

Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar

## Audience publique

## Public Hearing

|  | L'Honorable juge / |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Che Honourable Justice |  |
| Dennis R. O'Connor |  |$\quad$ Commissioner

Tenue à:
Salon Algonquin
Ancien hôtel de ville
111, Promenade Sussex
Ottawa (Ontario)
le mercredi 24 aoû† 2005

Held at:

Algonquin Room
Old City Hall
111 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario

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Ottawa, Ontario / Ottawa (Ontario)
--- Upon commencing on Wednesday, August 24, 2005 at 9:04 a.m. / L'audience reprend le mercredi 24 août 2005 à 9 h 04

THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Good morning,
Commissioner.
Prior to the testimony, there are a couple of points $I$ would like to make.

One is that we have prepared a very general CSIS public chronology which relates to events and information coming from the public record as well as public documents that have been introduced, and that will be available to the parties if they want to pick it up from our administrative office.

Second, there are going to be, if we can call them, two applications or motions, I understand, this morning. One will be dealing with the testimony of Mr. Hooper tomorrow.

In particular, $I$ understand that counsel for Mr. Arar will be asking for access to certain in-camera evidence, but $I$ would leave that for my friend to articulate in terms of what she

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will be requesting.
Second, Mr. Shore, who represents Mr. Hooper, will be making suggestions in respect of the order of witnesses today. We have indicated what the order of witnesses is. He indicates that that is unfair to Mr. Hooper and will be making certain suggestions as to the appropriate order.

So perhaps if we could start with Mr. Arar's counsel's motion, we can get going.

THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning, Ms Edwardh.

MOTION
MS EDWARDH: Thank you very much, Mr. Commissioner.

It is a pleasure to be here.
My motion is very, very brief. As
you know, your counsel has provided to us the testimony of Dave Dyet in respect of a certain conversation that will be the subject matter largely of today's proceedings.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MS EDWARDH: And that has been
most useful. We don't have to waste your time, or anyone's time, as $I$ understand this will be filed

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as an exhibit.
However, it is my understanding, or guess as much as anything, that in the same in-camera proceedings, Ms McCallion also gave her account of the conversation. We have a very, very general will-say, and as this has now fallen into the public domain and will be explored in the public domain, $I$ would request that at least the excerpts of her testimony in camera, as it relates to today's proceedings, be made available to counsel, should there be some questions that arise from that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Is there any objection to that? Is there anything NSC about Ms McCallion's evidence in camera?

MS McISAAC: My recollection, sir,
is there is not, but $I$ thought the whole point was that we were releasing, or we were asked to provide and the decision was made to provide Mr. Dyet's testimony -- I think perhaps Ms Burns' testimony as well -- from the in-camera proceedings to avoid having to call them publicly. Ms McCallion is here and will be testifying today publicly, and I don't see any need to release her other transcript in the
circumstances.
THE COMMISSIONER: Would there be anything unfair to -- let's assume, I don't suggest it to be the case, but let's assume her evidence here was different from what it was previously. It would be helpful to me to have her questioned on that.

MS McISAAC: That is true, sir,
but it has been an issue that I've raised with counsel on several occasions about witnesses testifying in camera first and then being called to testify about exactly the same things in public.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, it is the Government that suggested we call all the evidence in camera first, and we initially resisted the idea --

MS McISAAC: I don't want to
debate that with you, sir, but it is not absolutely true with all of the witnesses.

In any event, it seems to me that we have to make a decision as to how we are treating this in-camera evidence. And this isn't suggesting that we are going to start releasing all sorts of transcripts of the in-camera
evidence, because that obviously will be a huge undertaking.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think that is the suggestion, is it? You are not implying that?

MS EDWARDH: No, Mr. Commissioner.
As you know, we have not had the privilege of joining you in the in-camera process and have always harboured under the belief, rightly or wrongly, that the reason they are going on is to assist you in the resolution of National Security Confidentiality.

To the extent that this can be made public and it will assist us in further disclosure of what is to be said as well as to potentially ask questions and clarification from Mr. Arar's perspective, unless there is some unfairness here, it should be granted and will enhance the public component of the process.

THE COMMISSIONER: I guess the only point, Ms Edwardh, that Ms McIsaac is making is that -- I don't suggest she is necessarily agreeing to this, but to embark upon a process that would have us now looking at in-camera transcripts with a view to making them public to
the extent we can, that would be -- and you are not asking that. That is not where you are headed.

MS EDWARDH: No, that is not my
request. I'm asking for those portions of her testimony that relate to the subject matter of today's proceedings.

THE COMMISSIONER: And it is
simply with respect to that one witness and nothing more?

MS EDWARDH: That is what I'm
asking.
THE COMMISSIONER: Right. And do you envision that type of request arising with respect to any other witnesses? We now know the finishing line in terms of the evidence.

MS EDWARDH: Yes. And quite
frankly, Mr. Commissioner, I don't even know who testified in camera.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MS EDWARDH: It just struck me as obvious, when we got the excerpt from Dave Dyet, that there must be another side to this coin, and I would be ill of serving my client's interests to not request it.

I do not even have a list of who has provided evidence before you, so I'm not making a request that was broader than the one $I$ am putting before you now.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cavalluzzo?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: My concern,
Mr. Commissioner, is one of fairness. Both Ms McCallion's counsel and Mr. Hooper's counsel, who will be testifying tomorrow, have had full access to Ms McCallion's in-camera evidence. It just seems, as a matter of fairness, that if there are no NSC concerns in respect of Ms McCallion's evidence -- and there clearly isn't relating to this one particular situation that we are going to be discussing today -- I say as a matter of fairness counsel for Mr. Arar should have access. THE COMMISSIONER: My concern, on the other hand -- I hear what Ms Edwardh says -is just one of establishing a precedent. We haven't been doing this, $I$ think for good reason, because in most instances, virtually all instances, in-camera evidence had components of it that had to remain in camera, so we haven't set about the exercise of parsing it as to what would be and what wouldn't be. That would be yet
another incumbrance on this inquiry.
This, it seems to me, if $I$ recall
correctly, is a different situation. MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is a much different situation. This is a situation in which we have already released certain transcripts of the in-camera evidence.

There was a question as to -- you may recall that one of the counsel didn't have top security at the particular point in time and couldn't cross-examine one of the witnesses and as a result of that the procedure had to be accommodated along the way. This event has turned out to be a public event.

I should advise counsel that
Mr. Hooper did not testify on this point in camera. We were unaware of this particular conversation when he did testify, so there's no concern about his in-camera evidence. We are only talking about Ms McCallion's evidence, which obviously is very important, if we look at the public transcripts that are about to be released now in respect of Mr. Dyet and Ms Burns.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
Ms McIsaac, do you have anything
further?
MS MCISAAC: Yes, sir. Just in
the circumstances, $I$ don't believe there is anything that raises a national security concern in Ms McCallion's testimony. I have not read it with that in view. It would have been rather helpful if somebody had raised this earlier, because I know that Mr. Shore's motion deals with the order of witnesses, and $I$ don't know whether $I$ can have it read and reviewed and provided in time for --

THE COMMISSIONER: Ms McCallion is currently scheduled to testify this afternoon, isn't she? It is a very short transcript.

MS McISAAC: Yes, it is, sir.
THE COMMISSIONER: At least as I recall the evidence.

MS McISAAC: Perhaps you should hear Mr. Shore's motion. I understand your ruling is that it will be made public and we will review it as quickly as possible.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, that is what I'm inclined to do in the circumstance. I can't see anything unfair to Ms McCallion or Mr. Hooper in doing so.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just one final
comment on timing.
As Commission counsel, we were
spoken to, I understand, earlier this week by Mr. Shore about the public release of Ms McCallion's transcript. We said to Mr. Shore that we would agree to its public release so long as the Government agreed to it. I thought that that was going to take place, and I assume it didn't. But certainly there was a discussion between Commission counsel and Mr. Shore about releasing that evidence.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Cavalluzzo.

Let me hear your suggestion,
Mr. Shore.
MR. SHORE: Yes, thank you. If I
may come forward?
THE COMMISSIONER: Please do.
MR. SHORE: Mr. Commissioner, I
understand that my friend intends to call
Mr. Livermore, Mr. Gould and Ms McCallion, in that order.

THE COMMISSIONER: And they are all going to be called today.

MR. SHORE: All going to be called today, dealing with the Hooper-McCallion phone call.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MR. SHORE: My concern is this: Mr. Livermore, whatever information he received with regard to that phone call, received it third hand. Mr. Gould's information, which resulted in his note, which gives rise to this whole aspect of the hearing, was received from Mr. Dyet.

Mr. Dyet, according to him, and his transcript that is released or is presently about to be released, indicates that he spoke to Ms McCallion prior to the phone call with Mr. Hooper and he will indicate that during his conversation with Ms McCallion, Ms McCallion advised him that she was going to sign off on the memo even before she returned Mr. Hooper's phone call. We understand this is June 5th or June 6th. Mr. Dyet goes on to say that he is not sure where he got the information that he gave to Mr. Gould that ends up in Gould's notebook, and it is based on Mr. Gould's notebook that all this other evidence is being called.
So we are going to have

Mr. Livermore, who heard it from Mr. Gould, talk about the phone call. We are going to have Mr. Gould, who heard about it from Mr. Dyet, talk about the phone call, and we are not going to hear from the person who actually was involved in the phone call until all the other witnesses -Livermore and Gould -- have speculated with regard to that phone call.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, not necessarily speculate. They will tell what they heard.

MR. SHORE: Well, they are going to tell what they heard, but they are going to be asked more than that.

And what they heard is -- I
realize this is not a court of law and the rules of evidence don't apply, but there's hearsay and there's hearsay, and reliable hearsay, I suggest, can be admitted with ease. But this hearsay is unreliable.

THE COMMISSIONER: You are not suggesting we don't hear the evidence?

MR. SHORE: Not at all. Not at
all. I'm suggesting that we hear from Ms McCallion first, because she is the one who was
involved in the phone call, and that will reduce, in my submission, the amount of time we are going to need with regard to Mr. Gould and

Mr. Livermore, because we will already know what the phone call was about.

That is my submission. THE COMMISSIONER: Is that it? Commission counsel, I take it, have looked at this issue and decided that this is a sensible order to call it, as what is now proposed?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Exactly the way
we called it in camera.
THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
Does anybody else have something?
MS McISAAC: I would like to add,
sir, the fact that this evidence was called in this order in camera is, in my view, of no import to how it should be called publicly. It was called in camera in this order because the fact of the Gould note first came to the attention of the Commission when Mr. Gould testified.

It was then deemed necessary to call Ms McCallion and Mr. Dyet. The evidence from Mr. Dyet's testimony, which is now public, is
quite clear: No one spoke to Ms McCallion after the phone call with Mr. Hooper.

It strikes me as being unhelpful in the extreme, particularly to the public, to have a great discourse about what people thought the telephone call was about rather than starting by having the individual who participated in the telephone call get on the stand, tell you, and more importantly the public, since you have already heard it, what they talked about, and then the other individuals can testify.

That, in my submission, is the fair and proper way to proceed.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, the public will hear all the evidence today. I think we are getting to a new level of trying to micromanage this inquiry through suggestions. There is more than one way to call evidence, and typically in proceedings like this, there is a great deal of discretion left to parties, Commission counsel, to hear the order they call evidence.

I must say $I$ can't conceive that there be any unfairness. I think the evidence will be called, it will be fully tested and it
will all be heard today.
We will proceed as proposed.
I also direct that the transcript
of Ms McCallion's evidence be made available to
Ms Edwardh and the Government have a chance to review it for NSC first.

But that should take place over
the course of the day so that we complete Ms McCallion's evidence this afternoon.

Anything else?
Mr. David?
MR. DAVID: Good morning,
Mr. Commissioner.
Today you will hear the evidence from three witnesses. You will hear the evidence of Mr. Daniel Livermore, who you have already had the opportunity of hearing both in camera and in public. Following Mr. Livermore's testimony, Mr. Jim Gould will testify. And finally, Ms Kathryn McCallion will testify.

Essentially the issue that will be dealt with is a phone call that was placed between Jack Hooper, who was the ADO, the Assistant Deputy Director of Operations at CSIS, and Kathryn McCallion who was at the relevant time Assistant

Deputy Minister within DFAIT. And the timing of the call was approximately on June 5th of the year 2003.

So before we hear the testimony of
Mr. Livermore and his involvement in this phone call, $I$ would like to file a number of documents that will be useful for today's proceedings.

The first will be -- and we have referred to it already -- the transcript of Barbara Burns' testimony.

Ms Burns was, at the relevant
time, the executive assistant of Kathryn McCallion.

Could we file her document?
THE COMMISSIONER: 234. EXHIBIT NO. 234: Transcript of testimony of Barbara Burns, dated April 18, 2005

THE COMMISSIONER: I note this is a transcript, Mr. David. Should it be placed on the Commission's website with the other transcripts of proceedings?

MR. DAVID: I think that that would be appropriate --

THE COMMISSIONER: -- rather than
have it entered as an exhibit?
MR. DAVID: I would suggest both,
Mr. Commissioner.
The reason why $I$ think it is
useful to file it as an exhibit is, one, it is a redacted version of her testimony.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR. DAVID: Though there are no redactions that $I$ know of. But it has been reviewed for NSC concerns.

And second, it is simply for ease of reference during today's proceedings.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
MR. DAVID: The second document would be a transcript of Mr. Dyet's testimony, in-camera testimony.

And in both cases, for both
Mr. Dyet and Ms Burns, they testified on April 18th, 2005, in camera.

Again, concerning Mr. Dyet's
transcripts, this is a version that has been reviewed for NSC concerns. It is a redacted version, but to my knowledge there are no redactions.

THE COMMISSIONER: 235.

MR. DAVID: 235. Thank you. EXHIBIT NO. 235: Transcript of testimony of Dave Dyet, dated April 18, 2005

MR. DAVID: The next document I
would like to file are a compilation of Mr. Jim Gould's personal notes.

THE COMMISSIONER: 236. EXHIBIT NO. 236: Compilation of Jim Gould's personal notes

MR. DAVID: And finally, I would
like to file a Book of Documents that will be useful to today's proceedings. It is entitled "Newly Redacted Documents for the Testimony of Jim Gould, Kathryn McCallion and David Livermore", and that will be P-237, $I$ believe.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, 237.
EXHIBIT NO. 237: Book of
Documents entitled "Newly
Redacted Documents for the Testimony of Jim Gould, Kathryn McCallion and David Livermore"

MR. DAVID: Before beginning with the testimony per se of Mr. Livermore, for the

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public's benefit, Mr. Commissioner, given that Mr. Dyet and Ms Burns will not be testifying viva voce, by agreement of all counsel their testimony will be in the form of these transcripts that have been filed today.

I would like to summarize for you both their testimony.

In the case of Mr. Dyet --
THE COMMISSIONER: Just before you do that, this is a summary you prepared of the --

MR. DAVID: It is a summary of what $I$ believe are the most salient points out of the testimony.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's fine.
If any others that have seen it -I guess everybody has seen these transcripts -thinks that the summary that is about to be given is not complete or is inaccurate, please let me know and add to it.

But, yes, go ahead.
MR. DAVID: In the case of Mr. Dyet, there are 17 points $I$ would like to raise or flag for the public's benefit.

The first is that at the time of the -- there was a memo that was being processed.

The final version of this memo is dated June 5th of the year 2003 and has been filed already before this Commission as an exhibit. It is Exhibit No. P-117, tab 75.5.

So at the time that this memo was being processed by Ms McCallion, Mr. Pardy was away. That is the first point.

Second, Mr. Dyet, when he -- the testimony reveals that he went to see Ms McCallion. The memo was in the possession of Ms McCallion at that time.

Third, Mr. Pardy, as he had to leave and knew he had to leave, asked Mr. Dyet to reassure Kathryn McCallion that in terms of the content of the memo, it had been arrived at with a consensus amongst CSIS, the RCMP and DFAIT. So the product of the June 5 th memo was a product of a consensus amongst Canadian government agencies.

THE COMMISSIONER: That is what
Mr. Pardy said?
MR. DAVID: This is what Mr. Pardy says, and this is what Mr. Pardy asked Mr. Dyet to say to Ms McCallion.

THE COMMISSIONER: And
Ms McCallion, just for the record, her position
was?
MR. DAVID: She was the Assistant Deputy Minister in charge of consular affairs, passports and corporate services.

THE COMMISSIONER: At the
Department of Foreign Affairs?
MR. DAVID: At the Department of Foreign Affairs.

THE COMMISSIONER: She was being asked to approve the memo?

MR. DAVID: The memo was in terms of an approval process and therefore on her desk to be then forwarded to the Deputy Minister's desk for eventual review by the Minister.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR. DAVID: The fourth point is
that Kathryn McCallion requested Dave Dyet to come to her office before calling Mr. Hooper and that Mr. Dyet, in being so called to Kathryn McCallion's office, made the link between the call and the processing of the memo.

THE COMMISSIONER: Was
Ms McCallion going to call Mr. Hooper of her own initiative or was she returning a call?

MR. DAVID: The circumstances of
the phone call is that it was initiated by Mr. Hooper.

Number 5 is that the meeting between Ms McCallion and Mr. Dyet lasted for approximately ten minutes.

The sixth point is that Mr. Dyet had heard a rumour -- and this is how he characterized it, a rumour -- that CSIS was not thrilled with the fact that Mr. Graham's letter, or the project that $M r$. Graham sign a letter to be issued to his counterpart in Syria, the Foreign Minister of Syria, was going forward. So there was a rumour that there was discontent that CSIS was not thrilled, is the way he put it, that the Graham letter was going forward.

The seventh point is that Kathryn McCallion clearly indicated to Dave Dyet that she was processing and going ahead with the memo even before calling Jack Hooper; that her decision was made in that regard.

The eighth point raised by
Mr. Dyet's testimony is that he agreed, or he acknowledged, that if Mr. Hooper was to identify where the memo was, he had identified the right person, and his timing was appropriate in terms of
speaking to the person on whose desk the memo was being assessed. So both he had the right person and he had the right time.

The ninth point is that after the meeting between Mr. Dyet and Ms McCallion, Mr. Dyet met Jim Gould, who is the Assistant Director of ISI at DFAIT.

The tenth point is that Mr. Gould's notes, as reviewed by Mr. Dyet, accurately reflect what Mr. Dyet said to him, and we will review those notes, quite obviously. The eleventh point, and in reference to Mr. Gould's notes -- and I think for clarity of the record $I$ will read you the portion that is concerned by Mr. Dyet's testimony. Mr. Gould's notes state the following at page 9 of 16: that there was a call from Jack Hooper to Kathryn McCallion saying that: "CSIS didn't want us to get Arar back in the country as they would have to devote too many resources to watching him."

Mr. Dyet, in regard to those notes, to what is noted in Mr. Gould's notes, says
that he is unsure as to who said that to him; that it is possibly Kathryn McCallion and it is possibly somebody else within DFAIT.

The twelfth point,
Mr. Commissioner, is that Mr. Gould, following Mr. Dyet's disclosure, pursued his inquiry concerning the phone call and the processing of the memo on Monday, the 9th of June.

The thirteenth point is that
Mr. Dyet was upset in his reaction in terms of what he perceived CSIS was making representations that the Graham letter should not go forward. And the fourteenth point is Mr. Dyet confirmed to Mr. Gould that the memo was in fact on the Minister's desk on the $9 t h$ of June.

The fifteenth point is that Mr. Dyet says -- and $I$ think this has already been referred to, but he reiterated this in his cross-examination -- that there is nothing that Jack Hooper could have said that would have influenced Kathryn McCallion's decision with regard to the processing of the memo.

The sixteenth point is that Dave Dyet did not witness firsthand the phone call between Mr. Hooper and Ms McCallion.

And the final point is that the issue, as referred to in Mr. Gould's notes about resources, CSIS resources, or lack of CSIS resources to monitor Mr. Arar, related to the phone call, in his mind.

So those are the points I wish to
flag in terms of Mr. Dyet's testimony.
THE COMMISSIONER: Anybody else wish to add anything with respect to what is in Mr. Dyet's testimony?

Mr. Shore?
MR. SHORE: If I can address you?
THE COMMISSIONER: Sure, please
do.
MR. SHORE: Mr. Dyet also
indicated, sir, that this was a rumour that he had heard, and he had heard it only within the confines of CSIS. He had never spoken to anybody -- within the confines of DFAIT, I'm sorry. He had never spoken with anybody from CSIS with regard to that rumour.

He also indicated, as my friend had said, that he is not sure where he heard it, but that it was a rumour floating around.

He indicated that he had no idea
at all what Ms McCallion and Mr. Hooper discussed during her return call to him. He indicates that what he said to Mr. Gould could have been speculation. He indicated that he was speculating on the conversation because, of course, he didn't hear it, and he indicates very clearly that he had no idea whatsoever what the conversation was about.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR. SHORE: He also indicates, if
I can just conclude with part of his testimony, that he doesn't know whether or not there was any truth to the rumour which he had heard, which resulted in his discussion with Mr. Gould.

Thank you, sir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Ms McIsaac, do you have anything else?

MS McISAAC: No, I don't, sir, thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, I didn't ask you, Ms Edwardh. You have read this transcript.

MS EDWARDH: I did. But I'm content with the summary of Commission counsel.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

Thank you.
Mr. David?
MR. DAVID: The second testimony $I$
would like to summarize, again for the public benefit, as the testimony of Ms Burns will only be by way of transcript, filing of a transcript -- is to provide you with a summary of her testimony. And Ms Burns' testimony was very brief in camera, Mr. Commissioner.

As I said before, she was the executive assistant of Kathryn McCallion, and we have already filed two pages of phone slips, phone message slips, that she drafted, she wrote, concerning the phone call between Mr. Hooper and Ms McCallion. We will be reviewing those with the testimony of today's witnesses. She also wrote a second phone slip concerning a call from Mr. Gould to Ms McCallion, again concerning the phone call.

So the essence of her testimony concerned those slips, and her drafting of those slips, and the circumstances of her drafting of those slips.

But other than that, Ms Burns did say, did testify to the fact that she did not have any recollection of the processing per se of the

June 5th memo by Ms McCallion, except that she does remember -- or she did remember about a phone call about it, and she does remember that Ms McCallion was waiting for the memo to arrive in her office. And she made the point that Ms McCallion, before returning Mr. Hooper's call, wanted and wished to see the memo first.

So that, in essence, is the
summary of Ms Burns' testimony.
THE COMMISSIONER: Does anybody
have anything to add to that?
MS EDWARDH: My only request is I
am unaware that these phone slips have already been filed --

MR. DAVID: They have already been
filed and they are at $P-85$, volume 5, tab 15.
THE COMMISSIONER: Is there a
phone slip particularly -- a phone slip, I take it, is a message to call back?

MR. DAVID: Correct.
THE COMMISSIONER: Is there a
message that relates to this particular call?
MR. DAVID: There are two phone slips that relate to this call. THE COMMISSIONER: I think you
should provide them to Ms Edwardh.
MS EDWARDH: P-85, tab what?
MR. DAVID: P-85, volume 5, tab 15.

THE COMMISSIONER: What do the
phone slips say?
MR. DAVID: As I say, there are
two pages of phone slips. The first --
THE COMMISSIONER: You have those?
You are operating at a disadvantage here.
MS EDWARDH: I do. My apologies.
THE COMMISSIONER: Go ahead.
MR. DAVID: The first page,
Mr. Commissioner, we have to refer to the third slip because there are four slips that are photocopied on this page.

The third slip is not dated. It says, "For KEM", and KEM is Kathryn Elizabeth McCallion.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MR. DAVID: There is no date or
time indicated. It says "from Jack Hooper, CSIS", and the phone number has been redacted in question. And then the message is "Re: Arar". So the message that Ms Burns noted
for Ms McCallion is that Jack Hooper was calling Ms McCallion about Arar.

Again, the testimony of Ms Burns concerned the date that she may have drafted this slip, because there is no date indicated on it. But on the slip that is previous to that, which is fully redacted in terms of its content, we know that the date is June 3 rd of 2003 . And then the date that follows that, again it is fully redacted because it is not relevant to the phone call in question, the date indicated is June 5th, 2003.

THE COMMISSIONER: So this
was between the 3 rd and --
MR. DAVID: Which led Ms Burns to think that this was on or about June 5th, the slip that she wrote.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR. DAVID: I'm sorry. What she
said is that it was no later than June 5th.
On the second page, the first slip
is relevant to the phone call, and again it is for Kathryn McCallion. There is a date on this slip, and it is June the 6th, 2003.

It is from Jim Gould, identified as being from ISI, with the phone number in
question, and then the message is: "Re: your phone call with CSIS on Arar".

THE COMMISSIONER: Is that it?
If you will proceed with the first
witness then.
MR. DAVID: Yes, Mr. Livermore,
please.
MR. SHORE: Excuse me,
Mr. Commissioner.
Mr. David, if $I$ can just add one
note to Ms Burns' testimony, she indicated as well in her testimony, sir, that she knew nothing about the phone call -- nothing about the contents of the phone call, excuse me, and that Ms McCalion didn't talk to her about the call.

MR. DAVID: Mr. Livermore?
PREVIOUSLY SWORN: DAN LIVERMORE
THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning,
Mr. Livermore. You are still under oath.
MR. LIVERMORE: Thank you very
much, sir.
EXAMINATION
MR. DAVID: Good morning
Mr. Livermore.
Could we show Mr. Livermore

Exhibit P-117, volume 2, tab 75.5, please.
MR. LIVERMORE: Could I have that number again, please, Mr. David.

MR. DAVID: 75.5.
Simply to put you in context, Mr. Livermore, you are aware of the contents of the June 5th Pardy memo.

MR. LIVERMORE: I am, yes.
MR. DAVID: And you were aware of the contents of the June 5 th memo at the relevant time, that is, in the month of June of 2003.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I was.
MR. DAVID: And you were consulted
or you were involved, put it that way, in the drafting or in the preparation of the memo at the time with Mr. Pardy.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I was. MR. DAVID: And you supported the contents of this memo and indicated so to Mr. Pardy?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I did. MR. DAVID: You were aware, furthermore, Mr. Livermore, and I remind you perhaps that this was a final product of a draft memo that had a previous life, that is dated May
the 5th, 2003.
If you wish, you can refer to it at tab 3.

There was an initial version of this memo, dated May the 5th, and you were aware of that initial version and that it eventually evolved into the June 5th version?

MR. LIVERMORE: I believe I was.
I can't say for sure at what point $I$ was involved in the various drafts.

MR. DAVID: You were aware also,
Mr. Livermore, that the May 5th version led to discussions and meetings with your partner Canadian agencies, CSIS and the RCMP, amongst others?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I am.
MR. DAVID: And you were also
aware that the June 5th memo was a compromise of positions between CSIS, the RCMP and DFAIT?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I am.
MR. DAVID: This is a memo, the June 5th version is a memo that ended up on the Minister's desk. It was drafted and prepared by Mr. Pardy?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, it was.

MR. DAVID: Can you explain how a memo prepared by a director general -- what is the flow to end up on the Minister's desk?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the norm in
our department is to, first of all it is the responsibility of the drafting official -- in this case it would have been Gar Pardy or one of his staff -- to consult widely to make sure that all views in the department have been taken into account. And usually on what is called the transmittal slip, which is the first piece of paper, usually you see the record of consultation.

It is also the responsibility of
the drafting officer to ensure that there is interdepartmental consultation so that the consultation line, if you wish to call it that, reflects consensus. In other words, putting down the list of individuals, or divisions, or bureaus consulted more or less means that they have been taken on board the particular line of reasoning in a memo, unless there are contrary opinions expressed either in the transmittal slip, or possibly in the memo itself.

MR. DAVID: And so you are
referring, in fact, to the first page of tab 5?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: It is entitled
"Transmittal Slip", and we see in terms of consultation for the contents of the memo involved were GMR, which is within DFAIT.

MR. LIVERMORE: That is the Middle
East Division.
MR. DAVID: Geographic office or
bureau, we could say?
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: There is ISD, which is
your box.
MR. LIVERMORE: That's me. MR. DAVID: That's you. And then there is ISI, which is or was Mr. Heatherington's box at the time, as well as RCMP, CSIS and PCO?

MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: So they were involved
in the contents, in the development of the contents of this memo that went up to Minister Graham's office?

MR. LIVERMORE: They presumably
would have been, yes. I think they were.
MR. DAVID: We understand from
previous testimony, Mr . Livermore, if you look
underneath where there is two black -- there is F-something, I-U, I believe, and there in a box, and just below that there is a stamp. It is my understanding that stamp indicates the date it arrived in the Minister's office.

You see there is a -- it is in
the --
MR. LIVERMORE: I really am not
the best authority on that.
MR. DAVID: All right. That's
fine.
The distribution box on the
left-hand side simply indicates to whom the memo was distributed?

MR. LIVERMORE: That's correct.
MR. DAVID: And so we see that it
was distributed, among other people, to the Deputy Minister, USS?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: MKM, which is Kathryn
McCallion?
MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: And to yourself, ISD?
MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: And to

Mr. Heatherington of ISI?
MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: And JPO is Dave Dyet?
MR. LIVERMORE: That would be him, yes.

MR. DAVID: So Mr. Dyet also
received a copy of this memo.
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: In terms of
authorization, if Mr. Pardy drafts a memo it doesn't go directly to the Minister's office?

MR. LIVERMORE: The norm in our department is that a director or director general signs off the memo, and you can see Mr. Pardy's signature block and his signature in the memo. It is then sent up through the line.

You see at "To" at the top, it normally -- it always goes to USS, who is the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then usually you have a bracketed section which indicates the routing of the memo. In this case, the routing is through Kathryn McCallion, who is the Assistant Deputy Minister to whom Gar Pardy reports.

MR. DAVID: Essentially the flow
follows the hierarchy of DFAIT?
MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: So it went from the
Director General's office.
MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: To the Assistant
Deputy Minister, Kathryn McCallion.
MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: And then to the Deputy
Minister, and then it is permitted to go on to the Minister's office?

MR. LIVERMORE: The norm is then on the on the second page you see the Deputy Minister's sign-off. If the Deputy Minister agrees with the line of argument and the recommendations that are put forth, the Deputy Minister signs the memo and it is sent to the Minister's office.

MR. DAVID: And the initials that we see on the transmittal slip on the "To" line, MKM, we see initials -- there's a slash through MKM and there are initials KEM above that. That indicates to you that Kathryn McCallion has read and approved this memo?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, it does.

MR. DAVID: And the fact that
there is a similar annotation on USS also indicates to you that the Deputy Minister has read and approved the contents of this memo.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: For processing, for
final reading by the Minister?
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: In terms of content,
let's go to paragraph 11, which is on page 4.
You were aware that CSIS officials
had visited Syria earlier this year and discussed Mr. Arar with their counterparts? You were aware of that?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And you were also
aware that they did not meet Mr. Arar?
MR. LIVERMORE: That's correct.
MR. DAVID: And you were also
aware that subsequent to these discussions, Syrian officials informed us that they were informed by CSIS officials that Canada did not want to have Mr. Arar returned?

MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: And that the CSIS
officials denied that they had said this to the Syrians?

MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: This was information
that was to your knowledge?
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Finally in paragraph
13, Mr. Livermore, it says:
"In recent days, we have discussed the case with both CSIS and the RCMP. They have maintained their positions that Mr. Arar, while not under investigation in Canada, is a person of interest to them because of the evidence of his connections with others who are. In these circumstances, they will not provide any direct support in having Mr. Arar returned to Canada. Should Mr. Arar return to Canada, CSIS and the RCMP have both indicated they want

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to interrogate him. As such, the best we can do in these circumstances is to again raise the matter direct with the Syrian Foreign Minister and to that end we have attached a letter for your signature. We would also recommend that you call in the Syrian Ambassador and deliver the letter."

So clearly what is being proposed here by Mr. Pardy and his superiors to the Minister is a compromise; it is a diluted solution?

MS McISAAC: Excuse me, that's not clear at all from that sentence.

THE COMMISSIONER: Perhaps
rephrase the question?
MR. DAVID: Mr. Livermore, you are aware that previous to this final version, the original intent of Mr. Pardy was for the Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to jointly sign a letter that would have been addressed to the Syrian Foreign Minister?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I am.
MR. DAVID: And that the Solicitor General, on the advice of his people, refused to do so?

MR. LIVERMORE: I'm not aware of the precise channel of communications on that issue. I am aware that both CSIS and the RCMP were reluctant to pursue that course, but I'm not sure to what extent that reached the Minister's office.

MR. DAVID: But in the end, the only thing that was possible was for your Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to sign a letter to the Syrian Foreign Minister? MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, that's correct.

MR. DAVID: In that context, Mr. Livermore, you understood that there was an environment where CSIS, RCMP and DFAIT were not necessarily seeing how things should proceed at this time in terms of further actions and further efforts to get Mr. Arar back to Canada. There wasn't exactly unanimity amongst the three agencies?

MR. LIVERMORE: I wouldn't
characterize it quite that way. There was unanimity within Foreign Affairs, and there had been since the beginning of course, that we wanted Mr. Arar back, and that had been communicated quite clearly to the Syrians.

At this stage, my recollection was at this stage, in the month of May, Mr. Pardy had mooted the suggestion, put forward the suggestion, that it would be a good idea for the Solicitor General to put his signature on a letter and that the phraseology of the letter would indicate that Mr. Arar had no connection at all to international terrorist activities.

My recollection is that the RCMP and CSIS -- first of all, they were reluctant to get their Minister involved in these activities because I think, quite rightly, they said that consular affairs don't fall within the mandate of CSIS and the RCMP. But that was relatively minor.

More importantly they didn't agree with the letter that Gar Pardy had drafted. And that was the substance of the disagreement. It wasn't do we want Mr. Arar back? How should we press the case? At no time did anyone object to the Foreign Minister making representations. I
think that they simply felt that, to the extent that their agencies were going to be involved in the démarche, or in the phraseology put forward, it had to be accurate, and what Gar Pardy had drafted was simply not accurate.

So my recollection is that in the month of May, that is more or less what the tenor of debate was.

MR. DAVID: So the language which is the compromise language we can find at tab 439 of volume 5 of the DFAIT collection, C-42.

MR. LIVERMORE: 432?
MR. DAVID: 439.
And in the second paragraph, the language that has been accepted is:
"I can assure you that there is no Canadian government impediment to Mr. Arar's return to Canada."

MR. LIVERMORE: That among other things. There was another sentence which had been suggested in an earlier draft by Mr. Pardy which was taken out.

MR. DAVID: And do you recall the gist of that sentence?

MR. LIVERMORE: The draft letter should be in the material somewhere. I don't recall the exact gist of it. But my recollection of the phraseology was something to the effect that: I can assure you that Mr. Arar has no connection to something.

THE COMMISSIONER: Am I right, Ms McIsaac, that that was actually a suggestion from the Minister's office, the sentence that Mr. Livermore is referring to?

I'm not sure anything turns on it at this point.

MS McISAAC: I think perhaps what Mr. Livermore is referring to is there was some draft wording in the body of the May 5 th memo. That may be it, that Mr. Pardy --

THE COMMISSIONER: And that it was a suggestion from the Minister's office to strengthen --

MS McISAAC: Subsequently, yes.
MR. LIVERMORE: My recollection, though, is that the Minister's office was changing the phraseology of something that was already in a draft letter.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. DAVID: If you go to the May
5th draft version of the memo at tab 3, Mr. Livermore, and if you go to page 4 of 5 --

MR. LIVERMORE: Page 3?
MR. DAVID: Four of 5, if you go
to the bottom right-hand corner.
You will see at the very top that Mr. Pardy is saying:
"There is a need for an unambiguous statement by the government of Canada, preferably signed by the Solicitor General and the Foreign Minister, to the effect that we have no evidence in Canada, or from foreign sources, that Mr. Arar is or was a member of al-Qaida, that we do not believe that such information exists and that Mr. Arar should be permitted to return to Canada."

Is that what you were referring to?

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MR. LIVERMORE: That is the gist of the disagreement, yes.

MR. DAVID: So in that context, Mr. Livermore, you are visited upon by Mr. Jim Gould, Assistant Director of ISI in the early part of June.

Do you recall when that visit was,
what date?
MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall the date, but it would have been around the 5 th or 6 th of June. It was around the time when the final memorandum was proceeding up the line.

He didn't exactly visit me. His
office physically was next to mine, and my recollection is either he popped into my office and said something to me or I popped out of the office and he was there. But it was more or less one of those meetings.

MR. DAVID: And what did he tell
you?
MR. LIVERMORE: He told me that -the gist of it, and I can't remember his exact words, but the gist of it was --

MR. DAVID: Let me ask you first, Mr. Livermore. I'm sorry to interrupt you. Did
you take any notes in regard to what he told you? MR. LIVERMORE: No. MR. DAVID: So you have no notes? MR. LIVERMORE: No. MR. DAVID: Thank you.

