"The contribution of academics to the Quebec media debate on the procedure for secession"

October 23, 2003

“The intellectual [...] will not refuse to become involved, and when he participates in action he will accept its consequences, however harsh. But he must try never to forget the arguments of the adversary, or the uncertainty of the future, or the faults of his own side, or the underlying fraternity of ordinary men everywhere.”

Raymond Aron¹

Vincent Lemieux, who knows how to bring scientific precision to every area of his discipline, from advanced theory to simple commentary on current events, has reflected a great deal on the role of “the expert.” Indeed, it was the theme of the Presidential address he delivered to the Canadian Political Science Association in Charlottetown, in June 1992.² By expert, I should specify it means here academics who, invoking their scientific knowledge, provide advice with a view to influencing collective decisions.

Different avenues are open to academics who want to play a role as experts, including the media. For example, they can express their views in daily newspapers. It is on that written form of academic expression that I shall make my contribution to this work honouring Vincent Lemieux. Specifically, I shall examine the political debate which probably garnered the most coverage in Quebec daily newspapers in the years following the 1995 referendum on Quebec’s future: the debate on the procedure for secession. I shall look at what academics from all disciplines wrote on that theme in the three main French-language daily newspapers in Quebec: La Presse, Le Devoir and Le Soleil.

The debate on the rules for secession pertains not to the reasons that might justify a secession, but rather to the procedure whereby it might be effected: the “how” rather than the “why.” I looked exclusively at what academics have written for public consumption on the way in which Quebec could cease to be a Canadian province and become an independent state. I wondered whether academics, through our daily newspapers, were able to make a truly enlightened, scientifically precise contribution to that emotionally charged debate.

Ideally, I would like to have also analysed academic writings on this theme in the country’s main Anglophone dailies, but I did not have enough time to cast so wide a net. Similarly, I would like to have analysed contributions in the audio-visual media, but it would have been too difficult to track down all of them. In any case, I feel that the written word better reflects the essence of what one thinks than does the spoken word.

Daily newspapers publish academic writings provided they are short, topical and accessible to the public. One therefore needs to know how to meet the dailies’ requirements in order to get published. These inherent limitations of this type of publication must not be used as a pretext for complacency or vagueness. The need to communicate simply and clearly with the public is no excuse for a lack of rigour in the substance.

In his 1992 speech in Charlottetown, Vincent Lemieux warned academics against the pitfalls of intervening in the media as experts. I would point out two in particular. The first is insistent solicitation by the media, which may lead academics to express themselves on topics about which they know little or nothing. This is what Lemieux calls “experts on everything”: “This can occur when the media declare some of us ‘experts on everything” either because we communicate our message well, or because we are always available.”³

The second pitfall consists of academics’ own ideological preferences, which may cloud their judgment and prevent them from offering objective expertise. Trying to achieve objectivity does not mean abstaining from taking a position – that is neutrality. Rather, it means taking a position on the basis of a rational and thorough refutation of opposing positions. Vincent Lemieux is not calling on all academics to abstain from taking sides for a cause (which I find reassuring). But he does not want the heart’s attachment to a cause to prevent the head from forming an opinion based on reason and scientific precision: “University professors are citizens with political likes and dislikes, always ready to ‘colour’ to say the least, their opinions.”⁴

“Experts on everything” or “partisan experts”: academics have to avoid both these pitfalls if they want to express themselves by virtue of their qualifications, rather than under false pretences. If newspapers welcome copy from academics so readily, it is because of their status as scientists. They are credited with the ability to deliver accurate empirical information and in-depth reflection on the very topic they are writing about. If they lack that scientific expertise, they should either refrain from expressing themselves or do so simply as citizens, through letters to the editor.

The more media coverage and emotional reaction a topic generates, the more dangerous are the pitfalls of “experts on everything” or “partisan experts.” Professors Michel Fortmann and Stéphane Roussel described the extent to which the media, in the months following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, demanded “‘an expert,’ any expert, as long as they had a title, a degree and seemed to know what they were talking about.”⁵ [Translation]  The professors deplored how too many of their colleagues had succumbed to “the call of ‘expertmania’” and had transformed themselves into “Minute Rice experts, ready in five minutes”⁶ [Translation]. They urged academics to define their area of expertise honestly and to stick to it.

In my opinion, no political debate in Quebec in recent years has received more media coverage or elicited more emotional reaction than the debate on the procedure for secession. Indeed, if the national question is considered in its entirety, the media have been soliciting academics’ expertise for several decades now, in a context often fraught with emotion. As far back as 1958, in a text devoted to the national question, Léon Dion raised, in substance, the same red flags as Vincent Lemieux regarding public expressions by academics continually “at risk of being swayed left or right, on demand, giving their opinions on pretty well anything and on any occasion.”⁷ [Translation]. If French-Canadian academics, he wrote, were to accept “the ties of solidarity proposed by local nationalism” to the point of losing sight of their role of formulating sound reflection using the analytical tools of their respective disciplines, “irremediable damage would be caused to intellectual activity in our community.”⁸ [Translation]

The point I will be developing in the following pages is that a number of our fellow academics might have better used their status as experts if they had more rigorously verified the foundations of the ideas they conveyed regarding the procedures for secession. I believe they have given scientific imprimatur to erroneous data and arguments that have been widely rejected in the relevant scientific literature. In my view, they have presented their opinions ex cathedra without basing them on an objective refutation of contrary opinions. In terms of format, it seems to me that some of them have abandoned the rules of their discipline in order to espouse a partisan discourse, made up of trendy slogans, emotional denunciations and personal attacks. I do not know whether it is the desire to be seen (“experts on everything”), a nationalist infatuation (“partisan experts”) or some other reason that has caused them to blunder so, but in reading their writings, I do not believe I am the only one to be concerned about “intellectual activity in our community.”

Of course, as a political player engaged in this debate myself, I am wary of my own judgement. Perhaps it is because their positions are contrary to mine that my evaluation of the expressions of some of my colleagues is so severe. But I also lay claim myself to the title of researcher, moulded, notably, in the school of Vincent Lemieux. The Quebec academic community, of which I will always consider myself a member, is very dear to me. For this reason, without blaming anyone, I submit to that community the evidence to back up the severity of my findings. I ask only that my demonstration be judged on its own merits.

After giving an overview of the debate on the procedures for secession and the body of academic writings on this topic in three French-language Quebec daily newspapers (part 1), I will address in turn three fundamental aspects of the debate: namely, how a democratic procedure for secession has to respect the law (part 2), the negotiation of borders (part 3), and finally, the prerequisite for clarity (part 4).

1. What debate? What body of work?

The simplest way to summarize the debate on the rules for secession, as it was posed in the years following the 1995 referendum, is to start with the contrast between the positions that were defended respectively by the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada. After setting out those two positions, I will make an initial review of the body of work, in order to determine whether the positions defended by academics leaned more toward one government than the other.

1.1 The positions of the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada regarding the procedure for secession

The Government of Quebec, under the successive impetus of PQ Premiers Parizeau, Bouchard and Landry, has defended the thesis that the Parti Québécois has always advanced. According to that thesis, a simple victory in a provincial election would allow a Parti Québécois government to effect Quebec’s independence through a majority vote in the National Assembly. Holding a referendum is not considered necessary in law, although it is acknowledged that such public approval is an additional source of democratic legitimacy. It is the Government of Quebec which, bolstered by its majority in the National Assembly, would formulate the referendum question. A majority result, however slim, in favour of the government’s proposal, would be sufficient for Quebec’s National Assembly to be able to proclaim independence. But before that proclamation of independence took place, negotiations could be undertaken with the Government of Canada in order to facilitate the transition and with a view to possibly concluding a form of economic association or political and economic partnership. Nevertheless, at any point in those negotiations, the National Assembly could take it upon itself to proclaim itself, unilaterally, to be the parliament of an independent state. As soon as it was made, that declaration of independence would apply to all of Quebec’s territory, the borders of which would be sacred. All citizens and all governments would henceforth be bound to consider the Government of Quebec to be effectively the government of an independent state. Negotiations could continue, but between two independent states.

