

Commission d'enquête sur le déclin des populations de saumon rouge du fleuve Fraser

Public Hearings

Audience publique

Commissioner

L'Honorable juge /
The Honourable Justice
Bruce Cohen

Commissaire

Salle 801

Held at: Tenue à :

Room 801 Federal Courthouse 701 West Georgia Street Vancouver, B.C.

Cour fédérale 701, rue West Georgia Vancouver (C.-B.)

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

le merdi 26 octobre 2010



Commission d'enquête sur le déclin des populations de saumon rouge du fleuve Fraser

Errata for the Transcript of Hearings on October 26, 2010

Line	Error	Correction
	Brian J. Wallace	Brian J. Wallace, Q.C.
	counsel not included for Commission	Jennifer Chan (Junior Commission Counsel)
	did not attend	Wendy Baker, Brock Martland, Kathy Grant, Tim Timberg, Charles Fugere, Barron Carswell, John Hunter, Q.C., Chris Buchanan, Gregory McDade, Q.C., Lisa Glowacki, Margot Venton, Don Rosenbloom, David Butcher, Joseph Arvay, David Robbins, Gary Campo, John Gailus, Karey Brooks, Barbara Harvey, Rob Miller, Bertha Joseph, Joseph Gereluk, Nicole Schabus, Allan Donovan, R. Keith Oliver, Mike Walden, Steven Kelliher
	counsel with Government of Canada to be added	Mark East
	counsel with RTAI to be added	Charlene Hiller
	counsel with BCSFA to be added	Shane Hopkins-Utter
	Tim Leadem	Tim Leadem, Q.C.
	counsel with MTM to be added	James Reynolds
	James Walkus is not a participant and R. Keith Oliver is not counsel	remove names from record
	Musgagmagw Tsawataineuk Tribal Counsel	Musgamagw Tsawataineuk Tribal Council
	Submissions of HTC by Ms. Gaertner	Submissions of FNC by Ms. Gaertner
45	essential authority	a central authority
		counsel not included for Commission did not attend counsel with Government of Canada to be added counsel with RTAI to be added counsel with BCSFA to be added Tim Leadem counsel with MTM to be added James Walkus is not a participant and R. Keith Oliver is not counsel Musgagmagw Tsawataineuk Tribal Counsel Submissions of HTC by Ms. Gaertner

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Page	Line	Error	Correction
14	15	prove an aboriginal title	proven aboriginal title
21	22	Pearce	Pearse
22	47	Armor case	Yarmirr case
25	47	organic hole	organic whole
26	8	qualify	quantify
32	38	conversation	conservation
42 - 47	Н	Submissions by Ms. Gaertner (FNC)	Submissions by Mr. Dickson (STCCIB)
46	22	U.S. Declaration	UN Declaration
53	21	here	hear
58	20	form	from
59	24	fish	fresh
61	44	day sand	days and
63	30	steward	Stuart
64	30	lucky	luckily
65	37	bold or italicized Cheam	Cheam (not bold or italicized)
66	24	FNC	FSC
73	29	seeded	ceded

H = Heading

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Brenda Gaertner First Nations Coalition: First Nations

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Fisheries Society; Northern Shuswap Tribal

Council; Chehalis Indian Band;

Secwepemc Fisheries Commission of the Shuswap Nation Tribal Council; Upper Fraser Fisheries Conservation Alliance; Other Douglas Treaty First Nations who applied together (the Snuneymuxw,

Tsartlip and Tsawout)

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MR. McGOWAN: Good morning, Mr. Commissioner. While I don't intend to make a substantive submission to you today, I do wish to make a few introductory comments about this portion of the hearings. early June of this year, the Commission circulated to participants a preliminary discussion paper, which outlined the issues the Commission intended to consider as part of its investigation into the decline of the sockeye salmon in the Fraser River. The Commission invited participants to provide input as to whether there were additional issues the Commission ought to consider. You will recall, Mr. Commissioner, that on

June 15th and 16th of this year, you held hearings and heard from participants a number of helpful suggestions of additional areas they felt ought to be included in the Commission's work. One such suggestion came from counsel for the First Nations Coalition, Ms. Gaertner, who expressed her view that an understanding of the constitutionallyprotected aboriginal and treaty rights and title is important to the Commission's work.

At the June hearings and subsequently, a number of other participants communicated support for Ms. Gaertner's suggestion and encouraged the Commission to include a process to assist you in developing an understanding of the aboriginal and treaty rights framework related to the fishery and the various participants' perspectives of this framework.

Commission counsel agreed that although your terms of reference do not direct you to make findings of aboriginal rights and title that an overview of this area of law may be helpful to you in providing contextual background for the factual information yet to come. To assist you in your understanding of the legal framework and to provide a platform for today's discussion, Commission counsel has prepared a discussion paper designed to provide an overview of some of the significant applicable law. That paper is titled "The Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Framework Underlying the Fraser River Sockeye Salmon Fishery".

Now, Mr. Commissioner, I've had the registrar place before you a binder which contains that submission and I understand that's been provided to you previously. There are also the submissions of other counsel, which I'll come to in a moment.

Now, the framework paper drafted by Commission counsel is primarily a survey of aboriginal and treaty rights cases heard by the Supreme Court of Canada and B.C. cases with an emphasis on those cases, which deal directly with fisheries. The paper does not extend into areas such as international law or law from other jurisdictions.

In preparing the paper, Commission counsel has strived to present an objective and balanced summary of the law. Commission counsel has endeavoured to maintain a neutral tone throughout the discussion paper and does not offer any opinion on the manner in which this legal context ought to inform your findings of fact or recommendations. The paper covers a number of topics including constitutional recognition and affirmation of aboriginal and treaty rights, aboriginal title to marine areas or rivers, the aboriginal right to fish, treaty rights in the fishery, management of the fishery and duty to consult.

Given the broad nature of the paper and its intended purpose as an overview of the law, it should be recognized that there may be additional cases or details, which were not covered. We invited counsel for the participants to highlight details or cases not canvassed in the paper that they view to be of particular importance and that are relevant to your mandate.

I should not that while there are a number of judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada and B.C. courts, which offer guiding principles in relation to aboriginal treaty and rights framework, some aspects of this framework remain subject to ongoing litigation. For example, at least two cases originating in this province and cited in the Commission's paper are presently under appeal. The **Ahousaht** case, I understand, is being heard at the end of this year in the B.C. Court of Appeal, and the **Lax Kw'alaams** case is expected to be heard at the Supreme Court of Canada sometime early next

year.

Now, Mr. Commissioner, we do not suggest this paper is the final word on the legal framework. We are hopeful that this paper, together with the submission of participants, will provide you with some background on this legal framework which impacts on the management of the fishery you are considering.

There are two very brief points of clarification with respect to the framework provided by Commission counsel and I'll just address those briefly now. First, at paragraph 64 and following, there's a section and I'm not sure you need to go there, Mr. Commissioner. I'll just give you these brief points of clarification.

At paragraph 64 and following, after describing the right as characterized in each case, the paper distinguishes aboriginal right to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes from an aboriginal right to fish for what in the paper is called "commercial purposes". I just want to be clear, Mr. Commissioner, the word "commercial" is not applied as a term of art here but rather simply to connote fishing for the purpose of sale or profit. Commission counsel does not intend the use of the term "commercial purposes" in this section to necessarily refer to sale on an industrial scale.

The second point of clarification, Mr. Commissioner, relates to the final paragraph of the draft of the Commission's paper. That's paragraph 191. And in that paragraph there's a reference to "proven and unproven claims of aboriginal rights and titles". Just to be clear, the qualifier "proven" in this paragraph is intended to apply to the word "rights" only.

Now, with respect to this portion of the hearing, Mr. Commissioner, I wish to be clear that the proceedings today and tomorrow are not in the nature of an application. You are not, Mr. Commissioner, being asked to make any ruling whatsoever. Instead, this is an opportunity for the participants to, collaboratively I hope, address the legal framework so you will have some appreciation of this framework and their respective positions on it as you receive evidence throughout the hearings.

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To facilitate input from the participants, Commission counsel circulated its framework on October 1st and invited participants to respond with written submissions of no more than 20 pages. Ten participants have provided written submissions addressing issues canvassed in the Commission's paper. I have asked our registrar to provide you with the binder which I spoke of earlier and it should have copies of each of the participants' written submissions that provided them. Those will be contained at Tabs 3 through 12 in the binder.

Now, I would propose that each of these should be marked as an exhibit when addressed be the participant who submitted them. I think perhaps the appropriate thing to do, Mr. Commissioner, given that these are legal submissions as opposed to facts, might be to have them marked for identification but I'm in your hands on that.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, that's fine. Thank you, Mr. McGowan.

MR. McGOWAN: Now, I've also asked the registrar to place before you copies of all of the authorities, which have been provided and they're there in the event you need them. Counsel for each participant will have the opportunity today and tomorrow, if necessary, to make oral submissions commenting on the framework paper. Specifically, the Commission has asked the participants to focus their submissions towards their clients' position on the law including areas of agreement or contention and, perhaps most importantly, the practical implication of this law within the context of the inquiry's mandate.

Counsel for each participant group will have 20 minutes to present their oral submissions. Following this, each participant group will have five minutes in reply. The order of presentations and replies will follow the ordering of participants as set out in the attachment to Mr. Wallace's letter of October 22nd. That would be the same order we followed yesterday, Mr. Commissioner. We have a tight schedule planned and I'd ask counsel to please be mindful of the time limits and to keep track of the time while they're making their presentations so that

 everybody has an opportunity to address these issues.

As a final point, Mr. Commissioner, I wish to thank counsel for their participants, many of whom have much experience in this subject area, for their thoughtful written submissions and for what I am sure will be useful contributions today and tomorrow.

Now, at this point, Mr. Commissioner, I suggest it would be appropriate to have the Commission's paper marked as the next exhibit for identification. That's the paper, for the record, titled "The Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Framework Underlying the Fraser River Sockeye Salmon Fishery" dated October 1st, 2010. And I have provided an electronic copy to Mr. Lunn.

THE REGISTRAR: That will be marked for identification, A.

MARKED A FOR IDENTIFICATION: "The Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Framework Underlying the Fraser River Sockeye Salmon Fishery" dated October 1, 2010

MR. McGOWAN: Yes, Mr. Commissioner, subject to any questions you may have about the process today, I think we're ready to proceed. And the first presenter will be the Government of Canada.

MR. EAST: Good morning, Mr. Commissioner. My name is Mark East and with me today is my colleague, Charles Fugere. We are counsel for the Government of Canada in today's proceeding. Canada has provided written submissions in response to the Commission's paper regarding "The Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Framework Underlying the Fraser River Sockeye Salmon Fishery".

In these oral submissions today, we will highlight certain points in relation to this legal framework that Canada submits are of particular importance. As a general comment, the Commission's paper, in our view, represents a generally fair, balance and helpful overview of this legal framework. This framework is complex, dynamic and evolving. It is also often controversial and contentious. As we've just heard Commission counsel mentioned, many of the issues and topics described in the paper are the

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subject of active litigation.

In light of this concern, we note that the paper in places engages in what we consider to be perhaps unnecessary and sometimes unhelpful speculation as to the possible future direction or evolution of the aboriginal and treaty rights legal framework. And we note in particular paragraphs 25, 30, 70, 130, 133 and 147. Some of these examples are noted in our written submissions. We respectfully submit that you, as Commissioner, should refrain from endorsing those parts of the paper that reflect opinion or speculation nor the opinions or opinions in the participants' submissions that are inconsistent with the jurisprudence that exists currently.

As already noted, many issues described and discussed in the paper on many aspects of the aboriginal and treaty rights framework are controversial. The courts have stated numerous times that the questions relating to aboriginal and treaty rights are necessarily contextual and fact-specific. The often contradictory positions in the participants' written submissions provide ample demonstration, we submit, as to why legal questions in this area should be considered on a foundation of facts supported by evidence and with full opportunity to test the evidence and advance legal arguments.

Turning to specific comments on the paper, we refer you to our written submissions in response to the paper's observations regarding the law in relation to aboriginal title and in particular to potential claims to aboriginal title to submerged lands in marine areas and rivers. We note that this area of the law is particularly controversial and is the subject of ongoing litigation. No aboriginal group has, to date, established aboriginal title in law and there are significant questions as to whether and under what circumstances and aboriginal group could establish title to submerged lands.

In Canada's written submissions, we examine some of the questions that a court would need to consider in order to making a finding of aboriginal title to submerged lands. And in this respect, we note that the paper contains a significant omission in failing to consider or

even mention the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Bernard; R. v. Marshall, which along with Delgamuukw, are the leading cases on the nature and scope of aboriginal title. Bernard and Marshall are particularly relevant to the question as to whether an aboriginal group could demonstrate the requisite degree of exclusive and regular physical occupation of a site to establish aboriginal title to submerged lands. In Bernard; Marshall, building on Delgamuukw, is also important in describing the relationship of aboriginal title to common law notions of title. This becomes important when considering the question as to whether aboriginal title to submerged lands is cognizable in the common law or whether such title is fundamentally incompatible with the notion of fish in tidal waters as a common property resource and with the common law public rights to fish in marine areas or to navigation. As the Commission paper notes at paragraph 24, Madam Justice Garson considered these arguments relating to claims to aboriginal title to submerged lands in the Ahousaht case although she did not need to make a ruling on the claim for title. She expressed doubt the claim was legally tenable. And that's at paragraph 502 of that decision.

We make these submissions not to seek your endorsement of the positions advanced on this topic in Canada's written submissions but simply to demonstrate that the question of aboriginal title to submerged lands is very complex and controversial.

On a similar theme, at paragraph 68 and 69, the Commission paper infers that the court in **Ahousaht** ruled in favour of an aboriginal right to fish for commercial purposes equating that finding with the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in **Gladstone**. And as we've heard today in the Commission counsel's opening submissions, as I understand it, the paper did not intend by this in these paragraphs to equate the decisions of **Ahousaht** and **Gladstone** so I won't spend much time in contrasting and comparing these two decisions. However, I think it's worthwhile to take a look at some of the key elements of what Justice Garson said in the **Ahousaht** decision. Madam Justice

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Garson was explicit in describing the plaintiff's right in that case as "less than a right to a modern industrial fishery or to unrestricted rights of commercial sale". And that's at Ahousaht at paragraphs 486 and 487. Justice Garson declined to characterize the right as commercial to the extent that judicial authorities use the term to indicate sale on a large commercial sale noting that the plaintiff's aboriginal right was not for the purpose of accumulating wealth. We, therefore, submit that the paper overreaches in equating the decision in Ahousaht with the ruling in Gladstone.

More generally, as with claims to aboriginal title to submerged lands, claims to aboriginal rights to harvest and sell fish on a commercial basis remain a contentious and controversial area of the law. As noted by Commission counsel today, in particular, the Supreme Court of Canada will consider these questions in **Lax Kw'alaams** and the hearing date is scheduled, I believe, for February 17th, 2011. And the B.C. Court of Appeal will hear the appeal in **Ahousaht** on December 6th, 2010.

In contrast to the relatively nascent jurisprudence relating to claims to aboriginal title to submerged lands or to aboriginal rights to fish for commercial purposes, there is a substantial jurisprudence in relation to the aboriginal right to fish for food, social and ceremonial, or also called "FSC", purposes and in relation to the duty to consult. We submit that this part of the legal framework, which is summarized well in the Commission's paper, merits particular attention.

As a starting principle, it is uncontroversial in the jurisprudence that Canada has the obligation, responsibility and jurisdiction to manage the fisheries. And for that reference, I would recommend <code>Sparrow</code>, page 1118 of the SCR Reporter. The Supreme Court in <code>Nikal</code> provides a particularly powerful statement as to the Federal Crown's responsibilities in managing the salmon fishery for all users. If the salmon fishery is to survive, there must be some control exercised by essential authority. It is the federal government which will be required to manage the fishery and see to the improvement and

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the increase of the stock of that fishery. It is for the federal government to ensure that all users who are entitled to partake of the salmon harvest have the opportunity to obtain an allotment pursuant to the scheme of priorities set out in *Sparrow*.

The Commission's paper, too, refers to this important principle, referring you to paragraphs 155 to 158, including another important and compelling statement of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Marshall II at paragraph 40 of that case. Starting at page 34, the paper describes the essential elements for the legal justification of infringements of aboriginal rights, as articulated in Sparrow. The jurisprudence in connection with the justification of infringements, and, in particular, those cases specific to the management of Fraser River salmon merit particular scrutiny. In applying the legal test for justification, the Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that "courts must consider the specific factual context in any given case when applying the justification test, including the requirements for consultation and priority". That's in Sparrow at page 1111. The court has also ruled that the standard to be applied is one of reasonableness, Nikal, paragraph 110.

