Policy background paper for
the Canadian Privy Council Office

By Ragnar E. Lofstedt PhD
Professor and Director
King's Centre for Risk Management
King's College, London

December 2003

1. Introduction

I was asked by the EACSR Secretariat to write up a background paper on the role of risk management in strengthening the public's trust toward both regulators and products based on the work that I have done in risk communication and management in Europe. The Europeans, because of a wide array of regulatory scandals ranging from Mad cow disease (BSE), to tainted blood in France, to dioxin in Belgian chicken feed, to the foot-and-mouth disease have become increasingly distrustful of regulators, scientists, and industry. This public distrust, more pronounced in some countries (UK) than in others (e.g. Sweden) is to a certain extent driven by an increasingly hostile and aggressive media that amplifies risks and attenuates benefits (Kasperson et al 1988). European regulatory authorities, acutely aware of being increasingly less trusted by the public, have put forward a series of measures to address how to best rebuild public's trust, which I collectively refer to as the new model of risk management. The measures put in place include greater use of the precautionary principle, more focus on regulatory impact analyses (Lofstedt 2004), greater public and stakeholder participation in the policy making process, and to more thought-out proactive risk communication strategies (UK Cabinet Office 2002).

The issue of increasing public distrust of authorities is of concern to the Canadian government as well. It like many other Western nations do not want to fall into the downward public trust spiral, a situation which easily leads authorities to respond to public concerns via knee-jerk populistic regulatory measures rather than via "smart regulation". This brief policy paper provides an overview and analysis regarding what Canadian authorities can learn from their European counterparts in terms of how better risk management can strengthen public's trust. This over view and analysis is conducted in the following fashion. In the first instance I set the context by providing a short description of the old and new models of regulation and explain how the new model of regulation has its roots in the declining levels of public trust. In the second section I describe the types of risk management strategies European authorities have introduced to date, largely emanating from the new risk management model, to win back the public's trust. In the third section I analyse these strategies from a risk management perspective and in the final section I provide a series of recommendations for Canadian authorities.

2. Background

One can divide up regulation in Europe based on the old model and the new model (Leiss does the same for Canada, Leiss 2000). The old model is based on consensual styles of regulation, in which policymakers and industrialists met behind closed doors and made regulatory decisions. This model, put into operation already at the end of the 19^th century, was viewed by many outside observers (as late as the mid 1980s) as effective, in terms of promoting a cleaner environment and better public health, as the US model yet considerably cheaper (Brickman et al 1985; Vogel 1986). The consensual (old) model had the following features attached to it. It was elitist in nature, in which regulatory decisions were taken with a number of so called "peak groups" including heads of industry, senior regulators, representatives from trade unions and the like. The peak groups represented the interests of society at large, and any regulations passed should be measured with that goal in mind. In the making of these regulations scientists had an important role to play, outlining for the "peak" representatives what were the pros and cons of the regulations in question. Stakeholders, who were not seen as part of the peak groups (such as environmental NGOs), nor the public actively participated in the policy making process (Kelman 1981; Lundqvist 1980).

This consensual model, in the words of the eminent Italian political scientist, Giandomenico Majone, is now dead (Majone and Emerson 2001++). No longer are policy makers and other representatives of peak groups let alone scientists in many European countries trusted by the public or stakeholders. Following a series of scandals, the public has in many nations concluded that the peak groups did not regulate for the best of society but rather the best for themselves. Following a number of scandals, the public and certain stakeholders rightfully concluded that these peak groups more often than not ignored costly medium to long term regulatory strategies even when the benefits would be significant. Rather the peak groups favoured low cost short term regulator measures with limited benefits (as with the case of BSE) (Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2000; Ratzan 1998).

In the place of the old model of regulation a new model has begun to take form. This new model has been shaped over time by a wide array of actors, for which a number of academics working in close tandem with policy makers are seen to be particularly influential (e.g. Beck 1992; Beck et al 1994; Funtowitcz and Ravetz 1990; Giddens 1990; 94; 98; O'Riordan and Cameroon 1994; O'Riordan et al 2001; Renn et al 1995 and 1996). The model, more pronounced in certain European countries (e.g. UK) than others (Sweden) is composed of the following features. It aims to be more inclusive than exclusive encouraging greater public and stakeholder participation in the policy making process either via citizen panels or citizen juries or by having stakeholders participate in policy making round tables or advisory groups (such as the UK government's round table on sustainable development) (RCEP 1998). It argues for regulatory strategies to be completely open and transparent (e.g. putting draft recommendations on the internet) and for regulators to be accountable for any policy that they propose. The new model of regulation asks regulators to take into greater account environmental and social values (e.g. RCEP 1998) and to use the precautionary principle and other more risk adverse measures more frequently (O'Riordan et al 2003; Raffensberger and Tickner 1999). Science, albeit still important, plays less of role in the new model than in the old one. Compared to the old model when science was held in a very high regard, scientific results today is increasingly questioned by media, stakeholders and the public, who take the view that scientists in effect are just another stakeholder (O'Brien 2000).

The new model of regulation is clearly needed in many European nations and for the European Union as a whole (e.g. the European Commission's White paper on Governance). Public's trust in parliamentarians, regulators and local policy makers have declined significantly in many European nations. Levels of trust in UK policy makers have decreased from 39 per cent in 1974 to 22 per cent in 1996 (Curtice and Jowell 1997; House of Lords 2000) while in Sweden trust in policy makers have decreased from 65 per cent in 1968 to 30 per cent in 1999 (Holmberg and Weibull 2000). Similarly public's trust in regulatory science has also decreased. With regard to environmental issues, for example, polls in the UK show that the environmental NGOs are more trusted in providing accurate information than regulators, industry and even academia (House of Lords 2000; MORI 1999). As the public trusts policy makers and science less and less, policy makers in many parts of Europe have begun adopting the new model to try to revert these trends.

