
phenomenon.
And for my many, many fellow citizens who have
Canadian unity at heart, and who will thus be saddened to see their Parliament
pass legislation that contemplates the possible break-up of Canada, rest assured
that your federal government is firmly convinced that, if things are clear,
Quebecers will never renounce their full-fledged belonging to Canada.
The Government of Canada is convinced that
Quebecers will always choose to stay in Canada, will always work from the inside
to make Canada better, will always accept a helping hand from their fellow
Canadians, and in return will never deprive them of the remarkable contribution
of Quebec's culture and vitality. As Quebecers, we will never want to deprive
anyone, be it ourselves or our fellow human beings, of the benefits of Canadian
unity, here at home and throughout the world.
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