"Nationalism and democracy: The future of
decentralized systems"
Notes for an address
by the Honourable Stéphane Dion
President of the Privy Council and
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
Address delivered on the occasion of
the 25th anniversary of the Spanish Constitution
Madrid, Spain
November 21, 2003
Check against delivery
It is with great emotion that I take the floor today, at the invitation of
the President of the Senate, His Excellency Juan José Lucas Giménez, on the
occasion of this conference marking the 25th anniversary of the Spanish
Constitution. I am honoured and proud to commemorate with you the ratification
of the legislative instrument whereby, a quarter century ago, Spain entered into
what, at that time, was a very limited world of democracies.
The emotion I feel today is similar to how I felt on November 13, 2002, when
Carlos III University of Madrid gave me an honorary doctorate, which I received
from the hands of one of the “Fathers of the Spanish Constitution,” Rector
Gregorio Peces-Barba Martinez. On that occasion, I spoke of the conviction I
have, and which I reiterate today, that one of the most determining events of
the 20th century was the democratization of Spain.
Indeed, we should bear in mind how difficult the situation of democracies was
in the 1970s. Latin America, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and part of
Mediterranean Europe were under the yoke of authoritarian or totalitarian
regimes. In countries such as France or Italy, around one quarter of voters cast
their ballots for parties that were openly hostile to pluralist democracy. Such
ideas made headway in unions and academic circles in all Western democracies.
American democracy, for its part, was discredited by the aftermath of the war in
Vietnam and the Watergate crisis.
Now what happened in the years that followed was the very opposite of a
diminution of democratic space and individual freedom. Humanity experienced one
of the most positive phenomena in all of its history: the dazzling advance of
democracy on all continents. And where did that global shift originate? In
Greece, in Portugal, in Spain, in short in the Mediterranean, the eternal cradle
of civilization.
I have long thought that one of the heroes of the 20th century is your King,
His Majesty Juan Carlos I. Rather than listening to the fatalistic voices
claiming that the Latin people were not made for democracy, he believed in the
democratic destiny of a Spain ready to accept its pluralism. In so doing, it was
not only the destiny of Spain that was at stake: one can believe that it was,
perhaps, also that of humanity. For it is hardly an oversimplification to say
that, once it became clear that Spain would not go back and would become
democratic, Latin Americans said to themselves: if the Spanish can do it, so can
we!
And so a vast democratic wave swept over every continent, bringing down even
the Berlin Wall. There was nothing inevitable in that felicitous development,
which was not the result of any historical determinism. It was rather the
achievement of courageous women and men, such as your King. And so today, rather
than taking this progress for granted, we should make every effort to build
further on democracy and its underlying values.
It is precisely about one of the major democratic wagers of our time that you
have invited me to speak today. The theme the Senate has proposed to me is as
follows: Nationalism and democracy: The future of decentralized systems.
In other words, you are asking me to what extent decentralization is the means
to ensure the harmonious cohabitation of different populations within a single
democratic state.
This question is certainly relevant for Spain and Canada, two democracies
both characterised by pluralism and collective identities. But many other states
are in the same situation. While there are fewer than 200 countries in the UN,
worldwide it is estimated there are between 3,000 and 5,000 human groups that
recognize a collective identity for themselves. In other words, humanity has no
choice: either have the planet break into a scattering of ethnic groupings, or
learn to live together within pluralist states. The belief that every population
with its own specific characteristics has to have its own state is terribly
wrong. It is not only impractical, it is wrong from a moral standpoint, because
it rejects the fact that the cohabitation of cultures within a single state
helps human beings to become better citizens by enabling them to live the
experience of tolerance. I will leave it to you to speak for Spain, but I am
convinced that my country is duty-bound to show the world that the pluralism of
identities is a strength for a state and not a weakness.
In fact, you have invited me to talk about the very wager that led me to
accept the invitation made by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable
Jean Chrétien, to join his Cabinet as Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, a
responsibility I have held for eight years. I am convinced that the main
strength and the true grandeur of Canada is its capacity to rally different
populations around common objectives. The key idea that led me to leave academia
to enter the political arena is that of plural identities. As a Quebecer and a
Canadian, I maintain that, in this era of globalization, when one has the
opportunity to have different identities, one should accept all of them. When we
have the support of fellow citizens who open us up to other cultural
characteristics, to other experiences and other assets than our own, we should
accept their help and offer ours in return. The real choice for me is not
between being a Quebecer or a Canadian. It is not between Quebec and Canada. It
is about being a Quebecer and a Canadian, rather than being a Quebecer without
Canada. Identities add to each other, they never subtract.