Although some scientists and regulators would still welcome a consensual style of regulation (e.g. see Breyer 1993 for a US discussion), it is clear that Western Europe will be unable to completely revert back to the old model of consensual regulation. There have simply been too many regulatory scandals that have resulted in too much distrust in regulatory authorities to allow this to occur¹. However, the new model of regulation, at least as implemented in Europe, is not problem free. As the Canadians are exploring the new model (or at least a version of it) of regulation as well (e.g. Doern and Reed 2000; Leiss 2002), following declines in public trust toward authorities (e.g. Dobell and Berry 1992; Clarke et al 1995) there are inevitably some valuable lessons that the Canadian authorities can learn from some of the mishaps that have taken place with the European experience of the model. This is the primary objective of this paper.

2.1 The consequences of the loss of public trust

The new model of regulation is presently pushed forward by regulators and governments in Europe because of the loss of public trust. Regulators, just as researchers, view trust as the most important component of risk communication and management. Indeed some studies show, that this variable alone can claim more than 50 per cent of a certain public's perception of risk (Lofstedt 1996; Slovic 1993). Therefore, without public trust in authorities/regulators it is very difficult to assemble successful risk communication and management strategies (UK Strategy Unit 2002). The issue of public trust in authorities (or the lack of it) is made all the more important by research showing that there is a direct relationship between high public trust in authority and low perceived risk and vice-a-versa (Lofstedt 1996; Slovic 1993). Hence, as public's trust in authorities decline, the public's perception of risk increases. Indeed, research shows that it is possible to communicate risk issues of high uncertainty in a top-down fashion, when the public trusts authorities/regulators (Lofstedt 1996; Lofstedt 2001). In other words, when regulators have trust, the risk management regime becomes so much easier to deal with. This was the case in the old model of regulation and that is the primary reason why outside observers saw the old model as being so much more efficient than the US more adversarial one (Brickman et al 1985; Vogel 1986).

3. Regulatory strategies to combat public distrust

In Europe, the new model of regulation has slowly developed over time almost in a muddling through type fashion (Lindbloom 195*) following the scandals mentioned previously. These scandals should not be underestimated. The BSE crisis, for example, was viewed by the UK government as the worst crisis since the 1956 Suez conflict (Ratzan 1998), while the European Commission viewed BSE as the biggest crisis that the European Union has ever had (Southey 1996). These and other scandals have been further amplified by the fact that throughout these mishaps the regulators in many cases were unable to communicate to the public properly leading to even greater levels of public distrust.

As the new model has begun to take form, there have been a number of teething problems. Involving stakeholders in the regulatory process has led in some cases to regulators in effect loosing control of the regulatory agenda (e.g. the public outrage over MMR vaccines in the UK). In other cases, by being risk averse or precautionary, regulators have in effect over regulated causing destruction of whole industry sectors (e.g. the use of antibiotics for animal growth promotion). Sometimes, not necessarily to do with the new model per se, but simply via the regulators aiming to please the public, adopting populistic measures has in effect led to greater public distrust. The aim of the next section is to focus on some of these cases in more detail bringing in examples particularly from the UK (where the level and number of regulatory scandals to date have been the worst and the depth of public distrust have been the greatest). Please note the aim of these cases is not to argue for "throwing out" the new model of regulation, as this is not warranted or realistic, but rather to show that it is not fault free.

3.1 The changing communication processes

In the post regulatory scandal environment, the communication of regulation has changed. The new model calls for greater involvement of stakeholders in the regulatory process. This in turn inevitably leads to more significant role for stakeholders to communicate about risk related issues either directly via participation on government panels or indirectly via "socially amplified" media campaigns (Kasperson et al 1988). In addition, the influence of NGOs has increased still further by the public's and the media's willingness to turn to these groups for regulatory information (e.g. via having them write letters to the editor or via giving them space on the opinion editorial pages).

An example of how the communication process has changed over time has to do with the recent (November 2003) UK "ghost ship" episode. In this case, Friend's of the Earth (FoE) raised the alarm following the UK company Able winning a contract to break up 14 ageing merchant US Navy vessels. FoE claimed that the vessels contained large amounts of asbestos and other dangerous chemicals. Indeed, FoE came out to say that Hartlepool, the city where the ghost ships would be broken up, would shortly receive a number of "toxic time bombs". This alarm received front-page coverage in the major UK broad sheets as well as prominent television coverage. The UK Environment Agency, which had previously given Able planning permission to dry dock the ghost ships and dismantle them, following threats of legal action from FoE, withdrew their permission and asked for the vessels to be sent back to the United States. By this time, however, two vessels had already arrived, and the decision was taken that in any case, baring a court ruling, the ships could not be sent back to the US during the winter months due to significant storm risk. The outcome of this case is still pending. However, what is interesting about this case is that the risk communication process was completely dominated by FoE. Government officials virtually did not participate in the policy making process.

3.2 Risk averse decision making

The new model of regulation calls for an increased use of the precautionary principle (particularly the reversed burden of proof) and the greater taking into account of social and environmental values so as to reduce the chance of future scandals. Regulators' risk averseness has been made stronger by an increasing aggressive media in Germany, France, UK and elsewhere that amplify risks and attenuates benefits. In the European setting there are a number of examples of this risk averse regulatory behaviour. With regard to the regulation of mobile phones in the UK, for example, the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones, set up by the Government, concluded that there was a need to discourage children from using mobile phones and that warning labels should be distributed regarding the hazards associated with mobile phones. These recommendations were put forward even though there was no scientific data showing that mobile phones pose adverse health effects to humans (IEGMP 2000). The chair of the committee, Sir William Stewart arguably adopted this precautionary approach, because he was concerned that if there was ever a link between the use of mobile phones and public health effects he would not be held responsible.

