Commission of Inquiry into the Decline of Sockeye Salmon in the Fraser River



Commission d'enquête sur le déclin des populations de saumon rouge du fleuve Fraser

**Public Hearings** 

**Audience publique** 

Commissioner

L'Honorable juge / The Honourable Justice Bruce Cohen

Commissaire

Held at:

Tenue à :

Hearing Room, 12th Floor BC Securities Commission 701 West Georgia Street Vancouver, B.C. Salle d'audience du 12º étage BC Securities Commission 701, rue West Georgia Vancouver (C.-B.)

Wednesday, November 9, 2011

le mercredi 9 novembre 2011



Commission d'enquête sur le déclin des populations de saumon rouge du fleuve Fraser

## Errata for the Transcript of Hearings on November 9, 2011

Page	Line	Error	Correction
5	28	they're	their
5	38	I know for the precautionary approach that if	I'm all for the precautionary approach, but if
9	37	the brother Gavin Hume	the brother of Gavin Hume
14	7	This was, to me, one of the two	This was to be one of the two
15	15	Stock Specific Trends and Productivity	Stock Specific Trends in Productivity
15	37	Exhibit 299	Exhibit 399
16	38	this right in 2010,	this, write in 2010,
20	35-36	use the same fleet	use the seine fleet
21	29	So we recognized	So they recognized
43	11	Justice Boldt	Justice Orrick

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Union of Environment Workers B.C.

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No appearance Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. ("RTAI")

No appearance B.C. Salmon Farmers Association

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Morton; Raincoast Research Society; Pacific Coast Wild Salmon Society

("AQUA")

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1	Vancouver, B.C. /Vancouver
2 3	(CB.) November 9, 2011/le 9 novembre
4	2011
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	REGISTRAR: The hearing is now resumed.
	COMMISSIONER: Mr. Harvey.
	HARVEY: Yes.
9 10 SUBN	MISSIONS FOR WEST COAST TROLLERS AREA G ASSOCIATION;
10 5051	UNITED FISHERMEN and ALLIED WORKERS' UNION BY MR.
12	HARVEY:
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14 MR.	HARVEY: Good morning, Mr. Commissioner. Mr.
15	Commissioner, it's no small task to condense 125
16	days of evidence into one hour, so I'm going to
17	jump right in. I have prepared a booklet of the
18 19	exhibit excerpts. Mr. Lunn has an extra copy
20	there, and I have extra copies here if anyone else would like to
21	My goal and my clients' goal, Mr.
22	Commissioner, in this Commission is in fulfilling
23	the purpose which is reflected in the terms of
24	reference, so I'd like to start, Mr. Lunn, with
25	page 1 of my booklet which is the terms of
26 27	reference and to note and I've highlighted some
28	of the passages there in the preamble. The preamble recites that:
29	preamble recrees that.
30	the decline in sockeye salmon stocks in
31	the Fraserhas necessitated the closure of
32	the fishery for a third [successive]
33	consecutive year
34	That amphasings what because the this Commission into
35 36	That emphasizes what brought this Commission into being.
37	Deing.
38	that decline has been attributed to the
39	interplay of a wide range of factors
40	
	And you've heard much about that.
	' 1 1'
	including
	And then they're listed Then it says.
	inia chen ency to trocca. Then to bayo.
47	Whereas the Government of Canada wishes to
41 42 43 44 45 46	And you've heard much about that.  including  And then they're listed. Then it says:  Whereas the Government of Canada wishes to

take all feasible steps to identify the reasons for the decline --

And then it carries on. You're charged with making -- you're directed in paragraphs 1 a., b. and c., and c. in particular emphasizes:

...to investigate and make independent
findings of fact --

In other words, they're to be your findings of fact.

(i) the causes for the decline...

And then over the page:

...to develop recommendations for improving the future sustainability of the sockeye salmon fishery in the Fraser River including...changes to the policies...

Et cetera, in relation to the management of the fishery.

So, Mr. Commissioner, you're expected to do, really, three things. You're expected to look beyond the range of factors that the decline has been attributed to. You're expected to identify the reasons for the decline, and you're expected to develop recommendations for the future sustainability of the fishery.

The first point I take from this is that your focus is intended to be on sustaining the fishery, not the fish. Harvesting, not preserving the fish, is the point of the exercise. Therefore, the focus of my submission is on the concept of maximum sustainable yield, MSY, which goes right through my submissions 'cause that's the focus of your mandate as I interpret it, and I hope what I say may be of some assistance in fulfilling that.

The problem - Mr. Lunn, this is Exhibit 573A, page 6, and I've -- sorry, this is a page which I haven't got in my booklet. It's page 6 from 573A and it -- oh, I'm sorry, it's not the graph number 6, it's page number 6 which is graphs 9 and 10, I think. Yes, that page.

This page illustrates the problem, Mr.

Commissioner. It's on the screen. It shows the total returns in the top graph increasing. 3 There's a problem obviously after the 1958 run which I'll touch upon, and then the runs are 5 gradually built up, as Mr. Eidsvik demonstrated, 6 to '92 levels, and then they've been dropping ever 7 since until the 2010 level. 8 If we look carefully - maybe Mr. Lunn could 9 highlight at the bottom part of this page - what 10 you see in the -- I'm sorry, Mr. Commissioner, 11 this is on the screen and not in my booklet. It 12 should be in my booklet 'cause it's page 6 of 13 Exhibit 573A, it's an important page. 14 The upper left-hand graph shows the total 15 return index peaking '92, '93, and then dropping. That's the problem. The percentage of run 16 17 harvested is the upper right-hand graph, and 18 that's the problem to the fishery. The bottom 19 left-hand graph illustrates the problem in 20 management, in my submission, because you can see 21 the escapement levels going up to '92, and I say 22 that's what - by the essential laws of biology has caused the decline. But the escapement levels 23 24 are held up, they're increased until the early 25 2000s, and then they stop (sic) dropping. 26 In 2005, they're still above historic averages, and 2005 is the year that led to the 27 28 disastrous 2009 run. So the escapement levels are 29 still above historic averages. It's not until 30 2006 that escapement levels return to historic 31 That's an essential -averages. 32 THE COMMISSIONER: Where is this page from, Mr...? 33 MR. HARVEY: It's 573A, Exhibit 573A, page 6. It 34 should be in the booklet 'cause I've got other 35 graphs from the same presentation. 36 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. 37 MR. HARVEY: That is the Pacific Salmon Commission 38 workshop. It's Mike Lapointe's slides from the -he's from the Salmon Commission. 39 40 So just to outline where I'm going, I'll deal 41 only with two points in these oral submissions, 42 both relating to the MSY concept. The first

relates to the constitutional and statutory

framework, and I say that should cause DFO to

focus on use rather than conservation per se.

I should say that throughout these

submissions, I'll be making the point that the DFO

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has lost its vision, it's become an aimless department of government. Insofar as it has a vision of a primary goal at all, it is conservation of biodiversity of fish rather than sustaining the fishery for the benefit of Canadians. I say that's inconsistent with the statutory mandate.

Second main point I'll deal with is biology, and I will say that it requires some understanding on your part of the basic biological attributes of sockeye to understand what went wrong since DFO took over from the old Salmon Fisheries Commission, and what action is urgently required to restore the fishery.

The constitutional statutory mandate is covered starting at paragraph 4 of my written submissions, which I won't turn to now. this provides the lens through which the Commission should review and assess the work of DFO. DFO is not a federal Department of Parks, nor is it the equivalent to the Department of Trade and Industry, but it's closer to Trade and Industry, I say, than it is to Parks. The best analogy perhaps would be with the Provincial Department of Forestry, because forests are similarly a renewable resource. Conservation of forests is an important component of the mandate of the Department of Forestry, but it's not an end in itself. Sustainable use is the end or the goal of the Department of Forests, and so it should be for Fisheries.

Conservation, of course, is relevant to the sustainable part of that equation, but it's the use of the forests, and equally the fisheries, by humans and the contribution to the GDP of B.C. and Canada that's the primary consideration.

Canada responds to these submissions by referring to, among other things, what the Supreme Court of Canada said in *Comeau's Sea Foods*. I'll read it:

...the Minister's duty to manage, conserve and develop the fishery on behalf of Canadians in the public interest.

But, Mr. Commissioner, the words are "conserve and develop", which is totally different

than "conserve or develop". One gives DFO the option of conserving fish and ignoring the fishery, and the other doesn't. I say that DFO does not have the option of putting conservation, per se, ahead of sustainable use.

Canada further quotes from the preamble to the *Oceans Act*, says:

Canada holds that conservation...is of fundamental importance to maintaining biological diversity and productivity in the marine environment.

Well, again, the wording is "biological diversity and productivity", not "or".

Mr. Commissioner, this is not just quibbling words. It's an important distinction. In nature, survival of the fittest rules in the Darwinian theory, and as we get into, if we are, an area of dramatic climate changes, stronger stocks, in the Darwinian sense, will have a better chance than weaker stocks. And the evidence before this Commission indicates -- gives some indication of what are the stronger stocks and what are the weaker stocks. Some witnesses have suggested we should be propping up the weaker stocks. They must be protected regardless of costs because they're biological diversity may somehow save the fishery in the future.

I say that's totally unrealistic. The Cultus sockeye will never replace the Quesnel, Shuswap or Chilko CUs. Sockeye simply can't be moved around the province. We know that because of their genetic makeup. We must remember, then, to approach this question with pragmatism and perspective. I say that DFO appears to have lost that.

I know for the precautionary approach that if someone suggests that we should sacrifice hundreds of millions of dollars of GDP every year for 100 years to guard against the eventuality that we may need weak stocks to restock the Fraser fishery in 100 years' time, I say that's a preposterous suggestion.

Mr. Leadem says that I'm suggesting that sustainability can be achieved without conservation. That's not what I'm suggesting.

Sustainability obviously has to have due regard for conversation, sustainable use has to have due regard for conservation. What I say is that sustainable use cannot be achieved by focusing on conservation rather than use or yield. I say that the statutory mandate requires DFO to focus on yield and on conservation insofar as it is supportive of use. So conservation is a supportive goal rather than a goal in itself. It's not the decline of genetic diversity that led to this Commission. It's the decline of the fishery.

Mr. Leadem refers to various references in the *Fisheries Act* to fish, but he overlooks the constitutional context. He suggests that the Court of Appeal decision in *MacMillan Bloedel* was obiter, and he prefers lower court decisions from other jurisdictions. But those decisions all affirm -- and I'll quote one of the standard phrases [as read]:

That the federal power in relation to fisheries is concerned with the protection and preservation of fisheries as a public resource.

Not one of the cases says that the preservation of fish, without any link to actual or potential fisheries, is within federal power. If that were so, the goldfish in my goldfish bowl at home would be subject to federal jurisdiction because they're fish. There's no link between those fish and the fisheries, so they are simply outside federal jurisdiction and they're within provincial jurisdiction under the **Wildlife Act** as are probably most of the exotic fish species in the aquarium. So it's not "fish" that is the constitutional and statutory focus; it's fisheries.

At paragraph 16 of my written materials, my written submissions, I refer to another important statute. I don't think it's necessary to bring it up on the screen, but the statute is the -- I say this in paragraph 16:

The human-centric purpose of the **Fisheries**Act is further supported by amendments in

 1995 to the **Auditor General Act** that required departments and agencies, including DFO, to develop their own sustainable development strategies. This led in 2008 to the passage of the **Federal Sustainable Development Act...**the creation of...Strategy - all of which require DFO to:

And I quote from the Strategy:

Deliver an integrated fisheries program that is credible, science-based, affordable, effective and contributes to sustainable wealth for Canadians.

Now, that is an important statute. It's been ignored by Canada and by all the other participants as far as I can see. It encapsulates the true -- what should be the true focus under **The Fisheries Act** and it's a governing strategy developed under a different statute.

There are similar principles set out in the treaty, both -- I deal with the two treaties, the United Nations Fisheries Agreement -- this is at paragraph 25 of my submissions -- I'm sorry, 23 of my submissions is the UNFA. It incorporates the principle of sustainability and optimum utilization. At page 25 (sic), I turn to the Pacific Salmon Treaty, and it similarly deals with optimum production. You can see under "Principles", Article III:

With respect to stocks subject to this Treaty, each Party shall conduct its fisheries and its salmon enhancement programs so as to:

(a) prevent overfishing and provide for optimum production...

The following page, I set out another section of the treaty regarding implementation of Article III, where I've got 1(b).

The principal goals of the Treaty are to enable both countries, through better conservation and enhancement, to increase

production...

That's the focus of the treaty, the Salmon Treaty, as it of the United Nations Treaty.

A final point on optimum production that I'd like to make is this: Both Canada and B.C. suggest — support the notion that Canada should share its management responsibilities with stakeholders. I say, Mr. Commissioner, that this is a dangerous notion. It's contrary to the sovereign constitutional authority of DFO, and that responsibility cannot be shut down or abdicated. I like the word abdicated. That's the term that John Fraser likes to use, and he used it in his 1995 report. The responsibility rests with DFO. That's a sovereign constitutional responsibility.

It's all very well to take soundings of the views of stakeholders, but DFO is responsible and accountable for what it does. It's no good for managers to inform the Minister that any given decision is acceptable because stakeholders, or some stakeholders agree with it. In my clients' view, this put -- my clients' view this process is a means of avoiding responsibility and accountability by DFO. It's not just prejudicial to minority groups. It's an abdication of responsibility and accountability.

The evidence you've heard, Mr. Commissioner, indicates that the reason why most stakeholders support consultation is because they distrust DFO, and there seems to be good grounds for that. But, in my recommendations, I propose another means of ensuring trust, and that's an audit procedure or an adaptive management retrospective process whereby someone in the Auditor General's Department would do a review and report to Parliament or the Cabinet each year on the question whether DFO is achieving the maximum sustainable benefit to Canadians from the fishery resource.

In my written submissions, I suggest the appointment of a Commissioner of Productivity within the Auditor General's Department. There's already a Commissioner for Sustainability which covers off the conservation side. But what is not covered off anywhere, and DFO is woefully

inadequate, is in dealing with socioeconomic consequences of their actions.

If you look at the 2010 run, for example - and I touched upon this in the limited time I had to cross-examine the DFO panel in the final days of the hearing - there was at least \$100 million worth of foregone harvest in the Shuswap run alone. That's just foregone harvest. It doesn't take into account the density dependent effects that are going to affect future harvests.

Nobody does a retrospective analysis of that. Nobody puts in their report setting that out so the government can see what wastage is taking place here, what losses in terms of jobs and the economy and the reasons for it. If there were some sort of an audit, DFO would have to say, "Well, we had to do that to protect Thompson River coho," or whatever it was, the reasons for it. All right, well, let's see what numbers you protected and whether some other more costeffective means could be employed. So that's the basic thinking behind that suggestion that I made.

To put this in context, Mr. Taylor asserts that DFO is a science-based Department. I say that's completely contrary to the evidence. DFO is not a science-based Department at all. They're a policy-based Department. They spend far more time on policies, writing memos, than they do on science. If it were science-based, their scientists would have a much higher stature in the Department. They'd be up there in the pantheon of the Gods at DFO. People like Jeremy Hume would be directing harvest strategies like the four senior biologists in Alaska do with respect to the Bristol Bay fishery.

I don't know if you know that Jeremy Hume is the brother Gavin Hume. A cynic might say the legal profession holds up better prospects for good lawyers than the DFO does for good scientists.

I'm not suggesting that, but I am suggesting that it can't be said that DFO is a science-based Department. The scientists do not direct harvest strategies. The policy-makers do and it's based largely on consultation with uninformed persons, uninformed in the sense that they're lay people, not scientists.

Mr. Commissioner, DFO, I say, suffers from a systemic dysfunctionality. Unfortunately, no recommendations by you for new policies will cure that dysfunctionality. There has to be a major change in the checks and balances that affect DFO's actions. The only solution I can see, as I've said, is for some sort of an outside audit. John Fraser recommended that there be an audit of conservation, and that is done quite well, but there's got to be an audit of productivity.

Remember, Mr. Commissioner, that jobs and the economy are said to be the first priority of Canadians. That's what the present government tells us every time they launch a new action. Jobs and the economy are the first priority certainly of the coastal communities in B.C., but they are not the first priority of DFO which is quite obvious from the evidence.