But how can this be done, how do we ensure that populations that differ in
terms of language, religion or culture can live in trust and harmony with a
sense of common belonging to the same democratic state? You have invited me to
answer that question by focussing on the concepts of decentralisation and
nationalism. I shall give you my personal opinion on how these two concepts can
combine optimally in a democracy. But I shall also look at a less felicitous
scenario, that of break-up: what should a democracy do when one of its
populations asks to leave the state and form a new one of its own.
1. Decentralization
and nationalism in democracy
The first thing I would say is that a liberal democracy, both in its
Constitution and in practice, must above all be founded on individual rights,
and not on collective loyalties, whether they are called peoples, nations or
otherwise. The reason for this is simple: only flesh-and-blood persons exist
tangibly, and only they are capable of feelings, freedom, and happiness.
The decentralization of public powers can contribute to individual
well-being. It helps individuals participate in the affairs of the polity and
allows them to try out different solutions depending on the context. But
centralization also has advantages for them. A centralized state is well
positioned to initiate a course of action and ensure that equality of rights
among fellow citizens prevails. The quest for the optimal balance between
centralization and decentralization is the subject of ongoing debate in
democracy, whether it is a federal state like Canada or a regionalised one like
Spain.
That being said, this quest for an effective balance between centralization
and decentralization has to take account of the fact that individuals are social
beings. They maintain or develop affinities by virtue of sharing common traits.
Some of those affinities pertain to language, culture or religion and are
translated into collective identities. Those collective identities have to be
taken into account, not to deny individual rights, but to enable citizens to
develop and flourish as best they can.
For example, if, in a given region, a population speaks a different language
from that used in the rest of the country, or if it has a somewhat different
legal tradition, the public powers should be organized to respond to the
specific needs of that population. The objective must not be to cut off that
population from the rest of the country. On the contrary, the objective must be
to enable that population to flourish and to contribute in its own way to
strengthening the country as a whole.
This is how unity is obtained in diversity and plural identities are
addressed in a way that strengthens the sense of belonging to the country as a
whole. To do otherwise, to renounce the primacy of individual rights, to develop
the country first and foremost in terms of identity-driven collective
representation as defined by the public authorities, would be a mistake.
Collective identities, whether they are called peoples, nations or otherwise,
must be taken into account, but without postulating an artificial uniformity
among individuals who make up each of those collective entities. It is my belief
that one cannot build on diversity if one denies its most basic dimension: the
inalienable difference that makes every individual, every human being, unique.
Nationalism can be a good thing, to the extent it inspires more effective
mutual assistance within a human group, in a spirit of openness to other groups.
But it becomes a harmful and potentially dangerous force when it is seen as the
only principle of political and social organization, when it provides the only
ideological grid by which life in society is perceived. It then lends itself to
religious fundamentalism which, just like exaggerated nationalism, constitutes
the greatest menace to democracy and international security. The supreme value
must remain the flesh-and-blood individual, not his or her collective loyalties.
Allow me to illustrate that assertion by using the example of relations
between Quebec and Canada. Quebec is the only majority Francophone province in
Canada. The proximity of the United States gives the English language an
enormous power of assimilation. Under such conditions, one can easily imagine
that Francophone Quebec will always be nationalist. From that viewpoint, it
matters little whether Quebecers are defined as a distinct people, or a nation
within Canada, or a unique society in its own right, or a nationality, to refer
to a term used in your Constitution. What is important to me is that the seven
million individuals who live in Quebec find in their country, Canada, a source
of support to address their specific needs. I want Quebecers, in return,
strengthened by their specific identity, their own culture, their love for
Quebec, to have every opportunity to fully help other Canadians.
Let us review the principal measures Canada has taken in response to the
specific needs of Quebecers. French, together with English, is one of Canada’s
two official languages. The federal Parliament is duty-bound to work as
effectively in French as in English. The federal government is required to
provide services in French wherever numbers warrant, including all of Quebec. It
makes special efforts to promote French-speaking culture in Canada, to the
extent that it invests more in that sector in Quebec than the provincial and all
municipal governments combined. The Government of Quebec, for its part, has put
in place its own language policy. The Constitution Act, 1982 gives the
Government of Quebec the constitutional right to limit access to English schools
for as long as it deems desirable, in order to protect the French language more
effectively in the North American context. Quebec and New Brunswick have the
status of participating governments within the International Organisation of the
Francophonie, which is not the case for Canada’s other provinces.