In December 1997, at the time of the BSE crisis, the then Minister of Agriculture Jack Cunningham introduced a ban on the sale of beef on the bone citing that there was a real "risk" that consumers could contract CJD from eating beef on the bone. At the time of the ban some 70,000 individuals signed petitions calling for attempt to halt the ban and butchers came out stating that the ban was a panic reaction on behalf of government officials. The ban ended in December in 1999, having cost the industry some 170 million pounds, following scientific reports showing that there was one billion to one chance that somebody eating beef on the bone would actually get CJD (BBC 1999).

Similarly, in 2002 the European Court of First Instance (part of the European Court of Justice System) reaffirmed in September 2002 that the precautionary principle could be justified even without backing from appropriate scientific committees. In the two cases in question, which arose from a 1999 EU regulation banning antibiotic additives in animal feed (Edqvist and Pedersen 2001), on the basis that bacterial resistance to antibiotics might be transferred to humans, were challenged by Pfizer Animal Health and Alpharma. These two companies stated that the ban was based on zero risk and not a thorough risk assessment, the reason being that in 35 years of scientific studies there has been no such link. In its ruling against Pfizer the Court argued:

"When the precautionary principle is applied, the fact that there is scientific uncertainty and that it is impossible to carry out a full risk assessment in the time available does not prevent the competent public authority from taking preventive measures if such measures appear essential, regard being had to the level of risk to human health which the public authority has decided is the critical threshold above which is necessary to take preventive measures in respect of the product (European Court of First Instance 2002, p.11).

3.3 Non scientific grounded regulatory responses

The new model of regulation, as argued previously, takes into greater account non-scientific parameters than the old model of regulation. In many cases, however, whether it is the old model or the new model of regulation, regulators under pressure from distrustful publics and special interest groups will simply disregard science all together in order to get a supposedly "easier" less fraught resolution to the problem at hand. In so doing by taking a political rather than scientific decision authorities hope that the problem will go away. One can group these types of regulatory responses around three distinct terms, namely knee jerk reactions, give into public demand, and regulations by gut reactions.

3.3.1 Knee jerk responses

Knee jerk responses are quick regulatory reactions to media amplification, stakeholder protest and public outcry. They can occur at any time but the main driving factors include sensationalist press stories coming from an aggressive media, stigmatised issues, or issues driven by prominent and well respected (highly trusted) individuals. These driving factors are made stronger by rampant public distrust of regulators and policy makers. There have been quite a few cases over recent years, but for the sake of illustration two are discussed, one driven by media outcry and the other by an issue of stigma. One has to do with the passage of the so-called Dangerous Dog Act of 1991 (which was an update of the Victorian Dog Act of 1871). This Act, for which the UK Home Office was the main driver: "prohibits persons from having in their possession or custody dogs belonging to types bred for fighting…" (Dangerous Dog Act 1991) was put forward following a series of highly public attacks by American pitbull terriers (so called luxury fighting dogs popular among London based criminals) on members of the public. This Act focused on a small number of dogs (pitbull terriers) rather than on the dogs that are the most responsible for dog bites (such as German Shepherds). Since passing of the Act, it has been severely criticised by policy makers and academic experts alike, leading to greater public distrust of the Home Office (for a good review see Hood et al 2000).

Another example of knee jerk type regulation has to do with the January 2001 banning of durable multi-use medical instruments for tonsil surgery in England. The ban was put in place following public concern over CJD and longevity of proteinaceous prions on this medical equipment. This concern driven by the issue that the prions reside in lymph glands such as tonsils ignored the fact that single use medical equipment is not as strong as the multi-use leading to surgical complications. During the one year duration of the ban (whole of 2001), it led to increased post operational bleeding for many patients and one death (Department of Health 2001).

In both of these cases (in particular the Dangerous Dog Act) the regulatory measures put in place led to virtual instant mollification of the key constituencies clamouring for such regulatory action in the first place, but to the detriment of the majority of those constituencies who had not participated in the regulatory dialogue. In so doing the regulator in question also got an instant gratification, that is having supposedly solved the issue, by having the groups in question leaving the regulator alone (Graham and Wiener 1995; Sapolsky 1990). Of course, such gratification is strictly short term, as analysts, media and informed members of the public quickly see through the facade, leading to medium and long term affects on the regulator's credibility.

3.3.2 Give in to public demand

These types of regulatory measures or (lack of measures) are similar to knee jerk reactions as regulators are responding to the public. However, unlike knee jerk reactions in which regulators respond comparatively quickly in a populistic fashion, giving in to public demand is not usually immediate (that is within a period of months) but rather over years. Examples of giving into public demand include the virtual abandonment of the waste incineration strategy in the UK, even-though a large number of experts show that from a scientific as well as health and environment perspectives it makes more sense to incinerate waste than to place it in a landfill (Department of Environment, Transport and Regions 2000). One of the main reasons to why the government has virtually abandoned this strategy has to do with the majority of the general public, driven in many cases by special interest groups (both local and national), opposing the incineration option seeing it as a dirty, unsafe technology that produces large amounts of dioxin (Gray 1995; Lofstedt 1996; Petts 1992).