MR. LIVERMORE: Could my memory be refreshed on where $I$ could find the memo of July $30 ?$

MR. DAVID: Yes. We have filed a new document today, and that is $P-237$, if we could show that to Mr. Livermore. And I will bring you to tab 3.

It is today's document, $P-237$, and
if you go to tab 3 you will have the July 30 th memo.

The relevant paragraph that you are looking for is paragraph 5 on page 2. MR. LIVERMORE: Yes. That's the gist of what I recall Jim Gould told me on that occasion.

MR. DAVID: Let's read that. It says:
"Another senior CSIS officer
told MKM --"
is Kathryn McCallion.
"...that DFAIT should curtail its efforts to have Arar released as it was CSIS's preference that Arar not return."

MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: This in summary
reflects what Mr . Gould told you?
MR. LIVERMORE: I believe it does, yes.

MR. DAVID: I would like to refer you, Mr. Livermore, to Mr. Gould's notes, because Mr. Gould took some notes down about what he found out from Mr. Dyet.

I would refer you to $P-236$, which we filed today.

THE COMMISSIONER: $P-236$, that's
Mr. Gould's notes?
MR. DAVID: These are Mr. Gould's notes, yes.

If you go to tab 1 and go to page 9 of 16, at the very top there's an "i" and a double "ii", and this is what Mr. Gould noted from Mr. Dyet's statement to him.

It says:
"First of all, the memo from JPD, Gar Pardy, about

Arar --"
And then he notes:
"Status: Did it go to MKM?
Probably up today."
And just for your reference, the
record clearly indicates that these notes are dated June the 5th, 2003.

MR. LIVERMORE: Right.
MR. DAVID: So one is there is a
concern about the memo and where it's at. The
second point in Mr. Gould's notes is that:
"Call from Jack Hooper,
ADDO --"
Which is not entirely accurate; it is ADO.
"...to MKM saying that CSIS doesn't want us to get Arar back into the country as they would have to devote too many resources to watching him." Did Mr. Gould, in his conversation with you, say anything that resembles any of those two entries?

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MR. LIVERMORE: That was the gist of what he told me, yes. MR. DAVID: So that also reflects what he said to you. And how did you react,

Mr. Livermore?
First of all, let me ask you, how did you sense Mr. Gould was reacting to what he was saying to you?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, he will have
an opportunity to speak for himself --
MR. DAVID: I'm asking you for
your perception of it.
MR. LIVERMORE: My perception is
that what -- and my perception myself, I think we both probably shared the same perception. What was interesting was not particularly these comments; what was interesting was that Jack Hooper would call Kathryn McCallion because this issue had been handled for months personally by Gar Pardy and that Ms McCallion, although notionally she is in the line of hierarchy above the consular bureau, she did not deal with consular cases per se, or she dealt with the management of the bureau perhaps but not consular
cases per se. So it struck us odd that there would be a phone call between Jack Hooper and Kathryn McCallion.

That was about the only thing unusual that struck me about this conversation. MR. DAVID: I think there are two concerns, Mr. Livermore: One is the message that Mr. Gould is giving you is that CSIS doesn't want Arar back in Canada; that CSIS cannot handle the situation because of resources, or an issue of resources, if Arar does come back to Canada. So they are indicating that they are content with where he is, Syria? That's the message?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, I'm not sure
that was the message, but $I$ take it that --
MR. DAVID: Well, did you not
understand that to be the message?
MR. LIVERMORE: I took that to be the message that Jim Gould gave to me.

MR. DAVID: Correct.
MR. LIVERMORE: I cannot attest
that that indeed was the message.
MR. DAVID: I fully agree with
you. But I'm sure that when Mr. Gould told you
this, you didn't think that Mr. Gould was making this up?

MR. LIVERMORE: Oh, no. Not at all.

MR. DAVID: You took Mr. Gould to be acting professionally and seriously?

MR. LIVERMORE: Absolutely. He is a first class officer, and $I$ have no reason to doubt that what he told me was entirely in good faith.

MR. DAVID: So my first concern is this information is very significant. On one hand you have been spending months and months and months in efforts to get Mr. Arar back. It is DFAIT's mandate to do so. And here you are finding out from Mr. Gould that CSIS is not online, that CSIS is in fact perhaps working against that objective.

MR. LIVERMORE: Well --
MR. DAVID: So I'm asking you:
How do you deal with that information?
MR. LIVERMORE: In fact, our view at the time was that it was not significant and not very important, and $I$ will tell you why. At the very time that the phone call took place, or I
guess took place, the memo going forward with the strategy that we had proposed all along and that in fact we had worked with CSIS to propose, was gone. It had gone to the Minister's office. There was a letter to be signed. The strategy had been set. And that was it.

If there were a possibility of reservations on the part of another government agency, that was too bad. That was not going to be taken into account at that time.

So it didn't worry me at all, and
it was not particularly significant because a different course of action had already been entered into.

MR. DAVID: And the second area where you seem to have expressed surprise is the fact that Kathryn McCallion is dealing with Jack Hooper. That surprised you.

MR. LIVERMORE: On a consular
case, yes. Not of itself. I'm not saying that a call between a senior member of CSIS and Kathryn McCallion would have been unusual, but on a consular case, yes.

MR. DAVID: Now, clearly Arar is a consular case.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: But clearly the memo is addressing an approach that the Government of Canada is going to take.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And clearly the memo
is addressing concerns of different parties in terms of coming to an agreement on a course of action?

MR. LIVERMORE: That's right, and we had already agreed with CSIS on a course of action. You saw that their name was put down on the transmittal slip as being consulted and in agreement, and the memo had gone forward with that in mind. And that memo, as far as $I$ was concerned, had been signed off and was on its way to the Minister. We had agreed on it.

MR. DAVID: As I understand how DFAIT operates, or operated at this time, is that Mr. Pardy in fact could answer to two different Assistant Deputy Ministers: one was for the geographic region of Syria; and, two, it was to Kathryn McCallion, who was in charge of consular affairs?

MR. LIVERMORE: Formally it is to

Kathryn McCallion rather than to the geographic Assistant Deputy Minister, yes. But in fact everyone was on board the approach taken in that memo. GMR represents the Middle East Division, which is part of the geographic branch headed by the person who was at the time John McNee -- I think it was John McNee -- who was in charge of Europe and Middle East. So all of the parties within Foreign Affairs were on board that particular memo at the time.

MR. DAVID: So I'm not quite
understanding then why you thought it to be surprising that Jack Hooper would be phoning Kathryn McCallion about the memo.

MR. LIVERMORE: Because if someone
wanted to talk to the person in charge of this particular consular issue, the person to talk to was Gar Pardy.

MR. DAVID: And if Gar Pardy was
not around?
MR. LIVERMORE: Presumably you
would have to find a Deputy Minister. You would have to take it to a deputy, or presumably someone else could have handled it. But it was unusual that Kathryn McCallion would have been involved.

MR. DAVID: But Kathryn McCallion was an Assistant Deputy Minister. Jack Hooper was No. 3 in his organization.

MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. DAVID: So they are basically
the same level.
MR. LIVERMORE: Basically.
MR. DAVID: So Mr. Hooper, if he is going to call somebody within DFAIT, the appropriate person to address would be the person of his same rank?

MR. LIVERMORE: One might argue this, but $I$ had never heard of that happening before. That's my point.

MR. DAVID: Had you ever heard of Mr. Hooper ever calling anybody else about a consular matter within DFAIT?

MR. LIVERMORE: I can't recall, no.

MR. DAVID: Did you ever speak to Ms McCallion about what you had heard from Mr. Gould?

MR. LIVERMORE: No, I didn't.
MR. DAVID: Did you ever think of raising the matter with her?

MR. LIVERMORE: Not at all.
MR. DAVID: Did you ever speak to Mr. Hooper or anybody else at CSIS about the matter?

MR. LIVERMORE: Not at all, no.
MR. DAVID: Did you ever speak to your people internally at DFAIT, Scott Heatherington?

MR. LIVERMORE: I can't recall whether I spoke to Scott Heatherington about it, but he would have been possibly part of the preparation of that memo of July 30 , so he probably would have known.

I can't recall whether I spoke to him about it at all.

MR. DAVID: And we have seen this in P-237, tab 3, the July 30th memo. Clearly, the call, and what the call concerned, was on or about June the 5th, 2003.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And so two months
after, at the end of July, in a memo that is being prepared for the Deputy Minister, the substance of what you understood the call to be is reflected in this memo?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: So you felt that even two months after, that what Mr. Gould had described as being the reason for the call was accurate?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And that remains so, Mr. Livermore, until the time that DFAIT prepared a chronology in November of 2003 for PCO?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are my questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: What happened in the November chronology? Did that change then?

MR. DAVID: Yes. I was going to deal with that with Mr. Gould, but I would be happy to do so with Mr. Livermore.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, that's fine.

MR. DAVID: Mr. Gould is more hands-on in terms of the preparation of the chronology.

But for your understanding, Mr. Commissioner, in November of 2003, all involved Canadian agencies are being requested to
prepare detailed chronologies for PCO, and Mr. Gould suggested that the entry about the phone call between Ms McCallion and Mr. Hooper be included in the DFAIT chronology. In the end it was not included, and that's in November of 2003. THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. MR. DAVID: I'm sorry, one last thing.

Did you ever discuss the matter with the CSIS liaison officer within your office? MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall doing so, no.

MR. DAVID: Okay. Thank you. THE COMMISSIONER: Just before we start the cross-examinations, it strikes me that the need to review Ms McCallion's transcript for NSC, could that take place now so that -- what I envision is that Ms Edwardh have a chance to review it over the lunch hour so we don't delay. MS EDWARDH: It is being done right now.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Ms Edwardh?

EXAMINATION
MS EDWARDH: I will be brief,

Mr. Commissioner.
Mr. Livermore, you have testified at length before, but it is clear that the building of a consensus, as we have heard about it, was a consensus that could only be reached once no reference was made to the RCMP, or to CSIS, and their "position" in respect of Mr. Arar's return. In other words, they wanted nothing said about whether they had any evidence or didn't have any evidence; they simply wanted to be written out of the equation?

MR. LIVERMORE: I wouldn't put it precisely that way. As I indicated earlier, there was on the part of both of them a reluctance to play a role in consular matters for the very reason that consular issues don't fall within their mandate.

MS EDWARDH: And they were reluctant, sir, though, with respect to more than that. They were reluctant to have any statements made about assertions that fell directly within their mandate?

MR. LIVERMORE: The assertions -it is hard to answer that question, forgive me. But to go back a bit, the type of discussions that
took place were on an initial draft letter that Gar Pardy had drafted.

MS EDWARDH: And if you want to refer to it, it is in the exhibit that my friend first referred you to, in the Wayne Easter documents, $\mathrm{P}-117$.

MR. LIVERMORE: P-117.
MS EDWARDH: At 75. I think we
start at --
MR. LIVERMORE: Which?
MS EDWARDH: I think it is tab 3, 75.3.

This is the May 5th initial attempt to build an interdepartmental approach, as I understand it.

MR. LIVERMORE: But in some place in the documents is the initial draft document by Mr. Pardy.

MS EDWARDH: Yes. And he wanted to make statements about the absence of evidence linking Mr. Arar to terrorist activity.

MR. LIVERMORE: That's on page 4 of 5. But there is also the draft letter itself that he drafted.

MS EDWARDH: But that was the
issue, was it not?
MR. LIVERMORE: The issue was, as reflected in page 4 of 5 , at the top there. He wanted what he called an unambiguous statement of non-involvement in terrorist activities.

MS EDWARDH: Yes.
MR. LIVERMORE: CSIS and the RCMP came back and told us that they could not give that statement.

MS EDWARDH: No. And indeed at the same time that CSIS and the RCMP, and particularly CSIS, was taking that position, the Department of Foreign Affairs was aware that CSIS had travelled to Syria?

MR. LIVERMORE: Oh, yes, yes.
MS EDWARDH: That CSIS had met with Syrian Military Intelligence?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And that CSIS had
either directly or indirectly with its counterpart, the RCMP, received information in the past from Syrian Military Intelligence?

MS MCISAAC: I'm not sure that that is on the record.

MS EDWARDH: It certainly is.

MS McISAAC: And the extent of any information received by CSIS is a matter of -MS EDWARDH: I am not at all concerned about what was received or the extent of it, but we do know from the conversation held with Mr. Cabana, et cetera, that in making his offer to provide information to Syrian Military Intelligence, he did so on the basis that they had been helpful in the past in providing information to the RCMP.

MS MCISAAC: To the RCMP.
MS EDWARDH: We also have been given a document, as of two or three days ago, Mr. Commissioner, that has as part of a chronology the fact that DFAIT, on December 16th, 2002, through ISI, is the way $I$ translate the document, receives a memo summarizing CSIS' liaison visit to Syria, and further, CSIS' message to ISI providing translated transcript of Arar's statement during interrogation and interviews with Syrian Military Intelligence.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MS MCISAAC: I think that was the one the Ambassador brought back. MS EDWARDH: There's no suggestion

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it is. That's November the 3rd. This seems to be an entirely different "document" relating to a transcript of Mr. Arar's statement, not the three-paragraph bout de papier.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't have the document in front of me, but as I listen to it, that does seem what it seems to be.

MS EDWARDH: That's my
understanding, yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: Something
different than the three paragraph --
MS McISAAC: It is the
translation.
MS EDWARDH: Mr. Commissioner, let me argue by at least referring you to the document that I have.

If you look at Exhibit 237, and
turn to tab 4, under page 2, at the bottom of page 2 you will see two references to the date of December 16th, 2002. You will recall we have already heard ample evidence about Ambassador Pillarella's removal or return to Canada on or about November the 3rd, his bringing a very short three-paragraph document called a bout de papier, it being handed at that time, almost immediately,

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over for translation to CSIS, but it being the subject matter of meetings in the early part of November, well before CSIS travels to Syria.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: So I took this as clearly being a reference to other information. We also have Mr. Edelson's testimony. You will recall, when he met with the RCMP, he was told by the RCMP that they believed CSIS had further information from Syria, and the RCMP were anxiously awaiting it. And this was well after the November 3rd date.

THE COMMISSIONER: But I think this refers, though, the first reference under December $16 t h$ refers to a memo to USS summarizing CSIS' liaison visit to Syria.

MS EDWARDH: Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: But it doesn't then go on to say what was included in --

MS EDWARDH: It is the next entry,
Mr. Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: I think
Ms McIsaac's point, the translated transcript -- I want to be careful how $I$ say this, Ms McIsaac -but that refers to the November 3rd document.

Is that your point?
MS McISAAC: That's what $I$ believe
that refers to, sir.
The point is we know Ambassador Pillarella brought back the document --

THE COMMISSIONER: That was
translated.
MS MCISAAC: That needed to be translated. That document, unfortunately, is not part of the public record, or the summary of it is not, because my friend has refused to allow that to be made public, the summary that Mr. Atkey prepared.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MS MCISAAC: That has been
acknowledged that that information was brought back about Mr. Arar by the Ambassador. The

Government has not provided any further information and claims National Security Confidentiality with respect to any other information received from the Syrian government by anyone, including CSIS, with respect to this or related matters.

I don't know where this goes with my friend's question, if she can just rephrase it.

THE COMMISSIONER: I was just
going to come back to it. The question that struck me was that it indicated that he was aware that CSIS had visited, and he was aware that the RCMP had received information, and I guess to the extent that it is referred in this document that CSIS had as well.

Why don't we just leave it at that and without getting --

MS EDWARDH: Well, with respect
then, do I take it -- Mr. Commissioner, let me just go through this process.

In Ambassador Pillarella's materials that are marked as Exhibit $P-134$, at tab 6 in those materials we have a description. I am not precisely concerned with accurately describing who it generates from, but this clearly comes out of ISI and it may come from Donald Saunders, just so my friend can follow along.

It is dated November 3rd, 2002,
Sunday, and it then describes:
"On November 3rd, 2002, the Canadian Ambassador to Syria received a document (written in Arabic) from Syrian

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Military Intelligence. The Ambassador brought the document to Canada personally and gave it to ISI on November 6th."

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MS EDWARDH: "ISI sent it to CSIS
for translation. The
document, an undated
three-paragraph bout de
papier, was translated on
November 7th. The document
alleges that Mr. Arar spent
time in Afghanistan in
Mujahedin camps and that he
knew [redacted]. The
document was sent to CSIS for
translation by the CSIS
liaison officer in ISI. The
document was returned to ISI,
and the information was
shared with the RCMP and
CSIS."
THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MS EDWARDH: Then a month later,

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we have reference both to -- and of course this statement is made well before CSIS goes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right. I understand that.

MS EDWARDH: A month later, on December $16 t h$, we have a record in the chronology as put forward by ISI that ISI now has a summary of the CSIS liaison visit to Syria.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MS EDWARDH: Point 1.
And point 2, CSIS' message to ISI, providing translated transcript of Arar's statements during interrogations/interviews with Military Intelligence.

So in my respectful submission what $I$ have before me is totally consistent with the evidence of Mr. Edelson and also with the potential inferences available that CSIS received further transcripts of the interrogation.

MS McISAAC: My friend can
speculate all she wants, sir. We are not confirming what, if anything, CSIS may or may not have received from the Syrians.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think what I can say fairly, having listened to the evidence,
that I think the reference at the very bottom of the page, whether it is accurately drafted and the timing, refers to the one Mr. Pillarella received on November 6th.

MS EDWARDH: I'm content with
that. But the purpose of my question -- let me go back to the purpose of my questioning.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MS EDWARDH: Obviously, from your perspective, both CSIS and the RCMP had an interest in maintaining relations with Syrian Military Intelligence for their own purposes and their own mandate.

MR. LIVERMORE: I can't answer that question. One has to assume yes, but in fairness, we know that Syrian Military Intelligence was less interested in talking to the RCMP than CSIS.

MS EDWARDH: Then let's talk about CSIS. From your dealings with them in trying to build a consensus, and given your involvement in the world of intelligence, it became apparent to you that in the discharge of their own mandate that their interest in relationships was with Syrian Military Intelligence, and they did not
want to undermine their position by signing on to a letter?

MR. LIVERMORE: No, I don't think that was quite the situation. The situation had nothing to do with -- well, let me go back, because there are two different phases, and I think there is a mixture of two different phases being entered into.

There was a phase when there was some confusion allegedly on the Syrian side as to Canadian intentions, and that was --

MS EDWARDH: No, not Canadian
intentions.
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: There was allegedly confusion with respect to CSIS' intentions.

MR. LIVERMORE: No, I would call
it Canadian intentions because they were arguing that they were getting mixed messages. You are getting one message from one department, one message from another. So that's Canadian intentions.

MS EDWARDH: Just for the purpose of clarifying the record and to refresh everyone's memory, the Syrians said that they had received a
message from CSIS that CSIS did not want Mr. Arar back in Canada.

Is that not fair?
MR. LIVERMORE: Not quite, with
respect.
MS EDWARDH: Okay.
MR. LIVERMORE: They said that
someone in CSIS, or CSIS had told them. Not that they had received a message. Someone had told them.

MS EDWARDH: Someone had told them.

MR. LIVERMORE: Someone had told them.

MS EDWARDH: And the message that
they were told, sir?
MR. LIVERMORE: Someone had told them that CSIS did not want Arar back. That was the message that we had been given in Damascus. We didn't know where that came from. We didn't know the routing of that. That was reported back by Ambassador Pillarella.

MS EDWARDH: Let me just stop you.
You knew who it came from in the sense of what Syrian spoke for us.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, absolutely. MS EDWARDH: High-ranking Syrians involved in military intelligence?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, absolutely.
Yes.
MS EDWARDH: What you didn't know, with the greatest of respect, was who in CSIS may have said that, unless it was in the course of their visit?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, more than
that. That is one thing we didn't know, but another thing we didn't know was whether it had been said at all. There were lots of things we didn't know about that.

MS EDWARDH: Fair enough. And
when you learned that CSIS had failed to comply with their obligations of reporting in to Ambassador Pillarella after their visit and simply vanished from Damascus, do you recall there being anything on your part you did in order to get a briefing about those events and what had transpired and what had been said during the meeting that should have gone to Franco Pillarella at the time?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, what had
happened -- we understand what had happened was that Franco Pillarella, quite rightly, as Head of Mission, had insisted on a debriefing from the team, and the team had left Damascus without phoning him.

So my understanding is that -- and I'm recalling -- I don't think this was in my will-say, so $I$ wasn't looking at it. My recollection is that Franco sent us a message and said it didn't happen; it was supposed to happen. We then contacted CSIS to inquire why. And they said the circumstances of their departure, whatever they were, did not allow them to contact Ambassador Pillarella.

MS EDWARDH: Or send a written briefing after the fact to the Ambassador? MR. LIVERMORE: Yes. A written -MS EDWARDH: Excuse me. Are you aware of a written briefing by CSIS to the Ambassador, an account to him as Head of Mission? MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall
that myself, no.
MS EDWARDH: So all my point to you, sir, is: It was apparent to you that CSIS had a relationship. However primitive, it had a
relationship with Syrian Military Intelligence? It had been to Syria --

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: It had met with
Syrian Military Intelligence. You are clear about that?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, absolutely.
MS EDWARDH: And I'm simply going
to suggest to you that it is obvious to anyone looking at the involvement of CSIS that they would not want to undermine their asset by saying anything that made them look foolish.

I want to put this proposition to you. If the RCMP gave information, including CSIS information, to the Americans, and we didn't know what the Americans made of that information except to send Mr. Arar to Syria, then any statement by CSIS or any statement by the RCMP could make them look very foolish if the U.S. had handed on all that information?

MR. LIVERMORE: I don't think that was the issue, with all due respect.

And if $I$ could return,
Mr. Commissioner, to my recollection of events?
The confusion of messaging is very
important because you are suggesting, it seems to me, that the confusion of messaging continues on until June and the confusion of messaging is part of the June -- leading up to the June deliberations.

Well, the confusion ended very
quickly. We had heard of the confusion through the reporting of Ambassador Pillarella. Within about a month a memo was prepared by the Middle East Division, which advised the Minister as to how we should approach the subject with the Syrian Foreign Minister.

A call might have taken place in that pre-Christmas period, but for a variety of reasons -- logistical, $I$ think, $I$ recall -- it didn't take place. It took place, I think, in the middle of January. I don't recall the date, but around the $15 t h$ or $16 t h . \quad$ Mr. Graham spoke to the Syrian Foreign Minister, and that was the end of the confusion.

There was no more confusion in the minds of the Syrians about Canadian intentions. I say Canadian because we are talking here about Foreign Affairs, CSIS the RCMP. Confusion over as of January the 15th.

What you are talking about, it seems to me, is a different issue: namely, what is it that we put into the letter that we write to the Syrians?

MS EDWARDH: Let me stop you, because you make a very interesting point, sir, that the confusion was resolved vis-à-vis the Syrian Foreign Minister by Minister Graham's clear statements.

But I am a little puzzled then about why that same confusion appears when MPs from Canada travelled to Syria --

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, remind me of
the occasion.
MS EDWARDH: I'm just going to
look to see if $I$ can find it.
--- Pause
MS EDWARDH: I'm looking at Exhibit P-99, if the witness could be provided with that.

This is a document that originates under the hand of Myra Pastyr-Lupul, who of course you know as someone who was working with Mr. Pardy?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.

MS EDWARDH: Now we move forward from the complete resolution of any confusion in January, as you have described it, to March 24 th, 2003.

There is a telcon, which I take it to be a telephone conference call, between Marlene Catterall, the Member of Parliament, and Ms Pastyr-Lupul.

In the second paragraph -- well, perhaps we have to refer to the first paragraph -Ms Catterall and Sarkis Assadourian have met with the Syrian Ambassador and they did so Wednesday, March 21st, as reflected in this memorandum; correct?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And in the course of
their meeting, the Ambassador makes some observations, and they are:
"They learned that --"
And I take that to mean Ms
Catterall and Mr. Assadourian.
"They learned that initially
during this case that CSIS
officials told the Syrians
that they have 'no interest

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in Mr. Arar'. The Syrians took this to mean that CSIS have no interest in having Mr. Arar back. They may have meant that they had no security reason to investigate Mr . Arar in Canada. Due to the miscommunication, the Syrians believed the Canadians did not want Mr. Arar back in Canada and therefore decided to detain him, keep him in Syria."

Let me go on.
"What we need to do now is send a clear message in writing to the Syrians --"

Now, this is March 24 th, sir. "-- clear message in writing to the Syrians from CSIS that outlines clearly that we have no information that led us to believe that Mr. Arar poses a security threat to Canada.

Furthermore, the Syrians need to hear from the security people and DFAIT in writing that if we do have any information that shows any involvement in terrorist activities that we will charge him in Canada and deal with his case through the usual law enforcement channels."

So at least one inference from this, sir -- and I take it you weren't present at the meeting -- is that the alleged confusion has not been in any final dispositive way cleared up by mid-January?

MR. LIVERMORE: Absolutely not. The confusion was cleared up January the $16 t h$. This memo says even they learned that initially during this case, past tense; initially they learned during this case --

MS EDWARDH: But there still needs
to be -- on March 24 th it is very clear that the effect of the communication from the Syrian Ambassador to the two Mps communicated to DFAIT is
there needs to be clarification of CSIS' position? MR. LIVERMORE: Not on that point.

Not at all. That is not what the memo says.
Now, the second paragraph, it's a
bit unclear who is saying what here. But the
logic -- it's clearly a compilation of
misunderstandings that Myra Pastyr-Lupul is talking about, which is almost total speculation. "What we need to do now is send a clear message" was about a statement which eventually found its way into an initial draft of a Gar Pardy letter --

MS EDWARDH: Quite so, sir. My
only point is this --
MR. LIVERMORE: Excuse me, Ms Edwardh, may $I$ be permitted just to finish. THE COMMISSIONER: Please, yes. MR. LIVERMORE: What is important to note is that the initial draft of the letter that the Foreign Minister would sign had a sentence to the effect that Mr. Arar had no connections to terrorist activity. That is the letter that Gar Pardy, to my recollection, attempted to have agreement on throughout the interdepartmental community. And that's what this
thing refers to.
The difficulty was how do we describe in a letter to the Syrians what his involvement in terrorist activity was, and on the CSIS and RCMP side -- or this is my recollection -- they will have to speak for themselves on this issue. My recollection is they said quite clearly to us, "If you want us to say in a letter what his position is, we have to be entirely accurate about what that is. We cannot say there are no connections."

MS EDWARDH: My point is simply
this, sir: In March of 2003 , a senior person, Myra Pastyr-Lupul, at the Department of Foreign Affairs, having met with Marlene Catterall and Sarkis Assadourian, concludes on the basis of their conversation with the Syrian Ambassador that there is a need for a clear statement, which includes a statement from CSIS. Fair enough?

MR. LIVERMORE: A clear statement, yes.

MS EDWARDH: Including a statement from CSIS.

MR. LIVERMORE: That's her
conclusion, yes.

MS EDWARDH: That's her
conclusion. Fine.
And that is indeed what causes Mr. Pardy to try and build an interdepartmental consensus and is reflected in his May 5th memorandum?

MR. LIVERMORE: I assume so. I have not -- prior to a few weeks ago, I had never seen this memo, so I'm not sure what caused Gar Pardy to do so.

MS EDWARDH: Well, it's this kind of thinking.

MR. LIVERMORE: I don't object to the kind of thinking, yes.

MS EDWARDH: All right. And we do know that the only letter that ever came into existence is the one that makes no reference to information from the RCMP or CSIS?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: In effect, as I think
Inspector Cabana said, the letter proposed, of course, was counterproductive. It wouldn't have got Mr. Arar anywhere?

MR. LIVERMORE: Absolutely.
MS EDWARDH: In your dealings with

CSIS, was it not apparent to you that they had no interest in taking positive steps to facilitate Mr. Arar's return?

MR. LIVERMORE: The mandate of CSIS is completely different. They have nothing to do with consular issues. They certainly never posed a hindrance to his returning.

MS EDWARDH: We will leave that for the Commissioner. None that you know of? MR. LIVERMORE: None that I'm aware of, yes.

MS EDWARDH: Let me go back to the question. From your conversations with persons in CSIS, was it not apparent to you that they wanted to take no step that would facilitate Mr. Arar's return to Canada and indeed took none?

MR. LIVERMORE: I think that the way the question is posed, I would have difficulty answering it in a yes-or-no fashion. They did not see their mandate as a consular mandate. They don't have a role in returning Canadians to Canada. If Gar Pardy was successful, if Foreign Affairs was successful in seeking Mr. Arar's return to Canada, they had no problems with that. But, in fact, they are not a facilitator --

MS EDWARDH: Who did you speak to that conveyed that they had no difficulty in having Mr. Pardy do whatever he felt like doing in order to discharge his mandate under consular affairs? Who in CSIS said that?

MR. LIVERMORE: You are saying something that is pretty exaggerated, with all due respect.

MS EDWARDH: I thought I was paraphrasing what you said.

MR. LIVERMORE: No. You said do whatever -- whatever you said.

What they were always insistent on, and they were very insistent on this, was absolute accuracy in any letter. They didn't have any problem with the letter per se, and the letter clearly was designed to help secure his release. No one ever said to me, "We don't like the letter. The letter is impossible. We are not accepting the letter." No one ever said that to me.

But, as initially drafted by Gar Pardy, the letter was unacceptable to them, because Gar Pardy was attempting to speak for security officials in Canada in his initial draft, and they took exception to what he said.

MS EDWARDH: Do you recall anyone ever suggesting that someone write the Syrians and say, "Mr. Arar may be an important witness in a Canadian criminal case, and we would like to effect his return in order that that case can go forward"?

MR. LIVERMORE: No one said anything along those lines to me, no.

MS EDWARDH: No. So let me go back to my question.

It would be fair to conclude that CSIS' insistence on its mandate meant nothing more or less, in this case, that they would take no step of any kind to assist DFAIT in effecting Mr. Arar's return. And I'm talking about assistance.

MR. LIVERMORE: Again, I think the question is a bit unfair to what the import was. I sat through a number of sessions -- and $I$ was of course bouncing in and out of the country, so I can't say $I$ was in all of them -- where Gar Pardy's letter was being discussed. No one ever said, "We are not helping you at all. We are not helping you with this process. This process is not going forward." No one ever said that.

They basically said, "If you want to do a letter, Mr. Pardy, go ahead with the letter. The letter must be accurate. The letter must state the CSIS position, or the RCMP position, accurately. And, by the way, you haven't done so in your initial draft." That's basically the position.

I didn't regard that -- no one ever said, "We're not going to help you with his return." So I think that would almost be a speculative leap of faith on my part, and possibly on your part, to say they were not prepared to help.

They cooperated in the interdepartmental process. It was clearly the intention of the interdepartmental process to get Mr. Arar back to Canada. They simply insisted upon accuracy.

MS EDWARDH: When CSIS sat at the table, was there any suggestion made to them, "All right, if you can't sign on to this kind of letter, will you speak to your counterparts and tell them that we would like Mr. Arar to be returned and he will be dealt with under Canadian law if there is any evidence that justifies a
criminal prosecution"?
MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall
that we did but there was a very good reason for that, and that is that we regarded -- and I would love to put this question to CSIS too. We regarded the CSIS relationship with Syrian Military Intelligence as a pretty preliminary one. They didn't have much of a relationship.

The strongest relationship among Canadian government officials to Syrian Military Intelligence was Ambassador Pillarella. We mandated Ambassador Pillarella to say to Syrian Military Intelligence, "We want Mr. Arar back." He had the strongest link to General Khalil. He told General Khalil quite clearly, "I, Ambassador Pillarella, am the spokesman for the entire Canadian government, and we want him back."

MS EDWARDH: Well, I have no way of evaluating that statement, Mr. Livermore, because I don't know what the CSIS relationship was, other than to know that there was some relationship.
I accept -- well, I hear your
view.

But certainly there was nothing
said. We have heard that Syrian Military Intelligence preferred to deal with CSIS. I think that statement has been made by a number of individuals.

MR. LIVERMORE: As opposed to the RCMP, not as opposed to Franco Pillarella.

MS EDWARDH: In any event, I take
it you were never at a table where it was suggested CSIS go through its own channels and communicate the position of the Government of Canada?

MR. LIVERMORE: No, not at all.
MS EDWARDH: I just don't
understand the message that Mr. Gould gave you. The message that Mr. Gould gave is accurately reflected in your memorandum -- I'm sorry, the memorandum of Scott Heatherington on July 30th.

Is that fair?
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, it would have been, yes.

MS EDWARDH: I just want to make some observations and have you comment about this memorandum -- I'm sorry, I've just lost the reference.

THE COMMISSIONER: It's tab 3
of the newly redacted documents.
MS EDWARDH: Do you have that in
front of you, Mr. Livermore?
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I do.
MS EDWARDH: Certainly there was nothing about Mr. Gould that in any way caused you to be suspicious or sceptical about the information he provided to you?

MR. LIVERMORE: Not at all.
MS EDWARDH: And I take it you had absolute confidence in Mr. Gould that he was reporting not just something that he picked up by gossip and rumour but something that he felt was newsworthy and important for officials in DFAIT to know?

MR. LIVERMORE: I would not
characterize it as newsworthy and important. I would characterize it as interesting.

MS EDWARDH: Fair enough. But it
was the kind of thing a man in Mr. Gould's
position wanted to make sure that other senior officials in the department knew?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, yes.
Certainly me. He wanted me to know.

MS EDWARDH: And I take it that not only did he want you to know, he wanted Mr. Heatherington to know?

MR. LIVERMORE: I would assume so, yes.

MS EDWARDH: And subsequently we have learned he had conversations with others, and I take it we can assume that he wasn't about the business of simple gossip but felt that the information ought to be conveyed to persons who ought to know?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes. And we in
fact, as you can see in the memo, we put that subsequently into a memo.

MS EDWARDH: Yes. And this goes
to the Deputy Minister?
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: So I would take it
that matters that are brought to the Deputy Minister's attention are brought not on the basis of rumour but on the basis of matters the deputy must be aware of in order to conduct the affairs of the department?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I would think so.

MS EDWARDH: So at least it is clear that on July $30 t h$ there was still a view held by Mr. Heatherington, and indeed yourself, that this information, that CSIS would like the department to curtail its efforts to have Mr. Arar released, was a matter you felt ought to be brought to the deputy's attention?

MR. LIVERMORE: To be fair to the memo, it has to be put into some kind of context. The subject of the memo is really about a newspaper article which appeared, I think, that morning, possibly the day before, which quoted the then Solicitor General as saying that there were rogue elements in the $R C M P$ that were responsible. MS EDWARDH: Yes.

MR. LIVERMORE: So we were trying
to address what appeared to be a rather odd situation in the media. We dealt with that particular part in part of the memo, and then later on we dealt with the other one.

This, by the way, was long after
the fact. It was almost three or four weeks after the course of action that we had decided on in the June 5th memo that had already gone up.

MS EDWARDH: I appreciate that.

What is interesting, though, from the perspective of the reader of this memorandum, once the rogue element story comes out, the tenor of this memo, as reflected in paragraph 5 by Mr. Heatherington, is nothing more or less to say that it's odd that the media is blaming the Mounties for passing intelligence. We have information that CSIS may have done little to assist us or, in fact, actively curtailed the efforts.

That is what this memo says. MR. LIVERMORE: Well, not exactly. What it says is -- it expresses some curiosity, and that's how the paragraph 5 starts. It is curiosity in the media about the relative attention paid to the RCMP as opposed to CSIS.

But it does clearly state that the Syrians have maintained.

MS EDWARDH: Yes.
MR. LIVERMORE: So we tried to
describe the situation fairly.
MS EDWARDH: And it is also
interesting, sir, that when you say that the Syrians have maintained that a senior CSIS officer told them we did not want Arar back in Canada --

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.

MS EDWARDH: -- although CSIS denies this, one thing that you don't say to the deputy in your writing in July of 2003, you don't say to the deputy but of course the Minister made a telephone call in January, and any suggestions that the Syrians could harbour such a belief is ill-conceived, ill-founded and was set to rest.

I am going to suggest to you it was obvious that there were elements in the community, including the Syrians, who may well have continued on with this "misunderstanding" and that the origins of this misunderstanding have yet to be certainly placed clearly into this public domain.

MR. LIVERMORE: I think your latter comment is probably fair enough, but with respect to the first half $I$ would say categorically no. The misunderstanding was put to rest definitively and finally within weeks of it occurring.

Now, reporting on it -- yes, reporting on it continued to take place, but it's in the past tense.

MS EDWARDH: And as of July, of course, you are still reporting to your superiors
that there is this outstanding concern at least of CSIS' interest or lack of interest in having Mr. Arar returned. All you can say is it is there. We can read it. You approved it and it went to the deputy.