Quebec’s legal tradition is different from the rest of the country’s: it
uses the Civil Law, whereas the Common Law is prevalent elsewhere. Quebec’s
legal specificity is recognized in Canada’s Constitution. Indeed, that is why
three of the nine Supreme Court justices are Civil Law lawyers from Quebec.
Quebec has broad autonomy as a Canadian province, as Canada is a
decentralized federation in terms of the strength of its second order of
government. Compared to the constitutions of other federations, Canada’s
recognizes few shared jurisdictions and our provinces have major legislative
jurisdictions of their own. Over time, the provinces have also increased their
tax revenues in comparison with the federal government’s. Moreover, funding
transfers from the federal government to the provinces have few conditions
attached.
In addition, Quebec has taken greater advantage than the other provinces of
the possibilities provided by Canada’s Constitution or federal-provincial
agreements in terms of provincial autonomy. Thus, with respect to individual
income tax, while all the other provinces have tax collection agreements with
the federal government, only Quebec has its own separate regime. With respect to
pensions, Quebec has its own plan, while the other provinces have preferred to
join the federal plan. Quebec and Ontario have their own police forces, while
the other provinces call on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to obtain policing
services on a contractual basis. In Quebec, the immigration system is different
from the other provinces’, as the Government of Quebec has concluded a
bilateral agreement with the federal government in that area of shared
jurisdiction. Regarding professional training, Quebec has opted for a full
margin of autonomy, whereas other provinces have preferred co-management with
the federal government.
That broad autonomy enjoyed by Quebec in no way prevents Quebecers from
playing their full role in Canada’s common institutions. Indeed, the prime
minister of Canada has almost always been a Quebecer for the past 35 years.
Does Quebec need more autonomy within Canada? Many Quebecers think so, and it
will certainly be an ongoing debate in Canada, just as you will always debate in
Spain the appropriate arrangements for each of your autonomous communities. I am
merely pointing out that the best way to look at things is always to give
priority to the needs of citizens, including those living in Quebec and those
living elsewhere in Canada. But that is not the reasoning of some Quebec
nationalists, who put their conception of the nation ahead of the interests of
citizens. They affirm that, because Quebec forms a nation, the federal
government must cede to Quebec a great number, if not all, of its powers. They
demand these transfers of power without examining the consequences they would
have for citizens in terms of the quality of public service.
For example, in the health policy field, the federal government sets five
conditions for its financial assistance to the provinces, which can be reduced
to the following principle: in Canada, access to health care does not depend on
the size of the patient’s wallet. But some Quebec nationalists demand that
this federal funding transfer be unconditional for Quebec, not because they are
opposed to the principle in question, but because they believe that by
definition, Quebec being a nation, the Government of Quebec does not have to
respect Canadian national standards. In other words, they subordinate
patients’ rights to their conception of the nation. For my part, I fail to see
how the fact that Quebecers have their own collective identity should mean they
have a lesser guarantee of access to health care than do other Canadians.
Some nationalists want to strip the federal government of its powers, not in
order to improve public service, but because they hope that Quebec separates
from Canada. They want to leave Canada, not strengthen it. I am convinced that
separatism cannot be appeased by transfers of powers. What the separatists want
is not piecemeal powers, but their own state.
In short, the balance between centralization and decentralization must be
sought in accordance of the most basic interest of the citizen, in the very
nature of public service. But that interest must include the various needs of
citizens as a function of their collective loyalties. The approach I advocate
consists of focussing on the need to continually improve a country of which all
its citizens can be proud, a democratic and prosperous country whose highly
diversified population can flourish with their own cultures and institutions
while working together to achieve common objectives. I believe that is the best
way to achieve unity in diversity.
But what should be done if, in spite of all those efforts, a population were
clearly to express its desire to separate? That is the question I will now try
to answer.
2. Democracy
and secession
In a few democratic states, there are political parties which, in a
completely peaceful manner, by a democratic route, seek to effect secession. It
is these peaceful secessionist claims I will to address here, which, without
reservation, support a democratic debate free of any coercion. In a democratic
society, any act of terrorism for whatever political cause reduces those that
use it to common criminals subject to the full force of the law. They are
certainly not heroes or patriots. The only question I ask is as follows: how
should a democracy react to a perfectly peaceful secessionist claim?