This procedure for secession is well reflected in Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec,⁹ introduced by the Parizeau government in the National Assembly prior to the 1995 referendum. Under section 1, “The National Assembly is authorized, within the scope of this Act, to proclaim the sovereignty of Québec.” For greater certainty, section 2 specifies: “On the date fixed in the proclamation of the National Assembly, the Declaration of sovereignty appearing in the Preamble shall take effect and Québec shall become a sovereign country [...]” Section 26 adds that the negotiations on a partnership treaty with Canada must not extend beyond one year, within which time the National Assembly may proclaim sovereignty as soon as it has concluded that the negotiations have proved fruitless.

This is the PQ government’s concept of the procedure for secession, which they base on the right of peoples to self-determination. Sometimes the PQ leaders assert that this principle of self-determination confers a right to secession recognized in international law, sometimes they make of it a democratic rule that transcends formal law.

According to the Government of Canada, there is not one paragraph, not a single line in international law whereby peoples’ right to self-determination can be confused with a right to secession in a democratic context. When the Attorney General of Quebec argued in the Quebec Superior Court in April 1996, in Bertrand v. Bégin, that the process for attaining independence “is sanctioned by international law, and the Superior Court has no jurisdiction in this respect”¹⁰ [Translation], the Government of Canada felt duty-bound to intervene in order to point out this erroneous interpretation of the law. The Government of Canada intervened first in the Bertrand v. Bégin case, and then through a reference to the Supreme Court.

As for the argument that attaining independence is a purely political, rather than legal, question, the Government of Canada maintains this is incompatible with the elementary principles of democracy and the rule of law. A government that itself acts in violation of the law while requiring its citizens to comply with its laws exposes society to dangers that are unacceptable in democracy.

For the Government of Canada, all Canadians hold the right to full belonging to Canada. Such a right can be challenged only through a will for secession clearly expressed by a clear majority of a province’s voters. The Government of Canada believes it has the obligation to be sure that such a clear will for secession does in fact exist before undertaking negotiations on secession. Without that assurance, it could not negotiate the division of the country and the end of its constitutional obligations to a part of the Canadian population. So secession cannot be effected unilaterally by the government of a province; it must be negotiated within the constitutional framework, grounded in clear support for secession. The negotiations should try to take into consideration, to the greatest extent possible, the interests of everyone, which could necessitate altering the borders of the province seeking secession.

With regard to the clarity of the procedure for secession, the Government of Canada believes that both the referendum question in 1980 and the one in 1995 sowed confusion which had the effect of artificially inflating support for secession. It believes that secession cannot be negotiated in the wake of a vote on a question in which secession was confusingly intertwined with a vague plan for association or partnership with Canada. The majority must also be clear, notably because secession is a grave, irreversible decision that is binding on future generations.

The Government of Quebec maintains that the Government of Canada is trying to change the rules which it believes were accepted by all parties during the referenda in 1980 and 1995. The Government of Canada’s response is that no prime minister of Canada has ever agreed to recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by the government or legislative assembly of a province. In 1980, Prime Minister Trudeau stated: “If you knock on the sovereignty-association door, there is no negotiation possible.”¹¹ [Translation] It was the same situation in 1995, when Mr. Bouchard, on the day after the referendum, waxed indignant that Mr. Chrétien reserved the right “not to honour a narrow yes majority in favour of sovereignty.”¹²

When the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its opinion on the Reference re Secession of Quebec¹³ on August 20, 1998, the Government of Quebec maintained that the Government of Canada would be obliged by the Court to undertake negotiations on secession if the Government of Quebec managed to win a referendum. The Government of Canada responded that such an obligation existed only, according to the Court, in the event of clear support for secession, expressed by a clear majority of a province’s voters, on a clear question on secession. The Government of Canada specified that, again according to the Supreme Court, negotiations would have to take place within the Canadian constitutional framework, and that the Government of Quebec would not have a right to effect independence even after negotiations that it concluded had proved fruitless.¹⁴  In short, the Court confirmed, according to the Government of Canada, the prerequisite for clarity and the principle of constitutionality.

The Government of Canada’s decision to give effect to that opinion by the Supreme Court through legislation was hotly disputed by the Government of Quebec. The Clarity Act¹⁵ prohibits the Government of Canada from undertaking negotiations on the secession of a province unless the House of Commons has determined that the referendum question clearly pertained to secession and that a clear majority voted in favour of secession. The Government of Quebec responded by having legislation of its own passed by the National Assembly, on December 7, 2000.¹⁶ That Act sets out a list of principles, which do not, however, include the principle of external self-determination or the right to secession, according to remarks by the sponsoring minister in the National Assembly: “But Section 1 in no way confers on the Quebec people any right to secession.¹⁷ [Translation] In comparison, as we have seen, Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec, introduced by the Parizeau government in 1995, set out a procedure for unilateral secession.

The evolution of the debate is well reflected in the yawning gap between Bill 99 passed by Quebec’s National Assembly in 2000 and Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec, of 1995.

This broadly summarizes the two contrary positions defended by the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada. This important debate clearly calls for expertise in the humanities and social sciences and in law. Legal expertise: what is the relationship between peoples’ right to self-determination and the right to secession? Expertise in political science: what is state practice regarding attempts at unilateral secession? What is a clear decision-making procedure for secession? Multidisciplinary expertise: How can the law and politics be harmonized so that secession can be effected in a context of peace, justice and respect for democracy?

1.2 Academics on the procedure for secession: frequency and general direction of their writings

I elected to review writings by academics on the procedures for secession in three Quebec French-language daily newspapers: Le Devoir, La Presse and Le Soleil. The period covered was from January 25, 1996 to June 30, 2002. The first date corresponds to my entry into politics, a moment marking an intensification of the debate on the procedure for secession. June 30, 2002, is simply the day before I began writing this paper.

The body of work¹⁸ was compiled through computerized retrieval, using a number of keywords, from all texts published in the three newspapers that pertained wholly or partially to the procedure for secession. While I may have missed some texts, I am sure they were not very many. I retained articles signed by one or more authors as well as petitions supported by several signatories, following the principle that someone who signs his or her name to a text makes the decision to support it in its entirety.

I retained in the body of work only those authors who expressed themselves as experts in the humanities, social sciences and jurisprudence. This includes not just academics, but also authors who explicitly claimed to draw on a given discipline, as sociologists or political scientists, for example. I was not elitist: contributions by students were given the same consideration as those by professors. I did not, however, retain texts written by authors who do not have expertise in a specific discipline. Their texts appear in the body of work only if they cosigned them with academics or specialists in a given discipline. This is not because I deem unimportant the contributions of those who write as “intellectuals” rather than “experts,” to reiterate the distinction so well developed by André J. Bélanger.¹⁹ But I am interested here only in authors who claim to draw on a scientific precision specific to their discipline and who, on that basis, believe they can help the general public better to distinguish between true and false, possible and impossible, probable and improbable, desirable and undesirable.

And now some specifics on the body of work thus constituted are in order. Let us begin with a quantitative description. Between Jaunary 25, 1996, and June 30, 2002, the three papers published 117 different texts signed by experts and pertaining in whole or in part to the rules for secession. Some of those 117 texts were published in more than one newspaper. Seventy-five different authors signed or cosigned these texts. In fact, 12 authors alone were the sole signatories of 60 texts. The most prolific was philosophy professor Michel Seymour, who alone published eight articles, cosigned one and also signed one petition.