MR. LIVERMORE: And one of the reasons we did so, if $I$ may just add a supplementary note, I think it was in June the deputies changed. We had a new deputy coming in. So by and large there were more notes going to an incoming new deputy than there were normally. He had been, of course, I think, briefed on the issue. I wouldn't have been responsible for that. But we did send him the occasional note to keep him up to speed on new things that he might not have known from his previous function in the public service. --- Pause

MS EDWARDH: I would like to ask the witness one other question, and of course this has happened as a result of the changes in redaction policy as we have gone along.

I will give my friend an opportunity to consider her position.

It might be helpful,

Mr. Commissioner, if you have in front of you Ambassador Pillarella's material, P-134; also the DFAIT documents, volume 1 of 9, tab 61.

These are memorandums that are essentially the same, but the version has become less redacted since the witness first testified. MS McISAAC: I'm sorry, 134,
tab...?
MS EDWARDH: Volume 1 of DFAIT, tab 61.

So when Mr. Livermore first came to testify, we had before us a document that was redacted in the form of volume 1, tab 61, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MS EDWARDH: And there is a
paragraph -- the second-last paragraph in this document is of interest because it is authored, of course, by Mr. Livermore:
"At the direction of JPD, JPE Harris has contacted Léo Martel and asked that he make official inquiries about Arar as well as asking the immigration control officer

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to use his contacts to gather information. Martel has also been asked to locate Arar and determine as quickly as possible his condition and situation."

That's all we had when
Mr. Livermore was here, and he was very, as I recall -- and I don't have all of his testimony in front of me. He did not discuss at length at all his concerns about the conditions of confinement in Syria.

The new document that is now available to us is identical in all respects except that the phrase -- and let me just read it in context:
"Martel has also been asked
to locate Arar and determine
as quickly as possible his
condition and situation.
There are concerns that Arar
may be aggressively
questioned by Syrian security
services."
then Mr. Livermore signs off.

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I appreciate that this is not an area that is on the list, but $I$ would like to ask Mr. Livermore, in light of his quite narrow testimony on the first occasion on this specific issue, a few questions about that statement.

May I?
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: Mr. Livermore, do you see the document in question that I'm referring to?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: This was written by you, and sent on Thursday, October 10th, 2002?

MR. LIVERMORE: I can't guarantee that $I$ wrote it, but $I$ accept responsibility for its contents, certainly.

MS EDWARDH: All right. And it goes back to a period when Mr. Arar has not clearly been found by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: I take it, sir, that when Mr. Martel -- and we will hear from him -- is being tasked to locate Mr. Arar, the reason you use the language "as quickly as possible" is you
are in fact concerned about the nature of the interrogation he may be undergoing?

MR. LIVERMORE: I think that's fair to say, yes.

MS EDWARDH: And that the language that you choose in your memo, or that you have certainly adopted here today, the language "aggressive questioning" also includes interrogation, where the use of physical force, improper interrogation techniques and even torture might happen?

MR. LIVERMORE: I think if you
phrase it that way, I would agree with you.
MS EDWARDH: Those are my
questions then.
Thank you very much,
Mr. Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Shore? No, the Government is next? Mr. Shore goes last.

I think that is probably the
proper way.
EXAMINATION
MS McISAAC: Could I ask you to go to the June 5th memorandum, which is $\mathrm{P}-117$, volume 2, tab 3, I believe?

THE COMMISSIONER: I think it's 75.5.

MS MCISAAC: Pardon me, 75.5.
Mr. Livermore, what is being
contemplated here is that the Minister of Foreign Affairs will write a letter to his counterpart in Syria with respect to the Canadian government position that Mr. Arar should be released from custody.

In your experience with the Department of Foreign Affairs, is that an event which would be considered unusual, or would it be a commonplace event to have such a letter written?

MR. LIVERMORE: I can speak based on my experience but not as, of course, head of the consular bureau.

It would be fairly unusual, but it's not unheard of.

MS McISAAC: And before such a letter is written by a Minister of the Government of Canada on a highly public issue, what is the process in order to ensure that the Minister is acting in accordance with government priorities as opposed to simply his own priorities?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the dominant
feature of any consultation that takes place prior to a Ministerial letter is consultation across departments and agencies to make sure that what is put forward to the Minister is accurate.

MS McISAAC: And when we look at the first page of the document at tab 5 -- or at tab 75.5, which is the June 5th memorandum, and the cover transmittal slip, under the consultation we have the references that Mr. David took you to for the RCMP, CSIS and PCO.

What is that information under "Consultation" conveying to, first of all, the Deputy Minister, who must approve this, and then the Minister and his officials, with respect to those government-wide consultations?

MR. LIVERMORE: Under the
"Consultation" line of the transmittal slip, it conveys concurrence in the recommendations which are contained in the memorandum that goes forward, and by and large it also conveys concurrence in the line of argument that is contained in the memorandum.

In other words, people who are consulted are assumed to be in agreement with the course of action recommended.

MS McISAAC: So we can take from it that the RCMP, CSIS and the Privy Council Office, PCO, as institutions, were in agreement with the recommendation that Minister Graham sign the proposed letter?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MS McISAAC: Now in terms of the process for arriving at the wording of the letter, what would be the concerns with respect to the wording of the letter on the part of the Department of Foreign Affairs itself as to accuracy?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, basically, of course, the contents of the letter would have to vary enormously from situation to situation, but it would be the responsibility of the consular bureau to make sure that the entire background which is described in the letter is factually correct. And then there might be additional elements that go into the letter.

Again, it might be the consular bureau that takes a first stab at a draft, suggesting other elements that might usefully be engaged in this exercise, and then the draft would usually come back to the interdepartmental
community to make sure that everyone is happy with the language chosen.

MS McISAAC: And forgive me if this is a leading question, but $I$ think it is fairly obvious: Would it be unwise for the bureaucracy, or the Department of Foreign Affairs as an institution, to recommend to the Minister that he sign a letter which was not completely accurate, as best they could assess accuracy for him?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, it would be more than unwise, it would be irresponsible of officials to put forward a letter which contained inaccuracies, and it would be doubly irresponsible to place the Minister in a position where he was to sign a letter that somehow were to cause difficulty. One could easily visualize a letter going forward where, in other circumstances, the situation looked fairly straightforward but it wasn't, and the Minister got into the soup, so to speak, because his signature was on that letter.

MS MCISAAC: And indeed that goes
back to the reason for the need for extensive consultation to ensure that all aspects of a matter are fully discussed before a final

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recommendation is made?
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, yes.
MS MCISAAC: Thank you.
With respect to the initial
suggestion that the Solicitor General participate in signing a letter to the Syrians in some manner, along with Mr. Graham, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in your experience -- and, again, I'm only asking you to speak from your own experience -- would it be usual or is it something that you would contemplate the Solicitor General would participate in a communication of this nature with a foreign government?

MR. LIVERMORE: I would think it's relatively unusual. But to put it in some context, it's relatively unusual to have two Ministers sign any letter, in part for simple bureaucratic reasons; it's pretty cumbersome to try to get two ministerial signatures on the same letter.

It's doubly difficult in this area because the authority for Canada to speak abroad is the Foreign Minister. That is the individual, that is the office that speaks on behalf of Canada. It would be odd to have another Minister
with a signature block on a letter. It's not unheard of, $I$ would imagine, but it's unusual. MS McISAAC: Now, with respect to the issue of a separate communication on the part of CSIS to the Syrian Foreign Ministry or, pardon me, the Syrian Foreign Intelligence, whichever the case may be, to your knowledge was CSIS ever requested to provide some kind of separate letter or to independently communicate with the Syrian authorities as to the Canadian government's position with respect to Mr. Arar?

MR. LIVERMORE: I don't believe so.

MS MCISAAC: I would like to put to the witness, if $I$ may, sir, and ask him whether he agrees with it or not, evidence of Mr. Pardy with respect to a separate communication on the part of CSIS.

Perhaps -- do we have transcripts here? Oh. I thought we did. I'm sorry. I would have brought an additional copy.

Actually, maybe we do.
THE COMMISSIONER: I think if you
summarize it --
MS McISAAC: All right. Actually,

I was going to read it, sir, so I'll do it that way.

THE COMMISSIONER: If anybody has difficulty following, let me know.

MS McISAAC: All right. This is the examination of Mr . Pardy at pages 4969 of the transcript, and the date, I believe -- let's just clarify -- I'll give you the date after, sir.

This is a question by
Mr. Cavalluzzo at line 16, page 4969:
"...certainly as a Canadian, I'm very concerned that we have a Canadian lingering in jail in a foreign country such as Syria, with, as I said before, not a stellar human rights record, while it would seem to me a simple letter of three lines, or no more, could have clarified this confusion in the Syrians' minds and could have activated them in some way so that Mr. Arar could have returned to Canada earlier
than he did --
MR. PARDY: That's one
inter -- I'm sorry, I'm
interrupting you.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No.
MR. PARDY: That is one interpretation.

Another interpretation, I
mean, over a long experience of dealing with governments. Governments interpret information to their maximum advantage.

My view would have been, or one element in certainly my views on all of this, is that the Syrians themselves found it advantageous to establish some ambiguity as far as the position of the Government of Canada was concerned.

I don't think they were ready to release Mr. Arar much before they actually did

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so, for a variety of reasons that we went over in my direct testimony. And so in the sense of whether or not a, as you put it, a three-line letter from CSIS to the Syrian Military Intelligence would have made much difference, I'm -- I'm not sure.

The Syrians were quite comfortable, $I$ think, in terms of where they found themselves and whether or not they overinterpreted or misinterpreted a comment by CSIS officials, well, maybe next week or the week after you might have a chance to examine some of this."

That was June 2 nd in terms of the testimony.

Do you have any comments on
Mr. Pardy's interpretation of the Syrian position vis-à-vis Canadian efforts to have Mr. Arar

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returned to Canada?
MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the only
difficulty $I$ would have with that -- I don't really have much difficulty with his testimony, nor do I have too much difficulty with the way Gar Pardy handled the entire management of the case from the outset, but $I$ would think that there are a couple of minor nuances in that that $I$ wouldn't quite agree with.

The one that $I$ would say is
useful, and $I$ would agree with, is that it might have benefitted the Syrians momentarily to have some ambiguity. In other words, we're not sure of where matters stood.

But as I said, by January $16 t h$ or 17th, the ambiguities cleared up and there is no ambiguity anymore.

What I would disagree with though is in saying that the Syrians were comfortable -I'm not sure of the context of that statement in Mr. Pardy's testimony, but I don't think the Syrians were comfortable at all with the situation.

I think the Syrians were being squeezed in important ways, and we will never
know, I'm afraid, how much pressure was exerted on them in ways that were diametrically opposed to the way the Canadian government was pressuring them.

So I don't think they were
comfortable at all with the situation.
MS McISAAC: All right. Would, in
your assessment, assuming somebody had asked CSIS to write a letter, and, again, we realize you're speculating, what effect, in your assessment, would that have had, if any?

THE COMMISSIONER: I just
wondered, do you feel qualified to answer this? I mean, have you had contact with the Syrians in this type of situation?

MR. LIVERMORE: I have never put this question to the Syrians myself.

THE COMMISSIONER: From your position and your experience. All I'm asking you is, Ms McIsaac said we want you to speculate -actually we don't on an issue like that. If you feel you have an expertise or an experience that would enable you to answer the question, then go ahead.

MR. LIVERMORE: My experience
leads me to conclude that it would not be useful, for reasons $I$ addressed in a previous question. We had a much better line in to General Khalil than through CSIS, and $I$ could go on about that. But in different countries, the systems work in different ways. That are lines that are established.

In some countries, you can't have contacts with officials until you've taken those officials out to lunch or had dinner with them because what you need is a personal rapport before you can conduct business.

> It comes as a bit of a shock
sometimes for Canadians to realize that, and it comes often as a surprise to our department because we're asked to make appointments for visiting officials to go to other countries and conduct business with people in other countries. Very often they don't get very far because it's almost like a cold call. They show up on the doorstep of someone, and they expect that right away you'll get into the business end of whatever you're interested in.

Well, in some countries, it
doesn't happen that way. Unless you have an
established relationship of some kind, it goes no further than that.

We felt, and I certainly -- it was
my view, that Ambassador Pillarella's relationship with General Khalil was the strongest relationship the Canadian government had.

CSIS had nothing to parallel that, even though they had visited, and the RCMP had nothing at all, that $I$ 'm aware of, of any significance.

So the channel to be used was Ambassador Pillarella.

MS McISAAC: And what was the message that Ambassador Pillarella was instructed to convey to the Syrians regarding Mr. Arar?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, it was a pretty unequivocal message which he did quite effectively on the ground to everyone, namely, that the Canadian government wanted Mr. Arar returned to Canada.

MS McISAAC: Thank you.
MS EDWARDH: If my friend would refer us to the document that supports that -- I'm sure there are some, or there may be some.

THE COMMISSIONER: Certainly.

MS EDWARDH: The instructions given by the department in respect of the communication.

MS McISAAC: Well, the
instructions were being given by Mr. Livermore and others, and I refer actually to Mr. Pillarella's transcript, where he said that was his instruction as well.

THE COMMISSIONER: I guess in
answer to Ms Edwardh's question, if there's any documents that support that, if you could just advise her? Would that be satisfactory?

Mr. Shore, are you going to be long? I notice we've been sitting for a while, but I'd just as soon complete the witness, if we could.

MR. SHORE: I shouldn't be too
long.
THE COMMISSIONER: How are you doing, Mr. Livermore? Is everybody okay? Not too long is how not too long?

Okay. I'd be inclined, unless there are contrary objections, to get the witness done.

MR. SHORE: It will depend on his
answers.
EXAMINATION
MR. SHORE: Mr. Livermore, my
interest is in the phone call between Mr. Hooper and Kathryn McCallion.

What we understand is that you
learned of that phone call through Mr. Gould.
MR. LIVERMORE: That's my
recollection.
MR. SHORE: Either outside your office or outside his office.

And when he told you about that,
did he tell you where he had heard about it?
MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall
precisely, no.
MR. SHORE: Did he tell you that he had spoken to Kathryn McCallion, and this is what she said?

MR. LIVERMORE: He did not say that, but from whatever source, I did not infer that he had spoken to her directly, yes.

MR. SHORE: Do you understand, or did you understand at the time, that it was through Mr. Dyet that he had heard about the conversation --

MR. LIVERMORE: I don't think I
had inquired as to the routing of this
information. As I said, inferred that it was not directly --

MR. SHORE: That it was at least secondhand from him, and to you it's then third hand, basically.

And you indicated that you both expressed concern, not about the substance of the call, but about the fact that it was made to Kathryn McCallion, who was not involved in this particular matter?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, it wasn't concern that we expressed, it was interest. It was just a matter of interest that --

MR. SHORE: Isn't it interesting
that Mr. Hooper called Kathryn as opposed to Mr. Wright?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. SHORE: Do you know whether
Jim Wright was there at that time, that day?
MR. LIVERMORE: The only memory
jogger that $I$ have, if we could go back to the June the 5th memo -- well, that may not be the right -- excuse me. That will not be the memory
jogger. No, I'm not aware whether Jim Wright was there or not.

MR. SHORE: How would you describe Mr. Gould's demeanour when he told you that?

MR. LIVERMORE: I think it was rather matter-of-fact.

MR. SHORE: So he wasn't outraged, wasn't upset, wasn't astonished. Just "Isn't it interesting"?

MR. LIVERMORE: It was
interesting, yes.
MR. SHORE: And that's as high as
you'd put it?
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. SHORE: To you it had, as you've indicated, no significance whatsoever.

MR. LIVERMORE: It had no
operational significance, no.
MR. SHORE: I think as you said on
another occasion, the train was out of the station, the matter was going forward. Even if it happened the way Gould said it happened, did it --

MR. LIVERMORE: No.
MR. SHORE: Did you in your own mind have any reservations whether in fact the
conversation even happened the way it was reported to you?

MR. LIVERMORE: Not -- if Jim
Gould reported it to me, $I$ took it on faith, because he's a first-class officer, that he got it from someone.

MR. SHORE: Right. The fact that he got it from someone else didn't lead you to ask Mr. Gould, "Well, check with Kathryn McCallion whether this actually happened"?

MR. LIVERMORE: No, I think in -we found it curious, we found it interesting. Had we found it of any significance at all, we would have checked it out, but, in fact, it wasn't.

MR. SHORE: Right. And so you
didn't even ask him to check with Ms McCallion
whether it even occurred the way the person
reported it to him?
MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall
asking him, no.
MR. SHORE: Right. And was there any suggestion of checking with Mr. Hooper whether --

MR. LIVERMORE: No.
MR. SHORE: -- this is how the
conversation went down?
MR. LIVERMORE: No.
MR. SHORE: Therefore, it had no
impact whatsoever, apparently --
MR. LIVERMORE: Not on the course of action that we had already chosen.

MR. SHORE: -- on either of you
with regard to what was happening?
MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
MR. SHORE: And I think you
indicated also earlier that it was a question
of -- it was noise. There was noise around, and this was another piece of noise as to --

MR. LIVERMORE: It was
interesting. That was about it.
MR. SHORE: Okay. And I think you said that the decision with regard to the letter had been taken much before this time, much before June 5. We're assuming it's June 5th because of the --

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the decision within the department, and the decision interdepartmentally to send a letter had been taken.

MR. SHORE: Right.

MR. LIVERMORE: The memo I think is dated June the 5th.

MR. SHORE: Your understanding is
that there was never a problem with the letter going to the Syrians; the only issue was how it's languaged?

MR. LIVERMORE: That's my understanding, yes.

MR. SHORE: Right. And DFAIT was interested in languaging so that they can include RCMP, CSIS, PCO into their decision-making?

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. SHORE: As you indicated --
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. SHORE: -- do the responsible
thing. If DFAIT wanted to send a letter on their own without consultation, not responsible, but they could have done it?

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, they might have been able -- we might have been able to do it, but it's not a very good practice to do that.

MR. SHORE: No. Of course not. And the role of CSIS here was simply to advise DFAIT on these types of issues, on security intelligence issues?

MR. LIVERMORE: On the particular letter, it was to advise on what was acceptable to them in the contents of that letter.

MR. SHORE: All right. I think that's all, sir. Thanks, Mr. Livermore.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. David.
MR. DAVID: Two brief areas,
Mr. Commissioner.
EXAMINATION
MR. DAVID: Concerning the call, Mr. Livermore. When Mr. Gould spoke to you, did he indicate to you that he was going to follow up in any way on what he had been telling you about? Did he indicate to you that on June 6th or June 9th he had been pursuing the matter concerning the memo, the processing of the memo, and the phone call?

MR. LIVERMORE: I don't -- I don't recall that he did, no.

MR. DAVID: Okay.
MR. LIVERMORE: But the memo -the memo had already gone up by that stage. That's my recollection.

MR. DAVID: Our understanding is that the memo went up on June 9th.

MR. LIVERMORE: My understanding is it went up earlier than that, but -MR. DAVID: Well, if you want to look at tab 5.

MR. LIVERMORE: Okay.
MR. DAVID: And this is the stamp
I was telling you about and what has been explained to us through other testimony, and that's P-117.

MR. LIVERMORE: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: Go to tab 5, the front
page. You'll see that it's a bit -- it's poor in quality in terms of -- but there is a -- some sort of stamp with a date below the box, and it says 03,6 and then the 9 and then there's the hour.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yeah.
MR. DAVID: And our understanding
is that that is the stamp that indicates the day and the time that the Minister's office receives the memo.

MR. LIVERMORE: It could be the
time of receipt. I'm referring to the time that it was signed off by Gar Pardy and others.

MR. DAVID: All right.
MR. LIVERMORE: But in any event,
it certainly wasn't coming back to us. We had already agreed on a course of action and we had lent our concurrence to the memo that was going forward.

MR. DAVID: And had Kathryn McCallion decided that she wanted additional information, additional background, she wanted to clarify an issue, it was within her authority to do so?

MR. LIVERMORE: Absolutely.
Anyone up the line, so to speak, can send a memo back and ask for clarification of certain portions, or ask why something has been left out, or why something is included --

MR. DAVID: And she can, in fact, contribute to the memo?

MR. LIVERMORE: She could, yes.
MR. DAVID: The second area, Mr. Commissioner, has to do with your testimony concerning how the matter was resolved about the information coming from Syria, from Syrian -- from Syrian authorities that CSIS had somehow informed the Syrian authorities, "Let's keep Arar in Syria."
And your testimony has been that
this ambiguity was cleared up on January $16 t h$, 2003.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And that it was
definitely resolved as of that date.
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And it was resolved
insofar as your Minister phoned the Syrian Foreign Minister to address the issue.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And that's how it was
resolved.
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And it was resolved, therefore, at a political level.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: However, the
information per se that was coming from Syria that went to Ambassador Pillarella was not from a political source. It was from the Syrian Military Intelligence.

MR. LIVERMORE: I don't -- I'm not sure that in Syria you can separate the two levels that neatly. In Canada it's a fairly clear separation. In Syria, it's a little less clear.

MR. DAVID: But my question, again, Mr. Livermore, is that your understanding was that the information that was coming from Syria was not coming from the Syrian Foreign Minister, it was coming from the Syrian Military Intelligence organization?

MR. LIVERMORE: I think initially that's where Ambassador Pillarella picked up that information. I think so.

MR. DAVID: Correct. I think that that is the case.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
MR. DAVID: So would you agree with me, as a general proposition, that in terms of the Syrian Military Intelligence organization, that they would lend greater ear, they would be more responsive to a counterpart to CSIS than to a politician? Is that a general proposition that you're willing to accept?

MR. LIVERMORE: I can't accept
that, no. First of all, $I$ don't -- I can't speak authoritatively on Syria, but also we had a relationship -- I don't think the Syrians regarded Ambassador Pillarella as belonging to Foreign Affairs as opposed to any other ministry. He

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represented the Government of Canada in Damascus, and therefore when he said that he spoke with one voice for the Government of Canada and was informing them of something, $I$ think he took their -- they took his word at face value. MR. DAVID: But clearly, Mr. Livermore, it's been your testimony that the RCMP was not in the good books of the Syrian Military Intelligence? MR. LIVERMORE: Well, not exactly.

We had heard --
MR. DAVID: Let me put it to you
differently then.
MR. LIVERMORE: Yeah.
MR. DAVID: That the Syrian
Military Intelligence preferred to deal with an intelligence organization in Canada -MR. LIVERMORE: That's right, yes. MR. DAVID: -- which is CSIS,
rather than the RCMP?
MR. LIVERMORE: That's the
preference they expressed to us.
MR. DAVID: That's a proposition
you agree with?
MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.

MR. DAVID: And so it's a cultural aspect in terms of the relationship? MR. LIVERMORE: Yes. MR. DAVID: And there's simply -it's like if you're stopped on the street for a speeding violation, if you're a cop, you're more likely to be able to convince your police officer not to issue the ticket than if you're just Dan Livermore?

MR. LIVERMORE: I hope not. MR. DAVID: So the point I'm simply trying to understand and to elicit from you is that, in fact, to well-communicate the issue, the message, that Canada has no objection to Arar's return, would it not have been preferable, would the Syrian Military Intelligence not have lent a better, more attentive ear, had CSIS issued the statement rather than a Canadian politician? MR. LIVERMORE: Frankly, I don't believe so. I would accept your argument if CSIS had had a mature relationship of several years' standing, which possibly had been cemented over the years with visits back and forth between the head of the Syrian organization and the head of CSIS, establishing a dialogue and the basis of
relationship. But, in fact, they had none. The basis of their relationship was basically one visit to establish the relationship. So it wasn't there.

MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are my questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Are you familiar with the relationship between the Syrian Foreign Minister and the SMI? Is that -- we've heard some evidence from others. All I'm worried about is you're treading on areas that -- and it's not fair to you -- you're not --

MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the
difficulty is, I'm familiar with some things but $I$ have to claim National Security Confidentiality over --

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. In --
MR. LIVERMORE: -- in this
particular area.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Let's
leave it at that.
We'll rise and take the morning break for 15 minutes.

MR. SHORE: Mr. Commissioner?
Sorry. May I just, before the break, address one
issue?
THE COMMISSIONER: Sure. Please do.

MR. SHORE: It's similar to what
Ms Edwardh addressed with regard to the release of the Kathryn McCallion transcript before she testifies?

I think it only fair as well that Mr. Gould's transcript, with regard to the phone call only, be released as well.

THE COMMISSIONER: No problem.
Anybody have any objection to
that? It will have to be reviewed for NSC. I think if it's in respect of the phone call only, there's not going to be any NSC problem --

MR. SHORE: Oh, no. Absolutely, only the phone call. That's my only interest, and it's not a lot of transcript with regard to the phone call.

THE COMMISSIONER: Ms Edwardh will join wholeheartedly --

MR. SHORE: I'm sure she would.
THE COMMISSIONER: More rather
than less. I'm concerned about delays. Can I suggest this: Is Mr. Gould
the next witness?
MR. DAVID: Yes.
--- Off microphone / Sans microphone
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. So we'll
deal with Mr. Gould next. We'll carry out with the cross-examinations. People can look at the transcript, once it's released, over lunch hour. This will ruin your lunch, Ms Edwardh. And if there's any further questions that arise as a result of the release of the transcript, then we could deal with those after lunch.

But we will carry on.
MR. SHORE: Sure.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Fifteen
minutes.
THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Upon recessing at 11:23 a.m. /
Suspension à 11 h 23
--- Upon resuming at 11:40 a.m. /
Reprise à 11 h 40
THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning. Before we begin, Commission counsel raised with me the issue of the
transcripts for Mr. Gould and Ms McCallion.
They, of course, were heard in camera, so the Commission has our copies within a secure situation so that it's not easy for us here to make copies of that.

I am wondering if the Government has facilities here, that copies could be made?

MS McISAAC: The problem is that I'm not sure $I$ have clean copies to make copies from, sir.

MS EDWARDH: You know, this could all have been resolved if somebody had raised it earlier and it could be dealt with.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, it could. Unfortunately, we are all doing our best.

Actually when these things happened, at least as $I$ sit in this objective chair, sometimes it is one person's difficulty, sometimes it is another. I don't think anybody is in a glass house here.

MS McISAAC: I will certainly
facilitate. My concern is that I'm not sure that we have available clean copies of the transcripts in order to make copies, but I will make inquiries and see what we can do.

THE COMMISSIONER: If we can do it. Otherwise, they can be produced when they can be produced. Having made the direction, if we need to recall the witnesses on another day, we will do that -- and I'm not being critical of you, Ms Edwardh.

I think the facilities may be here in this building that we can get copies made and hopefully that we can do it that way.

Thank you.
Mr. David, please proceed.
Mr. Gould, welcome back. You are
still under oath.
PREVIOUSLY SWORN: JIM GOULD
EXAMINATION
MR. DAVID: Mr. Gould, we haven't
had the opportunity of having your public
testimony, so for the benefit of the public, I will refer you to your CV, which has been filed at P-85, volume 3, tab 113.

So just to introduce you, if you will, $I$ will refer you briefly to your CV.

MR. GOULD: What tab is it?
MR. DAVID: I'm sorry, tab 113.
First thing. In terms of
education, you have a Bachelor of Arts in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Toronto. You have a Masters of Arts in Islamic History from the American University in Cairo, and you have a doctorate, a Ph.D., in Islamic History from the University of Edinburgh.

MR. GOULD: Right. MR. DAVID: And you presently
teach at the University of Ottawa. MR. GOULD: Part-time. Sessional. MR. DAVID: Sessional lecturer. MR. GOULD: Yes. MR. DAVID: You teach in Middle Eastern affairs.

MR. GOULD: I have given courses on Modern Middle Eastern History, 20th century. I will be giving a course on politics in the Middle East in January, and Medieval Middle East as well. MR. DAVID: You are recently retired from the Department of Foreign Affairs. You have worked in the Department of Foreign Affairs since 1975.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: You lived in the
Middle East for about 15 years.

MR. GOULD: Somewhere around
there, yes.
MR. DAVID: You also worked in
various Canadian embassies in the Middle East?
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: Cairo, for instance,
Maghreb?
MR. GOULD: No, no.
MR. DAVID: Maybe just ...
MR. GOULD: Cairo, Saudi Arabia,
and Iraq.
MR. DAVID: Okay. You, at the end
of your tenure at DFAIT, were the Assistant
Director of ISI.
MR. GOULD: Deputy Director.
MR. DAVID: Deputy Director of
ISI, and you were a close collaborator of Scott Heatherington at the time.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: Thank you.
Mr. Gould, first let me ask you to
describe the role and responsibilities of the
Deputy Director of ISI?
MR. GOULD: The full title, if I
recall correctly, was Deputy Director (Policy).
(Policy) at the end of the Deputy Director. That meant a variety of things.

I was required to provide policy advice through Mr. Heatherington, through Mr. Livermore, through Mr. Wright, up to the Deputy Minister on intelligence matters when required.

Under my purview came such matters as liaison -- within the division, we had a CSIS liaison officer, an RCMP liaison officer. I was responsible for managing, in a loose sense, that relationship, correspondence, et cetera, back and forth between the department and the two agencies.

It's been a long time.
Pretty much that kept me busy.
I'm sure there were other things.
MR. DAVID: Coming to Project
A-OCANADA, which you became familiar with, you were involved with the project --

MR. GOULD: For a short time, yes, I was.

MR. DAVID: For a short time. I understand that the name of Maher Arar came across your desk approximately July 29th of 2002?

MR. GOULD: I think that was the
date it was.
MR. DAVID: And that basically we have reconstructed from your personal notes that have been filed.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And you had a
relationship with Superintendent Cabana of the project?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: There was a
consultational relationship between the both of you?

MR. GOULD: Yes. He and I had met on one matter, when the A-OCANADA task force was struck, when it was deemed the division -- or consultation within the division, we thought we should inquire as to whether Foreign Affairs had a role or something. I suggested that I call Mr. Cabana because I knew him. That's how I did it.

MR. DAVID: Mr. Gould, just to advise you, $I$ will be dealing with two issues with you today in your testimony: One is the phone conversation as you have well heard and understand.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: The other, though, before $I$ get to the phone conversation and your notes, has to do with a conversation that you had with Mr. Cabana on October 21st of 2002 , and let me put you in context.

MR. GOULD: Okay.
MR. DAVID: October 21st, as you recall, 2002 , the Syrians confirm in a definite way that they hold Mr. Arar. You were advised of that and you called Mr. Cabana to advise him of that also. So there was official notification, put it that way, that Mr. Arar was in Syria.

There was also a question of you having been mandated or were requested to assist your ambassador in Syria in a meeting that he was about to have with General Khalil in Syria, and in that context, you called Mr. Cabana and you wanted information from --

MR. GOULD: Oh, I'm sorry.
MR. DAVID: Is that --
MR. GOULD: As I recall
correctly -- you had me wondering whether I was flying to Syria.

MR. DAVID: No, no.

MR. GOULD: Yes, I think the -MR. DAVID: And let me, for your reference, refer you to page -- first of all, the document is $P-236$. These are an extract of your personal notes.

Let me refer you to page 2 of 16
in tab 1.
They were a challenge in camera; they are more of a challenge in public because of the redactions. These are basically your notes for that day, so I'm just putting them in front of you. I don't want you to read them. I just want you to have them in front of you if you care to refer to them.

You essentially asked Mr. Cabana
three questions --
MR. GOULD: Excuse me, Mr. David.
Is there any merit -- given as you say they are a challenge and I'm assuming everyone has got them -- for me to explain to people, because I think $I$ had to explain in camera how I used my little black book.

MR. DAVID: Sure.
THE COMMISSIONER: Just before we proceed with this, I notice Superintendent

Cabana's counsel is not here today. Was there -MR. DAVID: This was on the will-say, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: And those were distributed, were they?

MR. DAVID: Yes. And there are
four bullets that deal with the issue.
THE COMMISSIONER: Carry on.
MR. DAVID: SO...
--- Off microphone / Sans microphone
THE COMMISSIONER: The difficulty
is when you speak, if you don't speak into the microphone, the court reporter can't hear you.

MR. DAVID: I'm sorry.
THE COMMISSIONER: So that I'm clear, this is in the will-say. There were four bullet points dealing with this area.

MR. DAVID: Let me just read you
those bullets if it --
THE COMMISSIONER: It's not
necessary, but the will-say was circulated to all counsel, including Superintendent Cabana's counsel.

MR. DAVID: I can only assume, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Let's go ahead and hear the evidence, and if there is any difficulty with Superintendent Cabana's counsel not being here, we can address it later.

MR. DAVID: I understand.
Mr. Gould, you were proposing in
terms of your notes --
MR. GOULD: Just to clarify,
perhaps, and it came up in earlier testimony. Typical of all books, there is a right and a left when you open the book. I tended to keep notes on the right-hand side. And what you have on 2 of 16 is a right-hand page.

The left-hand page was left blank, and that is where $I$ usually took telephone voice messages off my machine. I would write down telephone numbers. That made them faster for me to find.

And we get confused later because I would make notes there which supplemented things that I had written on the right-hand page. But don't expect to be flipping from page to page. When you get things like this page with arrows, I made points that $I$ wished to discuss with Mr. Cabana, and obviously didn't
leave enough room, and that is the reason for the arrows. So I apologize. That's the way I use it.

These were very transitory notes
that were there. They are not complete in any way, shape or form. They are just things to keep me directed and hopefully jog my memory when $I$ needed to have it jogged.

MR. DAVID: Certainly you never
expected them to end up in the public domain.
MR. GOULD: It is normal for me to shred them when I leave a division. You asked me before I left the division.

MR. DAVID: Mr. Gould, if you want
to refer to your notes, you asked three questions to Mr. Cabana, and these questions were asked to him concerning both Mr. Arar and Mr. Almalki?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: The first is: Is he wanted in Canada? The second is: If he is, why? And third: Will charges be laid in Canada?

And I would like to understand how
Mr. Cabana responded to your questions.
First of all, let me ask you:
What did Mr. Cabana inform you of in terms of Mr. Arar's status as of this date, October 21st,

2002?
MR. GOULD: My notes indicate to
me, and I have -- I remember the call because I paged him and he called me back. The details of the call are long gone. So I'm going to be dependent upon the notes that we all have before us.

Mr. Cabana came up, commented that
Mr. Arar came up in an investigation, but they were a long way from any charges. He was just a person of interest, $I$ think was the phrase. They are still trying to figure out who he is. They would like to talk to him.

The problem is his associations, I mean, who he was connected with. It wasn't him directly so much as who he was associated with, but being police, you follow all leads. That was the context.

MR. DAVID: Okay. Second, there is an issue that was raised and discussed that day about sharing information with the Syrians about these two individuals.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And my question to you
is, Mr. Gould: Had DFAIT, had ISI sanctioned
then, on this date or before, such a possibility? MS McISAAC: Commissioner, could I ask the witness, please, to confine his answers to matters relating to Mr. Arar rather than any discussions that might have taken place regarding Mr. Almalki?

MR. DAVID: That's fine.
MR. GOULD: Yes. And on this -- I
recall from earlier testimony that this was an issue. I cannot recall -- I do not recall any occasion where we sanctioned the sharing of information on Mr. Arar with the Syrians.

MR. DAVID: In other words, I'm
asking --
MR. GOULD: I don't think they
asked us, $I$ don't think we said yes. I don't think we said -- I don't think it came up.

I notice here, it obviously came up -- there was something in this conversation because there is a "possibly already transmitted to them" reference. I think that is what that may have been. Some information may already have gone, but $I$ don't know.

MR. DAVID: And my third question to you concerning this date is: What was the
follow-up in terms of this raised possibility of sharing information on Mr. Arar with the Syrians? Did anything come of it? Was there anything that was pursued in that line?

MR. GOULD: Not that I recall.
MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those were my questions, Mr. Commissioner, concerning October 21 st.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. MR. DAVID: We move now to the telephone conversation that you have heard already described. You were present in the room when Mr. Livermore testified, Mr. Gould, so I'm not going to give you a very lengthy introduction in that regard.

I'm going to ask you to refer to your notes once again, and $I$ ask you to go to page 9 of 16 . There are five pages of your notes that concern this phone call, and it goes from pages 9 to 13.

There is an entry, and we have
seen this before in your previous testimony, but page 9 of 16 is essentially dated June the 5th.

Is that correct?
MR. GOULD: As I understand it,
yes.
MR. DAVID: And you have certain inscriptions. In what context did you make these notes and these inscriptions?

MR. GOULD: Again, $I$ was going to speak to Dave Dyet from JPO. Has he testified already?

MR. DAVID: Well, we filed his
testimony.
MR. GOULD: You discussed -- you summarised his testimony this morning.