Consider for a moment the situation of fish processors. They must be one of the few industries in the world without any assurance of supply of raw product. They can't raise their prices to their suppliers to get more product. They're completely at the mercy of DFO as are the fishermen. They don't have what supply-managed agricultural processors have, which is a quotabased system that assures supply. They don't have any market mechanism. They have nothing. amazing that they've been able to continue to run a viable business, particularly with DFO seemingly having as its lowest priority the need of the industry, fishermen, processors, and the need of people to obtain food products. So something has to be done about that. It requires, I say, a very creative and strong recommendation on your part.

Mr. Commissioner, I've had a lifelong connection with the fishing industry since I got my first job in a fish plant a week after my 15th birthday in 1955. I then spent some years on a scout boat with the seine fleet on the Nass, around the Charlottes, down the central coast, spent seven years as a commercial fisherman. Then throughout my legal career, I've represented fishermen.

My greatest hope, I must say - and I echo some of the feelings that Dennis Brown articulated in his evidence - my greatest hope is that you can

do something effective in this Commission. The model I look to is the MacDonald Royal Commission on the economy. It was set up in 1982 by the Trudeau government, reported to the Mulroney government in '85. One of its recommendations related to a more market-oriented economy and it recommended pursuing a free trade agreement with the U.S. That Royal Commission report gave impetus to the free trade debate which I think followed after the report was issued, but it gave a strong impetus to it and it allowed it to be carried through. I don't think it's unrealistic to say without that Royal Commission report, we might not have NAFTA today.

Now, a similar sort of thing could be done with the fishery. The fishing industry at one time was a main driver to the B.C. economy. The 2010 sockeye return shows us what the resource is capable of, but there has to be changes within DFO if the fishing industry is ever going to be able to again become a major driver. If it does become a major driver to the B.C. economy, then, Mr. Commissioner, I say DFO would have earned the right to call for more budget funding.

There's been a whole lot of bleating about inadequate funding, but we've forgotten that if a department can't produce tax revenue, it can't expect to receive tax funding. The Department has got to earn its funding, and it's simply not doing that.

Let me turn to biology 'cause I've only got 32 minutes left. In my paper, I deal with this in my written submissions starting at paragraph 28. I deal with general concepts about the equilibrium establishing forces that exist in nature. This section, I should say, draws heavily on this book by Walters and Martell, "Fisheries, Ecology and Management." It's published by the Princeton University Press. I got it on Amazon.com. I say if there are only two books that you read in the more general reading, this should be one. Roos's Salmon Commission book on restoring Fraser sockeye should be another, and if you've got time for a third, it should be Dennis Brown's book, which recounts the anguish that the fishing industry has gone through in these years of declining fisheries.

Dr. Walters, we know from his evidence and from what other witnesses have said, is a leader in the field of population dynamics. As I said at the outset, Mr. Commissioner, you are expected to sort through the interplay of a wide range of factors - that's the way it's put in the terms of reference - and find what has caused the decline. To do that, in my submission, you can't delegate that to the writers of the technical reports. You can't delegate - and I say this with respect to both you and your science advisor - you can't delegate that to your science advisor.

I have some passages in my written submission at paragraphs 112 to 114 about my concerns about the science advisor and his role on this panel. But basically I'm saying that these are not concepts, these biological concepts are not such that someone with a legal mind cannot cut through them and determine the cause of the decline.

The first point to remember in the sockeye ecosystem is this, that it always accommodates, through the years of the old Fisheries Commission management, humans as major predators. Equilibrium was established prior to 1985 whereby human predation accounted for around 80 to 85 percent of the adult recruits. It removed them from the ecosystem. Sockeye abundance was gradually increased during that period and then starting in '87, DFO made a major change. It removed progressively the human predators from this ecosystem. It was all well-intentioned, but it had an effect just as significant as removing pikeminnow predators from the Cultus. It had a different effect, and I'll come to that.

I'm turning to density dependence, both simple density dependence and delayed density dependence. I say, Mr. Commissioner, there's nothing complex about this. Everyone knows that if you spread too many carrot seeds in your garden, you're not going to get a good crop of carrots, and that model will persist every year. Some years it will be a better growing season, and some years a worse growing season, but too many carrots, poor crop. That is the scientific model that applies. Whether that's a law of biology, whether that's a theory of biology or what, doesn't matter.

But every scientist knows about models. Galileo and Copernicus developed models. I Googled this, this morning, and came up with this [as read]:

Galileo's work founded the modern scientific method of deducing laws to explain the results of observation and experiment.

Too many carrots in the garden? Too many carrots seeds in the garden, poor crop. That's observation and experiment, and a model gets developed from that. The Ricker and the Larkin models are just that.

Now, there are residuals in the carrot analogy. That's poor growing season, better growing season. Peterman and Dorman dealt -- got quite interested in residuals. But what exactly is a residual? I say it's something interfering with the model. But residuals may be of great interest to scientists, but if you focus on the residuals, you tend to forget that there are variations. They result in variations of the model. They don't change or negate the model.

If I could turn back to my collection of exhibits to page 3 of the exhibits, which is taken from Exhibit 53 -- 573A. It's page 10. Here you have in the top graph, you can see what the basic model does. Mike Lapointe says this in the slide [as read]:

Expect productivity to decline with increasing spawner abundance.

That's the Ricker model. He's got the sloping curve there. That's the Ricker model.

Then you see he's got residuals. Residuals can bring it up or they can bring it down. That's what a residual factor is. That's what Peterman and Dormer spent a lot of time looking at. But you can't forget the basic model.

The bottom slide on this page defines, in the red print, the residuals:

Trends in residuals used to examine productivity patterns remaining after removing effects related to changing spawner

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So it's that additional element.

The next page in this booklet is page 12. And here you can see trends in productivity, the Quesnel stocks, and the trends in productivity -we know this. This was, to me, one of the two major stocks in 2009 and it basically collapsed. There's the declining trendline. Below that is the Ricker and Larkin models, and you can see there's very little residual effect. And Peterman confirmed this, that the Quesnel decline is basically consistent with the Larkin model, delayed density dependence. So the residual effect -- contribution is small. It's mostly excessive spawner abundance.

The bottom of the page is the late Shuswap, and similarly, Peterman said it was both the Ricker and the Larkin model fit with the Shuswap trends in productivity, and you see that by the straight line. There's very little residual

The next page, page 17, is the 2009 sockeye forecast. You can see the breakdown. Forecast was 10.5 million, Chilko 4.2, Quesnel 3.6, others 2.7. That was the forecast. The bottom slide on this page shows the returns, hugely under the estimate. From 4 million Chilko, 270,000 return; Quesnel, 3 million estimate, 2,020 (sic) return. That's the problem that gave rise to this Commission.

The next page is page 17 -- I'm sorry, yes, page -- the next page, page 25, at the top I refer to this page from Mike Lapointe's slides because it's been suggested all the growing seasons -- or the conditions, the environmental conditions were different year to year. You can see on the right these are the years we're talking about. But the changing -- the variations in ocean conditions were within the same range as we've always had going back to 1960. Ocean conditions always fluctuate and the sockeye take that into account. There's nothing in the ocean conditions to account for the dramatic declines we've seen in sockeye.

On page 26, the slides deal with -- if I start with the top slide, yes, the summary of multi-year comparisons. 2008, productivity was

below average, most stocks, but higher in '07/'09. Then the conclusion: do not show a common pattern.

At the bottom of the page, the comment:

Underscores the futility of these broad comparisons and the need for Fraser-specific indicators.

So, in other words, we can't look at salt water, we've got to look at fresh water. Salt water is a common -- common to all the species. Fresh water lifecycle is different and that's on the next page, page 8 of this. The bottom of the page, "Stock Specific Trends and Productivity". Down the right-hand column, these are the different -- these are the trends. It gives the brood year that the most recent decline began, which is mostly different one from the other. The right-hand column, "Percentage Change". The percentage variation is huge. The Quesnel has declined by 93 percent, the Harrison has increased by 140 percent, and there's everything else in between.

I say the only inference to draw from that is that something stock-specific is driving the declines, not the shared ocean environment.

The next page in my compendium of exhibits, I've got a -- there's a similar graph if we go down a bit, Mr. Lunn. There it is in the middle of the page. This is from Technical Report 4, and again, it shows the variations in ocean conditions from warm and unproductive to cool and productive going back to 1979. In other words, we've always had these features.

The next page I want to refer to deals with Exhibit 299. This is Pestal and Cass, "Updated Methods of Assessing." This, Mr. Commissioner, I think is the best simplified — the best way to understand the difference between the Ricker and the Larkin models. Ricker model basically just deals with the effects on the generation in question, whereas the Larkin model deals with the influence of excessive spawning escapement on successive brood years, but I've got this in here because if you take time to read this, it's just about all you need to understand the difference

between the two models.

The next page indicates which model fits better in the different runs. You'll see the Larkin full model fits better Scotch, Seymour, Chilko, Quesnel and Stellako.

The next page in this exhibit shows you what happens and how the models affect returns. These have the -- this is the Quesnel run on this page, 1948 to 2008. You can see the "Spawner" column, the amounts of spawners right up until 1981, less than a million. From '85 on, they're in excess of one million. Let's look at 2001 and 2002 more closely. 2001, 3.5 million spawners. This is where the carrying capacity is less than a million. Three-point-five million spawners, the return, 3.7 million four years later. See it on the right-hand column. So basically a one-to-one recruitment.

Second year, it's done again, over three million, 3,062,000 spawners, and the recruitment then drops to 640. This is the effect of delayed density dependence. Mr. Peterman said this run is consistent with delayed density dependence. This is what it does in practice, huge loss of stocks.

Then look what happens again. We've got 2005, it's still about twice the optimum, 2005, and the run is not here, but if you want to write it in, I'll show you where you find this. The recruits column is 220,000, 2005. Oh, we've seen that already, 2,000 and 20,000 (sic) for Quesnel.

In 2006, the spawning escapement drops way down, 169,000. That's within the lower and upper benchmark range for that run. In other words, this is optimum. There was, as we know, a huge return in 2010.

But here's something else to write in, and this is most troubling. If you want to add to this right in 2010, the spawning escapement is in excess of three million again. Nothing's been learned. In excess of three million, and it's going to be hugely detrimental again. Where you find this, this number is at page 15. I'll just skip ahead for a moment where we find these numbers. Page 15, Mr. Lunn.

There's the Quesnel. This is from Exhibit 1908, Selbie and others, DFO workshop. The asterisk in the upper corner is basically the --

this is the photosynthetic rate. This is the determination of carrying capacity -- and I don't know why there are two bars in this one. The escapement in females is either 1.5 or 1.75 approximately, so it's in excess of three million.

If you want to go on this page, if you look down, Shuswap, same thing. The asterisk shows the carrying capacity and the escapement in 2010 in excess of 3.5 million females. In other words, in excess of seven million spawners, hugely — there's a loss in foregone harvest and there's going to be a huge impact in four years' time. The same for the Chilko. If we go back — in the interest of time, I won't deal with the Chilko, but I can deal with page 14, that's back one page, the Late Shuswap.

The Late Shuswap, it's interesting to start this in 1954. Spawners just over two million which, in the Roos book, is said to be optimum and a huge return, 15 million. In 1958 -- and this is discussed in the Roos book, and I've got references to it in my written submissions -- there was a problem with the seine fleet, taken by surprise in some way. They weren't effective in catching as many fish as they should have in 1958. Spawners -- so what the Commission did, they put an electric fence up on the Adams run to try to stop the excess spawners getting in.
Unfortunately, it was ineffective, so they had 3.2 million spawners in '58, and it led to -- and you can see the recruits, 2.2 million.

If we follow this down, the spawners were kept down until huge spawning in 2002, 5.5 million. So with a little more than one-to-one recruitment. In 2006, it's 2.8, but on the effective female side it's 1.1 million spawners, which is almost identical to 1954. And we got a record run in 2010, 15 or 20 million. I'm not sure what it is for the Shuswap. It was a huge return.

Then, if you want to write this in, about 7.1 million spawners in 2010, which is hugely in excess of historic levels. That, Mr. Commissioner, is the problem. With everything that's been done, the Wild Salmon Policy which everyone says is the answer, the FRSSI scheme, all this complex management, and this is what results

from it. There's a very serious problem out there that something has to be done about.

Peterman and Dorner, there's controversy over what proportion of the decline is caused by residual factors, what proportion by density. So Peterman looked at the residuals. I've got the results of this starting at page 22. This is from Peterman and Dorner. Because undeniably, there are some residual factors affecting — the top of the page is the Early Stuart, and this blue line is Larkin and the red line is Ricker. You'll see they're varying, so there are residuals in Early Stuart and the Bowron. Fennell, the Ricker — that's the bottom of the page — the Larkin line is flat, no residuals.

The next page, Gates, Nadina, basically no residuals. Pitt, there are obviously residuals. Next page, Scott and Seymour, very little residual factors with respect to Larkin. Quesnel - this is page 25 - Quesnel is at the bottom of the page and this was in the body of the Peterman report. You'll see there's no residual departure from the Larkin model.

But that tells you really very little, because whether there's a slight residual factor or no residual factor, it tells you very little. What is significant is the Larkin model itself and the Ricker model. Too many carrot seeds, too little crop. That's the scientific method that Galileo talks about.

The Shuswap, I should say, page 27, a few more pages on, Shuswap, as we've heard from a number of witnesses, is consistent with both the Ricker and the Larkin model and, as we would expect it to be consistent therefore in 2014 as well, which is the major problem that we have.

So, Mr. Commissioner, this evidence I say fully supports Dr. Walters' conclusion, and this is — that he sets out in that email, but he described more fully in his evidence — that the models explain most of the trend. Most of the loss is due to the basic model, which is due to excessive escapement. In other words, the variations — the residuals, the variations due to factors other than parental abundance are minimum. This explains also, of course, why there's a wide variation in stock-specific declines. They start

at different times, they range from minus 92 percent to plus 140 percent. It explains why the Columbia to the south and Bristol Bay to the north have had a totally different experience.

If you read only one page of my written submissions, Mr. Commissioner, it should be page 21 which sets out the basic Ricker curve. Because once you understand this, you can understand quite clearly, see quite clearly what has happened. should say what I should have done here is written in - and perhaps you could do this on your own notes - on the bottom line is spawners. That's the horizontal line is spawners. The vertical line is recruits. As the spawners increase, there's a sharp -- this is the left-hand slope of the curve -- there's a sharp increase. At low spawner numbers, there's a sharp increase in recruits. The rate of increase is far greater than the norm, and then at what's called the MSY level, the angle is the same as the straight line, oblique angle.

Then there's the dome of the curve. That's the maximum number of -- that's the maximum carrying capacity level, if you will, then it declines down. So the spawners increase and you're into the area of diminishing returns, so anyone approaching harvest management with a business perspective take into account the law of diminishing returns and will look at the levels which are recorded here, look at the USMY (sic) range. That is meant to be the range between upper and lower benchmarks.

I should say there's something else in my exhibits that -- yes, my exhibit bundle, which has that range from the Grant report. This is starting at page 16 of my exhibit booklet. Grant et al, Exhibit 1915. It's page 16, Mr. Lunn, of my exhibit book.

This page relates to Chilko and I just have that page there for the purpose of identifying Chilko. It's the next page which has the upper and lower benchmarks for the Chilko, 39 lower, 273 upper. If you go two pages further on, this is the Quesnel upper and lower benchmarks, 121,00 701,000 upper benchmark for Quesnel. This is the stock that got the three million escapement in 2001, 2002.

Two pages further on is the Shuswap, lower Shuswap -- or Late Shuswap. The benchmarks there, which are set by Grant et al, 355,000 is the lower, 1.288 million is the upper benchmark. These are set at 80 percent of MSY, so MSY would be calculated at 1.4, 1.5 million, something like that. This is the stock that had a seven million escapement in 2010.

So this whole complex scheme, I say, is utterly useless in practice, and totally detrimental. And my submissions are that the WSP should be scrapped and replaced by something simple and understandable.

