"The State of Canadian
Democracy"
Notes for an address
by the Honourable Stéphane Dion
President of the Privy Council and
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs
Leadership Forum
Ottawa, Ontario
February 11, 2003
Check against delivery
The Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs has
offered me its prestigious forum to speak to you today about the state of
Canadian democracy. I am flattered, but at the same time I ask myself why I
deserve this honour.
I am not the Government House Leader. You are not, I presume, expecting a
speech on past and present government initiatives concerning parliamentary,
government or electoral practices. My colleague, Don Boudria, would be much
better suited to speak about this impressive record from the first parliamentary
initiative in 1993 (like the referral of government bills to committee before
second reading) to the current Prime Minister’s ethics package: a new
independent Ethics Commissioner, a new Code of Conduct for parliamentarians, and
a bill on political party financing.
Although I am the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, I do not imagine
that you expect a presentation on federal-provincial relations. That would be
straying off topic. Federalism and democracy have strong links (there is no true
federalism without democracy), but they are not the same thing.
No, I assume I was invited for reasons having more to do with my personal
journey. I imagine you wish to hear the views of an academic who, after writing
about democracy and Canada, has been active for seven years in the political
life of this country. And so I will speak to you today in my capacity as a
political scientist/politician.
I am aware that our democracy is said to be feeling a certain
"malaise." According to the Law Commission of Canada: "A
growing ‘democratic malaise’ has begun to characterize the Canadian
political landscape."1 This statement
strikes me as exaggerated. Rather, I would say that our democracy remains a work
in progress, that it is experiencing some noticeable problems, which, by the
way, it shares with other democracies, and for which the solutions are not
simple.
There are two themes I would like to develop in particular today. The first
has to do with democratic leadership. I have chosen this theme because the
organizers of this conference have identified the perception of an excessive
concentration of power, in the hands of the Prime Minister and his
immediate entourage, as one of the sources of concern in terms of the health of
Canadian democracy. I will show you where I see the link between democracy and
leadership.
My second theme is that of institutional reform as an antidote to our "democratic malaise."
The conference organizers raised a hypothesis that has been the subject of
numerous debates which maintains that such troubling trends as the decline in
voter turnout could be reversed if we were to replace some of our institutions
outright, chief among them the first-past-the-post system. I would like to tell
you about my great interest in this hypothesis, but also about a certain
scepticism. Caution is the order of the day, for we could do more harm than good
if we went ahead with institutional changes without properly weighing the
consequences first.
I will conclude my remarks with a discussion of values. The optimal
functioning of institutions is an important aspect of the future of democracy,
but no more so than the need to express civic values.
1. Democracy and leadership
The assertion that power is too concentrated in the hands of the Prime
Minister and his immediate entourage can mean two things: that power is being
increasingly concentrated in relation to past practices, or that it is overly
concentrated in relation to an ideal standard.
As for the first assertion, the trend toward this concentration of power over
time, I have yet to read anything that substantiates this. The works by Donald
Savoie and Jeffrey Simpson,2 are at times
captivating, but to my mind they do not prove the thesis of an increasing
concentration of power as the years go by. I find nothing in these works that
can convince me that the Prime Minister and his immediate entourage, in
particular the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister’s Office, have
acquired more power under Jean Chrétien than they had under Brian Mulroney
or Pierre Elliott Trudeau.
However, if I compare their descriptions with analysis of an earlier time,
like the one penned by Jack Granatstein on the Mackenzie King era in The
Ottawa Men,3 it is evident and without
doubt, that power at that time was far more concentrated in a few hands than it
is today. There is no possible comparison to what we are experiencing. The
political system was less complex, there was less expertise, and there were far
fewer checks and balances on power.
But expectations of democracy change. We now demand of our elected officials
conduct much more irreproachable than before.
Regarding these requirements, I know that some people, including Liberals
that nevertheless admire Mr. Chrétien, find that he is too authoritarian. I am
afraid that on this topic, my personal experience might not be of much value. I
have never worked with any prime minister other than Jean Chrétien. In fact, I
have never had a boss other than him, since as you know, academics have no boss,
thereby pursuing the most liberal of professions.
One day, Mr. Chrétien asked me if I liked working with him. I replied:
"Not always". He asked me why not. I told him: "Because
you don’t always do what I ask you to." Which shows you just how
unrepresentative my judgment is in this regard!
While I have worked closely with only one prime minister, I have, on the
other hand, worked with three deputy prime ministers, two finance ministers,
three foreign affairs ministers, two chiefs of staff in the Prime Minister’s
Office, three clerks of the Privy Council... I can confirm to you what everyone
knows: power shifts a lot according to the people holding it.
