"The key role of the Government of Canada
in the Quiet Revolution

Notes for an address by the
President of the Privy Council and
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
the Honourable Stéphane Dion

In the context of a symposium on
"La Révolution tranquille : 40 ans plus tard... "

Université du Québec à Montréal

Montréal, Quebec

March 30, 2000

Check against delivery

          Our Quiet Revolution had its specific characteristics. The university we are in today, with its own distinct personality, is an example of this fact.

          And yet, I believe that to gain a true appreciation of the real scope of our Quiet Revolution, we also have to look at its universal dimension, in addition to its specific characteristics. The Quiet Revolution was part of a major trend in contemporary social history: the adaptation of Catholic societies in relation to Protestant societies in the industrial and post-industrial era.

          Because this social phenomenon coincided with another, more institutional phenomenon, the rise of the welfare state, one of the catalysts for our Quiet Revolution was our federal government. This is what I will be demonstrating today, before drawing a number of conclusions which I feel are useful for today's debates.

1. A Weberian revolution

          In his classic book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,⁽¹⁾ published in 1905, the German sociologist Max Weber stated that Protestant societies adapt better to industrialisation than Catholic societies, because of the higher value they place on material enrichment and individual initiative.

          Weber may have pursued the argument too systematically, but there is no denying that Protestant societies were quicker to enter the industrial era than Catholic societies - although this in no way detracts from the virtues of Catholicism in terms of devotion and altruism. In the early 20th century, the thriving economies were mainly in Protestant countries, and the only Catholic countries that came anywhere near them - France and Belgium - were located in the same geographic region. The Protestant minority in France played a disproportionate economic role. In Europe, the economic growth rate of Protestant countries outstripped that of Catholic countries by 152%. With the advent of secularization, Catholic countries were able to make up the lost ground, and economic development ceased to be a singularly Protestant phenomenon.⁽²⁾

          The convergence effect produced by secularization was also observed in relation to individual values. In the United States, for example, Catholics in the 1950s had markedly more authoritarian and traditional values than Protestants. Those differences waned as religious fervour among both groups diminished.⁽³⁾

          This catching-up by Catholic societies was sometimes accelerated by a sudden liberalization accompanied by rapid secularization. Some Catholic societies experienced an even more spectacular thaw than ours. I think Spain is a good example. Anyone who visited that country in the mid-1970s, and then returned in the early 1980s, could not have but been struck by the incredible change that had taken place in only a few years. The Ireland of the 1990s provides another striking demonstration of this phenomenon.

          It was this shakeup of traditional Catholicism that was seen in Quebec in the early 1960s. Of course, we must not exaggerate the significance of the break with the past that happened in 1960, and of the dark period preceding it. But the Quiet Revolution really happened. It was first and foremost a phenomenon of rapid secularization, which coincided with the Second Vatican Council. In a few short years, the Church lost most of its secular power in Quebec, as noted by my father, Léon Dion, in his book on Bill 60, which created the Department of Education. The profound repercussions of the clergy's loss of power over the daily lives of Francophone Catholic Quebecers can never be underestimated.

          Those of us who are older all have our own memories of that era. I remember how the neighbours' children used to say to us: "You Dions are going to burn in Hell because you don't go to Mass every Sunday." And then suddenly, one Sunday morning, there they were beside us on the ski slopes.

          It would have been very surprising for Canada to have escaped the general trend which resulted in Catholic societies being slower than Protestant societies in progressing toward modernization and liberalism. In Canada, as elsewhere, lower incomes, less developed entrepreneurship and, above all, a significantly lower level of schooling could be observed among Catholics than among Protestants.

          Let's look at schooling, which is within provincial jurisdiction. In Quebec, instruction did not become mandatory for Catholics until 1943, 30 years after the Protestant board had introduced such a measure. McGill University agreed to accept female students in 1884, 50 years before that authorization was granted in the Catholic community. At the dawn of the Quiet Revolution, school attendance among 14-17 year-olds in Quebec was below 50%, compared with 80% in Ontario.  University enrolment was much lower among Francophones (2.9%) than among Anglophones (11%) in Quebec.