In the remaining few minutes, I would like to deal -- well, firstly, finish this. If I could turn to page 34 of this book of exhibits, you can see at page 34 what -- this is what the Alaskans are doing. The Alaskans have the same precautionary approach, the same United Nations Fisheries Agreement, and this graph shows until 1982, there were wild increases in escapement - this is the low grey-coloured area - but they managed to level off the escapements pretty well starting from 1982. And look at the huge dark portion which is the catch. That means jobs, that means economy, that means support for coastal communities, et cetera, et cetera.

The subsequent pages are from this same exhibit, Technical Report 7. They describe how the Alaskan managers go about it. They have clear goals and they apply them. That's the model, I say, that we should be applying here as well.

My conclusions are these, Mr. Commissioner. I say, firstly, back to basics. DFO should go back to basics. Facilitate fishing, use the same fleet as the tap to turn on and off to control escapement, focus on stock assessment, focus on enforcement and stop spending the majority of your budget on consultations and developing policies. Develop optimum harvest strategies based on simple functions of current stock size and the recruitment rate variables that are based on historic data.

In order to determine current stock size, which is critically important, they must deploy in-season monitoring systems - test fishing if you will - but some in-season monitoring systems in

the approach waters that allow managers to achieve their spawning goals in the -- spawning goals by quickly learning about current stock size as the season proceeds.

I say apply the lower benchmarks and upper benchmarks in the way the U.S. managers do, and apply them to the four run-timing groups, because that's the only practical way to do it.

The Wild Salmon Policy I say is words, words, words. It's so complex that it obscures the goal of productivity for the benefit of Canadians. Funding, I say that we first have to earn the right to receive more funds.

I say with respect to terminal fisheries, and this is paragraph 125 on in my submissions. I just want to leave that with you, but I'd like to explain one thing. I refer to inherently high risk of terminal fisheries. Mr. Commissioner, in the days — in my high school days, one of the things I saw was creek guards on all the little creeks around the Charlottes and places. They were guardians, they had a little hut to live in and their sole function was to make sure that no seine boats came within the boundary of those creeks.

Why that was so critically important is all it would take is one seine set close to the terminal area there to wipe out an entire stock. So we recognized that as being inherently risky to fish in terminal areas. The same thing applies with terminal areas upstream. If we're going to go to terminal fisheries, we're going to have to greatly increase the enforcement budget. We're going to have to have the equivalent of the fish guardians in the old days, because all it would take is some excessive fishing in a terminal area where stocks are concentrated, that you could wipe out an entire stock.

If you have excessive fishing in a mixed stock area, you're not going to wipe out a whole stock because they're mixed. They're all equally impacted. But there's an increased risk in fishing close to the terminal areas. That's one of the many arguments, in my submission, against terminal fishing. Nobody's considered who's going to pay for the enforcement of terminal fishing, terminal fishing areas scattered throughout the

province. Terminal commercial fishing, I'm talking out; in other words, fishing that has the 3 incentive of making money. 5 THE COMMISSIONER: 6 Mr. Lowes? 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 MR. LOWES: 15 16 17 Drift Fishers. 18 19 20 21 22

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Mr. Commissioner, those are my submissions. Thank you very much, Mr. Harvey.

MR. LOWES: J.K. Lowes, Mr. Commissioner, with Brad Caldwell, for the B.C. Wildlife Federation and the B.C. Federation of Drift Fishers.

SUBMISSIONS FOR B.C. WILDLIFE FEDERATION AND B.C. FEDERATION OF DRIFT FISHERS BY MR. LOWES:

I'm not sure if -- yes, it is. J.K. Lowes, Mr. Commissioner with Brad Caldwell for the B.C. Wildlife Federation and the B.C. Federation of

I originally was allocated an hour. donated 15 minutes of that to Ms. Baker to deal with housekeeping matters. I understand that she dealt with those with more expedition, and so with your indulgence, Mr. Commissioner, I think I'll be closer to the original than the latter.

Briefly, in my oral submissions, Mr. Commissioner, what I intend to do is briefly set out the objective and structure of the written submissions, touch a little bit on the law, and not so much in the law, per se, but the implications flowing from the law. Then going to my submissions on the questions before the Commission which I break down into three questions, really. What is the present situation? What does the past say about declines; in other words, a causation issue. And what do we do in the future?

If I have a little bit of time at the end, I do want to deal with some of the replies on my submissions on the law.

The written submission, Mr. Commissioner, is in two parts reflecting the dual role of counsel for the participants in these proceedings. main thrust of the submissions is essentially pursuant to my view of what the role of a participant is. A participant isn't here to advocate a cause. A participant is here to assist you, Mr. Commissioner, in answering the questions that you've been asked.

However, of course, the participant is a user group and I am an advocate for that group, so I've divided my submission into two parts: one dealing with what I call the main issue, or the main objective, which is to assist you as a participant, and the other is to set out the specific interests and positions of the recreational fishing industry. In these oral submissions, I will simply deal with the first objective and leave the more specific one to your reading.

Briefly, and I think I can cover this before the break, Mr. Commissioner, I would like to start with a few remarks about the law, and that's set out at pages 3, 3 to 5 of my factum -- or my submission, rather -- and what I basically say is this, that it's essential to understand at the outset that the fishery is rights-based, and that the government of Canada has no proprietary rights in the fishery.

The implications of that are this, that because it has no proprietary interest in the fishery, Canada cannot create proprietary entitlements in others. That principle clearly places limits on the ability of Canada to create entitlements for individuals or groups of individuals. In specific terms, Mr. Commissioner, that has implications for share-based management, and I deal with that in more specific terms at paragraphs 166 to 170 of my submission.

It has particularly strong implications for the use of fish or access to the fishery as currency for the satisfying of aboriginal aspirations.

The *Larocque* case says that fish cannot be used as currency by the Department for paying its test-fishing expenses, and similarly, the access to the fishery cannot be used as currency to satisfy the aspirations of particular user groups.

I say also, Mr. Commissioner, that because they occupy the position of a steward or trustee, as distinct from a proprietary -- from a proprietor, rather, Canada cannot abdicate its responsibility to the public by sharing its authority in such a way as to promote the interest of particular groups at the expense of others, or at the expense of the public at large. That has

implications in the sense that it provides limits to Canada's ability to adopt co-management, at least co-management at the government-to-government level regimes. That, as Mr. Harvey indicated, was an abdication of Canada's responsibility to the public as a trustee of the resource.

Turning specifically to the question of aboriginal rights, Mr. Commissioner, it is my position that policy distinctions between fishing by aboriginal Canadians and fishing by the Canadian public at large should be congruent with the judicially-defined interfaces, first between aboriginal rights and the public right, and second, between aboriginal rights and Crown sovereignty.

There's a distinction to be made, Mr. Commissioner, between fishing by aboriginal Canadians and fishing pursuant to the exercise of an aboriginal right. What I mean by those interfaces, Mr. Commissioner are this: There is an interface between the public right and aboriginal rights. That interface has been drawn by the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly in the 1996 cases.

five days. They heard seven cases dealing with aboriginal rights claim, five from British Columbia. That was **Van der Peet N.T.C. Smokehouse, Gladstone, Nikal and Lewis.** They issued reasons for judgment which — the full court sat. There are two sets of dissents and the majority judgment. The decisions refer to one another, cross-referenced to one another and they really lay down the law in no uncertain terms about the interface between the public right to fish and the aboriginal rights.

In 1996, the Supreme Court of Canada sat for

In paragraph 18, I set out a summary of what that interface looks like from the 1996 cases which, incidentally, have been followed since 1996, not only by the judges who were the majority in those cases, but also by the judges who had dissented and, in particular, the present Chief Justice.

The principles, Mr. Commission, are this. Aboriginal rights exist within a legal context which recognizes the public right to fish. That's

Gladstone. Aboriginal rights are additional to, not substitutional for the public right. Every aboriginal Canadian shares in the public right to fish with his non-aboriginal countrymen. His aboriginal rights, if he has any, are additional. The principle of special rights for some Canadians is an exception to the general constitutional rule of universal individual's rights. That's right out of Van der Peet.

Consequently, the existence, the scope and the protection of aboriginal rights is to be defined and confined to the rationale for the exception. The rationale is the integrity of aboriginal identity. That's the constitutional value that is protected. In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in the **Van der Peet** trilogy, what's protected is aboriginal specificity, and that is what is necessary to ground an aboriginal right.

Of course, it's trite law that the definition of an aboriginal right is an activity which is an element of a custom, practice or tradition which is integral to the distinctive culture. It's the core of the aboriginal identity. It's not fishing by aboriginal people. It is the exercise of a tradition that existed and was central to the community prior to contact and remains so.

Now, with respect to the second interface, that is, the interface between aboriginal rights and Crown sovereignty, I say simply that constitutional protection for aboriginal rights is limited to a burden of justification similar to s. 1 of the *Charter*. Aboriginal rights are not absolute. They may be infringed as long as the infringement is not justified (sic).

The point of that law in these proceedings, Mr. Commissioner, is that neither -- is in paragraph 20 -- that neither policy - that is policy of DFO - nor an overbroad application of the constitutional duty to consult and accommodate, should be allowed to usurp the judicial determination of those interfaces. The determination and the delineation of those interfaces is a matter of the application of the constitution, and that is a judicial function. It is not a function of the policy development branch of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

Perhaps you will want to break. Before we do, Mr. Commissioner, I would just refer you to paragraph 23 of my submissions in which I point out that two of your colleagues, the late chief Justice Brenner and Mr. Justice McKenzie, saw fit to make comments about the expansion of aboriginal fisheries, if I can put it that way, even where constitutional -- made comments that it wasn't necessarily good policy, and they made those comments for different reasons.

Chief Justice Brenner, after upholding the constitutionality of the pilot sales, which are now the Economic Development Fisheries, pointed out the social cost and queried whether those sales programs should be continued. Mr. Justice McKenzie pointed out the problem of the balkanization of the fisheries, which Mr. Eidsvik alluded to yesterday, and indicated that he didn't think that the pilot sales program should be expanded.

I will then turn to the main thrust of my submissions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will recess for 15 minutes.

(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED FOR MORNING RECESS) (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED)

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> THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now resumed. THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Lowes.

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SUBMISSIONS FOR B.C. WILDLIFE FEDERATION AND B.C. FEDERATION OF DRIFT FISHERS, continuing:

35 MR. LOWES: Yes, Mr. Commissioner, before I get into my main submission, I should clarify that when I use the term "Aboriginal fishery", I'm referring to an "Aboriginal only" fishery. And the bottom line of 39 my submission is that Aboriginal only fisheries 40 should be restricted to fisheries in what is being exercised as an Aboriginal right. To the extent that Aboriginal individuals are fishing other than 43 pursuant to an Aboriginal right, they're fishing 44 as a member of the public, they're fishing as a 45 recreational fisher, or as a commercial fisher, and pursuant to the same rules as everyone else. And that's the -- the importance of the -- of

remembering that Aboriginal rights are additional. When we sat down, Mr. Commissioner, to look at the three questions essentially that you've been asked to deal with, and the mass of evidence and submissions that you've received, we quite frankly wondered how we were going to do it. what we did was we came up with a number of focusing concepts, and we found those focusing concepts useful in making our way through the -through the issues. And essentially the structure of my submission is to offer you the focusing concepts as an analytical tool, and to show you what the use of those concepts resulted in, in our examination of the questions, and ultimately what those focusing concepts result in terms of recommendations for the future.

There are five concepts that we found useful. They're not new, and other parties or other participants will refer to them.

The first is, and these are found at page —starting at page 5 of my submissions. The first is "Pragmatism", and that simply means focus on the immediate and practical as distinct from the remote and the merely theoretical. And quite frankly, Mr. Commissioner, much of the evidence, particularly the scientific evidence, is remote and theoretical.

The second guiding concept is "Interests and Values". And this means having regard to the interest or value often hidden or obscured, which underlies the evidence or positions of witnesses or participants. And by that we don't mean that the witnesses and participants have a hidden agenda. And indeed, the agenda of most of the participants, or virtually all of the participants and most of the witnesses, is not hidden. And it doesn't mean, as would happen in a trial, that the function of this tribunal is to sift and discount biases. It's exactly the opposite.

I will make this statement in a couple of contexts, Mr. Commissioner. This not a trial. It is a commission of inquiry. This is very -- an important distinction in the treatment of the evidence, and I will go into some of the implications of that later. But here it is the function of this tribunal, I submit, or it is useful to this tribunal, I submit, to take into

account the interests and values which underlie the submissions and the evidence.

In short, and to use a term that was used by my friend, Ms. Gaertner, early in the proceedings, all world views are to be identified and to be taken into account.

The third guiding or focusing concept is "Proportionality". And that means two things, Mr. Commissioner. First, and this is very important, it means recognizing that most, if not all, of the issues before you are issues of degree; they are relative, not absolute. They are issues of degree. How much? They are not categorical either/or. For example, what is the risk?

And secondly, Mr. Commissioner, proportionality means also having due regard to the interests and values and therefore the relative priority and importance of those interests and values. For example, what is an acceptable risk under particular circumstances?

And as I indicated, paragraph 29, Mr. Commissioner, we've chosen the word "proportionality" rather than "balance", because it emphasizes the notion of judgment, of weighing and of prioritizing in dealing with matters of degree.

The fourth focusing concept is "Terminology", and I suggest very strongly, Mr. Commissioner, that it is important to be sensitive to the use and misuse of language. Many and if not all of the participants and witnesses have special interests, and those interests can be obscured by the vagueness of the language.

More importantly, as I say, many, if not most of the terms and concepts used are ambiguous in the abstract, and require context in order to provide specific content. Some examples, some egregious examples are co-management, overescapement, rights, and even conservation. You'll recall, Mr. Commissioner, that there was a special panel, one of the first panels in these proceedings was devoted to trying to -- to debating or to giving evidence on what the word "conservation" meant, and how it related to a term like "sustainable use".

And I would submit, and you'll also recall, the evidence, I think it was Mr. Chamut who said

that the Wild Salmon Policy was essentially the DFO's definition of conservation. In other words, it defined conservation in terms of biodiversity. It separated sustainable use and conservation, defining conservation effectively as biodiversity.

And I say that that's only one definition

And I say that that's only one definition. The term "conservation" is an ambiguous term and needs to be used in -- with sensitivity to the context in which it was used by witnesses, or is used by participants, and ultimately is used by you, Mr. Commissioner.

The fifth focusing concept is dealing with the "Perspective", and it has two parts, and that is that the perspective is that of a public resource. I agree with Mr. Harvey's remarks this morning that the focus is to be on the Fraser River sockeye as a "resource", as distinct from but not ignoring an element of nature. The appropriate perspective is not that of the species and it's not that of Mother Nature, but the human beings which relate to both the species and Mother Nature.

And I believe that Canada also made this submission, and indeed referred to the same passage in the **Ward** case, which I set out at paragraph 31, and which, as you may recall, Mr. Chamut agreed was effectively the perspective from which he viewed his responsibilities when he was with the Department.

The second part of the concept, public resource, is "public", and what that really does, Mr. Commissioner, it embodies the legal principles that I identified at the outset. It's closely linked to that of resource, but it adds the legal dimension. And by "public", I mean the Canadian public.

And the concept has two important implications. First, as I indicated earlier, public is the antithesis of private or exclusive, and second, public, the public resource emphasizes the obligations as distinct from the powers of the Government of Canada and in particular the DFO. The Crown is a trustee of the resource. It is not the owner, and public emphasizes that.

Now, at paragraph 34 I set out the "Use of the Guiding Concepts". And this is what we -- what we suggest for you, Mr. Commissioner, and for

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your staff when looking at the evidence and the questions.

As I indicated, there are three essential time periods which are to be looked at. There's the present, i.e., what is the state of the sockeye. There's the past, what is the cause of the present state of the sockeye, and there's the future, what should we do in the future?

Now, in looking at the present and the past, that is, in focusing on your fact-finding task, and in particular the question of causation, we say that those focusing concepts give rise to the following guidelines:

Pragmatism gives rise to the guideline, focus on the knowable and the doable. And again remember that essentially Canada advised you or recommended the same

Proportionality plays out as look at the situations and problems as matters of degree, rather than as categorical. And this will have a special application when it comes to dealing with the schools of thought on causation which I will say ultimately, Mr. Commissioner, are not mutually exclusive. And when I -- I'll get to that.