These themes are prominent in the B.C. Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Douglas, referred to in the paper as "Douglas 2007". And also, in four decisions rendered in 2008 by Madam Justice Smith of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on appeals of convictions of members of the Cheam First Nation for unauthorized fishing during the 1999 fishing season. In three of the appeals, Justice Smith upheld the convictions but granted the appeal in R. v. Tommy, also described in the paper as "Douglas 2008". We submit that these four appeals, as well as the earlier B.C. Court of Appeal decision in **Douglas** provide important clarity to the principles for the justification of infringements of First Nations rights to harvest Fraser River salmon for FSC purposes. And in particular, we recommend to you the ruling of Justice Smith in R. v. Douglas 2008, BSCC 1098, where at paragraph 61, she summarizes the key principles to be applied with respect to the

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infringement of aboriginal rights to fish for FSC purposes. Of the principles described by Justice Smith in this decision, three are of particular importance. Conservation as a valid legislative objective, the priority of aboriginal rights to fish for FSC purposes and Canada's duty to consult with respect to infringements of aboriginal rights to fish for FSC purposes.

The courts have afforded DFO considerable deference in determining whether the Department is pursuing a valid legislative objective when that objective is conservation. The court in Sparrow considered the justification of conservation and resource management as surely uncontroversial. There is controversy in the jurisprudence as to what constitutes conservation, how it is defined or whether some measures instituted by DFO are validly for the purposes of conservation. controversy is noted in some of the other participants' submissions. The court in Nikal clarified that in managing the salmon fishery, conservation entails more than simply preventing the elimination of the salmon, rather, management imports a duty to maintain and increase reasonably the resource. Paragraph 102.

Justice Smith in the four 2008 appeals noted previously returned consistently to the theme that determining the needs of conservation as a valid legislative objective requires a contextual and fact-specific inquiry. The court in those cases also expressly endorsed the principle of managing the conservation of fisheries for all user groups often with competing interests as a valid legislative objective. Justice Smith ruled that in the justification analysis reasonableness of DFO's conversation measures cannot be assessed with the benefit of hindsight. Justification will focus on the reasonableness of DFO's decisions in the circumstances. The court noted:

However, in the absence of evidence of mala fides, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess management decisions that fall within the range of 'reasonable and necessary'.

That's at Douglas 2008, BCSC 1098, para. 31. In

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that same case, Justice Smith, noting the importance of the contextual analysis in the justification inquiry, questioned whether a specific definition of conservation beyond its current broad meaning that includes the protection and enhancement of the resource is possible or even desirable. That's at paragraph 33.

Another area of controversy in DFO's management of the Fraser River salmon fisheries is the question of whether DFO affords sufficient priority to First Nations to meet their FSC requirements. In particular, can DFO meet its obligations to afford priority to aboriginal FSC fishing when it provides prior or contemporaneous opportunities to recreational or commercial fishers? This theme is central to the Douglas ruling of the B.C. Court of Appeal and to the mixed stock salmon appeals before Justice Smith. And I should note here as an aside that the B.C. Court of Appeal has agreed to hear the appeal of some of these defendants in the rulings of Justice Smith on this issue of priority.

Again, the courts emphasize that they must take a contextual approach to the question of priority. In *Sparrow*, the Supreme Court ruled that DFO's conservation and management plans must ensure that aboriginal rights are taken seriously. Page 1119. The court elaborated on this principle in *Gladstone* at paragraph 63:

Priority under Sparrow's justification test cannot be assessed against a precise standard but must rather be assessed in each case to determine whether the government has acted in a fashion which reflects that it has truly taken into account the existence of aboriginal rights.

What this principle from **Sparrow** means in practical terms is articulated by the B.C. Court of Appeal in **Douglas 2007**. At paragraph 54, the court said:

This is not to say that the priority required by Sparrow means that the food, social and ceremonial fisheries must always precede or occur contemporaneously with the non-

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aboriginal fisheries. As part of the 1 2 contextual analysis into priority, it will 3 sometimes be necessary to consider the 4 practical difficulties occasioned by the 5 movement of the fish themselves. The Fraser 6 River sockeye encounter numerous fisheries, 7 including aboriginal, recreational and 8 commercial, as they migrate from the Pacific 9 to their spawning grounds. If a non-10 aboriginal fishery could never precede any of 11 the aboriginal fisheries, the result would be 12 an exclusive food, social and ceremonial 13 fishery, regardless of need and abundance of 14 stock. That cannot be the intended result of 15 Sparrow. 16

> And we note that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied in this case. submit that the guidance from the courts on the question of priority can be summarized as follows. Firstly, determining whether the First Nations FSC fishing has been afforded adequate priority requires a contextual analysis of the particular circumstances of the case. Second, DFO's conservation and management plans must treat aboriginal peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken seriously. Third, the brunt of conservation measures must be borne by recreational and commercial fisheries rather than the First Nations FSC fisheries. Fourth, priority for First Nations FSC fisheries does not mean that such fisheries must always precede or occur contemporaneously with recreational or commercial fisheries. Fifthly, in certain circumstances, harvest and recreational, or arguably by analogy, commercial fisheries, do not necessarily violate the principle of priority for First Nations FSC fisheries.

> In the time I have remaining, I'll turn quickly to the issue of the duty to consult. The B.C. Court of Appeal in *Douglas 2007* similarly applied this contextual and fact-specific approach to determining if DFO had, in justifying infringements of the appellants' aboriginal rights, engaged in adequate consultation. The *Douglas* decision at paragraphs 39 to 47 is important in setting out certain consultation

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Submissions by Mr. Tyzuk (Province of British Columbia)

principles specific to the management of the Fraser River salmon fishery. These principles include, firstly, DFO's emphasis on early and extensive joint consultations with Fraser River First Nations was reasonable and appropriate, particularly considering the nature of the Fraser River salmon fishery, the number of First Nations involved and the lack of unanimity between them on important issues. That's at paragraph 40. not required to consult with each aboriginal group on all openings and closings of the salmon fisheries where those closures are consistent with the overall strategy, that is, the strategy on which DFO consulted at the start of the season. Paragraph 42. Aboriginal groups have reciprocal obligations to participate in DFO efforts at and processes for consultation. Paragraph 45. Finally, perfection in consultation is not required. The court said that DFO's efforts to consult, while not perfect, were reasonable and in good faith. DFO provided consultation in good faith appropriate to the circumstances. Paragraph 47.

To conclude, these aforementioned cases and other jurisprudence directly applicable to the management of Fraser River fisheries emphasize the following themes. Canada and DFO have an essential role in managing the fisheries. task of managing the fishery for some 93 First Nations and for commercial and recreational users is a complex and difficult task. DFO's management decisions are to be considered on a standard of reasonableness always with consideration of the factual context in which those decisions are made. Perfection is not the standard. The courts have demonstrated deference in allowing DFO to manage the fishery consistent with this contextual approach. Within this context, as the Supreme Court of Canada indicated in Sparrow, Canada is required to treat aboriginal peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken seriously.

Mr. Commissioner, this concludes our submissions on this topic subject to the opportunity for reply submissions and subject to any questions that you might have.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Counsel. MR. TYZUK: Mr. Commissioner, my name is Boris Tyzuk

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Submissions by Mr. Tyzuk (Province of British Columbia)

and I am appearing for the Province --THE REGISTRAR: Speaker, microphone, please. MR. TYZUK: There we go. Mr. Commissioner, my name is Boris Tyzuk. I'm appearing for the Province of British Columbia. And with me is D. Clifton Prowse. We, too, would like to thank the Commission for a well-done and relatively balanced overview paper. The Province does have a number of concerns about the paper and those concerns are set out in the written submissions and I will make some comments to them in these oral comments. do note, though, that two matters, which the Province did bring to light concerning the use of "commercial purposes" in the paper and the reference in paragraph 191 "to prove an aboriginal title" have been spoken to by the Commission and we thank them for those clarifications.

There are a number of speculative provisions and opinions expressed in the paper that the Province submits, for the reasons set out in the submissions and in these oral remarks, the Commissioner should not consider in carrying out his inquiry pursuant to the mandate. Examples of some of these are found in paragraphs 25, 30, 70, 130 and 133. These speculative provisions or opinions involve areas of the law that, as you can see from the submissions provided and comments that have already been made, are unsettled or controversial or are issues that are before the courts. But more importantly, as is evidenced by a review of the written submissions filed today, there are many unresolved issues, many differing interpretations of the law and this inquiry, as was mentioned by Commission counsel, has no specific mandate to inquire into aboriginal or treaty rights. The terms of reference, I note, do not include any reference to that nor do we submit is this inquiry process set up for such a task and thus, we submit, it is not advisable for you, as the Commissioner, to make any rulings or findings in this particular area of the law. I won't go through all of the specific comments in the paper but there will be a few that I will mention.

With respect to the aboriginal title section, we feel that it is an important omission that no reference was made to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in *R. v. Bernard; R. v. Marshall*,

 probably the most important aboriginal title decision from the Supreme Court of Canada since <code>Delgamuukw</code>. At paragraph 3 of our written submission, we point out that <code>Bernard; Marshall</code> deserves consideration, as it not only confirms certain aspects of <code>Delgamuukw</code>, namely, that exclusive occupation was satisfied by actual and exclusive physical occupation of definite tracts of land but gave greater direction on the kind and degree of occupation necessary to ground an aboriginal title and the need for regular use of defined tracts of land in that regard.

We make references in paragraphs 5 and in 6 of our written submission to the speculative nature. Paragraphs 25 and 30 of the paper dealing with aboriginal title in relation to marine areas and rivers. However, we would note that paragraph 29 of the paper points out the lack of jurisprudence in regard to this area. paragraphs 10 to 20, we spend a little time clarifying matters relating to modern treaties. And Mr. Commissioner, I confess this is a result of the four years as I've spent as lead counsel of the Province in the Nisga'a final agreement negotiations so it's a matter of just clarifying some of the points there. There is no presumption of ambiguity in any of the modern B.C. treaties. They are very comprehensive. It's a full and final settlement of all existing claims. And there are no exclusive governance powers. It's a concurrent governance model and those are set out there. And the provisions that I have referred to deal with those.

Further, at paragraph 17 of our submission, we note we're not aware of any decision in Canada that sets out a general right of self-governance for aboriginal groups or First Nations. And according to the Supreme Court of Canada, any particular right to self-government must be proved in accordance with the tests set out in **Van der Peet**.

Now, as the second question, which is the practical implications. As pointed out in the Province's written submissions, there's no requirement in the terms of reference to make any ruling or interpretation of law in regard to the aboriginal and treaty rights in general for the

Fraser River sockeye salmon. And the reasons are these. As has been pointed out, there is no reference to aboriginal treaty right in the terms of reference. This inquiry, with its particular format and its limited timeframe, is not suited to the fact-specific requirements of proving aboriginal rights and titles. I understand that in the **Ahousaht** case there were approximately 110 days of trial. I don't think we have that many days set aside. Matters concerning infringement, justification or consultation are again fact-specific and, as stated above, this inquiry is not the appropriate forum to make such findings.

This is clearly an area of the law that is subject to differing interpretations. It is controversial. Cases are before the courts and, as can be evidenced from the various written submissions and the law, while it is evolving, does not always do so predictably. And just to provide a bit of example of how differing things are, I will make a few comments on the written submission of the First Nations Coalition because that is the one that we received first. And it's just to give a sample, again not to suggest that one interpretation is any better than the other but just to note what the differences are, Mr. Commissioner.

The Province submits that the First Nations Coalition's submissions mischaracterize the aboriginal right to fish at paragraph 9. And then through paragraphs 11 to 15. By implying there is an inescapable conclusion that such rights provide the legal foundation for First Nations to demonstrate jurisdiction over fisheries, including management, stewardship and allocation of fisheries resources. The Province disagrees completely and would say the law recognizes that there is an aboriginal right to fish. The verb. And within that right to fish may be internal processes of allocation in the aboriginal community and decision-making about when and when not to fish but that an aboriginal fishing right has never been said to create management jurisdiction over a fishery that is also accessed by others.

Likewise, at paragraph 34, the Province takes some issue with the submission of the First

Nations Coalition that the jurisprudence supports a fulsome right to a fishery. In paragraph 45, there are references to the inherent right of self-government. The Province deals with these in paragraph 17 of its submission in terms of the basic proposition.

Paragraph 46 of the First Nations Coalition paper is another example of an assertion with which the Province takes issue as that paragraph purports to combine aboriginal title, we say not yet proven anywhere, an aboriginal right to the fishery, which we say overstates the law, and the exercise of self-government, which we say there's no case law that shows there are any particular self-government rights to date, as the basis for First Nations to be meaningfully involved in all matters related to the fishery and directly involved in all decisions that have the potential to impact the fishery, including habitat.

At paragraphs 51 and 52 of the FNC paper, these assertions of aboriginal rights are combined with references to the B.C. Treaty process and other processes to advocate that the inquiry needs to direct that collaborative management and shared decision-making models be developed and implemented. Once again, the Province challenges the logic used. Undefined aboriginal rights are very, very different from carefully negotiated treaty rights found in modern treaties in British Columbia. And I will just make note of a couple of these. As I said, Mr. Commissioner, I was involved in the Nisga'a Treaty negotiations for four years, as well as in the first round of the Sliammon AIP negotiations, the Nuu-chah-nulth AIP negotiations and part of the Sechelt negotiations. For some reason, I was always involved in the fisheries negotiations.

These were always the toughest negotiations. In the Nisga'a final agreement, we had 57 drafts of the fisheries chapter from the AIP stage to the final agreement stage. These negotiations were always challenging, more challenging than any other subject matter. And no doubt that representatives from the First Nations will indicate you the passion and the feeling that they had towards this. But as someone who was there at the table all the time, you felt it was always

Submissions by Mr. Tyzuk (Province of British Columbia)

difficult. These are very difficult issues. Those provisions from the fish chapters in Nisga'a, Tsawwassen and Maa-nulth have been very carefully negotiated. And as in all negotiations, they are the result of compromises by all parties. The fisheries chapters in the modern B.C. treaties cannot be compared to generally undefined aboriginal rights that are asserted in the FNC paper.

We categorically disagree with the statement at paragraph 29 at the FNC written submission, which suggests that there is sufficient judicial direction available to advance changes to the status quo. Clearly, this is the opposite. While there are some settled areas of the law, as appropriately summarized in parts of the Commission's paper, many important areas remain unresolved. So then the question that becomes asked, as to what practical applications they are with respect to this particular exercise.

In its written submission, the Province expressed some uncertainty on the point. However, the Commissioner would no doubt, in considering the existing and settled law, including the existing and settled law in regard to aboriginal and treaty rights underlying the Fraser River sockeye fishery. You could consider these in carrying out your mandate and developing recommendations pursuant to item (d) of your terms of reference for improving the future sustainability of the sockeye salmon fishery in the Fraser River.

To conclude, Mr. Commissioner, again, the paper is a very good and relatively balanced overview of the law in this area. As we have said, as there is no reference to aboriginal treaty rights in your terms of reference, there is no need to make any nor is it advisable to make any findings in relation to the law of aboriginal or treaty rights of First Nations generally or any particular First Nation.

And finally, the Commissioner can use the existing and settled law, including the law relating to aboriginal and treaty rights in considering the recommendations he may wish to develop in fulfilling the terms of reference.

Mr. Commissioner, these are our submissions,

MR. McGOWAN: He was here?

Submissions by Mr. Tyzuk (Province of British Columbia)

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subject to the right of reply and any questions
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            which you may have.
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       THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Mr. Tyzuk.
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       MR. McGOWAN: Now, Mr. Commissioner, I notice we've
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            proceeded without marking the last two papers for
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            identification. Perhaps we should attend to that
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       THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, we'll go back then to Canada's
            paper, which I have at Tab 3 of my binder.
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            that correct, Mr. McGowan?
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       MR. McGOWAN: Well, the Commission's paper has been
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            marked Canada's paper would be B for
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            Identification.
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       THE COMMISSIONER: That's the one I have at Tab 3 of my
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            binder?
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      MR. McGOWAN: Yes, that's correct.
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       THE REGISTRAR: That'll be marked B for Identification.
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                 Government of Canada by Mr. East
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       THE COMMISSIONER: And then the Province's submission,
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                    That's correct. At Tab 4 of your binder,
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       MR. McGOWAN:
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            Mr. Commissioner, will be C for Identification.
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       THE REGISTRAR: C for Identification.
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       THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much.
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                 Province of British Columbia by Mr. Tyzuk
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      MR. McGOWAN: Mr. Commissioner, next on the list is
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            Pacific Salmon Commission. I don't see Mr. Hunter
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            here nor do I see Mr. Buchanan for the Public
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            Service Alliance of Canada. I've been advised
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            that while somebody is here for participant 5, Rio
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            Tinto Alcan, they don't intend to make an oral
            submission, which brings us to participant 6, the
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            B.C. Salmon Farmer's Association, who I'm just
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            being advised now doesn't have an oral submission
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            to make. Is anybody here for the Seafood
            Producers today? Well, we're moving right along
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            to participant number 8, the Aquaculture
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            Coalition.
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       UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They're not here. No one's
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            here.
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They're not here.