          But a general trend does not imply inevitability. Francophone Catholic Quebec might have adapted much more quickly if events had turned out differently. After all, Quebec experienced a sort of pre-Quiet Revolution under the Liberal government of Adélard Godbout in the 1940s, when women became eligible to vote and to run for office and could practise law, and with the advent of mandatory schooling, the creation of Hydro-Quebec and the beginning of nationalization of electricity, along with the creation of an independent civil service commission, which Duplessis later scrapped,⁽⁴⁾ and the right to organize and wage bargaining.

          Godbout met with fierce opposition from the Church and conservative nationalism at the time because of his progressive reforms, his efforts to expand the role of the state and promote education and anti-patronage measures. He was also hurt by the conscription crisis, his emphasis on education was denounced as anticlericalism, and his promotion of women ran counter to the Church's definition of family hierarchy and unity. His anti-patronage measures were criticized as the introduction of foreign values, and his vision of an enhanced role for the state was denounced as Bolshevism. According to his biographer Jean-Guy Genest: [TRANSLATION] "It is regrettable that the era of reforms he introduced did not continue, and that it was not until the 1960s and the Quiet Revolution that the face of Quebec changed."⁽⁵⁾

          The wind of reform would likely have continued under Godbout. The traditional classical education curriculum, which was sorely lacking in scientific instruction, might have been reformed before the 1960s, as Godbout had denounced it as the private fiefdom of the Church. He had also expressed his desire to adopt a medicare system, and had struck a commission to that end.

          Cooperation with the modernization initiatives of the Government of Canada would certainly have been more positive, because Godbout, while a defender of provincial autonomy, was also an astute observer of the broader picture. It was in large part because of him that the constitutional amendment allowing the Government of Canada to establish unemployment insurance was made possible. At that time, assistance to the unemployed, while insufficient, still absorbed half of the provincial budget. Godbout would not, as Duplessis did until his dying day, have impeded the completion of the TransCanada Highway because of the Government of Canada's requirement that contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder, regardless of political affiliation.

          But Adélard Godbout, despite a four-point lead in the popular vote, fell victim to the electoral map and the concentration of Anglophone and Allophone voters, who massively supported him, and lost the 1944 election. He was brought down by accusations of anticlericalism, socialism and servility to Ottawa.

          And so the Quiet Revolution might have taken place earlier. But it also might have occurred later, or been a slower and more gradual process of evolution. That likely would have been the case if the formidable Liberal team of Jean Lesage had not pulled off its squeaker election win in 1960, following a campaign that appealed to the modernizing aspirations of a large number of Francophones and garnered massive support among Anglophone and Allophone voters.

          So while it may not have been inevitable, our Quiet Revolution was indeed a part of a broader, fundamental trend. It was a Weberian revolution: an adaptation by a Catholic society to a secular world. And our federal government, which, unlike our provincial government, was not in the grips of Catholic conservatism, played a key role in that adaptation. And that role was enhanced by the increased importance of central governments occasioned by the introduction of Keynesian-inspired policies and the welfare state.

2. The catalytic role of the federal government

          The Quiet Revolution was a clarion call for change. The winds of change with which Quebecers infused their society came from universities, unions, intellectuals and the Church itself, but an appreciable proportion came from our federal institutions. Since I am well aware that I may be suspected of partiality, I would like to call, in my own defence, a figure of a rather different political stripe than mine, who was also a major contributor to the Quiet Revolution: Mr Jacques Parizeau.

          In an interview with Robert-Guy Scully on January 22, 1999, Mr Parizeau said that: [TRANSLATION] "Before the Quiet Revolution, any young Quebecers who had developed any economic expertise, and there weren't all that many, were working in Ottawa. Ottawa was where the action was. It was Ottawa that created Canada's social safety net and the policy of reconstruction following the Second World War. The serious government was in Ottawa. Quebec City was just a place for small-league politicians and patronage. [...] When Sauvé took office with the words "Désormais" [as of now] [...] a lot of those [...] working in Ottawa for boards of inquiry or as consultants in various departments headed for Quebec City, and they were horrified at what they found."