The appropriate response to this question in Spain concerns only the Spanish,
just as Canadian unity concerns only Canadians. Canada is very pleased with the
productive relations and warm friendship it maintains with a strong and united
Spain, but it does not interfere or intervene in Spanish domestic affairs.
Rather, the question that arises is whether there are universal principles that
are likely to guide democracies facing peaceful secessionist claims.
Your country considers itself to be indivisible, a characteristic entrenched
in article 2 of your Constitution: “The Constitution is based on the
indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of
all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the
nationalities and regions which make it up and the solidarity among all of them.”
Indeed, many other well established democracies declare themselves indivisible
in their constitutions, explicitly or implicitly. These include France, the
United States, Italy, Australia and many other democracies which affirm that
they form indissoluble entities.
The underlying principle of that indivisibility is easily understood. That
very principle is evoked in article 2 of your Constitution: solidarity, which
binds together all citizens and all regions of a country. One can certainly
agree that citizens of a democracy are bound by a principle of solidarity or of
mutual loyalty. They all owe one another their assistance regardless of
considerations of race, religion or regional belonging. For this reason, all
citizens are, so to speak, the owners of the country as a whole, with all its
potential for wealth and human solidarity. No group of citizens can take it upon
itself to monopolize citizenship over one portion of the national territory, or
to take away from fellow citizens, against their will, their right to full
belonging to the country in its entirety. All citizens should be able to pass on
to their children that right to belong. Ideally, such a right should never be
challenged in a democracy. That is probably why so many democracies consider
themselves to be indivisible.
Because loyalty binds all citizens together, over and above their
differences, no group of citizens within a democratic state can claim for itself
the right to secession on the pretext that its particular attributes –
language, culture or religion – qualify it as a nation or distinct people
within the state. As the Supreme Court of Canada has written regarding Quebec in
its Reference Re the Secession of Quebec of August 20, 1998: “Whatever
be the correct application of the definition of people(s) in this context, their
right of self-determination cannot in the present circumstances [those of a
democratic state] be said to ground a right to unilateral secession.”1
But at the same time, one cannot rule out the possibility of circumstances
arising in a democracy that make negotiating a secession the least harmful of
foreseeable solutions. That might be the case in the event that one part of the
population clearly expresses, peacefully but resolutely, its desire no longer to
be part of the country. There are, in fact, measures which a democratic state
would not contemplate using to hold a population, concentrated in one part of
its territory, against its clearly expressed will.
In other words, secession is not a right in democracy, but it remains a
possibility to which the existing state may agree in the face of a clearly
affirmed will for separation.
That is the position the Supreme Court of Canada took in its opinion of
August 20, 1998. It confirmed that the Government of Quebec does not have the
right to effect secession unilaterally. It does not have the right to proclaim
itself, unilaterally, the government of an independent state. It does not have
that right either under Canadian law or under international law.2
As you know, under
international law, peoples’ right to self-determination cannot form the
foundation of a right to external self-determination, that is to say, a right to
effect secession unilaterally, except in situations of colonization, military
occupation or serious human rights violations. Apart from such extreme cases,
the right to self-determination applies within the limits accorded to the
territorial integrity of states.3
The Supreme Court has confirmed that, to be legal in Canada, a secession
would necessitate an amendment to Canada’s Constitution. Such an amendment
would entail the negotiation of “many issues of great complexity and
difficulty,” which could include that of territorial boundaries.4
The obligation to
undertake such a negotiation on secession would exist only in the presence of
clear support for secession, expressed through a clear majority and in response
to a clear question. Only such clear support would give the secessionist demand
sufficient democratic legitimacy to justify the obligation of a negotiation on
secession. The Government of Quebec would still not have a right to unilaterally
effect secession even after negotiations proved fruitless in its opinion. “Under
the Constitution, secession requires that an amendment be negotiated.”5
The Parliament of Canada passed, on June 29, 2000, the Act to give effect
to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference. This law, more generally referred
to as the Clarity Act, which I had the honour of sponsoring in the
Canadian Parliament, made Canada the first major democratic state to acknowledge
its divisibility by a legal enactment. It sets out the circumstances in which
the Government of Canada could undertake negotiations on the secession of one of
its provinces. It prohibits the Government of Canada from undertaking
negotiations on the secession of a province unless the House of Commons has
determined that the referendum question clearly pertained to secession and that
a clear majority had been expressed in favour of secession.