The frequency of publication of these texts followed the ebb and flow of the debate in the world of current affairs. Between 1996 and 1998, the year in which the Supreme Court rendered its opinion, the frequency of publication of texts by experts on the rules for secession held steady in our major daily papers: 29 texts were published in 1996, 28 in 1997 and 29 in 1998. The year 1999 saw a pause: only four texts by experts were published between January and November. Interest picked up again following the presentation of a draft bill on clarity in the House of Commons.²⁰ From December 1999 to June 2000, 19 texts on the issue appeared. The debate then dropped off and writings by experts became few and far between: from July 2000 to June 2002, in the space of two years, only eight texts pertained in whole or in part to the procedure for secession.

Now let us turn to a somewhat more qualitative evaluation of the body of work. I classified texts according to whether the position defended appeared to me to be generally “close” to the Government of Canada’s, “far” from that position, or neutral. By neutral, I mean a position which generally sides with the Government of Canada on some points but differs with it on other equally key points, or a position which presents only facts that neither the Government of Canada nor Government of Quebec is likely to contest. In the vast majority of cases, this classification was easily made, as the positions defended by the experts were very clear-cut. My classification of some texts may be challenged, but I do not think there are very many such debatable cases.

Table 1 reproduces the results of this exercise, using the texts or the authors as the units of measurement. Of 117 different texts, 63 indicate a position that is “far” from the Government of Canada’s, 33 a position that is “close” to it, and 21 that can be classified as neutral. As a percentage, that gives 54% “far” positions, 28% “close” and 18% neutral. The scales tip even more toward “far” when the authors are the unit of measurement. Table 1 indicates that only 15 of 75 authors (20%) defended in their texts positions “close” to the Government of Canada’s, while 52, or 69%, defended “far” positions.

Table 2 also classifies texts as “far,” “near” or “neutral,” but by newspaper (the total exceeds 117 texts because some were published in more than one paper.) It can be seen that Le Devoir published more texts by experts than La Presse: 76 compared with 43. Le Soleil published only 6. The proportion of texts setting out a position “far” from the Government of Canada’s was higher in Le Devoir than in La Presse: 59% compared with 44%.

If a comparison is made of the positions of jurists and political scientists, the most sought-after experts in this debate, a more balanced distribution of positions can be seen among the latter than among the former. Of the 15 jurists who contributed texts, 6 had “far” positions, 8 “near” and 1 “neutral.” In comparison, among political scientists, almost all, or 19 of 23, adopted “far” positions, only 2 “near” positions, and 2 remained neutral.

In sum, what I retain in particular from these data is the information in Table 1 indicating that over three times as many experts (52 versus 15) defended a position “far” from, rather than “close” to, the Government of Canada’s. This reveals a different orientation from that of the general public. In effect, while polls reveal that Quebecers were not comfortable with this debate and tended to disapprove of the federal initiatives with the Supreme Court and Parliament at the time, it also appears that the majority of Quebecers tend to approve of the content of the Government of Canada’s position. They tend to feel that the Government of Quebec does not have the right to effect Quebec’s independence unilaterally²¹ and that the Government of Canada ought to have a say on the procedure for secession²², including the referendum question²³ and the majority required.²⁴ Quebecers tend to feel the referendum question in 1995 was not clear²⁵ and that a majority of “50% plus one” would not be enough to effect independence.²⁶ They are inclined to think it is justified, especially in the case of Aboriginals, that territorially concentrated populations be able to stay in Canada if that is what they clearly want.²⁷

This divergence between Quebec public opinion and the views of the vast majority of experts seems to have provoked, in the long run, a feeling of frustration among some of the experts. For example, Professor Seymour has spoken of a “Milquetoast attitude typical among Quebecers”!²⁸ [Translation]

But experts have no obligation to absorb public opinion in the name of democracy. Their analyses may well lead them to defend a different position from that of a less well-informed public. But I do not believe that this is what happened in the present case. A number of academics who took a position did not, in my opinion, bring any added value by virtue of their scientific expertise. They either added nothing new to the debate, or defended original positions but without informing the public that they were highly contested in research circles. I feel some of them gave their sanction as experts to nationalist theses in vogue, but without backing it up with facts or a rational refutation of opposing arguments. They cited almost no one and paid no heed to the expert evidence presented to the Supreme Court, parliamentary debates, or open letters between ministers. Very few foreign cases were genuinely discussed.

The result is, I believe, of considerable concern in terms of the capacity of our academic community to play a useful role in this public debate. I will demonstrate this through a more qualitative analysis of the body of work.

2. The relationship between the law and secession in democracy

The debate on the procedure for secession raises some specific questions which call on specific areas of expertise. I shall review the most important of these questions in turn in order to analyse how academic experts have dealt with them. The first question is undoubtedly the one the Government of Canada put to the Supreme Court: “ [...] is there a right to self-determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?”²⁹ As the answer to that question, as the Supreme Court stated, is negative, the experts wondered whether a secessionist government could effect a peaceful secession in democracy outside the law, either by considering the question to be purely political or by appealing for international recognition.

2.1 Does a right to secession exist in democracy?

Academics writing in the newspapers claimed that peoples’ right to self-determination was equivalent to the right to secession. It is noteworthy that this belief was widespread in political and media circles when the debate on the procedure for secession intensified in early 1996. Wrongly persuaded that the right to self-determination presupposes a right to secession, these academics reproached the Government of Canada, often in quite emotional terms, with denying that secession is a recognized right in democracy.

For example, the first academic text devoted to the rules for secession that appeared after my entry into politics, which ran in Le Devoir on February 3, 1996, was signed by Mr. Henri Lamoureux. He presented himself as a “writer, professor of social ethics who teaches the principles of collective action at the Université de Montréal, UQAM and the Université de Sherbrooke.”³⁰ [Translation] From one sentence to another, he confused the “right to self-determination” and the “right to independence.” He asserted that “Mr. Dion knows that” and that my public statements on this question, and on the negotiation of borders or the majority required, were “pure provocation” and “ramblings” that “have absolutely nothing to do with political science.”³¹ [Translation]

Fortunately, qualified jurists in international law brought needed clarification to the debate. The first to do so was Professor José Woehrling of the Université de Montréal. In La Presse on February 14 and 15, 1996, he signed two texts which contained almost everything the Supreme Court’s opinion would confirm two and half years later. Citing relevant legal texts, Professor Woehrling made the fundamental distinction between internal self-determination and external self-determination: “In the dominant opinion, it is thus not possible to extrapolate a right to secession (or separation) in a non-colonial context from the right of peoples to self-determination. The practice followed by the United Nations has confirmed this view.”³² [Translation]

Another jurist from Université de Montréal, however, Professor Jacques-Yvan Morin, defended a divergent view. On January 6, 1998, he signed a text in Le Devoir in which he asserted that the distinction between peoples’ right to self-determination and the right to secession was the product of a UN law too marked by the influence of authoritarian or despotic regimes. According to Professor Morin, if one keeps to Western law, as expressed notably in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975,³³ it appears that the right of peoples in democracy effectively includes the right to secession. In his words: “It would be truly paradoxical if the federal government obtained from the Court that it was behaving like a Nigerian tribunal rather than a constitutional court in the Western tradition.”³⁴ [Translation] One rather wishes Professor Morin had specified to which Western tradition he was alluding. It is difficult to see how that tradition could have been that of France, the United States, Italy, Australia or all the other democratic states that declare themselves to be indivisible in their Constitution or their case law.