Power is a very difficult concept to define. I have a friend who worked in
political offices under Brian Mulroney. He told me all sorts of things regarding
the concentration of power. However, I avoid concluding from his remarks that
power has never been so concentrated as in the hands of Brian Mulroney and his
entourage.
My thesis director, the great French sociologist Michel Crozier, taught me
that power is not a possession that some have and others do not. Power is a
relationship within systems of complex actions.4
Analysing it is never simple. That is why I suggest a great deal of caution
before making peremptory judgments on a supposed trend toward concentration of
power within the Government of Canada.
As for determining whether the power wielded by our prime ministers is
excessive in relation to some ideal standard, we must first agree on the
standard in question. Certainly, the combination of a parliamentary government
and a first-past-the-post system often places our prime ministers and our
premiers in a position that allows them to enjoy absolute majorities in the
House or the legislative assemblies. This gives them a more solid base than that
afforded a president, such as in the USA and Mexico, who has to deal with both
houses of Congress, or a prime minister, such as in Israel and Belgium, leading
a governing coalition of parties elected under a proportional system.
But on the one hand, one must bear in mind that in our decentralized
federation, our federal government has fewer areas of jurisdiction than do the
national governments of other countries. Consequently, to use a sport analogy,
our Prime Minister plays on a smaller rink than his foreign counterparts even if
he has more freedom to manoeuvre.
On the other hand, I see nothing questionable, from a democratic standpoint,
in the fact that we in Canada are able to elect stable governments that are
usually composed of a single party. We can and we should discuss the respective
advantages of presidential and parliamentary systems, or of the various
electoral systems, but let us agree that these choices of institutions remain
within the realm of democracy. They express different modalities. Certainly, the
modalities which originate from our electoral system and our parliamentary
government favour the exercise of leadership. But the point is, democracy and
leadership are not mutually exclusive.
I find it very appropriate that it is within its annual Leadership Forum that
the Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs chose the state of Canadian
democracy as its theme for this year. Indeed, in representative democracies it
is generally felt that elected officials must conduct themselves as leaders,
that is as decision-makers who accept responsibility for their decisions.
Elected officials are asked to act according to their conscience, according to
what they feel is just, desirable and feasible. We do not want elected officials
without conviction, who like weathervanes follow the winds of public opinion,
tossed about by polls.
I know that one notion of democracy would have the elected official conform
at all times to the preferences of the majority of his electors. For example, if
he is against the death penalty but most of the voters in his constituency are
in favour of it, he must vote for the death penalty. This notion is present in
democracies, but it does not strike me as dominant anywhere. The elected
official is generally recognized as having the right, if not the obligation, to
make unpopular decisions if he considers them to serve the common good. His
task, at election time, will be to convince his electors of his judgment as a
leader. The Canadian political system favours the expression of such leadership
and permits the electorate to sanction it.
It is true, however, that we do not want these leaders we elect to behave
like dictators between elections. The power of elected officials is subject to
law in a democracy. That is why there is no democracy without the rule of law.
It is through the law that we determine electoral procedures, relations between
the executive and legislative bodies, the independence of the judiciary, the
division of jurisdictions in a federation, the charters that safeguard rights
and freedoms, and so on. There is certainly room for improvement, but I think we
can say that the rule of law is doing well in Canada.
We also require of elected leaders in a democracy the most transparency
possible. Nothing they do must be concealed from the public, except what is kept
secret out of respect for privacy and the public interest. A democracy such as
Canada is constantly refining the mechanisms that foster this transparency:
access to information laws, the reports of auditors general, ombudsmen, and so
forth.
Finally, in a democracy, we also hope that the actions of our leaders are not
only transparent, but that they are accompanied by fruitful and ongoing
consultation and dialogue with the population. A leader must make decisions on
the strength of a deep understanding of the various opinions that prevail among
citizens, groups, experts and so on. Hence the hearings of parliamentary
commissions, white papers, ministerial tours, etc.
Democracy is a work constantly perfecting itself. Minister Boudria could talk
to you about all the government has done in this vein since 1993 and describe
coming measures, such as an expanded mandate for the Ethics Counsellor, or the
important bill on the financing of political parties. For myself, I would like
to discuss the hypothesis according to which a significant improvement to our
democracy necessarily implies fundamental institutional change, including a
change to the electoral system.
2. Change our institutions? The grass isn't always greener on the other side
I follow the current debates on our institutions with great interest. It is
healthy for our institutions to be continually challenged. This allows us to
better understand them, improve them or eventually replace them. I am wary,
however, of getting too carried away: we must avoid any ill-considered
expectations of institutional change.