The Government of Canada affirms that it could not proceed to break up the
country nor abdicate its constitutional responsibilities toward Quebecers – or
the population of any other Canadian province – without the assurance that
this is what they clearly want. In fact, no democratic state could cease to
honour its responsibilities toward one part of its population in the absence of
clear support for secession.
The Government of Canada would not agree to undertake any negotiations on
secession except in the event that the population of a province clearly
demonstrated its will to no longer be part of Canada. This clear will to secede
should be expressed by a clear majority in support of a question clearly
pertaining to secession, rather than on some vague proposal of political
partnership. If undertaking negotiations on secession is excluded, unless it is
supported by a clear majority and not an uncertain and fragile one, it is
because secession is a serious and likely irreversible act which binds future
generations and has major consequences for all citizens of the country thus
divided. The referendum question must also be clear, for it is obvious that only
a question truly about secession can determine whether citizens want secession.
Negotiation on secession should be undertaken within the Canadian
constitutional framework and should be guided by a genuine quest for justice for
all. For example, in the event that territorially concentrated populations
within Quebec clearly asked to remain a part of Canada, the divisibility of
Quebec’s territory would have to be contemplated with the same spirit of
openness which led to accepting the divisibility of Canada’s territory.
The Clarity Act also specifies the elements that must be included on
the agenda for the negotiations: “No Minister of the Crown shall propose a
constitutional amendment to effect the secession of a province from Canada
unless the Government of Canada has addressed, in its negotiations, the terms of
secession that are relevant in the circumstances, including the division of
assets and liabilities, any changes to the borders of the province, the rights,
interests and territorial claims of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the
protection of minority rights.”6
That is the Canadian way of contemplating secession in democracy. Its
fundamental premise is that a secession cannot be effected unilaterally in
democracy. It necessarily involves constitutional negotiations. A democratic
state could undertake such negotiations only in the presence of clear support
for secession. A democratic state could not authorize secession until after such
negotiations had been duly completed, respecting established laws and justice
for all.
Conclusion
I have stated today that the balance between centralization and
decentralization must be sought in accordance with the interest of citizens. I
have added that citizens are social beings who have collective loyalties that
must be taken into account. Thus conceived, nationalism can be a positive force
which prompts citizens to help one another more effectively within their
country, while respecting their plural identities and their common identity.
I have also looked at how peaceful secessionist demands may be treated in
democracy. I know full well, from that viewpoint, that both the Supreme
Court’s opinion on Quebec secession and the Clarity Act, giving effect
thereto, are known in Spain and are referred to in various ways in your national
discourse. Indeed, they have become a reference in a number of other
democracies.
All I can say is that, in Canada’s case, this exercise of clarification has
had a beneficial effect on national unity. For indeed, if there is one thing
that clearly stands out, poll after poll, it is that with a clear question,
Quebecers choose a united Canada. The vast majority of Quebecers want to remain
Canadian and do not want to break the ties of loyalty that bind them to their
fellow citizens in other parts of Canada. They have no wish to be forced to
choose between their Quebec identity and their Canadian identity. They reject
the exclusive definitions of the word “people” or “nation”and want to
belong to both the Quebec people and the Canadian people, in this global world
where concurrent identities will more than ever be an asset for opening oneself
to others.
It was José Carreras who said: “Cuanto más catalán me dejan ser, más
español me siento.”7 Just think! The more
Québécois we are, the more we feel Canadian.
- Opinion by the Supreme Court of Canada on the Reference re Secession of Quebec,[1998]
2 S.C.R. 217, at par. 125.
- Opinion by the Supreme Court, at par. 155.
- Antonio
Cassese, Self-determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal (Cambridge,Cambridge
University Press, 1995); James Crawford, State Practice and InternationalLaw
in Relation to Unilateral Secession. (Expert’s Report submitted to the
SupremeCourt of Canada on February 19, 1997); see also Opinion by the Supreme
Court ofCanada on Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217,
at par. 113 to 139.
- Opinion by the Supreme Court, at par. 96.
- Opinion by the Supreme Court, at par. 97.
- Clarity Act: An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the
opinion ofthe Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference
[Assented to 29th June,2000], ch. 26, par. 3(2).
- José Carreras, “Cuanto más catalán me dejan ser, más español me siento,”
Le Mundo(Vol. VII, number 2, August 26, 1995) available at:
http://www.el-mundo.es/papel/hemeroteca/1995/08/26/uve/
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