The focusing concept of interests and values results in the direction to focus on the underlying interests and values, as well as the specific situations and problems. And in that way you will take into account that this is a resource, and it is a public resource, and that there are conflicting and competing interests and values that are relevant to resolution of even specific situations and problems.

The focusing concept of the perspective, that is, focusing on the species as a public resource, is especially important when defining the issues. As Mr. -- the sub-issues, the issues that need to be broken out in order to come down to the main -- the main issue. As Mr. Harvey said, you will focus -- if you focus on the resource, you ask different questions than if you are focusing on the species or the ecology generally. The issues will be defined in human terms.

And finally, the value or the focusing concept of terminology, I have said, be clear to the point of bluntness. There's been a lot of jargon used in these proceedings, a lot of

bureaucratic jargon. One got sick of hearing 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

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46 47 words like "array" and "suite" and "visions" and that sort of thing, without really knowing what they meant. And there's been a lot of scientific jargon and the recommendation that we have, or we urge you to look through that jargon and to look at what the witnesses were really saying, and what the documents really say in plain -- in plain English. Now, the questions that are before you, as I

indicated, Mr. Commissioner, are set out in paragraph 36 of my submissions. Mr. Harvey read you the Terms of Reference and put them in the formal language. In informal language they're simply this. What is the present situation? What is the cause of the present situation? And what should be done in the future? Now, the rest of this submission addresses those three questions in light of the focusing concepts and the guidelines.

Starting at page 9, I deal with the present because that is where the Terms of Reference begin, and that is what -- what is the status?

Now, I say that it's important before looking for causes in the decline of the Fraser sockeye salmon, it's important to be specific as to what is the subject being measured, and what is the metric being used. As you heard, Mr. Commissioner, that there is a distinction between the aggregate and the stocks, the components that make up that aggregate. So is this -- is the status that is being measured the status of the individual components, or is it the status of the Fraser River sockeye which, as Mr. (sic) Walters indicated during his evidence, is a system in and of itself.

The second part of that question is what is the metric? Is the metric the abundance? Is the metric the ratio of responders to recruits, the production ratio. Those are questions that should be set out at the outset and it should be made clear. Because as I set out in paragraph 41, keeping those distinctions in mind, here is the pattern that I say is -- is the pattern that reflects the present status.

And I'm thankful to Mr. Harvey for producing the book of exhibits, because the pattern that we set out in paragraph 41 is essentially in our

words what we say the exhibits, especially the graphs of Mr. Lapointe, tell us. So he went through in detail; I will simply set out what we say those documents show.

But in the aggregate, the Fraser River sockeye have experienced a severe decline in the ratio of recruits to spawners between the years '95, approximately, to 2009. However, when measured in terms of abundance, the decline is from an extraordinary high level of returns, which Mr. Harvey pointed out in between -- around 1985 to 1990, to levels which are more consistent with historical averages.

So when you look at the question of decline or are describing decline, the question arises, decline from what? And what is the perspective?

If you go back in the graph to the '40s and look forward, you'll see that there hasn't been a severe decline. If you go into the mid-'80s to '90s, you're at the top of the peak of the returns, of course it's a drastic decline. So are you measuring a decline in historical terms, or are you measuring the decline from that top of the -- of the peak.

So as I say, in terms of abundance, it's from an extraordinary high level to a level that is low but, stepping back, is not inconsistent with historical averages.

I say that the drastic decline in both, that is, in abundance and in the ratio of recruits to spawners, is driven by the decline in the larger stocks. That most of the stocks, particularly most of the smaller stocks, are relatively stable and healthy, and that the most serious problems are stock-specific and identifiable.

And I won't go into it, but in the following paragraphs, I set out, Mr. Commissioner, where you can look to find out the best evidence on the status of those — of those individual stocks, and then essentially Slaney and Dr. Walters in his slide show, "Where Have All the Sockeye Gone?" Unfortunately, we don't have an equivalent analysis using the new units, the conservation units, and so the analysis will have to be made in terms of the traditional stocks and/or the aggregate.

Now, at paragraph -- starting at paragraph

47, I set out what -- again what we say the pattern is shown by the evidence, and in particular the evidence referred to by Mr. Harvey this morning.

What is the decline that we're talking about? We say there are two declines before the Commission. There's a long-term decline, and the precipitous collapse in 2009. And by long-term decline I set out in paragraph 48 -- and there's an error here, Mr. Commissioner. I say that the description is a four-year cycle average. It's in fact a description of the history of the 2009 cycle year. So by decline, we mean this, long-term decline.

By 1993 the aggregate stocks on that cycle year were built from a low following the Hell's Gate slide, to approximately 23 million. From '94 to 2008, they declined to the order of two million, and that decline was in stages. From 23 million in '93 to 60 million in '97, roughly, to seven million in 2001, approximately, to seven million in 2005, approximately, and to virtually zero in 2009 or two million.

By short-term collapse we refer to the facts that in 2009 the escapement was just over a million, which is less than one-half of the average cycle escapement and approximately a third of the escapement in the previous cycle year. And here's the important factor that was drawn to your attention by Mr. Harvey, that this decline took place during the period in which the commercial harvesting rate had dropped from an average rate of 80 percent between 1950 and 1990, to firstly approximately 40 percent in the mid-'90s to the mid-2000s, and then essentially zero from 2006.

Notwithstanding that, escapement had increased by approximately a factor of three from mid-1950 levels from 1990 to the mid-2000s.

In terms of recruits per spawner, I set that out at paragraph 51, and as Mr. Harvey indicated they have fluctuated, and by -- between 1992 and 2009 they had dropped to barely one recruit per spawner on an aggregate basis.

Now - and I'm at paragraph 57 here, Mr. Commissioner - this decline didn't occur in a policy/political vacuum. Over the critical period there were important and significant changes in

both management mechanics and policies that were not driven at all, or not solely driven by biological or environmental concerns. The measures were proactive rather than reactive, and they include these:

The 1987 rebuilding program.

The Aboriginal Fishing Strategy.

The redesign of the commercial fishery for "economic efficiency" through the Mifflin and Anderson plans.

The expanding mandate of DFO. You'll recall, I think it was Ms. Dansereau, who used the term "mandate creep".

And the shift in responsibility for setting escapement goals from the Pacific Salmon Commission to DFO.

A further significant change, Mr. Commissioner, was that to "weakest stock management". And although that policy cannot be completely delinked from conservation issues, it does share the characteristics of being proactive and aggressive, rather than reactive and incremental with the other changes.

At paragraphs 59 through 64 I set out what I say are the implications of those changes, and given the time constraints I won't go into them now.

I would point out, however, at paragraph 63, when we talk about the range of objectives and consequent policies, Mr. Commissioner, you will probably recall a number of occasions when you asked witnesses from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans about the hierarchy of policies and visions and discussion papers, and that sort of thing, and also what you are to do with the fact that so many of them were described as works in progress. And that is part of the -- of the context in which this decline takes place.

One asks how can those policies and those programs be related to one another, be coordinated, be implemented, be assessed and be modified, when they're works in progress and one does not necessarily flow from -- one move does not necessarily flow from the completion of the former one.

I want to quickly, but in some depth, go to the question of the evidence on causation. And my

bottom line there, Mr. Commissioner, is this. You've heard from what I categorize as two schools of thought. There's the population dynamics school of thought, and there's the environmental effects school of thought. And those schools of thought have come up with different hypotheses, and they've come up with going to different evidence in support of those hypotheses.

When push comes to shove, I agree with Mr. Harvey's submission that the evidence dealing with, and the hypothesis with respect to the population dynamics school, that is preferable for a number of reasons which I will outline in a minute, to the evidence from the other school.

But I do have some remarks to make which are not in my written submission about how -- they're my suggestions about how the Commission should treat the evidence in those two schools of thought. And this is this, Mr. Commissioner. It is not necessary -- it's not necessary to decide between these approaches. This is not an either/or issue for the Commission, for a number of reasons.

First of all, as I indicated earlier, this is not a trial. You are not called upon to resolve a dispute between interested parties, let alone a debate between scientists. You are charged with the responsibility of finding out the facts, of determining where the truth lies, and the truth may have multiple layers.

Secondly, the objectives of the two approaches are substantially different. The objective, if I understand it, of all of the scientists is to find correlations between variables, to find a "Y" which is a function of an "X". In the population dynamics school, the "X" is the number of spawners and the "Y" is the ratio of recruits to spawners. In the environmental effects school, the "X" is something else, we don't know what, and the "Y" is the ratio of recruits to spawners. They're looking for correlations. The level of analysis is different. This is why you don't have to choose between them.

In the population dynamics school, as I understand it, the existence of the correlation is itself significant. As the number of spawners goes up, the ratio of spawners to recruits, or

recruits to spawners goes down. It doesn't matter why, it's just that the correlation is there. It's been shown to be there. It's embodied in the Ricker and Larkin curve, and Mr. Walters, to personify that school -- Dr. Walters to personify that school simply says there's the correlation. We don't have to understand why it works to know that it works.

It's like understanding an algebraic equation. You don't have to give a value to the "X" to watch the function of the "Y" and the "X". You don't have to understand the content of the quanta to watch the quanta in -- the behaviour of the quanta in quantum physics. It's like a bracket. It's like a bracket, you don't have to know what's in the bracket. They're different levels of analysis.

The stages of verifiability and development are different. The Ricker and Larkin models are verified and used by fisheries managers and biologists.

With respect to the alternative, the environmental effects, there's no specific correlation postulated, let alone verified, let alone used. At the end of the day, and again if I can personify it, Dr. Peterman and Dr. Marmorek say there's something at work probably other than or in addition to population dynamics, but we don't know what it is.

As I will indicate in a minute in a little more detail, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. It doesn't have to be one cause. It can be multiple causes. There can be different causes between different stocks. And again, as I indicated, Mr. Commissioner, these are matters of degree. It's not an either/or choice. You don't have to choose between Walters and Peterman.

And lastly, and I think this is the most important point, the population dynamics approach applies by definition to large stocks. The large stocks are the important stocks, economically and biologically. They drive the system. And even if the population dynamics approach only explained the decline in one stock, the Quesnel, and it doesn't. I say that it is a probable cause of the decline in most of the large stocks. But even if it explained the decline only in one stock, if

that stock is significant from both a biological and a social and economic point of view, that is a matter of urgent -- of urgency to the Commission.

Having said those, why you need not choose

Having said those, why you need not choose between the two schools of thought, Mr. Commissioner, I'd like to turn to paragraph 68 and indicate why I prefer in the context of this Commission, the population dynamics school.

I say firstly it provides a clear and supportable hypothesis for the cause of the long-term decline.

Secondly, it provides an explanation, both for the collapse in 2009 and the large return in 2010, and Mr. Harvey took you through that explanation.

Thirdly, it does not require the identification of the specific causal factor. As I indicated, you don't have to know why the ratio goes down when the population goes up. You just have to know that it does. You don't have to know why, you don't have to know where, you don't have to know whether the effects are in the lake, the river, or the ocean, or you don't have to know when in the lifecycle it operates, or whether it depends on single or multiple environmental factors. It's there, it's tried and true, it's in the Larkin and Ricker models.

And I think, perhaps most importantly, it provides a practical means of testing the hypothesis and, if supported, taking remedial steps. The remedial steps being, of course, dealing with exploitation rates.

Now, I say in paragraph 69, that while not to be ignored, the environmental approach in the main, as we've seen in these proceedings, does not have the same clarity in terms of hypothesis; does not account for the collapse in 2009 and the large return in 2010; requires identification of a specific factor or factors, in fact, that's the object of the exercise. And finally, if proven, offers no apparent short-term remedy other than ever diminishing fisheries. And that's where we are if the population dynamics school is ignored or rejected.

I don't have the time, Mr. Commissioner, to go into the evidence and the detail. It's in my written submission about the difference between

 the two schools of thought.

Perhaps I'll just take you quickly to paragraph 94 where I say this. The evidence shows that density-dependent effects are a likely cause of the decline in production of some stocks and that these stocks are the major components of the Fraser River sockeye. The possibility, or even probability, that other factors are at play in other stocks, or even the same stocks, does not diminish the importance and urgency of attending to the impacts of over-escapement.

I'll skip very quickly, I think I have a few minutes left, just to highlight how the focusing concepts play out into the future, that is, the recommendations, and I'll be at page 23 of the submission. And these really are recommendations that are directed at the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

"Pragmatism" plays out as the direction to be conservative in the approach to changes in fisheries management. We've heard a number of witnesses talk about uncertainty and the need for transformative remedies. At paragraph 110 I deal with that.

The second direction given by the focusing concept of pragmatism is attend to the known, stock-specific problems. And there are three, the Early Stuart, the Early migrating Lake sockeye, and the Cultus.

And thirdly, apply the principles of adaptive management, which are all found in Dr. Walters' textbook referred to by Mr. Harvey this morning.

"Proportionality" manifests as look to the costs as well as the benefits of management decisions, strike the appropriate balance between management and science, and strike the balance between science and experience, both personal and institutional.

"Perspective", I've really dealt with that. The point is that the fisheries resource, or the fishery is a public resource.

Very, very, very quickly, the question on the interest of terminology, or the governing concept of terminology, really comes down at the end to a plea for transparency. A plea for transparency from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans as to what they're doing and why they're doing it, and

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 in particular transparency about the Aboriginal agenda. Are we talking about fishing issues that relate to Aboriginal people, or are we talking about Aboriginal issues that relate to fishing? Because they're two different things: what is driving the agenda with respect to Aboriginal fisheries, and the relationship between those fisheries and the public fishery.

I see that I'm out of time, Mr. Commissioner. I wish you well and I hope that our focusing concepts help you in your endeavour.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Mr. Lowes.

SUBMISSIONS FOR WESTERN COAST SALISH FIRST NATIONS:

COWICHAN TRIBES AND CHEMAINUS FIRST NATION,

HWLITSUM FIRST NATION AND PENELAKUT TRIBE, TE'MEXW

TREATY ASSOCIATION BY MR. GAILUS:

MR. GAILUS: Mr. Commissioner, John Gailus, I'm here today on behalf of Western Central Coast Salish First Nations. And with me here today is Robert Clifford, he's an articled student, he helped us out on the written submissions, which I don't intend to refer to in any detail. I just want to make note, however, that you'll see on the first page there, this was quite a collaborative effort. Ms. Leah DeForrest, David Robbins, Holly Vear, Robert James and Sarah Sharp. We worked together on these submissions and managed to pull them together. They're quite comprehensive submissions, Mr. Commissioner, and we look forward to you reviewing them.

Just by way of background, again, for the record, Mr. Commissioner, when we speak of the Western Central Coast Salish First Nations, we're talking about nine First Nations: Cowichan, Chemainus, Penelakut, Hwlitsum and the members of the Te'mexw Treaty Association: Songhees, Nanoose, Beecher Bay, T'Souke and Malahat.

My clients have asked me to thank you, Mr. Commissioner, for granting them standing in this Commission and giving them the opportunity to participate.

We would also echo the comments of counsel as to the thanks for Commission counsel and staff and the degree of professionalism and hard work.

For the next day and a half, Mr.

Commissioner, you are going to be hearing from a number of First Nations participants. I have the privilege to bat leadoff for the First Nations, so I need to talk a little bit about the law. We're going to briefly discuss causes and DFO priorities, and then the main part of our submissions are going to be on the Aboriginal issues.

So we've got some submissions, Mr. Commissioner, in reply to B.C. and Canada, and I guess to a certain extent Mr. Lowes has nicely teed this up for us.

We submit, Mr. Commissioner, Canada and British Columbia's submissions are illustrative of the impoverished view of Aboriginal and treaty rights. There's three areas in particular that require comment. The Aboriginal Rights Framework, the Aboriginal right to fish for what's commonly been known as FSC purposes, and Canada's approach to Douglas Treaties.

Now, B.C. at page 18 of its main submission says this:

...the Commissioner is not required to, nor should he, make findings with respect to the state of the law concerning Aboriginal rights and title with respect to fisheries, given the evolving state of the law...