MR. McGOWAN: They're not here. Sorry, okay. Is
anybody here for the Conservation Coalition today?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.

- MR. McGOWAN: You are. All right. No submissions for the Conservation Coalition. The Area D Gillnetters, I don't see Mr. Rosenbloom here. Nor Mr. Butcher for participant 11. Mr. Harvey? With the utmost efficiency, we're at participant 12, Mr. Commissioner, the West Coast Trollers Area G Association.
- MR. HARVEY: It's Chris Harvey. I've not submitted a party and I only have one point to make on the Commission's paper. It arises out of what is said at paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Commission's paper where a quote from Mr. Justice Dickson's judgment in Jack v. The Queen is set out. The quote refers to an order of priorities, a four-fold order of priorities, which I submit is somewhat misleading. The four-fold order of priorities there set out is:
 - 1. Conservation;
 - 2. Indian fishing;
 - 3. Non-Indian commercial fishing; and,
 - 4. Non-Indian sports fishing.

And the passage from the judgment goes on to identify that as being the position taken by the aboriginal defendants to which Mr. Justice Dixon agrees with the general tenor of the argument. And the paper in paragraph 55 says that the court in **Sparrow** adopted this prioritization. My submission is that that is somewhat misleading. That general statement has been overtaken by any number of other cases subsequently that focused on the basis of evidence on the priorities in the fishery and set them out on the basis of conservation. Section 35, fishing. And then commercial and sports fishing together.

So in other words, the description of non-Indian commercial fishing has been superseded and not followed. And indeed if it had been followed, it would require some fundamental changes in the practical management of the commercial fishery because Indian and non-Indian fishers operate together under the same umbrella and basically the

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same priority. Those are my submissions. THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Harvey. MR. LOWES: Mr. Commissioner, J.K. Lowes for the B.C. Wildlife Federation and the B.C. Federation of Drift Fishers. With your indulgence, Mr. Commissioner, I'd like to, before I begin my submission, make a few remarks about the man who up until about a week ago was giving me instructions. I'm speaking about William John Otway, "Bill", as he was known, who passed away on Sunday, 17th of October, at the age of 75. was a lifelong angler, hunter and outdoorsman. Mr. Commissioner, he dedicated his life to the preservation of that outdoor way of life. He served in many capacities with the B.C. Wildlife Federation, the Sports Fishing Advisory Board. was retained by DFO as the recreational fishery ombudsman. He prepared and made submissions to Parliamentary fishery committees. He participated in all of the inquiries since and including that conducted by Dr. Pearce in 1982. Many minsters of fishery were deluged by his correspondence. was a member of the Williams Inquiry.

He lobbied hard, Mr. Commissioner, for the establishment of this Commission and he looked forward to giving evidence. I last saw Bill three days before his death and from his bed in the hospice in Merritt, he was still giving me instructions. He called for his notebooks to be brought to the hospice from home so he could review them with me and ensure I got it right. Mr. Commissioner, he expressed the same passion for the well-being of the Fraser River sockeye that you described in your opening remarks yesterday. He urged me to continue on my way past Merritt up to the Adams River to see the spawning salmon, a sight which is both awesome and poignant at the same time. Mr. Commissioner, Bill saw this Commission as vitally important. He wished you well in its conduct. His message, which is our message, was that of inclusiveness, of keeping the fish and the fishery for the public to be cherished and enjoyed by all Canadians.

Dealing with the paper that was done by Commission counsel, I, too, like British Columbia and Canada, start by commending Commission counsel

on the report. Mr. Commissioner, they've produced a framework, which, given the controversial nature of the issues involved, provides a reasonably objective summary of the jurisprudence, as it stands today. I qualify that, as did Canada and British Columbia, with the speculative nature of the comments on title and some of the extrapolations from cases dealing with land and land-based resources to the fishery.

In addition to being comprehensive and just as important, Commission counsel have recognized the dynamic and evolving nature of the jurisprudence, as well as the inherent difficulty of translating that jurisprudence into fisheries policy and management practice.

Mr. Commissioner, my submission is in two parts, one general and one specific. In this oral submission, I will only refer to the general comments and leave it to you to look at the specific paragraph-by-paragraph review. Commissioner, the fundamental point of fisheries law is that the resource is rights-based. Unlike the land and land-based resources, the fishery, which is the subject matter of this inquiry, the Fraser River sockeye, is not a Crown asset. the common property of all Canadians. The Crown is a steward or a trustee for the public. pointed out in the practice report, the relationship of the Crown to the resource has been expressed in terms of a legal obligation or duty to the public different from the general political obligation of providing good government.

Mr. Commissioner, ensuring the integrity of the public nature of the resource is the prime concern of this participant. And in that light, we commend to the Commission the Railway Belt case, which describes the origins of the public right and its nature as an ancient liberty recognized in Magna Carta. The Railway Belt case is contained in my book of authorities and I won't ask you to turn it up. As can be seen, however, Mr. Commissioner, from those reasons for judgment, the right of fishing is as much a part of Canada's British heritage as it is of the aboriginal heritage of some aboriginal communities.

In passing, I also make reference, Mr. Commissioner, to the **Armor** case, again, referred

to in my authorities, a decision of the Australian High Court in which the High Court of Australia identified the public right of fishing, together with that of navigation, as constraints on the Crown's capacity to recognize aboriginal title to submerged land, which would be in conflict with those public rights so that any aboriginal title to submerged land must be consistent with those public rights.

And this participant, Mr. Commissioner, stresses the fact that the public to which the resource belongs includes every individual Canadian of aboriginal descent. Aboriginal Canadians when fishing other than pursuant to aboriginal or treaty rights, i.e., recreationally or commercially, are exercising the same public right of fishery, as their non-aboriginal countrymen.

Mr. Commissioner, this proposition seems obvious but it is usually overlooked in the public, political and even sometimes the legal discourse about aboriginal rights. To put it bluntly, there's no such thing as a non-aboriginal fishery. Aboriginal fishing rights are not substitutional; they are additional. The public right is not exclusionary but inclusive. And that inclusiveness is the central position of this participant. We ask you, therefore, Mr. Commissioner, to be careful in the use of terminology, that if it is necessary to distinguish, the distinction not be between aboriginal and non-aboriginal fisheries but between fishing pursuant to an aboriginal right or treaty right and fishing pursuant to a public right, between the aboriginal fishery and the public fishery and that it be kept in mind that the public fishery is inclusive of all aboriginal Canadians.

Mr. Commissioner, it's the recognition of the special and additional nature of aboriginal rights that drives the substance and the methodology for the determination, description and application of those rights laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada in the seminal cases of *Sparrow*, *Van der Peet* and *Gladstone* and which this Commission should, with respect, keep in mind throughout. Mr. Commissioner, in its conclusion, the report

states

states, and I quote:

In practical terms, uncertainties may remain as to exactly how such rights and titles ought to inform the detailed decision-making inherent to managing a complex fishery.

Mr. Commissioner, this participant couldn't agree more. It is suggested that much of the focus of this Commission should be on the question of how such uncertainties have been dealt with and how such dealings may be improved in the future. opening remarks made before this Commission in June, the point was made by many that scientific controversies and uncertainties, although important in themselves, were secondary to the issue as to how such controversies and uncertainties were managed by government. point made here is that the same applies in controversies over aboriginal fishing rights. function of this Commission is not to settle the law or even to apply it, but rather, we submit, to review the way in which the jurisprudence informs or doesn't inform fisheries management and to provide guidance for that process. We suggest, respectfully, therefore, that the Commission be alive not simply to controversies or uncertainties themselves, and there many and serious, but also to the sources and potential sources of those uncertainties.

Clearly, Mr. Commissioner, some of those uncertainties are based in the jurisprudence itself. The courts have clearly stated that aboriginal claims to fishing rights are fact-specific and consequently must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Further, such concepts as priority and consultation are relative and contextual rather than absolute and categorical. Still further, the jurisprudence is dynamic and developing. The report, like any survey of the jurisprudence, is a snapshot of a process.

Another source of uncertainty to which particular attention should be paid is the interface between law and policy, between the judicial and the executive functions. Appellate decisions, even at the level of the Supreme Court of Canada, are focused primarily on correcting

error and providing guidance to lower courts. They are not policy manuals. Government and, in particular, the DFO, however, must follow the law, as laid down in those decisions. This is particularly the case where, as stated above, it is managing the exercise of rights of access by individuals to their own common property. This Commission, with respect, should examine how DFO, its policies and practices, are informed by the law with a view to making recommendations for the improvement of that process.

A further potential source of uncertainty, we suggest, is the administrative level at which the law is to be interpreted and applied. Briefly put, this Commission should investigate where in the management process and by whom such difficult questions as whether priority has been given, consultation occurred or food, social and ceremonial needs met, are answered.

Notwithstanding the preliminary and general nature of both the practice report and this comment, however, there are two concerns about the application of the policy on aboriginal rights, which are of concern to this participant and should be raised here. These are the dual systems of fisheries management and the lack of quantification or transparency about quantification respecting aboriginal fishing rights.

With respect to the first, Mr. Commissioner, there's a tension in the management of the aboriginal fisheries between an integrated management and segregated fisheries. concern of this participant that numerous management problems are caused or exacerbated by the existence of two management regimes, one for the public fishery and the other for the aboriginal fishery. Without getting into detail, this participant is concerned that these dual systems result in different standards and, in particular, different standards with respect to conservation, i.e., different escapement objectives, different fishing rules, differences in the reliability of data and differences in enforcement. The existence of a dual system also runs counter to the nature of managing the fishery as organic hole. This latter problem, which I

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46 47 will refer to briefly in a moment, was commented on by Mr. Justice Mackenzie of the Court of Appeal in *Kapp* when he recognized the management problems caused by the Balkanization of the commercial fishery.

The second area of concern is the lack of quantification. There's no apparent attempt to qualify the real food, social and ceremonial needs of the groups holding aboriginal food fishing rights. This results in apparent per capita allocations which are out of all proportion to reasonable domestic needs. This, in turn, leads to the inference that substantial quantities of food fish are, in fact, sold. The lack of quantification also concerns this participant in the context of treaties and harvest agreements where it results in the lack of any indication as to the ultimate extent to which access is to be reallocated from the public to the treaty-based fishery.

Mr. Commissioner, the essence of the law, both Canada and British Columbia have suggested that there is a core in the report that is sound and some speculation. And this participant The essence of the law is in the seminal agrees. cases decided in the 1990's and in particular, Sparrow, Van der Peet and Gladstone in which the Supreme Court of Canada consciously laid down the substantive principles and the methodologies for the determination of the claims to aboriginal fishing rights, their existence, nature and scope, their relationship to other rights and their relationship to government power. This is the core of the law dealing with aboriginal rights of fishing. Cases involving aboriginal title, together with cases involving consultation and accommodation with respect to land and land-based It is resources, are at the periphery. appreciated that this -- the consideration of these matters is necessary for the sake of completeness but in relating them to the fishery, however, they must be recognized as speculative.

And finally, dealing with the translation of law into policy, Mr. Commissioner, and this is in my written submission, it's notable that of the three judges who commented on the policy underlying the commercial aboriginal fishery in Submissions by Mr. Lowes (WFFDF)

the aboriginal fishing strategy in the case of <code>Kapp</code> all were critical of it. Judge Kitchen found that the impugned licensed provisions were not only unconstitutional but socially disruptive and, hence, unwise. Chief Justice Brenner, although finding constitutionality queried whether the program, which was then suspended, should be reinstituted, he stated, and this is at paragraph 120 and 121 of the report, which is in my report, and quote:

In many respects, the pilot sales program has had an unfortunate history. It has generated much ill will between those who work in the two fisheries. It has also generated ill will amongst Aboriginals who work in the commercial fishery and those who work in the P.S.P. fishery. This stands in contrast to the positive acceptance of other A.F.S. measures such as a licence buy-back program.

In view of my conclusion that there has been no s. 15 breach, the Minister, subject to further decisions of the higher courts, is left with the absolute discretion...to reinstitute the P.S.P. However, before doing so and perhaps in giving consideration to other methods, or to changes in the P.S.P. that might be employed to accomplish the same objective, it would be this court's hope that the Minister would consider the history of the P.S.P. and would further consider the extent to which it has enhanced or diminished the overall strategic objective of reconciliation between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals in our country.

And again in the same case but at the level of the Court of Appeal, I read from paragraph 115 of the judgment of Mr. Justice Mackenzie in *Kapp*.

In my view, there are sound reasons not to constitutionalize aboriginal commercial salmon fisheries. Sparrow pointed out that there are 91 separate bands along the Fraser with a claim to an aboriginal food fishery. If a commercial fishery is constitutionally

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Submissions by Mr. Lowes (WFFDF)

1 recognized for some it will be hard to deny 2 it to others. Recognition of the right also 3 would require defining its extent in terms of 4 quantities of fish taken and there is no 5 obvious limit to commercial catches as there 6 is with the food fishery to the reasonable 7 food, cultural, and ceremonial requirements 8 of particular bands. It would risk 9 Balkanizing the commercial fishery and 10 compounding the already formidable management 11 challenges facing the DFO. It would fail to 12 recognize the aboriginal component of the 13 existing commercial fishery, including the 14 nearly half of the seine fleet, that accounts 15 for a large share of the commercial catch of 16 Fraser sockeye in most years. It would 17 threaten to undermine the greater aboriginal 18 participation in the integrated commercial 19 fishery which in many ways sets the fishery 20 apart as an example for other sectors of the 21 economy. 22 23 Thank you, Mr. Commissioner, those are my 24 submissions. 25 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Lowe. And thank you 26 very much for your words with respect to Mr. 27 Otway. 28 I wonder if we might have Mr. Lowe's MR. McGOWAN: 29 paper marked as the next exhibit for 30 identification. 31 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I have it, Mr. McGowan, at Tab 32 6 of my binder so that will be the next. 33 THE REGISTRAR: Marked for identification, D. 34 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. 35 36 MARKED D FOR IDENTIFICATION: Submissions of 37 WFFDF by Mr. Keith Lowes 38 39 MR. McGOWAN: Now, Mr. Commissioner, I note the time. 40 Would this be a convenient time for the morning 41 adjournment? 42

45 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED FOR MORNING RECESS) 46 (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED)

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you very much.

hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.

Participant No. 14 James Reynolds In chief by Mr. McGowan

MR. McGOWAN: Next is our participant 14, Mr. Commissioner. Is it Mr. Reynolds?

EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. McGOWAN:

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MR. REYNOLDS: Mr. Commissioner, my name is James I. Reynolds, that's R-e-y-n-o-l-d-s. I have with me today the general counsel for the Tsawwassen First Nation, Ms. Tina Dion, D-i-o-n.

I'm appearing today for participant group number 14 which is made up of the Maa-nulth Treaty Society, the Musqueam Indian Band and the Tsawwassen First Nation, although the Maa-nulth Treaty Society has decided not to take an active part in these submissions.

My submissions will mainly summarize the contents of the written submissions of the Musqueam and Tsawwassen on the practical implications of the law of aboriginal and treaty rights within the context of the Inquiry's mandate. I believe you have a copy of those written submissions and you may wish to note the paper for identification purposes.

THE COMMISSIONER: We'll do that at the conclusion of your remarks.

MR. REYNOLDS: Thank you. Before dealing with the practical implications of the law, I would like to make five comments on the substantive law. The first is that we agree with other submissions that the Commission's paper gives a fair and balanced view of the law on the whole.

Secondly, we do not agree with every statement in the paper and our failure to state our views on the substantive law is not to be taken as agreement with those statements.

Thirdly, in our respectful submission, the Commissioner has no power to make rulings on the law of aboriginal and treaty rights and we are not asking you to do that.

Fourth, the paper and an understanding of such rights are important to an understanding of DFO's management of the fishery and to possible recommendations that you may choose to make, and we wish to thank the Commission counsel for preparing the paper.