Similarly, in Sweden policy makers have virtually abandoned geology as one of the primary criteria for siting a permanent nuclear waste depository. The reason for this abandonment is closely related to the fact that when the Swedish Nuclear Waste Inspectorate drilled in an area that had the best suitable geology, the local public would come out protesting the drilling. The situation was not made any better by the fact that in many cases the areas with the best rock formations were places of outstanding natural beauty (such as south west coast of Sweden), or near large university communities where those that protested were both educated and had plenty of time on their hands (students) (Lidskog++). Instead, the regulator decided that the de-facto best option was to place the permanent high radioactive waste facility in an area that has already has an experience with nuclear power, as the regulator took the view, correctly, that these communities would be more likely to be pro nuclear power in the first place (e.g.Lofstedt 1996). Because of this decision, the regulator is now only looking at two areas in Sweden for siting this facility both near nuclear power stations, namely Forsmark and Oskarshamn (Sjoberg 2003).

3.3.3 Regulation by gut reactions

Particularly in a public distrustful environment regulations can be put forward that are based on instinct "gut reaction" rather than on regulatory science. That is to say, rather than collect all the science regarding a regulatory issue at hand, regulators opt to ban the substance completely as it simply "feels right" and the public will therefore be sure to support the decision. One of the most famous European gut reaction regulations has to do with the ban of antibiotics in animal feed at first in Denmark and Sweden and then in the European Union as a whole. Initially the practice to feed anti-microbials in small (sub-therapeutic) doses to farm animals came about in the late 1940s when it was discovered that by feeding chicken tetracycline they grew more rapidly (Stokstad and Jukes 1949). Following this discovery, feeding antibiotics to animals through Europe and the United States became an integral part of animal husbandry. Starting the mid 1960s, however, there was growing concern that feeding animals antibiotics would increase antibiotic resistance, something that was already occurring with regard to the therapeutic use of penicillin for adults. Hence, as a proactive regulatory measure, regulators, particularly in Scandinavia took the view that antibiotics for animal feed should be banned as well before antibiotic resistance became a problem for animals and even worse if the antibiotic resistant bacteria transferred from the animal to the human. Starting in 1984 the Swedish Farmers Union asked for a ban of anti-bacterials as feed additives, and in the mid 1990s Danish authorities began banning anti-bacterials as well because of this risk. At the time of the Commission's ban in 1999, the EU farming chief, Franz Fischler, took the view that antibiotic resistance in the guts of animals was already taking place. The ban was therefore needed, as antibiotics were becoming less effective as medical treatments because people were supposedly ingesting them in meat and creating bacteria resistant to them. Upon further reflection, however, there was (and still is) no scientific evidence of this transferal, following some 35 years of scientific studies. Therefore, at least from a scientific perspective, these substances should not have been banned (for an historical overview see Edqvist and Pedersen 2001; see Vos 2003 for an analysis of the recent European Commission case). In sum, the ban was put in place to satisfy a "gut reaction" rather than a true regulatory need leading to the demise of a 300+ million Euro European industry (Arthur and Comerford 1998).

4. New regulatory philosophies

The new risk management model has also taken on board several regulatory philosophies. These can be grouped into three distinct categories namely the increased use of the precautionary principle, the role of regulatory impact analysis and greater public and stakeholder transparency in the policy making process

4.1 The European Use of the precautionary principle

The European use of the precautionary principle has its origins in German and Swedish policymaking. It became part of the European regulatory repertoire in the 1980s following significant lobbying on behalf of Germany.  At this time it was a welcomed tool, seen by many Commission policy makers as a way toward ecological modernisation with tougher regulations forcing industry to become more innovative and creative (e.g. Lofstedt 2003a). At this time, if one uses the classification system proposed by Wiener and Rogers, the precautionary principle in use was either version 1 or version 2:

Version 1: "Uncertainty does not justify inaction. In its most basic form, the precautionary principle is a principle that permits regulation in the absence of complete evidence about the particular risk scenario".

Or

Version 2. "Uncertainty justifies action" (Wiener and Rogers 2002, p.320-321).

These two versions of the precautionary principle were virtually abandoned in the mid 1990s following the rise of the regulatory scandals, cronyism, aggressive media reporting and the like, leading to public distrust of authority (particular on the EU level). At that time, policy makers within the Commission increasingly began to adopt the Swedish version of the precautionary principle (Lofstedt 2003b) that of reversed burden of proof (or what Wiener and Rogers refer to version 3):

Version 3: "Uncertainty requires shifting the burden and standard of proof. This version of the precautionary principle is the most far reaching. It holds that uncertain risk requires forbidding the potentially risky activity until the proponent of the activity demonstrates that it poses no (or acceptable) risk" (Wiener and Rogers 2002 p.320-321).

Examples of the reversed burden of proof argumentation in EU law abound. One of the most quoted ones comes from the EU Chemical White Paper (27^th February 2001):

"Responsibility to generate knowledge about chemicals should be placed on industry. Industry should also ensure that only chemicals that are safe for intended purposes are produced. The Commission proposes to shift responsibility to enterprises, for generating and assessing data and assessing the risks of the use of substances. The enterprises should also provide adequate information to downstream users" (European Commission 2001 p.8).  

By putting forward this version of the precautionary principle, the European Commission (as well as the member states that abide by it) hopes to win back the publics and stakeholders trust in effect by acting tough on industry.

4.2 (Regulatory) Impact Analysis

The current use of RIA grew out of a need for better regulation in the EU and was addressed in the 2001 Governance White Paper (European Commission 2001b) a document that was developed following the resignation of the Santander Commission to help re-establish trust in the European Union project. The European version of regulatory impact analysis, commonly referred to as impact analysis takes into account both environmental and social values and as such is different from the US model. It has been promoted (specifically in the post 2002 era) as a philosophy that ensures greater transparency (and thereby engendering greater public trust) in the regulatory policy making process (Lofstedt 2004).