And number (i) and number (ii) -which is (i) and (ii) -- are notes that $I$ took. The first question --

MR. DAVID: First of all, let me ask you: Do you recall approximately when in the day you met Mr. Dyet?

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. DAVID: Do you recall how it
is that you met Mr. Dyet about the contents of your notes: that is, the memo; the processing of the memo; and, thirdly, the phone call between Mr. Hooper and Ms McCallion?

MR. GOULD: I called on
Mr. Dyet -- and I'm quite certain in my own mind $I$
called on him -- to determine the status of the memo. Excuse me, we refer to it as a memo. It's the memorandum which covered the draft letter for the Minister's signature.

MR. DAVID: For your benefit, I
would like to refer you to that document so you can have it in front of your eyes.

That is at $P-117$, volume 2 , tab 5. THE COMMISSIONER: 75.5?

MR. DAVID: 75.5, yes, or 5.
MR. GOULD: Thank you.
MR. DAVID: This is the memo in
question?
MR. GOULD: It may indeed be. I will make a random jump in assumption and say yes, it is.

MR. DAVID: Okay. So you were
saying --
MR. GOULD: We, the division. I wanted to know how did it stand. Has it gone from -- because there had been at one point considerable to-ing and fro-ing with CSIS over the wording. Has it gone forward?

MR. DAVID: We know that there was a meeting, for instance, on May 8th. There was a
meeting on May 12 th.
MR. GOULD: I was rarely involved in those meetings, if ever. I was aware they were going on. I knew there was a controversy going on -- a controversy -- a discussion over the wording.

For whatever reason, I said I am going to see David. It could have been as simple a matter as I'm walking past there, or $I$ know David and $I$ will go over and see him and ask him where it stands. So that was the idea.

MR. DAVID: So your concern
basically is: Where is the memo?
MR. GOULD: Where's the memo?
MR. DAVID: Where is it at?
MR. GOULD: And it was in that conversation that he said it had gone up to MKM, Kathryn McCallion, and then he commented on this telephone call, that there was to be a telephone call with Mr. Hooper.

MR. DAVID: So he indicated to you that the call had not taken place?

MR. GOULD: My notes indicate that he indicated that the call had taken place, and as far as $I$ know that was my first notification that
the call was in train.
MR. DAVID: When you met Mr. Dyet, your impression was that $M r$. Hooper had already spoken to Ms McCallion, and in effect you are noting the contents of that conversation?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And the contents of the conversation were being relayed to you by Mr. Dyet?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: So my next question to
you is: Do you know what Mr. Dyet's source was? Did you ask him? Did he tell you? Was it discussed?

MR. GOULD: I don't think it was discussed. My notes indicate to me that there was to have been a call at 1100 hours that day. So your timing question? Obviously it was after 1100. Gar was to be there, that's Mr. Pardy, was to be there, but probably wasn't, so it's in the past. So it's after that. It's not clear from my notes as to whether Mr. Dyet was there or whether he was recounting. I have no idea what his source was.

MR. DAVID: When you're affirming
that the call was to have taken place at eleven, you're now reading further on, you're about halfway down your notes for that day.

MR. GOULD: Yes I am. The notes
on this section are probably more for that day. MR. DAVID: Let's take the very top of the page and it days Dave Dyet, JPO, and there's a phone number. That's Mr. Dyet's phone number, I gather.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And there's an (i),
and it says, "memo from JPD about Arar ? status. Did it go to MKM probably up today."

So was this the fundamental basis for you contacting Mr. Dyet that day. MR. GOULD: That's correct. MR. DAVID: And then the (ii)
"call from Jack Hooper ADDO to MKM saying that CSIS doesn't want us to get Arar back in the country as they would have to devote too many resources to working --"

MR. GOULD: To watching. MR. DAVID: "To watching him." I'm sorry.

Again, this is something that is
coming to you from Mr. Dyet?
MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: And the way you draft it, is it drafted in a way that reflects that the call has taking place or is about to take place?

MR. GOULD: I understand that the call had taken place. This was Mr. Dyet's recounting to me of the substance of the call.

MR. DAVID: And moving down the
page now, it says -- and you tell me if it's "done" or "Dave"?

MR. GOULD: We've been on this one before, sir. I do not know.

MR. DAVID: You're not sure. It's either one.

MR. GOULD: Let me guess. I think
it's probably "Dave." It's reflecting a note. My -- and, again, I go back. These are sketchy notes. I seem to recall $I$ called back just to clarify, was there -- what time was the call, that sort of thing, and "Dave (ii)" because it's a reference back to the (ii) above, "there was to have been a call at 1100 today. Gar was to have been there but probably wasn't." MR. DAVID: Okay. So now I just
want to be clear about that. The note that says "Dave" or "done" is not contemporaneous with the first annotations?

MR. GOULD: I do not think so.
MR. DAVID: It was a follow-up
that you gave?
MR. GOULD: I think it is.
MR. DAVID: Let me ask you how you
reacted to the information at the top of the page, when you first got it?

MR. GOULD: The first information about the fact that the memo had gone up, that's fine. The question, of course, has to do with the Hooper telephone call.

Surprise. CSIS had been very involved with the drafting of the letter, so why are they calling? Why are they calling Ms McCallion? Why are they not going through the liaison function? Remember I said that I -- I don't like to use the word but I think it's the government word, manage the liaison function which CSIS did as far as the division went. The day-to-day to and fro-ing. They have a liaison officer in the division. Would that have been the appropriate channel? Just, what happened? Why is

CSIS going to Kathryn? What's the issue? And some surprise at the substance of it.

MR. DAVID: And Mr. Dyet
volunteers this information to you?
MR. GOULD: Oh, yes.
MR. DAVID: You knew nothing about
it beforehand?
MR. GOULD: I don't recall knowing about it beforehand. I'm sure he's the one that told me about it.

MR. DAVID: And what was
Mr. Dyet's attitude or reaction to the information he was giving you?

MR. GOULD: Matter-of-fact. I
mean, he was just passing on information.
MR. DAVID: Okay. So you're
surprised.
MR. GOULD: Surprised,
interested -- I don't -- I don't want to put too strong a word on it. I don't want to put "alarmed." Even "concerned" would probably be too strong a word. But surprised and interested and what's this mean? What's happening here?

MR. DAVID: And did you understand that you had to follow up on this information, or
that you should --
MR. GOULD: I thought I should just to confirm, has it slowed this letter down, which $I$ know that my Director and my Director General, that's Mr. Heatherington and Mr. Livermore, were very involved in the drafting -- not necessarily the drafting, but the approvaling --

MR. DAVID: The processing?
MR. GOULD: The processing of the
letter. Again, back to my policy work, to advise them if $I$ thought there was something. If it was coming back down, for whatever reason, then it might be up to me to advise. I didn't know.

MR. DAVID: To your knowledge was ISI or ISD, or both for that matter, involved in the negotiation or in the processing of the memo in terms of its dealings with the RCMP and CSIS and coming to a consensus?

MR. GOULD: In the sense of facilitating the arrival at consensus or --

MR. DAVID: Yes.
MR. GOULD: I would think their
role was more peripheral in that being party to the consensus and ensuring that the right -- that
people did communicate, but you'd have to speak to either Mr. Heatherington or Mr. Livermore on that one.

MR. DAVID: When you take these
notes concerning (i), the first (i), was it understood by you that the first memo had been authorized by Kathryn McCallion at this point, or was it still in her hands?

MR. GOULD: It's not clear from my
notes. When it says they probably went up to today, that could mean it went to Kathryn today -excuse me, Ms McCallion -- or it could mean that it moved past. But it's not clear to me what's meant by that.

MR. DAVID: Then, as you say, you
called back Mr. Dyet to follow up. You try to get more detail, and what you find out is there was to be a call. The call was to be at eleven. MR. GOULD: Yes. MR. DAVID: He tells you that? MR. GOULD: Yes, that's my sense of what my notes say.

MR. DAVID: And Mr. Dyet also
informs you that Gar Pardy --
MR. GOULD: Gar was to be there, I
probably should have said, "was to have been there but probably wasn't."

MR. DAVID: And then further down
the line, in the notebook, it says: "MKM's EA --" executive assistant?

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: Barbara Burns, with a phone number, "about call from CSIS/Hooper." What's that about?

MR. GOULD: That's my saying I
should call Ms Burns. (a) Did the call happen? (b) What was the substance of it? Is it going to affect?

MR. DAVID: So again you're following up.

MR. GOULD: Just a minor follow-up
to keep, you know...
MR. DAVID: Is this page a
right-hand side or left-hand side --
MR. GOULD: This is a right-hand
side, this is one of my telephone conversations that $I$ was ...

MR. DAVID: Let's move on now to the next page, page 10 of 16 , and there's a date indicated at the top, it's June 6. Is this a
left-hand or a right-hand --
MR. GOULD: It's a right-hand, and
it indicates on June 6th, for whatever reason, I had not contacted Ms Burns on the previous day, the 5th.

MR. DAVID: Okay.
MR. GOULD: I was trying again on
the 6th.
MR. DAVID: For the record the 5th
is a Thursday, and the 6th is a Friday.
MR. GOULD: Thank you. And the
substance -- why was I calling? About the call from CSIS -- from CSIS about Arar. Then there's an answer there, and it says "Call happened." So I was able to confirm in conversation with Ms Burns the call happened. But that's all I obviously have.

MR. DAVID: No content.
MR. GOULD: No content.
MR. DAVID: Okay. Then we go to page 11. Is this a right-hand or a left-hand?

MR. GOULD: Right-hand.
MR. DAVID: And the indicated date is June the 9th, which is the Monday.

MR. GOULD: Monday.

MR. DAVID: It says Barbara Burns, again her phone number, "about calls from ADDO/Hooper to MKM." Can you tell us what that is about?

MR. GOULD: Again that's a tasking to myself saying please call Ms Burns about the same call.

MR. DAVID: Okay.
MR. GOULD: Probably -- it doesn't
say why, but it is probably what was said.
MR. DAVID: Content.
MR. GOULD: Content.
MR. DAVID: You're seeking
content.
MR. GOULD: Probably. I have no indication here, but $I$ can't imagine why if $I$ knew the call happened that $I$ wasn't, you know, calling to ask -- if the call happened twice it would be down that way.

MR. DAVID: You're simply
following up.
MR. GOULD: Absolutely.
MR. DAVID: Page 12, Mr. Gould.
Is this a left-hand or a right-hand --
MR. GOULD: This is the left-hand
one.
MR. DAVID: So should we go to the
right-hand page first?
MR. GOULD: If you would, please.
MR. DAVID: So that would be
page 13.
MR. GOULD: Yes, indeed.
MR. DAVID: At the top it says
"Dave Dyet 992-1152, WCB, will call back."
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And then hyphen or
slash:
"He spoke to MKM \& she signed off on the memo."

And there's a star. What's this
about?
MR. GOULD: Well, I'm speaking to Mr. Dyet.

MR. DAVID: You did speak. Okay. MR. GOULD: I tried to phone him. Left a message. WCB, means he will call me back. He obviously did. He spoke to Ms McCallion, and she confirmed that she had signed off the memo. That means, in our jargon, that she has signed it, I think Mr. Livermore explained, and it has gone
up to the deputy's office.
MR. DAVID: This was confirmed by Mr. Dyet on Monday, June 9th.

MR. GOULD: Correct. The star throws me. Obviously there was something more.

MR. DAVID: Another reference.
MR. GOULD: Yes, now, again, right-hand, left-hand. I had carried on with my day, he called me back, and I had already added a few lines of stuff that has been redacted. So, in order to make space for it, a star and across to the left-hand side.

MR. DAVID: We go back to page 12.
MR. GOULD: Right. So now go back
to page 12, and this is the expansion on
what --about the call.
MR. DAVID: And this is coming
from Mr. Dyet?
MR. GOULD: From Mr. Dyet.
MR. DAVID: So it says: "About
call-confirmed story. We had heard."
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: "We" being?
MR. GOULD: David and I.
MR. DAVID: David Dyet and
yourself?
MR. GOULD: Correct. And I had actually heard it from David, so I mean it's not perhaps --

MR. DAVID: It's a grammatically
correct "we."
MR. GOULD: It is indeed.
MR. DAVID: Then it says: "-may be a bit more to it, but she didn't want to go into it."

Who is saying that to you?
MR. GOULD: As I recall, this is David saying this to me in light of a conversation which he had with Ms Burns.

MR. DAVID: Okay. And not with Ms McCallion?

MR. GOULD: Not with Ms McCallion.
MR. DAVID: The next line says:
"MKM signed the memo so she seems to be ignoring the request from the ADDO"?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And what does that --
translate that.
MR. GOULD: It tells me that the
memo has gone up. Whatever -- if it is correct
that Mr. Hooper asked Ms McCallion, or implies -said to Ms McCallion you don't want him back because of the resource problems or for whatever reason, she was ignoring that and going forward with what had been decided within the department and interdepartmentally with the memo to the deputy and then the Minister.

MR. DAVID: Okay. And that's the end of your notes on this call. MR. GOULD: That's -- yes, it is. MR. DAVID: You were present during Mr. Livermore's testimony? MR. GOULD: Yes, I was. MR. DAVID: I'll get directly to the point. You go and see Mr . Livermore and speak to Mr. Livermore about this call?

MR. GOULD: I don't -- I wouldn't want to say I go -- that implies I got up, walked around the door --

MR. DAVID: Put it this way, you had a conversation --

MR. GOULD: I certainly had a conversation with Mr. Livermore. Whether it was the next moment, or half an hour or an hour later, I don't recall.

MR. DAVID: What day would that
have been on?
MR. GOULD: I assume it would be on that Monday the 9th, after $I$ had had that tale confirmed.

MR. DAVID: And your reason for
going to see Mr. Livermore about the call?
MR. GOULD: Again, I'm not
comfortable with the "going to see."
MR. DAVID: Okay. Discussing.
MR. GOULD: My discussing this with Dan. It could literally have been a matter of I walked out of my office, Mr. Livermore was there, and on that topic, which I would guess we probably talked about before, $I$ just confirmed to him that the memo was gone forward. That was the whole point to it. It's gone up to the Minister's office. Case closed.

MR. DAVID: Did you discuss it
with Mr. Heatherington?
MR. GOULD: Almost certainly, and
almost certainly in the same informal manner.
MR. DAVID: Did you discuss it
with Gar Pardy?
MR. GOULD: I don't recall, but
unlikely.
MR. DAVID: And did you pursue the matter with Kathryn McCallion herself?

MR. GOULD: No, I did not.
MR. DAVID: Did you raise the issue, or discuss the matter, with the liaison officer of CSIS that works within your office -MR. GOULD: I don't think so. I think $I$ was just doing this on my own.

MR. DAVID: I'd like to bring you
now to the Book of Documents we filed today, Mr. Gould, and that is $P-237$, and if $I$ could bring you to tab 2.

MR. GOULD: Two?
MR. DAVID: Tab 2.
The call is on June the 5th.
Perhaps June the 6th. Your dealing with the call directly is over the course of three days, the Thursday, Friday, and the Monday, and then in the weeks that follow, we will see that on July $30 t h$, a memo is drafted for the Deputy Minister, and we'll come to that. But before that, on June 24th, you drafted this draft memo --

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And it was destined
for two people. It was destined for Jim Wright, who was the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for your --

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: -- office, for the
ISD office, so in terms of a reporting structure, Mr. Wright had authority over your office. And it was also destined for Kathryn McCallion, who was the authority in terms of consular affairs. MR. GOULD: Correct. MR. DAVID: And it was to those
two people that you were addressing this draft. And it says "Via ISD". So this is via Dan Livermore? MR. GOULD: Correct. MR. DAVID: And also JPD, this is Gar Pardy, the Director General of Consular Affairs and the Director General of ISD, so respecting again the chain of command. MR. GOULD: Sure. MR. DAVID: It's dated June 24 th. It says at the very top:
meeting of minds between the Department of Foreign Affairs on the one hand and CSIS and the RCMP on the other with regard to the case of Maher Arar. Recent exchanges have been almost testy and there is a fear that the working relationship between DFAIT and CSIS, in particular, might be poisoned if agreement is not reached on a government-wide approach to this case."

Can you tell us, what was going
through your mind at this time when drafting this memo that allowed you to use this kind of language and to speak of the fact that there was discord between CSIS and DFAIT and the RCMP about Arar?

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm. Again, because -- I was drafting the memo because of my policy function, and the fact I manage policy, which means $I$ get to draft a lot of memos. My concern about managing that relationship with CSIS.

Now, what had happened? Well, we had had the -- and if $I$ recall it went on for some days, this negotiating or discussing of the wording of the letter, Mr. Pardy wanted it to go much farther than CSIS and the RCMP were prepared. That's one point.

There was the phone call, which I had understood Mr. Hooper to have made to Ms McCallion. That was another point.

And there were other meetings which had occurred, some of which I had been privy to, some of which I had not been but about which I knew, and about by $I$ really cannot go into details for reasons of national security. But it was a summing up of.

MR. DAVID: Okay. And this first paragraph in this draft memo, did it reflect accurately your thinking at this time?

MR. GOULD: It was the desire to head something off. "Might be poisoned." I'm trying to do something in advance.

I was concerned -- as I read this,
I was concerned that if we didn't come to a conclusion, if Foreign Affairs couldn't sit down with CSIS, and I think the RCMP is implied,
although it's not named, that the relationship could become difficult.

So I was trying to get a conversation started, first in-house, and then, if successful, a bilateral conversation with our colleagues in the service so that we really did have a one-voice, one-channel, one-line approach on these matters. I was concerned that it would spread, that if it didn't work well with this then it might go into other areas. There's a fairly rich relationship between the department and the service.

MR. DAVID: And obviously
Mr. Pardy shared your concerns in that regard?
MR. GOULD: I don't know whether
Mr. Pardy shared the concerns or not, but I thought Mr. Pardy should be part of this discussion, first in-house and, second, with the service, because -- this seems to be stimulated by the Arar case, a consular case.

MR. DAVID: Right. Let's move down to the last paragraph of your draft memo, and you say:

> "There is not sufficient evidence against Arar for him
to be charged with anything in Canada. CSIS has made it clear to the Department that they would prefer to have him remain in Syria, rather than returned to Canada."

Let me ask you. You're asserting
this in a draft memo?
MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: I understand that it
was never finalized, it never actually went up the chain of command.

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. DAVID: It remained a draft in
your computer?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Okay. When you
assert, "CSIS has made it clear to the department that they would prefer to have him remain in Syria rather than returned to Canada," what are you basing that on?

MR. GOULD: Meetings, et cetera,
that $I$ mentioned a moment ago that $I$ really don't want -- I can't go into the details for national security, but there was sufficient grounds to make

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me concerned.
The wording is dramatic because I
wanted to start a dialogue. Not all memos are intended to be finalized. I wanted to bring my concerns to people's attention.

MR. DAVID: And so did this
sentence, this -- I should say this allegation, go beyond simply the Hooper-McCallion phone call?

MR. GOULD: There were -- well, if nothing else, and you discussed it this morning, the debate over the wording of a letter, which went on for some date -- it was not a one half-hour meeting. And there was certainly not a meeting of minds on that. And although a decision was reached, there may not have been a true meeting of minds. They may not have totally agreed.

MR. DAVID: You go on and you say: "CSIS officials do not seem to understand that, guilty or innocent, Maher Arar has the right to consular assistance from the Department and that in the circumstances in which he presently finds himself,
the best outcome might be his return to Canada. Even though there is a risk that Arar might later be found to have been involved in extremist activities of one sort or another, his right to consular assistance must be honoured."

So there's -- you're raising the issue of understanding; that is, you're saying that maybe there's misunderstanding --

MR. GOULD: That's right. I was concerned, from my position as the Deputy Director (Policy), that $I$ wanted to bring my slightly more senior people into it, and possibly more senior, depending on how far up this went, to ensure that they -- that I obviously had a concern that CSIS might not be understanding here. We've got to be a little clearer.

We have a mandate to deliver
consular -- a consular program to Mr. Arar. He has certain rights and privileges as a Canadian citizen. We've got to do that. And make sure they understand that. And if, as I say in here,
if later he might be found to have an extreme -was involved, well --

MR. DAVID: So be it.
MR. GOULD: So be it. That's --
that's a criminal matter.
MR. DAVID: And thus your
recommendation -- we find this at paragraph 3:
"It is important that the Minister and his staff be made aware of the evidence that can be marshalled against Arar and a way must be found for the Department to respond to allegations that there is no suggesting that Arar has a connection to the activities of Muslim extremists." MR. GOULD: That's back to the wording question, as came out during the debate over the letter. To me, it is.

MR. DAVID: And, finally, your

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assertion:
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"CSIS must accept that DFAIT
has a duty to assist Arar,
even though this may result in him regaining his freedom in Canada."

MR. GOULD: That's reiterating the same point $I$ made in paragraph -- the previous paragraph, which I think is numbered wrong. Oh, well. Yeah.

MR. DAVID: And so this reflected basically your understanding of the environment at this time?

MR. GOULD: Yes. That's well-put.
That it was the environment that $I$ was trying to address.

MR. DAVID: Okay. We go now to tab 3, Mr. Gould, and there's a memo that has been reviewed also with Mr. Livermore.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: From this memo, and
it's at paragraph 5 of page 2 of the memo, the assertion comes that another senior CSIS officer told MKM that DFAIT should curtail its efforts to have Arar released and that it was CSIS's preference that Arar not return.

Again, that was the operating understanding of the phone call --

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: -- almost two months
after it occurred?
MR. GOULD: At least in the mind
of the drafter and -- Mr. Heatherington, yes.
MR. DAVID: And at this time, July
30th, as far as you're concerned, this is an accurate statement?

MR. GOULD: This was our
understanding of the situation.
MR. DAVID: On July 30th?
MR. GOULD: Yes. Or at least my
understanding of the situation, and I can't
imagine it being different.
MR. DAVID: Okay. And then we go
to tab 4, Mr. Gould, and, again, I'll put you in context.

November the 6th is the date.
Bill Gusen is one of your colleagues, he's one of your underlings in ISI?

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: And the task at hand
was to draft a chronology.
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And it was to be a
detailed chronology, factual chronology, and it was for the purposes of PCO. PCO had -- I don't want to say "ordered," but certainly requested, and there was to be follow-through on that request.

MR. GOULD: Right.
MR. DAVID: And so in a fairly
intense environment, a chronology was prepared?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Okay. And this first
e-mail that is going from Mr. Gusen to
Mr. Heatherington concerns the drafting of that memo and you're being cc'd on it.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And it says, "As
okayed by Don and Jim."
And "Don" is Don Saunders and
"Jim" is Jim Gould, yourself.
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: So you have reviewed
the contents.
MR. GOULD: Yup.
MR. DAVID: And then it says, "To
be hand-delivered to Chesson."
MR. GOULD: Yes.

MR. DAVID: Now, let's go to the next page, page 2 , and at the very top we see, "Chronology of Maher Arar case," and then it says, "ISI input."

So this is ISI's contribution to a
chronology that was prepared by other -MR. GOULD: Was being prepared at the department.

MR. DAVID: Okay. So here is your contribution.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And if we go to page 2
or -- or page 3 of 3 . We'll see that there's an entry for July 30th, 2003, and I bring you to the last sentence. It says:
"It also reports --"
I'm sorry. Let's read the whole thing, just for clarity. It's in reference to the July 30th memo, and it says:
"ISI Top Secret memo to USS concerning Sol Gen's comments about rogue elements in the RCMP. The memo mentions the cross-border information sharing on individuals of

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interest such as Arar. It also reports on a call from a very senior official at CSIS to DFAIT/MKM (responsible for consular affairs) suggesting that DFAIT curtail its efforts to secure Arar's return as that would not be CSIS' preference."

So clearly, again, a reference to the phone call, a reference to what Mr. Dyet told you, a reference to the July 30 th memo. This you had found was not included in the draft chronology that was circulating. You suggested, "Let's put this in." "This is ISI's input. Let's put it in."

MR. GOULD: I don't know whether I suggested putting it in. It was in.

MR. DAVID: Well, it's because the e-mail, at the first page, says, "As okayed by Don and Jim --"

MR. GOULD: Yes, but it's not -- I didn't necessarily go through and say, "Stick this item in." I read that draft input and said, "Yeah, it looks good --"

MR. DAVID: Okay. So you felt it appropriate to refer --

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: -- to that reference?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And in point of fact, Mr. Gould, if I compare the ISI input suggestions on those two pages with the final chronology that was actually released to PCO, almost the totality of the suggestions made by ISI were included in the draft -- in the final memo, in the final chronology.

MR. GOULD: Okay.
MR. DAVID: Except for this reference to July 30 th, in terms of the phone call, and except for the entry for the 8 th of September, 2003. Other than that, in some form or another, all of ISI's input has been included in the final chronology.

We go to tab 5, please, and this
is the next day, November 7th, and it's from Mr. Gusen once again and it's going to Scott, and it says Gould -- and it's being cc'd to you, and the message is as follows:

237, TAB 5"I've picked up the
typos, et cetera, refer. Jim's comments on having missed the ADDO call to MKM in early June. I leave it to those here then to decide. I've left it out for now."

And in terms of the identified subject matter on the e-mail, it says, "Arar chron with Jim Gould's recommended changes."

MR. GOULD: Yup.
MR. DAVID: Could you tell us what that is about?

MR. GOULD: Well, it's some -it's a day or so later, I think?

MR. DAVID: It's one day later.
MR. GOULD: One day later, it's
come back down. More comments and more -- other things to add. The chronology went through several combinations and permutations as more and more information was added. Items were put in as they went into more detail. Items were taken out because they were deemed as no longer relevant or superfluous, unnecessary; it added nothing to the chronology.

MR. DAVID: Okay. And if you go
to page 9 of 12 within that tab --
MR. GOULD: Yup.
MR. DAVID: You'll see that on
July 30 th, the reference to the phone call is not there.

MR. GOULD: Yup.
MR. DAVID: So are we to
understand that you're saying, "Hey, let's put it back in" or "This should be in"? Is that --

MR. GOULD: It sounds -- if I
recall correctly, I noted -- I noted that it was not there --

MR. DAVID: And you make a
recommendation --
MR. GOULD: And the reference to Bill as in -- you know, that's out. You know, did you drop it or -- I don't know whether I asked who dropped it but why -- you know, is it out? Why is it out? I thought it should be in there, but others thought it was -- because it had been overtaken. The memo had gone. The letter had been -- you know. So that was the context. MR. DAVID: Okay.

Then we have, at tab 6 -- this is, again, it's a draft version of the chronology,
which is dated the 11th -- I'm sorry, the 7th of November. And if you go to page 7, you'll see the entry on July 30 th; there is no reference to the phone call?

MR. GOULD: Yup.
MR. DAVID: And then at tab 7, Mr. Gould, you have a version that seems to be dated November 13th, and this, from previous testimony, $I$ can tell you, are the manuscript notes of Jim Wright, because Jim Wright was actually responsible for the production of the chronology.

That is correct?
MR. GOULD: I don't recall.
MR. DAVID: No, but that
Mr. Wright was in charge of --
MR. GOULD: I don't recall.
MR. DAVID: You don't recall.
MR. GOULD: GMR was doing it --
excuse me. GMR was compiling it, putting it together. Now, whether they were doing that on behalf of Mr. Wright or Mr. McNee, their ADM, I'm not sure.

MR. DAVID: That's fine. We have testimony to that effect.

MR. GOULD: Good.
MR. DAVID: I simply note that at
tab 7, the version of the chronology at page 14 stops, and it stops on July 22 nd, '03. So we don't have the benefit of Mr. Wright's comments on July $30 t h$ or after, thereafter.

And then we have the final version
of the chronology at tab 8. And if you go to page 16, you'll see that the entry for July $30 t h$-- I'm sorry. The entry for the phone call, in terms of the events for July 30 th, is not referenced.

MR. GOULD: Okay.
MR. DAVID: Do you have any knowledge, Mr. Gould, as to why it was -- who decided to exclude it?

MR. GOULD: No idea. No, I do not.

MR. DAVID: And do you know why it was decided to be excluded? Who --

MR. GOULD: No, only in the sense
it was no longer relevant. The memo had gone. Whatever the discussion was, whatever the phone call was about, the memo was up, gone, finished.

MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are
my questions, Mr. Gould.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. It's 12:30, and we'll take the lunch break.

Just before we do, two things: If
the lawyers, counsel could look at -- I may have made a misstatement to you, Ms Edwardh. In tab 4 of $P$-237, you will recall that you asked, down at the bottom of the second page, the 16th of December, 2002 , providing the translated transcript, and we had a discussion about that. I had expressed certain views. Ms McIsaac had as well.

It's pointed out to me that at tab 5, if you turn over to page 7 of 12 in tab 5, the second entry from the bottom is that same date. So we're at the $16 t h$ of December, 2002, and it refers to:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 237, \text { tab } 5, \text { p. } 7 \text { "In response to } \\
& \text { a request for a debriefing on } \\
& \text { the CSIS visit to Damascus, } \\
& \text { CSIS provides a report } \\
& \text { summarizing what appears to } \\
& \text { be information provided to } \\
& \text { SMI by Arar under } \\
& \text { interrogation." }
\end{aligned}
$$

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So that I'm not sure how one reconciles the two entries, but I thought -- I don't think it's necessarily as clear as I had indicated to you, but -- I'm just not sure. I just simply bring it to your attention.

MS EDWARDH: Well, thank you, Mr. Commissioner, because it was a matter I was hoping to discuss with Commission counsel because I had failed to point out to you -- if you go to tab 4, at the very top of the chronology, that subsequently refers to December $16 t h$, it starts with an undated three-paragraph translation. THE COMMISSIONER: Right. MS EDWARDH: And it seems to me unlikely it's the same document being referred to at the bottom of the page.

THE COMMISSIONER: In any event, I
wanted to bring that to your attention, and I'll let you make of it what you will.

MS EDWARDH: Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: The second
point is that there are the two transcripts being prepared. I don't know how your time -- we were going to just take an hour for lunch, but if you'd like longer in order to read that -- let me ask
counsel how long we're likely to be. We have to finish today.

MS EDWARDH: I understand.
THE COMMISSIONER: We have
Ms McCallion. How long do you think you'll be in chief with Ms McCallion? MR. DAVID: I'd say between 30 and

45 minutes?
THE COMMISSIONER: Well, then, I
think we're fine.
Is an hour long enough, or would
you like more --
MS EDWARDH: Could we have an hour
and 15 minutes? It will allow us to both grab something to eat and review the materials.

THE COMMISSIONER: It's
twenty-five to one now. We will resume at ten to two.

MS McISAAC: Sir, I have not yet received confirmation that both transcripts are ready, but ...

THE COMMISSIONER: If they're not, then we'll follow Plan B.

MS McISAAC: Because we had to
obtain Mr. Dyet's as well because we didn't have
the full transcript --
THE COMMISSIONER: Right. I
appreciate --
MS MCISAAC: And part of
Mr. Gould's.
THE COMMISSIONER: I appreciate,
Ms McIsaac, the assistance you're giving us. It's one of those situations that come up.

If they're not ready, we'll go to
the other plan, and somehow we'll manage.
In any event, we'll resume at ten
to two.
MR. DAVID: Ten minutes to two?
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
MR. DAVID: All right. Thank you.
THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Upon recessing at 12:35 p.m. /
Suspension à 12 h 35
--- Upon resuming at 1:51 p.m. /
Reprise à 13 h 52
THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Ms Edwardh?
MS EDWARDH: Thank you,
Mr. Commissioner. I wonder if I could just make
this observation.
I was handed about 30 seconds ago a transcript from Ms McIsaac, and it is the transcript in relation to Ms McCallion.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MS EDWARDH: It runs from 14609 to 14687, which is about 80 pages, and while I am sometimes a quick read, I'm not nearly that quick.

THE COMMISSIONER: Fair enough. MS EDWARDH: I understand the other transcript is in the course of preparation.

I'm in your hands, of course. I am ready to commence my cross-examination, and maybe would ask for an opportunity to look at Mr. Gould's transcript when it is done, just to see that I've covered everything that I need to cover.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right. The other one was Mr. Gould's, okay. Why don't we finish the cross-examinations and any other examinations. We will take a break for you to look at the two transcripts, as long as you need, and then we will call Ms McCallion.

MS EDWARDH: Thank you. I promise to read quickly.

MS McISAAC: Sir, if I might just make one observation, I spoke at the lunch hour to both Ms Edwardh and Mr. David. I personally felt rather uncomfortable being given the task of deciding which portions of these transcripts were in fact relevant. It will probably come as no surprise that I've taken a narrow view of relevance.

I did that actually for the very specific reason in some cases because it avoided issues of National Security Confidentiality where I would have had to consult.

What I had suggested is that, in the days following, your counsel take a look at my choices, they identify additional materials that they believe ought to be to give context to what's there. We will take a look at that as well. THE COMMISSIONER: And we will address it if there have been any problem. Is that satisfactory to you, Mr. David?

MR. DAVID: That is correct, Mr. Commissioner. Everybody is working in pretty tight circumstances right now.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mostly,

Mr. David. I guess you are, but ...
--- Laughter / Rires
THE COMMISSIONER: No, just
kidding. Sure, okay. Let's go ahead on that basis.

MS EDWARDH: Thank you,
Mr. Commissioner.
EXAMINATION
MS EDWARDH: I should call you
Dr. Gould. Is that correct?
MR. GOULD: No, I don't use it.
MS EDWARDH: Okay. I want to just
ask you a little bit about your earlier involvement in this case, Mr. Arar's case.

I take it that you had some
consultative arrangements with A-OCANADA and therefore had become aware of Mr. Arar as early as July 29th, 2002?

MR. GOULD: Yes. We asked for a briefing, just sort of -- after the events of 9/11, there were a variety of individuals started to come to our attention. We asked for a briefing as to who were people of concern, what was happening, and $I$ think that is how his name came up as one of -- in that briefing, he was one of
several, if $I$ recall correctly.

MS EDWARDH: And that briefing was provided by...?

MR. GOULD: I'm not sure, I'm
sorry.
MS EDWARDH: A-OCANADA. Do you
know whether it was Cabana himself, Inspector Cabana?

MR. GOULD: I do not recall. It may well have been, but I'm not sure.

MS EDWARDH: And in respect of the purpose of your involvement, although you may have asked for a briefing -- and I take it the members of A-OCANADA provided you with some of the details of their investigation post-9/11?

MR. GOULD: Almost no details of an investigation to my knowledge were ever passed over.

MS EDWARDH: They provided you with names of people who were targets?

MR. GOULD: People who were of interest. They confirmed that people were of interest, that sort of thing, but we didn't get details of the investigation.

MS EDWARDH: What would be the
purpose of providing that information to the Department of Foreign Affairs?

MR. GOULD: We are talking about people who were abroad. So they were either consular cases, or potential consular cases, or might come to the attention of our missions abroad, that sort of thing.

Certainly we weren't getting information -- we didn't ask for and didn't receive information about people in Canada. MS EDWARDH: And so you would have then been told that sometime in June 2002 -- no, excuse me.

So you would have been told that Mr. Arar was believed to be in Tunisia in July 2002 and had recently left Canada?

MR. GOULD: I don't recall the details of how much I was told. It was very little.

MS EDWARDH: All right.
MR. GOULD: I mean, the note that is in my notes, there is one handwritten squib, I think.

MS EDWARDH: I'm not sure I have that squib.

MR. GOULD: Excuse me, could I -I thought that is where it came from. Maybe I'm wrong.

The first -- no, I guess it's not there, unless it's...

MS EDWARDH: Could it be in tab 2?
MR. DAVID: Tab 2, perhaps page 1
of 6 .
MS EDWARDH: I hope that
clarifies.
MR. GOULD: Yes, that's "RCMP". I
can't read the first word, "for their info. We are having our people seek" something.

THE COMMISSIONER: "Consular"?
MR. GOULD: "Seek consular". That's probably after he was...

MS EDWARDH: July 29th.
MR. GOULD: I'm not sure what that is in aid of, I'm sorry, because that is before Mr. Arar was sent off, I think.

MS EDWARDH: Certainly.
Considerably before.
MR. GOULD: It was that sort of information. Almost nothing.

MS EDWARDH: There is certainly
nothing in that note that would confirm that Mr. Arar's name was given to you on that day.

MR. GOULD: No. And I don't know where that came from. I thought that that's where that was from. Perhaps I'm mistaken.

MS EDWARDH: You could be mistaken with respect to that, and it could have been the names of other persons?

MR. GOULD: It could indeed have been.

MS EDWARDH: Now, did you have an ongoing relationship of consultation with A-OCANADA?

MR. GOULD: No, not -- excuse me.
I attended, if $I$ recall correctly,
two or three part-sessions -- I did not attend the entire sessions -- of the task force meetings. Colleagues attended, I think, one other, perhaps two others, so it was not a long ongoing regular consultation in that sense.