I also think that Professor Morin ought to have informed readers that his interpretation of the Helsinki Final Act was contrary to the prevailing interpretation in the relevant literature. In effect, one of the results of the Helsinki Final Act, which was not negotiated solely among democracies, but is the fruit of a compromise between Western democracies and what was then the Eastern Bloc, was to confirm the principle of the territorial integrity of states. The right of peoples to determine their own political status is therein defined in a manner compatible with the principle of territorial integrity and other international conventions. To be sure, Professor Morin is entitled to disassociate himself from a consensus among experts.³⁵ But I maintain he should have informed readers of Le Devoir – or L’Action nationale³⁶ – of the fact that he was deviating from the consensus. The reason is simple: courts and states interpret the Helsinki Final Act on the basis of established legal doctrine, not on the basis of one isolated opinion. Indeed, in its opinion, the Supreme Court of Canada mentioned the Helsinki Final Act among the legal texts that circumscribe the right to self-determination within the limits accorded to the territorial integrity of states.³⁷

In a few sentences, political scientist Jean-Pierre Derriennic summarized the principles of law that apply to secession in a way that I believe finds consensus among leading experts in the field: “In international law, Quebec does not have the right to effect secession, but there is nothing prohibiting it. Canada has the right to its territorial integrity, and thus to refuse Quebec’s secession. But it can accept it, and Quebec can thus become independent. If it does, it will have in turn the right to its territorial integrity, and thus to refuse separation from Quebec by those who might desire it.”³⁸ [Translation]

It is noteworthy that the distinction between the right to self-determination and the right to secession holds true both for federal countries and for countries with a unitary system. Political scientists François Rocher and historian Michel Sarra-Bournet have suggested the contrary. They maintained that in a federation, secession is a right that the constitutent entities can avail themselves of on demand, in the name of respect for diversity: “If federalism is based on voluntary adherence and the free consent of the constitutent entities, the federal government cannot have a veto over the right to withdraw, which is not negotiable.³⁹ [Translation]

It seems to me that Messrs. Rocher and Sarra-Bournet should have specified which federations they had in mind. I do not know of any federation today where a right to secession exists on demand, whereas there are a number of democratic federations that declare themselves to be indivisible, like the United States and Australia. In research circles, the prevailing view is that federalism is based on an interdependence of the entitities that is incompatible with unilateral secession. Those experts include international law professor Luzius Wildhaber, who is currently President of the European Court of Human Rights. In a letter submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1998, he explained why the territorial integrity of federal states is no less of a guarantee in law than that of centralized states: “It would be unjust if it were otherwise. Not only to give member units of a federal State a claim or "privilege" to secede, but further to grant them a claim to secede with territorial integrity, would create an obvious inequality between States.”⁴⁰

It is always possible that Messrs. Rocher and Sarra-Bournet are right, and that the prevailing opinion in the research community is wrong. But there again, I feel they ought to have informed La Presse readers of the marginality of their position. They should have told them it was not in line with how courts and states view the territorial integrity of federal states.

2.2 Is the procedure for secession a purely political question or does it have a legal aspect as well?

A number of experts have maintained that the law is not relevant to this question because achieving independence is a purely political phenomenon. Sociologist André Turmel posed a question that expresses this viewpoint well: “[...] between the legitimacy of the ballot box and the supremacy of the law, which ought to prevail in the case of Quebec sovereignty?”⁴¹ [Translation]. My feeling is that those academics adopted that position without ever really assessing the implications of it. I believe that a more in-depth examination of the matter would have obliged them to acknowledge that democracy cannot be exercised outside the law. For example, one cannot appeal to the “legitimacy of the ballot box” without legal rules that specify, among other things, who can vote, how and on what.

That the exercise of democracy must be based on the law seems to me to be a well accepted reality in political science. I do not understand the reasons that have led some academics to embrace the opinion that the procedure for secession eludes that reality.

The law is not that easily discarded. The PQ government, which regularly claims that achieving independence is a purely political question, nevertheless makes sure to announce its intention to use its legal authority to give effect to secession. Academics seem to me to have taken up in turn this double standard which consists of denying the relevance of the law while invoking it when it becomes useful to the cause. For example, the law suddenly becomes relevant in the eventuality of some regions of Quebec getting the idea, in the name of “the legitimacy of the ballot box,” to separate from an independent Quebec: “It must be pointed out and explained [...] that international law works in favour of the territorial integrity of a sovereign Quebec.”⁴² [Translation]

It is very difficult to imagine how a democratic secession could be effected outside the law. Political scientist Max Nemni has wondered how the Government of Quebec “would force [...] citizens loyal to Canada to pay all their taxes to what they perceived to be an outlaw government.⁴³ [Translation] Similarly, Professor Yves-Marie Morissette⁴⁴ gave a good explanation of the tangible difficulties that would prevent a unilateral declaration of independence from being effective on the ground. It is quite possible that these professors are mistaken, but here again an attempt ought to have been made to refute their arguments, rather than merely repeating that the question is a political, rather than a legal, one.

The rule of law is an essential principle for democracy. I am therefore understandably surprised that academics could have rejected that principle without assessing the consequences for Quebec society and Canada as a whole.

The main reason invoked by a number of academics for defending a position at odds with the law is that the constitutional provisions that might enable Quebec’s secession are, in their opinion, too demanding to be realistic. The approval of at least seven provinces representing 50% of Canada’s population would have to be obtained. For example, constitutionalist Henri Brun has talked of “the impossible agreement of the federal government and the other provinces” and, like others, has evoked the failures of the Meech and Charlottetown accords: “If the five modest conditions of the Meech Lake Accord were never able to win that agreement, one can imagine how the idea of allowing Quebec to leave Canada would fare.”⁴⁵ [Translation] A number of writers, such as Professor Christian Dufour, have spoken of a “constitutional prison for Quebec.”⁴⁶ [Translation] A political science masters student maintained that “the vast majority of parliamentarians who make up the House of Commons believe that Canada is and always will be indivisible.”⁴⁷ [Translation] Some professors went even further, accusing the federal government, without any evidence whatsoever, of planning a military intervention to stop secession.⁴⁸

I am surprised at the ease with which so many academics have allowed themselves to write such things about the rest of Canada without ever offering the slightest bit of proof to back up their accusations. None of them has reported on the state of public opinion in Canada on this issue. While there are a number of political parties in our country that are resolutely opposed to any repetition of the Meech Lake Accord, none of them is on record as saying it is prepared to keep Quebecers in Canada against their clearly expressed will.

For its part, the Government of Canada has reiterated, both before the Supreme Court rendered its opinion and afterwards, that the clearly expressed will by Quebecers to effect secession would lead to negotiations on secession.

One can always maintain that all those political parties are brazenly lying to the public. But it seems to me that academics should produce some evidence if they are going to impugn motives in this way. Without such evidence, I see no reason to doubt the sincerity of the statement by the Attorney General of Canada when he set out the reasons for the Supreme Court Reference in the House of Commons on September 26, 1996: “The leading political figures of all the provinces and indeed the Canadian public have long agreed that this country will not be held together against the will of Quebecers clearly expressed.”⁴⁹

I am also surprised that these academics have not seemed to grasp the distinction, which Professsor Woehrling would ultimately make, between the negotiation of secession and the constitutional amendment that would give effect to it. The negotiation of the division of a modern state would inevitably raise many thorny issues. But if those negotiations succeed, “[...] it is difficult to see how the federal government or a province could still refuse its formal consent to the amendment needed to implement the political agreement. ⁵⁰ [Translation] It is only reasonable to expect that the likelihood of reaching agreement on separation is greater if the law is respected, rather than flouted. Those who think otherwise have the burden of proof.

2.3 Are states inclined to recognize unilateral secessions?

Some academics have suggested that a Quebec government that attempted a unilateral secession would have reasonable chances of winning recognition from other states against the advice of the Canadian government. Professor Brun, for example, emphasized what he calls “the aegis of the international community.”⁵¹ [Translation] It is unfortunate he did not comment in greater detail on the likelihood of such international recognition.