4.3 The growing reliance on public and stakeholder participation

As long ago as ancient Grecian times, citizens participated in policy making, and direct democracy likened to the Greek model was practised in a few small Cantons in central Switzerland in the 13^th Century. Today the involvement of the public and various interest groups in a multilevel framework which characterise risk to be managed in some western nations (such as the Netherlands and the UK) has its direct origins in the increasing degree of public and stakeholder distrust for authority. The public and stakeholders are asked to participate in the policy making process chiefly for equity and fairness reasons thereby ensuring a greater likelihood that a controversial siting issue or a regulation in question can be dealt with out incurring to much conflict. In so doing allowing the public and stakeholders to participate levels the playing the field as it allows these bodies to influence their representatives. With deliberation, the affected public can help decide which burdens are tolerable thereby ensuring that people's values and the concept of fairness gets due consideration. The tools used for ensuring deliberation include citizen advisory boards, citizen panels, citizen juries, referendums, participation via web sites or organised consultation meetings (Renn et al 1995 and 1996).

In Europe, the call for greater public and stakeholder participation has increased dramatically since the mid 1990s. The publics are asked to "write in" comments on proposed regulations (such as the recently announced European chemical regulations) as well as to participate in national GM debates such as those that has taken place in both the Netherlands and the UK, to asking the public to get involved either directly or indirectly in siting disputes (e.g. Lofstedt 1999; Renn et al 1995). In addition, NGOs are increasingly involved on both the national and international levels in helping to set regulatory standards be it with regard to phylates, chemicals, pesticides or the radiation emitted from mobile phone handsets.

5. An analysis of these measures

It is unclear whether these European regulatory measures and philosophies some directly part of the new model of regulation, others heavily influenced by it have either instilled greater public trust or lead to better regulation overall. In this section, based on the risk communication and management literatures I analyse some of the problems of these measures and philosophies.

5.1 Short term populistic measures will not withstand long-term scientific scrutiny

Short-term populistic measures such as the passage of the Dangerous Dog Act do not in the long term instil public confidence. Rather it leads to greater public distrust toward the authorities, in this case chiefly the Home Office, that put the measure forward (Hood et al 2000). Similarly, the ban on multi-use tonsil surgery equipment not only endangered patient's lives but also inevitably led to the public questioning the competence of medical authorities. Arguably, what the Government should have done in this case would firstly have been to conductive a scientific analysis regarding the transfer risks of prions from surgical equipment to humans and based on that scientific analysis decided whether to go ahead with a ban or not. Secondly, the regulatory authority in question should have ensured that this regulation (like all other regulations) should have undergone a peer review by qualified specialists in appropriate technical disciplines as is presently being proposed in the United States by the Office of Management and Budget (Office of Management and Budget 2003). Had these measures been put in place, it is unlikely that the Department of Health would have banned multi-use surgical tools for removing tonsils in the first place.

5.2 Issue of risk-risk tradeoffs

Another issue that populistic, non-scientific regulatory measures tend to ignore is the so-called "risk-risk trade off". That is when taking regulatory actions to avoid a specific harm, such actions may open up an additional not yet considered number of uncertain harms, which upon further reflection may in certain instances have a greater toll on the society at large (graham and Wiener 1995;Wiener 1998).  Indeed this "phenomenon of risk tradeoffs, otherwise known as side effects in medicine or unintended consequences in public policy" (Graham and Hsia 2002 p.383)(or collateral damage in military tactics) can have profound effects on the impacts of regulations (Graham and Wiener 1995). Regulations that are put in place to protect the public may actually have detrimental effects that are in many cases worse than the intended regulation

Populistic non-scientific measures are plagued by risk-risk tradeoffs. For example the English decision to ban durable multi-use equipment for removing tonsils is a classic risk-risk trade off issue. In this case, the probabilistic risk of a patient receiving CJD from a proteinaceous prion left on the equipment from a previous operation is considerably lower than the real risks associated with the excess bleeding that the patient suffers post-operation. Similarly, the unofficial decision not to build any waste incinerators for the time being is also a risk-risk trade off with the policy makers not taking properly into account the risks associated with landfill vis-à-vis incineration. Furthermore, the risk averse decision of banning beef on the bone failed to recognise the increased likelihood of both butchers and consumers increasing their risky behaviours with regard to either conforming or flaunting the ban. Butchers, for example, were forced to remove the bones from T bone steaks and the like before they could be sold and in so doing in many cases the discarded bones (or pieces of bone) ended up in advertently back into the food chain (e.g. beef mince). Similarly, a large number of consumers showed a wilful desire to consume beef on the bone taking part in "prohibition" dinners and the like (Wiener and Rogers 2002).     The environmental, public health as well as reputational costs of not taking into account risk-tradeoffs are significant. Proposed regulations can not only needlessly result in greater life loss and a worsened environment, but also lead to in the medium term to reputational loss for the regulator caught unawares of a possible trade off (Graham and Wiener 1995).

5.3 Involving stakeholders in the risk communication and management processes

By empowering NGOs to participate in the policymaking and thereby advertently or inadvertently in the communication process can cause a number of problems. Firstly, in an era of public distrust of regulatory authorities and scientists as in the UK, empowering NGOs can lead to a regulatory outcome that is neither justified or desired. For example, the UK ghost ship case in which FoE was putting forward statements that were un-scientifically grounded (e.g. the boats were not toxic environmental time-bombs but rather no more dangerous than any other old merchant vessel) led to less publicly trusted regulators to (unjustifiably) question their reasoning behind giving Able planning permission in the first place. Secondly, empowering NGOs can lead to greater public distrust of both policy makers and scientists the exact opposite to what the policy makers originally intended. The NGOs, seeing that there is an opportunity to get their voices heard, in many cases frequently and systematically criticise the scientists and the regulators in question to gain even further power at the expense of scientists and regulators. They often accuse the regulators, for example, for putting forward regulations that are poor, weak, non-scientific, and not grounded in public values which in turn will have detrimental affects on the environment and public health (Lofstedt 2001). Indeed, in some cases the NGOs themselves become the de-facto regulator as in the case of the UK Soil Association which now determines what can be classified as an organic food or not.