MS EDWARDH: And was there any
purpose from your perspective of your participation in what was a police investigation? What were you contributing to it?

MR. GOULD: We probably only
contributed that information that would have been received from the embassy in Damascus: items, diplomatic reports on his state or the latest consultations with General Khalil, something like that.

MS EDWARDH: Were you aware or privy to Mr. Pardy's decision to pass on consular visit notes?

MR. GOULD: No. I was not aware of it, nor would $I$ be privy to it.

MS EDWARDH: Were you aware or
privy to -- were you aware of the fact that CSIS came into possession of certain consular notes?

MR. GOULD: No.
MS EDWARDH: Notes of visits with
Mr. Arar
MR. GOULD: I believe they were copied or we shared with them. I would have to see the documents to see if they were copied by the mission, or whether we shared with them. But we may have shared parts of those reports from the post.

I can't recall an example of where I did that or where that was done.

MS EDWARDH: We have heard
evidence that at least there are, leaving aside the RCMP, there are two consular notes written -MR. GOULD: From the CAMANT notes?

Is that what you mean by consular notes?
MS EDWARDH: Yes, they record the contents of a consular visit with Mr. Arar, and are written by Leo Martel --

MR. GOULD: Okay, no, I did not have access to those myself and I didn't see them. MS EDWARDH: And you would have had no knowledge that they were placed in CSIS hands?

MR. GOULD: I certainly. No, I don't know -- no.

MS EDWARDH: And were you aware of any system within the department whereby approval could be given for release of those notes to other interested entities like CSIS? And who, from your perspective, would be the person to give that approval if you were going to seek the release of those notes to someone like the RCMP or CSIS? MR. GOULD: If... MS EDWARDH: Let me give you -MR. GOULD: I would in the first instance refer to JPD, Gar Pardy, and quite
possibly to the lawyers. I would take advice from the Director General first, and then after that consultation $I$ may have gone to the departmental lawyers.

But $I$ don't recall it ever having
come up.
MS EDWARDH: All right. And so while you were, if $I$ can for want of a better term, the manager of the liaison both with RCMP and CSIS and DFAIT, I take it you were never involved in any process whereby information of that kind flowed either to the RCMP or to CSIS?

MR. GOULD: Coming out of the CAMANT notes, no, not that $I$ recall.

MS EDWARDH: I would like to go, just for clarification, to your discussion with Inspector Cabana.

MR. GOULD: Okay.
MS EDWARDH: I take it that your
knowledge of him, sir, arose because of your contacts with A-OCANADA and that was a formal relationship?

MR. GOULD: He had approached me some time earlier. We had dealt with another matter on another case, $I$ presume successfully.

So when it came up that we discovered that there was an A-OCANADA task force that was following these individuals on whom we were certainly having an interest because they were becoming or potentially consular cases, I said, "Well, Mr. Cabana is running it or on it. I will call him." I knew him. I called him.

MS EDWARDH: So you call
Mr. Cabana, $I$ take it as best you can recall, the first time when you make your note about Mr. Arar has been confirmed --

MR. GOULD: In this context. As I
say, there had been previous contexts.
MS EDWARDH: But in this
context --
MR. GOULD: Some months before. MS EDWARDH: In this context, this is the first occasion, and you make the overture to Inspector Cabana to let him know that Arar has now been identified as being -- confirmed as being in Damascus?

MR. GOULD: It sounds strange that I would have phoned; but just, by the way, we haven't spoken on this issue before, but you might like to know that he is there.

I would guess I must have spoken to him before, but $I$ have no memory of it and no record of it, $I$ don't believe, that $I$ know of. MS EDWARDH: You are talking a little bit to yourself there. I take it you have no memory or record of a prior conversation about Mr. Arar's whereabouts?

MR. GOULD: That's right. Before
the one that is recorded there.
MS EDWARDH: So the only record we have suggests that you made the telephone call? MR. GOULD: Yes.

MS EDWARDH: Although you are surprised that you would have made that call? MR. GOULD: Yes, not having -unless there had been previous conversations like, "Do you know where he is? Oh, we don't know where he is. Do you know where he is?" Sort of thing. MS EDWARDH: Did you receive instructions to communicate that information to Inspector Cabana?

MR. GOULD: No idea. I don't recall.

MS EDWARDH: In any event, the net effect of it, the issue $I$ wish to pursue, you have
described the three questions: Is he wanted in Canada?

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MS EDWARDH: And just so $I$ can
confirm it, I'm having trouble reading your writing, sir, my apologies.

MR. GOULD: No, no. I have trouble reading my writing, so don't apologize.

MS EDWARDH: That's comforting. The answer "Is he wanted in Canada?" is "no". MR. GOULD: Is he wanted in Canada. Why -- if so, why? And will charges be laid?

MS EDWARDH: The first question, did you ask that of Inspector Cabana? MR. GOULD: Yes, I did. MS EDWARDH: And by using the term "wanted", would I be correct that you were asking were there allegations that would give rise to charges against Mr. Arar? That's what "wanted" means. Either there is a warrant or there could be a warrant.

MR. GOULD: I think perhaps you
are seeing a non-legal person using words more -less correctly than you or Mr. Cabana would have,
but that's -- "is he wanted?" Are you investigating him? Are you looking for him? You know, are you --

MS EDWARDH: So it's broader
than --
MR. GOULD: Broader than the legal term, definition, you just gave it.

MS EDWARDH: And his answer --
MR. GOULD: I think I included the
legal in the third question, which is: "Will charges be laid?"

MS EDWARDH: And what was his answer again to the first one, is he being investigated, or do you want him here, or whatever?

MR. GOULD: As I read my notes, he came up in an investigation, but it's a long way from any charges. They are still trying to find out who he is. They would like to talk to him. Problem is association.

MS EDWARDH: So he conveyed to you, at least from his perspective, that the problem was not any knowledge of Mr. Arar's activities themselves but rather his connection to persons?

MR. GOULD: That is my reading of my note, so $I$ would think you are probably correct.

MS EDWARDH: Inspector Cabana also
answered implicitly, "will charges be laid", by saying really there are no charges in sight. That's your understanding?

MR. GOULD: That is my
understanding -- that was my understanding.
MS EDWARDH: But he does make the
offer to provide evidence or information from their investigation to the Syrians?
--- Pause
MR. GOULD: My notes, as I have them before me, don't confirm that, but they imply that.

MS EDWARDH: Yes. They
certainly -- and your recollection?
MR. GOULD: About the same.
MS EDWARDH: Okay. But then there is other evidence, sir, that suggests that such an openness to the sharing of information about Mr. Arar was there for the RCMP.

So the question really is: Once this is on your plate, what steps, if any, do you
take to inform the relevant persons that such a sharing from the RCMP perspective is at least on the table?

MR. GOULD: I would have informed
Messrs. Heatherington and Livermore, and almost certainly Mr. Pardy, but $I$ can't guarantee that 99 per cent. I was gathering information on this occasion in order to provide information to our Ambassador in Damascus who was going to meet a senior representative of the --

MS EDWARDH: General Khalil?
MR. GOULD: It was General Khalil.
Probably.
I would guess -- I don't recall
that I phoned Ambassador Pillarella. I would guess that it was probably Mr. Livermore who did so, although I may have. I don't recall.

MS EDWARDH: You can't exclude
that as being --
MR. GOULD: I cannot exclude it.
But $I$ would certainly think those two at least, and probably Mr. Pardy. But $I$ can't confirm it. MS EDWARDH: All right. So assuming that once you have in your hands this information that the RCMP is prepared to share
this, isn't that, sir, exactly the kind of information that the Ambassador would want to have for his meeting with General Khalil that is upcoming in the next day or so?

MR. GOULD: I would think that -although I went seeking information about Mr. Arar specifically, to give him context and background, yes, he would like to know that.

MS EDWARDH: Certainly, because he is going to meet the General. Mr. Arar is in detention in Syria, and the RCMP are in theory offering, at least, to provide information to the Syrians that they may find of relevance to their own investigation.

I mean, isn't that the sum and
total of it?
MR. GOULD: As you say, so it
would seem.
MS EDWARDH: And I take it that it would have been either your job or someone to whom you report to let the Ambassador know that that was on the table?

MR. GOULD: Yes, in the context of the other information on Mr. Arar himself, yes. MS EDWARDH: Yes.

MR. GOULD: Okay.
MS EDWARDH: You are not
uncomfortable with that conclusion.
MR. GOULD: No, no.
MS EDWARDH: And do you know, sir,
should the Ambassador have passed on that general
offer to Syrian Military Intelligence or General Khalil, thereafter would the information have flowed through your good offices or would the information have flowed directly then to the Ambassador or through the LO Rome or some other circuit?

MR. GOULD: I had no idea if the offer was made. If the Ambassador even raised that, he may have -- it may have been sufficiently vague that he didn't feel comfortable raising the prospect of sharing information.

As you say, I think you said there is other information which implies that he did know this or --

MS EDWARDH: I'm going to leave that aside.

MR. GOULD: Okay. The information almost certainly would have gone through their LO.

MS EDWARDH: Their LO being the
liaison officer in Rome?
MR. GOULD: I'm sorry, the liaison officer in Rome.

MS EDWARDH: And that would be the CSIS liaison --

MR. GOULD: No, the RCMP liaison.
MS EDWARDH: The RCMP liaison
officer in Rome.
MR. GOULD: Is it Rome?
MS EDWARDH: Yes, $I$ think we now
know that. And so that would be the ordinary channel.

So if the Ambassador had made the suggestion, then indeed if it had been accepted -and we will leave the Commissioner to determine what did happen, but the route that it would go is through LO Rome?

MR. GOULD: Probably.
MS EDWARDH: Not back through ISI
or ISD?
MR. GOULD: It could have gone
that way, but it is more likely to have gone police force to police force, but...

MS EDWARDH: Now, to the best of
your knowledge, I take it you have no recollection
or there is no record that any RCMP information flowed through the Department of Foreign Affairs to Syrian Military Intelligence? MR. GOULD: Correct. MS EDWARDH: And is that also the case of any information that may have somehow been reposed in ISI or ISD? Nothing went to Syrian Military Intelligence?

MR. GOULD: From us?
MS EDWARDH: Yes.
MR. GOULD: No.
MS EDWARDH: Were you aware, sir, of information that flowed from CSIS through DFAIT to Syrian Military Intelligence? MR. GOULD: No -MS MCISAAC: May I take a moment just to consult on whether that question may be answered?
--- Pause
MS McISAAC: My instructions are that we are refusing to confirm or deny whether or not any information travelled from CSIS to the Syrian authorities.

MS EDWARDH: That's not the
question, though. It has travelled from CSIS to

DFAIT to be transmitted to the Syrian authorities. MS McISAAC: The objection would apply to that question or an answer to that question as well.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MS EDWARDH: Mr. Gould, I take it when Inspector Cabana made this offer, that the RCMP were prepared to share the fruits of their own investigation with Syrian military, that was a fairly unusual offer from your perspective to be told about?

MR. GOULD: It's unusual, yes. I don't have the wording before me of his offer and I don't know what the reference is, but it's certainly unusual.

MS EDWARDH: Right. I am going to
suggest to you, sir, that you weren't aware of other cases, leaving aside the names, where you at least, or ISI and ISD, had been conduits for police information to foreign intelligence agencies?

MR. GOULD: Can $I$ answer this or does it fall under the -- excuse me. Can I speak to my counsel or Ms McIsaac?

THE COMMISSIONER: Ms McIsaac? MS MCISAAC: I'm sorry, sir, I have no idea what the answer would be, so I'm having some difficulty here.

If it deals with other
individuals, $I$ have some difficulty, and out of an abundance of caution $I$ have to say that if we are dealing with whether or not ISI or ISD facilitated the transfer of policing information to other police or security authorities in respect of other individuals, $I$ would first argue that it is not relevant, and out of an abundance of caution I would have to take the position that we claim national security with respect to any answer relating to that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. MS EDWARDH: If the offer, as I've described it -- although I appreciate you are not precisely clear, there certainly is other evidence that such an offer was made for the sharing of information in respect of Mr. Arar.

What I wanted to simply ask you is
this: To your knowledge, was there ever any discussion with Inspector Cabana's superiors or anyone between yourself or anyone else in DFAIT
about the propriety of such a sharing?
MR. GOULD: Not to my knowledge.
MS EDWARDH: Were you ever
consulted one way or the other about DFAIT's perspective on the sharing of police investigative information with entities like Syrian Military Intelligence?

MR. GOULD: Not to my knowledge.
MS EDWARDH: So as someone who was on the policy side, and someone who also watched over the relationships between CSIS and the RCMP and DFAIT, do I take it then you were never specifically asked to give advice about whether or not such sharing carried with it certain risks attached for the individual who might be the subject of investigation, if they were detained in Syria?

MR. GOULD: I do not recall ever being so asked.

MS EDWARDH: And hypothetically, sir, if you had been asked the question about whether a Canadian citizen who is being detained by Syrian Military Intelligence, and who is under investigation by Canadian police forces should be a person whose information is shared with Syrian

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Military Intelligence, would you have had any advice to offer about the risks associated with such information-sharing?

MR. GOULD: You want my comments
on the propriety of it, the legality of it, or the risks associated with it?

MS EDWARDH: The risks associated with it.

MR. GOULD: Had I been asked -and $I$ do not recall being asked -- I believe I would have said that there would be some risk to the individual, just because the enforcement of laws in Syria is rather more rigorous than it is in Canada, physically rigorous.

MS EDWARDH: Physically rigorous.
Let me just explore that a bit further.
This would be particularly the
case if in fact the person was being detained without charge and there being no trial in sight, simply being detained?

MR. GOULD: No difference.
MS EDWARDH: No different? So am I correct, sir, that the risks that you would have identified would have been both the risks associated with a much more severe penalty, as
well as the risks of the use of force during interrogation?

MR. GOULD: I would have been concerned about the use of aggressive or rigorous questioning tactics, you know, however you want to call them. I worry about the terminology, but I think you understand what I mean.

MS EDWARDH: I understand what you
mean. And that language --
MR. GOULD: Strictly hypothetical.
I was never asked --
MS EDWARDH: I know. I clearly understand that, sir. And I want to assure you there is no document that suggests you were asked.

MR. GOULD: Okay, good.
MS EDWARDH: But it just seems to me that you are simply one of those persons who could have opined about the risks and were about the business of managing those two entities, CSIS and RCMP, in their relationship with DFAIT.

And so when you use the term "aggressive interrogation", just so there is no illusion here, hypothetically such interrogation could involve the use of torture?

MR. GOULD: I don't know at what
line torture starts but certainly physical force, violence.

MS EDWARDH: In the course of
interrogation?
MR. GOULD: In the course of an
interrogation.
MS EDWARDH: And had then you been
asked hypothetically, you would have alerted
Inspector Cabana or CSIS that one of the concerns
that they would have to factor into any decision
is that that kind of interrogation was a
possibility, if you had been asked.
MR. GOULD: Had I been asked, I
would like to think $I$ would, but that's -- yes. MS EDWARDH: Yes. I mean, that's
what you said.
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: Let me go on then, if
I could, Mr. Gould. I just want to take you, if I could, to the little volume of documents that is associated with your testimony, Exhibit 237 .

Do you have that there?
MR. GOULD: 237?
MS EDWARDH: Yes. And in
particular, $I$ would like you to turn to tab 5,
page 7. I would like you, sir, to look at the date, $16 / 12 / 02$, which is at page 7.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And the entry reads:
"In response to a request for
a debriefing on the CSIS
visit to Damascus, CSIS
provides a report summarizing
what appears to be
information provided to
Syrian Military Intelligence
by Arar under interrogation."
Do you see that reference?
MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MS EDWARDH: Is there anything
wrong with that statement? Is it factually
accurate or is it accurate?
MS McISAAC: Mr. Commissioner, we
have taken the position on a number of occasions
that details of what transpired during the CSIS
visit to Damascus is a matter of a claim for
National Security Confidentiality, and I would object to the witness answering any questions in this area in terms of the national security implications of any answer he might be able to
give.
THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I
understand that, and if there is an objection, there is an objection. But there is no claim over this statement. Is there an objection to simply asking -- I understood the question was just is this statement correct? MS EDWARDH: That's correct,

Mr. Commissioner.
MS McISAAC: It's one of those
difficult areas, sir, where we keep -- we can't tell the whole story in public. We are not telling the whole story in public, and these little snippets, in my submission, end up being rather misleading for most people.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, $I$ know the whole story.

MS McISAAC: I know you do, sir. But we are doing this for other reasons.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't want to quibble, but $I$ have a hard time understanding how answering that question would be misleading because of anything that was in camera. MS McISAAC: As long as the witness is confined to a statement as to whether
that is accurate or not and we don't get into the details going beyond that.

THE COMMISSIONER: When I saw it and I raised it before the lunch hour, that is what was in my mind.

MS EDWARDH: Well, that's why I'm doing this, Mr. Commissioner, because I have taken the witness to the next tab where the reference to this date is a little different, and $I$ want to know which is correct.

I am troubled by my friend's
statement, you know, little bits get us into trouble. Well, all Mr. Arar has is what you give us in this forum, Mr. Commissioner, and I'm content to pursue little bits, if that's all I get.

THE COMMISSIONER: The answer is, you can ask if that statement is correct.

And you can answer that question.
MS EDWARDH: Mr. Gould, I have
taken you to tab 5, and I am looking particularly at page 7, under the date December 16th, 2002.

First of all, there is a reference "TS". Can I ask what "TS" means?

MR. GOULD: Top secret.

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MS EDWARDH: I see. All right.
Then it says:
"In response to a request for a debriefing on the CSIS visit to Damascus, CSIS provides a report summarizing what appears to be information provided to Syrian Military Intelligence by Arar under interrogation."

Sir, to the best of your
knowledge, is that statement true or false?
MR. GOULD: To the best of my
knowledge, it is true. But it's to the best of my knowledge. I cannot recall.

MS EDWARDH: You don't have all
the records in front of you, but is there anything that you can identify as incorrect about that assertion?

MR. GOULD: No.
MS EDWARDH: Thank you.
I must admit, Mr. Gould, and I'm going to ask you to help us, we have heard that as of June 5th -- we have heard evidence, and I'm not suggesting it came from you, but as of June 5th
there had been a consensus and resolution reached that led to a memorandum in support of a letter that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was to write, and that really finished off the kind of difficulties or institutional friction that existed between DFAIT and the Mounties and CSIS. Even with that sign-off, sir, on June 5th, and the consultation process that had gone on, it's clear, is it not, that there were -and this leads to your memorandum. But it's clear that there were ongoing concerns -- and I'm going to call it conflict, in the broadest sense -between the RCMP and CSIS and DFAIT about the course of action that should be followed in Mr. Arar's case, and what CSIS and the RCMP could or would not agree with?

MR. GOULD: In my mind, there was the potential for more friction.

MS EDWARDH: We will come to your mind in a little bit. But it was quite clear, too, that that was not you just operating in isolation of your colleagues. It is my understanding, sir, that Mr. Heatherington shared your concerns. MR. GOULD: You would have to ask

Mr. Heatherington that, I'm sorry. I haven't read his testimony.

MS EDWARDH: Well, let me take you
to tab 4 in these materials, and there is a brief outline. It is tab 4 , page 3 of 3 .

Well after the June 5 th memo is
cleared through the Deputy Minister's office, there is a reference to a June 18th, 2003, proposal from ISI -- which I believe comes from Mr. Heatherington -- to Gar Pardy, struggling again with the language of a possible draft. So we are now two weeks after the deputy signed off.

What is being proposed by ISI is
language that is designed to suit the interests of the RCMP.

Do you see that?
MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MS EDWARDH: Now, first of all, I
am correct, am $I$ not, to suggest that when ISI proposed that language to Mr. Pardy, it was in aid of a continuing attempt to bring the RCMP and CSIS into some kind of formal letter?

MR. GOULD: I really don't recall.
MS EDWARDH: You don't recall.
MR. GOULD: I do not recall.

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MS EDWARDH: Certainly the date of this suggests that June 5 th was not the end of the matter?

MR. GOULD: That would be
suggested by the dates.
MS EDWARDH: And of course
Inspector Cabana testified that language which indicated that Mr. Arar was the subject of a national security investigation, et cetera, was recognized -- I'm sorry, it wasn't Inspector Cabana. It was Mr. Loeppky who testified that he appreciated that that language would be counterproductive to effecting Mr. Arar's release.

Do you agree that the use of that language in a letter to the Syrians would be counterproductive to effecting Mr. Arar's release?

MR. GOULD: I don't know enough about the case to be able to make a judgment call. I really don't.

MS EDWARDH: You are certain about that?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: You were asked a whole series of questions about how the telephone call vanished from the chronologies, and let me
just understand your evidence, sir.
I take it you yourself did not
remove the telephone call.
MR. GOULD: No.
MS EDWARDH: You yourself would have chosen to put the call in had you been drafting the chronology?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And who was it that removed the telephone call, to the best of your knowledge?

MR. GOULD: I do not know. Do not know.

MS EDWARDH: Do you know if that was within the Department of Foreign Affairs or was it after a -- I don't know. Or PCO? Any knowledge about where it disappeared? MR. GOULD: This was a departmental chronology. I would therefore assume it was someone in the department -- or it was a decision taken in the department.

MS EDWARDH: All right. Now, I
take it the removal of that didn't cause you to make any objection about the reliability of the chronology?

MR. GOULD: No.
MS EDWARDH: You were still
prepared to sign off on it?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: One of the things
that puzzles me is not only is the call not mentioned when it disappears from the chronology, but as I read the chronologies, the call disappears, a lengthy discussion with CSIS and the RCMP to try and forge an agreement disappears, the memo on June 5th going up to the deputy disappears, and that's all just taken out of the chronology.

And if you would just like to take a moment to take a look -- do you agree with that?

MR. GOULD: I will take your word for it.

MS EDWARDH: Well, no, I don't want you to take my word. I'm not testifying, sir. I may be making suggestions and I want you to satisfy yourself.

Certainly we can start by looking at the very last chronology.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's tab 8?
MS EDWARDH: Which is tab 8. It
is the final chronology.
The way I read it, this whole series of meetings from May 5 th to June 5 th, and the letter that is so much the subject of concern just doesn't exist in here, unless $I$ have misread something.

MR. GOULD: There is certainly a reference on the $18 t h$ to an agreed text to be used in a ministerial letter.

MS EDWARDH: You help me with this.

MR. GOULD: Page 15 of 19, tab 8. MS EDWARDH: Fifteen.

MR. GOULD: Fifteen of 19 , under 18 June '03, under $T S$-- it's got an acronym. And there is reference to a...

MS EDWARDH: Well, the problem that's so kind of -- let me stop about this.

When CSIS and the RCMP provide an agreed text, it's June 18th.

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MS EDWARDH: The attempt to get an agreement is long gone because the Deputy Minister or Assistant Deputy Minister has signed off. It appears, from what we have heard, that everything
was honky dory with CSIS, and the RCMP say, no, go write a letter that doesn't mention us.

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MS EDWARDH: There is no mention
here -- we will try it in small bits.
There is no mention in this
chronology of the meetings held to discuss an agreed text that occurred in May, is there?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: There is no mention
that on June 5th Mr. Pardy signed off and placed on Ms McCallion's desk a document which recommended to the Minister that he write his own letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Syria? No mention of that?

MR. GOULD: Correct. MS EDWARDH: No mention of the alleged phone call between Mr. Hooper and Ms McCallion where Mr. Hooper is alleged to have made remarks about CSIS's concerns?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: And when you read this chronology, sir, one of the remarkable things about it -- and we haven't really addressed it -is if on June 5th Ms McCallion is recommending to
the Deputy, and the Deputy is recommending to the Minister, we all of course know that the Minister never signed it?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: Correct?
MR. GOULD: Okay, yes.
MS EDWARDH: You are aware that
the Minister never signed this letter?
MR. GOULD: Yes, I am.
MS EDWARDH: Mr. Pardy told us
something about institutional politics, and I would like you to comment about it.

The effect of what he said is, you
know, discussions are expected to take place interdepartmentally, so if CSIS has a difficulty with what we are doing, or the RCMP, we are expected to be responsible and try to address our concerns with our colleagues in another department.

Do you agree with that?
MR. GOULD: I agree.
MS EDWARDH: And if we cannot agree and we are not able to come to some consensus, we go up the hierarchy. Is that correct?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And ultimately the resolution, if you have to go all the way up to the hierarchy, is to be found in the Prime Minister's Office?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: So from an outsider looking in, it seems awfully like somewhere after Ms McCallion signed off, this whole issue continued to percolate, and on June 18th there is another proposal. But ultimately the PMO addresses this issue by calling upon a special envoy to deliver a letter from the Prime Minister, and he is the one who ultimately bridges the consensus or makes the consensus, does he not? MR. GOULD: So it would appear from the chronology. MS EDWARDH: Yes. MR. GOULD: Or that could -- yes. MS EDWARDH: So it would appear from the chronology.

So the concerns you fairly
identify -- and let me go back to your letter, if I could, or your memo at tab 2.

I got a little puzzled by what
this document was. Commission counsel fairly described it as a draft that is the kind of thing that is obviously on your computer?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: Then obviously you
also described it, not only as a draft, but as something that was meant to provoke discussion and therefore in some respects the language was a bit dramatic.

Do you recall that testimony?
MR. GOULD: Yes, I do.
MS EDWARDH: So even though it is a draft, we are to take it that this was a draft that was shared for the purposes of discussion?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And can you tell us, sir, who it would have been shared with for the purposes of the discussion you wanted to have? MR. GOULD: My assumption is that this would have been shared with Mr. Heatherington and Mr. Livermore.

MS EDWARDH: Anyone else?
MR. GOULD: I cannot think of
anyone else. In the first instance, I would have just delivered to them a hard copy of the two for
comment, suggestion, "What do you think?" And that's the way it would start.

MS EDWARDH: And is it the case that you did deliver a hard copy of this to Mr. -MR. GOULD: I don't recall, sorry. MS EDWARDH: But logically -MR. GOULD: Logically, that is
what $I$ would have done.
MS EDWARDH: That is not
inconsistent with its character as a draft. It is there for the first level of discussions --

MR. GOULD: There are typing mistakes and that sort of thing, so it was a very early push-out on the machine and hit print. MS EDWARDH: Right. But my point is, even as a draft, this is the kind of document you expect that you at least shared within the inner circle of ISI.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And that it was the subject of discussion for your group.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: You perhaps would
appear more than anyone to have been a person bridging the relationships between DFAIT, the RCMP
and DFAIT, and CSIS in this management role, for want of a better term, between CSIS and the Los -MR. GOULD: Yes, I will accept that.

MS EDWARDH: You used the term, unsatisfactory though it may be, so I'm just following up with it.

MR. GOULD: It is. I wanted to be facilitating a relationship, managing a relationship, assisting a relationship, but... MS EDWARDH: But you are there to help smooth over the -MR. GOULD: Whatever. MS EDWARDH: Whatever. Okay. And there was no one else that had that responsibility, to the best of your knowledge, in ISI? That was your obligation. MR. GOULD: Excuse me. I was given that responsibility, but we all worked at it when necessary, Mr. Heatherington, Mr. Livermore, Saunders, the others, but it was on my --

MS EDWARDH: It was part of your job description.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And they would of
course assist you if circumstances required it?
MR. GOULD: And direct me.
MS EDWARDH: And direct you. MR. GOULD: Yes.

MS EDWARDH: Do you have any
recollection of the conversation that this memorandum precipitated?

MR. GOULD: No, I don't. No, I do not.

MS EDWARDH: Certainly your concerns -- and $I$ just want to tap into this for a moment, if I could.

Your description that CSIS has made it clear to the department that they would prefer to have Mr. Arar remain in Syria rather than returned to Canada -- do you see that?

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MS EDWARDH: Sir, as someone who
had been to meetings with CSIS, had struggled through the issue of the language in the letter, or had seen the letter issue develop, had heard about the phone call, $I$ take it you are not relying on any single event but rather on the kind of collection of conversations, discussions, innuendos, all those things that go into
interpreting and understanding a position?
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: So it's not just what someone may have said on one occasion but the total dealings and the institutional culture and mandate of the organization?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And I take it that your overall conclusion from weeks and months of dealings is that this was their position with respect to Maher Arar, otherwise you would not have set it down as such?

MR. GOULD: Yup.
MS EDWARDH: It also strikes me, and $I$ have seen this in other contexts, that the comment that you make is very important to the provision of consular services, that the consular services persons providing assistance to Canadian citizens overseas can't constitute themselves as judge and jury.

So when you say guilty or
innocent, Canadian citizens have the right to these kinds of services?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And I take it that

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was one of the things that CSIS appeared to you -CSIS and the RCMP, I think you said in chief -appeared to you to be reluctant to accept?

MR. GOULD: Yes, if you accept that the wording may be more dramatic than it -but, yes.

MS EDWARDH: In general the sense that providing, at enormous cost sometimes and a great deal of energy, services to people who may have been even found guilty in a serious criminal case, may be something that they had difficulty -or a serious criminal case with intelligence components -- was something that CSIS appeared to have difficulty with?

MR. GOULD: Yes, okay. Yes, fair statement.

MS EDWARDH: Now, post-9/11, one of the concerns it would appear that CSIS had conveyed to you, and to I'm going to suggest others, is that there wasn't enough evidence to charge Mr. Arar with anything but they were concerned that maybe out there there may be something that could show that Canada's efforts brought back someone who was an extremist and a terrorist? They were afraid of that, although
they had no information that that was the case?
I'm drawing that from --
MR. GOULD: No, I see where you're
drawing it from and I'm trying to think of occasions -- there were meetings about which --

MS EDWARDH: You can't maybe tell me about meetings, but $I$ think you can answer the question that I've asked you, unless there's an objection, but $I$ don't hear one, so if you wouldn't mind, sir, answer the question.

MR. GOULD: I'm trying to think of
how I should phrase it because I don't want to give undue weight to something.

I certainly had that impression, and that's drawing on a variety of experiences.

MS EDWARDH: Yes, and $I$ think we have before us information to indicate that CSIS was mindful of the example with Mr. Khadr, and the efforts made by the Prime Minister that resulted or may have affected his release and then subsequently information arose indicated he had been obviously much more involved in activities than people had initially understood.

So that what seems to be at the heart of this as well.

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm. MS EDWARDH: Is that correct?

This fear --
MR. GOULD: It may indeed be, yes. That example I am not using, but that may indeed be it.

MS EDWARDH: It's one of the examples that was floating in the environment, was it not?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: Were you aware of any
discussion that CSIS itself could take steps through its own channels to assist by communicating with Syrian Military Intelligence a message of send Mr. Arar home? Was there any discussion -- or were they so far away from that there was no point in having the discussion?

MR. GOULD: I'm not sure I can
answer that because -- should I fall back, I can neither confirm nor deny the relationship between CSIS and Syria. I don't know the state of that. MS EDWARDH: Well, Ms McIsaac. MS McISAAC: Well I basically
understood the question to be, if $I$ can paraphrase, if Foreign Affairs ever asked CSIS to
make contact with Syria to ask for Mr. Arar's release.

MS EDWARDH: Through the
intelligence channels.
MR. GOULD: Okay. Then, no. Not
to the best of my knowledge.
THE COMMISSIONER: The second part
of the question $I$ think was -- was that because you said there would be no sense --

MS EDWARDH: Yes, I think -- I
have to ask you to finish the question.
Would one of the reasons that such a request would not be made is CSIS had made its position clear that Mr. Arar -- it would be better if Mr. Arar remain in Syria?

MR. GOULD: No, I don't think that would have been a factor.

MS EDWARDH: So why not ask?
MR. GOULD: Don't know. Don't
know.
--- Pause
MR. GOULD: Excuse me. If $I$ can
just?
--- Laughter / Rires
MR. GOULD: I'm sorry, I just
reconsidered -- not reconsidered, I don't know. But it may have been, and I do not recall our conversation, but it may have been the fact that Ambassador Pillarella had a personal relationship with General Khalil, and that that was deemed to be as good a pipeline into that organization as one could ever ask for. That there would have been no merit in asking a CSIS liaison officer, who would have gone in at a lower level. That could have been it. That would be very logical in the circumstances of the --

MS EDWARDH: And even if one were to accede to the logic of that for a moment, I take it your evidence today, sir, is you can never remember sitting around a table and mooting the issue of should CSIS do this or do we have a more effective entree?

MR. GOULD: I don't recall that I sat around and table and discussed that, correct. MS EDWARDH: And I take it you have no reason to believe it was mooted by others. MR. GOULD: I have no reason to believe it was not, so $I$ have no comment on that. MS EDWARDH: Mr. Gould, thank you for answering my questions, sir.

MR. GOULD: Oh? That's all?
MS EDWARDH: That's it. Thank
you, Mr. Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Boxall, do you have any questions?

MR. BOXALL: I do.
THE COMMISSIONER: You're next.
EXAMINATION
MR. BOXALL: Mr. Gould, I
represent Inspector Cabana, and just to pick up with respect to the last comment. You were asked if you ever sat around with -- in a totally different context than where I'm going -- but Ms Edwardh is asking you if you sat around and discussed or mooted the possibility with respect to the letter she was talking about from CSIS.

My question is going to be more general in nature, and that is, the process of putting something out for discussion, either in a memo to attract discussion from people that you work with, or sitting around and mooting possibilities, I take it that's something you do do in your everyday work?

MR. GOULD: I'm fortunately able to say I did do.

MR. BOXALL: That you did do.
Okay.
MR. GOULD: Thank you.
We were a very collegial, and I
assume the division or bureau still is. Many issues would be discussed standing in a doorway or meeting in the open area as often, or probably more often, than you would put a draft together, as I did here, to force an issue. So when you say "moot," I see us literally three people standing with a coffee, it could be Mr. Heatherington, Mr. Livermore, and myself standing there saying, "What should we do about this?" As easily as it could have been as, "What did you think of last night's hockey game?"

MR. BOXALL: And as perhaps
lawyers could well understand who accept the adversarial decision gets to the best decision and the result, there is often a value in taking pros and cons of different positions and determining what the best route might be to go. It allows for that discussion to consider all alternatives? MR. GOULD: Yes. MR. BOXALL: Right. Okay. Now I'm not quite certain what material is public and
what isn't, so I'm going to try and be fairly general here, but clearly you had an ongoing consultative relationship with Inspector Cabana in 2002?

MR. GOULD: I spoke with
Mr. Cabana a dozen times over a period of six or eight months.

MR. BOXALL: And this wasn't about
hockey games?
MR. GOULD: This was -- almost
certainly not.
MR. BOXALL: Right. It and it
would be about Canadians abroad?
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. BOXALL: And it would be about
RCMP interest in Canadians abroad?
MR. GOULD: Or any information
they could share about Canadians abroad that were coming to our attention.

MR. BOXALL: And that would be
part of his job and your job --
MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MR. BOXALL: -- to discuss, to
consider information-sharing about Canadians abroad?

MR. GOULD: To discuss information-sharing, or to discuss the information?

MR. BOXALL: To discuss the possibility of information-sharing.

MR. GOULD: I don't recall ever
discussing with Mr. Cabana the policy and principles of information-sharing.

MR. BOXALL: Okay. You don't
recall ever discussing with Inspector Cabana the possibility about sharing information?

MR. GOULD: It was more along the
lines of, do you know anything about Individual "A"? Yes, no. Can you tell me anything about him? Yes or no. And whatever information. Not the principle or policies.

MR. BOXALL: So he would just ask
you about specific persons?
MR. GOULD: And I might ask him about specific persons.

MR. BOXALL: And what about
specific countries? He might ask that?
MR. GOULD: He might.
MR. BOXALL: And would you agree with me that -- this may not be the best choice of
words but my characterization is you're not a very good note taker?

MR. GOULD: I'm a terrible note
taker.
MR. BOXALL: All right, good. And
so the discussions that you would have with
Mr. Cabana, your notes are not really of much assistance to you in trying to recollect what was said.

MR. GOULD: Not now. At the time hopefully they would have been. These are not meant as permanent records.

MR. BOXALL: And that's the notes that you do have, which are limited?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. BOXALL: There would be a lot of material that is not put in the notes?

MR. GOULD: Oh, almost certainly.
MR. BOXALL: And it's even more difficult to be able to recall what was said when there is no entry at all?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. BOXALL: So your recollection of what you discussed with Inspector Cabana over these meetings is very limited?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. BOXALL: Now, you agree that
it is you that called Inspector Cabana on October 21st?

MR. GOULD: That's the one with all the squiggles, yes. Because $I$ have got his pager number listed at the top, so, yes, I initiated the call.

MR. BOXALL: You initiated the call, and you had some questions that you wanted to ask?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. BOXALL: And you knew that he was the appropriate person to call?