Professor Jacques-Yvan Morin, for his part, has admitted that such recognition would be difficult: “It would be a rough ride.”⁵² [Translation] In effect, according to Professor Woehrling, “foreign states would surely be somewhat reluctant to adopt the opposite position [from the Canadian government’s], as this would lead them to take an action that Ottawa would consider to be unfriendly, even hostile, and would bring them into conflict with the Canadian state.”⁵³ [Translation] Similarly, according to Benoît Pelletier, then a professor of law at the University of Ottawa: “[...] the international community clearly prefers that the territorial, economic and social stability of existing states be maintained.”⁵⁴ [Translation] Professor Derriennic was more blunt: “[...] if Canada opposes secession and declares it to be illegal, no country will formally recognize it.”⁵⁵ [Translation]

In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Canada made a prudent and realistic assessment of the role of the international community.⁵⁶ Indeed, it merely stated the obvious: there would have to be 1) clear support for secession in Quebec, 2) respect for constitutional principles by the Government of Quebec in the negotiations, and 3) unreasonable intransigence on the part of other participants, for recognition to be “more likely,”⁵⁷ as specified by the Court.

This prudence by the Court is understandable in light of the international community’s extreme reluctance to recognize unilateral secessions. As Professor James Crawford of the University of Cambridge wrote in the report he submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada, since 1945, outside the colonial context, “no state which has been created by unilateral secession has been admitted to the United Nations against the declared wishes of the government of the predecessor state.”⁵⁸

None of the academics who wrote in the three newspapers reported the slightest fact that might challenge that assertion by Professor Crawford.

It would have been beneficial for everyone if the reasons for this obvious reluctance by states to recognize unilateral declarations of independence had been discussed in our newspapers. It might have been acknowleged that this reluctance is not inspired solely by considerations of order and stability. For example, the idea could have been debated that a philosophy of democracy based on the logic of secession would encourage groups to separate rather than working to come closer together and reach agreement: “[...] democratic institutions are most likely to flourish when exit is not so easy as a majoritarian right to secede would make it.”⁵⁹

3. Is it better to negotiate or not to negotiate borders in order to effect a just and peaceful secession?

Negotiating the division of a modern democratic state would be an enormous task, a source “of considerable upheaval and uncertainty” giving rise to “many issues of great complexity and difficulty,” in the words of the Supreme Court.⁶⁰ But by far the most hotly debated issue in our three main daily newspapers was that of the negotiation of Quebec’s borders. The assertion by the Government of Canada that those borders would indeed be negotiable under the law provoked indignation by the secessionist parties, which was echoed by many academics.

I do not think it is very useful to catalogue all of the vindictive posturing in this regard. Suffice it to say that the first text, by Mr. Lamoureux, set the tone in referring to “precocious political despotism” and accusing the Government of Canada of trying to “provoke a violent reaction by some Quebecers.”⁶¹ [Translation] Such accusations rained down from all corners, even though the Government of Canada has always undertaken to act peacefully and with respect for the law. None of that criticism was levelled at PQ ministers who invoked the use of force as a means for effecting secession throughout Quebec’s territory.⁶²

Other academics, while keeping a more sober tone, nonetheless maintained that the Government of Canada, by raising the issue of borders, was provoking a “dangerous polarization”⁶³ [Translation] along ethnic lines: “Partition is essentially an issue that is settled not by the law or by politics, but by tanks and soldiers,”⁶⁴ asserted political scientist Denis Saint-Martin.

In other words, those academics maintain that there is less risk of violence if political authorities ignore demands that borders be altered than if they agree to look into such demands. The assurance with which that argument was defended is surprising, considering that, save for one exception, none of the writers referred to real-life examples of negotations on borders in cases of secession. And yet there are known cases of peaceful secession where changes to borders were negotiated (the former Czechoslovakia is one), and other cases where violence broke out when the negotiation of borders was refused.

The only writer who referred to experiences in other countries was Professor Pierre Binette, who teaches history and political science at the Université de Sherbrooke. He focussed in particular on the case of Abkhazia, a republic that declared its independence from Georgia in 1992. An armed conflict ensued, and Abkhazia has still not obtained international recognition, in spite of a de facto secession. What conclusion did Professor Binette draw? That an Abkhazian-style ethnic partitionism is “at the origin of conflict and violence.”⁶⁵ For my part, I will not risk laying blame in that affair, but I know that borders were not negotiated and that there was violence. In such a situation, would Professor Binette recommend to the Government of Canada, or the government of an independent Quebec, to behave as the Georgian government did?

There can be no useful discussion of the Government of Canada’s position if that position is distorted. The Government of Canada does not advocate the negotiation of borders on the basis of divisions among nations, peoples or ethnic groups. It simply says that the clear expression of democratic choices by citizens may make it preferable to have a negotiated change of borders in the event of secession. The academics who disagree with that position have not written anything in my opinion that would justify political authorities closing the door in advance to any request for changes to borders.

I found much more useful comments by some academics that changing borders may be impractical in some cases because it would create dysfunctional entities.⁶⁶ I agree completely, and it is unfortunate that this pragmatic aspect did not garner more attention. It is a practical argument that could help keep people reasonable during turbulent negotiations on secession. They will not be kept reasonable if they are labelled as extremists and lectured using a double standard.

And speaking of a double standard, I think one can be seen in all writings that posit a hierarchy of citizens’ rights according to their collective belonging. In that scheme of things, the Canadian territory could be divided, but not Quebec’s, because Quebecers form a nation or a distinct people within Canada, whereas there are no nations or distinct peoples within Quebec, only sub-groups of the Quebec nation. Accordingly, so the theory goes, Quebecers can impose a secession on other Quebecers that they do not want, in the name of the indivisible nature of the territory of the Quebec nation. Philosophy professor Michel Seymour has made himself the champion of that theory. It continually reappears throughout his writings.⁶⁷

In terms of substance, I feel those academics far too readily agree to a hierarchy of citizens’ rights, where some citizens can be described as forming a people and others as forming something less than a people. But I will limit my comments to one on method: in my opinion, it would have been a good idea for those academics to talk about why such attempts to establish a hierarchy of citizens in terms of nations and sub-groups of nations have no relevance in democracy from a legal standpoint, as confirmed in the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion.⁶⁸ Perhaps some of them would have ended up agreeing, as Professor Derriennic has stressed, that “[...] if the fact of a human group’s being or not being a nation enabled some groups to claim rights that are refused to others, all discourse designed to show that some are nations and others are not would be morally repugnant.”⁶⁹ [Translation]

The Government of Canada has been reproached with having invented this problem of changing borders. The academics that make that reproach seem to have forgotten that in 1980 and again in 1995, Aboriginal populations in Quebec held their own public consultations, in which they clearly expressed their desire to stay in Canada. As such preferences would likely come to the fore in the event of negotiations on secession, I believe it is reasonable to establish in advance the normative and legal bases on which they could be taken into consideration. In my opinion, academics would have made a better contribution on that front if more of them had not stuck to a discourse of denunciation. As political scientist Philip Resnick has written: “In the event of Yes victory in a third Quebec referendum, appeals to fellow citizens in the rest of Canada to come to their assistance, combined with those of other Quebecers who wanted to remain Canadian, could plunge us into a quagmire. [...] I thus find it useful and relevant [...] that the new Intergovernmental Affairs Minister address the question of partition forthwith; while we may wish otherwise, it must be acknowledged that it could well come up and that the federal government will be obliged to consider it.”⁷⁰ [Translation]

The writings of a number of academics give the false impression that the Government of Canada’s position – that it would be imprudent to rule out the negotiation of borders in advance – is outrageous in comparison to the prevailing views in the democratic world. But that position, which is also held by the Supreme Court, is hardly original. It can often be found in the scientific literature dealing with secession. It is inspired by the democratic principle that one must strive in such circumstances to satisfy the interests of everyone, to the greatest extent possible: “The dictum, do not do to others what you do not wish to be done to you, is applicable to this situation.”⁷¹

4. Secession and the prerequisite for clarity

Some academics have maintained that any majority, however slim, ought to be considered as clear and sufficient to effect secession. Professors Morin⁷² and Brun,⁷³ among others, can be cited in this regard. But they did not really develop their argument. So I will not respond by reiterating all of the reasoning that leads to the conclusion that a referendum on secession should be held only if it makes it possible to officially confirm that a clear consensus exists within the population in favour of secession.⁷⁴

Instead, I want to highlight the position of the following researchers in the separatist camp: Jean-Herman Guay, Pierre-Alain Cotnoir, Pierre Drouilly and Pierre Noreau: “For the next referendum, we will need to aim beyond a precarious majority, to a comfortable majority, because that third time will undoubtedly be the last.”⁷⁵ [Translation]  Those writers were not far from admitting that it should never be attempted to effect secession in a democracy without the assurance that it has broad support within the population. I firmly believe that more of our academics would have expressed that conclusion in our newspapers if they had founded their positions on examples of referenda that have been held during successful processes of secession outside the colonial context. But for reasons I cannot explain, they did not address those examples, nor situate their position within a comparative perspective.