5.4 Problems associated with public participation

Increasing the level of public and stakeholder participation in the policy making process has also been criticised. These criticisms can be grouped around who participates, whether participation indeed leads to greater public trust, and to the public being incompetent.

Arguably at present the main problem associated with public participation has to do with who actually participates. On the whole studies indicate that most people actually do not want to participate in the policy making process. An example of this self selection process occurred with regard to setting up a citizen panel process in the North Blackforest to advice government officials where would be the best place to site and build a waste incinerator and two aerobic digesters. For this project, the Gesellschaft zur Planung der Restabfallbehandlung in der region Norschwarzwald (PAN) asked Europe's leading citizen panel expert, Professor Ortwin Renn, to set up a series of citizen panels on this issue. Using random sampling techniques, Renn and his colleagues invited 5440 citizens from the region to participate in the panels, and of these 198 accepted and 191 actually participated, giving a response rate of 3.5 per cent. In a follow up study analysing the results of the process, those people that did participate, most of them were either pensioners, house wives or husbands and students (that is to say that they had time on their hands) and most were either Social Democrats or Greens. It should be noted that the State of Baden Wurttemberg is seen to be one of the most conservative states in Germany, with a consistent majority voting for CDU (for a discussion see Lofstedt 1999). In other words, a random sample of participants was not achieved². Similarly it is argued that with regard to the recent National GM Forums in the UK, once again those people that did participate where the ones who were most hostile against GM crops.

Other researchers question whether greater public involvement actually leads to greater public trust. Although most of the research does indicate that public participating in the policy making process does increase public trust as the public is judged to have "bought into" the policy making process or because policy makers have been able to take note of public concerns (e.g. Fischhoff 1995; Morgan et al 2002; Renn et al 1995) other researchers are more sceptical. They point out that deliberation can actually lead to public distrust toward policy makers and the government as a whole, as the public becomes increasingly aware of how staid and ineffective bureaucrats actually can be (Rossi 1997).

Some researchers and policy makers take the view that the public should not participate as they are either under or misinformed, lost and bewildered, and question whether overtly self interested or simply apathetic publics should actually participate in policy making (Rossi 1997). These findings tend to ignore the facts, however, that in many cases involving the public will actually lead to better and more informed decision making processes (e.g. Fischhoff 1995 and 1996; Leiss 1996 and 2002; Wynne 1989).

One way to address the issue of better involving the public in the policy making process is via the mental model process which co-ordinates the knowledge of diverse experts as well as securing public understanding of the analytical results (See appendix 1).

5.5 A need for a clearer understanding of what trust is

There is also a need to get a clear understanding of what the term trust actually means. In a recent literature review Kramer and Tyler (1996), noted that there are no less than 16 definitions of the word. Trust can be an expression of confidence between the parties in an exchange transaction (Axelrod 1984; Bateson 1988; Zucker 1987) and can be both process/system or outcome based. For example, in some cases the public will trust regulators even if they do not agree with a regulatory decision, as long as they see the process as credible, i.e. fair, competent and efficient. However, in most cases, the public judges regulators on their past decisions (outcomes). If the public perceives the regulator as competent, fair and efficient, based on previous decisions, the public is highly likely to trust these regulatory bodies in the future. To be more specific I use the term trust in the sense of a complexity reduction thesis, in which the public delegates to authority. That is to say trust means acceptance of decisions by the constituents without questioning the rationale behind it. In such a case constituents are in effect asking to accept a "risk judgement" made by the regulators (Earle and Cvetkovich 1995). In using this definition, trust becomes something that regulators should strive for. It is always easier to trust than to distrust. By trusting the regulatory process, the public has one less issue to be concerned about. The three most important components of trust are fairness, competence, and efficiency (Renn and Levine 1991; Viscusi 1998). In order to understand how fairness, competence, and efficiency impact public trust it is useful to look at the criteria in more detail.

5.5.1   Fairness

Impartiality and fairness (also one of the main factors of deliberation) is an important element of any regulatory decision that will have an impact on public trust (Albin 1993; Linnerooth-Bayer and Fitzgerald 1996; Renn and Levine 1991; Renn et al 1995 and 1996; Young 1995). There are two ways to measure fairness in regulation, either via the process itself or through the outcome of the process. Fairness is usually defined by a view of the process or outcome as being impartial. Did the regulators take everybody's interests into account, and not just those of certain powerful industrial bodies? If the regulators are not seen as impartial or fair they are unlikely to gain trust.

5.5.2   Competence

Public perceptions of risk managers' competence (one of the underlying variables of technocracy) are viewed by researchers as the most important component of trust (Barber 1983; Lee 1986; Slovic 1993). The easiest way to measure regulators' competence in a specific process is to evaluate it. Did the regulators handle the process as proficiently as possible? Did the risk managers have the necessary scientific and practical background to deal with the range of issues associated with the process?

5.5.3   Efficiency

The third component of trust is efficiency and can be viewed as how taxpayers' money is used in the regulatory process (saving lives or safeguarding the environment) (Hahn 1996; Lofstedt and Rosa 1999). The efficiency argument is particularly important during periods of economic stress, when levels of government expenditure have significant effects on the public's welfare and state of well being (Foster and Plowden 1996). The concept of relating efficiency to trust has not been much developed. The reason being that in many cases what the economists and/or technocrats see as inefficient, such as spending public funds on cleaning up contaminated land sites (e.g. the US super fund project), are seen by the public as very important, for reasons other than efficiency (EPA 1987 and 1990; Graham 1997; Viscusi 1998).