MR. GOULD: I knew he was a person to call.

MR. BOXALL: You knew he was a person to call.

MR. GOULD: Very often if he's not the appropriate person, he could identify the appropriate person.

MR. BOXALL: Fair enough. Just as
if he was speaking with you and you weren't the appropriate person, you could direct him to the appropriate person.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. BOXALL: And this would be an
example of the ongoing consultative relationship you had with this man?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. BOXALL: And you asked him a
series of questions?
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. BOXALL: And that would be part of your responsibility to attempt to learn what information you could be provided to assist your department.

Correct?
MR. GOULD: In this case specifically the Ambassador in Damascus, yes. MR. BOXALL: Right. And would you agree with me that a police investigator would have a responsibility himself to complete his own investigation and to gather information for his investigation?

MR. GOULD: Of course.
MR. BOXALL: Of course. And from
time to time that police investigator would have to deal with foreign sources?

MR. GOULD: I suppose that would
depend on the case he was pursuing, yes.
MR. BOXALL: Right. But if it involves an international component, it may be necessary, in order to get information, to deal with foreign sources.

It makes sense to you, right?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. BOXALL: That would be the types of things you may have contact with Inspector Cabana or other police officers if it came up.

Correct?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. BOXALL: And, generally
speaking, is it a recognized principle that in order to get information from foreign sources that you had to give? It's a two-way street?

MR. GOULD: It is normally seen as a two-way street.

MR. BOXALL: And that would be made clear, in a hypothetical sense, that if you were asked by a police officer, if you have to give to get, you would tell them it's normally a two-way street?

MR. GOULD: If a police officer
were to ask me what it takes to get, I would probably say you may be asked questions back and maybe you should be prepared to answer some. MR. BOXALL: Because you have to give to get. It's that simple, isn't it? MR. GOULD: Hypothetically, yes. MR. BOXALL: All right. And beyond hypothetically, in the everyday working world of DFAIT, you have to give to get? MR. GOULD: You have to be prepared that when you're dealing -- setting aside these cases -- as a working diplomat abroad dealing with a representative of a foreign Ministry of your host country, you may go in one day and ask six questions, and the next time you're talking to him he asks you eight. You have to be prepared to the best of your ability, within the constraints, to answer them.

MR. BOXALL: Right. Because if
you want to get answers to yours, you have to answer theirs.

MR. GOULD: Yes, right. MR. BOXALL: Now, you've indicated -- perhaps I'm just going to ask it again. What exactly, if you're able to say

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exactly, did Mr. Cabana say in this offer to share? What did he say?

MR. GOULD: I'm sorry, the notes I have available to me don't clearly tell me what he said.

MR. BOXALL: What was said
immediately before that?
MR. GOULD: Again, they do not
clearly -- these are very sketchy notes.
MR. BOXALL: And what was your
response to him, if any?
MR. GOULD: No response that I have noted, so therefore, $I$ don't recall.

MR. BOXALL: Okay. All right.
And did you invite Inspector Cabana, did you ask Inspector Cabana, do you have any message to deliver to the Syrians? Did you invite that, if he had any message or anything to tell him?

MR. GOULD: I don't recall doing that.

MR. BOXALL: But you don't recall
what was said before it.
Correct?
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. BOXALL: And the purpose of

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the call seems to be for you to ask certain questions?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. BOXALL: All right. So the
inference would be, when the topic switches from the answers to your questions to what's characterized as an offer, the inference may well be that you asked him if he had anything to say to them?

MR. GOULD: I don't know why I
would have. My Ambassador was going in to meet the Head of Syrian Military Intelligence. I wouldn't have thought that the RCMP in an investigation would have something, but -MR. BOXALL: You can't deny that you may have? Right.

Your evidence is, sir, in this
forum, that you were never asked any -- for your opinion or advice about sharing information with the Syrians?

MR. GOULD: I don't recall.
MR. BOXALL: No recollection of ever being asked that?

MR. GOULD: I think the question was, did we sit about in the division or the
bureau and discuss this matter.
MR. BOXALL: Forget the bureau.
MS EDWARDH: If my friend wishes
to put the question I asked, I'd ask that he put it fairly to the witness.

MR. BOXALL: All right. So that you never -- you never discussed it within the bureau.

Is that what you're saying?
MR. GOULD: I don't recall being
asked, or sitting about discussing the merits of information-sharing by the RCMP I think, or CSIS -- I'm not sure which, whichever you're discussing.

MR. BOXALL: Let's deal with the RCMP sharing information with the Syrians. You have no recollection of discussing that with anyone? That's your evidence? MR. GOULD: The merits of sharing information with --

MR. BOXALL: The possibility of doing it.

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. BOXALL: The pros and cons?
MR. GOULD: No.

MR. BOXALL: You're saying,
though, that hypothetically, if you ever had been asked, you would like to think that you would have indicated there would be some risk to doing so, or sharing information with respect to a person detained in custody?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. BOXALL: And yet with respect
to Mr. Cabana's offer, communicated to you, of being open to the possibility of sharing with the Syrians, you made no response?

MR. GOULD: I do not recall having made any response.

MR. BOXALL: You certainly didn't tell him of any risks at that time, did you, sir? MR. GOULD: I don't recall having done so.

MR. BOXALL: All right. Well, what I'm suggesting to you, sir, is that you didn't at that time.

MR. GOULD: Okay.
MR. BOXALL: All right? And who
did you pass that on to --
MS EDWARDH: I think I have to object -- I want to make an objection.

We've heard from Cabana. As I recall his evidence was he never asked, and I don't think it's fair to say to this witness, "I'm going to put it to you that you didn't share." I mean, he's answered as best he can in his recollection. We know what the officer said. But I don't think that the last suggestion was fair to the witness.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, as I understand his evidence, he said it several times, he doesn't recall whether he did or not.

MR. BOXALL: That's fair enough.
MR. GOULD: Is there evidence to
suggest that $I$-- that Mr. Cabana did say, "How about we go and share information?" Did he put a distinct offer to me through us. Is there evidence to that effect?

MR. BOXALL: What exactly did he say then?

MR. GOULD: I don't know. I phoned him up and asked -- I listed out three questions $I$ wanted answered. If you take a look at my notes, $I$ think $I$ only got to the first one because it seemed to cover the other two. I would guess this conversation lasted a few moments at
best. That was the information I needed. There was nothing else. Bang.

MR. BOXALL: This possibility, this comment about sharing information with the Syrians, did you pass it on to anyone?

MR. GOULD: I would assume that I
did. There's no reason to hold on to it and there's no reason not to have told it, but I don't recall -- and it would have been an informal passing on to Heatherington or Livermore.

MR. BOXALL: So you don't know if
you did?
MR. GOULD: No.
MR. BOXALL: All right, sir, those are the questions I have.

MR. GOULD: Super.
THE COMMISSIONER: Just in the order, earlier $I$ think $I$ may have mixed the order. I don't think it really matters. Is there a preference between Mr. Shore and Ms McIsaac? MS McISAAC: I'm content to let him go last. THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. If that suits you, Mr. Shore. MR. SHORE: Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think Ms McIsaac was saying she'd go before you, Mr. Shore. But, as I say, it doesn't matter to me. Mr. David will be the last re-examiner. EXAMINATION

MS MCISAAC: Do you have your
notes in front of you, Mr. Gould, $P-236 ?$
MR. GOULD: Yes, I do.
MS MCISAAC: I want to go to the telephone conversation that you had with Mr. Dyet, which is referenced at page 9 of 16 at tab 1 of your notes.

MR. GOULD: Okay.
MS MCISAAC: Now, to the best of your recollection, at the time that you spoke with Mr. Dyet and recorded this note, was it your understanding that Mr. Hooper and Ms McCallion had already spoken or were about to speak?

MR. GOULD: My notes -- the tense of the second point, or point 2 of my notes, implies to me it is post-conversation.

MS McISAAC: All right. Now, I just want to clarify your notes, given the way you make your notes.

MR. GOULD: Sorry about that.

MS McISAAC: I understood your evidence, and correct me if I'm wrong, that you had written down the question you wanted to ask Mr. Dyet, which was.

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"memo for JPD @ Arar ...
did it go to MKM"
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You had written that question down before you spoke with Mr. Dyet?

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm, yup.
MS McISAAC: Now, number 2 though, would you have -- as I understand it, you then record your answer, when you're speaking with Mr. Dyet was, "status: Probably up today."

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS MCISAAC: So you've written the question, you speak to Mr. Dyet, you write the answer.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS McISAAC: Number 2, however, presumably was not written before you spoke with Mr. Dyet?

MR. GOULD: No it was not. This is as if it -- there's no question, it's just an answer.

MS McISAAC: So, during that
conversation, you record what Mr . Dyet is telling you, or what you understand him to be telling you?

MR. GOULD: Either during the conversation or after the conversation. I do not recall when it was done.

MS McISAAC: Then if we go down to the second part of the notes, I know there was some discussion about whether it was "done" or "Dave," quite frankly it looks more to me like "done." I don't know if you have a view. You put number 2.

Now, when you have recorded the second part of that? Concurrent with the number 2 above or at a later date?

MR. GOULD: I think at a later
time on the same day, and $I$ have no idea how much later that would be. It looks to me as if $I$ made the note, the first note (2), went back to my office. There's two names there. People that I probably tried to phone or discuss --

MS McISAAC: Yes.
MR. GOULD: And then went back to
and I think it's probably "Dave," because it's a reference back up, and I said -- and I went back just to clarify something, and that's basically
the time of the call, but $I$ got the tenses wrong. There was to be -- it's not a particularly clear note, but that's probably done a couple hours after the first one or within, you know -MS MCISAAC: But there was to be a call. Is there still some confusion as to whether the call had taken place or not?

MR. GOULD: No, because the next
one, "Gar was to be there, probably wasn't." It implies -- as $I$ say, it's not a clear --

MS McISAAC: More importantly,
though, at any point in time do you recall speaking with Ms McCallion about the substance of the telephone conversation she had with --

MR. GOULD: No. No, I did not.
MS McISAAC: Now, I'd like to move on to another topic. During examination by Ms Edwardh, we were reviewing, or you were reviewing with her, the discussion you had with Inspector Cabana on October the 21st, I believe, when it was first confirmed that Mr. Arar was in Syria.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MS McISAAC: And why were you
seeking information to pass on to the Ambassador
about the status of Mr. Arar?
MR. GOULD: It was the status of
Mr. Arar in Canada, and it was for background information for the Ambassador's background. Information to give him some context. As the notes say, we had just had it confirmed, that the Syrians had -- you will recall there was the great to-ing and fro-ing trying to find him. It has now been confirmed that he's in Damascus, or he's in Syria. The ambassador is going to meet the head of Syrian Intelligence, or a senior officer, a senior representative. Who is he? Is this guy a mass murderer in Canada? Is he -- you know? Just strictly context for the background of the Ambassador.

MS MCISAAC: And the information that would then be passed on to the Ambassador by way of background for the purposes of his discussions, how would that normally be provided to him? Would it be provided by a telephone call or some kind of $C-4$ message?

MR. GOULD: Either way, and it would depend on timing. If you have the luxury of time and if there's sufficient to warrant it, you type out a $C-4$ message. If the time differential
between post and headquarters and it's short, you phone.

MS McISAAC: And would that type of information normally be passed directly by ISI, or would it be passed back through Mr. Pardy and the Consular Affairs Bureau?

MR. GOULD: Oh, in this case, this would have been passed probably by Mr. Livermore, possibly by Mr. Heatherington, possibly by myself, although $I$ don't recall phoning --

MS McISAAC: You don't recall
phoning.
MR. GOULD: I don't recall phoning
Ambassador Pillarella.
MS McISAAC: Now, with respect to
the Book of Documents that constitutes your documents for the purposes of today, exhibit P-237--

MR. GOULD: Yes?
MS McISAAC: -- and the draft
memo at tab 2, I understood you to say that you -I just want to clarify this.

Do you have any clear recollection of actually providing a copy of this memo to Mr. Livermore and Mr. Heatherington or anyone
else?
MR. GOULD: No, I don't.
MS McISAAC: So your evidence earlier was based on what you might have done?

MR. GOULD: Yes, it is what I assume I did with it. It died. It didn't go any further. That's one version. We never cleaned the typos up. My guess is I -- my guess is I handed it to either/or, or possibly both, of Livermore and Heatherington, and for whatever reason, it just never went anywhere, nor do I recall a conversation discussing it, which should be your next question.

MS McISAAC: Those are my
questions. Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Shore?
MR. SHORE: Mr. Commissioner, just
to make it clear with regard to Mr. Gould's transcript, do I understand that we're proceeding with the cross-examination, but that once the transcripts have been reproduced, we will have an opportunity to review them and then recall Mr. Gould if anything arises that requires -THE COMMISSIONER: If necessary, yes.

MR. SHORE: NO, I understand that
you prefer it not happen but --
THE COMMISSIONER: I take it
you've seen Mr. Gould's transcript, though?
MR. SHORE: I had read it earlier.
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. So that
if you need to cross-examine -- if you have a question, you should do it now so that we don't have to --

MR. SHORE: Well, I don't have --
I don't the transcript.
THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, you don't
have it with you. I see.
MR. SHORE: NO, I --
--- Off microphone / Sans microphone MS McISAAC: Well, the
ever-obliging Ms Mcisaac can provide. THE COMMISSIONER: Well, there you go.

MR. SHORE: I don't propose to
read it while I'm asking Mr. Gould questions -THE COMMISSIONER: We expect you to do that. We have high standards around here. MR. SHORE: I understand that. I realize I may not be up to scratch. I'm pedalling
as fast as $I$ can.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Well, let's go ahead with the cross-examination -MR. SHORE: I'm prepared to go ahead, and then at the break review it and if $I$ have to I --

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. MS MCISAAC: I just want to be sure that it's the entire transcript, that if there is a question it relates to a part that I have, in fact, produced.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Thank
you.
EXAMINATION
MR. SHORE: Mr. Gould, I act for Mr. Hooper, so my questions will be restricted to events that involve him.

I just want to start, though, with
clarification with regard to your memo of June 24 th, 2003, which is in tab 2, that you have described as being a dramatic memo in order to stimulate conversation? MR. GOULD: There's some wording in there which, yes, $I$ would characterize as dramatic.

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MR. SHORE: Or provocative? MR. GOULD: Or provocative,
perhaps.
MR. SHORE: And you say at the very beginning that there hasn't been a meeting of minds on an institutional level between CSIS, RCMP, and DFAIT.

Apart from what you've told us about your knowledge of the alleged conversation between Mr. Hooper and Ms McCallion, is there anything that you rely on there that comes from Mr. Hooper to indicate that there hasn't been a meeting of the minds?

MR. GOULD: With specific
reference to Mr. Hooper, no.
MR. SHORE: Just Mr. Hooper.
Mr. Hooper is my client.
MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: That's my mandate.
MR. GOULD: Nothing.
MR. SHORE: And when you say in
the next sentence that "recent exchanges have been almost testy," I take it nothing that you rely on for that provocative comment is related to Mr. Hooper?

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: And if you go to -MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry, I don't think the witness has answered the question.

MR. GOULD: I said "no." I'm
sorry.
I apologize.
MR. SHORE: I thought he said no.
And if you go to the last paragraph on that page, the second sentence: "CSIS has made it clear to the Department that they would prefer to have him remain in Syria, rather than returned to Canada."

Apart from what you've told us about your understanding of the Hooper-McCallion phone call, anything in that comment that would come, in your view, from Mr. Hooper?

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: The next sentence: "CSIS officials do not seem to understand that, guilty or innocent, Maher Arar has the right to consular

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assistance ..."
Anything that you have, any
information you have to say that coming from Mr. Hooper?

MR. GOULD: Part of that, the wording of that sentence, may have been drawn from my understanding of the telephone conversation about which we're discussing, but it would be an element of it. It was not -MR. SHORE: I'll get to the telephone conversation -MR. GOULD: I'm sure you will. MR. SHORE: -- later. But apart
from that, nothing that -- any information you have, or any culture within your department derives from Mr. Hooper?

MR. GOULD: I'm not sure I
understand your question.
MR. SHORE: Well, you indicated to
my friend, Ms Edwardh, that your opinion is based on a myriad of sources --

MR. GOULD: Several, yes.
MR. SHORE: -- with regard to
CSIS's position generally. MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.

MR. SHORE: And I take it this opinion from these sources are solely from within your department, basically. You never spoke to anyone at CSIS.

MR. GOULD: No, I did speak to
people at CSIS, but at meetings about which $I$ am not prepared to speak.

MR. SHORE: You never spoke to
Mr. Hooper?
MR. GOULD: I do not recall he was
in the meetings to which $I$ just referred.
MR. SHORE: And you never spoke to
him outside the meetings?
MR. GOULD: On this topic, no.
MR. SHORE: Whereby you got an
indication of where he stood with regard to these matters?

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: So you're not prepared to refer to any document or other source of information, apart from the phone call, which we will deal with, where Mr. Hooper doesn't believe that Mr. Arar has the right to consular assistance?

MR. GOULD: No.

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MR. SHORE: And on the next page, paragraph 3, last sentence:
"CSIS must accept that DFAIT has a duty to assist Arar, even though this may result in him regaining his freedom in Canada."

Anything that you have that
suggests that Mr. Hooper is not pursuing his mandate in good faith, apart from the phone call?

MR. GOULD: Apart from the phone call, no.

MR. SHORE: And then you conclude your memo with, "Do you agree?"

And you are asking Mr. Livermore, Mr. Heatherington -- who else?

MR. GOULD: No, I'm actually --
had this been finalized, had this gone up the chain, I'm asking Ms McCallion and Mr. Wright, do they agree that the Minister should seek a briefing? That would have instituted a whole other memo up to the Minister.

MR. SHORE: I see. And over their initials you have a line for their signature, if they agreed.

MR. GOULD: Excuse me.
MR. SHORE: The last page. Right?
MR. GOULD: Badly drafted.
MR. SHORE: Pardon me?
MR. GOULD: Badly drafted.
MR. SHORE: Badly drafted in what
way?
guess $I$ was leaving room for them to put your initials --

MR. SHORE: If they agreed, you
would expect them to put their initials?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. SHORE: If they don't agree,
you would expect that they wouldn't put their initials?

MR. GOULD: Or they could easily
write "I do not agree," or -- no, not unusual, not uncommon.

MR. SHORE: Anyway, there was certainly no indication that anyone agreed with this?

MR. GOULD: No, other than myself.
MR. SHORE: You agree with that?
MR. GOULD: Right.

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MR. SHORE: So this is your
ramblings, basically, conveying your frustration about your interpretation of the events?

MR. GOULD: I wouldn't
characterize them as ramblings, but there's obviously a level of frustration there. But I think I'm more concerned about the state of the Foreign Affairs relationship with CSIS and the RCMP rather than just frustrations.

MR. SHORE: And are you sure that you gave it to anyone to look at, or did it just remain on your computer --

MR. GOULD: As $I$ just said, I
don't recall physically giving it, but it is normal that $I$ would have done that. I wouldn't have done it just for myself and left it on the hard drive to sit there.

MR. SHORE: Do you recall who you gave it to?

MR. GOULD: I do not recall, but it would have been normal for me to give it to Mr. Livermore and/or possibly both, Livermore and Heatherington.

MR. SHORE: And I take it that
neither responded?

MR. GOULD: I don't recall.
Certainly there was no formal -- the memo went no further. The response may have been: "Crumple it up and throw it away, Jim," or "We don't agree," or "Let's let it sit for a while," or "Let's think about it." I don't recall.

MR. SHORE: If they had said we don't agree, would you have made a note of that somewhere?

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: It's over. This is your personal views, and for whatever reason, you couldn't get anyone else to sign on to it.

MR. GOULD: That's fine. That's correct.

MR. SHORE: You couldn't get anyone else to sign on to it, assuming --

MR. GOULD: Yes, no. The fact that it did not go anywhere means exactly that.

MR. SHORE: Now, dealing with the phone call -- do you have your notes in front of you? Momentarily -- sorry to take you back to them again.

MR. GOULD: Not at all. Where are we starting?

MR. SHORE: Let's start at page 9
of 16 .
MR. GOULD: Yeah.
MR. SHORE: So is there a date
that contextualizes that note?
MR. GOULD: Is there a date for
that note?
MR. SHORE: Yes.
MR. GOULD: It's not noted on the
paper but if $I$ recall correctly it's June the 5th. It's certainly -- in the hard copy text there is a date for that page and it is June 5.

MR. SHORE: All right. So you're

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satisfied --
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MR. GOULD: Excuse me.
MR. SHORE: Sorry.
MR. GOULD: To confirm that, do you have a copy of the one that I dated with each date?

MS McISAAC: My recollection was
that we had to reconstruct the dates. That they weren't actually on the page, and that you reconstructed the date as being June the 5 th --

MR. GOULD: That's right. That's
my recollection. But $I$ don't -- on each page, if
you recall, when $I$ did my in camera testimony, I went back, took out my black books and wrote the date -- I'm confident in my own mind it's June 5th, but ...

MR. SHORE: That's fair enough.
So on page 9 of 16 , June 5 , is that your first notation for that day?

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: There are other
notations for that day that come earlier than that?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. SHORE: And do you have any
times beside them?
MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: And you have no time beside this one?

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. SHORE: Apart from these
notes, do you have any personal recollection of these events?

MR. GOULD: I recall sitting down with David in his office and him telling me this, yes.

MR. SHORE: You don't know the
time?
MR. GOULD: No, I do not.
MR. SHORE: You don't know whether
it was morning or afternoon?
MR. GOULD: No, I do not. I would
guess it's after 11 p.m. because the second note has an eleven o'clock -- or 1100 hours as the time the call was to have been made --

MR. SHORE: But that doesn't
necessarily mean that the earlier part --
MR. GOULD: It does not
necessarily mean, no.

MR. SHORE: Well, you have
something intervening that has nothing to do with this matter.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. SHORE: You have two names
there, Peter Bailey and Delores --
MR. GOULD: Peter Bates and
Delores Nowak.
MR. SHORE: Dolores?
MR. GOULD: $\mathrm{N}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{W}-\mathrm{A}-\mathrm{K}$. I'm not
sure of the pronunciation.
MR. SHORE: They're not relevant.

Have nothing to do with this matter?

MR. GOULD: Nothing.
MR. SHORE: So those notes were separated by some period of time.

MR. GOULD: Yes, they were.
MR. SHORE: So the fact that under
"done," you think it may say "Dave," but if you look at how you've written "Dave" beside "Dyet" on the top line, it doesn't look the same as that.

MR. GOULD: I can only say that
I'm orthographically challenged.
MR. SHORE: Well, you may be. But
are you suggesting that that could be "Dave"?
MR. GOULD: I suggest it could be "Dave." I think it is "Dave." Other people have said it might be "done," and I can see how it might be read as "done."

MR. SHORE: Because it certainly doesn't look like the earlier "Dave."

MR. GOULD: No, it does not.
MR. SHORE: And you sometimes
write --
MR. GOULD: Sometimes I write in different scripts.

MR. SHORE: In different ways on the same day, within hours of each other?

MR. GOULD: Within hours.
MR. SHORE: What we can assume is
that the top note on the top part of the page, on top of the names and the bottom note under "done" or "Dave" were written at different times? MR. GOULD: Oh, yes. MR. SHORE: No question about
that?
MR. GOULD: No question. MR. SHORE: And I take it when
you're writing these notes on June 3rd -MR. GOULD: June 5th. MR. SHORE: June 5th, thank you, 2003, you were writing them in a normal way using normal language?

MR. GOULD: The normal language with which $I$ make notes, yes. MR. SHORE: And the first notation, "Memo from JPD," and "Status, did it go to MKM," "Probably went up today;" is that what you wrote?

MR. GOULD: Yes, it is.
MR. SHORE: That was your
understanding at that time? MR. GOULD: Yes.

MR. SHORE: That it had already gone up to her?

MR. GOULD: Yes. Oh, excuse me. MR. SHORE: Yes?

MR. GOULD: "Probably went up
today" could mean it that it went past Ms McCallion, if she had signed it off, and went up to the Minister. It's not clear from that. I think from the context it's clear later it didn't hit the Minister's office until the 9th, so this is unlikely.

MR. SHORE: So you're probably
referring --
MR. GOULD: Probably, with a fair degree of certainty.

MR. SHORE: -- to Ms McCallion. And then the bottom part of the page, under "Dave" or "done." "There was to be a call at 1100 hours today," normal languaging was to suggest -- would suggest that there has not yet been a call, there was to be one, but perhaps it didn't happen. Is that not right?

MR. GOULD: You're absolutely
correct. Badly, badly drafted note.
MR. SHORE: Well, it may be. But
if you're using normal language in the normal way, a well educated --

MR. GOULD: The original note to
above places it quite clearly in the past. MR. SHORE: I understand that. MR. GOULD: From -MR. SHORE: I understand that. But a well-educated person saying there was to be a call at 1100 hours today doesn't say by that that there already was a call.

MR. GOULD: To me, as I say, it's
badly drafted --
MR. SHORE: It's worse than badly
drafted, it's misleading.
MR. GOULD: Absolutely.
MR. SHORE: If there was a call at
1100 hours today --
MR. GOULD: Absolutely.
MR. SHORE: You would have said
that there was a call at 1100 hours today.
MR. GOULD: Had I thought that
this going to become as important as it has become, I would have taken much more care with my wording.

MR. SHORE: Well that's my point.

MR. GOULD: As it was, it was a busy day.

MR. SHORE: My point is you're reconstructing now what you wrote then, but looking at the normal languaging then, the call had not yet taken place.

MR. GOULD: Fine.
MR. SHORE: Do you agree that that
is a normal interpretation of that language?
MS EDWARDH: May I make an
objection? I don't represent the witness, obviously, but $I$ think my friend is not fair. The line that he's reading to the officer -- not the officer, the witness, has two prongs to it. One implies the future; the other implies the past.

THE COMMISSIONER: The very next sentence, Gar was to be there --

MS EDWARDH: It's not even the next sentence, there Commissioner. There's a dash. "There was to be a call." "Gar was to be there, but probably wasn't," brings it into the past. So I think in fairness to the witness the whole phrase should be put to him.

MR. GOULD: You can put the phrase to me, and I will agree you can interpret it that
way. I will interpret it the way I believe it was meant, and $I$ will say $I$ am sorry for my bad drafting but that's the way she came down. MR. SHORE: Underneath that, you have Barbara Burns with her phone number. MR. GOULD: Correct. MR. SHORE: Why is that written
there?
MR. GOULD: Because that is a phone call that $I$ made to Ms Burns about the call from CSIS Hooper basically asking if she had any information on it.

MR. SHORE: And when did you
make -- when did you make that call?
MR. GOULD: Later that same day.
MR. SHORE: And I take it you
didn't get through to her?
MR. GOULD: Correct. That's the
way I understand that note.
MR. SHORE: And you were calling
her with regard to whether that phone call took place.

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MR. SHORE: Is that right?
MR. GOULD: Correct.

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MR. SHORE: Right. And if you
turn over the page, 10 of 16 , again, you have:
"Barbara Burns EA to Ms McCallion," with her telephone number and it's about a call from CSIS.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. SHORE: Is that right?
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. SHORE: That's on page 10 so
that's a left-hand side?
MR. GOULD: No, that's a
right-hand side.
MR. SHORE: That's a right-hand
side?
MR. GOULD: The date above it sets
it into context because that's the way I start each working day, by putting the date.

MR. SHORE: So the odd numbers are
the right-hand side?
MR. GOULD: No. You cannot do
that in here. That's the reason I tried to explain, because they didn't photograph every page.

MR. SHORE: I see. Okay. So
June 6 then, is this your first entry on that page?

MR. GOULD: Yes. That date. MR. SHORE: On that date, I mean. MR. GOULD: There may have been some voice mails which would have been on the left-hand side, but whoever photocopied my black book decided if there were any voice mails that they were not relevant.

MR. SHORE: And your note is, on
June 6, "Call happened."
MR. GOULD: Yeah, right.
MR. SHORE: So that's your
confirmation.
MR. GOULD: Right.
MR. SHORE: That's your
confirmation of the call.
Isn't that right?
MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MR. SHORE: Well, isn't it
interesting that you get confirmation on June 6th of the call when you thought that the call had happened and you had spoken to Mr. Dyet about it on June 5th? If you knew that the call -- in other words -- do you follow me?

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: If Mr. Dyet is telling

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you about a phone call that has taken place, why do you have to, the next day, get confirmation that the call has taken -MR. GOULD: I was also asking about the substance. I didn't get that confirmed. I got the call happened confirmed; I didn't get any comment on the substance. MR. SHORE: Did you ask for comment on the substance? MR. GOULD: Yes. MR. SHORE: You asked Barbara

Burns that?
MR. GOULD: If I recall correctly, yes.

MR. SHORE: Did you ask her person
to person or via voice?
MR. GOULD: No, this would have
been person to person.
MR. SHORE: Person to person. And
what did you ask her?
MR. GOULD: One, did Ms McCallion
receive a call from Mr. Hooper, happened? Two, was it -- and probably rehearsed or reviewed the details as I received them from Mr. Dyet. MR. SHORE: And what was the
response?
MR. GOULD: As I recall, she didn't know. She knew the call had occurred but she had not yet spoken to Ms McCallion about the substance of the call.

MR. SHORE: So do you not understand that $I$ would find it odd that you would have to confirm a call on June the 6th that you understood took place the day before? Did you have any doubt about what Mr. Dyet told you?

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: NO?
MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: So then why would you have to confirm the call if you believed what he had said?

MR. GOULD: Perhaps I was more interested in the confirmation of the substance of the call, and the did-the-call-happen would be a polite entry into that. I don't know. I don't recall my thinking at the time.

MR. SHORE: You have no note here about the contents of the conversation?

MR. GOULD: No, I don't.
MR. SHORE: Would it surprise you

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to know that Ms Burns doesn't recall speaking to you?

MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: About this call?
MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: If we go over to the next page, 11 of 16 , you have Barbara Burns again.

MR. GOULD: That's correct.
MR. SHORE: Same number, same re.
MR. GOULD: Right.
MR. SHORE: What is that referring
to? That's June 9th.
MR. GOULD: That's Monday, and
that's me trying to phone Ms Burns to see if she has -- she has now confirmed on Friday that the call happened, and now perhaps she can give me a brief -- a debrief on the substance of the call.

MR. SHORE: And did you speak to her on June 9th?

MR. GOULD: There's no indication there that I did.

MR. SHORE: Did you leave a voice mail?

MR. GOULD: Probably.
MR. SHORE: Did she call you back?

MR. GOULD: I have no -- no
indication that she did.
MR. SHORE: And then we go to, I
take it, 13 --
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. SHORE: Is the right-hand
side.
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. SHORE: And 12 before that -MR. GOULD: Is the left-hand side, that's right.

MR. SHORE: And here you're
speaking with Mr. Dyet?
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. SHORE: And you have written
here: "He spoke to Ms McCallion. She signed off on the memo."

MR. GOULD: Yeah.
MR. SHORE: Is that coming from
Mr. Dyet?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. SHORE: And it's not coming
from Barbara Burns?
MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: It's Mr. Dyet?

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MR. GOULD: My notes would
indicate to me that it's Mr. Dyet.
MR. SHORE: And if you go back to page 12, "About call," is that information coming to you from Mr. Dyet?

MR. GOULD: Mr. Dyet.
MR. SHORE: And everything in that
paragraph is from Mr. Dyet?
MR. GOULD: Correct. Just a
second.
MR. SHORE: I'm sorry?
MR. GOULD: Yeah.
MR. SHORE: And you say "Confirmed
story we had heard."
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. SHORE: Are you referring to
the phone call as a story?
MR. GOULD: I'm referring to the conversation Mr. Dyet and I had on the 5th, where he told me that Mr. Hooper had called Ms McCallion and then went on to say that CSIS doesn't want us to get Arar back into the country because they would have to devote too many resources to watch him. So he -- so he told me -- that's my notes -that in speaking ...

MR. SHORE: I'm suggesting to you
that "Story we have heard" has nothing to do with the phone call. It has to do with the rumours circling throughout DFAIT.

MR. GOULD: What rumours?
MR. SHORE: That CSIS did not want
Arar back into Canada. MR. GOULD: I find that hard to
believe. I was talking to the same person about the same topic about which we have been discussing and $I$ don't recall the rumours. MR. SHORE: You don't recall any
rumours?
MR. GOULD: No. MR. SHORE: Within DFAIT? MR. GOULD: No. MR. SHORE: I see. I find it odd, sir, that you would use the word "story," "Confirmed story." MR. GOULD: Sloppy drafting again. MR. SHORE: Why would you not say
"Confirmed contents of call" or "Confirmed call"? MR. GOULD: Possibly because story is shorter than "contents of call." Sloppy drafting is all $I$ can put it down to.

MR. SHORE: How about just "call"? MR. GOULD: No, it's the information within the call, the story within the call.

MR. SHORE: And are you getting all this from Mr. Dyet -- maybe a bit more to it because he didn't want to get into it?

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. SHORE: And are you assuming here that Dyet had spoken to Ms McCallion about this?

MR. GOULD: I am.
MR. SHORE: Did you check with him
to see whether --
MR. GOULD: I did not follow up on it.

MR. SHORE: Did you ask him when he's telling you this, "Did you get this from Kathryn McCallion"? Did you ask him that?

MR. GOULD: I do not recall being that specific about it. I wrote down he spoke to MKM, so he must have said that he did. I wouldn't have made it up -- or at least $I$ don't think I would have. She signed off a memo. And then we just carry on. Those are my notes because...

MR. SHORE: All right. Where you
say: "MKM signed the memo so she seems to be ignoring the request from ADDO," is that your conclusion, Mr. Dyet's conclusion, or Kathryn McCallion's conclusion?

MR. GOULD: I don't recall. It certainly -- it wouldn't be Mr. McCallion's conclusion, it might be Mr. Dyet's. I don't recall whether Mr. Dyet said that to me or whether I wrote that down. Sorry. Don't.

MR. SHORE: And thinking back, of
course, is not going to help you now?
MR. GOULD: Probably not.
MR. SHORE: Could that have been
your conclusion?
MR. GOULD: Yes, it could easily
have been.
MR. SHORE: And you're sure that this information is not coming from anybody else than Mr. Dyet through Kathryn McCallion?

MR. GOULD: The information is
coming from Mr. Dyet, it's not coming through Ms McCallion.

MR. SHORE: Well, from
Ms McCallion.

MR. GOULD: I only report what
I --
MR. SHORE: You're satisfied
with --
MR. GOULD: I'm very comfortable in my own mind.

MR. SHORE: All right. Subject,
Mr. Commissioner, to reading the transcript.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
Mr. David, any re-examination?
MR. DAVID: I will be brief,
Mr. Commissioner.
EXAMINATION
MR. DAVID: The first is I'd like to bring Mr. Gould to tab 2 of our new Book of Documents, and it's your draft memo, June 24 th.

MR. GOULD: June -- oh, I believe it is, you're right.

MR. DAVID: 2003. I've read this many times.

MR. GOULD: I'm sure you have, sir.

MR. DAVID: Mr. Shore just brought you through it and asked you at several points whether the basis for your affirmations were Jack

Hooper.
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And in all cases I
believe you said no.
MR. GOULD: With the one exception that things that $I$ may have interpolated from the telephone call.

MR. DAVID: Correct. So, I bring you to the last paragraph of the first page, in the second sentence, where you claim that CSIS has made it clear to the Department that they would prefer to have him remain in Syria rather than returned to Canada. My question very simply, and just for clarity of the record, is that a reference to the Hooper-McCallion call?

MR. GOULD: I think it, as I think
I said to Mr. Shore, that it may be partially drawn from that, but it's partially drawn from other meetings as well, other incidents.

MR. DAVID: All right. And the question begs, Mr. Gould, insofar as you did have meetings with members of CSIS, and insofar as some of the language conveyed in this draft memo is based on meetings with members of CSIS personnel, my question to you is: Is your thinking, some of
your thinking, based on direct conversations with CSIS personnel?

MR. GOULD: Yes, some of it is.
MR. DAVID: And would those
members of CSIS be junior or senior to Mr. Hooper?
MR. GOULD: Oh, junior. In CSIS
it was -- there were two people who were not junior to him, if $I$ recall correctly.

MR. DAVID: Okay.
MR. GOULD: And I didn't associate
with them.
MR. DAVID: I'd like to now bring
you to the phone slips concerning the call itself, and the phone slips have been filed in volume P-85, volume 5, tab 15.

MR. GOULD: Sorry? Tab 15?
MR. DAVID: Tab 15. And if you
could go to the second page, and I'm going to ask you to also refer to your notes, but the first message on the very top, it's a phone slip that is addressed to Kathryn McCallion. It is dated June the 6th.