Only one example was mentioned on a number of occasions. But indeed, it was only mentioned in passing, and not really analysed. This was the case of Newfoundland, whose entry into the Canadian Confederation following a narrow referendum result was highlighted.⁷⁶ An analysis of that case would have led those academics to point out that only 14% of Newfoundlanders voted in 1948 in favour of maintaining the link with Britain.

With regard to the clarity of the question, there again, few academics claimed that the question in 1995 was clear. Some did, however, adopting the argument of the separatist leaders that the high voter turnout in the 1995 referendum was evidence that voters understood what was at stake.⁷⁷ One might have expected academics to base such an argument on empirical data. It would have been desirable for them to express their opinion on well-known polling data that show that many voters showed up at the polling stations believing in good faith that sovereignty was tied to an agreement on political and economic partnership with Canada. For example, in October 1995, a survey indicated that only 46% of voters had understood that the question meant that Quebec would become independent even if the negotiations on the political and economic partnership failed.⁷⁸

In the applied social sciences, one is taught that it is very difficult to be clear in a survey or a referendum when two questions are rolled into one.⁷⁹ In the case at hand, the view of law professor Patrice Garant, that a clear question should pertain “solely and exclusively to secession,”⁸⁰ [Translation] seems to be in line with that teaching.

This leads me to comment on how some academics addressed the Quebec-Canada partnership theme in the newspapers. The body of work contains two attempts to shed some clarity on that project: one by philosopher Michel Seymour⁸¹ and one by sociologists Gilles Bourque and Jules Duchastel.⁸² Both cases consisted of complicated intellectual constructions indicating that Canada would be obliged to add a superstructure to its two orders of government. The authors juggled with decision-making mechanisms that were not quite equally weighted between the two countries– so as to make the project acceptable to Canada – but were sufficiently equal for Quebec to preserve its sovereignty. In addition, Professor Seymour proposed a tripartite partnership with Aboriginals, adding to the complexity.⁸³

The result of those ambitious attempts leaves one sceptical. Professor Seymour himself conceded that: “At the outset, perhaps, the partnership will be minimal.”⁸⁴ [Translation] He even maintained that “the partnership project is an accessory to the sovereignty project.”⁸⁵ But if that is so, then why include something ancillary in a question on secession?

Professor Denis Monière and journalist Pierre de Bellefeuille were highly critical of Professor Seymour’s attempt to flesh out the partnership project. In their opinion, the result would be too cumbersome to be credible: “a guarantee of paralysis [... that would be] double padlocked.”⁸⁶ [Translation] According to them, Canada would be quite right to reject that tortuous arrangement and even Quebec would lose out: “a free Quebec would be better off without a partnership of structures.”⁸⁷ [Translation] They concluded that the promise of partnership is ultimately just a dishonest process used for tactical purposes. In their words: “While some sovereignists paint an enticing picture of the prospect of partnership, it is less to influence Canada than to reassure Quebecers who are fearful in the face of such a major upheaval. But this is in itself dishonest, given that, even in the most optimistic scenario, a partnership will become possible only after a long process with respect to Canadian public opinion. Therefore, no promises can be made.”⁸⁸ (My emphasis.) [Translation]

After such an eloquent repudiation of the partnership concept, one might have expected Messrs. Monière and de Bellefeuille to make every effort to ensure that this “dishonest” procedure is never again used in the wording of a referendum question. After all, they themselves seem to call for clarity: “The country called Quebec will be able to be born only if the majority of its inhabitants are proud citizens who knowingly renounce the Canadian identity.”⁸⁹ [Translation] And yet, on the contrary, it seems those two gentlemen want to maintain that dishonest procedure, judging from a subsequent text⁹⁰ in which they reproached the Government of Canada in no uncertain terms with not recognizing as valid a referendum question that presupposed negotiations on sovereignty-partnership. The question they must answer is: how could a democratic government negotiate the termination of its constitutional responsibilities toward a part of its citizenry on the basis of a dishonest question?

Anthropologist Claude Bariteau has shown himself to be a much more rational separatist intellectual. Since it is clear to him that other Canadians will want no part or parcel of “a bilateral union that would limit their flexibility”⁹¹ [Translation], and because the obscure concept of partnership ultimately has no function other than as a vote-getter, the idea of inserting this vague notion into a referendum question ought to be renounced: “Quebecers, who have chosen independence, want to walk into history with their heads high. So they will refuse the partnership approach.”⁹² [Translation] Although Professor Bariteau has only disparagement for the Government of Canada – “the Quebec people is under attack,”⁹³ [Translation], I take as a compliment his avowal that the Clarity Act constitutes an argument for abandoning what he calls the “myths”⁹⁴ [Translation] of partnership.

Conclusion

I have just passed critical judgment on the contribution of many academics whom I disagree with in regard to how secession can be effected in democracy. But my subject was not that disagreement on substance. Rather, I have compiled what I believe are disturbing examples of a lack of thoroughness in method, incomplete information, and sometimes even a certain incapacity to discuss contrary arguments without lapsing into insult and vindictiveness.

Too often, academics did not ground their positions in empirical facts or compare them on a rational basis against contrary arguments that are nevertheless well accepted in the relevant literature. Sometimes, some of them gave the impression of not even re-reading themselves from one text to another: for example, one cannot without contradiction describe a referendum question as dishonest and then reproach a government for disregarding it.

I repeat that I do not know whether it is the syndrome of “experts on everything” or that of “partisan experts,” in the words of Vincent Lemieux, that is at the source of this lack of rigour. But I am convinced that the contribution of a number of academics in our newspapers would have been of higher quality had they followed the rules of method one hopes they teach in their classrooms.

It has been said that the separatist leaders have avoided or dodged⁹⁵ the debate on the substance of the procedure for secession. It is infinitely regrettable that so many academics have done the same.

In closing, I will hazard three suggestions which, if put into practice, I believe would help make academic expression in the media more useful. First, the advice of Professors Fortmann and Roussel,⁹⁶ whom I cited in my introduction, should be heeded: academics should stick with their own fields of competence, at least when expressing themselves as experts, rather than simply as citizens.

Second, it would be desirable for academics to explain to the public, clearly and concisely, to what extent the viewpoint they are defending is well accepted in research circles. Experts have every right to swim against the current, but they ought to let their readers know when that is what they are doing.

Finally, they should integrate their writings into the debate underway in our newspapers. In that way, the debate would have a cumulative effect. I would like us to form a genuine intellectual community. I do not think the debate I have just reported was exactly a model of open dialogue. It might rather be described as a collection of closed monologues in which almost no one cited or discussed texts by other experts. And yet, almost every Francophone intellectual in Quebec reads La Presse and Le Devoir (and Le Soleil in the Quebec City region). It would not cost us very much to reflect on what other experts have written in those papers before setting out our own positions. The quality of debate would be better in terms of substance, and perhaps also more respectful in terms of form.