We submit that, Mr. Commissioner, your recommendations must be cognizant of, and consistent with the s. 35 jurisprudence.

We have provided a legal framework in our submissions that we say must guide you in making your recommendations. We also want to take a look at PPR1, our written submissions in reply to that, as well as some of the -- all of the, I would say, First Nations' submissions in that regard.

My paragraph 10, it's at page 2 of our final submission, I wanted to summarize this, but I don't think I could put it any better than this, Mr. Commissioner. We say the Commission must also have regard to these rights in formulating its recommendations. The Commission's recommendations are only useful to the extent that they can be lawfully implemented. As such, these recommendations must be consistent with the

existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of all affected Aboriginal peoples in accordance with the fashion that those rights are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act. This means regard must be had both to the substantive aspects of Aboriginal and treaty rights. I mean the Aboriginal right to fish, as well as the rules limiting the extent to which the government can interfere with these rights. And I would also add to this the right of consultation that comes from that. Now, B.C. goes on at paragraph 4 of its reply and says: 

...consideration of the Aboriginal right to fish should not include making any specific rulings or findings with respect to the scope of Aboriginal title or the Aboriginal right to fish or with respect to treaty rights to fish.

Now, Mr. Commissioner, you're not going to be expected to make any specific rulings on the Aboriginal title or the Aboriginal rights of the participants in this Inquiry. But I think we should take a look at what Dr. Harris had to say in his testimony of June 27th. It's at page 90 of the transcript. So at line 7, this is actually Mr. Dickson doing some cross-examination. He says:

And then you say in this first paragraph on this page further:

Fish were crucially important as food in many Aboriginal societies in North America, but also facilitated the accumulation of wealth.

And then he goes on to say:

And I'm interested in the last portion...

Dr. Harris at line 19 replies, and says:

So fish, and salmon in particular, were the single most important -- or was the single

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most important resource in the territory for aboriginal peoples, and this territory supported as large and as dense a pre-industrial non-agrarian population as existed anywhere in the world. There was a remarkable -- well, a remarkably dense sophisticated political society here that was built around the fishery, and a society that included a social hierarchy with nobility at the top and slaves at the bottom; a hierarchy that allowed for an enormous cultural production, a society rather that allowed for enormous cultural production.

All of this was made possible because aboriginal people and the cultures that they built were specialists in the catching and processing of fish.

And, Mr. Commissioner, to sum up Dr. Harris's testimony, and we address this also in our written submissions, salmon was the centrepiece of the society and it continues to be so. There was a sophisticated, organized society whose sustenance, culture and economy was built around the fishery.

This isn't a matter that's in dispute, Mr. Commissioner. The historical and anthropological evidence on this is overwhelming. In **Sparrow** the court opined and said the existence of a right is not a subject of serious dispute.

I submit, Mr. Commissioner, when it -certainly when it comes to fishing for food,
social and ceremonial purposes, there should be no
dispute that each of the First Nation participants
in this inquiry, as well as the other First
Nations along the migratory route, has an
Aboriginal right to fish for FSC purposes.

Although some of Dr. Harris's evidence may be controversial, the historical record is not. First Nations have fished since time immemorial for food, social and ceremonial purposes.

Now, this fact is implicitly recognized by DFO throughout its policy and its operations decisions. We have licensing. We have openings. We have the priority that's given to Aboriginal fishing. I submit this may explain why DFO does not comply with the *Haida* consultation framework.

There's no need to do a strength of claim if the right exists. 3 Finally, I'll just wrap up here, Mr. Commissioner. 5 There is a dispute, we agree, whether the 6 Aboriginal right to fish includes a right to sale 7 or even a moderate livelihood. However, the right 8 is not simply the right to dip the net in the 9 water and come up empty. And I didn't come up 10 with that, that comes from a judgment of Mr. 11 Justice Boldt in the U.S. Washington case, 1980, 12 what's often referred to as Boldt, and that's 13 found at paragraph 189 of our submissions. 14 I note the time, Mr. Commissioner. 15 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much. 16 THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is adjourned until 2:00 17 p.m. 18 19 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED FOR NOON RECESS) 20 (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED) 21 22 THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now resumed. 23 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Gailus. 24 25 SUBMISSIONS FOR WESTERN COAST SALISH FIRST NATIONS: 26 COWICHAN TRIBES AND CHEMAINUS FIRST NATION, 27 HWLITSUM FIRST NATION AND PENELAKUT TRIBE, TE'MEXW 28 TREATY ASSOCIATION BY MR. GAILUS, continuing: 29 30 MR. GAILUS: Mr. Commissioner, John Gailus on again for 31 the Western Central Coast Salish. I have one more 32 straw man argument to address, and then I want to 33 talk about the causes of decline. 34 At paragraph 188 of its reply, Canada states: 35 36 ... the question as to which modern day 37 Aboriginal groups are beneficiaries of the 38 Douglas Treaties --39 40 - and you will recall, five of the First Nations 41 that I represent claim to be Douglas Treaty 42 successors -43 44 -- is a question of mixed fact and law, and 45 one that is not settled in the jurisprudence. 46 While the members of the Te'mexw Treaty 47 Association [TTA] assert Douglas Treaty

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 rights, this is not established in law.

We submit, Mr. Commissioner, this is a bizarre position for the Crown to take, given that it is a party to this treaty, but one that the members of TTA and other Douglas Treaty First Nations have repeatedly dealt with. I submit, Mr. Commissioner, the answer to this argument can be found in *Mikisew*, which is in our list of authorities, at paragraph 34, where Mr. Justice Binnie says:

In the case of a treaty the Crown, as a party, will always have notice of its contents.

Now, he didn't mention the issue that we're addressing here, but one would expect that the Crown would also be expected to know who the successors, successor bands are to the treaty that they've entered into. Given the degree of control that we've heard about that the Crown has exercised over Aboriginal people, dividing them into bands, it's disingenuous of Canada to say we don't know who the successors of the Douglas Treaty are. The fact is, it's these five First Nations. There's no dispute on this.

The reason why I waned to address these straw man arguments, Mr. Commissioner, is to illustrate the fundamental schism that exists between First Nations and the Crown generally, but in fisheries in particular.

Now we go to the causes. We've heard, and we've got quite extensive submissions in our written submissions on this, but I just want to highlight a couple of those for you, Mr. Commissioner.

As you're aware of, throughout their lifecycle, sockeye salmon are subject to multiple stressors in both the freshwater and the marine environment. Although the causes of the long-term decline are not entirely clear - I think I'm adopting Canada's submission here - it seems to be that climate change and warming ocean conditions may be a driver. Not a cause, but a driver of other cumulative effects. And we went through these, harmful algae blooms, decreased nutrients,

pathogens, invasive species, finfish aquaculture and predators. That does not mean that the freshwater environment of the Fraser River is a pristine oasis for salmon. The cumulative effects of contaminants, wastewater, logging, mining, hydro, gravel removal, urbanization and warming river temperatures, all impact upon the sockeye salmon in its journey out to sea.

And I think Mr. Leadem did a very good job of going through each of these topics in detail. While these may not necessarily be primary drivers, it would be reckless to state they do not impact on salmon.

Now, B.C., at paragraph 33 of its submissions, makes this statement:

None of the provincial topics, individually or collectively, is responsible for the 20-year decline of Fraser River sockeye salmon or the collapse in 2009.

Now, we felt it necessary to reply to that, Mr. Commissioner, and at paragraph 2 of our reply, we say this:

WCCSFN's submissions comprehensively canvas the individual Technical Reports that suggest that increasing freshwater and ocean temperature is the underlying condition contributing to other factors that stand to impact sockeye salmon mortality. Dismissing other factors is a simplification of the evidence. All of the factors mentioned above in paragraph 1 --

- those being logging, urbanization, wastewater, et cetera -

-- may play a significant role in the cumulative impacts that sockeye salmon encounter during their lifecycle. The fact is that the Fraser River watershed is far from the pristine watershed that British Columbia's submissions paint it to be.

Habitat, and habitat protection both in-river and in the marine environment must be a priority

for DFO. We've heard the evidence. DFO isn't doing habitat. And similarly, B.C. needs to be protecting habitat.

In a particular geographic location, Mr. Commissioner, salmon may be influenced by a number of variables. In addition, these variables may change throughout their lifecycle, whether in the freshwater or the marine environment. We submit that future research should focus on these potential causes, the causes that Mr. Marmorek in his evidence and in Technical Report 6 talked about in the marine environment.

Future research must be conducted with cumulative effects in mind, rather than looking at these causes in isolation. We submit that knowledge of these cumulative effects will hopefully allow better decisions in a host of areas, including pre-season and in-season estimates on returns.

Now, at page 45 of our submissions, Mr. Commissioner, we make some general recommendations on this, and I'd like to turn to those.

So right at the bottom we've got "Causes" and the "Recommendations".

Overall there's a need for better science.

Areas of the marine migratory route, especially the North Pacific, Queen Charlotte Sound, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca, also I'd say Strait of Georgia, as well, should have priority for the collection of scientific data.

There is a need for science information to inform DFO policy, not for policy accountabilities to drive science. We've heard this from several of the participants.

And finally, First Nations need to be intimately involved in providing Traditional Ecological Knowledge, TEK, and assisting in data collection.

I want to move on to DFO organization. I want to go through this just in a very summary fashion, given the amount of time that I have.

But not unlike the sockeye salmon, the DFO is subject to multiple stressors: decreased funding; increased responsibility in the area of finfish aquaculture; implementing complex policies such as the Wild Salmon Policy; scientific uncertainty in the face of climate change; and ever-increasing

 consultation obligations with First Nations.

Now, many of the participants have recommended that DFO be provided with increased funding to address these stressors, and others. Now, while we support these recommendations, I think we need to take a reality check. We suggest that if they don't get increased resources, they need to focus on certain priorities.

First, co-operational areas, in particular habitat, enforcement and protection.

Second, the implementation of the Wild Salmon Policy should be a priority and adequately funded with clear benchmarks and reasonable timeframes for implementation.

Third, as detailed in our written submissions, meaningful consultation and comanagement with First Nations should be a priority.

Fourth, the test fishery needs a multiyear funding commitment.

Fifth, science should be focused on the priority areas set out in Technical Report 6. That's the Marmorek Cumulative Effects report, and DFO should seek out funding partners.

I want to turn now to consultation and the aboriginal right to fish. Now, we've already dealt with the aboriginal right to fish earlier, but with that right come incidental rights. And that comes from the *Mitchell* case, which is in our list of authorities.

Similarly, the right is much broader, as I said, than the right to dip a net in the water. And for that we referenced the **Saanichton Marina** and **West Moberly** cases, as well as the Boldt series of decisions from Washington State.

We say inherent in that right includes a right to manage the fishery, as well. Dr. Harris's evidence was that of pre-contact societies with a complex social structure who had their own customs and law and methods of fisheries management. You'll recall, Mr. Commissioner, that he pointed to the Cowichan as an example of fisheries management and the conservation ethic.

We submit, and I think the law is pretty clear on this, that Canada has a duty to manage the fishery in a manner that does not infringe upon these constitutionally protected s. 35

rights.

Now, the second aspect is **Haida** and the consultation requirement. We spent some time on this during the hearings. We know that DFO doesn't do the strength of claim analysis. It's not clear whether they do the second part of the test, which is the potential for adverse impact. But regardless, we say they have a strong claim, so the duty to consult when decisions have the potential to adversely affect First Nations rights.

Now, this engages a whole host of DFO decisions, decisions regarding allocations, access, habitat, and so on, have the potential to impact upon these s. 35 rights. We go into this in some detail in our written submissions, Mr. Commissioner. But in essence, we say that strategic decisions, and this comes right out of <code>Haida</code> and <code>Rio Tinto</code>, starting from the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the Fraser River Panel, down the chain, all these decisions require meaningful consultation with First Nations.

I want to talk a little bit about where the rubber hits the road on this, and that's in the matter of allocations, whether First Nations are getting their fish requirements. The testimony on this, Mr. Commissioner, is clear. First Nations dietary and cultural needs are not being met. Allocations have remained static since the implementation of the AFS Strategy, post-Sparrow, 1992. Meanwhile, First Nations populations are exploding, not in the sense of Mr. McDade's explosive factory, but fish numbers haven't moved.

During the course of the hearing we heard about the Coastwide Framework, which among other things has established an endpoint allocation for First Nations in B.C. Now, this endpoint allocation was arrived at without consultation with First Nations. That's in Ms. McGivney's testimony, and Canada has claimed a Cabinet confidence and refused to disclose this number.

At page 22, paragraph 116 of our written submission, Mr. Lunn, perhaps I'll just read it out. We say this:

The danger of an percentage allocation model in this case is best illustrated by

considering the FSC fishery. The FSC is a priority, needs based fishery. Thus it does not follow that the percentage of the fishery it consumes should decline if the fishery declines. Instead, what one would expect to see is that the priority principle, and that's outlined in Sparrow, subject to the ultimate conservation limit, would act to increase the percentage of the declining fishery dedicated to the FSC fishery, while displacing non-Aboriginal fisheries and potentially aboriginal economic fisheries as is required by Sparrow. Thus the adoption of a global endpoint based on a percentage allocation is in and of itself a fundamental change to the constitutionally quaranteed FSC rights of Aboriginals, if implemented. 

Now, in addition to this, we know that fish numbers for various groups of First Nations, whether we're talking Lower Fraser, Upper Fraser, marine and approach, are also fixed.

Finally, First Nations individual allocations have generally remained static.

We say that FSC allocation decision-making is based on illegitimate factors. I'd like to look at Canada's response to the s. 35 questions that the Commission counsel put to them. We've got them at paragraph 123, page 24 of our submissions, Mr. Lunn. It's the part indented there. Canada says this:

Factors considered in the negotiation of First Nations FSC allocations could include: recent harvest levels...; species availability...; species abundance; consideration of allocations for other First Nations; and, population size (on reserve, off reserve). In the treaty context FSC levels have been negotiated with reference to the above factors.

Now, recent harvest is obviously problematic because the numbers have been fixed in *Sparrow*. We say use of this factor renders the inadequate allocations of sockeye self-perpetuating.

Similarly, alternate species availability

 lacks legitimacy. First Nation sockeye fishing traditions cannot be arbitrarily substituted for by virtue of having access to another protein source.

Finally, the relevance of allocations for other First Nations is also highly questionable. These allocations, too, were arrived at post-Sparrow in the early '90s, again, self-perpetuating.

Finally, and we make reference to this in our reply. There's a reference there to game. I'm not sure that a deer would be out in the fishery.

The testimony of the DFO witnesses, they don't have a plan for how they'll accommodate First Nation needs in light of these increases in population. They don't intend to conduct a needs assessment for each First Nation. And we address this at paragraph 132 on page 26. I'm not going to go there, given the time.

Population, we say, population and preferred species must be the driver for allocation decisions.

And FSC allocations require more transparency and must be based on clear policy - rather than draft, we saw a lot of draft policies - with mechanisms to provide for revisions to allocation, based on increases in population, as well as changes to area.

I want to talk briefly on the terminal fishery.

The Conservation Coalition and some of the First Nation participants argue that terminal fisheries will assist in ensuring a more robust fishery from the conservation perspective, and recommend a move to more terminal fisheries.

Now, this is where we part ways with some of our First Nation colleagues. We don't support a move to a terminal fishery at this time that excludes or even limits exercise of our clients' constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights to fish sockeye in the places where this was traditionally done.

You'll recall, Mr. Commissioner, that the **Adams** case from the Supreme Court of Canada established that Aboriginal rights are sitespecific.

Similarly, if there was a move to a terminal

 fishery, to exclude the interception fisheries, this would likely be seen as unjustifiable under the **Sparrow** test and not honourable for the Crown to tell the First Nations, go fish elsewhere.

We submit that both traditional interception and terminal fisheries can coexist. Conservation of sockeye does not require a choice between a interception fishery and a terminal fishery. The combination of better science, understanding of CUs under the WSP, targeted openings, to have less impact on weaker stock, and specific fishing gear and techniques, we suggest is a less intrusive solution than a terminal fishery.

I might add that a move to a terminal-only fishery would be potentially fatal to the commercial fishery and contrary to the constitutional rights of First Nations generally, and obviously the WCCSFN particularly.