MR. GOULD: Yup.
MR. DAVID: And the message says that it's from you.

MR. GOULD: Yup.
MR. DAVID: And the contents of the message is "re your phone call with CSIS on Arar."

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: It would seem from
this phone slip that you called Kathryn McCallion on June 6th --

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: -- seeking her input
on the phone call.
MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: Do you recall doing
so?
MR. GOULD: No, I will contend
that $I$ called Ms Burns. I don't recall whether I asked to speak to Ms McCallion. I may have just -- but for whatever reason she has passed it on to Ms McCallion. I may have said -- I could easily have said I would like to speak to Ms McCallion about this topic and that's the message being passed, but that's the day in which my note says "Call happened," so I would -Ms Burns confirms that the call happened. She may have been -- I may have said I'd like to talk to

Ms McCallion about what was said and that's the substance of it.

MR. DAVID: But you never spoke to
Ms McCallion?
MR. GOULD: No, I did not.
MR. DAVID: The final question, Mr. Gould, concerns your notes once again, and on page 9 we've dated these as June 5th. You take it and your testimony is to the effect that the phone call -- the understanding that you have is that the phone call has already taken place -MR. GOULD: Yes. MR. DAVID: -- and that is the way you understand the language that you've used. MR. GOULD: That's correct. MR. DAVID: If you go to your notes on the next page for June 6th -- let me first say that on June 5th the confirmation that the call has occurred is coming from Dave Dyet.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And on June 6th you
note call happened, and this confirmation is coming from Barbara Burns.

MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: Is there any

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inconsistency in your mind between those two references and the fact that you're noting that the call is confirmed happened --

MR. GOULD: Not, not in my mind.
MR. DAVID: Could you just
explain?
MR. GOULD: I was still interested in the content of the call, the substance of the conversation, and I phoned Ms Burns. She confirmed that the call happened, was not -perhaps had not yet received a briefing, or Ms McCallion had not yet told her -- she hadn't asked her or thought to tell her what the substance was. I would guess by the fact that there's a phone message there, that $I$ probably said, "Well, can I speak to Ms McCallion about it?" She wasn't available. A phone message went in.

MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are my questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. David.

Just wait a second. I'll address the timing issues.

It seems to me there's two issues.
The first is the time to read the two transcripts.

The second, with that in mind, is does Mr. Gould need to stand by in case there are further questions.

As a matter of process, one way of dealing with it, which may be the most efficient, would be to take a short break now -- Ms McCallion is here -- and to have Mr. David do the examination, his examination, then to take a break for the cross-examinations to give people a chance to read the transcripts, having heard the main examination, may shorten the exercise. That's just a suggestion, and I'm open to suggestions from all counsel.

I'd like to finish all of this
today.
Does anybody disagree with that approach?

Okay. Well, then we'll take a ten-minute break right now. Mr. Gould, unfortunately we're going to have to ask you to stand by for some time, and get a newspaper and entertain yourself and we'll resume in ten minutes.

Thank you.
THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Upon recessing at 3:46 p.m. /
Suspension à 15 h 46
--- Upon resuming at 3:49 p.m.
Reprise à 15 h 49
THE REGISTRAR: Please, be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
MR. DAVID: Mr. Commissioner,
Ms McCallion is before you, and has testified in camera.

THE COMMISSIONER: Good afternoon,
Ms McCallion.
MS McCALLION: Good afternoon,
sir.
THE COMMISSIONER: You are still
under oath.
Go ahead, Mr. David.
PREVIOUSLY SWORN: KATHRYN McCALLION EXAMINATION

MR. DAVID: Ms McCallion, I'd like
to, for the benefit of all present, review briefly your CV, as this is your first appearance in public.

Your CV has been filed as
exhibit $P-85$, volume 5, tab 14.
MS McCALLION: Okay, yes.

MR. DAVID: You have a bachelor's in political science in 1972, and you have a partial completion of a masters in political science from Carleton University.

You have been employed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs since 1973 ?
MS McCALLION: Two.
MR. DAVID: Nineteen
seventy-two (1972).
And you have been an Assistant
Deputy Minister since 1994.
MS McCALLION: Yes, correct.
MR. DAVID: So for over ten years?
MS McCALLION: That's correct.
MR. DAVID: You are presently -or I should say at the relevant time you were Assistant Deputy Minister of Consular Affairs, Corporate Services and Passport since 1999, September of 1999?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And previous to that, Ms McCallion, you were also the Assistant Deputy Minister, since the very beginning of 1998, again for consular affairs?

MS McCALLION: Yes.

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MR. DAVID: So in fact, in point of fact, since 1998 you have been Assistant Deputy Minister of Consular Affairs?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And is this a position
that you hold to this day?
MS MCCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: When did you lose the
consular affairs portfolio?
MS McCALLION: January 16 of this year.

MR. DAVID: Of 2005?
MS McCALLION: Of 2005. It was a reorganization of the Department of Foreign Affairs, after the split that the government had announced of DFAIT being split into two departments.

MR. DAVID: All right. Can you describe briefly the role -- the responsibilities attached to your position in terms of the relevant time, in terms of 2002, 2003?

MS McCALLION: As it pertains to consular or the whole package? MR. DAVID: No, as it pertains to consular affairs.

MS McCALLION: My role was the day-to-day management of the consular bureau as Gar Pardy, who was Director General, it was a direct report. So it was concerning how they spent their money, the staffing actions, all the regular things that go on in a bureau of the department, and at the senior level he reported to me. So it was concerning primarily the day-to-day management of consular affairs.

However, I was also briefed regularly on key issues of concern and how they were being managed. Normally, who collectively were managing them; so if you had a crisis, like this last year, the tsunami, then you would have the consular bureau as part of a task force. That task force would be chaired by an ADM, usually an ADM geographic, but $I$ was kept in the loop of where we were, what was happening, in particular if more resources were required or not, as an example.

MR. DAVID: So is it that priority files were brought to your attention even though they were consular matters?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And does Mr. Arar's
file fit into that category?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And when did you
become first aware of the Arar file? Obviously
there were media reports, and I'm not referring to
that. We were well aware of at least since October of 2002 , but in terms of your position as Assistant Deputy Minister?

MS McCALLION: There would be two ways of informing me. One is sort of an update on hot cases, and secondly it would have been the intensity when he had been deported and we were trying to get him back.

I distinctly remember being
briefed. He has gone from New York and we have to find him.

MR. DAVID: So as of at least
October 2002 --
MS McCALLION: October of 2002.
MR. DAVID: -- you were being briefed more than what the media was reporting in your position as Assistant Deputy Minister?

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MR. DAVID: Is it fair to say that since that time the Arar file was one of the files
that you were regularly briefed on by Mr. Pardy and others?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Ms McCallion, I don't
know if you have had the benefit of hearing today's testimony from Mr. Livermore and Mr. Gould. We have reviewed extensively the June 5th memo. I would like you to refer to it briefly.

That is found at tab 5 of $P-117$, volume 2. In fact, it's 75.5.

The front page, the first page is the transmittal slip. Your name appears on it, and in fact your signature also appears on this document.

My first question to you -- and I gather you are familiar with the contents of this memo?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: My first question to
you: Is there anything unusual in terms of internal processing for this memo to land up on your desk for authorization?

MS MCCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: Is this in the normal
course of business that you would have received such a memo from Mr. Pardy?

MS McCALLION: Yes. Yes, sir.
MR. DAVID: Were you aware of the background of this memo -- and by "background", I will define that.

We have -- and it's been filed in
fact at tab 3 -- seen a draft memo, a draft version of this memo that Mr. Pardy wrote that is dated May the 5th, 2003. We have heard also much evidence about meetings that followed the draft memo, the circulation of the draft memo to CSIS and to the RCMP. Meetings occurred to come to a consensus on a course of action.

Are you aware of that background to the June 5th memo that came up to you? MS McCALLION: I'm aware of the background. I'm not aware of all of the ramifications or all the details. So the nature of the briefing would have been Mr. Pardy reporting to me what was being attempted and how they were doing it and how they were progressing, but not a blow-by-blow, nor was $I$ at any of the meetings, nor was $I$ asked to be at any of the meetings.

MR. DAVID: But you did have a
general understanding --
MS McCALLION: A general
understanding that work was proceeding to, to the best of our ability, bring Mr. Arar home and processes and conversations, dialogues between partners were carrying on.

MR. DAVID: And was it to your understanding that the process of trying to arrive to a recommended course of action for your Minister involve discussions with the RCMP and with CSIS?

MS MCCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And was it to your understanding that in fact at one point there was the hope, put it that way, that a joint letter, a joint letter signed by both your Minister and the Solicitor General could be signed and sent over to Syria in terms of an effort of getting Mr. Arar back to Canada?

MS McCALLION: That one I'm not as comfortable with agreeing with. I don't recall being told specifically who would sign the letter. I remember we now need to propose a letter. But I can't agree that $I$ knew that it would have two

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signatures on it.

MR. DAVID: All right. Can you tell us the date that this memo ended up in the Minister's office, by looking at the transmittal slip?

MS McCALLION: My assumption is it was Monday the 9th.

MR. DAVID: And what do you base
that on?
MS MCCALLION: The date stamp in
the corner.

MR. DAVID: In the right-hand
corner of the box --
MS McCALLION: $3 / 6 / 9,11: 30$, I
think it is.
MR. DAVID: And there's a time
that is indicated.
So that is your understanding of the date at which it would have arrived at the Minister's office?

MS McCALLION: Registered.
MR. DAVID: Registered in the
Minister's office?

MS McCALLION: Right.
MR. DAVID: Do you know when this
memo left your office to end up in the office of the Deputy Minister?

And just to help you or assist
you --
MS McCALLION: It was sometime between Thursday and Friday at close of business.

MR. DAVID: Okay. Which brings me to my next question: When did you receive this memo?

MS McCALLION: I'm not precisely clear as to when, but it was very -- around the whole discussion of the phone calls, I received the memo. I did not have the memo sitting in my office gathering dust. So it's with the same timeframe and the same rather vagueness. It was within a day, day and a half.

I clearly had asked to see the memo prior to dealing with it, either by a phone call or -- $I$ couldn't deal with it or sign it if $I$ didn't have it. So where is it? Please get it here.

MR. DAVID: So you were expecting this memo?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And this expectation
was created by the fact that $M r$. Pardy told you that this memo was coming to you?

MS MCCALLION: I believe so. MR. DAVID: And you have already mentioned just now that you wanted to read the memo before speaking to Mr. Hooper?

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MR. DAVID: So am I to understand,
or are we to understand, I should say, that Mr. Hooper had placed a call to you before you received the memo?

MS McCALLION: I really don't recall the exact chronology of this, but around that time I had received a call from Mr. Hooper. I clearly would not have taken the call without knowing why he was calling, and I would normally ask my DG, "Do you know what this is about?" And if it had been about this, which we assume it was, then could you show it to -- if it's something to be discussed, could I see it and read it before $I$ call back?

So that's perfectly normal
behaviour.
The precision of how it happened in this occasion I'm not as clear on as $I$ would
like to be.
MR. DAVID: Let's see if $I$ can help you reconstruct that.

First of all, did you know who
Jack Hooper was?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Had you ever spoken to
Mr. Hooper before?
MS McCALLION: I think, as I had said to you previous -- well, let me repeat myself. I may have, but not on a specific consular case. There are other occasions in Ottawa where ADMs get together and they are on working groups, et cetera, et cetera.

MR. DAVID: So not specifically --
MS McCALLION: Not specifically on this, work-related.

MR. DAVID: And you knew Mr. Hooper to have a very senior position within CSIS?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Can $I$ say that you
knew that he was basically the Number 3 man of the organization?

MS McCALLION: I would have done
it the other way, which is -- I assumed he was more or less my counterpart.

MR. DAVID: Fair enough. Your position as an ADM puts you basically at Number 3 position --

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: -- within your
organization?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And you understood
Mr. Hooper to be your counterpart?
MS McCALLION: Yes, without
counting.
MR. DAVID: Let me now refer you to Barbara Burns, your executive assistant's phone slips for that day.

Could you go to tab 15 of $P-85$, volume 5, please.

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: There are two pages in
this tab and they are in chronological order, Ms McCallion. The second box has been redacted. However, the date that appears for that -- on the first page, I'm sorry, if you go to the first page?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: The second box is
redacted. It does not concern this inquiry. However, the date that is indicated is June 3rd, 2003.

The next message, Jack Hooper, is not dated. And the bottom message is dated, and that is June 5th, 2003.

So by Ms Burns' reconstruction,
she has testified to the fact that this message of Jack Hooper was registered by her no later than June 5th.

MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: And the message reads: "For KEM."

Is that her common way of
addressing you, KEM, on phone slips?
MS McCALLION: Yes. We have been together for 13 years and they keep changing my acronym but not my initials.

MR. DAVID: So far.
MS McCALLION: So far. They are
working on that one.
MR. DAVID: And the message is:
"Jack Hooper CSIS"

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MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And the message is:
"re: Arar"
So you knew that Mr. Hooper was
calling you about Arar?
MS McCALLION: Right.
MR. DAVID: Did that puzzle you?
MS McCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: At first?
MS McCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: Okay. You have
mentioned that your position was you are not returning Mr. Hooper's call until you have read the memo?

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MR. DAVID: So you have made the
link between the call and the memo?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And why?
MS McCALLION: Because I knew we
were going up to the Minister around that time with the strategy of what next steps we were taking to get Mr. Arar released.

MR. DAVID: And you knew that that strategy included a letter to be issued by your

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Minister to the Foreign Minister of Syria. If you want, $I$ can refer you to the document in question that it is attached to the memo.

MS McCALLION: The memo now had the letter. You are asking me did $I$ know in advance? Yes and no. I knew we were going to the Minister with a briefing. I knew we had been asked for one and we had been asked for our strategy and various strategies had been outlined, and I probably knew that it had got to the point of sending a letter.

MR. DAVID: And there was a letter
that was attached to the memo?
MS McCALLION: Yes, there was.
MR. DAVID: And you read that
letter?
MS McCALLION: I did.
MR. DAVID: And you understood
that the letter was going from your Minister to the Foreign Minister of Syria? MS McCALLION: Yes. MR. DAVID: And it included this language that was arrived at by consensus as it was indicated in the memo, that "there was no

Canadian government impediment to Mr. Arar's return to Canada"?

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And this you
understood to be a language to be coached -coached in the sense that it was the product of a consensus between various Canadian government agencies, including CSIS?

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MR. DAVID: Including the RCMP?
MS McCALLION: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And obviously DFAIT.
Okay.
Other than the phone slip that we have just seen, what other heads-up, if any, did you have that Mr. Hooper was going to call you, or calling you about Mr. Arar?

MS McCALLION: The best I can
recollect was $I$ was aware that the town was not in agreement at the outset, 100 per cent agreement. Well, I must have been told by someone because I don't have any briefing notes to that effect, that we are trying to get the town to agree and we are working on it but we are not there yet.

MS EDWARDH: Mr. Commissioner, I
didn't understand the word. You are trying to get the "town" to agree?

MS McCALLION: I'm sorry. Other departments in Ottawa. Keep your eye on me; I do things like that.

So I was aware that it wasn't, what would we say, a done deal at the start; that it was going to take some collaboration and some discussions.

MR. DAVID: And that was including
on June 5th to be the situation?
MS McCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: No?
MS McCALLION: By the time $I$ got the memo, I had been told this was an agreed memo. MR. DAVID: And do you recall who
told you that?
MS McCALLION: Gar.
MR. DAVID: Gar Pardy told you
that this was now a final product and that you had the green light and this could go ahead?

MS McCALLION: From his level. MR. DAVID: From his level.

Director General level?
MS McCALLION: Director General
level.
MR. DAVID: Below you?
MS McCALLION: They had done their work interdepartmentally. The interdepartmental community could agree with this letter.

MR. DAVID: And that was for the interdepartmental community of all the concerned organizations?

MS McCALLION: I wasn't in the room, so I'm not sure who was there. I had been following it with CSIS, RCMP. I think other people from the Solicitor General, I believe PCO; but the community of concerned departments.

MR. DAVID: And did you understand that on June 5th, when you received this memo, that there were potential outstanding issues in terms of agreement on the manner to proceed?

MS McCALLION: No, the contrary.
MR. DAVID: The contrary, okay.
MS McCALLION: That this was now understood around town, the role that Foreign Affairs was going to take, how they were going to take it, and the content of the letter.

MR. DAVID: So did you read the memo before returning Mr. Hooper's call?

MS McCALLION: I did.
MR. DAVID: And do you recall the date that you did that on?

MS McCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: No. Did you
understand that the processing of the memo, there was some -- maybe "urgency" is a strong word, but there was some --

MS McCALLION: Urgent.
MR. DAVID: You will qualify it as
being urgent?
MS McCALLION: Urgency.
MR. DAVID: Urgency?
MS McCALLION: There was some
level of urgency.
MR. DAVID: There was some level. And that concern for some urgency in treating of the matter, how did you understand that there was some urgency to dealing with the memo and processing the memo?

MS McCALLION: My understanding was the Minister or the Minister's office was asking where are we on the next steps? This was in the public domain at the time, and there was pressure for Ministers to answer questions about
what were they doing and how were they doing it.
MR. DAVID: And so you understood
that your Minister wanted to act in this manner --
MS McCALLION: A manner.
MR. DAVID: I'm sorry?
MS McCALLION: He wanted action.
This was our recommendation.
MR. DAVID: Okay, fine. So he was waiting upon the memo, and he was waiting upon the letter? Yes?

MS MCCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: No?
MS McCALLION: He was waiting for us to suggest something to him. This is what we were suggesting to him.

MR. DAVID: Okay, fine. Good
enough.
Did you have any issues in reading the memo when you read the memo?

MS McCALLION: No. Issues? No.
I may have asked for clarification, but I don't recall. But it was very clear.

MR. DAVID: And did you read the
letter?
MS McCALLION: Yes.

MR. DAVID: And did you agree with the contents, the language of the letter? Did you make any suggestions? Did you seek any clarification as to the letter?

MS McCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: Now, before calling Mr. Hooper back, what did you do? Did you try to speak to Gar Pardy?

Do you recall having a meeting
with Dave Dyet in your office?
MS McCALLION: No. But I
understand Mr. Dyet recalls having a meeting with me, and therefore we had a meeting. I mean, if Mr. Dyet recalled it, we did.

It is customary for me to say,
"I've read the memo. What do you want me to know prior to a meeting I'm going to, a briefing I'm going to," and in this case probably prior to the phone call. Background. Like, how did we get to where we are.

MR. DAVID: But clearly you
understood that there was a link between the memo, the phone call and Mr. Arar?

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MR. DAVID: And this phone call
lasted approximately how long with Mr. Hooper? MS McCALLION: To my best recollection, it was longer than five minutes and it wasn't half an hour, so $I$ would say 15,20 minutes.

MR. DAVID: Okay. And clearly you
had read the memo?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And from Mr. Dyet's testimony, you are satisfied that you had sat down with Mr. Dyet previous to calling Mr. Hooper?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Did you call
Mr. Hooper back, or did he call you back to speak to actually --

MS McCALLION: I believe I called him.

MR. DAVID: I would like you now to describe in as much detail as possible the contents of your conversation with Mr. Hooper.

MS McCALLION: This isn't as easy as it sounds because it was a general conversation as well as a specific conversation. It was specific, we should be talking about Arar, but rather than talk about the details of Arar, we
were talking about the global situation, relations with the United States and other states post-September 11 , my role, or the role of Foreign Affairs vis-à-vis our mandate and our obligation on consular affairs, his role and mandate vis-à-vis his obligation as a member of CSIS, previous ways and means of cooperation.

Did I understand the full
ramifications of promising more than we could deliver or not? Were we clear?

It was of that magnitude -- like,
it was of that kind. It was not a specific request. It was not acrimonious. It was not confrontational. It was a dialogue between two ADMs representing two different mandates that were being obliged to work together, and I think it was a verification that $I$ knew what consular was doing, that $I$ understood what the memo was about, and that $I$ was aware of the contents of the memo and the letter. Like, $I$ wasn't just signing something.

So to the best of my ability, that was the nature of the conversation.

MR. DAVID: So Mr. Hooper was asking you to reflect upon how you do your work in

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terms of processing this memo?
MS McCALLION: No, because that makes it sound like he was questioning how I did my work, and that's not what $I$ said.

We were acknowledging that in some instances departmental mandates were not always 100 per cent complementary, and that efforts would be made to get them as close as possible, understanding the mandates of each department, why they might be in conflict.

For instance, with the RCMP, in previous times with criminal cases the RCMP have been known to be upset when they help put someone in jail, and the first thing that happens is the consular division tries to offer them consular assistance, with or without any prejudice about whether they are or aren't guilty.

So I think it was again with CSIS, "This is our mandate, national security. We have to be careful, we have to be thorough." And I'm saying, "I do consular. This person is obliged to get the assistance we are giving." And then we talked about it.

MR. DAVID: Let me ask you, Ms McCallion, was it your understanding that when
you spoke to Mr. Hooper, he was in possession of the memo?

MS MCCALLION: No, I don't
think -- I never -- we never asked whether he agreed to the contents or had seen the memo. The only reassurance was that the contents of the letter as drafted had been sufficiently negotiated that CSIS was not objecting to it.

MR. DAVID: So there was reference
to the letter?
MS McCALLION: No, not
specifically. It's, "Are you comfortable with the steps? Do you understand $I$ am sending my memo or my letter up?" That was my job.

MR. DAVID: But $I$ just want to understand very clearly here.

Mr. Hooper, in his conversation with you, did he understand that there was a letter to be issued by your Minister to Syria?

MS McCALLION: Yes. I would say
he was.
MR. DAVID: And did you understand
that he was aware of the language of the letter, the contents of the letter?

MS McCALLION: I don't know if he
was or not.
MR. DAVID: But he was aware of the fact that DFAIT was contemplating this course of action?

MS McCALLION: Yes, and that there had been meetings.

MR. DAVID: Meetings between --
MS McCALLION: The agencies.
MR. DAVID: The agencies,
including the RCMP, CSIS and DFAIT?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And he made reference
to that course of action?
MS McCALLION: I don't recall. I don't recall specific step-by-step what the conversation -- like, step-by-step.

MR. DAVID: Okay.
MS McCALLION: So my hypothesis is we were discussing the fact that there had been consultations, things were progressing, and we would be going ahead with our plan of action.

MR. DAVID: So one of the things
that you have mentioned is that he explained to you CSIS' mandate?

MS McCALLION: Yes.

MR. DAVID: What did he tell you in that regard?

MS McCALLION: It was in general
terms; that they have to take great care of national security and that's what their job was. MR. DAVID: And did you not know that already? MS McCALLION: Sure, I did. MR. DAVID: Did you learn anything about CSIS' mandate -MS McCALLION: No. MR. DAVID: -- from Mr. Hooper that day?

MS McCALLION: No, nor do I think he learned anything about consular.

MR. DAVID: So in terms of an
education process between two ADMs, you learned nothing about CSIS' mandate and their role in the Canadian government, and you are saying that he learned nothing about DFAIT's role in the Canadian government and its mandate?

MS McCALLION: I think both of us
were reassuring each other that we were aware of the issue in the context of our mandates.

MR. DAVID: Aware of what issue,

Ms McCallion?
MS McCALLION: The Arar case.
MR. DAVID: The Arar case. So he was contextualizing for you what you should be considering in terms of CSIS' mandate with regard to what you had to decide in terms of processing the memo.

MS McCALLION: No. I think it was more an acknowledgment of the mandates on both our parts.

MR. DAVID: So what did he want you to acknowledge in terms of CSIS' mandate with regard to what you had to do?

MS McCALLION: The role they had been playing up till then in the interdepartmental community. Discussions.

MR. DAVID: That doesn't quite answer my question.

I mean, you clearly understood what your role was and what DFAIT's mandate was.

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And clearly Mr. Hooper had nothing to tell you about what you had to do in terms of DFAIT's mandate.

MS McCALLION: No. I think what

I'm trying to say is the discussion was around the fact that in some instances the mandates of the two departments are not necessarily 100 per cent concurrent, and how do we resolve the need -again, you have heard it today -- to speak with one voice. How does the government make sure that all considerations that have to be taken into account have been taken into account?

And it was simply, "Are you taking
into account?" "Yes." "Are you taking me into
account?" "Yes." "Are we still more or less in the middle of the road?" "Yes." "Are we in agreement that what we have done so far we can live with?" "Yes." "Thank you." "Thank you." So it's not a lecture. It's not an instructive thing. It is a reassurance. MR. DAVID: It's a reassurance of what, Ms McCallion?

MS McCALLION: Well, I would
imagine he was reassuring himself that I was aware of the content of the discussions that had occurred at a junior level and that they weren't actually as easy as they might have been, but they have been resolved.

MR. DAVID: But your understanding
is that a consensus had been arrived at already. MS McCALLION: Yes. MR. DAVID: That is your
understanding?
MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: Was it not
Mr. Hooper's understanding?
MS McCALLION: I think so. MR. DAVID: So what was the point of his call?
ask him.
MS McCALLION: You will have to

MR. DAVID: And his conversation
to you.
to ask him.
MS MCCALLION: Well, you will have
being a pointless call to you?
MS McCALLION: No. Reassuring.
MR. DAVID: Reassuring for himself
or reassuring for you?
MS McCALLION: Both of us.
MR. DAVID: And how did the call
reassure you?
MS McCALLION: Because it ended
well. "Thank you for calling."
MR. DAVID: So you discussed the
mandate of CSIS in the context --
MS McCALLION: In the context of
the issue at hand. It was the role and function each of us play, from a slightly different perspective on a very complex issue, that was in the public domain.

MR. DAVID: And what did you
explain to him about your mandate?
MS McCALLION: That the memo would
be going forward.
MR. DAVID: You told him that?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: You asserted that?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And how did he react

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to that?
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MS McCALLION: He agreed. He didn't disagree.

MR. DAVID: He did not disagree with the fact that your Minister was writing to the Foreign Minister?

MS McCALLION: Right.
MR. DAVID: Did he give you any
warnings?
MS MCCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: Did he raise any
flags --
MS McCALLION: This is part of the reassurance because sometimes you can end a phone call with, "Then I'm afraid I will have to have my Minister talk to your Minister" or "My Deputy will talk to your Deputy."

And I think both of us were
reassured that after our conversation he did not refer it upwards in his system and I did not refer it upwards in my system. I did not debrief upwards on the phone call.

MR. DAVID: And what did you
discuss concerning Mr. Arar per se? What was shared between the both of you about -MS McCALLION: To my recollection, nothing.

MR. DAVID: -- the case?
MS MCCALLION: Nothing.
MR. DAVID: Now, in terms of
timing, clearly Mr. Hooper had well-identified the time where this memo was in the machine, if $I$ could say, in terms of processing, and clearly he
had identified the person on whose desk the memo was for the purposes of processing?

MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: Did that not strike you as an odd coincidence?

MS McCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: Did it not strike you as being perhaps an indirect attempt to influence your decision-making in terms of processing the memo?

MS McCALLION: I would put it more that $I$ was willing to listen to him, but I didn't assume what he was going to say. So I wasn't surprised he phoned me. I wasn't surprised he knew where the memo was. I assumed all the DGs had been told it has been finalized and it is starting up the system, and each department would have so informed their immediate superiors. And if you wanted to touch base, you would.

MR. DAVID: But the situation is as follows: The memo is on your desk. It is there for the purposes of your review.

MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: It is there for the purposes of your contribution, and it is there for
the purposes of your authorization.
MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: And Mr. Hooper is
calling at that exact moment --
MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: -- where it's before
you --
MS McCALLION: Right.
MR. DAVID: -- for that purpose.
MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAVID: And on one hand, you understood from your people, Mr. Pardy and others, that a consensus had been arrived at with, amongst others, CSIS?

MS McCALLION: Right.
MR. DAVID: So in your mind, or in the mind of a reasonable person, I'm asking you: Could it not be understood that Mr. Hooper's call was an attempt to influence your decision-making in terms of the memo?

MS McCALLION: Not at all. He was probably phoning to find out if $I$ was going to change the letter. But $I$ don't know. You will have to ask Mr. Hooper. But he did not ask me to change anything.

MR. DAVID: Did he refer to the
language of the letter?
MS McCALLION: Not directly.
MR. DAVID: Well, indirectly, how
did he refer to it then?
MS McCALLION: That we have agreed
language around town that we can all live with.
MR. DAVID: And this call, to the
best of your ability to recall it, lasted from 15 to 20 minutes?

MS McCALLION: Approximately.
MR. DAVID: So if you had to
describe the purpose of the call, Ms McCallion, at the end of the day, how would you describe the purpose for that call?

MS McCALLION: He was reassuring himself $I$ was aware of the intricacies of the job at hand.

MR. DAVID: That you were aware of the intricacies? In other words, that you were not only --

MS McCALLION: That $I$ knew this had been talked about around town. It wasn't agreed around town at the beginning. It was difficult. Sensitivities. Did I know there had
been a lot of work going into this? An awareness. And I suggest I was.

MR. DAVID: So was it to try to
make it that the language that the letter contained remained that language and didn't change --

MS McCALLION: You will have to
ask Mr. Hooper. He did not ask me about it.
MR. DAVID: Did he tell you that he was content with the present form of the letter?

MS McCALLION: No. We did not discuss happiness, contentment, anything at all of that nature.

MR. DAVID: Did he tell you that the language in its present form, as it was attached to the memo, was satisfactory to CSIS?

MS McCALLION: Not to my
recollection.
MR. DAVID: Did he tell you that any other language would not be satisfactory and there would be no consensus if any other language was considered?

MS McCALLION: I don't recall that he did.
--- Pause

> MR. DAVID: It was understood by
> you, Ms McCallion, that the language was an agreed-upon language in town, as you say?
> MS McCALLION: Yes.
> MR. DAVID: And it was also your
> understanding that Mr. Hooper understood that it
was agreed-upon language --
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: -- when he called you?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: That was his
understanding?
MS MCCALLION: That was my
understanding of his understanding.
MR. DAVID: So, again, what is the
point of the call?
MS McCALLION: You will have to
ask him. He initiated the call. We had the call.
I left the call not briefing up -- not worried I had signed or was signing the memo. And to be brutal, as far as $I$ was concerned, that was it. MR. DAVID: And so you informed

Mr. Hooper --
MS McCALLION: We didn't -- we

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didn't plan to meet again, talk again. We had our conversation. It was very cordial and very professional, and we hung up.

MR. DAVID: And did you gain any additional understanding from anything Mr. Hooper said to you?

MS McCALLION: Hard to say. Hard
to say what $I$ knew. Hard to say what -- I had also been responsible for Passport, so $I$ was very aware of the ramifications of September lith internationally. Maybe he didn't know that $I$ knew that. I don't know. You will have to ask. MR. DAVID: Did Mr. Hooper acknowledge in any way that he was better educated about DFAIT's mandate following your call, your conversation?

MS MCCALLION: Not to me, he didn't.

MR. DAVID: I would like to bring you to Mr. Gould's notes, Ms McCallion. This is P-236.

MS McCALLION: No, I don't have
that. Or if $I$ do, it's gone. All right, $I$ have it. MR. DAVID: Could you go to page 9

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of 16 at tab 1.
These are Mr. Gould's notes. You
know who Mr. Gould is. He is an officer within
ISI. He is the Deputy Director of ISI.
He notes the following on June
5th. It's at the top and it's ii:
"Call from Jack Hooper ADDO
to MKM saying that CSIS
doesn't want us to get Arar back in the country as they would have to devote too many resources to watching him."

Did Mr. Hooper refer to the lack of CSIS resources in terms of watching Arar if he was to come back to Canada?

MS McCALLION: Not to my recollection, no.

MR. DAVID: Did Mr. Hooper mention to you that CSIS didn't want Mr. Arar back in the country?

MS MCCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: To your knowledge, Ms McCallion, had a member of CSIS ever called you before about a consular case?

MS McCALLION: Not to my
recollection.
MR. DAVID: I would like to bring you now to tab -- you have the Volume in front of you. It's P-85, volume 5, tab 15. It's the phone slips from Ms Barbara Burns.

If you could go to the second page, the top message, it says "KEM" and it's dated June the 6th, from Jim Gould, ISI. And, again, the message in terms of content is "Re your phone call with CSIS on Arar".

Did you have any conversation, to your recollection, with Jim Gould concerning this call?

MS MCCALLION: No, I didn't.
MR. DAVID: Did you discuss the call with anybody?

MS McCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: Did you discuss the call with Mr. Pardy, with Mr. Heatherington, with Mr. Gould?

MS McCALLION: To the best of my recollection, I never discussed the content with anyone and discussed the fact that it had occurred and the memo had gone forward with someone in consular.

MR. DAVID: With some what?
MS McCALLION: Someone in
consular. And my understanding now is Gar Pardy had left, so it would have been Dave Dyet.

I had the conversation. I've
signed the memo. It has left my office.
MR. DAVID: And did you take any actions of any kind following the phone call with Mr. Hooper?

MS MCCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are my questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Should we take a break?

Ms Edwardh?
minutes?
THE COMMISSIONER: Sure.
MS EDWARDH: I think $I$ have found
the portions of the conversation that I need to read, and then $I$ will be able to proceed.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
And, Mr. Shore, you were going to read the transcript. That will give you enough
time, I take it?
MR. SHORE: Yes, I've read what I
have to read. I will have some examination for Mr. Gould.

THE COMMISSIONER: You will?
MR. SHORE: But brief. Yes. I'm
sorry to surprise you, but it won't be lengthy. THE COMMISSIONER: All right. We will break for 20 minutes.
--- Upon recessing at 4:39 p.m. /
Suspension à 16 h 39
--- Upon resuming at 5:00 p.m. /
Reprise à 17 h 00
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. David.
MR. DAVID: Thank you.
Ms Edwardh, I have one more
question for Ms McCallion.
I just want to clarify a point, Ms McCallion.

After the phone call with Mr. Hooper, I understand you did speak to the matter to Mr. Dyet; that you confirm that the call had taken place?

MS McCALLION: To the best of my
recollection, $I$ informed consular that the call
had taken place and the memo had been signed. I don't recall who $I$ spoke to.

They were the originators of the memo. They should not expect it back.

MR. DAVID: Assuming that
Mr. Pardy was away, was the next in line be Dave Dyet?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Not being 100 per cent
sure as to who you spoke to from consular that day
about the memo, processing the memo and the phone
call, did you describe to the person your
discussions with Mr. Hooper?
MS MCCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: And provide content
about the discussion?
MS McCALLION: No.
MR. DAVID: Thank you.
EXAMINATION
MS EDWARDH: Good afternoon, Ms McCallion. My name is Marlys Edwardh. I represent Maher Arar. Why didn't you discuss the content of the conversation with anyone? Is there any reason?

MS McCALLION: It didn't affect
the actions being taken.
MS EDWARDH: For that reason you treated the matter as confidential?

MS McCALLION: No. More did it, done it, finished. It didn't affect what was taking place.

MS EDWARDH: Let me ask you a couple of questions.

This telephone call you have described as being relatively short, something less than 30 minutes, probably closer to 15 or 20 ?

MS McCALLION: I described it that way, yes; not short, but about that length.

MS EDWARDH: I take it, from the absence of any notes that you have referred to, you didn't make any notes at all of the conversation with Mr. Hooper.

MS McCALLION: I made no notes.
MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry?
MS McCALLION: I made no notes.
MS EDWARDH: Nor did you dictate any report in respect of that contact or provide any information to anyone who was your superior in the department.

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MS McCALLION: Yes, correct.
MS EDWARDH: You have described
yourself as having been kept abreast of developments, at least in general terms, as they related to Maher Arar. In particular, it is my understanding that you met with or were briefed by Mr. Pardy on a fairly regular basis.

Is that a fair statement?
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: Would you also agree with me that Mr. Pardy is a man who makes clear generally his views of the matter? He is a blunt man.

MS McCALLION: You could describe him that way.

MS EDWARDH: In his memorandum -before we get to his memorandum, I take it you knew that he was aware and had struggled with issues around differing views of Mr. Arar for some time.

MS McCALLION: Differing views of an approach to the case.

MS EDWARDH: Fair enough.
Differing views of an approach to the case.
Would it be fair to say that

Mr. Pardy undertook his consular obligations with vigour and was fairly aggressive in his insistence that consular services be provided to individuals, regardless of their status?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: He was a person --
and you adverted to some difficulty in the past with RCMP struggling to put someone in jail only to have people like Mr. Pardy enthusiastically throw themselves into positions of assisting. And I think it is obvious that that happened particularly in cases, for example, dealing with death penalties in the United States. He was active in trying to assist people and indeed solicited the participation of the department in those areas.

