|
"Tocqueville and the Civic
Virtues of Nationalism"
Notes for an address by
the
President of the Privy Council and
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
the Honourable Stéphane Dion
at a conference sponsored
by the
Conference for the Study of Political Thought
in association with the
Canadian Political Science Association
Quebec, Quebec
July 29, 2000
Check against delivery
Between 1988 and 1995, when I was a political science professor at the
Université de Montréal, I published five studies on the thought of Alexis de
Tocqueville(1). I sought to illuminate how this
great mind tried to reconcile two systems of thought which are vital to the
Quebec society to which I belong: liberalism and nationalism.
As I reread Tocqueville, not just his three great works, the two volumes of Democracy
in America and The Old Regime and the French Revolution, but also
his writings on French Canada and on Algeria, I was trying to find for myself a
way to be a Quebec and Canadian nationalist that is fully compatible with my
liberal values.
Of course, I am not trying to use the work of this 19th century
thinker to support my own. No one can know what he would have to say about our
national question as it stands today. I simply want to share my interpretation
of his work and the conclusions I have drawn from it. By inviting me to this
conference, Professor James Moore has given me the
opportunity to do so, for which I am most grateful.
I will first show how the reconciliation that Tocqueville sought between
liberalism and nationalism touches on the very theme of your conference: civic
education. Then, after listing the dangers that Tocqueville saw in nationalism,
I will point out the civic virtues that he attributed to it, before drawing some
conclusions from the viewpoint of my own political involvement.
1. Liberalism
and nationalism
For many liberals, liberalism and nationalism are incompatible. They see in
nationalism a danger to individual freedom. They maintain that the ultimate
objective, the supreme investment of values, must be the flesh-and-blood
individual, rather than the nation conceptualized as a body. A world in which
citizens are merely instruments of the nation, in which belonging to the nation
takes precedence over belonging to themselves, is a world that is repugnant to
the liberal mind.
Tocqueville, for his part, wanted to reconcile liberalism and nationalism. As
Raymond Aron has written: [translation] "This
prince among thinkers renounced neither national greatness nor individual
freedom."(2)
As a liberal, Tocqueville wanted the ultimate objective of the social order to
be individual freedom: [translation] "I want the general principles of
government to be liberal principles, and the largest possible role left to
individual action, to personal initiative."(3)
A nationalist, Tocqueville pursued throughout his life the ideal of a strong
French nation. He was a nationalist thinker, elected official and minister, and
a colonialist as well.
Tocqueville believed that under certain conditions, nationalism can be the
bearer of the civic virtues necessary to a democratic and liberal society. He
was less conscious than we, as witnesses of the 20th century, can be of the
dangers of nationalism, of the terrible offences that it can lead to, but he
anticipated them nevertheless. In spite of these dangers, he believed in the
possibility of what we call civic nationalism.
And this brings us to the very theme of your conference: "Citizenship,
Conscience and Political Education." It is fitting that such a conference
devote one of its sessions to the thought of Alexis de Tocqueville. The main
concern that permeates Tocqueville's work is precisely citizenship in democratic
society.
Tocqueville sought ways to strengthen the commitment of individuals to the
societies to which they belong. He feared that democracy could degenerate into
asocial egoism. One of the remedies he prescribed to counter this problem,
alongside religion and administrative decentralization, was patriotism. Under
certain conditions, he believed, love of one's country, or what we call
nationalism - Tocqueville did not use that term - can serve, rather than
threaten, civic education and individual freedom.
2. The
dangers of nationalism
Although he could anticipate neither the scope nor the exact forms of the
authoritarian offences that the pretext of national imperative would give rise
to, Tocqueville perceived a number of vices to which the idealization of the
national theme could lead.
"'The will of the nation' is one of those phrases that have been most
largely abused by the wily and the despotic of every age."(4)
Democracy, believed Tocqueville, does not provide an insurmountable barrier to
the demagogic exploitation of national attachment. Indeed, to some extent, it
favours such exploitation, by strengthening the feeling of belonging to a nation
rather than to a social class. In effect, he explained, the evolution toward
greater social mobility and equality of conditions among individuals breaks down
the castes and makes the nation appear more clearly as a collective referent.