Similarly, we don't support a share-based fishery.

And we agree with and adopt the Sto:lo and Cheam submissions at paragraphs 149 and 150 of their submissions.

We also support the recommendation in "Our Place at the Table", Exhibit 493, that ITQs not be introduced until s. 35 rights of First Nations are accommodated.

Finally, there's the matter of the socioeconomic factors. And it pains me to say it, but we agree with Area G, at paragraphs 139 to 140 regarding the potential impacts of a move to ITQs -- Mr. Harvey's clients.

Finally, I want to go to "Co-Management". We agree with our First Nation colleagues about the need to move to a true co-management structure for fisheries. We submit there is a legal and a political basis for co-management.

Now, we have suggested a move to a Boldt-type model, true co-management. You will recall, Mr. Commissioner, that Boldt is actually the judge in the case in Washington State involving a number of Tribes who signed on to what are known as the Stevens Treaties. Negotiated around the same time as the Douglas Treaties in British Columbia.

It's also interesting to note that the signatories to those treaties are Coast Salish people, relatives of my clients and many of the

1	other First Nation participants here. They've
2	been doing co-management for 40 years, Mr.
3	Commissioner.
4	We recognize that there are impediments to
5	co-management. I discussed at the outset the
6	positions taken by B.C. and Canada in this.
7	DFO decision-making is also an impediment.
8	My friend, Mr. Taylor, said it's incremental,
9	consultative and transparent. We say it's ad hoc,
10	autocratic and opaque.
11	At paragraph 671 of the First Nations
12	Coalition submissions, which we adopt, Ms.
13	Gaertner goes into some detail in terms of what
14	the other impediments to a co-management system
15	would be. In particular is this first principle,
16	Mr. Commissioner, which we discussed in some
17	depth:
18	
19	a. explicit recognition of Aboriginal title
20	and rights and treaty rights or the
21	willingness to proceed on the basis
22	ofstrength claim;
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24	DFO doesn't do either.
25	
26	I'd recommend the other principles, as well:
27	
28	b. clarity among First Nations, and between
29	First Nations and Canada, on the elements and
30	principles of co-management;
31	
32	c. the incremental sharing of management
33	[and] responsibilities;
34	
35	d. a clear commitment from Canada of its
36	willingness to negotiate and implement co-
37	management with First Nations;
38	
39	e. dedicated resources;
40	
41	f. a champion;
42	
43	g. [developing], resourcing anduse of Tier
44	1 and 2 processes;
45	
46	himmediatelyincreased First Nations
47	representation on the Fraser River Panel to a

minimum of 50 percent;

 i. support...capacity building and meaningful involvement [with] individual First Nations and Tribal Councils...and provide technical expertise, and policy advice to First Nations.

In order to get here, though, Mr. Commissioner, First Nations have a lot of work to do. The structure must be built from the ground up and capacity needs to be provided to First Nations and to DFO. We cannot rely on the existing groups as it's recognized, there's problems with authority. They're not the rights holders, or in many cases the knowledge holders, and we're talking about Traditional Ecological Knowledge. First Nations have to get their house in order, as well, in order to make the commanagement structure work.

Now, Mr. Buchanan spent a lot of time asking certain questions in his presentation about, well, we really don't know what this thing's going to look like, so where do we start?

Well, there needs to be political will on all sides. B.C. needs to get on board. They play a significant role in habitat and land use decisions that affect habitat.

There's been some really good work done in the Forum and the Roadmap processes that we wouldn't want to lose.

How? How do we get there?

Well, first the *Fisheries Act* needs to be amended. Canada's got it on as a priority, so let's get on with it. But do so in a manner that acknowledges the need for First Nations comanagement, without fettering the Minister's discretion.

In our written submission, we make reference to the B.C. *Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act*, something that B.C. enacted to enable comanagement in Haida Gwaii. Similarly, Parks Canada, agent of the federal Crown, is doing comanagement with the Haida in the Gwaii Hanaas.

Second, we need a framework agreement or an MOU amongst the three governments. Examples abound in Health, Education, Child and Family

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Submissions by Mr. Gailus (WCCSFN)
Submissions by Mr. Dickson (STCCIB)

Services, where the three governments have come together and entered into a co-management agreement. There isn't an impediment to this.

The status quo is not working, Mr. Commissioner. My friend Mr. Timberg says we have to consult with over 130 First Nations, mostly bilaterally, which takes up huge resources. We agree. If they're actually doing proper consultation, it would likely take even greater human resources and financial resources. We submit co-management, true co-management, will lead to a more efficient use of resources. This solution would be a model of what the Supreme Court of Canada has termed "cooperative federalism", all three governments working together for a common goal.

I notice I'm out of time, Mr. Commissioner, but I just want to take you to our recommendations, and they're right at the end, at page 63, although there's no -- there's no number there, Mr. Lunn.

So we've got "Appendix A", which we're calling "General Principles". This is our -- our top ten list, Mr. Commissioner.

And then behind that is the "Table of Recommendations" which is supposed to be labelled "Appendix B", which Mr. Clifford created. He went through our submissions and parsed out 111 -- 111 different recommendations. I didn't figure we had more than 25, but apparently they're there.

In conclusion, Mr. Commissioner, you face a daunting task. Your hard work is just beginning. The First Nations that I represent, as well as First Nations about the Province and throughout the Province are anxiously awaiting your report, and we look forward to reading it, and wish you the best of luck. Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Mr. Gailus. Mr. Dickson.

SUBMISSIONS FOR STO:LO TRIBAL COUNCIL AND CHEAM INDIAN BAND BY MR. DICKSON:

MR. DICKSON: Mr. Commissioner, Tim Dickson for the Sto:lo Tribal Council and the Cheam Indian Band. Mr. Commissioner, we have 45 minutes, which will be divided between Ms. Schabus and myself.

Before I turn to our substantive issues, I want to express our appreciation for this Inquiry, and for the efforts of yourself, of Commission counsel and staff, of the other participants, and of all of the witnesses.

The topic of this Inquiry is enormously important and a huge amount of public money and time has been devoted to it. And I don't say this, Mr. Commissioner, to add to the weight already upon your shoulders, but rather to stress that much will be lost if this opportunity is not seized to make bold recommendations for the management of Fraser sockeye. You have been granted the mandate, the forum, and the resources to position you to make far-reaching recommendations, and I urge you not to fear making them.

Let me turn to the issues I will speak to. There are five of them: First, I will address what we see as the nature and causes of the decline of the Fraser sockeye. Next, I will turn to what we say is the proper management philosophy to respond to that decline. Third, I will address the benefits for the future sustainability of the sockeye in implementing joint management between DFO and First Nations. And we see these three points as inextricably linked. The first leads to the second which leads to the third. I will also address a fourth point, which is the monitoring and enforcement over the Aboriginal fishery. as a last point, I will briefly address the testimony of Dr. Harris, and then Ms. Schabus will take over the podium.

So let me turn to the first topic, which is the nature and causes of the decline. One thing is clear in this Inquiry, Mr. Commissioner, and that is that there is no one cause of the decline of the Fraser sockeye. We do not have a smoking gun scenario. Rather, we have a scenario of a thousand cuts suffered by the sockeye as they travel down the river and up the coast and back again. They are subjected to a large range of stresses that impact upon their health and lead to their mortality.

And in this way the causes of the decline of Fraser sockeye are best conceptualized as cumulative in nature. As Mr. Leadem described in

his oral submissions, they are synergistic and sometimes additive, but in any event the widespread declines are best thought of as a combination of a large number of stressors on the fish that together lead to their mortality.

And in this sense, Project 6 by David Marmorek and his colleagues is important in conceptualizing this cumulative aspect of the causes of the sockeye's decline.

In that project, that Technical Report is also important in identifying where those cumulative effects are becoming realized, where the impacts are the largest, and the Project 6 team concluded that marine conditions on the outmigration and climate change are the most likely drivers of sockeye mortality, the largest drivers. And as a general proposition we commend Project 6 to you. The analysis, in our view, is sound and the conclusions well supported.

One of the key implications of Project 6, Mr. Commissioner, and indeed of the overall body of evidence in this Inquiry, is that we live in an era of changing environmental conditions, of increasing uncertainty, and of higher mortality for sockeye. In these conditions, many of the conditions that are most closely linked to the decline of the sockeye cannot be fixed by DFO, or indeed Canada alone. Some contributing stressors like contaminants maybe, but others, including big ones, cannot.

And here let me just pause to note that one of the most important pieces of evidence in this inquiry is the finding by Peterman and Dorner in Project 10 that most of the 45 sockeye stocks outside of the Fraser that they examined displayed a similar decline as Fraser stocks. This is not just a Fraser River problem. This is happening all up and down the cost.

So the most important focus has to be on how to manage properly within these conditions. And this is the second broad point I wish to address.

The key aspects of the appropriate management philosophy are to protect the biodiversity among the sockeye and to protect ecosystems. And if you add into that list that fisheries must be managed in a sustainable manner, then those are the three core principles of the Wild Salmon Policy, and we

 support those principles, and we broadly support the policy.

Mr. Leadem called it a home run. We say it's at least a base hit.

Let me just address the biodiversity point for a moment. If we can't reverse climate change and we can't reverse deteriorating marine conditions, then it is essential that se preserve the ability of the sockeye to adapt to those changes.

And that means that you need to preserve diversity, both genetic diversity and diversity among life histories. Because some populations will do better than others and relatively they will thrive, and you need to preserve those populations so that those successful traits are not lost, but rather propagated. And so we say that generally weak stock management is the right course.

And let me just address here for a moment the issue of over-escapement. This is an issue in which the battle lines are drawn between the commercial and recreational groups on the one hand, and DFO, the Conservation Coalition and the First Nation groups on the other. And it is related to a difference in management philosophy, essentially, whether you are opposed to or advocate for weak stock management.

The Sto:lo and the Cheam do not see that over-escapement poses a significant concern in the context of the widespread declines of sockeye. And so we say that weak stock management is the proper approach.

Mr. Rosenbloom took us on yesterday, saying that we stated that there is no evidence of the decline from over-escapement. And that's not quite right. What we rely upon in our submissions at paragraph 24 is Project 10 by Peterman and Dorner, who addressed this issue of over-escapement, among other things, and they noted that there is some evidence that might suggest that the Quesnel stock is declining from spawner overabundance, but that's it. That's the only stock which may support the hypothesis.

And Peterman and Dorner concluded, quote:

Our data do not support the hypothesis that

 large spawner abundances are responsible for widespread declines

And we go on in our submissions to note that David Marmorek preferred the evidence of Peterman and Dorner to that of Carl Walters, and we respectfully submit that you should, too.

So in our submission, the correct approach is weak stock management, and to put it another way, the Wild Salmon Policy's goal of protecting biodiversity and ecosystems is the right philosophy. But philosophy alone will do nothing for the sockeye. What is needed is action, and in this DFO has failed. DFO has not adequately implemented the policy.

And this is an issue on which we agree with Mr. Rosenbloom. And he and Mr. Leadem and the Gardner Pinfold report, the draft report, have spoken to this point. I will not linger on it.

I will only say that Ms. Farlinger's testimony from the DFO Priorities panel left a large impression on me. When she was asked questions about the implementation of the Wild Salmon Policy, she repeatedly responded that the policy is being implemented in spirit. The policy is being implemented in spirit, but not in body, and that's not nearly enough.

Philosophy won't save the fish, and neither will theology. What is needed, Mr. Commissioner, is action. And we join the other participants in calling for more funding for the implementation of the Wild Salmon Policy. And in our reply submissions we adopt a number of the recommendations from the Conservation Coalition and the First Nations Coalition in this regard, and I'll leave those with you.

Mr. Commissioner, to recount to this point, our submission is that based on Project 6, you should find that the major drivers of the decline in productivity are deteriorating marine conditions and climate change, and this reality mandates a management approach that preserves biodiversity and ecosystems. Essentially, the core of the Wild Salmon Policy is correct. The issue is that the Wild Salmon Policy needs to be implemented.

I'd like to turn to my third topic, which is

co-management between DFO and First Nations. As you know, we say that is essential, and it is essential in two respects. The first is that co-management is part of the basket of rights that some First Nations have in Fraser sockeye. And indeed, co-management is necessary to ensure the conservation of the sockeye so that First Nations can continue to exercise their constitutional rights to take the fish.

Now, I know that the nature of Aboriginal rights is controversial, and it's the subject of evolving case law, and anyway it's not an issue you have been squarely mandated to determine. But you should have this point in mind, Mr. Commissioner, it is not controversial among First Nations that they have a right to co-management. That is a deep-seated conviction among First Nations people, and they will continue to push for it.

What I do say, with respect, you are mandated to consider, is the second reason co-management is essential, which are the many benefits for the conservation of the sockeye that will flow out of it.

In our submissions at paragraph 66 to 77, we set out five of these benefits, and I will touch briefly on three of them here in my oral submissions.

The first of these benefits, Mr. Commissioner, is the incorporation of Traditional Ecological Knowledge, TEK, not just of the sockeye stocks, but of the sockeye's habitat. Because it should be remembered that First Nations live along the Coast and the Fraser River, and they have for millennia, and they do today, and they have a deep reservoir of traditional knowledge of that habitat and of the sockeye within them.

Many witnesses in the hearings spoke of the enormous value of TEK to fisheries management, and many DFO witnesses, including at the highest level, acknowledged that DFO is not adequately incorporating TEK, and that's very clear. And the problem DFO faces with incorporating TEK is that they don't know how to do it, and how could they?

Mr. Taylor called DFO a science-based organization, and Mr. Harvey took issue with that and called it a policy-based organization. But

what is clear is that it is not a TEK-based organization. It would never be able to incorporate TEK on its own. It doesn't know how to do it, and it won't know. But it wants to — it wants to have the benefit of TEK, and that is proper. It should want to have the benefit of it. But the point is this, to incorporate TEK in the fisheries management, Aboriginal groups and Aboriginal organizations must be incorporated into fisheries management, and that is done through comanagement.

A second benefit of co-management, Mr. Commissioner, is that First Nations can serve as a balance to DFO, in a manner similar to the role the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission plays in Washington State. As this inquiry heard from a number of witnesses, that model is working. And a benefit of it, of course, is that it allows for the inclusion of TEK.

But also it allows for the inclusion of the energy and commitment of the tribes toward the conservation of the fish. That is, it allows the bureaucracy of government to be balanced by the tribes, who have a direct and profound stake in the conservation of the fish and the sustainability of the fishery. To put the point briefly, if the fish are lost, government officials might lose their employment, but the tribes, and here in B.C., First Nations, would lose their culture.

And that leads me to the third and last benefit of co-management I'll speak to here, that is that First Nations have deep within the core of their cultures an ethic of conservation and an integrated view of the environment. And those are values and perspectives that are essential to the sustainability of the sockeye, and they are fundamental principles of the Wild Salmon Policy.

DFO adopted that policy in 2005, but those principles have been part of Aboriginal cultures for a very long time. And if the principles are going to be put into practice, if they are going to be implemented in body as well as in spirit, then First Nations will have to be intimately engaged in that process.

Now, I wanted to pause here and draw your attention to one of the differences between the

commercial and recreational groups and the conservation and Aboriginal groups. The former emphasize sustainable use. Really, they emphasize fisheries over fish. Indeed, Mr. Harvey this morning went so far as to suggest that DFO is mandated to care only about fisheries, and I suppose, especially about his clients' fisheries. And that approach is exactly contrary to the Wild Salmon Policy, and indeed the commercial and recreational groups reject the Policy.

And if you believe that the Wild Salmon Policy is broadly correct, and we submit that you

And if you believe that the Wild Salmon Policy is broadly correct, and we submit that you should, then DFO will need more of the perspective that First Nations have to offer, which focuses on conservation and long-term sustainability.

And indeed, Mr. Commissioner, when you look at the six Strategies of the Wild Salmon Policy, you sill see that the close participation of First Nations is essential to each of them. And I'll just touch on the first three.

Strategy 1 calls for "Standardized monitoring of wild salmon status". Well, the baseline data and benchmarks that are to be developed need to take into account the enormous reservoir of knowledge that is TEK. And monitoring and assessing of conservation units need to utilize the fact the First Nations people live year round along critical sockeye habitat.