          This quotation by Mr Parizeau is a good description of the two key roles played by the Government of Canada. First of all, it was a reformer, launching major policies which were then continued by the provinces, as the Government of Quebec has done with great enthusiasm and originality. But it was also a refuge, a place of freedom and learning, as it was the case for two main authors of the Quiet Revolution, Georges-Émile Lapalme and Jean Lesage, who began their career on the federal scene, and for René Lévesque, who was making a name for himself on national television.

          Throughout Western society, post-war modernization efforts were spearheaded by the central government, including in federations, as demonstrated so well by Edmond Orban.⁽⁶⁾ In Canada, the decentralized nature of our federation enabled some provinces - in particular Saskatchewan under the CCF - to be genuine breeding grounds of innovation, but it was the Government of Canada that built on those initiatives and extended them on a national scale.

          So the establishment of the welfare state was first driven by the federal government, and initially required extensive centralization. The federal initiatives were opposed by the Duplessis government and its clerical, nationalist and conservative supporters, although they were welcomed by the Quebec population. In the early 1950s, for example, Quebecers enthusiastically signed on for the non-mandatory baby bonus, showing unprecedented enthusiasm for the program, at over 95%, as confirmed by a 1955 Gallup poll.

          As noted by Dominique Marshall⁽⁷⁾ : [TRANSLATION] "In two decades, the federal government indirectly laid the foundations for a provincial welfare state, by providing Quebec reformers with laws, structures and expertise." The provincial governments continued what the federal government had initiated, in part thanks to grants and agreements established through the federal spending power, for example. Claude Ryan, although rather wary of that power today, has acknowledged as much: "The leadership of the federal government during the last half-century allowed Canada to establish a wide-ranging social security net. This would have been impossible without the federal spending power."⁽⁸⁾ The Quiet Revolution is in part the history of these negotiatied agreements, through which the Government of Quebec became in its turn [TRANSLATION] "a serious government," to use Mr Parizeau's words.

          To become serious, a government needs highly qualified and experienced personnel. Jean Lesage and his government drew extensively on Ottawa. For example, René Lévesque recruited Michel Bélanger, a public servant in the federal Finance Department, as director general for planning in Quebec's department of water power resources, and appointed Jean Lessard, the vice-president of the St. Lawrence Seaway, as president of Hydro-Québec. The new director of Quebec's provincial police was Josaphat Brunet, a former RCMP officer. The head of the civil service commission was a 20-year federal public service veteran, Jean Fournier. Another federal official, Roger Marier, was appointed by Jean Lesage as deputy minister of family and welfare, and, as pointed out Georges-Henri Lévesque, was considered responsible for [TRANSLATION] "the transition from ad-hoc and often poorly organized charity to universal social assistance.⁽⁹⁾ And Jean Chapdelaine, after a 27-year career in Canadian diplomacy, provided an impetus to Quebec diplomacy.

          But beyond government circles, [TRANSLATION] "the Quiet Revolution was first of all a cultural revolution," as stated by Fernand Dumont.⁽¹⁰⁾ The Government of Canada's direct contribution to Quebec's cultural renewal through its communication and scientific research policies is undeniable. The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, the CBC, the National Film Board and the Canada Council [TRANSLATION] "paved the way for the Quiet Revolution," according to Louis Balthazar.⁽¹¹⁾

          It must be realized that Radio-Canada was [TRANSLATION] "the first cultural organization in Quebec not to be controlled by the clergy."⁽¹²⁾ Fernand Séguin said that [TRANSLATION] "Radio-Canada was the most extraordinary thing to happen in French Canada since Jacques Cartier."⁽¹³⁾ Marcel Dubé⁽¹⁴⁾ saw public television as the source of the intellectual rejuvenation, development in the arts and letters and ideological revolution observed in Quebec.