With the dislocation of the aristocratic bodies and classes that had linked the
peasantry to the Crown, "it is always to the whole nation, and in the
name of the whole nation, that the orator speaks."(5)
The danger of demagogic manipulation of the national theme in democracy is even
more real, according to Tocqueville, when national pride dulls the critical
spirit that democracies need so much. The nationalist tends to reject any
criticism of his country, perceiving it to be a personal attack and no longer
seeing the weaknesses of the society with which he identifies himself.(6)
Moreover, Tocqueville notes, love of one's country is naturally conservative,
and linked to "a taste for ancient customs."(7)
While this bias in favour of tradition and conformity may be desirable "while
society is steadily based upon traditional institutions"(8)
it may prevent peoples from discerning where their interests lie in a world
undergoing rapid upheaval. Thus, Tocqueville believed it was in Americans' best
interest to preserve their federal union, and he deplored the fact that this "ideal
nation, which exists, so to speak, only in the mind" was under a
continuous threat of dismemberment through the pressures of the habits, local
biases and "prejudices of local and familiar attachment"(9)
on which the sovereignty of the American states was based.
Tocqueville also foresaw that nationalism can over-value the distinctive
characteristics of peoples, to the point of artificially dividing humanity.
While in his earlier writings he appeared convinced of the explanatory force of
the cultural traits of peoples, over time he would come to accord less and less
importance to national temperaments, even expressing annoyance in his last book
with explanations relying systematically on the "French spirit"(10).
A margin note in the draft of his last book reads: [translation] "The
portrait of a people is always a vague, indistinct image, when attempting to
give an overall impression. In such cases, pretension is always more prevalent
than truth."(11)
Tocqueville was categorically opposed to any national claim based on a belief in
racial superiority. He denounced such [translation] "false and odious
doctrines"(12) in the strongest
possible terms. Nations initially possess the same natural genius, and if it is
possible that each has a specific biological identity, this is an explanation
that Tocqueville sought to relegate to the rearmost ranks of the causes of
social behaviour. But he did observe the strong hold that racial prejudices had
over his contemporaries. As a parliamentarian, he championed the abolition of
slavery, and while he may have believed in an enlightened, civilizing
colonization that would [translation] "bring light to the darkness",(13)
he denounced the fanaticism of the brutal French officers whose hearts were
filled with [translation] "disdain and anger," for whom
[translation] "the Arabs are wicked beasts"(14).
And so, because the idealization of the nation, which we now refer to as
nationalism, can potentially deteriorate into demagogy, despotism and racism,
because it can lead to artificial divisions among human beings, because the
extraordinary mobilizing capacity of national demands has such a potential for
turning into fanaticism, why not try to steer clear of it altogether? Why not
make humanity as a whole the collective referent? After all, democracy is the
bearer of a universal civilization in which the differences between nations will
tend to wither away: "Variety is disappearing from the human race; the
same ways of acting, thinking, and feeling are to be met with all over the world."(15)
Tocqueville observed that nations tend to lose their specificity as individuals
abandon their old traditions to gain greater benefit from freedom. Of their own
accord, democratic peoples converge toward a similarity of values, they "seem
to be advancing to unity"(16). "This
displays the aspect of mankind for the first time in the broadest light."(17)
Tocqueville believed that this feeling of human unity brings with it a
tremendous benefit: the love of peace.
And yet, Tocqueville refused to renounce the nation, believing that the
reference to the nation, if used properly, can contribute to the civic sense.
3. The
civic virtues of national attachment
Tocqueville was very concerned with civic-mindedness, defined as a bridge
between the individual interest and the collective interest. He was convinced
that democracy, because it leaves individuals free to refuse to participate in
communal affairs so as to better tend to their private affairs, has great need
of civic-mindedness. For this reason, he recommended that democracy draw on the
civic virtues of religion, administrative decentralization and patriotism.
Theoretically, the risk of general apathy, of asocial egoism, poses no threat to
democracies, believed Tocqueville, because the enlightened self-interest of an
individual who is left responsible for himself should be enough to convince him
to associate with his fellow citizens: "Each individual will feel the
same necessity of union with his fellows to protect his own weakness; and as he
knows that he can obtain their help only on condition of helping them, he will
readily perceive that his personal interest is identified with the interests of
the whole community."(18)
But Tocqueville realized that things can be very different in practice. People
are less perceptive in democracy than the optimistic theory of enlightened
self-interest would suggest. Established in their rights, they tend too much to
be concerned solely with their own private affairs and material comforts, and to
abandon public affairs to the state. "Hence such men can never, without
an effort, tear themselves from their private affairs to engage in public
business; their natural bias leads them to abandon the latter to the sole
visible and permanent representative of the interests of the community; that is
to say, to the state. Not only are they naturally wanting in a taste for public
business, but they have frequently no time to attend to it. Private life in
democratic times is so busy, so excited, so full of wishes and of work, that
hardly any energy or leisure remains to each individual for public life."(19)
According to Tocqueville, the consequence of this asocial egoism is a laxity of
moral standards and a short-sighted materialism, tendencies which can be
suicidal for freedom, as the expansion of the state represses individual
initiative. Patriotism takes its place alongside religion and administrative
decentralization among the means of combating such harmful tendencies.