Strategy 2, is the "Assessment of habitat status", and the same points apply here. That must incorporate TEK and that must utilize First Nations living alongside sockeye habitat.

Strategy 3 calls for the "Inclusion of ecosystem values and monitoring". Well, of course, a holistic integrated view of the environment is central to Aboriginal world views, and monitoring and observation is the very basis of TEK.

And in our written submissions, Mr. Commissioner, we break down the Strategies by the Action Steps, and we show the importance of comanagement to each of them, and I'll leave that with you for now.

So my submission is that co-management is essential to sound fisheries management. And in my submission, you should urge DFO to commit more fully, more genuinely to real co-management, real

joint decision-making with First Nations.

We have more specific recommendations in our submissions with respect to the necessary steps to achieving co-management, including that DFO demonstrated support for co-management by entering into a letter of understanding with First Nations in the Roadmap process, and that DFO provide longer-term funding for the building of capacity among First Nations, including Tier 1 processes.

I wanted to say here just something about the form that co-management will eventually need to take, a point Mr. Gailus touched on, and that is that it will need to respect the source of authority on the Aboriginal side. And that is at the level of First Nations, because that is where Aboriginal rights are held, not within Aboriginal organizations. The aggregate groups, the Aboriginal organizations, will play very important technical roles, but the decision-making authority must ultimately find its source with First Nations.

And let me here just express our appreciation for organizations like the First Nations Fisheries Council. In this Inquiry they form with other groups the First Nations Coalition. And I suggest that their involvement in this Inquiry demonstrates the kind of rigour and creativity and commitment that Aboriginal organizations like the Fisheries Council will bring to co-management. Because many of the practical constructive and forward-looking recommendations that have been presented to you, Mr. Commissioner, come from the First Nations Coalition. And groups like the Fisheries Council will bring that to comanagement, and that is a strength of comanagement, that is one of the enormous benefits of it. But I urge you as well to keep in mind that any legitimate and resilient system of comanagement will have to base authority on the Aboriginal side in the First Nations.

I want now, Mr. Commissioner, to turn to monitoring and enforcement within the Aboriginal fishery. This is a subject that has arisen in many of the past reviews of the Fraser fishery, and of course it arose within this Inquiry.

Again and again over the decades, the commercial groups, of which Mr. Eidsvik's

Coalition is merely the vanguard, have made all sorts of baseless allegations against the Aboriginal fishery. And I suggest, Mr. Commissioner, that you ought to take the opportunity of this inquiry to state the truth about the Aboriginal fishery, and that is this: first, that the monitoring of the Aboriginal fishery is adequate and provides fairly good coverage; and (2) that there is credible enforcement on the Aboriginal fishery and there is no over-harvesting in the Aboriginal fishery that is a cause of the decline. Those are the facts, and they are well borne out by the evidence, and we give the references in our primary submission and in our reply, as does the First Nations Coalition.

We submit that DFO's focus in terms of enforcement in the Aboriginal fishery must instead be on shared stewardship, on building buy-in within the communities on supporting their efforts to police themselves. And initiatives like the Aboriginal Guardian Program are very important here, as Mr. Bevan noted. And he and Mr. Nelson agreed that the program should be restored, and we urge you to make that recommendation.

There is another issue within this subject, and that is the sale of FSC fish. You have heard, Mr. Commissioner, outrageous and unsupported statements in this regard, like Mr. Coultish's belief that that 97 percent of all FSC fish is sold. And baseless statements like that one, from a C&P witness, demonstrate very clearly that C&P needs to spend more time building trust and communication with First Nations than it does now.

Indeed, the evidence clearly shows that C&P has no idea how First Nations use and store FSC fish. They've never conducted a study. They've never even asked the communities. And Ernie Crey spoke to how damaging such statements are to the relations between DFO and Aboriginal communities, and we suggest that C&P's approach needs to shift more to Pillar III, more to collaboration and communication, and more to share stewardship.

Now, Mr. Commissioner, you've also heard some very well-supported facts about the sale of FSC fish. You've heard that the enforcement of it uses up enormous C&P resources and with little

result. You've heard that it creates huge antagonism between DFO and First Nations.

You've heard from Dr. Harris that the ban on the sale of FSC fish was a legal construct designed to marginalize the Aboriginal fishery and create space for the commercial fishery. And you've heard that many First Nations people regard that ban as unjust.

And most importantly, Mr. Commissioner, you have heard every DFO witness who has spoken to the point, agree that the sale of a legally caught, properly accounted for FSC fish does not pose a conservation concern. And obviously that's right. The conservation concern is over-harvesting, not the sale of FSC fish. And the evidence shows that over-harvesting is not a serious problem within the Aboriginal fishery.

So all this enforcement effort on sales, and all the antagonism it engenders is for nothing, from a conservation perspective. And we submit that you should make that clear in your report, and you should urge DFO to step back on this issue a bit, readjust its priorities and focus instead on cultivating trust and shared stewardship.

I need to stay on the sales issue for just a moment longer, because I need to address our opponents on this issue, which are the commercial group. Because that is what they are on this issue, they are opposed to the Aboriginal fishery. And the reason why is because it eats into their allocations, and into their market shares. And that's the plain and obvious truth.

That's why they took a challenge to the pilot sales program, which allowed for legal sales, all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada in the *Kapp* case. They want to roll back the clock to when they didn't have to compete with the Aboriginal communal sales fishery. And that's why Mr. Eidsvik yesterday and Mr. Lowes today cite the lower court decisions in *Kapp*, where they won, and refuse to acknowledge the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada where they lost.

They refuse to acknowledge the reality of First Nations special relationship to the fishery. And I suggest that you have heard enough of that relationship to understand the key points, that First Nations have rights in the fishery that were

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into it. 43 46

long denied them, and that there are grave historical injustices here that need remedying. And I urge you to reject the position stated by Mr. Eidsvik and his allies, and reject them soundly and clearly, and help put them to rest.

And I want to touch just on one more point, and that is Dr. Harris. Because you heard from him some of the context and history of the Aboriginal fishery, and I want to say a quick word about his testimony. He has come under attack from some participants here. Part of their complaint is that he opined on legal matters, and part of it is that they didn't like his opinions. And that was the nature of his brief, Mr. Commissioner. He was asked to give you a legal history of the Aboriginal fishery up to 1982, and that would necessarily involve some opining on legal matters, and it will of course cause some anxiety in DFO, the Province, and other groups who seek to minimize Aboriginal rights.

And I just say to you, Mr. Commissioner, that you could not have had come before you with this brief a more balanced, neutral and authoritative witness than Dr. Harris. And I suggest to you that his evidence is very important to understanding some of the tensions that exist between First Nations and DFO, among other things, and I urge you to pay heed to it.

I turn over the Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. podium to Ms. Schabus.

Mr. Commissioner, I'm going to pick up

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Dickson.

SUBMISSIONS FOR STO:LO TRIBAL COUNCIL AND CHEAM INDIAN BAND BY MS. SCHABUS:

where my friend left off. And just looking at Commission counsel, I want to indicate that

of his minutes with me. So I would hope that I

although my co-counsel ate some five of my

get some leeway. But I'd like to launch right Mr. Commissioner, First Nations are the first to be negatively impacted by the decline of the Fraser River sockeye salmon. Fraser River sockeye salmon is a cultural keystone species for

minutes, Mr. Gereluk was kind enough to share five

MS. SCHABUS:

 indigenous peoples in the Pacific Northwest. This is especially true for the Sto:lo people, the People of the River, including the people at Cheam, for whom the *sthéqi*, that's the Hal'qemeylem name from which the English word "sockeye" is derived, is central to their culture and indigenous economies.

Within living memories of the elders they still remember times of abundance like the ancestors enjoyed throughout their lifetime. In turn you heard Aboriginal witnesses testify how they are worried about their grandchildren and future generations, and how they will be able to maintain the relationship with sockeye salmon that is central to their culture.

Indigenous peoples have their own collective systems for managing sockeye salmon, including indigenous laws to protect them.

The common law recognizes Aboriginal right to fish, as *sui generis* rights, which are also constitutionally protected in Canada. But the substance of these rights is enshrined in indigenous legal and management systems, and a lot can be learned from them.

A number of participants are missing those important points that we are actually dealing with ancestral and inherent rights, and these rights are also collectively held and controlled. They cannot be compared to individual rights with an oversimplified equality argument.

We therefore disagree with the submissions of the B.C. Fisheries Survival Coalition, and the Area E, and the B.C. Wildlife Federation. Repeated references to race-based fishery, and comparisons to privileged placed fisheries of individuals distract from the communal nature of Aboriginal fishery and its basis in indigenous legal systems.

The comments are also not consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada decisions that have upheld Aboriginal rights, and rule them their constitutional protection.

We take issue, as my colleague already has, with the finger pointing on the part of participants, such as unsubstantiated references to Aboriginal fisheries in regard to differences between estimates, or DBEs. Mr. Eidsvik did so

yesterday, and when he talked about and suggested that there could be dropouts from set nets, an issue that was not established in evidence before the Commission. Instead, he referred to old documents that have long been overtaken by research since.

Similarly, Area G especially in their written submissions, especially in paragraph 134, and the

Similarly, Area G especially in their written submissions, especially in paragraph 134, and the B.C. Wildlife Federation, especially in paragraph 60 and 61, have added references, unsubstantiated references to DBEs.

Pacific Salmon Commission Chief Biologist Mike Lapointe pointed to apparent correlations between DBEs and water temperatures, and he generally considered environmental factors as the major factor relating to the difference between estimates. It is therefore frankly misleading to then go on and suggest a correlation to the new in-river fisheries as the B.C. Wildlife Federation does in their submissions.

We have already addressed the issue of DBEs, and its causative phenomenon of en route mortality in our initial submissions. We just want to point out here that the Pacific Salmon Commission had funded extensive research, including the genomics research of Dr. Kristi Miller, to get to the bottom of en route mortality. This research has since uncovered a mortality-related signature and for the first time an isolated parvovirus in sockeye salmon. This research should therefore be fully funded and supported to better understand the causes of en route mortality and death, resulting difference between estimates.

This integrated fish health research correlated with analysis of environmental factors should assist in better estimates, so as to avoid the current differences between estimates and to make better management decisions. Pointing to earlier reports that fail to entirely recognize the phenomenon of en route mortality is not helpful and misleading.

Indicative, if you look at Canada's reply submissions, is that they hardly raise any issue with the submissions of commercial groups despite — and also recreational groups despite numerous inaccurate and frankly inappropriate comments in regarding to Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal

fisheries and conservation issues generally.

On the other hand, every time Aboriginal participants mention rights, they try to limit them and beat down any federal obligation. This attitude on the part of the Canadian government and its silence in light of inappropriate assertions and interpretations, on the part of some commercial groups is disconcerting, and that it is also indicative of attitudes that have to be countered and rejected, since they stand in the way of finding a more constructive approach to future management of Fraser River sockeye salmon. To show leadership is to put an end to such antics.

Other groups, for example the Conservation Coalition stated in their reply submissions at paragraph 113, likewise the submissions of Area E, have little merit to them. The premise that the decline of Fraser River sockeye is due to illegal overfishing, termed poaching in its submission, by the Aboriginal fishing sector, is in our view patently wrong and moreover dangerously close to racist sentiment that should have no place in this inquiry.

We wholeheartedly agree with this point, and further want to point out that such racist sentiment should have no room in discussions about fisheries management. We again urge you, Mr. Commissioner, as we do in our reply submissions at paragraph 44 to 46, to put an end to this.

As stated earlier, we want to suggest to you, Mr. Commissioner, that the first step and first important step in properly dealing with First Nations regarding management of Fraser River sockeye salmon, is recognition of Aboriginal rights. Canada has never taken this step, and it complicates any move towards true co-management and joint decision-making.

Limitations in Canada's laws and policies remain a major point of contention for indigenous peoples. In order to reshape the relationship between the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and indigenous peoples, these systemic issues will have to be addressed. Not only to overcome an historic injustice that Professor Harris talked about, but to set the legal basis for true joint decision-making and co-management to ensure

sustainability of Fraser River sockeye salmon.

Then and now. DFO's policies and regulations were aimed at protecting the exclusive jurisdiction of DFO fisheries. This objective appears to be paramount for DFO, even ahead of conservation of Fraser River sockeye salmon stocks, which, as many have testified before the Cohen Commission, could be furthered through implementing co-management fully with Aboriginal peoples.

Mr. Commissioner, you heard from senior DFO managers, including from the Aboriginal Policy and Governance Directorate, that rather than recognizing or implementing Aboriginal rights, they are using Aboriginal programming and policy approaches.

Furthermore, Canada treats Aboriginal rights as a risk and applies a risk management approach. While a risk management approach might be appropriate to dealing with environmental phenomena that are not easily predictable, in regard to Aboriginal rights, it just creates additional uncertainty in the management of Fraser River sockeye salmon for all.

Aboriginal rights are an issue that could easily be addressed by recognition and implementation of those rights in fisheries management.

DFO's current risk based management and policy approach, especially regarding Aboriginal fisheries, results in a lack of transparency that prevents effective participation of First Nations in decision-making, or even meaningful consultation, for that matter. Negotiating mandates are closely guarded, information is not openly shared, and therefore does not enable informed decision-making and co-management. This results in ongoing infringement of aboriginal rights.

DFO themselves acknowledge that a number of their management decisions have the potential of infringing Aboriginal rights, including the shift to a quota or share-based management system. Yet DFO has been promoting and proceeding with this approach without consulting with Aboriginal peoples and First Nations, and without first addressing outstanding issues of recognition of

1 Aboriginal title and rights. 2 The lack of transparence

The lack of transparency in DFO policies regarding fisheries management, especially Aboriginal fisheries, is evidenced most recently by the development of the Coastwide Framework without any direct input and consultation with First Nations, including setting the endpoint for a single allocation.

International standards and principles relating to indigenous peoples stipulate that indigenous peoples should be involved at all stages of decision making, and also in the development of laws and policies that affect them. The Coastwide Framework is clearly an example on point, yet, its contents and development have been closely guarded, including from the Cohen Commission and First Nations have had no say regarding its development.

Mr. Commissioner, we are not asking you to make a ruling on Aboriginal rights, but you are tasked with making recommendations to ensure future sustainability of Fraser River sockeye salmon. Recognition of the important and unique role that First Nations play in the future sustainable management of Fraser River sockeye salmon is key in that regard.

As a result, a first important step in that direction, we respectfully submit to you, is that you should recommend that First Nations are recognized as rights holders and treated as such by DFO. In making recommendations, it's important to have a forward looking approach, aiming at better future sustainability of Fraser River sockeye salmon, and new approaches are clearly needed.

You can also look to international standards and principles for a better approach. In regard to indigenous peoples and their involvement in decision-making, we want to point you to the internationally recognized principle of prior informed consent. The principle is compelling because it requires as a first step that all relevant information is shared with indigenous peoples so they can make an informed decision on the basis of it.

Transparency and open sharing of information is a key element that is missing from DFO's

current management approach.

We have heard from other participants, including public interest advocacy groups, that information should be made more broadly available, so that the public can form their own opinions. Aboriginal peoples agree. It is important to have all the necessary information to engage in an open debate and informed decision-making.

By implementing a prior informed consent standard, indigenous peoples as decision-makers can ensure that all the necessary information is provided and made available.

Indigenous peoples can also serve as checks and balances on DFO to ensure that they do not take unilateral decisions that negatively impact and infringe on Aboriginal rights, or negatively impact the sustainability of Fraser River sockeye salmon and their habitat.

Mr. Gailus has already referred, and we also support the development of a model similar to the Boldt model in the United States, where indigenous peoples are co-managers of the Fraser River sockeye salmon. The tribes are joint decision-makers regarding fisheries management. In that case, the federal government brought a case alongside the tribes against the State of Washington, which in turn have implemented the court decisions, again taking the important step of recognition and implementation.

And we also support the recommendation that the independent indigenous participation of 50 percent, a minimum of 50 percent on not just the Fraser River panel, but the Pacific Salmon Commission overall, including the Commissioners that are independently mandated by Aboriginal peoples.