          There is much more to say about the Government of Canada's role in the Quiet Revolution. For example, I haven't even mentioned the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism established by Prime Minister Pearson, which was a wake-up call in many ways. The study done by André Raynaud⁽¹⁵⁾, on behalf of the Commission, which revealed the low rate of participation of French-Canadians in Quebec's economy, provoked a "general commotion," as my father noted.⁽¹⁶⁾ But I think I've made my point: the federal government was one of the unsung catalysts of the Quiet Revolution.

3. Two pertinent conclusions for today's debates

          I will draw two conclusions: one to do with our nationalism, the other with our federalism.

          My first conclusion is that nationalism is inherently neither good nor bad. Before the Quiet Revolution, it was often a stumbling block for Quebec's modernization, but it has since often been a stimulant.

          For example, while nationalism was used to justify patronage prior to the Quiet Revolution, it was subsequently used to fight it.⁽¹⁷⁾ Just as it was previously seen as "being ourselves" to act according to paternalistic principles, it subsequently became imperative to clean up our act in order to be the best. René Lévesque likely described this metamorphosis of nationalism better than anyone else. In his memoirs, he was scathing in his denunciation of Duplessis's legacy of public administration, calling it: [TRANSLATION] "a shell game," "a police force rotten to the core," "Augean stables."⁽¹⁸⁾ You'd be hard pressed to find another former head of government who placed greater importance in his memoirs on integrity in government.

          While nationalism can be a force for good, it is not necessarily so. There is always a risk of its becoming a sort of mental straitjacket, a knee-jerk reference to a past by which we must always define ourselves, an obsession for consensus as a hallmark of loyalty to ourselves. That's what happens when we define ourselves collectively through a "model," which no one can challenge without being accused of not loving Quebec.

          The Quiet Revolution did not take place in the name of a "Quebec model" or "traditional demands." On the contrary, the model at the time, as defined for example by the Tremblay Commission on constitutional problems set up by Duplessis in 1953, was one of a traditional community culture based on [TRANSLATION] "family, self-reliance and religion,"⁽¹⁹⁾ and was thus an obstacle to many reforms. The Quiet Revolution was the work of a generation of Quebecers who were determined to shake things up, who looked forward, not backwards.

          In the same way, nationalism is harmful when it becomes an obsession with distinctiveness. We Quebecers are distinct from other Canadians for obvious reasons. But still, being distinct is not all that defines us. We also share many objectives and interests with them. The Quiet Revolution enabled us further to affirm French language rights, and gave rise to new forms of Quebec innovation, but in many ways our customs and institutions have become less distinct from those of other Canadians. In addition, our distinctiveness has varied over time. The Quiet Revolution would have been much more difficult to achieve if the conception that the Tremblay Commission had of our distinct society had been entrenched in the Constitution.

          And this is where I want to talk about our federalism. We Quebecers have two governments with constitutional powers: our provincial government and our federal government. The federal government is not a foreign power. It has made a powerful contribution to forming our society, during the Quiet Revolution and at other times as well. Just because we are a minority doesn't mean that the federal government is always automatically wrong. Sometimes it's the federal government that has been right and the provincial government that has been wrong and, in my opinion, this was more often the case than not during the Duplessis era.

          And we influence the federal government in turn. Pierre Trudeau and his team of Quebec reformers, who reformed Ottawa to such a great extent, can themselves be described as artisans and products of the Quiet Revolution. They brought their energy and their vitality to the very heart of the institutions we share with other Canadians. They affirmed our language and showcased their talents in Ottawa just as Lesage's team did in Quebec City.

          From an intergovernmental point of view, the Quiet Revolution was the emergence of two major-league governments rather than one. Some of us see this as an untenable contradiction. Just as they call on us to renounce our Canadian identity and be Quebecers only, they say that our only government is the one in Quebec City. In matters of governance and identity alike, they truly have a one-track mind.