In effect, the sharing of the same national attachment builds a bridge between
free citizens, who too often tend to keep to themselves: "Do what you
may, there is no true power among men except in the free union of their will;
and patriotism and religion are the only two motives in the world that can long
urge all the people towards the same end."(20)
National attachment is a "virtue" that combats the "destructive
agencies" linked to "the ambition of private citizens"
and "the strength of parties."(21)
Tocqueville placed such great emphasis on the civic virtues of religion, much
more than on those of patriotism, because he observed that his contemporaries
questioned religious values. But however convinced he might have been of the
benefits of the religious spirit, he still felt that it needed to be completed
by the patriotic spirit: [translation] "I feel that the duties
individuals have to one another as citizens, citizens' obligations to their
country, are ill-defined and quite neglected in Christian morality. That seems
to me to be the weak point of that admirable morality, and the only real strong
point of classical morality."(22)
Through the convergence of values and the disappearance of national differences,
it might be possible to mobilize people in favour of the well-being of humanity
as a whole, and to do without the national referent. But Tocqueville was none
too sure of this, believing that humanity as a whole was an abstraction too
intangible for the human spirit to grasp. He believed in the virtues of
proximity and hands-on experience. He wrote: "For in the
United States it is believed, and with truth, that patriotism is a kind of
devotion which is strengthened by ritual observance."(23)
An individual in democracy has an interest in his country's well-being as
something that is useful to him and as the results of his own labours. That is
why he takes pride in the nation's success.
Tocqueville thought that, to promote this civic patriotism more effectively, a
democratic state ought to be federal or decentralized. "It is not the administrative,
but the political effects of decentralization that I most admire in
America. In the United States the interests of the country are everywhere
kept in view; they are an object of solicitude to the people of the whole Union."
(24)
Uniformity held no attraction for Tocqueville. "I should regard it as a
great misfortune for mankind if liberty were to exist all over the world under
the same features."(25) He worried
that the passion for equality could drive democracies to see legislative
uniformity as the primary condition for good government. "Their minds
appear never to have foreseen that it might be possible not to apply with strict
uniformity the same laws to every part of the state and to all its inhabitants."(26)
One of the missions that Tocqueville assigned to the modern legislator was to
safeguard what little originality remained to the individual.(27)
According to Tocqueville, federalism, decentralization, and love of one's
country, "by the people of the whole Union " should
contribute to this plural quest for freedom and genuine citizenship.
So patriotism in democracy is rooted in practice. [translation] "It
grows through the exercise of rights and ultimately, to some extent, becomes
melded with the individual interest;" it will be "more
rational" and "more fruitful" than antiquated
patriotism, which Tocqueville described as "instinctive, (...)
[a] natural fondness"(28).
And yet, Tocqueville was not sure that this self-serving patriotism, "extension
of individual selfishness"(29) was
sufficient on its own to mobilize the citizenry for the common good and to
eliminate the risk of general apathy. He noted: "[...] I do not rely
upon that calculating patriotism which is founded upon interest and which a
change in the interests may destroy."(30)
Legislators must intervene to stimulate it: "It depends upon the
laws to awaken and direct the vague impulse of patriotism, which never abandons
the human heart."(31)
According to Tocqueville, legislators themselves must be imbued with patriotic
feeling. He criticized politicians who replaced patriotism with electoral
cunning. Tocqueville admired the first legislators of the American Union, whom
he described by saying: "distinguished as almost all the legislators of
the Union were for their intelligence, they were still more so for their
patriotism."(32)
The leaders of democracies must regenerate the moral discipline of their
citizens by providing them with objects of national pride and with great
challenges, Tocqueville believed. "I would have endeavours made to
give them a more enlarged idea of themselves and of their kind."(33)
Those great challenges might take the form of military and colonial
undertakings, Tocqueville went so far as to think. "War almost always
enlarges the mind of a people and raises their character. In some cases it is
the only check to the excessive growth of certain propensities that naturally
spring out of the equality of conditions, and it must be considered as a
necessary corrective to certain inveterate diseases to which democratic
communities are liable."(34) He
enthusiastically hailed the conquest of Algeria and had misgivings about the
French's lukewarm appetite for those distant undertakings. He saw Algeria as
[translation] "a great monument to the glory of our country",(35)
just as, for the British, India was [translation] "a star whose light
shines upon the whole nation"(36).