Mr. Commissioner, you've heard a lot about the changes in the environment, but this also requires a change in the management approach. DFO's current unilateral non-transparent management approach has not and cannot result in sustainable management of Fraser River sockeye salmon.

Mr. Leadem took you through many of the impacts that Fraser River sockeye salmon encounter along the migratory route, from urbanization to increased impact on riparian areas, logging,

resulting erosion, pollution, and it's important to also note that climate change at its current rate is a human-caused phenomenon. These are all things that the Fraser River sockeye salmon have to struggle with in their lifespan.
Similar to First Nations, the environment that they have to navigate has dramatically changed in the last 100-plus years, and especially

Similar to First Nations, the environment that they have to navigate has dramatically changed in the last 100-plus years, and especially in the last 20-plus years, they've been increasingly stressed, and we've seen a resulting overall decline in fish health.

The Fraser River sockeye salmon are very resilient creatures, but it is important that we give them the fighting chance by focusing more of our effort on the ground, and protecting this diversity and biodiversity of the ecosystems they depend on.

We will not take you through our -- to the different impacts in detail, and also want to point out that we actually make recommendations and endorse others' recommendations in regarding to habitat management in our reply submissions.

Now, these are only the physical changes in the environment that Fraser River sockeye salmon have to navigate. It is just lucky that they do not see the bureaucratic maze that is the current framework for their management or they might get lost forever. You just have to look at Canada's submissions to see the bureaucratic maze, and also note how little money and effort is expanded on proper management on the ground.

This is a maze that indigenous peoples have to navigate if they want to participate in the management of Fraser River sockeye salmon, and this is why it is so important to ensure transparency and involve them as equal decision—makers to ensure that they serve as checks and balances on DFO and bring management decisions down to the ground in their territories.

You have heard a lot of budget cuts and reduced ability of DFO personnel to address habitat-related issues. Indigenous peoples not only hold knowledge, but they are also present in their territories. And as such they are often the first to recognize negative impacts or changes. Working with indigenous peoples as co-managers ensures that there are more eyes and ears on the

ground and that decisions are carefully considered in the local context.

You have heard a lot about the inability of DFO to deal with all development proposals in the respective territories, and to achieve no net less of habitat. A number of habitat-related impacts are complicated by inter-jurisdictional issues, where the Province makes key decisions or downloads responsibility to municipalities or the professional reliance model, and DFO is increasingly missing from the table.

Now, both the Province and the federal government cannot deny that they have an obligation to consult with First Nations, so working with First Nations can ensure as strong a voice for fisheries habitat and fish-related concerns at those tables. Integrated management and joint decision-making with fisheries management will ensure better overall habitat management, and can help ensure that cumulative effects are better addressed in the future. Joint management decisions and decision making with First Nations should not be seen as a threat, but as an opportunity to provide more and ensure more sustainable management of Fraser River sockeye salmon.

The Conservation Coalition endorses moving to co-management, and also endorses our call for increased transparency and First Nations involvement in decision-making. And we strongly urge you, Mr. Commissioner, to do the same.

Finally, I would like to thank you, Mr. Commissioner, for all the patience that you have shown and the understanding of Fraser River sockeye salmon that you have built. I also want to thank your staff for helping us all navigate the increasingly difficult and challenging waters of management of Fraser River sockeye salmon. Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Schabus. THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will recess for 15 minutes.

(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED FOR AFTERNOON RECESS) (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED)

THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.

SUBMISSIONS FOR MÉTIS NATION BRITISH COLUMBIA BY MR. GERELUK:

MR. GERELUK: Thank you. My name is Joe Gereluk. I represent the Métis Nation of British Columbia, a group whose traditional rights are guaranteed by s. 35 of the *Charter* and who has provincial-wide presence in the Province of British Columbia.

The Métis Nation, unfortunately, has not been part of and has been excluded from any consultation process with respect to the sockeye or any other fishery in the Province of British Columbia. DFO, although excluding the Métis Nation from representation in British Columbia and from the consultation process in British Columbia, has provided the Métis people in other provinces and other regions an opportunity to be heard and an opportunity to be consulted in relation to various resource-based issues.

In spite of having a foot in both the First Nations camp and the European camp, the Métis Nation, as I said, has been excluded from any meaningful consultation or any consultation absolutely. So that has been one of the central themes, or the central theme of the MNBC, or the Métis Nation's submissions in their written submissions to this Commission.

We seek an opportunity to be meaningfully consulted with respect to the sockeye fishery, and any fishery, for the benefit of the Métis citizens and people of British Columbia and for the preservation and sustainability of that resource.

The Métis claims a right to be consulted based on the principles advanced in the **Haida** decision, where it's stated there's a duty to consult with Aboriginal groups who have advanced the prima facie right to be consulted. That consultation is not based on the proof of right as it may arise through a court decision, but based on the --

...the duty arises when the Crown -

-- I'm quoting from Haida --

- the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of

the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.

As a s. 35 Aboriginal group, the Métis say, and partially as our participation in this Commission, the Métis say they have a potential Aboriginal right and there are some actions with respect to the sockeye fishery that will affect that right.

In the relation to the establishment of the right, the Métis further propose that there are submissions and evidence in the Commission hearings that referred to an expression or a signal that perhaps there could be a time when Aboriginal rights could be determined without having to present evidence and arguments through litigation, a process that the Métis has not gone through yet and, therefore, that evidence is provided by Ms. McGivney with respect to the rights issue, and it leads to a belief that there is a light in the litigation tunnel. And I'd like to just quote from some of Ms. McGivney's testimony, and that was found -- or stated in the September 2011 transcripts -- hearings, and I'm looking at pages 14 and 15.

On page 14, Ms. McGivney answers some of the questions posed by Mr. Eidsvik about what the policy is with respect to DFO and how they do it, and he quoted Alaska and New Zealand, and he asked, on line 29:

Can you tell me why, I mean, even Canadian, why are Canadian fishermen in the public fishery in the Maritimes being treated with more respect than the B.C. commercial fishermen have been shown, that those in the public fishery.

And Ms. McGivney responds by saying:

Yes, in B.C. one of the challenges we have is that aboriginal rights, the extent and scope of those rights haven't been defined, and so the Department has developed policies to approach how to address some of the interests that have been brought forward, and that actually then the policy,

And then it becomes indiscernible. On page 15, starting at line 9, Mr. Eidsvik requests -- asks:

I'm in agreement with that. So you're saying that there's aboriginal fishing rights in the Fraser River have not been defined. I'm trying to summarize what you're saying.

And Ms. McGivney responds by saying:

I'm saying in B.C. there was a -- the Department has taken a broad policy approach because of the -- because of the fact that there have not been long-standing treaties, and the aboriginal rights are not -- the scope and extent of those are not clarified. So the policy approach is that there is a policy approach to try to provide through our programs, provide access for food, social, ceremonial purposes. And we've also looked to providing the First Nations with some economic opportunities on the same basis as the regular fisheries.

This carries on that day with some evidence as well from Ms. McGivney responding to Ms. DeForrest, and on page 25 of that transcript there was some discussion about similar issues. Ms. DeForrest asks Ms. McGivney:

And you'd agree with me that there's -- that this negotiation process is evident, it's not evidence-based; is that correct?

And Ms. McGivney responds:

The Treaty Process?

And Ms. DeForrest asks:

That's correct, the B.C. Treaty Process?

Ms. McGivney responds by saying:

Yes, that's right. And that as a result there's no Crown inquiry to research into the validity of the territorial assertion, or the

geographic scope or the nature of any aboriginal rights, for example, fishing of the First nations in question; is that correct?

And Ms. McGivney says:

I don't know if -- sorry, can you say that again?

Ms. DeForrest says:

There's no Crown inquiry into the validity of the territorial assertion that's brought in with the Statement of Intent?

And Ms. McGivney says:

There's no requirement for that. There may be some Crown investigation on that. I don't know.

To be fair, further on in the testimony, Ms. DeForrest reads in:

In this regard it should be remembered that DFO does not have a mandate to determine whether an Aboriginal group has aboriginal or treaty rights to fish, or the nature and scope of any such rights.

And Ms. McGivney responds, "Correct." I read that in for the purpose of saying, ultimately it's the view of the Métis Nation that enforcement or the provision or the determination of rights, which now rests with the courts in consideration of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Policy, DFO policy, is contrary to the notion of consensus, the notion of consultation reaching consensus with all interested parties in the sockeye and fishery in the Fraser River generally. I suggest that although it's not a current acknowledged method of obtaining recognizing enforceable rights, which is left with the courts, it is an expression of hope that sooner or later the need for Aboriginal rights to be determined through an adversarial court process

may give way to an understanding by way of negotiated rights with appropriate evidentiary safeguards. If DFO is not the authority in that regard, certainly it can ignite the process with Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.

Leaving aside our earlier discussion about the duty of DFO to consult with the Métis Nation, it is contented that consultation with the Métis would provide real benefit to the sockeye fishery in the Fraser in relation to fish monitoring and enforcement of DFO policy. We note that in the commissions and the committees and the reports leading up to the Wild Salmon Policy, that the majority of the reports spoke about effective and timely monitoring, which was a serious issue that had to be dealt with in more detail, and we have dealt with this in more detail in our written submissions.

It appears that without a significant increase in the number of DFO agencies and officials in the field, effective and dependable fish monitoring must rely on the data provided by resource users. Without the numbers provided by the Métis, that data is incomplete.

Mr. Jantz gave evidence on that subject on May 11th, and I'll just briefly read a bit of what he had to say. In response to Ms. Chan:

Mr. Jantz and Mr. Parslow, just to wrap up with the Fraser River First Nations FSC and economic opportunity fisheries catch monitoring, could you speak to whether or not you feel the catch monitoring and reporting provides you with accurate and reliable estimates, and if you'd like to add to that any recommendations that you have for improving that process?

And Mr. Jantz says -- responded similarly to what Mr. Parslow stated, but further added:

There are opportunities for improving some of the catch estimates in the section of the Fraser River immediately above what we call the mid-river area, so it's the upper Fraser. In that particular area, we don't have full coverage of the fishery and our current

funding levels through AFS programs primarily, in many years, often do not cover the full duration of the fishery.

So we are put in a position where we have to extrapolate catch for those periods when we don't have coverage. So that's one area that we could certainly improve our monitoring.

And it's our submission that the Métis, with province-wide representation, representing something like 35 communities throughout the province, would benefit, that consultation with the Métis would benefit the monitoring circumstance that is the gap in monitoring that's been evidenced by Mr. Jantz.

In addition, besides monitoring, the studies refer to a need to deal with -- effectively deal with enforcement of DFO policies. If the Métis were part of the consultation process they would certainly assist through monitoring and presence throughout the province, assist in the enforcement of current DFO policies.

Mr. Parslow responded in similar fashion to Mr. Jantz with respect to that issue. And if I could read from the September (sic) 11th transcript what Mr. Parslow had to say to that in response to Ms. Chan's question. He talks about the driftnet fishery, but in one sentence says, on line 27:

I mean, the other piece would be providing some sort of independent validation of catch numbers. I think those are the main things. The other piece would be actually rebuilding the relationships with the groups which we're not receiving numbers from and addressing those concerns so that our dataset is more complete, because that is a hole in our dataset at the current time.

In B.C., the Métis Nation sees a need for peace in the water. While consultation is central to the issue of maintaining a relationship between all users and determining in advance allocations of a sockeye resource, the current manner that DFO proceeds in allocating the resource by not

including all stakeholders, the Métis Nation included, is in the consultation process prior to allocation has a detrimental effect to that relationship.

The ultimate resulting allocation may not be affected, but if all stakeholders have a voice, at least gaining an understanding of the perspectives of all parties would be helpful.

The broad principle. I'd like to speak very briefly about the cumulative effect of the philosophy surrounding the disappearance of the sockeye in the Fraser, and I've had some readings in with respect to the Tragedy of the Commons, and I'm not sure if that issue has been brought up, but that's a philosophy that deals with the issues relating to the depletion of a common resource and specifically relating to the costs of overpopulation in relation to the use of a common resource with the inevitable and ultimate result the exhaustion of that resource.

While that philosophy may or may not be applicable in this instance, it seems that it at least has some relevance. The proposed remedy provided by that philosopher, Mr. Garrett Hardin, through that inevitable result and the preservation of the common resource was the requirement for change in society's values.

Society's currently -- and I think that value is reflected in DFO policies, it's reflected in the manner in which DFO proceeds to allocate resources, is currently based on the commercial value of the sockeye fishery. It's based on, and it sees that as a society-driven response. What I think and what the MNBC thinks requires to be done is a change in the social values that lead to this depletion, that may save this resource. And the change should come from society in general so that there's no reliance on the commercial value, total reliance on the commercial value of the resource but, instead, a value in the intrinsic value in having a unique species, like the sockeye, preserved for the uniqueness itself.

Certainly there is food, social and ceremonial as far as First Nations are concerned. There's the necessity for food. But that, in our view, takes, and it's stated in DFO policy, it takes second place behind the conservation of this

resource. The conservation of this resource is dependent upon, in our view, a change in social consideration of the sockeye and other fishery in the Fraser.

So the broad principle is consensus-building so that all of the stakeholders who have an interest in sockeye fishery can work together for a common purpose, the common purpose being the preservation and conservation and sustainability of this resource. Meaningful consultation with all of the stakeholders, including the Métis, and engagement of society as a whole, and that poses certainly a problem to engage society as a whole when stakeholders claim absolute rights, claim prior rights, which we recognize are certainly a valid point, but in order to engage society as a whole, I think it's necessary to ensure that society has an interest, a definable interest in the resource, and until that happens, society will have difficulty becoming fully engaged in this process, and the common tragedy may occur, which is the depletion and the extinction of this resource.

It's not our suggestion to paint a gloomy picture, but in following certain philosophical threads, it seems to me that there's an inevitable result here that should be -- that we need to deal with, and only through society's engagement, in our view, will that happen.

I bow to the philosophy of the First Nations, who clearly seek not -- they seek the right to manage the resource. I bow to their traditional ecological knowledge, the use of that knowledge in order to proceed, and this is a management issue and I think youth consultation with all the parties would certainly be a benefit for that purpose.

I do want to point out that use of traditional knowledge on the behalf of DFO -- I'm sorry, the science on behalf of DFO is, to the exclusion of traditional knowledge, does not accommodate the role that traditional knowledge can play in the preservation and sustainability of the resource. Captain Ducommun, on behalf of the Métis Nation, has commented on that subject, and I do point out that there's a large discipline surrounding the principle of integrated science.

The Métis Nation believes that expanding the use of traditional knowledge would be an advantage to the fishery.

The Metis Nation submits that it would be desirable for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to focus fully on implementing the Wild Salmon Policy. Clearly, there's an issue surrounding the funding for the Wild Salmon Policy, and there has been some delay in implementing it. As a result of the delays, the Metis Nation has a reserved confidence in the final implementation and effectiveness of the Wild Salmon Policy; however, it is a program, it is a policy, it's in existence, and that's why the Metis Nation has reserved confidence in it.

In our view, then, Mr. Commissioner, we see, as I said earlier, a need for peace in the water, a consultation process which includes all interested parties, and which involves society as a whole.

And I think - I know it's early, but those would be our submissions. We have provided submissions which cover our view of the need to be consulted, in particular the Métis, who have been excluded and who, in our view, have a right to be consulted, and we would ask, Mr. Commissioner, that there be some indication that DFO consider at least, at the very least, some consultation process.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Mr. Gereluk.
Thank you. I understand, from Commission Counsel,
that we're now adjourned until tomorrow morning.
Thank you very much.

THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now adjourned until tomorrow at 10:00 a.m.

(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED TO THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2011, AT 10:00 A.M.)

I HEREBY CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true and accurate transcript of the evidence recorded on a sound recording apparatus, transcribed to the best of my skill and ability, and in accordance with applicable standards.

## Diane Rochfort

I HEREBY CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true and accurate transcript of the evidence recorded on a sound recording apparatus, transcribed to the best of my skill and ability, and in accordance with applicable standards.

## Pat Neumann

I HEREBY CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true and accurate transcript of the evidence recorded on a sound recording apparatus, transcribed to the best of my skill and ability, and in accordance with applicable standards.

Karen Hefferland