To deal with the decline in public trust one should examine any solution in light of the three components of trust, that is fairness, competence, and efficiency. To deal with public distrust caused by the lack of fairness, for example, some form of public/stakeholder involvement may be necessary, to ensure that the regulators/public authorities have the public's best interest at heart. However, if the lack of public trust is caused by incompetence, greater involvement of experts (technocracy) may be required, and if the process is seen as inefficient then a rational risk analytical approach may be needed.

In addressing how to best communicate to the general public, greater public dialogue (the most popular tool at the present time) is not necessarily the best tool for increasing public trust in regulators. Rather the simplest way to address the trust conundrum is to test for public trust (via open-ended face to face interviews on random populations where the issue has been raised or via mental model techniques) and based on the results develop a communication programme and act accordingly. In so doing the four following risk communication programmes can be developed:

1. If the interviews show that there is public trust in authorities, top-down risk communication with the general public will suffice. Such a strategy will work even under issues of extreme uncertainty, as long as the message being communicated can be made simple and understandable (for a great review see Renn et al 2002).

2. If the interviews show that the public do not trust authorities because they are not seen as fair, then some form of a dialogue needs to be built up with the public to ensure successful risk communication;

3. If the interviews show that the public does not trust authorities because they are not seen as competent, competent senior civil servants and scientists need to be hired before a top-down risk communication process can commence;

4. If the interviews show that the public do not trust authorities because they are seen as inefficient then competent well respected economists need to be brought on board before a top-down risk communication process can commence.

However, this degree of flexibility is presently not available to many risk managers. In the UK, for example, the present New Labour government is arguing (at least in public) for greater public and stakeholder participation in the policy making process as it sees that this is the best way of increasing public trust in policy makers (e.g. UK Strategy Unit 2002). This view is also shared by the European Commission which takes the view that only through greater stakeholder involvement as well as transparency can trust be restored (European Commission 2001).

5.6 Need to better understand the costs and benefits of regulations

The non-scientific regulatory measures reviewed in this paper also show that there is a greater need to understand what are the true costs and benefits of the regulations in question. Does the use of the precautionary principle, and here particularly the reversed burden of proof model, lead to more innovation and creativity or does it indeed lead to industry flight and the removal of entire industrial sub-sectors as industry and certain stakeholders suggest? These issues do need to be debated in a clear and rigorous way and presently they are not. Presently in Europe, regulators are pushing forward with a new chemical control policy called REACH based in part on reversing the burden of proof. REACH has not undergone an independent, scientifically peer reviewed impact analysis. Rather policy makers, industry representatives and even NGOs have put forward their own independent studies, coming up with a wide array of different figures, resulting in further public distrust of the regulators in charge of the process and RIA as a regulatory tool.

5.7 The importance of proactive risk communication

Unscientific regulatory measures are in many cases the outcomes of retroactive risk communication. That is to say the regulatory crisis at hand, be it dangerous fighting dogs in the UK, the banning of beef on the bone all resulted out of a retroactive risk communication process. With regard to the first example, the government was on a defensive, not having accurately predicted the furore of American pit bull terriers attacking members of the public, and quickly wanted to reinstall confidence by putting forward the draconian Dangerous Dog Act. Similarly, the government's very much top-down risk communication strategy associated with the BSE crisis was an abysmal failure, as a majority of the public took the view that regulators had lied to them, and hence there was no reason to believe them now. The government's attempt to reassure the public at the height of the crises by promoting a tough regulatory measure (banning beef on the bone), also failed as the public rightly saw it as irrational.

6. So what should the Canadian government do?

As I have argued throughout this report the crucial factor to any risk communication or management strategy is that of ensuring strong public and stakeholder trust. Neither risks nor regulations can be properly communicated if the members of the public do not believe what the regulators are saying. This in turn leads to the public not complying with the regulation at hand, as we saw with the UK beef on the bone ban. One needs to take into account that increasingly the new model of regulation will become the modus operandi in the western world, which will require some form of public/stakeholder involvement, greater transparency and accountability. Based on this understanding there are a few measures that Canadian authorities could implement to ensure on the one hand public and stakeholder trust remain in the policy making process and at the other hand ensuring that authorities are not giving in to populistic measures, knee jerk reactions and stakeholder scare mongering (as is increasingly the case in the UK). In sum, the overall aim for Canadian authorities is to be more proactive in its thinking with regards to both risk communication and management. To achieve this, there are a number of recommendations that Canadian authorities may wish to consider:

1. The Federal government should establish standards for conducting risk analysis, particularly for measuring and comparing risks. Ideally these standards should espouse peer review by qualified specialists. These guidelines should address: Reasons for the scientific assessment; Nature and quality of the evidence on which the risk assessments and other scientific opinions are based; Scientific uncertainties in risk assessment; Inconsistencies between different scientific opinions; Potential impact of the risk-risk paradigm; Risk perceptions (biases) and other non-scientific factors; Costs and benefits of alternative risk management options; Conditions that must be met for risk management decisions to be reversed;

   Justification: Risk (regulatory) guidelines based on peer review and openness will lead to greater public and stakeholder trust toward authorities.

2. Federal Government should enhance the scientific independence and credibility of regulatory programmes via greater use of independent expert scientific advisory committees. These expert committees should be attached to the major Federal Regulatory bodies;

   Justification: Independent scientists are not only able to be more open and honest than government based scientists, but in addition, they are on the whole more trusted than government based scientists (see also Leiss 2000).