* * *

Table 1: “Far,” “close” or “neutral” positions in comparison with the federal position, by number of texts and number of authors

Table 2: “Far,” “close” or “neutral” positions in comparison with the federal position, by number of texts published in each newspaper*

* Some of these texts were published in more than one newspaper.

1. Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1957), p. 303.
2. Reproduced in the Canadian Journal of Political Science XXV, 4 (December 1992): 651-660, under thetitle “The Scholar and the Expert.”
3. Ibid., p. 655.
4. Ibid., p. 654.
5. Michel Fortmann and Stéphane Roussel, “Les experts Minute Rice,” La Presse, November 26, 2001,p. A13.
6. Ibid.
7. Léon Dion, “Aspects de la condition du professeur d’université dans la société canadienne-française,”Cité libre 21 (July 1958): 17.
8. Ibid., p. 30.
9. Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec, introduced on September 7, 1995.
10. Bertrand v. Bégin, Quebec, 200-05-002117-955 (Superior Court).
11. Speech by the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau at the Paul Sauvé Arena in Montreal, on May 141980. Reproduced on the website of the National Library of Canada and National Archives of Canada: FirstAmong Equals: The Prime Minister in Canadian Life and Politics: The Right Honourable Pierre Elliot Trudeau. <http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/primeministers/h4-4083-e.html>
12. Hansard, November 1, 1995, p.16063.
13. Opinion by the Supreme Court of Canada on the Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
14. Ibid., at par. 97.
15. Clarity Act: An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the SupremeCourt of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference [Assented to 29th June, 2000].
16. An act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people and theQuébec state, assented to on December 13, 2000.
17. Statement by Mr. Joseph Facal, Minister for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs, in Quebec’s NationalAssembly during the committee stage of Bill 99, An act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rightsand prerogatives of the Québec people and the Québec state. Journal des débats, 36th Legislature, 1stSession, Standing Committee on Institutions, Journal n^o 80, May 30, 2000, p. 22. The Attorney General ofQuebec reiterated the same argument to convince the Superior Court of Quebec of the constitutionality of theAct: “Here again, there is nothing to support a claim that this Act is akin to a unilateral declaration ofsovereignty.” [Translation] (Henderson vs. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] R.J.Q. 2435 (C.S.), oralargument by the respondent, transcripts of March 13, 2002, p. 63).
18. The body of work can be consulted on the Government of Canada’s Intergovernmental Affairs website: http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia.
19. André J. Bélanger, The Ethics of Catholicism and the Consecration of the Intellectual (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997), 242 pages.
20. Draft bill giving effect to the requirement for clarity defined in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canadain the Quebec Secession Reference, presented on December 10, 1999.
21. CROP, October 1997, August 1998.
22. CROP, February 1996, May 1996, March 1999, December 1999; EKOS, June 1997; Sondagem, December1997.
23. SOM, May 1997; CROP, February 1998, August 1998, January 2000; Angus Reid, March 1998, December1999.
24. CROP, March 1999.
25. CROP, September 1998.
26. CROP, May 1996, August 1998, March 1999, December 1999; Léger et Léger, August 1998, December1999; Angus Reid, August 1998.
27. SOM, July 1997, December 1999; CROP, April 1998, October 1998.