          Mr Jacques Parizeau is no doubt the person who has likely best expressed this radical conception of a political society that requires that the seat of authority be in only one location. As far back as 1967, he said that Canada had fallen into "anarchy" because [TRANSLATION] "we had pushed decentralization too far": [TRANSLATION] "No country should be authorized to fragment its decision-making power as we have done [...]"⁽²⁰⁾ He repeated that same conviction again in 1999, (Quebec City, February 28): [TRANSLATION] "It is imperative that the federal government, if it is to be able to retain the powers of a real government and to set policy, centralize what has become an extraordinarily decentralized federation."

          Canada is bound to centralize, and Quebec has got to get out: such is Mr Parizeau's prophecy, which hasn't changed since the 1960s. I'm convinced that it is a false prophecy, and that Mr Parizeau has drawn the wrong conclusion from a Quiet Revolution to which he contributed so much.

          We can and we must have two serious governments. Two governments each with their own perspectives, subject to different influences, and which, through healthy emulation, learn from each other and from the other governments in our federation. In this way, we put the best chances for development on our side. It's only natural that we have different opinions on their respective roles or their place in relation to civil society and market forces, but what is important is that we consider both of these governments as our own, and that we encourage them to work together above and beyond their natural competition.

          That is the main conclusion that I draw about the Government of Canada's role as a catalyst in the Quiet Revolution.

1. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York, Scribner's Press), 1958.

2. Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," American Political Science Review, 82, 1988, pp. 1203-30.

3. Duane F. Alwin, "Religion and Parental Orientations: Evidence of a Catholic-Protestant Convergence," American Journal of Sociology, 92, 1986, pp. 412-40.

4. James I. Gow, Histoire de l'administration publique québécoise (Montreal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal), 1986, pp. 274-77.

5. Jean-Guy Genest, Godbout (Sillery, Quebec, Les éditions du Septentrion), 1996, p. 327.

6. Edmond Orban, La dynamique de la centralisation dans l'État fédéral : un processus irréversible? (Montreal, Québec-Amérique), 1984.

7. Dominique Marshall, Aux origines sociales de l'État-providence : familles québécoises, obligation scolaire et allocations familiales,1940-1955 (Montreal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal), 1998, p. 287.

8. Claude Ryan, "The agreement on the Canadian social union as seen by a Québec federalist," Inroads, 8, 1999, p. 33.

9. Georges-Henri Lévesque, Souvenances 2 : Remous et éclatements (Montreal, Les Éditions de La Presse), 1986, p. 113.

10. Fernand Dumont, Le sort de la culture (Montreal, l'Hexagone), 1987, p. 305.

11. Louis Balthazar, "Quebec and the Ideal of Federalism", in M. Fournier, M. Rosemberg and D. Whyte (eds.), Quebec Society, Critical Issues (Scarborough, Prentice Hall), 1997, pp. 46-47.

12. Louis Balthazar, "Aux sources de la Révolution tranquille : continuité rupture, nécessité," in M.R. Lafond (ed.), La Révolution tranquille 30 ans après, qu'en reste-t-il? (Hull, Éditions de Lorraine), 1992, p. 94.

13. Fernand Séguin, cited in Ignace Cau, L'édition au Québec de 1960 à 1977 (Quebec City, Ministère des Affaires culturelles), 1981, p. 98.

14. Marcel Dubé, "Dix ans de télévision," Cité libre, no. 48, June-July 1962, pp. 24-25.

15. André Raynauld et al., La répartition des revenus selon les groupes ethniques, study by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. (The third study of Book III of the Commission's Report released in 1969, The Work World, is based on the study by André Raynauld et al.).

16. Léon Dion, La révolution déroutée (Montreal, Boréal), 1998, p. 214.

17. Jacques Bourgault and Stéphane Dion, "Public Sector Ethics in Quebec", in Corruption, Character and Conduct (Toronto, Oxford University Press), 1993, pp.67-89.

18. René Lévesque, Attendez que je me rappelle... (Montreal, Québec-Amérique), 1988.

19. Quebec, Rapport de la Commission royale d'enquête sur les problèmes constitutionnels (Tremblay Commission), 1956, volume II, p. 69.

20. Lecture given in Banff, published in René Lévesque, Option Québec (Montreal, Éditions de l'Homme), 1968, p.104.

 

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