Some Reflections on the Concept of Nation
The new Premier of Quebec, Mr. Bernard Landry, asserts that the crux of the Canada-Quebec question lies in the fact that Quebecers form a nation, that nations aspire to govern themselves, and that Quebec therefore must become independent.
Let's run through that. Do Quebecers form a nation? In sociological terms, in the French sense of the word, admittedly, but in legal terms, in the English sense, it is Canada that constitutes a nation, that is, an independent state with its own seat at the United Nations.
But in sociological terms, I would say that a nation exists as soon as human beings consider that they form one. They feel that they share common historical, cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious traits and on this basis see themselves as a nation. It is undeniable that a large number of Quebecers consider themselves to be a nation and are one from that moment on.
When Mr. Landry maintains that Quebec, since it is a "nation," must be the political equivalent of "nations" such as Canada, the United States or France, he is playing on words: he is sliding from the "French sociological" meaning (a community aware of its identity) to the "English legal" meaning (an independent state). In fact, the vast majority of nations in the sociological sense have a political status that is much narrower in scope than that enjoyed by our Canadian provinces. That includes the Catalans and the Scots, nations that our Quebec separatist leaders nevertheless point to as models.
When we talk of a nation in the sociological sense, it is often difficult precisely to delineate its contours because the national sentiment stems from a process of self-identification which is ultimately rather subjective. Moreover, it would be intolerable if that self-identification were to degenerate into an attempt at annexation or appropriation of others. It is Fernand Dumont, the well-known sociologist with pro-independence allegiances, who has written that one cannot encompass into the Quebec nation, "with some sort of magic vocabulary," [translation] Quebec residents who do not recognize themselves in this nation (Raisons communes, 1995, p. 63). Now, while there are not many Quebec residents who do not recognize themselves as Quebecers, there are very many who do not want to be part of the Quebec nation if that means that they are not Canadian.
Because that is what Mr. Landry is claiming: if we are part of the Quebec nation, we cannot be part of the Canadian nation. It is impossible to belong to two or more nations at the same time, he alleges. He is even saying that the Aboriginal peoples of Quebec are not part of the Quebec nation because they form their own nations.
This ignores the world in which we live, where plural identities constitute a strength more than ever before, where these identities must be accumulated, never subtracted. For the majority of human beings, national attachments are intermingled.
Compounding this false idea of Mr. Landry's that people can belong to only one nation is another, even more serious error, which is that each nation must form a country. This would make the planet explode. There are over three thousand human groups that define themselves as nations in the world, whereas there are fewer than two hundred states in the United Nations. The vast majority of countries are made up of several nations. In France, do the Alsatians or the Bretons form nations? In Canada, do the Acadians form a nation? Why not? Even within Quebec, just how many nations are there? Should they not form just as many independent countries, according to Mr. Landry's own logic?
Very well then, the separatist spokespersons respond, if you do not deny the existence of the Quebec nation, why not recognize it in the Canadian Constitution? There would then have to be agreement on the number of nations to recognize in the Constitution. With the very special exception of Aboriginal peoples, the Constitution only establishes the rights of citizens and the powers of the public authorities, and otherwise lets all citizens define themselves as they see fit without imposing anything on anyone. It does not even recognize the Canadian nation.
You are trivializing the Quebec identity, the separatist leaders accuse. To which I respond that we are not trivializing anything whatsoever. We are simply refusing to commit the error of believing that everything that is important has to be put into the Constitution.
Many important things are not in the Constitution. The most important of values, love, is not constitutionally recognized, to take the example used by Jean-Pierre Derriennic (Nationalisme et démocratie, 1995, p. 134). It is not because our Constitution is mute on this point that love does not exist! Everyone will agree that it would not exist to any greater extent if it were mentioned in the Constitution. Even legal texts on marriage do not talk about love. That does not prevent anyone from seeing marriage as the union of two beings who love each other. I know that this argument will cause some smiles, but I nevertheless believe it is fundamental: we put into a constitution not everything that is important, but everything to which we want to attach legal consequences.
So, the question, from the viewpoint of constitutional law, is not whether Quebecers have their own identity, to which they are attached in addition to their Canadian identity. Of course the Quebec identity is alive and well, and its existence, no more than the existence of love, does not depend on constitutional recognition. No, the question is which rights would need to be attached to an eventual constitutional recognition of that Quebec identity.
Incidentally, I much prefer the expression "society" to that of "nation." If the objective is really to be as inclusive as possible, the word "society" is more appropriate. The etymology of the word "nation" refers to "birth," and thus retains a connotation linked to origins, even to race. The nation can be civic, but that is not guaranteed. The number of Quebecers who feel included is expanded when Quebec is defined as a society rather than a nation.
But the question remains: what legal consequences are to be attached to a constitutional recognition of this unique or distinct Quebec society?
It cannot be a question of giving Quebecers more rights than other Canadians. Democratic states usually do not go very far into the hierarchisation of the rights of their citizens according to whether some belong to "nations" or "societies."
Nor can it be a question of decreeing in advance that Quebec's specificity necessitates the transfer of additional powers to the Government of Quebec, or new arrangements, such as that on which our civil law is based, without specifying which powers or which arrangements those are. Even with the constitutional recognition of Quebec's specificity, it would be necessary to continue, as we do today, to assess each proposal for change on its own merits, in light of the interests of citizens.
But if the objective is to make that constitutional recognition an interpretive clause, as provided for in the Meech and Charlottetown accords, it must be borne in mind that this is what judges generally do in any event. The late Chief Justice Dickson, former Chief Justice Lamer and the current Chief Justice, the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, have all said that the Supreme Court of Canada takes Quebec's specificity into account when interpreting the Constitution on issues that affect Quebec. To recognize this explicitly in the Constitution would be desirable, but not absolutely necessary.
In short, with or without constitutional change, Quebecers can live very well with their national attachments. Above all, they can do so without having to choose between Quebec and Canada. It is terribly false to believe that one can belong to only one nation at a time and that each nation must be independent. Mr. Landry's over-enthusiasm for the concept of nation is misplaced. What he says about it in no way changes the fact that it is better to be both Quebecer and Canadian than to be a Quebecer without Canada.