MS McCALLION: Well, if you will
excuse me, you are editorializing. If you are asking about Mr. Pardy and his work habits --

MS EDWARDH: Yes.
MS McCALLION: He was a committed
officer. He was very good. He was enthusiastic. And he was persistent in trying to achieve his goals.

MS EDWARDH: He was persistent in

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defining the right of a Canadian to have access to consular services.

MS McCALLION: Yes, because that is our mandate.

MS EDWARDH: He had, had he not, conveyed to you at least in general terms what the differing views were as to the "approaches" that should be taken to the case of Maher Arar?

MS McCALLION: No. He had
referred to the fact that there was not a consistent approach around town.

MS EDWARDH: Did you not at that time ask him what was the inconsistency and whether or not it formed an impediment to the actions that fell within your mandate?

MS McCALLION: One of the things that concerned me is there were other players -i.e., there were two other governments involved. So it was not only Ottawa.

And yes, there were issues of coordination of federal departments around this case.

MS EDWARDH: So you have other governments and other departments.

MS McCALLION: Correct.

MS EDWARDH: That are players in the Maher Arar case.

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: Leaving aside for the moment other governments, Mr. Pardy, did he not, speak to you generally about the issues of divergence as it related to the players within the Government of Canada?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: Could you recount for us what his descriptions, not necessarily in this memo but over the months or so leading up to this memo, what were his descriptions of the divergence with respect to the Canadian government players, starting with DFAIT.

MS McCALLION: I would simply say
it was how much was known and who knew what. I did not go to those meetings and therefore it was national security.

But who came at it from their
mandate and why.
MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry, I am having trouble understanding that.

MS McCALLION: CSIS is in charge of national security.

MS EDWARDH: Correct. RCMP is
supposed to conduct criminal --
MS McCALLION: Criminal behaviour, domestic criminal behaviour.

MS EDWARDH: Yes. They are at the table.

MS McCALLION: They are at the table.

MS EDWARDH: Right. And they have a different approach, according to what you just said.

MS McCALLION: Concerns, concerns.
MS EDWARDH: Well, you said --
MS McCALLION: And approach.
Concerns around how the government as a whole would approach the case.

MS EDWARDH: Right. It is not
probably uncommon for one department to think that its view of the matter ought to prevail over others, but nonetheless they are forced into the position of recognizing that you speak for consular services and are in charge of how they will be delivered to a particular Canadian.

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: What $I$ am trying to
capture is $I$ don't have a handle -- and $I$ know it is late in the date -- on what those divergences were.

MS McCALLION: I didn't get a
detailed list. It was in the hands of, not only Mr. Pardy, but other parts of the department.

MS EDWARDH: Certainly, though,
one of the things you knew was that that divergence was an impediment for Mr. Pardy to gather together an intergovernmental consensus. He made that clear to you.

MS McCALLION: I wouldn't use the word "impediment". I think he was talking about the process he was going through.

MS EDWARDH: Let's look at his
memo.
loosely.
I don't use the word "impediment"

If you go to 75.5 -- we will get
that for you.
This is Exhibit P-117,
Mr. Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: I have it. MS McCALLION: It is No. 5 here?

MS EDWARDH: Yes, that is correct.

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This memo, which is ultimately
proposing a letter written only by Minister Graham to his counterpart, has two interesting comments that Mr. Pardy makes, to make sure you understand the context, I think.

In paragraph 11 at page 4 of the memorandum, Ms McCallion, it says:
"CSIS officials visited Syria earlier this year and discussed Mr. Arar with their counterparts. They did not meet Mr. Arar. Subsequent to
these discussions, Syrian
officials informed us that
they were informed by CSIS
officials that Canada did not want to have Mr. Arar returned. The CSIS officials denied that they had said this to the Syrians."

So there is a tension in
communication.
MS McCALLION: When I read this, it was clear. You asked me if Gar told me these things in his regular briefings, and I said no, he

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did not go into it in great detail.
By the time I reached this memo,
it was very clear in para 11.
MS EDWARDH: Right. Now let's go
to paragraph 13:
"In recent days, we have discussed the case with both CSIS and the RCMP. They have maintained their positions that Mr. Arar, while not under investigation in Canada, is a person of interest to them because of the evidence of his connections with others who are. In these circumstances, they will not provide any direct support in having Mr. Arar returned to Canada."

Clearly, $I$ am going to suggest that Mr. Pardy is making as obvious as can be that after discussions, interdepartmental discussions with the RCMP and CSIS, CSIS is not willing to provide any direct assistance.

Is that fair? You don't draw any
different meaning from those words?
MS McCALLION: My interpretation
of it now from then, my understanding was that they were no longer in a discussion about whether their minister would sign a document.

MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry?
MS McCALLION: There was a
proposal that the Solicitor General would co-sign the letter.

MS EDWARDH: Yes.
MS McCALLION: Withdrawing their
agreement to co-sign that letter could be deemed that they would not offer support.

MS EDWARDH: So you were aware
that Mr. Pardy had made his best efforts to try and see if a co-signed letter could go forward. When you read this specific reference, you understood that that proposal had gone by the board. It was now dead.

MS McCALLION: All of this
happened around the time $I$ got the memo. I was not told most of this -- I understood you were asking Mr. Pardy's frequent or regular briefings to me, in what detail did they go into.

MS EDWARDH: No. I am asking
you --
MS McCALLION: Hardly any. I was
aware of the case. I was kept abreast of the fact that there was a case, the fact that it was causing some concern.

MS EDWARDH: Ms McCallion, you were the one who just testified that in reading the language "they will not provide any direct support in having Mr. Arar returned to Canada", you were the one who said you understood that this meant --

MS McCALLION: No. I did when I read it.

MS EDWARDH: Yes, at the time you read it.

MS McCALLION: At the time $I$ read it.

MS EDWARDH: That this referred to the letter that you had understood might be co-signed and that it was no longer going forward.

MS McCALLION: No longer co-signed and now we had the one that was attached.

MS EDWARDH: Right.
MS MCCALLION: With agreed wordings.

MS EDWARDH: So you understood that when you read it.

And of course, $I$ suppose it was at an earlier briefing that you had been informed about the co-signing process --

MS McCALLION: No.
MS EDWARDH: -- because it is not here. So it must have come from Mr. Pardy on an earlier occasion.

MS McCALLION: Or at the time I asked Mr. Dyet to talk to me.

MS EDWARDH: All right.
MS McCALLION: I don't recall being involved in any great detail up until I was asked to sign this memo.

MS EDWARDH: In any event, upon receiving this and being confronted with this choice --

MS McCALLION: What does this
mean?
MS EDWARDH: You understood.
MS McCALLION: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: So then Mr. Pardy goes:
"As such, the best we can
do --"

And that is, of course, DFAIT, the best DFAIT can do. I think that is obvious there.

MS McCALLION: Right.
MS EDWARDH: "... in these circumstances is to again raise the matter direct with the Syrian Foreign Minister and to that end we have attached a letter for your signature."
So it is quite clear that the collaborative process has ended insofar as a joint letter, and now there is a single letter going from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to his counterpart, and that is what has been left out of this negotiation.

Is that fair?
MS McCALLION: It is an
interpretation.
MS EDWARDH: Did you interpret it in any different way?

MS McCALLION: I don't recall
interpreting it either way.
MS EDWARDH: All right. But you

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certainly do know that CSIS and the RCMP are not involved in any joint effort by way of a letter where the Solicitor General will sign. That is a given.

MS McCALLION: Yes. If I would
have been asked -- this is when the
"plus-que-parfait" always comes in handy -- I would not have recommended asking for more than one signature of one Minister.

I support others who have said it
is very complicated; it is not normal; we
shouldn't go there. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had the direct responsibility and could use that responsibility that rested in him by virtue of the Foreign Affairs Act to send the letter.

MS EDWARDH: But I take it you were not asked.

MS McCALLION: I was not consulted. My advice would have been this is fine.

MS EDWARDH: I hear what you said you would have said had you been asked, and we will come back to that. I take it that it is very clear from your evidence to date that you were not
asked.
MS McCALLION: Not asked.
MS EDWARDH: Mr. Pardy has
undoubtedly alerted you that this memo and letter are coming.

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: I am going to suggest
to you that it is obvious that he, at least, is
not satisfied with the language of the letter. He would have liked it to be more fulsome.

MS McCALLION: Okay.
MS EDWARDH: Would you agree with that?

MS McCALLION: Probably.
MS EDWARDH: Thank you.
It is my understanding that
Mr. Pardy, prior to his departure, had at least given you a heads-up that maybe Mr. Hooper would contact you.

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: So you knew that this matter retained some delicacy from CSIS' perspective.

MS McCALLION: Okay.
MS EDWARDH: They thought it was a
complex case, and even though they had written themselves out of the letter, they had concerns that they wanted you to be aware of.

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: When you looked at
that letter -- and you will find it at tab 439 of
volume 5 of the -- do you have it there?
No, not that volume. Let me get
you another volume.
MS McCALLION: No problem. Which
tab is it?

MS EDWARDH: It is tab 339.
THE COMMISSIONER: Tab 439, I
think.
MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry, 439,
Mr. Commissioner.
MS MCCALLION: I have it.
MS EDWARDH: The letter that you agree that you will sign on to for the Minister's consideration makes a very limited statement, and I quote from the second paragraph:

> "I assure you there is no Canadian government impediment to Mr. Arar's return to Canada."

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It doesn't say anything about the fact that he is not wanted or anything like that in Canada.

That observation did not escape you. It is a limited statement for the Minister to make.

MS McCALLION: It is a correct statement at the time.

MS EDWARDH: It could have said Mr. Arar is facing no criminal charges in Canada. Mr. Arar is a long-time resident; he has a wife and family, blah, blah, blah. It could have said all sorts of things.

This assertion on behalf of the Government of Canada that there is no impediment is a very limited statement of support that represents the consensus reached.

MS McCALLION: It was a sentence agreed to by consensus among the agencies, yes.

MS EDWARDH: That's right.
When you mean that it was a
sentence agreed to by consensus, it is fair to say it was negotiated to the extent that no one department took offence or was upset or disagreed with the character of the letter going from the

Minister of Foreign Affairs.
MS McCALLION: If you look at it from a different perspective, it is very rare for the Minister to take a unilateral action when other agencies are concerned. Therefore, we consult with other agencies. We take on board their views, and we do the best we can to represent one voice, one view, when it goes to a Cabinet Minister.

MS EDWARDH: I hear you saying -and $I$ am interpreting something of what you are saying, Ms McCallion -- that the contents of the letter, be what they may be, are designed to accommodate the concerns of entities outside the Department of Foreign Affairs.

MS McCALLION: They are designed
to reflect the collective view of the Cabinet, Cabinet Ministers and their concerns.

MS EDWARDH: Certainly it is not simply the Minister of Foreign Affairs --

MS McCALLION: He was writing on behalf of the federal government.

MS EDWARDH: I see. So by definition, then, must accommodate the concerns of the Solicitor General, CSIS and the RCMP.

MS McCALLION: To the best of his capacity.

MS EDWARDH: Yes. Knowing as you did that Mr. Pardy felt the letter was a little on the inadequate side, and knowing as you did that he gave you a heads-up that Mr . Hooper may be knocking on your door, don't you think it is fair for us who were observers of this to see Mr. Hooper's telephone call, as you have described it, as a way of ensuring that this letter doesn't change?

Let me give you an example.
Mr. Hooper conveyed to you in
general terms -- leave aside the precise words -that this has been the product of hard work. Correct?

I thought that is what you said;
that Mr. Hooper had conveyed --
MS McCALLION: I am waiting for
the next --
MS EDWARDH: No, no. The question
is --
MS McCALLION: This is the result of collaboration --

THE COMMISSIONER: Ms McCallion,
please just listen to me.
You will help this process if you listen to the question and answer the questions directly. This is not a fencing contest between you and Ms Edwardh. She is asking clear questions, and it will help me if you try to answer them clearly. Thank you.

MS EDWARDH: I gathered from what
you testified to, Mr. McCallion, that Mr. Hooper in the conversation said that this letter that was now before you had been the product of hard work on an inter-agency basis.

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: And that it had been difficult to define a consensus that was acceptable to the agencies, to everyone.

MS McCALLION: That is my
understanding.
MS EDWARDH: That is the effect he left you with. That is the understanding he left you with from his words.

MS McCALLION: That is my
understanding.
MS EDWARDH: He also, I think, conveyed to you then, in a discussion of the
mandate of CSIS the general concerns CSIS had about such complex security cases.

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MS EDWARDH: I am going to suggest
to you that the effect of conveying the extent of the complexity was to share with you why he felt the agency couldn't go any further, why it couldn't be more of a participant; that he felt they had done their best.

MS McCALLION: He didn't put it that way, nor did $I$ hear him say that.

MS EDWARDH: What was your understanding of why he was telling you that this letter was in fact the product of hard work and cooperation?

MS McCALLION: I can't tell you
that.
MS EDWARDH: If you go back then, in addition to talking about this being the product of hard work and cooperation, you did also say in your testimony that you and he discussed your respective mandates.

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: I take it from that, Ms McCallion, that in no uncertain terms you said
listen, consular affairs belong to us. We have an obligation to a Canadian citizen. And this letter, with this language, is going to go forward.

MS McCALLION: I believe I was a little more subtle than that, but that was the message I imparted.

MS EDWARDH: Yes. What he conveyed to you was that it was only this kind of letter that could go forward.

MS McCALLION: No. He conveyed to me the mandate of CSIS above all is the security of Canadians in general an larger terms and that individual cases are taken in that context.

MS EDWARDH: And therefore...?
And therefore what?
MS MCCALLION: I agreed.
MS EDWARDH: And therefore...?
MS McCALLION: There was no
"therefore".
MS EDWARDH: Do you have any
information that after your conversation with Mr. Hooper, because you signed off on this letter and the Deputy signed off on this letter, this letter dies. This letter doesn't go. No one ever

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sends this letter.
Do you have any knowledge of whether anyone else at CSIS spoke to any of your superiors to say, "Better not this letter", so that the only entity in Canada who could resolve the dispute between CSIS and the RCMP and DFAIT was the Prime Minister's Office?

MS McCALLION: I have no
knowledge. That was your question? I don't know. MS EDWARDH: You have no
knowledge?
MS McCALLION: I have no
knowledge.
MS EDWARDH: Do you know how the letter that was the product of such efforts and hard work, do you know how it just died on the vine?

MS McCALLION: No, I don't know.
MS EDWARDH: When the letter just
simply died on the vine, given the urgency that you have described -- I don't want to over emphasize it -- given the hard work to make it a product, did you every inquire as to why it died on the vine or who killed it?

MS McCALLION: My understanding --

Commissioner, I have to object to the premise of these questions. We have heard evidence that the Minister sent it back with changed wording. It didn't die on the vine. I refer you to tab 75.6.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think that is fair.
tab 6 --
MS MCISAAC: That's fair.
MS EDWARDH: If you turn to

MS McCALLION: Which book, please? MS EDWARDH: The one that has the coloured tab.

MS McCALLION: The same one?
MS EDWARDH: Yes.
MS McCALLION: Okay.
MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry, it is the large book. No, I'm sorry. You don't have it.

MS McCALLION: This one?
MS EDWARDH: It says Exhibit
P-117. I think you have it.
MS McCALLION: Yes, I have it.
MS EDWARDH: Do you get a copy of this?

MS McCALLION: MKM C4 is my
office. It is not my personal -- it is not my personal computer. It is my office.

MS EDWARDH: But having signed off on the memorandum, $I$ take it that this coming back recommending changes would be of concern to you? Or is it your evidence that --

MS McCALLION: To be fair, I don't recall seeing this, but yes, my office is on the distribution list.

MS EDWARDH: Do you recall
participating, then, in any further discussions to try to resolve the issue that is created in this memorandum from the Minister's office saying they want more in the letter?

MS McCALLION: I did not participate in any further discussions.

MS EDWARDH: Were you alive to the fact that Mr. Pardy, who receives this memorandum, participated in further discussions? Did he brief you with respect to those?

MS McCALLION: No, he didn't.
MS EDWARDH: So then we take it
that you were not involved in any further respect in trying to build a consensus or a bridge in respect of the differing views of the government?

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MS EDWARDH: Would you not have been the -- I'm just trying to understand the hierarchy and its respective responsibilities and duties.

Is there some reason why you wouldn't be the person who is having discussions with your counterpart as an ADM with CSIS about this --

MS McCALLION: My understanding, this was now over in Mr. Wright's shop.

MS EDWARDH: For the record's sake, this is Mr. Wright, this is --

MS McCALLION: The ISD world.
MS EDWARDH: So then he would have handled the negotiations. Is that your understanding?

MS McCALLION: I don't know if he did or not.
--- Pause
MS EDWARDH: Those are my
questions.
Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
Ms McIsaac?

MS MCISAAC: Thank you, sir.
EXAMINATION
MS MCISAAC: Just a couple of questions, Ms McCallion.

Did Mr. Hooper ask you not to send the memorandum up the chain of command to the Deputy Minister and the Minister?

MS McCALLION: No, he did not.
MS MCISAAC: Had there been
anything in the conversation you had with Mr. Hooper to suggest that CSIS was going to take the matter further, what would you have done?

MS McCALLION: I would have held the memo, I would have asked for further clarifications. Probably I would have asked Mr. Hooper if we could have worked it out at our level, I would have asked Gar or his deputy to assist, and $I$ would have let Gaetan know that we had problems.

MS McISAAC: By saying "Gaetan", you mean --

MS McCALLION: The Deputy
Minister.
MS MCISAAC: -- the Deputy Minister Gaetan Lavertu.

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And you didn't do any of those
things?
MS McCALLION: I didn't do any of
those things.
MS McISAAC: Thank you very much.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Shore?
EXAMINATION
MR. SHORE: Ms McCallion, you have
indicated that the discussion was both specific and general with Mr. Hooper. There was some specifics with regard to Arar, there was some generalities with regard to the sensitivities of the case, the high profit nature of the case, the respective mandates in cases of this nature. MS McCALLION: Correct. MR. SHORE: Is that right? You may not remember this because you didn't make notes, but was part of Mr. Hooper's concern that there were other cases coming down the chute that were also sensitive, difficult, high profile cases, dual national Canadians in the post-9/11 era incarcerated abroad?

MR. SHORE: And although you had never spoken to him before, this was an opportunity to sort of launch a new era with regard to dealing with these difficult cases, because --

MS McCALLION: If I could change
the tense --
MR. SHORE: Sure.
MS McCALLION: -- I would say we were in the new era and finding it difficult and trying to find ways of making it work.

MR. SHORE: Right. As you
indicated, there were a lot of difficulties in arriving at the negotiated language that was finally arrived at in this matter and Mr. Hooper's concern, if you recall, was to ensure that in the future the various departments could work together collaboratively to try and do it a little more smoothly?

MS McCALLION: I don't recall if he said that, but $I$ could agree that that was part of the tenor of the kind of discussion we were having.

MR. SHORE: Right. That was the general nature. Of course the hook to talk to you
was the talk about Arar, because that was the case that was presently receiving the high profile interest.

MR. SHORE: I think we were both concerned. There was political concern about the departments getting along, as well as senior level concern.

MR. SHORE: Right. This was a
matter in the press --
MS McCALLION: In the public
record, absolutely.
MR. SHORE: -- it was high
profile. And there were other cases that DFAIT and RCMP, CSIS, PCO were going to be involved in and this was sort of an opening salvo, "Let's get together on this stuff in a better way in the future", and that is why perhaps the call went to you as opposed to somebody else at --

MS McCALLION: Again, I took the call. I don't know why he chose to call me.

MR. SHORE: He will testify as to that. But you are at equal levels, as you indicated, counterparts without counting, as you said.

So I think you have already told
us, he didn't ask you to do or not to do anything. He made no request of you to perform or not perform --

MS McCALLION: No, he didn't
MR. SHORE: -- your function.
You indicated that you had no discussions with anyone with regard to the content of the phone call.

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MR. SHORE: You did have
discussion -- perhaps you are not sure with whom, but I think you said Dave Dyet -- that the call occurred, and you probably discussed it with Barbara Burns that the call occurred.

MS McCALLION: She knew the call
occurred.
MR. SHORE: She knew the call
occurred.
MS McCALLION: She did not know
the content of the call.
MR. SHORE: Right. You didn't
discuss, why would you with your Executive Assistant, the content of it.

Once you sign off you probably
gave her the memo and said --

MS McCALLION: Send it on.
MR. SHORE: -- let it go. You are finished with it.

MR. SHORE: You would never have said to anyone about the call that there may have been a bit more to it, because you didn't discuss the contents of the call with anyone.

And you never -- shaking your head
means no for the purpose of the record.
MS McCALLION: Oh, sorry. Not to
my recollection. It is not something I would do.
MR. SHORE: And you would never have said to anyone that you are ignoring the request from Mr. Hooper because he didn't make a request.

MS McCALLION: He didn't make a request to me.

MR. SHORE: Right. So you would not have told anyone that he did and you were ignoring it?

MS MCCALLION: Again, sorry for
shaking my head, no, I didn't.
MR. SHORE: No, that's fine.
MR. SHORE: And of course he never suggested to you, as has already been indicated,
that you not forward the letter? That was a fait accompli. It had been negotiated, it was done. MS McCALLION: Correct. MR. SHORE: And he didn't try to undo it.

MS McCALLION: No, he didn't. MR. SHORE: There was never any discussion about Mr . Hooper saying that CSIS did not want Arar back because they didn't have the resources to monitor him. That was not discussed in that conversation?

MS McCALLION: In that context, no.

MR. SHORE: Those are my
questions. Thanks, Mr. Commissioner.
Thank you, Ms McCallion.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. David?
MR. DAVID: Three questions.
EXAMINATION
MR. DAVID: Ms McCallion, I
understand that you have testified today to the effect that Mr. Pardy knew beforehand that Mr. Hooper was going to be calling you and that he told you so.

MS McCALLION: No, I thought I
said he would give me a heads up that Mr. Hooper might call me.

MR. DAVID: All right.
MS McCALLION: If I said he -- my
recollection is, $I$ was given a heads up as to a possibility.

MR. DAVID: As to a possibility of a phone call from Mr. Hooper to you, and this Mr. Pardy told you?

MS McCALLION: Yes.
MR. DAVID: Did you understand where Mr. Pardy was getting this information about the possibility of a phone call?

MS McCALLION: I assumed it came from the interdepartmental meetings.

MR. DAVID: Did Mr. Pardy
inform you?
MS McCALLION: I don't recall
that he did, but -- I don't recall why he said I -- like why he gave me the heads up, but he gave me a heads up.

MR. DAVID: And was it your understanding that Mr. Pardy had spoken to Mr. Hooper?

MS McCALLION: No.

MR. DAVID: Was it your
understanding that Mr. -- that's fine.
The second question, or second
area if $I$ can say, Ms McCallion, $I$ heard you say during the testimony where Ms Edwardh's was asking you some questions, that Mr. Hooper mentioned to you that CSIS' mandate was to protect Canadians and that individual cases are to be taken in that context.

MS McCALLION: Correct.
MR. DAVID: I'm going to ask you:
Could a reasonable person interpret that as meaning to sacrifice one to save and protect many is an acceptable principle?

MS McCALLION: No. I withdraw all of my comments if that is how you are interpreting them. No.

MR. DAVID: So he did not say this
to you to try to dissuade you from your efforts --
MS McCALLION: No, he did not.
MR. DAVID: -- in bringing
Mr. Arar back?
MS McCALLION: No, he did not.
MR. DAVID: The third area I wish to ask you some questions is that you have
mentioned now with Mr. Shore that you discussed the fate of other detained Canadians as well as Mr. Arar during this conversation?

MS McCALLION: The possibility of others. Not others in a highly specific list sense, no.

MR. DAVID: Explain to me the -- I don't quite grasp how this was referred to, then, in your conversation.

MR. DAVID: I don't recall the details of the conversation. It is a long time ago. I didn't take notes.

The context would more likely be there are other cases of similar nature on the order paper now and potentially coming. The world has changed. How we deal with a changed world will involve cooperation between two levels of agencies with two different mandates.

To my recollection, that is the context.

MR. DAVID: Therefore, he understood and he was trying to make you understand that today's world's context meant that DFAIT would be trying to repatriate other Canadians involved in situations similar to Mr.

Arar's as well as Mr. Arar?
MS McCALLION: Well, the
complexity of dual citizenship, the complexity of international law, yes. In that context.

MR. DAVID: In that context.
MS McCALLION: We were on an open phone, we did not go into details of any of the cases.

MR. DAVID: In that context, did Mr. Hooper mention that this fact, that there are potentially many other cases similar to Mr. Arar's, could bring on a resource issue for CSIS?

MS McCALLION: Not to my
recollection.
MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are my questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Thank
you, Ms McCallion, that completes your evidence and you may step down. The books can remain there, that's fine.
--- Pause
THE COMMISSIONER: That leaves only the recall of Mr. Gould, and Mr. Shore you had a few questions?

MR. SHORE: Very short.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Gould, you have patiently waited in the back of the hearing room. Please come forward. Thank you.
--- Pause
PREVIOUSLY SWORN: JAMES GOULD
EXAMINATION
MR. SHORE: Thanks for waiting
around, Mr. Gould. I just have a couple of questions.

Earlier today when we talked about the story we had heard, you indicated that you were referring to the story that you and Mr. Dyet had heard.

In your previous testimony at page 12744 you indicated -- Mr. David was asking: "`About call - confirmed story we had heard.'

The 'we' refers to?"
That is the question.
"MR. GOULD: To me. Sorry,
the 'we' is an imperial 'we'.
'I' here would have been more accurate."

MR. GOULD: Okay.

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MR. SHORE: So today you said that the we was both of you. Your earlier testimony, I forget the date -- do you have the date?

MR. GOULD: The date is fine. The
testimony --
MR. SHORE: You testified April -MR. GOULD: I have no problem with that.

MR. SHORE: I'm just trying to -MR. GOULD: The "we" I was
including that $I$ had heard from David Dyet. Again I go back to my sloppy drafting. The "we" quite properly was an imperial "we". "I" had heard from Mr. Dyet.

MR. SHORE: I'm not talking about the drafting, I'm talking about evidence. You gave evidence today that the "we" talked about -the "we" referred to David Dyet and myself.

MR. GOULD: It referred to a conversation that $I$ had with Mr . Dyet.

MR. SHORE: Right. That was the
"we". In your earlier testimony you said the "we" is an imperial we and it means really "I". So I am confused as to whether the "we" is just you or the "we" is you and Mr. Dyet.

MR. GOULD: I would think the we is the imperial "we". It is "I heard from Mr. Dyet".

MR. SHORE: All right. So you are
going back to what you said earlier --
MR. GOULD: I think so, yes.
MR. SHORE: -- as opposed to what
you said earlier today.
Is that right?
MR. GOULD: I think so, yes. Yes.
I am going back, yes.
MS McISAAC: I think it only fair
if the witness would like to have a copy of what he said.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
MR. SHORE: Sure. I have no problem with that. I was looking for it, but I just have one.

MR. GOULD: I'm sure I have a copy here.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't have a copy. Could somebody hand the witness a copy?

MR. DAVID: The other matter,
Mr. Commissioner, if $I$ can just raise it, is for the first time during these proceedings, whether
they be in camera or public, we are using transcripts to --

THE COMMISSIONER: That came out of today's process.

I am a little concerned. I'm not
sure, I may have misunderstood his evidence earlier today. I must say I'm having a bit of a difficulty understanding there is a distinction in substance between the two, but carry on. The transcript will speak for itself.

MR. SHORE: Do you have the
transcript?
MR. GOULD: I do have the page in
front of me, 12744.
MR. SHORE: Page 12744. Did I
read it accurately?
MR. GOULD: Yes, you did.
MR. SHORE: Both the questions and
the answers?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. SHORE: Just the next page,
12745 -- or perhaps $I$ will just continue on and put it all in context, and correct me if $I$-THE COMMISSIONER: Just follow along.

MR. SHORE: Correct me if I -- no, the next page.

MR. GOULD: Sorry.
MR. SHORE: You only had the
one page.
MR. GOULD: It was hidden
underneath.
und
Carry on.
MR. SHORE: Page 12745. I am
going to read into that from page 12744 .
"MR. DAVID: All right. It
says:
- may be a bit more to
it, but she didn't want
to go into it.'
So the 'she' there, this is
Barbara Burns?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. DAVID: And:
- may be a bit more to
it, but she didn't want
to go into it.'
You have no idea what that
refers to?
MR. GOULD: No, I have no

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gave --
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testimony?

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idea what that refers to. MR. DAVID: But she is indicating this to you -MR. GOULD: Yes. MR. DAVID: -- that there is more to the call than what -MR. GOULD: That there was a reference to there having been something to it, but she didn't want to go into it. MR. DAVID: Okay. Then it says:
- - MKM signed the memo -
so she seems to be
ignoring the request from
the ADDO.'
MR. GOULD: Correct.
MR. DAVID: This is again
Ms Burns telling you this?
MR. GOULD: Yes."
Earlier today you understand you
    idea what that refers to.
    she is
    indicating this to you-
    MR. GOULD: Yes.
    MR.DAVID: that there is
    MR. GOULD: That there was a
    rererence to there having
    been something to it, but she
    Mdn want to go intoit.
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    ` - MKM signed the memo -
    so she seems to be
    ignoring the request from
    the ADDO.
    MR. GOULD: Correct.
    Ms Burns telling you this?
    MR. GOULD: Yes."
MR. GOULD: Yes, I do. I do.
MR. SHORE: -- much different
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MR. GOULD: Yes, I do.
MR. SHORE: And they both can't stand beside each other.

MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. SHORE: One has to fall and
you have to choose if you can or --
MR. GOULD: I'm not sure I am
able to.
MR. SHORE: Or refuse to. You
don't have to, but --
MR. GOULD: Excuse me. May I
refer back to the copy of my handwritten notes here.

MR. SHORE: Absolutely.
MR. GOULD: Which is my only
source, as you are aware.
MR. SHORE: Absolutely.
MS McISAAC: Mr. Commissioner, I
should also point out that we brought to the attention of Commission counsel that the version of the note that has been produced is not the final version. There was a redaction at the top of the page, $I$ believe it is page 12 , if I'm not mistaken, which was originally made on the understanding that it related to an earlier note
about a different matter and then it was subsequently unredacted.

I believe that if you go to the re-examination there is some clarification, because at that point the second note was available to give more precision as to who was being discussed.

That is my recollection
anyway, sir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. That
is helpful.
That is the re-examination in
camera, so that the witness should be provided with that as well, and the unredacted ----- Pause

THE COMMISSIONER: Just before you answer the question, Mr. Gould, apparently there is evidence in the re-examination that touches on this and there is an unredacted version of what is at the top of page 12 of your note that may assist you in answering the question.

Can somebody provide the witness with both of those things?
--- Pause
THE COMMISSIONER: Can you give
the note, the unredacted note?
MS McISAAC: We don't have it. THE COMMISSIONER: Do you know
what it says?
MS McISAAC: My memory is not bad, but it is not that good, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR. DAVID: We certainly don't
have it here.
THE COMMISSIONER: Nobody would
have it here I guess because of the claim.
In any event, let's see if we can
complete this in some fashion.
--- Pause
MR. SHORE: Sir, have you read
the -- what is this?
THE COMMISSIONER: It is called
the re-examination.
MR. SHORE: The re-examination.
MR. SHORE: Re-examination,
thank you.
MR. GOULD: No.
MR. SHORE: Obviously the same
question came up because $I$ obviously made the same confusion the first time during the in camera.

If I can read --
MR. GOULD: Sure.
"MR. GOULD:" -- this is myself,
excuse me.
"MR. DAVID: On Monday, do
you recall testifying that
you said the ‘she' was
Barbara Burns?"
This replicates what you have
just stated.
My response:
"Yes. And I was confused because of exactly what you are clarifying now, my left page and right page."

You will recall $I$ started today with a short exposition on that.
"I have also since Monday had the opportunity to look at the originals. When I look at my originals, it is much clearer that $I$ am writing with the same pen, et cetera --"

I'm not sure what the "et cetera"

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means.
to left side.
however, the same date,
Mr. Gould, that you tried to call Barbara Burns. MR. GOULD: Yes. I had tried to call her sometime before..."
"MR. DAVID: Is it possible that your reference `may be a bit more to it but she didn't want to go into it', is it possible, Mr. Gould, that that reference is to Barbara Burns?

MR. GOULD: As I read it now, very, very unlikely. I would
have put a name in if there was a change in reference. MR. DAVID: Then you say 'MKM signed'. You don't say she signed the memo. Do you understand what $I$ am saying? MR. GOULD: Yes. Once in a while you put the person in. MR. DAVID: How you refer to the same person changes in the course of the text. MR. GOULD: Yes, it does. MR. DAVID: And that doesn't help in making you understand that perhaps when you say 'she ...' that that would refer to Barbara Burns.

MR. GOULD: You perhaps might
refer to it as bad style."
It really obviously confuses the
first time around and $I$ don't really think the matter is clarified in the original re-examination.

MR. DAVID: Could you, just for the clarity of the record, as confused as it may
be now, tell us what pages you just read from, Mr. Gould?

MR. GOULD: I'm sorry. I'm
reading from pages 12984 through to 12986.
MR. SHORE: Can I ask you a
supplementary question?
MR. GOULD: Of course you can.
MR. SHORE: Who is the "she"?
MR. GOULD: That is the question $I$
would love to be able to answer.
MR. SHORE: Well, there are only
two she's.
MR. GOULD: There are two she's in
play.
MR. SHORE: Two she's in play.
One is Barbara Burns --
MR. GOULD: And one of them is
McCallion.
MR. SHORE: -- and one is
Ms McCallion.
MR. GOULD: I find it --
MR. SHORE: Are you sure it was a she that told you that?

MR. GOULD: Didn't tell me. I think perhaps the solution would be to ask Mr.

Dyet.
MR. SHORE: Well, if you o back to page 12745 at line 13 -MR. GOULD: Yes. MR. SHORE: -- the question is -MR. GOULD: This is again

Ms Burns, yes.
MR. SHORE: This is again Ms Burns
telling you this and the answer is yes.
MR. GOULD: An imperial "you"
again. I think $I$ received this from -- it is certainly not telling me.

MR. SHORE: But that is clearly
how you answer the question.
MR. GOULD: Then I mis-spoke.
MR. SHORE: You mis-spoke.
In the re-examination that $I$ don't
have in front of me there is no mention of Mr. Dyet being the one who gave you the information, although that was the evidence you gave earlier today.

MR. GOULD: That certainly I
thought was very clear, that $I$ did not speak to Ms McCallion about this and that the information on this was passed to me by Mr. Dyet.

MR. SHORE: All right. So it is Mr. Dyet and you mis-spoke in your previous testimony on page 12745 when you said it was Ms Burns who told you.

Is that what you are saying?
MR. GOULD: Yes.
MR. SHORE: All right. Those are
all my questions. Thank you, sir.
Than you, Mr. Gould.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
Anything arising out of that?
Thank you very much, Mr. Gould.
Thank you for your patience and remaining throughout the afternoon.

MR. GOULD: I apologize for the
confusion here, but these notes are just what they are.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's fine. I appreciate the time and effort you have devoted to giving your evidence.

MR. GOULD: No, not at all.
Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. We will rise until tomorrow morning at 9 'clock. MS MCISAAC: Sir, just one last
housekeeping matter.
Will we be entering the two
transcripts that have been referred to as exhibits as well?

THE COMMISSIONER: Were they not
entered? I thought they had been this morning.
Oh, those.
MS MCISAAC: No, these are the ones that we produced at lunchtime.

MR. DAVID: Is this the right
time, in the sense that --
THE COMMISSIONER: Let's just talk about that for a second.

I'm not sure the transcripts should be entered as exhibits. They are evidence that was given on an earlier occasion. To the extent that they were referred to, as they just were in a cross-examination, that part would become part of the record, but $I$ don't think the transcripts in their entirety should go in.

MS McISAAC: I just wanted to be sure that we had some method of identifying that they were there and what they were.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right. I think that's okay. If anybody has a different thought,
let me know tomorrow.
Thank you, Ms McIsaac, for bringing to the attention of the hearing the reference to the re-examination. I appreciate that.

MR. DAVID: A final thing, Mr. Commissioner, is that $I$ have copies here of the CSIS chronology that was prepared that may be useful for counsel in terms of Mr. Hooper's testimony.

THE COMMISSIONER: You can
distribute those after we adjourn.
MR. DAVID: I can distribute
those, if anybody is interested in having a copy.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. We will
rise until 9 'oclock tomorrow morning.
MR. DAVID: Thank you.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5:52 p.m., to resume on Thursday, August 25, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. / L'audience est ajournée à 17 h 52 , pour reprendre le jeudi 25 août à 0900

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Lynda Johansson, C.S.R., R.P.R.

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