To renounce this moral discipline that stems from national sentiment is to risk
being conquered oneself, asserted Tocqueville. For indifference to communal
affairs also hinders action for common defence, a mortal danger in the balance
of power between states. "It profits a state but little to be affluent
and free if it is perpetually exposed to be pillaged or subjugated,"(37)
said Tocqueville, who had grown up during the Napoleonic wars and whose own
nationalism had suffered a great blow through the humiliation of France's
defeat.
And so, according to Tocqueville, the maintenance of national sentiment is a
precondition for national security, and beyond that, for a moral elevation that
extends the citizen's gaze beyond his or her own narrow interests.
Conclusion
Tocqueville believed that modern nationalism would be "more rational,
[...] more fruitful," less "instinctive, [...] [of a] natural
fondness" than old nationalism. Today, knowing the enormity of the
crimes that have been committed in the name of the nation, we cannot share his
optimism.
We must bear in mind Tocqueville's premonition of the demagogic, despotic,
reactionary and racist outrages which the inflammation of the national sentiment
can produce. We must be aware that even a democrat and a liberal such as
Tocqueville was not immune to the colonialist jingoism of his time, and that, on
the contrary, he encouraged it as a civic value, a stimulant to participation in
communal affairs.
And yet I still believe that Tocqueville was right in seeing national sentiment
as a potential source of civic virtue. Where his reasoning has limitations is in
failing to specify how nationalism might become just that, civic patriotism,
rather than degenerating into a principle of racist and totalitarian exclusion.
The same criticism may be made about Tocqueville's views on religion: he did not
specify how to preserve religion's civic morality while eliminating the risk of
fundamentalism and intransigence. He did, at least, formulate a general response
in respect of religious power, advising that it be separated as much as possible
from secular power. He did not exhibit the same prudence in respect of
nationalism, elevating it on the contrary into a state ideology.
In my opinion, there are universal values that are far more important than
nationalism; that go far beyond it. I am thinking of the values of liberty,
equality, solidarity, sharing, tolerance, acceptance of others, and the pursuit
of prosperity for all. These are the goals that, as human beings, we should all
pursue beyond our differences.
But if we are to better live these universal values, we must rely on the
experiences of each individual, of each human group. Like Tocqueville, we must
be wary of uniformity, valuing instead the plurality of experiences.
To my mind, that is what we are trying to do in Canada. I don't know whether my
country is really the best place on Earth to live, but that is certainly the
best objective that a country can set for itself: to be the country where the
values of freedom, prosperity, sharing and tolerance are best respected. In
Tocqueville's own words: [translation] "The great efforts inspired by
patriotism belong to all humanity."(38)
The quest for the universal, such is the true meaning of Canadian nationalism.
We must draw our national pride from our efforts to build here a country where
each human being has the best chance to flourish as a human being, whatever
their origin or skin colour. That is the goal toward which we must orient and
spur the civic participation of Canadians.
To do so, we must build on the plurality of experiences, on the diversity of our
country and on the federative form of our system of government. And this is
where my Canadian nationalism meets my Quebec nationalism. By building on my own
culture, my language, by relying on these assets, by sharing them with my fellow
Canadians, and in return by accepting their assistance and their contribution, I
give myself and my fellow citizens the best means of living the values that all
human beings seek.
Rather than being a contradiction, I consider the attachment to both Quebec and
Canada as a wonderful complementarity, perhaps the best combination to better
live according to the universal values sought by all human beings.
As Camus said, I love my country too much to be a nationalist. That is the
challenge in a nutshell: to be able to draw from our feelings of belonging,
"by the people of the whole Union," something bigger and
better than nationalism, something that can anchor us to the universal, to what
Tocqueville called displaying "the aspect of mankind [...] in the
broadest light."
Notes
1. Stéphane Dion,
"La pensée de Tocqueville - L'épreuve du Canada français, Revue
d'histoire de l'Amérique française, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1988), pp. 537-552.
Id., "Tocqueville, le
Canada français et la question nationale,"Revue française de science
politique, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1990), pp. 501-519.