Fifth, the Commission's recommendations should not be contrary to constitutionally

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protected rights if they are to be effectively implemented.

Turning now to the written submissions, they are divided into two parts. Part 1 consists of Musqueam's submissions on the practical implications of the **Sparrow** decision within the mandate of the Inquiry. Part 2 consists of Tsawwassen's submissions on the practical implications of its final agreement or treaty within the mandate of the Inquiry.

As indicated at page 3 of the written submissions, as I think is well known, in the 1990 **Sparrow** case the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal that the Musqueam have an aboriginal right to fish in the Fraser River for food, social and ceremonial purposes. The court left aside the question of the aboriginal right to sell the fish because of the way the case had been presented in the courts below.

I note that the **Sparrow** case was the first Supreme Court of Canada case that considered the aboriginal right to fish and, indeed, s. 35 of the **Constitution Act**, 1982, that recognizes and affirms the existing aboriginal and treaty rights. **Sparrow** also incorporated, within s. 35, the fiduciary obligation of the Crown and the duty to consult that had been recognized by the court six years earlier in the **Guerin** case. That case was also a case brought by the Musqueam.

I think it's important to note that the Musqueam do have a proven - and I stress the word "proven" - aboriginal right to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes, and that this right is protected by the Crown's fiduciary duty.

As noted at page 4 of the written submissions, the response of the federal government to <code>Sparrow</code> was to introduce the Aboriginal Fishing Strategy, an annual comprehensive fishery agreement to regulate fishing by aboriginal groups, including Musqueam, and to do so in a manner that was intended to respect <code>Sparrow</code>. The courts have consistently urged governments, including First Nations, to try and resolve these issues through agreements.

Musqueam has shown repeatedly that it's prepared to defend its aboriginal rights and title

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by litigation, if necessary, up to the highest courts. However, its preference has always been to avoid litigation and to try and resolve disputes by negotiated settlements as repeatedly encouraged by the courts. Therefore, Musqueam has agreed, in most years, to enter into comprehensive fisheries agreements.

It did so initially with great hope and expectation based on its discussions at the time with DFO that, over time, the comprehensive fisheries agreements would give the band an effective form of cooperative management. Unfortunately, as set out at pages 5 to 8 of the written submissions, the early promise of **Sparrow** and the resulting comprehensive fisheries agreements of a meaningful form of cooperative management have proven elusive.

Instead, the annual negotiations and the implementation of the agreements have been a source of frustration and confrontation. In the submission of Musqueam, DFO's approach to comanagement is based upon DFO giving instructions to the band on a shared-delivery of DFO-designed programs, bureaucratic paperwork and reviews, a reduction in budgets, and abrupt shifts in the focus of operations as new government programs are introduced.

We also submit that the **Sparrow** scheme of priority of allocation of the resource, first to Musqueam, second -- sorry, second only to conservation concerns has not been consistently applied. There's no meaningful form of cooperative management of the sockeye fishery in the Fraser and the band has no meaningful say in the sustainability of that fishery.

As noted at the bottom of page 6 of the written submissions, the agreement set up a weak system of a planning committee which has to react to decisions made by DFO on how Musqueam's participation in the fishery would be managed by DFO. There's not sufficient time for the Musqueam representatives to react, and the regional Director General of DFO has the final say. Musqueam has no say in the management by DFO of the fishery by other user groups who dominate the fishery to the detriment of the band and the sustainability of the fishery and often contrary,

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in the submission of Musqueam, to the **Sparrow** scheme of priority.

As noted at page 8 of the written submissions, it's not only Musqueam that suffers from Musqueam's lack of meaningful say in the management of the fishery. You may recall that in his welcome to the Commission in July, Musqueam elder noted that Musqueam had lived with the fishery for thousands of years and it sustained them and their culture. But in the hundred years -- the colonial era of 100, 150 years, and especially with the arrival of industrial fishery, the fishery has declined. Over thousands of years, the Musqueam developed an understanding of the fishery, an understanding that seems to have eluded the scientists that DFO relies upon. They've developed traditional knowledge that's been passed generation to generation and still survives today. Musqueam is very concerned about the sustainability of the fishery and therefore of its economy and culture.

I want to make, and I've been asked to make by my clients, a very important point. Although the paper talks about rights, and we're talking about rights today, it's central to Musqueam culture that the right to fish comes with a responsibility to respect the salmon. It comes with the responsibility to ensure the sustainability of the fishery for future generations. There are no rights without responsibilities and that's firmly established in the Musqueam culture.

It's relevant to note that the only salmon-bearing creek in Vancouver is Musqueam Creek. There is no other salmon-bearing creek in Vancouver. There is only Musqueam Creek. That's located on the Musqueam Reserve. The Musqueam have undertaken much conversation and habitat restoration along the Fraser within their very limited resources.

In **Sparrow**, the Supreme Court of Canada referred to the conservation consciousness of the Musqueam, and we respectfully submit that it's time again that this conservation consciousness and Musqueam's traditional knowledge be heard again through meaningful cooperative management of the fishery by DFO and Musqueam -- throughout

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Musqueam's traditional territory.

Musqueam respectfully submits that as part of the recommendations for improving the future sustainability of the fishery, the Commissioner should recommend that DFO enter into good faith negotiations on an agreement with Musqueam for meaningful cooperative management of the fishery.

I would now like to turn to Part 2 of the written submissions starting at page 10. Part 2 deals with the practical implications of the treaty signed with the Tsawwassen First Nation that came into force last year, the practical implications of that treaty within the context of the Inquiry's mandate.

I noted earlier that Musqueam was the first First Nation to prove an aboriginal right to fish, indeed any aboriginal right. For its part, Tsawwassen First Nation was the first First Nation to enter into a treaty within the B.C. treaty process and it was the first First Nation to establish a treaty right to fish in the Fraser.

The treaty or final agreement established mechanisms for a collaborative management of the fishery. In order to facilitate the cooperative assessment, planning and management of the fishery, it set up a Joint Fisheries Committee with representatives from the First Nation, the province and Canada.

As noted at page 11 of the written submissions, Tsawwassen's submissions are intended to provide the Commission with an understanding of the Joint Fisheries Committee in considering the possibilities that exist for the co-management of the fishery. Tsawwassen is not suggesting that the committee is the alternative or the only alternative to the annual comprehensive fisheries agreements that, as I've indicated, were introduced by DFO in response to the **Sparrow** decision, or even that the joint fisheries committee is a more appropriate process.

Tsawwassen recognizes that it's for each First Nation to make its own submissions on the form of management that it wishes to see, but it's hopeful that its submissions in the paper and today will be helpful to other First Nations and to the Commissioner.

The Joint Fisheries Committee or JFC model

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may contain elements desirable for the future comanagement of the Fraser River fishery by First
Nations and other governments. These elements
include a long-term structured relationship that
consists of representatives from the different
governments that will provide for a more reliable
long-term system of co-management including
allocation and sustainability. In the respectful
submission of the Tsawwassen, these desirable
elements could be replicated in agreements outside
of treaties if that is the desire of the First
Nations in question.

We note that the fisheries chapter of the final agreement provides for clear rules around things like dispute resolution.

As noted at page 12 of the written submissions, although the JFC, the Joint Fisheries Committee, is a relatively new process, the relationship between DFO and Tsawwassen has improved since its introduction, and Tsawwassen is hopeful for the future. The JFC process has improved the mode and quality of communication respecting fish management and Tsawwassen now regards itself and is regarded as a key partner.

Page 13 of the written submissions describe how salmon is allocated under the final agreement. Tsawwassen's allocation for the last ten years, and now under the final agreement, has been under one percent of the Canadian total allowable catch for the Fraser River sockeye salmon.

Page 14 of the written submissions discusses the commercial fishery. As with other commercial fishers, Tsawwassen wants its share of the benefits from the fishery. However, unlike other commercial fishers, Tsawwassen has the added mechanism and responsibility of working through the Joint Fisheries Committee to manage and enhance the fishery. This will likely result in long-term benefits to all users, not just Tsawwassen.

At pages 15 and 16 of the written submissions, there's a description of the composition and procedure of the Joint Fisheries Committee.

Page 17 of the written submission suggests that since DFO meets on an annual basis with other First Nations under the Aboriginal Fishing

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Strategy, that it would be possible that elements of the JFC process might be incorporated within that strategy. This would provide long-term security to the First Nations over fisheries management. It would also assist DFO to achieve its objective of reconciling the demands of First Nations for an enhanced role in management while, at the same time, meeting its statutory obligation to manage the fishery.

At page 18 of the written submissions, we stress that any determination by the Commissioner that results in DFO modifying the manner of deciding the Canadian total allowable catch, or even the actual amount itself, will clearly and significantly impact Tsawwassen's constitutional right to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes. It is very important that this right is protected and respected during this Inquiry and in any final determination or recommendation that the Commissioner makes. From Tsawwassen's perspective, the terms that protect access to the fishery for food, cultural and ceremonial purposes are among the most important aspects of the final agreement.

To conclude, in the respectful submission of the Tsawwassen, those First Nations who wish to participate more fully in stewardship and enhancement of the fishery should not be excluded from those activities, especially given their traditional knowledge of the resource, simply because they have not signed a treaty.

That completes our submissions. Thank you. THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Mr. Reynolds. We'll mark your submission at Tab C of my binder as the next lettered exhibit for identification.

MR. REYNOLDS: Thank you.

THE REGISTRAR: E for identification.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MARKED E FOR IDENTIFICATION: Submissions of Mr. James Reynolds

MR. JANES: Mr. Commissioner, Robert Janes appearing on behalf of the Western Central Coast Salish First Nations. We filed a written brief which I hope you have.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm just looking for that now. Mr.

McGowan, what tab is that at? Oh, I have it now. I think it's Tab 12.

MR. JANES: Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MR. JANES: And I don't propose, of course, to go through that. I primarily plan to touch upon certain highlights in it and relate it to some of the comments that have been made to you today.

I'd start off by saying that we offer this paper principally to address certain issues which we see as being -- requiring some colouring or some further elaboration in the context of what we see as overall a fair and relatively balanced presentation of the law in the Commission's paper. However, we do think there's certain issues which need to be highlighted and brought out, perhaps for some different reasons than some of my other friends have highlighted.

But I want to start off, Commissioner, with the question of what are the practical implications of the whole aboriginal and treaty rights framework for the Commission? Why is the Commission turning its mind to this question at all? Because we agree, as other counsel have said, you are not called upon to make any findings of aboriginal rights or title and you are not well-positioned to do so. So the question may occur, well, why would one even engage in this task at all?

The answer lies in the fact that you are tasked, in part, with the job of making recommendations with respect to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, future management of the Fraser River sockeye, and that -- those recommendations, if implemented, will inevitably have implications for how the Department of Fisheries and Oceans manages other aspects of the fisheries. In doing that, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans clearly has to come to grips with the modern constitutional reality that aboriginal and treaty rights are to be respected as legal rights.

One of the most profound concerns that all of our clients have - and I think this is reflected amongst many of the aboriginal peoples - is that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans appears largely to have taken the approach which says

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food, social and ceremonial fisheries, the FSC fisheries, have been proven in court. We have to deal with these. But that other fisheries and other potential rights which found claims to those fisheries are speculative.

So commercial fisheries or quasi-commercial fisheries or food -- or fisheries that are directed at moderate livelihood, sale-type fisheries, or fisheries founded in aboriginal title are speculative. Until a court tells us to deal with it, we will not and cannot deal with these matters.

In our submission, this has engendered feelings of hostility, of non-cooperation, of frustration and has led to conflict between aboriginal people and non-aboriginal people with respect to he management of these rights and the recognition of those rights, and the proper reconciliation of those rights. For aboriginal people, it creates the sense that these rights are still not recognized as legal rights, to use the words of **Sparrow**. Still not recognized as legal rights.

For non-aboriginal people, there's often a sense that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is recognizing the rights through the back door by perhaps allocating too much to FSC. What we are going to be submitting to you is that the reason you have to address these issues is to give the Department of Fisheries and Oceans -- or at least encourage the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to properly take grip of the mandate that it has been given in numerous cases to take on the process of recognizing aboriginal rights and reconciling them in the context of the fisheries.

You've heard it said that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans has the power to manage the fisheries, but the court, in *Gladstone* - and we reference this at page 23 of our submission -- and I apologize for going over the length, we actually didn't note the page length -- makes the point that ultimately the management of the fisheries is subject to both substantive and procedural limitations. It's just at the end of it 'cause it -- it frames it in terms of the right. The right, that is, in this case a commercial right, is that:

 ...once both procedural and substantive; at the stage of justification the government must demonstrate both that the process by which it allocated the resource, and the actual allocation of the resource which results from that process, reflect the prior interest of aboriginal rights holders in the fishery.

This is not an unfettered power to manage the fishery. It is a power to manage the fisheries which is subject to the substantive limitations imposed by aboriginal rights, and in this case, I highlight, it's a commercial aboriginal right, not just FSC rights and the procedural obligations.

In that context, I'd like to move to the question of aboriginal title. In common with some of my friends, I, too, want to comment on the absence of commentary on the Marshall and Bernard Although as often in the cases with the Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence in aboriginal rights and title, I take a somewhat different conclusion from what the court has written than my friends do. What's been urged upon you is the -- and in Canada's submission and the submission of British Columbia is that the court in Marshall and Bernard emphasize the question of physical occupation of lands. On that basis, the argument is put to you that this really precludes any consideration of aboriginal title in the context of submerged lands.

This is significant because of course, then, there could be fisheries attached to those or exclusive fishing rights in those areas, because how could you physically occupy submerged lands?

In our submission, at page 10 and 11, we cite the -- the entire quote from <code>Marshall</code> and <code>Bernard</code> in this regard. What the court is very careful to do is to make it clear that examining the question of physical occupation requires more than just thinking of village sites or enclosed fields or the classic sorts of things that are sometimes conjured up by that. But instead, it covers a wider range of activities that's driven by the character of the land and the character of the aboriginal people and how they use the land.

While they don't specifically talk about

submerged lands, there's discussion, for example, in the -- just at the page 11 in the last part of the quote -- was an example.

For example, where marshy land is virtually useless except for shooting, shooting over it may amount to adverse possession.

In the case of submerged lands, we would suggest that the use of those lands as fishing stations, as fishing sites for reef net fisheries are the kinds of uses — for shell fisheries, are the kinds of uses which would constitute the use that would be appropriate for foreshores, submerged lands, reefs. You come to the Fraser Canyon, the various fishing stations that are found along there. And that it is too simple an answer to say that the use of the word "physical occupation" excludes aboriginal title and all that goes with it.

And so too does the reliance upon this concept of the public right to fish and the various references that are made in the Commission's paper, and had been alluded to quite eloquently by Mr. Lowes in his submissions to the rights, going back to the *Magna Carta* of the public right to fish.

We wish to highlight that there are two distinctions or two considerations that you should take into account, Mr. Commissioner, when considering this concept of the public right to fish in tidal waters.

The first is that in Canada, we received English law in a very particular way. It was received with the understanding that it would have to be modified to take into account local circumstances and we reference this in our paper. I would suggest to you that in British Columbia, and on the Fraser River and in relation to the lands, the submerged lands of the Fraser River, of the foreshores of Vancouver Island and the Lower Mainland, the fact that aboriginal people were here before the English arrived, before the government asserted the application of English law, has to be one of the most predominant local circumstances imaginable. It was not an empty land in which the Magna Carta could be adopted

from 1215 and conveniently moved from the Fields of Runnymede to the coast of British Columbia.

To give you a simple example from the context of our clients, that is, my personal clients, that is, the Te'mexw Treaty Association, these people signed treaties with the Crown in 1850 and '51 in which they were promised the right to fish as formerly which, we'll eventually show you, included things like reef fisheries. That preceded the adoption of English law in British Columbia.

To say that the public right of fishery, which was adopted about six to seven years after these treaties were signed, would somehow trump these rights would be astounding, I'd suggest. And even Canada, in its submission, refers to **Gladstone** in this regard, but I would highlight to you that **Gladstone** actually raises this issue in the context of justification. That's important, because justification implies that the right has been recognized as existing and that what's engaged in at that point is a balancing of rights subject to all the rules around priority and honourable conduct by the Crown. It is not a denial of the potential of these rights.

The final point I want to end off on -- and again, this is just to highlight a few of the pieces out of the paper -- is the question of what I'll call commercial and quasi-commercial rights or sale rights. The first point I'll make, I referenced earlier, is that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans has really failed to adopt any coherent approach in the consultation/accommodation process to recognizing these rights where they exist.