Certainly, our institutions and our politicians enjoy less public confidence
than they did 20, 30 or 40 years ago. This is confirmed in many surveys. For
instance, in 1965, 49% of Canadians felt that "government does not care
what people think", a proportion which climbed to 53% in 1979, 63% in
1984 and 70% in 1990, then stabilizing (a poll released today by the
Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs, in the context of this forum,
indicates a proportion of 68%5). In 1979, 15% of
Canadians said they felt "very little" respect for the House of
Commons, a figure which rose to 20% in 1985 and 33% in 1993.6
Before concluding that our institutions have had their day and need to be
changed, we should ask ourselves if this problem of confidence is unique to
Canada. The answer is no. It can be found in democracies that do not have the
same institutions as we do. The satisfaction level with the way democracy works
is average in Canada relative to other countries, neither especially high nor
especially low.7
Take the example of party discipline. Those who say that our parliamentary
institutions are outmoded take issue particularly with party discipline, which
they claim prevents MPs from defending their opinions and the interests of their
constituents. But as political scientist Louis Massicotte has pointed out,
disenchantment with elected officials is not any higher in the United States. In
that country, where there is little or no party discipline, barely one fifth of
the population say they have "enormous" or "great"
confidence in Congress.8
I agree that we have to reflect on the importance ascribed to party
discipline in Canada. Mr. Chrétien has increased the number of free votes in
the House, and perhaps should it be done more. But there is some validity to the
principle that candidates who are elected as a team, under a particular party
banner and on a common platform, should work as a team once they are elected. If
we were to abandon this principle, I am sure our democracy would be no better
off and the public would not have more confidence in it.
I now come to our first-past-the-post electoral system. I already pointed out
its great advantage: it allows a party in power to exercise leadership and
assume the consequences at election time. But this system also has some obvious
disadvantages. I see four of these.
First, it makes it possible for a party to come to power without a plurality
of the popular vote, as is the case in my province today. Second, election
results can produce an opposition without enough MPs to play its proper role.
Third, it tends to artificially accentuate the regional concentration of
political parties. For example, we Liberals have almost all the seats in
Ontario, even though half of Ontarians did not vote for us. In the West, we are
under-represented in Parliament when we actually received the support of one
quarter of the voters.
Fourth, this electoral system seems to have a mildly negative effect on voter
turnout, since in a great many ridings the die appears to be cast in advance.
Voter turnout is four to five percentage points higher under a proportional
representation system.9
The ideal would be to find a mixed formula that lets us preserve the
advantages of our electoral system while eliminating its weaknesses. I am
following research in this field with great interest. But here again, I feel the
need to caution against unrealistic expectations.
For example, while it is true that proportional representation encourages
slightly higher voter turnout, the countries that have adopted it have seen
their turnout decline in recent years as well.10
They have not managed to escape this unfortunate trend with which we are too
familiar here in Canada.
The lack of public confidence in politics also exists in democracies that
employ proportional representation. New Zealand offers a telling example. That
country abandoned the Westminster system for a proportional representation
formula in October 1996. Three years ago, Professor Jonathan Boston of the
School of Government at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand drew from
this experience a conclusion which is not at all encouraging, even though he is
in favour of this electoral system: "[On the basis of New Zealand’s
experience to date], [a]ny suggestion, therefore, that electoral reform may
provide a cure for the constitutional discontent that currently afflicts many
democracies can be quickly dismissed. Indeed, there is a risk that it might
simply make matters worse."11
We must also take into account the effects that a change of electoral system
would have on our type of decentralized federalism. Most of the countries that
have retained proportional representation have only a single parliament that
really matters. Here in Canada, there are few things that our federal government
can do without having to negotiate with the provinces. When our fourteen
federal, provincial and territorial first ministers meet and come to an
agreement, as they did last week on health care, they are in a position to
honour that agreement. They do not have to renegotiate it later with fourteen
parliamentary coalitions.
To take another example, when the Government of Canada took steps to
establish the early childhood development initiative, it was necessary to
negotiate for almost two years with the provinces and territories. Imagine the
additional time it would have taken if we had had to negotiate with governments
preoccupied with maintaining parliamentary coalitions as best they could.
There is sometimes talk of adopting in Canada the electoral system used in
Germany, which allows much room for proportional representation. Germany, by no
means, figures as a country having "one single parliament that really
matters," to use my earlier expression. Even so, German federalism is more
centralized than ours. Its constitution or Basic Law provides for no
fewer than 26 concurrent jurisdictions, not just three as is the case here. It
also establishes seven other spheres where the federal parliament can institute
framework laws requiring the Länder to enact legislation in compliance
with those laws. Much of the activity of the Länder consists in
enforcing federal laws they have helped to shape through the Bundesrat, the
equivalent of what in Canada would be a provincial senate, if it existed. In
Germany, even the salaries of public servants in the Länder and
municipalities have to comply with rules set by federal framework laws.
I am not saying that we have nothing to learn from German federalism. I
simply maintain that even if we applied the German electoral system to Canada,
we may not get the expected result because our institutions are different.