28. Michel Seymour, “Pour sortir du cul-de-sac,” Le Devoir, June 19, 2002, p. A7.
29. Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, op.cit., question 2, at 2.
30. Henri Lamoureux, “La divisibilité du Québec et du Canada,”Le Devoir, February 3, 1996, p. A9;reproduced in La Presse, February 8, 1996, p. B3, with the title “Déclarations de Stéphane Dion :incompétence ou provocation?”.
31. Ibid.
32. José Woehrling, “Aspects juridiques d’une éventuelle sécession du Québec (1),” La Presse, February 14,1996, p. B3; see also the follow-up article published a few months later by Michel Lebel, professor of publiclaw at UQAM: “ La contestation de M^e Bertrand : l’État de droit,” Le Devoir, May 22, 1996, p. A7.
33. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki Final Act, August 1, 1975.
34. Jacques-Yvan Morin, “Comment Ottawa peut contourner le droit international,” Le Devoir, January 6,1998, p. A7.
35. Antonio Cassese, “The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination ,” in Human Rights, International Lawand the Helsinki Accord, Thomas Buergenthal, ed. (Montclair/New York: Allanheld, Osmun/UniverseBooks, 1977), pp. 83-110, notably p. 104. Patrick Thornberry, “Self-Determination, Minorities, HumanRights: A Review of International Instruments,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38 (October1989): 867-889. Harold S. Russell, “The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?,” AmericanJournal of International Law 70 (April 1976): 212-272, notably pp. 269-70. See also the article signed in LaPresse by Mr. Sven Deimann, then an intern at the Berlin Court of Appeal: “Le droit européen s’opposerait àla reconnaissance unilatérale du Quebec,” La Presse, March 6, 1998, p. B3.
36. Jacques-Yvan Morin, “Démembrer le Quebec?,” L’Action nationale LXXXVI, 6 (June 1996): 150-168,and by the same author, “La sécession du Québec et la Cour suprême du Canada,” L’Action nationale,LXXXVIII, 4 (April 1998): 117-135.
37. Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, op.cit., at par. 129.
38. Jean-Pierre Derriennic, “Les frontières du Quebec : le droit, la politique et les erreurs de lecture,”Le Devoir, September 18, 1997, p. A7.
39. François Rocher and Michel Sarra-Bournet, “Le Renvoi à la Cour suprême transgresse l’esprit dufédéralisme,” La Presse, February 27 1998, p. B3.
40. Letter of January 15, 1998, which can be consulted on Justice Canada’s website at the following address: http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/const/wilrpt.html. See also Allen Buchanan, “Theories of Secession,”Philosophy & Public Affairs 26, 1 (Winter 1997): 43.
41. André Turmel, “Réplique à Marc Angenot : le devoir de mémoire,” Le Devoir, June 28 1996, p. A9.
42. Jean-François Thuot, “Pourquoi avoir peur du débat sur la partition?,” La Presse, October 11 1997, p. B3.
43. Max Nemni, “Cherchons plutôt les clowns dans les rangs péquistes,” La Presse, September 11, 1996,p. B3.
44. Yves-Marie Morissette, “Que saurons-nous de plus après le jugement de la Cour suprême?,” La Presse,March 13, 1998, p. B3.
45. Henri Brun, “Le renvoi à la Cour suprême sur l’accession du Québec à la souveraineté : une bien drôle dejustice,” Le Devoir, February 12, 1998, p. A7.
46. Christian Dufour, “La cause de l’avocat Bertrand : la main dans le tordeur,” Le Devoir, May 23 1996,p. A7.
47. Stéphane Larouche, “C-20 ou le refus de se soustraire à l’avis de la Cour suprême,” Le Devoir, August 22,2000, p. A6.
48. Daniel Latouche, “La loi du silence,” Le Devoir, March 9, 1996, p. A8. Pierre Desjardins, “Requiem pourla souveraineté ?,” La Presse, April 6, 1996, p. B3. Denis Monière et al., “Un sens étriqué de la démocratie,”Le Devoir, January 7, 2000, p. A8.
49. Hansard, September 26, 1996, p. 4707.
50. José Woehrling, “La Cour supême a-t-elle voulu se ‘racheter’ pour son attitude de 1982?,” La Presse,September 10, 1998, p. B3.
51. Henri Brun, “Le Clarity Act est inconstitutionnel,” Le Devoir, September 23, 2000, p. A7.
52. Jacques-Yvan Morin, “Une souveraineté systématiquement entravée en pratique,” Le Devoir, September 1,1998, p. A7.
53. José Woehrling, “Aspects juridiques d’une éventuelle sécession du Québec (2),” La Presse, February 15,1996, p. B3.
54. Benoît Pelletier, “Droit international : les assises de la sécession du Québec,” Le Devoir, November 2,1996, p. A13.
55. Jean-Pierre Derriennic, “Les déclarations unilatérales d’indépendance en Palestine et au Québec,”Le Devoir, April 26, 2000, p. A7.
56. Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, op. cit., at par. 103.
57. Ibid.
58. James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession, reportsubmitted on February 19, 1997, to the Supreme Court of Canada in connection with the Reference ReSecession of Quebec, par. 26.
59. Allen Buchanan, “Democracy and Secession,” in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 21.
60. Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, op. cit., at par. 96.
61. Henri Lamoureux, op. cit.
62. See the statements by Jacques Brassard reported in Le Devoir, May 31, 1994, p. A4; Le Soleil, February 15,1996, p. A1; The Globe and Mail, January 30, 1997, p. A4.
63. Neil Bissoondath et al., “Pas de Québec morcelé,” Le Devoir, February 10, 1996, p. A7. See alsoJane Jenson et al., “Le prix du plan B,” Le Devoir, September 5, 1996, p. A7.
64. Denis Saint-Martin, “Pour les fédéralistes, la partition est une stratégie gagnante,” La Presse, August 30,1997, p. B3.
65. Pierre Binette, “La légitimité de la sécession et celle de la partition, deux cas bien différents : la rouletterusse du partitionnisme,” Le Devoir, September 27, 1997, p. A11.
66. Pierre Drouilly, “À quoi pourrait ressembler un Quebec morcelé?,” La Presse, March 9, 1996, p. B3. Daniel Latouche, “Les têtes à Papineau,” Le Devoir, February 10, 1996, p. A10. Jane Jenson et al., op. cit.
67. See in particular the article by Michel Seymour, “Le partenariat, une réponse à la tentation partitionniste,”Le Devoir, August 19, 1997, p. A7. By the same author: Le pari de la démesure. L’intransigeancecanadienne face au Québec (Montreal: Hexagone, 2001), p. 247 in particular.
68. Opinion of the Supreme Court Canada, op. cit., at par. 125.
69. Jean-Pierre Derriennic, “ Réplique à Claude G. Charron : quel rapport!,” Le Devoir, October 25 , 1997,p. A13. See also Carol Hilling, “Réplique à Michel Seymour : les Amérindiens ont aussi le droit de décidereux-mêmes de leur avenir,” Le Devoir, September 8, 1997, p. A9.
70. Philip Resnick, “La guerre des nerfs,” Le Devoir, February 9, 1996, p. A10.
71. Radmila Nakarada, “Federalism, Civil Society and Multiethnic Conflicts: Challenges in the Era ofGlobalization,” International Conference on Federalism 2002, Federalism in a Changing World – Learningfrom Each Other, (St. Gallen, Switzerland , 2002), p. 348. See also Hurst Hannum, “RethinkingSelf-Determination,” Virginia Journal of International Law 34, 1 (Fall 1993): 56: “Support for secessionshould be grounded in the desires of a substantial majority of the population [...]. It is also unreasonable tomaintain the fiction of immutable borders under all circumstances [...]. Newly recognized states that basetheir self-determination claims on ethnic or religious concerns must recognize the legitimacy of similarclaims made within the new state[...], although common-sense limitations of geographical contiguity may beimposed.” Also Benedict Kingsbury, “Claims by Non-State Groups in International Law,” CornellInternational Law Journal 25 (1992): 499; Margaret Moore, “On National Self-Determination ,” PoliticalStudies 45 (1997): 910.
72. Jacques-Yvan Morin, “Une souveraineté systématiquement entravée en pratique,” op. cit.
73. Henri Brun, “Le Clarity Act est inconstitutionnel,” op. cit.
74. I have developed these arguments on several occasions, notably in my brief entitled “Who’s Afraid ofClarity?”, which I submitted on February 16, 2000, to the legislative committee of the House of Commonsstudying Bill C-20, and in my address on the third reading of Bill C-20 in the House of Commons on March15, 2000. These documents can be consulted on the Government of Canada’s Intergovernmental Affairswebsite: http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia.
75. Jean-Herman Guay et al., “Entre le lys et l’érable,” La Presse, September 6, 1997, p. B3.
76. Henri Lamoureux, op. cit.; André Turmel, op. cit.; Jean-François Thuot, “ La morale, selon StéphaneDion,” La Presse, November 28, 1997, p. B3; Claude Emanuelli, “La constitution d’un État fédéral peut êtrecomparée à un traité multilatéral,” La Presse, September 16, 1997, p. B3; Stéphane Larouche, op. cit.
77. Denis Monière et al., “Un sens étriqué de la démocratie,” op. cit.
78. Maurice Pinard, Confusion and Misunderstanding Surrounding the Sovereignist Option, brief submitted tothe legislative committee of the House of Commons studying Bill C-20, February 24, 2000.
79. Vincent Lemieux, “ La formulation de la question,” dans Pierre F. Côté et al., Démocractie et référendum :la procédure référendaire (Montreal: Éditions Québec-Amérique, 1992), p. 98. Similarly, forEarl R. Babbie, it is important to “avoid double-barreled questions”: Survey Research Methods (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company Inc., 1973), p. 140. Also, for André Blais and Claire Durand, “A question is[...] ambiguous if it addresses more than one dimension. So it is best to introduce only one idea at a time.”[Translation]. In Recherche sociale, Benoît Gauthier (ed.) ( Montreal: Presses de l’Université du Québec,1997), p. 385.
80. Patrice Garant, “Projet de loi C-20 ‘sur la clarté’,” Le Devoir, March 1, 2000, p. A7.
81. Michel Seymour, “Partenariat Québec-Canada : comment bonifier l’offre?,” La Presse, March 22, 1996,p. B3.
82. See the three articles by Gilles Bourque and Jules Duchastel: “ La souveraineté n’est plus le monopole del’État-nation ,” Le Devoir, May 26, 2001, p. A11; “ Souveraineté partagée et union confédérale,” Le Devoir,May 28, 2001, p. A7; and “L’union confédérale n’est pas une réforme du fédéralisme,” Le Devoir, May 29,2001, p. A7.
83. Michel Seymour, “Partenariat et partitionnisme : la problématique autochtone,” Le Devoir, August 20,1997, p. A7.
84. Michel Seymour, “Le partenariat, une réponse à la tentation partitionniste,” op. cit.
85. Michel Seymour, “Les intellectuels souverainistes doivent repenser le partenariat,” La Presse, June 26,1998, p. B2.
86. Pierre de Bellefeuille and Denis Monière, “La dérive des ‘IPSO,” La Presse, June 17, 1998, p. B3.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Denis Monière et al., “Assurer l’avenir du Québec : il faut convoquer une assemblée constitutante,”Le Devoir, April 3, 2000, p. A7.
91. Claude Bariteau, “L’union confédérale après le partenariat,”Le Devoir, June 8, 2001, p. A7.
92. Claude Bariteau, “Lucien Bouchard appelait à des changements qualitatifs, que refuse Bernard Landry,” LeSoleil, January 29, 2001, p. B7.
93. Claude Bariteau, “Être Canadien implique la soumission aux diktats de la Chambre des communes,”Le Devoir, February 18, 2000, p. A8.
94. Claude Bariteau, “L’union confédérale après le partenariat ,” op. cit.
95. Jean-François Thuot, “Pourquoi avoir peur du débat sur la partition?”, op. cit.; Michel C. Auger,“La victoire de Dion,” Le Journal de Montréal, March 30, 2002, p. 14.
96. Michel Fortmann and Stéphane Roussel, op. cit.