That's not to say there should be a holus-bolus just grant of these rights. There's no doubt they're specific to specific situations. But there should be a mechanism to meaningfully recognize them and not just say, "Over to the courts." The whole point of the process is to say "not the courts".

Second, for treaties -- and of course this is of interest to the Te'mexw people particularly. It's important to note that the rights contained in treaties are determined with reference to the time at which the treaties are made. In the case

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of the Douglas treaties, that was some twenty-orso years after contact with Europeans, by which time there was well-established trade between the aboriginal peoples and the Hudson's Bay Company. The aboriginal peoples were the fishermen who sold the fish to the Hudson's Bay Company to provide them with food. So there should be great caution exercised in drawing any conclusions with respect to aboriginal rights that necessarily transfer to treaty rights.

But in the end, we submit that all of this is before you because, as Mr. Reynolds says, if your recommendations are to be practically implemented, they have to conform with the constitutional framework that Canada and the Supreme Court of Canada have created, which has been designed to recognize aboriginal rights, to use the words of Haida, and then to achieve a reconciliation of those rights, not to merely deny or fail to deal with those rights.

Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Mr. Janes. MR. McGOWAN: We could perhaps mark Mr. Janes' paper, Tab 12.

THE COMMISSIONER: Tab 12, Exhibit...? THE REGISTRAR: F for identification.

MARKED F FOR IDENTIFICATION: Submissions of WCCSFN by Mr. Robert Janes

- MR. McGOWAN: I think we have just enough time for Ms. Gaertner's submission before lunch.
- MS. GAERTNER: Mr. Commissioner, I am going to be a little bit longer than 20 minutes, but I understand my friend, Mr. Dickson won't be, and so if -- with your leave, he's happy to take this time and I'll begin after lunch.
- MR. DICKSON: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. It's Tim Dickson for the Sto:lo Tribal Council and the Cheam Indian Band.

Like the other participants, Mr.

Commissioner, on the whole we, too, regard -THE COMMISSIONER: I apologize for interrupting. Have
you filed a paper?

MR. DICKSON: Sorry, Mr. Commissioner, we have.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'll just --

MR. DICKSON: I don't know the tab number.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. I'll just find that.

Sorry for interrupting. I just want to -
MR. DICKSON: Not at all.

MR. McGOWAN: I believe you'll find that at Tab 9, Mr.

Commissioner.

MR. COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MR. DICKSON: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. I'm just going to touch on some of the highlights that we set out in that paper, Mr. Commissioner. As I say, on the whole, like the other participants we, too, regard the report as a good snapshot of the law as seen in the case law at this time.

We wish to make a few comments on the report, including on the practical implications of the law. I begin with a few comments on inherent rights. It's important, in our view, to understand that aboriginal peoples like the Sto:lo have inherent rights. That means that they have rights that do not depend on the Canadian state for their existence. They exist not because they are recognized at common law or by the constitution, but rather because these aboriginal peoples are a sovereign people.

Before Europeans came, they had their own legal systems, land tenure systems, management regimes for water and natural resources and wildlife. Since time immemorial, they were sovereign within their own traditional territories, exercising the rights and privileges that sovereignty confers.

That is what must be reconciled with the assertion of Canadian sovereignty. As Chief Justice Lamer stated in **Van der Peet**, aboriginal rights come down to this one simple fact, that when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples were already here living in communities on the land and participating in distinctive cultures as they had done for centuries. It is this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples from all other minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal and now constitutional status.

When the Europeans arrived, the Sto:lo were already here living in communities on the land. They were also fishing in the river for sockeye. Indeed, the Sto:lo are the people of the river and

the word "sockeye" is actually an Anglicization of "sticky" which is the Halq'eméylem word for the species. Sockeye, and salmon more generally, have always been fundamentally important to the Sto:lo and many other aboriginal peoples. The Sto:lo lived off the fish. It supported their communities. They fished it for food, used it for social and ceremonial purposes and they traded it. No distinctions were drawn between these uses. There were no rights to do one but not another.

The Sto:lo also governed themselves with respect to fishing as well as other things. They determined when they would fish and how, and to whom they would trade and how much, and how they would relate to other aboriginal peoples. These were rights and privileges they exercised as sovereign peoples and they had those rights then and they continue to exist today.

What I have just said reflects some of the reality of inherent aboriginal rights. But having the state recognize those rights is a different thing altogether. Aboriginal law has been developed because First Nations have sought protection from the courts against the state's infringement of their rights. The law of aboriginal rights has been in constant development since the 1970s. Generally, that's been a good thing for aboriginal peoples since, in the modern era, it has been primarily through the courts that they've achieved recognition of their rights, and the trend of aboriginal law has been toward protection of an increasingly wide array of aboriginal rights and the holding of the Crown to a duty to act honourably.

But litigation is full of challenges. One challenge is the fact itself that the law is in flux. For instance, in *Sparrow*, the court found that the Musqueam had an aboriginal right to fish for FSC purposes, but the court didn't set out a test for the proof of an aboriginal right. So when the Sto:lo came to assert their right to sell fish in *Van der Peet*, they could not know the test to meet and the result is that they may have to return to court in the future to achieve recognition of their right to sell fish.

Also, while the Court of Appeal found in **Douglas**, 2007, as you've heard, that the priority

afforded to FSC fisheries does not always mean priority in time. The Court of Appeal has recently given leave to a subsequent case to revisit that point.

Another difficulty with litigation is the complexity that it poses. The trial in **Delgamuukw** lasted 384 days resulting in the Supreme Court sending the case back for retrial. The trial in **Chilcotin** lasted 339 days and resulted in the trial judge opining that the Chilcotin had aboriginal title to about 2000 square kilometres of land, but he declined to make a declaration to that effect because of the nature of the pleadings.

So aboriginal litigation is very lengthy and very costly and often does not result in resolution of the claims. The parallel process to litigation, the treaty process, has also been notoriously unproductive. It's so far yielded two treaties, although I should note that the Maanulth treaty will come into force next year.

So if you were to measure the extent of aboriginal and treaty rights in this province only by what has been proved in court to this point, you would conclude that there was very little, but that would be of course entirely untrue. Canada and British Columbia did take that position for many years, and to a large degree, continue to do so today.

The Supreme Court of Canada, however, has held that such a position is contrary to the honour of the Crown. As the court stated in **Haida**, to limit reconciliation to the post proof sphere risks treating reconciliation as a distant legalistic goal devoid of the meaningful content mandated by the solemn commitment made by the Crown in recognizing and affirming aboriginal rights and title. This is not reconciliation, nor is it honourable.

The Crown's duty to act honourably requires it to respect aboriginal rights, even when they have not yet been proven. When the Crown knows of a claim to an aboriginal right and is contemplating some action that could negatively affect it, that it must consult and accommodate. The depth of the consultation and accommodation is dependent not upon the right already being proved,

but rather on the *prima facie* strength of the claim and the seriousness of the impact.

When we think about that test in the context of Fraser River sockeye, we submit that two things are immediately apparent. The first is that there can be no serious question, no honourable question — if I can put it that way — that there is a very wide range of aboriginal rights in Fraser sockeye. Fishing salmon, including sockeye, is what Fraser River First Nations did. Perhaps nothing else was as defining of their cultures.

Second, while the various decisions that DFO makes will differ in terms of their specific impacts on these rights, it is obvious, on a broader view, that decisions that affect the numbers and kinds of sockeye that swim up the river, and First Nations' entitlements to take those fish, how many and how and when, and how many fish will be allowed to escape to the spawning grounds to provide for future generations, all of these are of the utmost importance to First Nations. Fishing sockeye is central to these communities.

The report suggests, at paragraphs 115 and 116, a number of things that we say do not fully reflect the full content of the honour of the It suggests that the fact that one Crown. aboriginal group has a right to do a particular thing will not be without something more sufficient to demonstrate than any other group holds (sic) the same right, that the vast majority of the right to fish claims asserted in respect of Fraser River sockeye have yet to be determined by the courts, that DFO may be required to apply tentatively principles relating to justification of infringements of aboriginal rights, and that in some cases, a duty to consult and possibly to accommodate may arise.

In our submission, it should be obvious that there are a wide range of aboriginal rights in sockeye all up and down the Fraser River, and that the Crown's duty to consult and accommodate in respect of those rights is very deep indeed.

One of the things aboriginal peoples like the Sto:lo really seek in the sockeye fishery is to share decision-making over the sockeye with the Crown. They want to manage the sockeye through a

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truly collaborative process. They don't just want to be told by DFO how many fish they can fish and when and how, for instance. They want to make those decisions with DFO.

There are good policy reasons for DFO to share decision-making with First Nations. One reason is that the decision-making process could thereby incorporate aboriginal traditional knowledge. Another reason is just to ensure that decisions on a topic so important are guided by the communities who have the most at stake in the future sustainability of the sockeye.

But there are also legal reasons. Under the law as it stands now, the Crown ought to recognize that aboriginal peoples have very strong claims to rights related to the stewardship of sockeye and the management of the fisheries through their territories. The honour of the Crown requires that these claims be accommodated.

In our submission, international law also supports that conclusion. There is growing international acceptance, as seen in the U.S. Declaration on the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples, of the principle that states [as read]:

...shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples' concern through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislation or administrative measures that may affect them.

The vast majorities of countries around the world, Australia and New Zealand among them, have endorsed the Declaration. So far, Canada has not.

Indeed we say instead of meaningfully consulting with First Nations and accommodating the rights within a co-management regime, Canada demands that First Nations sign comprehensive fishery agreements which they write unilaterally. We say this is not meaningful consultation nor accommodation.

I have just one more point I wish to touch on, Mr. Commissioner, and that is that the Crown's duty to consult and accommodate First Nations in respect of Fraser sockeye, including through co-

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46 47 management, means that it must provide adequate and stable funding to First Nations so that they can develop the capacity to meaningfully engage in that consultation and co-management. If we consider the duty to consult as it was described by the B.C. Court of Appeal in *Halfway River*, we can see this point.

The Court of Appeal stated there that [as read]:

...the Crown's duty to consult imposes on it a positive obligation to reasonably ensure that aboriginal peoples are provided with all necessary information in a timely way so that they have an opportunity to express their interest and concerns and to ensure that their representations are seriously considered, and whenever possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of action.

Well, the management of Fraser sockeye raises technical issues that plainly require specialized education and experience. The duty to consult, let alone the duty to co-manage, cannot be fulfilled simply by providing all necessary That may work in many contexts. information. That alone cannot work here. A First Nation can only provide meaningful input in the complex area of fisheries management if it has a high degree of technical capacity. That means that a First Nation must be able to employ technical consultants to allow it to participate in consultations with the Crown and especially comanage with the Crown. The result is that, in our submission, in order to fulfill its duty of honourable conduct, the Crown must provide adequate and stable funding to First Nations to allow them to develop this technical capacity.

Indeed, one of the First Nations' largest frustrations, as I hear it, is that the funding they receive from DFO, aside from being inadequate in terms of dollar amounts is year by year where it is provided. They need stable long-term funding to be able to develop capacity and perhaps to form larger organizations for the purposes of

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consultation and co-management with DFO. We say the provision of stable adequate 3 funding is obviously necessary to make consultation and co-management meaningful in an 5 area that is this technically complex. The courts 6 have begun to recognize this point and we have 7 noted a number of cases in this respect in our 8 submission at paragraphs 59 through 61. 9 Those are my submissions. 10 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Mr. Dickson. 11 The paper that is at Tab 9, then, will be marked 12 as the next exhibit. 13 THE REGISTRAR: For identification, G. 14 15 MARKED G FOR IDENTIFICATION: Submissions of 16 STCCIB by Mr. Tim Dickson 17 18 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Mr. McGowan? 19 MR. McGOWAN: Perhaps an appropriate time. Till two o'clock, Mr. Commissioner? 20 21 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much. 22 THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now adjourned until 2:00 23 p.m. 24 25 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED FOR NOON RECESS) 26 (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED) 27 28 This hearing is now resumed. THE REGISTRAR: Order. 29 MR. McGOWAN: Yes, Mr. Commissioner, and Ms. Gaertner 30 is up and I understand that she has perhaps had 31 some discussions with some of our colleagues here, 32 who have agreed to share some of their time with 33 her, so I'll let her address you on that. 34 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Ms. Gaertner? 35 MS. GAERTNER: Mr. Commissioner, I'd like to be able to 36 stand on my own two feet with my own time; 37 however, I understand that there is somewhat of a 38 trading that occurs in these rooms, and so 39 although, again, I stressed, as I have stressed 40 with this coalition, I speak on behalf of a lot of 41 people and a lot of interest, and sometimes I may 42 not be able to say it in as short a period of time 43 as others. 44 I have, however, been advised by participants 45 number 9, the Conservation Coalition, and 20, the 46 Musgagmagw participants, that they are happy to 47 have me use their 20 minutes, and so I think that,

collectively, should give me more than enough. And so, on that, I'll proceed.

I wanted to start by expressing my gratitude to the Commissioner for taking the time to do all the site visits. While there are so many more that you could have done as part of your preliminary work, and I'm sure you appreciate that, given the months that you did do, I'm confident from your opening remarks that the importance of the Fraser River fishery has become more of a reality in your own life experience as a result of those visits.

Many of the places that you went to I've also visited or spent time during the time that I've been working for First Nations, and there were a few that I hadn't been to, and I totally regretted that my own time commitments prevented me from getting there, and I was grateful from your expressions yesterday because, for me, my learning has been that knowing the place from which people live and how they relate to the fish is one of the most important teachings around the importance of the fish to those people, and that if we spend time in Vancouver talking about fish, it doesn't quite give you the right flavour, and that it's extremely necessary to spend time on those rocks and in those places with the people to begin to grasp the depth of relationship that they have.

I also wanted to begin my submissions to this inquiry by expressing and saying that over the 25 or so years that I've worked for First Nations, working for salmon is one of the most honourable parts of my profession, and I was touched and pleased to hear the Commissioner speak, yesterday, of that honour in your own approach.

The sacredness of salmon to First Nations is such an important part of that relationship. We treat things that are sacred different than we treat things that are just numbers or a problem to solve. We are careful before we act, before we speak, how we act, how we complete a task, and how we pass it on to next generations. All must be in right relations when we are relating to something that is sacred.

And so it could be said that the work we're doing here is cloaked with that same sacred relationship and must, therefore, be in right

relations. And I thought, again, Mr.
Commissioner, I would take a moment to talk about that concept or right relations. It's a very, very old way of expressing a very basic concept, which is being in a good or right place with another, whether that's with an animal, a place, water, or other human beings. It's an old ethic at the heart of many indigenous cultures around the world.

Whenever I begin a project, whenever I'm

sitting at negotiating tables - not at court tables - but whenever I'm sitting at negotiating tables, especially ones of this magnitude and this significance, I rest within that principle and offer it to those I'm working with, for, or against. And so now I ask myself, "How can I be in right relations with all the positions and everybody around this room?" And I'm left wanting to share with you another teaching on this topic. It's a teaching I received from an anthropologist by the name of Angelie Zarion (phonetic). worked all over the world with cultures and indigenous people all over the world, and one of her techniques and one of her skills is to summarize teachings so that they're meaningful in a modern context. And so she summarized right relations amongst humans as an act of prayer, a way of being in this way, four-fold way:

One, show up, be present and pay attention, be respectful. The court process and the process you have here has a bit of a one-up on a lot of other fishing meetings I've been to where people are very heated and a lot of arguments are going on and the room is very contentious.

Listen. Again, you're very skilled at that. You've been trained at that. You have to pay attention. What she goes is one step further: Pay attention to what is heart and has meaning.

Thirdly; speak the truth. And again, this process will help to ensure that all of us speak the truth before you.

The last item, I think, is one of the most challenging items for any processes, especially those in which there is advocates that are trained to act on behalf of interests.

And the last one is to be open, but not attached to outcome. I must say, I struggle with

that regularly. I want to get right down to your recommendations and what I want you to do in this commission and how to get there. But, rather, I'm here to be open and not attached to the outcome.

I offer this to all of those around. I'm more than happy to be reminded of these principles as the time goes on, and I think it will be useful for us to ensure that we stay in right relations to each other and to the salmon for whom we're all here working.

I turn, now, to the topic at hand and, again, as Commission counsel opened this morning and reminded me, I'm grateful for the Commission for taking up the opportunity, as I suggested, to review the law of Aboriginal rights and title and treaty rights as part of the beginnings of the hearing, and particularly, to allow the participants to engage in a dialogue about this area of the law in order to find out areas of agreement and disagreement.