3. Develop an in-house risk strategy unit (ideally in the Privy Council Office) (would be responsible for A). This body would be made responsible for monitoring and evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of the risk communication and management policies that are put in place;

   Justification: If the Canadian government wants to be seen to take risk communication and management issues seriously it needs to establish a risk strategy unit. To be effective this proposed unit must be situated in central government. The Privy Council office is ideal place for the unit.

4. Strengthen training aimed at middle management regulators at both federal and state levels with regard to risk communication;

   Justification: Based on research done in Europe (e.g. Ballantine 2003) indicating that civil servants have been poor in carrying out risk communication programmes both proactively and retroactively (Lofstedt 2003) there is a real need for government employees to take risk communication courses.

5. Related to (D) Put aside funding for the various regulatory departments to conduct proper and well thought out risk communication strategies. To ensure the success of such an effort, each regulatory department should have a dedicated risk communication expert. Such strategies could be conducted in co-operation with independent social scientists and should be on a case by case basis. Ideally the first study such a risk communication expert would commission is to see if the regulatory department he/she works for is trusted or not and based on that develop a proactive risk communication strategy;

   Justification: To ensure some independence among the agencies (and thereby cater to their specific needs) it would be most useful that funding was made available to address risk communication and management issues. These easily accessible funds would help agencies in developing proactive risk communication strategies at the time of impending crisis (be it West Nile virus, SARS, or acrylamide).

6. The Government should on an annual basis make available a document re its priorities for regulatory programs, particularly the "balance" that the government has reached to protect Canadians. This document, ideally prepared by the proposed Risk Strategy Unit, should be revised following a 6 week public consultation on a yearly basis;

   Justification: Transparency and openness leads to greater public and stakeholder trust in the policy making process.

7. Members of Parliament and other politicians should be provided more support to better understand and cope with complex and difficult risk communication and management problems;

   Justification: Members of parliament (at least in Europe) have just as high of difficulty in understanding risk communication and management issues as regulators in middle management (Ballantine 2003).

8. The bases for which all major risk policy and legislative decisions should be disclosed;

   Justification: Transparency and openness leads to greater public and stakeholder trust in the policy making process.

9. The Government should to a greater degree strengthen its international co-operation on risk management. Such co-operation would focus on developing a shared understanding of the science that underpins key regulatory areas as well as helping to ensure a better balanced use of the precautionary principle;

   Justification: One of the ultimate goals for countries in the western world are to develop uniform regulatory guidelines so as to ensure fairer and more accurate regulation for all. This can only be achieved through regulatory co-operation.

10. The government should make available significant funds for an interdisciplinary research on risk communication and management in Canada. Ideally industry should provide a significant amount of this funding. In addition, each independent Federal Agency should make available considerable amount of earmarked funding for risk communication and management projects which they deem important;

    Justification: In comparison to some of its counter parts (most notably the US) there is a real need to increase the funding for applied risk research in Canadian universities. Only by doing this, can Canadian government authorities be able to more accurately prepare for risk communication and management controversies that are bound to occur at some time or another.

11. Encourage media to develop independent peer review communication guidelines as well as independent academic advisory boards;

    Justification: As discussed throughout this report the media amplifies risks and attenuates benefits. With regard to communicating risks, in many cases the media does not accurately account for the science on which the risks are based upon, nor accurately portrays how large the risk actually is and whether it actually needs media attention. This is a topic that BBC news is slowly beginning to address in the UK.

7. Acknowledgements

This paper was supported by a grant from the Privy Council Office of the Canadian Government. The author wishes to thank Jamie Wardman for providing research assistance of this paper as well as the following individuals who provided information for the study and who commented on earlier versions of the paper: Frederic Bouder, Robyn Fairman. The paper was greately improved following a presentation to senior staff at Environment Canada, 21^st November 2003. The opinions expressed in the paper is that of the author

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Appendix 1. Mental models

Risk-based policy analysis faces two interlocking communication challenges. One is coordinating the knowledge of diverse experts, each understanding a portion of the processes creating and controlling a risk. The second is securing public understanding of the analytical results. That means ensuring that the analyses address the issues that matter to the public and that they are communicated in a comprehensible, authoritative way.

The mental models method is designed to achieve both goals. It begins by creating an integrated assessment, summarising expert knowledge of the processes determining the outcomes that matter to the public. The modelling procedure draws on risk analysis, Bayesian decision theory, and cognitive science, in order to incorporate knowledge from diverse sources -- ranging from theory-grounded statistical evidences to disciplined expert judgement. integrated assessments also serve as a knowledge management tool, facilitating dialog among experts and tracking changes in the research base.

It proceeds to describe lay beliefs, in terms comparable to the integrated assessment, in order to set communication priorities. The design and evaluation of communications draw upon basic research in the psychology of risk decision making. That research allows building on the strengths of lay understanding, while compensating for known weaknesses. It allows behaviourally realistic predictions of the success of proposed regulatory and market regimes. When linked with integrated assessments, mental models communications can help keep all parties on the same page regarding the substance of a risk management process, even when they disagree about the relative importance of different outcomes.

Mental models communications have been developed for a wide variety of topics, including health effects of electromagnetic fields, domestic radon, sexually transmitted diseases, escalators, nuclear energy sources in space, electricity deregulation, sexual assault, and climate change. Current projects, at various labs and stages of development, include childhood immunisation, disease stigmatisation, nuclear power, genetically manipulated crops, bipolar disorder, and sustainable design.

¹ In Slovic's 1993 seminal article he concludes that it is 9 times easier to destroy trust than to gain trust. As a result, it is highly unlikely that regulatory authorities once seen to have misled the public (as in the case of BSE) will ever regain the public's trust to the levels that they were prior to BSE or other regulatory scandals (Slovic 1993).

² It should be noted that the panels, to almost everyone's disbelief, came up with a sensible outcome (Lofstedt 1999).