Id., "Durham et
Tocqueville sur la colonisation libérale, Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue
d'études canadiennes, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1990), pp. 60-77.
Id., "Le nationalisme
dans la convergence culturelle : Le Québec contemporain et le paradoxe de
Tocqueville, In Hudon, Raymond and Réjean Pelletier, eds., L'engagement
intellectuel : Mélanges en l'honneur de Léon Dion (Québec City: Presses
de l'Université Laval, 1991), pp. 289-311.
Id., "La conciliation
du libéralisme et du nationalisme chez Tocqueville", The Tocqueville
Review/La Revue Tocqueville, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1995), pp. 219-227.
2. Raymond Aron,
"Discours lors de la réception du prix Tocqueville", The
Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville, Vol. II, No.1 (1980) p.120.
3. «Lettre à
Charles Stoffels» (Oeuvres complètes 5,
1866 edition, pp. 436-38), quoted in Jean-Claude Lamberti, Tocqueville et
les deux démocraties (Paris: PUF, 1983), pp. 160-161.
4. Alexis de
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I (New York: Vintage Books
Edition, 1990), chap. IV, p. 55. Vol. 1 of Democracy in America will
hereafter be referred to as DA1.
5. Alexis de
Tocqueville. Democracy in America, Vol. 2 ( New York: Vintage
Books Edition, 1990), First Book, chap. XXI, p. 93. Vol. 2 of Democracy in
America will hereafter be referred to as DA2.
6. DA2, Third
Book, chap. XVI, p. 226.
7. DA1, chap.
XIV, p. 241.
8. DA1, chap.
XIV, p. 242.
9. DA1, chap.
VIII, p. 166 and p. 169.
10. Alexis de
Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (New York:
Doubleday & Company, 1955), Part 3, chap. I, p. 148.
11. Quoted in
Françoise Mélonio, "Nations et nationalismes", The Tocqueville
Review/La Revue Tocqueville, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, (1997), p.
63.
12. Alexis de
Tocqueville, "Rapport fait au nom de la Commission chargée d'examiner la
proposition de M. De Tracy relative aux esclaves des colonies", July 23,
1839, Oeuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1962) 3. Écrits et
discours politiques, Part 3, p. 42. Unless otherwise noted, all references
to the Oeuvres complètes are to the 1962 Gallimard edition.
13. «Intervention
à la Chambre à l'occasion du vote du budget général de l'Algérie pour
1848», July 9, 1847, ibid., p. 420.
14. «Lettre à
Francisque de Corcelle», December 1, 1848, Oeuvres complètes 15.
Correspondance Tocqueville-Corcelle et Tocqueville-Madame Swetchine,
Part 1, p. 224.
15. DA2, Third
Book, chap. XVII, p. 229.
16. DA1, chap.
XVIII, p. 433.
17. DA2, First
Book, chap. XVII, p. 75.
18. DA1,
Author's Introduction, p. 10.
19. DA2, Fourth
Book, chap. III, p. 293.
20. DA1, chap.
V, p. 93.
21. DA1, chap.
VIII, p. 161.
22. «Lettre à
Arthur de Gobineau», September 5, 1848, Oeuvres complètes 9.
Correspondance Tocqueville-Gobineau, p. 46.
23. DA1, chap.
V, p. 67.
24. DA1, chap.
V, p. 94.
25. DA1, chap.
XVII, part 2, p. 330.
26. DA2, Fourth
Book, chap. II, p. 290.
27. DA2, Third
Book, chap. VII, p. 329.
28. DA1, chap.
XIV, pp. 241-242.
29. DA1, chap.
XVIII, p. 286.
30. DA1, chap.
XVIII, p. 392.
31. DA1, chap.V,
p. 93.
32. DA1,
chap.VIII, p. 153.
33. DA2, Third
Book, chap. XIX, p. 248. He expressed the same idea in «Lettre à John Stuart
Mill», March18, 1841, Oeuvres complètes 6. Correspondances
anglaises, Part.1, p. 335.
34. DA2, Third
Book, chap. XXII, p. 268.
35. «Seconde
lettre sur l'Algérie», published in La Presse de Seine-et-Oise,
August 22, 1837, Oeuvres complètes 3. Écrits et discours
politiques, Part 1, p. 151.
36. «Ébauche
d'un ouvrage sur l'Inde», ibid., p. 478.
37. DA1, chap.
VIII, p. 162.
38. «Réflexions
diverses», Oeuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1953) 2. L'Ancien
Régime et la Révolution, Part 2, p. 343.
|