In my view, the paper that was presented by the Commission is a useful overview. It thoroughly canvasses a snapshot of the ever evolving legal framework. As you will hear in my oral submissions, the challenge, I believe, is not the law but the application of that law to a very complex fishery.

Oddly, I would make this observation: The Federal Crown chose not to discuss the practical implications of this law and took the time to discuss, in full, their views on the law. Suffice it to say that in our view, whenever dealing with the issues of law, the challenge will be to apply them.

Going first, now, this inquiry is to be conducted within the context of the Canadian law. You are not being asked to make rulings on any specific rights as it applies to any specific findings or any specific situations. A judge, however, being asked to consider recommendations on how to rebuild the Fraser River sockeye, must take notice of the legal framework that governs and affects salmon. Undoubtedly, that framework concludes the constitution and, in particular, constitutionally protected s. 35 rights related to that fishery.

We all agree that the Commissioner has no

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authority to decide legal rights or obligations and, therefore, will not be making rulings on the state of law. However, I want to take you to a quote from Ed Ratushny's book. I know it's in your binder of submissions, tucked into the front page, because I just passed it around this afternoon. This is more in reply to a paragraph in Canada's argument, where he refers to the first paragraph of the quote, on page 162, but I have to take you to the subsequent paragraphs.

And so Canada takes you to the first paragraph, on page 162, which reads:

A commission of inquiry has no authority to decide legal rights or obligations; the fact-finding function of a commissioner has an intrinsic value quite apart from that of serving as the foundation for determining rights or obligations.

But I want to take you to two paragraphs further than that in the same description of the basic functions of an inquiry [as read]:

It would be a sterile exercise merely to record these conclusions -

-- which are your conclusions of fact --

- since they provide a unique opportunity to go one step further; that is, to make recommendations to avoid similar problems occurring in future. The commissioner must become educated throughout the inquiry process in order to draw lessons from the events. The recommendations can relate to laws, administrative practices, relationships, and organizational structures, and can inform public and political discussion and debate.

And then, just as I think of salmon, I think of:

In many respects, the journey of a commissioner of inquiry is as important as the destination.

Commissioner, Cohen, we submit you have a unique opportunity to go one step further than finding facts about the state of decline for the Fraser sockeye. Rather, as we submitted in our opening remarks regarding the scope of this inquiry, it is your ability and responsibility to make recommendations regarding the sustainability and improved management of the fishery that is of critical importance to my clients and the members of the public at large. These recommendations will very much relate to the application of the law by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, including the administrative practices of DFO and the relationships and organizational structures that would be useful for the sustainability and improved management of the Fraser River sockeye.

In our submission, the debate resulting from the submissions that are before you should not focus so much on the state of the law but, rather, the challenges to implement the law. We are hoping that the Commissioner will here, during the course of this inquiry, ways of improving our relationship to salmon, including the ethics of sustainability.

You are also likely to hear about measure that, given the last 20 years or so with the development of the law to date, require changes, further changes to the status quo in terms of the management of the fisheries.

In the views of many First Nations, DFO has not been truly responsive to s. 35 law as it is already developed, and in this way I would like to note that I support the submissions that were made by Mr. Dickson and Mr. Reynolds today, regarding the frustrations that many First Nations have experienced. Mr. Reynolds spoke about it directly as it relates to Musqueam, whose case whose rights were determined in **Sparrow**. Mr. Dickson talked about it as it relates to the Fraser River First Nations. Many, many, have experienced increasing frustration that the law has changed but it has not been sufficiently implemented on the ground.

Having read Mr. East's submissions on behalf of the Department of Justice, it was clear to me why it's very difficult for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to get on with the business at hand in a constitutionally respectful and, we

submit, useful manner. Continued legal denial or de minimis of the rights the First Nations hold is a significant handicap for DFO's managers.

Oddly, some of that reluctance seems to disappear when the Crown enters into treaties, modern treaties, with First Nations, who negotiated those treaties, relying specifically on the rights entitled that others assert.

We agree with the Commission's paper and with Keith Lowes' and Bradley Caldwell's, counsel for the B.C. Wildlife Federation and the B.C. Federation of Draft Fishers, at paragraphs 14 to 18 of their submissions, where they note that in practical terms uncertainties remain on how such Aboriginal rights and title ought to inform the decision-making inherent in managing a complex fishery.

Gratefully, I believe you will find that good governance in the complexities of the modern Fraser River sockeye, is an inclusive governance system which we believe can be implemented in a manner that's transparent and consistent with s. 35 rights. Again, it's a matter of political will.

Like my friends, Mr. Lowes and Mr. Caldwell, we agree that the Commission must be alive to the controversies and uncertainties regarding the implementation, alive to the fact that the case law is dynamic and evolving and, we submit, must be acutely aware of the interface between law and policy.

There are two topics that I want to briefly speak on with respect to the content of the law before I turn to the practical implications. The first is the dialogue and discussions as have happened both in the written submissions and orally today on the Aboriginal title to fresh and marine waters. And you'll find our submissions at page 1 of our written submissions, and I'm going to take you to paragraphs 5, 6, and 7.

Clearly, while all aspects of Aboriginal law will evolve over time, it is neither impossible nor, in our submissions, doubtful to successfully the law of Aboriginal title to include water areas.

I take you to paragraph 5 in my written submissions in which I outline how First Nations,

including those members of the FNC, have consistently and strongly asserted that the territories over which they exercise and hold Aboriginal title, include not only the land. Water is often described by most First Nations as a key to life, and it goes without saying, if you look at the settlement of British Columbia, that the lakes, rivers, banks, fishing rocks, and the parts of the ocean, seabed and foreshore that they have traditionally used and occupied, are still being relied upon by them today. First Nations' use and occupation of their territories is interconnected with the resources of their territories. For the First Nations of the Fraser Watershed and the marine area along the migratory route of sockeye salmon, use and occupancy of fresh and marine waters will be directly related to the presence of fish and marine mammals in those territories.

First Nations' connections to those vital resources for sustenance, for economics, for spiritual, social, ceremonial and other purposes, together with the practices of fishing, hunting, gathering, are all foundations for and indicia of Aboriginal title.

You'll also note that the traditional villages, and later reserves, are often located in areas adjacent to or in strategic locations along the Fraser River, its tributaries, and key marine access points. These rivers, streams, lakes and marine areas are a fundamental part of the First Nations' territories and how they have used those territories, the Aboriginal title they rely upon and, most particularly for you, the stewardship responsibilities that they exercise in relation to them.

I understand my friends take issue with the conclusions and perhaps the strength of my conclusion in paragraph 6. I am prepared to make an amendment to the word "predictable" to "possible"; however, the First Nations Coalition submits the judicial findings of Aboriginal title to marine and river areas and the salmon resources are a possible evolution of the law of Aboriginal title should First Nations not be able to achieve recognition of those rights outside of the courtroom.

And again, I adopt the submissions of Mr. Reynolds, on behalf of the Musqueam and Tsawwassen, when he took you to a quote of the Supreme Court of Canada, which encourages us all to be at the negotiating tables rather than in the courts.

Meanwhile, and Mr. Dickson raised this point briefly in his submission, but I have to underscore it and stress it in the context of the management of the fishery, until those cases, and only if those cases are necessary, these assertions of strong Aboriginal title and interests require the Crown to proceed honourably when contemplating any actions or decisions that could affect such title. Without such caution or respect of the Crown, they would be reverting to a post-proof sphere and, as stated by the Court in <code>Sparrow</code> and again <code>Haida</code>, would then be treating reconciliation as a "distant legalistic goal, devoid of the 'meaningful content'".

Turning a bit in response to Canada's submissions, and in particular their paragraphs 4 to 6, Canada suggests that the Commission's framework paper cross the line from summarizing the law to speculating about its future direction. Oddly, I think Canada has done exactly what they criticize the Commission in doing. Canada's discussion about the possible evolution of the law of Aboriginal title and, in particular, the arguments that title would not likely be proven to freshwater and marine spaces is, in our submission, entirely speculative and unhelpful.

If I read and heard Mr. East correctly, he hypothesizes that the common law test for Aboriginal title to the fishery is so stringent it's out of the reach of most First Nations, and in my submission, that is totally contrary to both the spirit and the intent and all the Supreme Court of Canada rulings with respect to s. 35.

S. 35 isn't there so that we can somehow figure out, from an Aboriginal context, how to fit into Canadian common law. S. 35 is there so that we can adapt and adjust our laws to properly recognize and respect and reconcile the Aboriginal rights and title of First Nations of this country.

It is our submission that Canada spends, from pages 10 to 15, stating its opinion on where the

law should go and, with respect, that's not the purposes of this inquiry. The Commission got it right the first time. The Commission recognized that the law of Aboriginal rights and title is evolving, and noted and remained open to the possible directions it may take.

I also want to stress that it's my view that

I also want to stress that it's my view that he does exactly the same thing in paragraph 18 of his submissions. I'm not going to go through the detail of it. Again, you'll hear that he suggests, or you'll see that he suggests that it would be much more difficult to establish exclusive and physical occupation in the Fraser River and its tributaries. Of course, it's the submissions that I made, and you heard from Mr. Dickson, that First Nations along the river could meet this test, should this be necessary.

Again, in our view, as I'll review more substantively in my submission, it's the clear assertion and the constant assertion, together with the constant use and continued use of that river that shows that the First Nations have a very strong relationship to that fishery and rights associated with that fishery, and it's those assertions tat are strictly and must be honourably dealt with in the context of DFO's obligations around management.

Oddly, my friend, Mr. East, relies on **Bernard** and **Marshall** to discount exactly what the court in that decision, I think, says as it relates to the recognition that a First Nations use of a place for fishing could ground Aboriginal title. Canada's treatment of **Bernard** and **Marshall** completely overlooked the requirement for the court to consider the Aboriginal perspective when determining an Aboriginal right or title claim.

When determining an Aboriginal title or rights claim, the court must start with the understanding the claim for the First Nations' perspective, understanding the practices, uses and nature of occupation from an Aboriginal perspective, and then looking for a corresponding common law right. Canada forgets this.

In addition, we say that if and when such a claim is made, the court will have to consider whether the test for Aboriginal title to land needs to be adjusted when dealing with water

spaces.

Next in the area of the law, I want to turn to the Aboriginal right to manage, which we begin to discuss particularly at page 3 of our submission, and I want to take you to paragraphs 12 through 15.

It's our submission that implicit in s. 35 Aboriginal rights to fish for sockeye salmon is the responsibility to make management decisions, including such things as fishing methods, openings, and stewardship measures that need to be in place.

The courts have repeatedly indicated the content of that right must be guided by the perspective -- sorry, I am repeating myself there.

The First Nations Coalition submits that the law on Aboriginal rights to fish should not be rendered meaningless by reducing an Aboriginal right to fish to something we now call a harvest right. Such a right, when viewed form the Aboriginal perspective, always includes the right and responsibility to manage the fishery for present and future generations, which, in modern times, can, as a minimum, be described as the right to be meaningfully and collaboratively involved in strategic and operational aspects of the management of the resource.

I also note that treaty rights also provide a recognition of First Nations' rights as managers of the fisheries. In particular, I am representing Snuneymuxw, Tsartlip and Tsawout, who are holders of the Douglas Treaty rights, and those include fisheries and formally, and in paragraph 14 I refer to cases that have, in our submission, provided a foundation for the right to manage fisheries.

Finally, I just want to respond on the bit of the law that was taken up by the participants in response to the Commissioner's paper on the duty to consult. In particular, Canada's argument at paragraph 28 of its submission, that the Commission has gone too far in saying that the assertions of Aboriginal title to marine areas may be sufficient to place consultation obligations on the Crown. And they say that *Haida* was clear that the Crown has an obligation to consult when it has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential

 existence. So that's what I say.

In *Brokenhead*, the Federal Court emphasized that the claim must be credible to engage the duty to consult. What Canada does is say, by quoting Professor Newman, is to somehow suggest that the idea is there can be no overriding doubts or, if there are overriding doubts, that somehow that undermines the obligation to consult.

Although the Federal Court, in Athabasca, referred to Professor Newman's writing, it did not specifically adopt his understandings of when the duty to consult arises. The First Nations Coalition submits that there are no overriding doubts test as to when the Crown is obliged to consult. Haida remains the authority in this regard. All that Athabasca says is that you need a nexus between the claimed Aboriginal right and the impugned government activity. The fact that First Nations have used and occupied the Fraser River area and its tributaries for their fishery for hundreds of years is not speculative, it's not theoretical, and it's not hypothetical. First Nations have credible Aboriginal title claims to the fish and marine waters that support sockeye salmon, and these claims must be treated respectfully by the Crown by recognizing those claims give rise to a duty to consult when the Crown contemplates conduct that could affect such claims.

One last matter in reply on some of the comments that were made around the law and some facts is that in Canada's submissions, it seems to suggest or cast doubt on which modern day nations are signatories to the Douglas Treaty. The First Nations Coalition submits that it's patently clear that the Snuneymuxw, the Tsartlip and the Tsawout First Nations are signatories to the Douglas Treaty. There is case law that supports that and confirms that for each one of them. Morris and Olson, the injunction case as it relates to Snuneymuxw and the Saanichton Marina case are all cases that specifically deal with each of those communities.

So I'm not quite sure where the Crown was going with that, but I wanted to make it abundantly clear that for the three clients I'm representing, there's no doubt that they're

holders of the Douglas Treaty right.

Mr. Commissioner, I'm now going to take you to the substance of my paper as it relates to the practical implications of this law for the mandate and work of those Commissioner, and I'm going to start at page 6, and the rest of my oral submissions will be based on that, and I'm just stressing some of the things that I've covered in my written materials.

As you'll see in paragraphs 23 through to 26, I wanted to ground this challenge, which is the challenge of reconciliation. One of the first topics the Commission paper took on when it reviewed the law is the fundamental intention of s. 35 law is to bring reconciliation.

And so I think it is extremely important, when you look at the intention of that law and how it applies to your mandate, to recognize that there's a historical context for that reconciliation and, in particular, as it relates to the Fraser Watershed and the coastal marines of what is now British Columbia, these people had created lives that were deeply connected with the salmon.

You've heard lots about that. I'm not going to repeat anything. I've written, in the paragraphs that follow that, but perhaps bring it home, a couple of things that I always think is useful. Often, it's suggested that some of the ethics and myths that First Nations hold as it relates to the salmon are really not that relevant today, and I disagree terribly with that suggestion.

One of the things that I've learned through my time with First Nations and the salmon is just how important those older traditions are to teaching us ethical behaviour. You know, it's one thing to come in and have a principle of use that includes often using a resource to extinction. It's another thing to have the ethical foundations of the government that teach people right from the beginning, right relations, with that resource.

And so often so many of the stories, some of which you may have heard as you travelled through, are not just cute stories, they were stories that people were taught from the get-go so that they understood what it meant to go down to those

 rocks, what it meant to take the fish, what it meant to feed the families, how much to take, when to take it. All of those things were practical teachings that many of the fishers still carry. Some of it have lost it as a result of colonization, there's no doubt about that.

And there were two, as in preparation for this hearing, that made me smile, and so I thought I'd bring them to this room today.

The first is the Haida people have, through this preparation, taught us about their relationships to the creeks and their territories. And in their teachings, every one of their creeks has a supernatural being, a creek woman, who is a steward of that resource. And so before any salmon is taken from the creeks or the rivers, permission from the creek woman must be obtained and respect must be paid through offerings.

I was thinking about that story this morning as I walked to work, and I imagined the creek woman that's sitting at the front of the Fraser River and how powerful a being she may be, given the strength of that river, and perhaps whether or not we're in right relations with her or not.

The other story that I thought I'd bring home to you, today, is an Interior Salish story that I most recently heard from Dr. Ron Ignace, who I believe may be a witness in this hearing later on, and he tells the Secwepemc story of the Coyote. Now, Coyote is an extremely important part of the creation stories of all of the Salish people, because the Coyote is the transformer who brought life into the manifested world, into the manifested places we have before us.

And one of the stories they teach all of their fishers up in Skeetchestn is the story about Coyote, who is a transformer, travelling up the river and into the Secwepemc territory. And Coyote apparently gets hungry at various times and developed quite a hankering for fish. And after trying a number of numerous different ways of getting himself into various different forms so he could attract the fish, he was eventually taken in by three medicine women who, for four day sand four nights, worked him, as they say, and eventually, as a result of the strength that he obtained through those teachings, he was able to

break the dam and summon the salmon up the river.