Today, with globalization, not only must our federal government negotiate
with the provinces, but increasingly it must also take part in supranational
decision-making forums. I have noted you are discussing this phenomenon in one
of your panels. In such a context, Canada finds itself more than ever obliged to
exercise leadership if it wants to promote its interests both at home and
abroad. We do not want a poorly designed reform of the electoral system
producing in Canada a situation analogous to what the Germans call a
joint-decision trap (Die Politikverflechtungs-Falle), that is, an overly
cumbersome decision-making system.12
Conclusion
In summary, I would like to see us reflect on improving our institutions, and
eventually replacing them, very openly but also prudently, because rash reforms
would do us great harm. In conclusion, I would add that we need to reflect not
only on our institutions, but also on the values upon which democracy is
founded.
Let us return to the very worrisome example of declining voter turnout, a
trend which is affecting democracies whether their regime is presidential or
parliamentary, whether their electoral system allows for proportional
representation or not. In Canada, this decline has been found to be
statistically verifiable only among young people, that is, voters born after
1970, in particular among less-educated youth:13
"On the contrary, turnout has remained fairly stable among those who
were born before 1970."14 The same
phenomenon seems to be occurring in the United States.15
Contrary to what one might think, there is no indication these young people
are getting involved in alternative forms of political action in great numbers.
They are simply less informed and less interested in politics than other voters:
"The low level of interest and information of those born after 1970 is
clearly a crucial source of their high level of abstention."16
Similarly, there is much less sense of a moral obligation or duty to vote among
young people than among older voters.17 I would
not be surprised if this were found to be true in the United States and Europe
as well.
What is it then with our ability – or inability – to
connect with and interest young people? We would all like to know the answer,
but allow me to venture one hypothesis. Samuel Huntington18
has written that democracy bears within itself an anti-establishment ethic. The
more the values of deference and respect for authority lose their hold on people
to the benefit of the democratic values of liberty and equality, the more people
tend to mistrust those who govern them. I believe it is primarily this values
dynamic that is at the source of the "democratic malaise."
Could it be that this shift in values is particularly pronounced in young
people? Perhaps they are more mistrustful of politics than their elders without
being any the less democratic? Whatever the case, we have to find a way of
making contact with them, to persuade them to take an interest in politics,
because politics is interested in them.
So I hope there is at least as much discussion of the transmission of civic
values as there is of improving institutions. By advancing these two thoughts,
forums such as this one will help Canada to progress towards ever more
democracy.
-
Law Commission of Canada, Renewing Democracy: Debating Electoral
Reform in Canada, Discussion paper, (Ottawa, 2002), p. 39.
-
Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of
Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999),
440 pages; Jeffrey Simpson, The Friendly Dictatorship (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 2001), 238 pages.
-
J. L Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins,
1935-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 333 pages.
-
Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg, Actors and Systems: the Politics
of Collective Action (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 333
pages.
-
Pollara Survey, "Canadian Society Today", February 2003.
See also: André Blais et al., Anatomy of a Liberal Victory:
Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election (Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 2002), p. 55.
-
I discuss these poll results and others on the same subject in
"Rising Cynicism: Who is to Blame?," Canadian Parliamentary
Review (Winter 1993-1994), pp. 33-35.
-
Richard Nadeau, "Satisfaction with Democracy: The Canadian
Paradox," in Neil Nevitte (ed.), Value Change and Governance in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), pp. 44-45.
-
Louis Massicotte, "Parliament: The Show Goes on, but the Public
Seems Bored," in James P. Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon (eds.), Canadian
Politics, 2nd ed. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1994), p. 339.
-
André Blais and A. Dobrzynska, "Turnout in Electoral
Democracies," European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998),
pp. 239-261.
-
Anne-Marie Grenier, Le déclin de la participation électorale dans
les démocraties établies depuis 1961: l'influence du mode de scrutin,
Masters thesis presented to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for a degree in
political science, Université de Montréal, 2002.
-
Jonathan Boston, "Institutional Change in a Small Democracy: New
Zealand’s Experience of Electoral Reform," address given in June 2000
at a symposium entitled Parliamentary Government at the Millennium:
Continuity and Change in Westminster Systems, organized by the
Canadian Study of Parliament Group, June 10-11, 2000, p. 43. During a
telephone conversation on February 10, 2003, Professor Boston confirmed to
me this less than encouraging conclusion is still the case today.
-
Fritz W. Scharpf, "The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German
Federalism and European Integration," Public Administration, 66
(1988), pp. 239-78.
-
Blais et al, op. cit., p. 46 - 50.
-
Ibid, p. 60.
-
See chapter 3 in: Warren E. Miller et J. M. Shanks, The New American
Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 640 pages.
-
Ibid, p. 54.
-
Ibid, p. 58.
-
Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1981), 303 pages.
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