Now, apparently, Coyote got very impressed with himself and he began to catch a whole lot of those salmon and set up those beautiful drying racks, some of which I understand you saw, at least when you were in Bridge River, and had all these drying racks packed full of salmon. And so he decided he wanted to hold a large meeting and show off those salmon to everybody around as to how much he had caught. However, just as he was doing that, the salmon jumped off the racks and returned to the river, and all that was left on the racks was the slime from the skin on the stick.

Now, you might ask, "What's that story about and why did the fisherman learn that story?" Apparently, it's extremely important, from the Secwepemc's perspective, to learn that when you inflate your ego and spend your time showing off how much you've caught, you're disrespectful to the salmon. The Secwepemcs say that when we disrespect that salmon and their homes and are more concerned about, I'm going to say, numbers, here, and they say "showing off your catch," then the salmon will leave us.

It's interesting to apply that story to the ethics of Fisheries management over the last hundred years and begin to ask the question why the salmon are going away.

In just over a century, much of what has been fundamentally changed has resulted in the brink of extinction of a salmon fishery that's meant a lot to First Nations.

In paragraph 25 and 26 I talk about what led to the **Sparrow** decision. In 1992, after **Sparrow**, DFO then moves to the AFS strategy. And again, I support the submissions that were made by Mr. Reynolds this morning about the challenges that have happened with AFS.

All of this to say, and I say it at the end of paragraph 27, that the path towards reconciliation paved by the court decisions is not for the weak of heart. Applying those court decisions in the context of colonization in the fisheries and, in particular, both the commercial and recreational fisheries that have developed, is an extremely difficult task for DFO managers, for

First Nations' managers and, in my submission, Mr. Commissioner.

The next practical challenge, as it relates to the law, is on page 9 of my submissions and, in particular, the Aboriginal perspective on the content of Aboriginal title and rights to the fisheries. As I've already mentioned, and as you're already aware, there are numerous Supreme Court of Canada decisions that speak about ensuring that when applying and considering the rights protected by s. 35, we be informed by the Aboriginal perspectives.

And so I took from my clients and from the work that's been done with respect to First Nations' relationships to their fisheries, and provided you as best I can a summary of the key components of the Aboriginal perspective on the content of Aboriginal title and rights, and you can find that at paragraph 31.

I stress that it includes the responsibility to protect, conserve and sustain the fishery for this and future generations and with it, therefore, the responsibility to manage and preserve the salmon in the environment in which it relies.

It also includes the responsibility to other First Nations who access, depend upon, and are similarly related to the salmon. There are many stories about how when First Nations along the river accessed that early steward about how many days the fish have to be passing before they can start accessing that fish to ensure that the people up river have an opportunity to access the same fish.

Thirdly, the right to harvest salmon for all purposes within their homelands and, in particular, to harvest salmon to support thriving families and villages and nations. So often in our perspective we compartmentalize the right to fish in the way that we, as colonists, have compartmentalized the right to fish, but over and over again I've heard from First Nations the integrated nature of their relationship to that fishery and how it has always supported thriving villages, families and nations.

Thirdly (sic), the right includes the right to harvest salmon using all the traditional

methods that they've known and passed down over the centuries, and the methods that have evolved and developed over time.

And, finally, the right and responsibility to exercise and maintain proper relations to the salmon and its ecology, including the rivers - and I should have said, also, lakes there - the rivers, the lakes, the forests and the marine areas.

All those are components indicia parts of the rights and Aboriginal people have traditionally used, continue to use, and will continue to assert, and I'm sure that they can exercise in a modern context.

Paragraph 34, I submit that the jurisprudence required for the recognition of an Aboriginal right to the fishery has already been laid. By relying upon both the common law as established and First Nations' perspectives on Aboriginal title and rights, sufficient changes could be made to the management of the Fraser River sockeye salmon fishery that would not only pave the way for reconciliation, but also substantively increase the likelihood of ensuring the sustainability of those fisheries.

One of your challenges in this inquiry will be to diligently look to find solutions that balance both the rights that First Nations exercise and the sustainability of that fishery. And lucky, we will be coming here with opportunities and suggestions and solutions for you to do that.

Another practical, and I would say one of the most difficult components of applying the law, has been the constitutional priority that's been afforded the Aboriginal right to fish for what we call food, social and ceremonial purposes.

Since **Sparrow**, that right has been confirmed in law, and since **Sparrow** there have been differing perspectives on what that priority means and whether DFO is meeting it.

The constitutional priority of s. 35 fishing rights should not be equated to priority of access. The priority of that right must be given a fulsome interpretation.

I'm not going to read out the quote that I have set out for you at page (sic) 36, I leave it

 for you to read, but it's clear in the context of the title, questions arising that in **Delgamuukw** the court adopted, from **Gladstone**, relevant questions as to whether the Crown is showing priority for Aboriginal fishing rights, and they were speaking in a much, much broader context than just priority of access.

So what are these practical implications? Well, I say there's two: one, what does conservation mean; and, second, how can First Nations food, social and ceremony priorities be protected in a fishery that has historically denied that right and faces continued pressures from other users and industries, especially users like the commercial and recreational fisheries that have traditionally accessed that fishery prior in time.

Now, we're going to spend a little bit of time later this week on the whole issue of "What does conservation mean?" At the end of paragraph 38, I just want to stress that the level of risk tolerance that's inherent in DFO's management approach has often been unacceptable to First Nations whose own laws, practices and traditions require a much more precautionary approach that builds, rebuilds and sustains a very complex mixed-stock fishery for this and future generations.

Now, I want to say, and I have a quote that I'm going to read in paragraph 39 up on the top of page 12, which is, the Crown's submission somehow suggests that the leading case on priority is the Douglas case, and I respectfully disagree. The leading case on priority is Sparrow. It sets out the principle as it relates to **Sparrow**. Douglas applies it to a very fact-specific situation and setting that arose in Cheam, but I think what's going to become very important is a line from $% \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) =\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)$ Sparrow. We've seen it, and we've seen the challenges associated with applying this over the last few years, but it's very clear that particularly during times of scarcity that priority and balancing are a little bit difficult to do. You can't balance priorities if there aren't enough fish. And we say that if in a given year -- we agree with the Court in Sparrow and we submit this is something that DFO has an extremely

 difficult time implementing on the ground. If, in a given year, conservation needs required a reduction in the number of fish to be caught such that the number equalled the number required for food by the Indians, then all the fish available after conservation would go to the Indians, according to the constitutional nature of their fishing right.

That is going to be something you will have to consider, Commissioner Cohen, when you consider the implications and the challenges associated with a fishery that is at risk.

Now, as part of the priority and its an acknowledgment and not something that I'm hiding from, of course there's a test of reasonableness when assessing infringements and scrutinizing government actions related to that priority, but it should come as no surprise to you that when a test of reasonableness is used, that different people are going to have different views on what's reasonable.

And while the First Nations Coalition recognizes the successful implementation of the FNC priority as a challenge, we also submit that neither the complicated nature of the fishery, which we often hear about, nor the pressures from the various interests, are sufficient excuses for failing to honour the constitutionally held right to priority of First Nations.

Now, you might wonder where I'm going with all of that and what that might mean for you. paragraph 42, one of the issues that I want to raise with you that I know the evidence in the next while will deal with is, so how do you solve that trickiness of priority and the fact that the Fraser River is filled with First Nations along tributaries with a lot of different streams, and there has been a number of suggestions and strategies that have been posed to DFO on many occasions, in many ways, and in paragraph 42 I quote from Parzival Copes, who has written an article on Aboriginal fishing rights and salmon management in British Columbia, and I set out what he has summarized as what's called terminal fisheries. So it's one of the ways to reduce fishing effort on mixed stocks as much as possible is using these terminal fisheries. And the other

is to employ selective fishing techniques, such as weirs and traps and fishwheels and beach and purse seines, and all of the others that he lists.

Ironically, these are exactly how First Nations have managed the fishery and were managing the fishery when we arrived in this area of the province.

The First Nations Coalition is not satisfied the DFO is committed to these solutions. We say there's been insufficient effort employed to date to transition an unsustainable marine mixed stock fishery into a more traditional and long standing practice of the selective terminal fisheries.

And we submit that this inquiry will, amongst other things, need to explore why there's such resistance to that change. It will be useful for all of us to know what the challenges are to implementing that, and the steps that may be necessary so that they can be implemented.

The next area that I want to speak to is the meaningful participation in the management of the fishery. You've heard, on many occasions already today, the inherent responsibilities that First Nations have to the fishery, whether it's a part of title or their rights or they exercise as self-government. At paragraph 47, I picked up a quote, again from Parzival Copes in the same article, and I thought it was useful. Actually, it's the first time I've seen it so succinctly put into a paragraph, on the complexities of fisheries management.

And I say that not because it's so complex we should therefore just leave it for DFO to do. Quite the opposite. I say it to suggest that DFO has been slow to substantively work with First Nations to develop the transparent and inclusive processes that are adequately resourced and accountable to make their participation useful to DFO, responsible to their own rights and responsibilities, and effective for the management of the fishery.

I'm also going to suggest, at paragraph 48, that our own history and our own work over the last 20 years also suggests that there are challenges that are inherent in the number of First Nations that access these runs all throughout the marine and the Fraser River

Submissions by Ms. Gaertner (FNC)

Watershed, many of which are organized in various ways in operating with distinct political authorities and mandates. Most of them have inadequate resourcing in order to have and ensure fulsome political representation when necessary, and definitely the necessary sufficient technical expertise.

In that regard, I support the submissions of Tim Dickson earlier today about the need to have technical expertise that's reliable and much more than based on an annual funding.

Just because it's challenging doesn't make it impossible. With adequate human and financial resourcing dedicated to overcoming these obstacles. It is possible and, I submit at paragraph 49, at the top of page 15, what needs to be done. We need to develop, resource, organize and refine what's been called the Tier 1 process. I'm not sure, Mr. Commissioner, whether you're familiar with those terms yet or not, but Tier 1 refers to -- there's three tiers. Tier 1 -- oh, you've got it, okay. Tier 1 is discussions and the relationship that's necessary amongst First Nations; Tier 2 is First Nations and Federal Government; and Tier 3 would eventually get us to talking to all of the participants in the fishery.

The second is to engage in a process that ensures and obtains the necessary mandates from First Nations. The third is the technical capacity, expertise and support. And then, finally, we need to encourage and work with DFO to develop the Tier 2 government-to-government processes that would address, amongst other things, the establishment of selective and terminal fisheries.

Now, I made a point, at paragraph 51, that I just want to pick up, especially in response to Mr. Lowes' comments about an integrated and segregated system. I have to say that I think for most First Nations, giving DFO the credit of saying that the management is done in a systematic way is a first step. Many people do not experience it as systematic. Most people experience it as quite chaotic, very reactive, very unclear on what processes are being used for what purposes, who's going to be engaged in those discussions, how the decisions will be made as a

result of that engagement. It isn't clear.

And so when Mr. Lowes suggests that we have a dual system, I think that's being kind. I think it's basically a piecemeal system that's being —that's not guided by defined terms of reference and is not clear how it's being implemented.

Again, I would say that one of your tasks, when looking at management and recommendations around management, is to figure out, what is the resistance to change that's occurred, that still is alive within DFO subsequent to these cases. Why can't we have effective and transparent decision-making processes that engage all of those that are involved and care about the management of the fishery? What are the steps that are going to be necessary to get there, and what's the funding that will be necessary to ensure that we get there?

My last point to make, today, results from the honour of the Crown and the duty to consult and accommodate. The practical implications of the clear enunciation of the justification test pronounced in *Sparrow*, the judicial clarifications that the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with First Nations, and DFO's knowledge of the existence, both real and potential, of s. 35 Aboriginal rights, is that, unquestionably, DFO must meaningfully consult the rights holders prior to making decisions that have the potential to impact such rights, with the goal of addressing their concerns.

Over the last few decades, the Federal Crown, and in particular DFO, has clearly been put on notice in addition to the proven Douglas Treaty rights, that First Nations asserts strong prima facie claims for First Nations title and rights to the Fraser River Watershed and, particularly, to the sockeye.

Given DFO's knowledge of such assertions, their willingness to offer AFS Agreements, and their tendency, in my submission, to admit the existence of s. 35 FSC rights, First Nations assert that the consultation must occur at the deepest level of the *Haida* spectrum.

It is the FNC's submission that if DFO takes a position contrary to that they should not only advise First Nations, but they should provide

sufficient opportunity and resources in order for First Nations to gather the information that's necessary for the Crown to make an informed decision.

All that being said, there are practical implications associated with implementing the duty to consult and accommodate, including there's inadequate human and financial resourcing for both DFO and First Nations to adequately engage.

And, you know, I'm just going to take this moment. This is one of those times where maybe it's too much of a jump, but I actually anticipated that in the Crown's submissions, when looking at the application of this law to the fisheries, we might have heard the challenges we hear from a lot of DFO managers, which is that they don't have the human resources or the financial resources to fully and properly engage in these processes.

Secondly, the challenge is a meaningful engagement during in-season decision making processes. You are going to hear and you've probably already surmised from the work that you've done, we got a little bit of it yesterday already, that while we can do a lot of predictive modelling, there are too many issues that are coming at these fish to be that accurate with our predictive modelling. So in-season decisions are some of the most time sensitive decisions, but they're also the ones that are most likely to result in direct infringements to s. 35 fishing rights. There has not been, in our submission, adequate effort by DFO to develop options for meaningful in-season consultation and involvement in decision making.

Secondly, in the area of consultation, there is a lack of reliable and timely information. Often, First Nations get information way too late in the decision making process. There is so much complexity, both at the political, economic, scientific and traditional knowledge base in order to inform decision makers, and if we're getting decisions right before a decision -- we're getting the decision is going to be made, it's way too late to inform the decisions (sic).

While consultation may not always result in providing First Nations with a veto, we have that

direction from the courts. We also have the direction that consultation must be meaningful, must be timely, and with sufficient information to provide a real opportunity to engage.

Many First Nations have observed the DFO has not only failed to satisfy this obligation, but it also relies on the time sensitive nature of its decisions to substantively continue operating according to the status quo without truly incorporating the guidance from <code>Haida</code> and <code>Taku</code> on this point.

Finally, and it's no accident that my submissions with respect to the honour of the Crown in consultation come back to and result in some of the same submissions I made on management. The First Nations Coalition offers the observation that until DFO and First Nations develop effective Tier 1 and Tier 1 processes, many of the legal obligations held by DFO and the responsibilities held by First Nations will remain frustrated.

In closing, I wish to express gratitude for the Commission in taking time at the early part of this inquiry to do this review. I think it's useful, because at least now you have a flavour of the nature of the differences amongst the participants around the application of this law and a practical implication so that every time it comes up we won't be arguing it in the same way but, rather, that we'll have had an opportunity to set that foundation. I hope the submissions around the practical implications bring you a little bit clearer into where the areas of frustration are with First Nations and DFO so that we can ground this inquiry towards its recommendation.

Thank you.

- THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Ms. Gaertner. Mr. McGowan?
- MR. McGOWAN: Yes, Mr. Commissioner, just to provide you with an update as to where we stand --
- THE COMMISSIONER: Just before you do that, I don't think we've marked, yet, this.
- MR. McGOWAN: You're right. Of course.
- THE COMMISSIONER: I believe it's at Tab 8 of my binder, anyway.
- MR. McGOWAN: Yes, Mr. Commissioner, it's at Tab 8 of your binder and should be marked on its own as

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            being the next exhibit for identification.
       THE REGISTRAR: H for Identification.
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                 MARKED H FOR IDENTIFICATION: Submissions of
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                 HTC by Brenda Gaertner
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       MR. McGOWAN:
                     Thank you. Now, Mr. Commissioner, just
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            to update you and the others in the room as to
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            where we stand, that was participant 16.
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            Participant 17 is the Métis Nation. I haven't
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            seen Mr. Gereluk here. Participant 18 has gone
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            already; that was Mr. Dickson.
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                 Mr. Donovan, who is counsel for participant
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            19, had originally requested to make his
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            submission by way of telephone, but has
            subsequently advised that he is not available to
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            do so today, but his written submissions are found
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            at Tab 11 of your binder, and perhaps in his
            absence we could mark those as the next exhibit
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            for identification?
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       THE COMMISSIONER:
                         All right.
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                        That will be I for Identification.
       THE REGISTRAR:
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                 MARKED I FOR IDENTIFICATION: Submissions of
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                 LJHAH by Mr. Allan Donovan
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       MR. McGOWAN: And Ms. Robertson, I understand, gave her
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            time over to Ms. Gaertner, which will leave Ms.
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            Fong, who I understand does have some submissions.
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                 Now, I don't know, perhaps you want to take a
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            break before that? I understand Ms. Fong is going
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            to be about 15 minutes.
       MS. FONG: Ten, 15 minutes.
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       THE COMMISSIONER: I'm content to hear Ms. Fong now,
            Mr. McGowan, if that's okay?
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       MR. McGOWAN:
                     Thank you.
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       MS. FONG:
                 Lisa Fong, counsel for Heiltsuk Tribal
            Counsel. With me is my co-counsel, Ming Song, and
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            articled student Benjamin Ralston.
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                 Mr. Commissioner, we have provided a written
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            submission, and the basis of that written
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            submission was clarifying the law in Sparrow and
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            Gladstone. I believe Your Lordship has that
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            behind one of your tabs.
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       THE COMMISSIONER: I'm just looking for it now, Ms.
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            Fong. Just bear with me for just a moment.
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       MS. FONG: Thank you. Yes, I think it's at Tab 10 of
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mine; is that correct, Mr. McGowan?
MR. McGOWAN: That is correct, Mr. Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MS. FONG: Having found your way to Tab 10, now I have to confess that I won't be speaking about that written submission, but, rather, I'll be giving an oral submission on the practical implications of the law of Aboriginal rights and treaty rights in this Commission, and in doing so I'm not going to speak about the substantive Aboriginal rights law, because that's been done very ably by many counsel today; rather, I just want to address how Aboriginal law and Aboriginal rights should be addressed in this inquiry and how far this Commission can go.

So the simple answer to the question is that the recommendations of this Commission must recognize and honour First Nations' Aboriginal rights and treaty rights. Now, this answer's complicated by Aboriginal rights exercised and asserted by First Nations being broader than those rights legally recognized to date. Many Aboriginal rights currently before courts or tribunals remain to be legally recognized, and First Nations exercise many more Aboriginal rights not currently part of any process of formal recognition.

Nonetheless, Heiltsuk, for example, their Aboriginal rights have never been seeded, surrendered or extinguished, including their inherent right to self-government or to manage their fisheries.

In Heiltsuk's view, implicit in the success of this Commission is its recognizing existing Aboriginal rights and its acknowledging valid claims to yet unproven Aboriginal rights. Recommendations by this Commission at either operational or leadership levels must recognize these rights and respect these claims, otherwise the mandate of the Commission in making meaningful recommendations will be unduly limited, and I'll talk about that a bit more.

In the context of the inquiry where the Commission's mandate expressly includes addressing DFO policy, this means the Commission is able to evaluate the extent to which government practices have failed to give proper effect to Aboriginal

rights in favour of other interests. This means the Commission must formulate recommendations about allocation which properly reflect Aboriginal rights to priority.

Now, on a broader policy and leadership level, the Commission may make recommendations about stewardship, which are consistent with and which recognize the benefits of co-management by First Nations claiming and exercising a right and a duty to steward resources within their traditional territories.

Such recommendations would be consistent with the Commission's overall aim of encouraging broad cooperation among stakeholders and developing recommendations about sustainability.

Now, the Province, in their submission, has urged limits to what this Commission should find and recommend. The Province says this inquiry is not about Aboriginal or treaty rights or Aboriginal fishing. The Commission's not required, they say, to make findings of law or to apply or interpret law in general or in particular.

Heiltsuk disagrees. The Province's position is too narrow. It is no answer to merely say that the words "Aboriginal rights" and "treaty rights" were not written into the terms of reference of this Commission. The terms of reference provide for recommendations to improve future sustainability. These recommendations will necessarily address priority and allocation. This Commission simply cannot investigate and make recommendations about sustainability without the Commission considering and providing for the priority of First Nations. The Aboriginal right to fish and the priority recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada is an inherent component to any plan for sustainability.

Now, Canada's position is that it recognizes the Commissioner must be cognizant of the legal framework, but it says, however, that the Commission is to apply the law as it currently stands and not to pronounce upon or seek to direct the evolution of Aboriginal rights or treaty rights' framework.

Heiltsuk disagrees. Canada's position is too limiting. The nature of the Commission, here, is

broader than what Canada implies. This Commission is uniquely situated. It is specifically designed to provide leadership. It is specifically mandated to not only find the facts necessary to draw inferences as to the cause of the decline of sockeye salmon, but, most importantly, to make recommendations that are future-looking and provide leadership in formulating changes that favour sustainability.

Now, in their submissions, Canada quotes from Mr. Ratushny's book, and we picked up on that same paragraph that Ms. Gaertner picked up on, which I wish to emphasize [as read]:

But it would be a sterile exercise merely to record these conclusions, since they provide a unique opportunity to go one step further. This is to make recommendations to avoid similar problems occurring in the future. The commission must be educated throughout the inquiry process in order to draw lessons from the events. The recommendations can relate to laws, administrative processes, relationships, and organizational structures -

-- and this is important --

- and can inform future public and political discussion and debate.

It's our submission that the Commission may comment on existing law of Aboriginal rights and may anticipate its development when fashioning recommendations for sustainability. The fact that First Nations self-government has not yet been judicially determined to be an Aboriginal right does not prevent this Commission from commenting on that possibility and does not foreclose the Commission from recommending, for example, comanagement of marine resources by First Nations.

Every First Nations here may say something different about the method of stewardship, but every First Nations here, we've heard, will say it's traditional knowledge and its right and duty of stewardship is part of the solution of sustainability of sockeye salmon.

 This Commission, I'm going to come back to, is uniquely situated. The subject matter of its inquiry and recommendations is complex and multifaceted. It includes the environment, the business of aquaculture, the extensive policy and practices of the Provincial and Federal Fisheries, Aboriginal rights and policies, and the public interest in sustainable salmon fishing.

The tools available to this Commission are powerful. As demonstrated, the Commission conducts its own research, commissions its own expert reports, conducts interviews of witnesses and has a right to speak to a range of persons, including scientists, environmentalists, members of the public, First Nations and governments, and will hold extensive evidential hearings over the next few months.

As a result, the Commission will be uniquely situated to make comprehensive findings of fact and provide leadership to fashioning forward-looking recommendations that address systemic problems.

Heiltsuk submit the Commission's recommendations should address both operational and policy issues. They should affirm and be consistent with Aboriginal rights and they should encourage broader cooperation by governments with First Nations, consistent with their Aboriginal rights, consistent with their rights of self-government, and consistent with their rights to manage fisheries within their traditional territorial waters.

Those are our submissions, and we'll provide a copy of the oral submission in writing to Mr. McGowan.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Ms. Fong.

MS. FONG: Thank you.

MR. McGOWAN: And if we could perhaps mark the written submission that is -- has been provided, I believe it was Tab 10, Mr. Commissioner, if that could be the next --

THE REGISTRAR: For Identification, J.

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44 MARKED J FOR IDENTIFICATION: Submissions of
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MR. McGOWAN: Thank you. And I'm just noting, Mr.

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Reply by Mr. East (Government of Canada)

Commissioner, there's one additional written submission that has been provided that was not spoken to today. It's provided on behalf of the 3 Southern Area E Gillnetters Association and B.C. 5 Fisheries Survival Coalition. Mr. Butcher was not 6 here today, but did provide that submission, and 7 perhaps it should be marked as the next exhibit. 8 It's at Tab 5 of your binder. 9 THE REGISTRAR: For identification, K. 10 11 MARKED K FOR IDENTIFICATION: Submissions of SGAHC by Mr. David Butcher 12 13 14 MR. McGOWAN: Mr. Commissioner, that brings us to the 15 end of the principal submissions. We had 16 indicated an opportunity for a five-minute reply 17 by any participant who felt the need to do so. 18 Perhaps we could take a brief break and I can 19 canvass the room. 20 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. I thought we could maybe 21 just do that before we break so we have some sense 22 of --23 MR. McGOWAN: Certainly, Mr. Commissioner. 24 THE COMMISSIONER: Maybe that would be convenient. 25 any counsel can indicate to Mr. McGowan if you 26 wish to make a reply submission, could you do that 27 now, please. 28 MR. McGOWAN: Mr. Lowes and Mr. East, for the 29 Government of Canada, have both indicated they 30 will require a few minutes. Mr. Tyzuk has indicated, for the Province, maybe a couple of 31 32 minutes, Mr. Commissioner. Is there anybody else? 33 THE COMMISSIONER: If counsel don't mind, we could take 34 a short break and then come back and wind up with 35 those few submissions. 36 THE REGISTRAR: We will now recess for 10 minutes. 37 38 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED FOR AFTERNOON RECESS) 39 (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED) 40 41 THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now resumed. 42

> MR. EAST: Mr. Commissioner, I just have two points; one specific and I think one more general, in rebuttal.

East on behalf of Canada.

MR. McGOWAN: Mr. Commissioner, I believe we just have

a couple of reply submissions, starting with Mr.

Firstly, and this is in response to something that was raised in the submissions of the Sto:lo Tribal Council - I believe that's Exhibit G - and there was a reference, a short reference in the oral submissions, but I think a much more detailed reference in the written submissions, relating to the United Nations declaration for the rights of indigenous people. And I just want to leave a short note as to what the legal status, or Canada's position, at least, on the legal status of that document in domestic law.

As a United Nations general assembly resolution, and what we call the UNDRIP, is a non legally binding instrument. It was adopted as an aspirational document. It does not reflect customary international law and there's no legal effect in Canada.

Consequently, the UNDRIP should not -- should be given no weight as an interpretive source in domestic law. However, and I think this is important to point out, in the Speech from the Throne on March 3rd, 2010, the Government of Canada committed to take steps to endorse this aspirational document in a manner fully consistent with Canada's constitution and laws. Canada, however, has not yet endorsed the declaration.

Moving, now, to a more general point, some of the submissions today, I think, characterized Canada's submissions as yet another in a long list of litanies of denial, and I think the term was "de minimis procedures". And also, there was a reference to Canada's submissions not addressing the practical implications of the legal framework.

Now, I think it would be foolish to deny that there is a theme in the jurisprudence, wherein the courts have prodded grudging Federal and Provincial Governments to give effect to the substantive promise of s. 35 rights. But to say that Canada - and I think, here, I can speak for B.C., although Mr. Tyzuk will correct me if I overstep my bounds here - but to say that Canada remains resolutely rejectionist in its approach to Aboriginal rights, including title, is incorrect and we submit simplistic.

Today, we have heard discussion of a number of things, including the Aboriginal fishing strategy as a response to the **Sparrow** decision,

Reply by Mr. East (Government of Canada)
Reply by Mr. Tyzuk (Province of British Columbia)
Reply by Mr. Lowes (WFFDF)

the B.C. treaty process and the negotiation of cooperative management arrangements and self-government. The pilot sales program, which provides opportunities for First Nations to fish for commercial purposes, which was negotiated and which was provided in advance of any court declaration of such commercial fishing rights.

And you will hear, throughout the course of this, and you have heard and your staff have heard and you will hear throughout the course of this inquiry, about the various consultation initiatives of government programs and processes for Aboriginal people and for fisheries, generally.

So I just want to leave you with the point that if you have not heard from me, Mr. Commissioner, you will hear, throughout the course of this inquiry, from DFO staff and from many others, all about the practical implications and challenges facing DFO staff in reconciling s. 35 Aboriginal and treaty rights with Canada's obligation to manage the fishery for all Canadians.

And I think I'll just leave it there, thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much.

MR. TYZUK: Mr. Commissioner, I wasn't going to say anything, but British Columbia has undertaken many different initiatives from the new relationships to interim agreements to the various treaty processes and other things, so clearly it takes the direction of the courts seriously.

That's all I have to say. Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MR. LOWES: J.K. Lowes. Mr. Commissioner, I know it's late and I have three brief points.

Notwithstanding that it's late, two of them are very technical, and the third is more general.

Dealing with the technical points, you've heard a number of submissions dealing with what could be called a governance dimension to Aboriginal fishing rights, and the suggestion that the law is -- there's no law on the point, I would point out, and I've referred to this in paragraph 43 of my submissions, Mr. Commissioner, that the **Nikal** case in the Court of Appeal was argued on the basis of a self-governance dimension to the

Reply by Mr. Lowes (WFFDF) Reply by Mr. Janes (WCCSFN)

Aboriginal fishing right, and I've included in my list of authorities, or my authorities brief, the passages from the Court of appeal.

I might say that the case then went on to the Supreme Court of Canada and was argued by **Nikal** as a self-government case. Now, if you read the Supreme Court of Canada decision, you'll see that the decision was virtually devoid of any reference to self-governance, and what I say in my submission is that implicit, or at least that silence in the face of the way in which the case was argued in the courts below, is, in itself, significant and that what, indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada did implicitly in **Nikal**, was what they did explicitly in **Pamajewon**, and that is, in effect, reject a self-government claim in favour of an analysis based on **Van der Peet**.

The second technical point I'd like to take up is with respect to Mr. Janes' submission on the public right and why it either was not received or was modified in British Columbia. That submission clearly overlooks the *Railway Belt* case, a decision of the judicial committee in 1914, which explicitly held that the public right existed in British Columbia.

But on a more technical point, the **Yarmirr** case, which I have referred to, was not based on anything to do with the reception of the common law. The concept in the **Yarmirr** case was that the public rights of navigation and fishery were, in effect, a burden on the prerogative power of the Crown and, of course, the assertion of sovereignty, colonial sovereignty, is an exercise of the prerogative power. In other words, the Crown, in asserting sovereignty over Australia, could not recognize Aboriginal title that was inconsistent with the rights which had been guaranteed in **Magna Carta**, but the situation is identical in British Columbia, in my submission.

And on the more general point, you've heard a lot about conservation consciousness, stewardship and traditional knowledge, and I would simply make the point, which should go without saying, that the conservation ethic is not confined to the Aboriginal community.

MR. JANES: Robert Janes, for the Western Central Coast Salish group. Just on the public right of fishery

point, I don't agree with Mr. Lowes' point about reception, and I'd just highlight two issues here. Number one is, of course, the New Zealand courts have taken a very different approach to that, and that's highlighted in our argument, essentially accepting the idea that the reception point that has the effect of not completely allowing the public right to trump the other rights.

The second point that goes with that, and I guess I'll just say I'll play a technical response to a technical response which, of course, is that the Magna Carta right, itself, was qualified by the fact that it did not displace private rights of fishing, which were longstanding in the English phrase, predating the reign of Henry II. The courts in New Zealand have recognized that the Aboriginal fisheries have that same quality of being ancient, longstanding rights, which would not be taken away by Magna Carta or its adoption into Canada which, frankly, only makes sense in the context of the modern Aboriginal law policy in Canada that we are trying to recognize the fact that the Aboriginal people were here first.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Janes.

MR. McGOWAN: Mr. Commissioner, I don't see anybody else moving to the microphone, and I think that means we're at the end of a long day. We've moved through this material a little more quickly than we anticipated, which is the good news. The, perhaps, not so good news, from moving this matter forward, is that we have arranged, as the next topic, a panel of witnesses on matters related to conservation. Those panellists are scheduled for Thursday, and I understand are not available tomorrow. Where that leaves us is we have a down day tomorrow, recommencing on Thursday with the topic that was scheduled for that day and which we hope will conclude on Thursday.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. McGowan.

I want to, before adjourning, thank each and every counsel who spoke here today, and I also want to thank all of those who were not here today but filed their submissions in response to the Commission's paper. I found your submissions very helpful and informative and an important ingredient as we move forward in considering all of the issues that this Commission is mandated to

 investigate. So I'm grateful to all of you.

As Mr. McGowan said, we are very hopeful not to have many down days, but in a long process like this, and in the interests of scheduling witnesses, there may be, from time to time, such down days. We have them here, and we have them in trials, of course, so as lawyers and as judges we're not -- I'm used to that, but we try to avoid it as best we can.

So we're now, as I understand it, adjourned until 10:00 a.m. on Thursday morning. Thank you all very much.

THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now adjourned until 10:00 a.m. Thursday morning.

(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:40 P.M. UNTIL THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2010, AT 9:30 A.M.)

I HEREBY CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true and accurate transcript of the evidence recorded on a sound recording apparatus, transcribed to the best of my skill and ability, and in accordance with applicable standards.

Karen Acaster

I HEREBY CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true and accurate transcript of the evidence recorded on a sound recording apparatus, transcribed to the best of my skill and ability, and in accordance with applicable standards.

Diane Rochfort

Proceedings

 I HEREBY CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true and accurate transcript of the evidence recorded on a sound recording apparatus, transcribed to the best of my skill and ability, and in accordance with applicable standards.

Karen Hefferland