Commission d'enquête sur les actions des responsables canadiens relativement à Maher Arar



Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar

Audience publique

Public Hearing

Commissaire

L'Honorable juge /
The Honourable Justice
Dennis R. O'Connor

Commissioner

Tenue à:

Held at:
Algonquin Room

Salon Algonquin Ancien hôtel de ville 111, Promenade Sussex Ottawa (Ontario)

Old City Hall 111 Sussex Drive Ottawa, Ontario

le mercredi 24 août 2005

Wednesday, August 24, 2005

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1	Ottawa, Ontario / Ottawa (Ontario)
2	Upon commencing on Wednesday, August 24, 2005
3	at 9:04 a.m. / L'audience reprend le mercredi
4	24 août 2005 à 9 h 04
5	THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
6	Veuillez vous asseoir.
7	MR. CAVALLUZZO: Good morning,
8	Commissioner.
9	Prior to the testimony, there are
10	a couple of points I would like to make.
11	One is that we have prepared a
12	very general CSIS public chronology which relates
13	to events and information coming from the public
14	record as well as public documents that have been
15	introduced, and that will be available to the
16	parties if they want to pick it up from our
17	administrative office.
18	Second, there are going to be, if
19	we can call them, two applications or motions, I
20	understand, this morning. One will be dealing
21	with the testimony of Mr. Hooper tomorrow.
22	In particular, I understand that
23	counsel for Mr. Arar will be asking for access to
24	certain in-camera evidence, but I would leave that
25	for my friend to articulate in terms of what she

1	will be requesting.
2	Second, Mr. Shore, who represents
3	Mr. Hooper, will be making suggestions in respect
4	of the order of witnesses today. We have
5	indicated what the order of witnesses is. He
6	indicates that that is unfair to Mr. Hooper and
7	will be making certain suggestions as to the
8	appropriate order.
9	So perhaps if we could start with
10	Mr. Arar's counsel's motion, we can get going.
11	THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning,
12	Ms Edwardh.
13	MOTION
14	MS EDWARDH: Thank you very much,
15	Mr. Commissioner.
16	It is a pleasure to be here.
17	My motion is very, very brief. As
18	you know, your counsel has provided to us the
19	testimony of Dave Dyet in respect of a certain
20	conversation that will be the subject matter
21	largely of today's proceedings.
22	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
23	MS EDWARDH: And that has been
24	most useful. We don't have to waste your time, or
25	anyone's time, as I understand this will be filed

1	as an exhibit.
2	However, it is my understanding,
3	or guess as much as anything, that in the same
4	in-camera proceedings, Ms McCallion also gave her
5	account of the conversation. We have a very, very
6	general will-say, and as this has now fallen into
7	the public domain and will be explored in the
8	public domain, I would request that at least the
9	excerpts of her testimony in camera, as it relates
10	to today's proceedings, be made available to
11	counsel, should there be some questions that arise
12	from that.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Is there any
14	objection to that? Is there anything NSC about
15	Ms McCallion's evidence in camera?
16	MS McISAAC: My recollection, sir
17	is there is not, but I thought the whole point was
18	that we were releasing, or we were asked to
19	provide and the decision was made to provide
20	Mr. Dyet's testimony I think perhaps Ms Burns'
21	testimony as well from the in-camera
22	proceedings to avoid having to call them publicly.
23	Ms McCallion is here and will be
24	testifying today publicly, and I don't see any
25	need to release her other transcript in the

1	circumstances.
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Would there be
3	anything unfair to let's assume, I don't
4	suggest it to be the case, but let's assume her
5	evidence here was different from what it was
6	previously. It would be helpful to me to have her
7	questioned on that.
8	MS McISAAC: That is true, sir,
9	but it has been an issue that I've raised with
10	counsel on several occasions about witnesses
11	testifying in camera first and then being called
12	to testify about exactly the same things in
13	public.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, it is the
15	Government that suggested we call all the evidence
16	in camera first, and we initially resisted the
17	idea
18	MS McISAAC: I don't want to
19	debate that with you, sir, but it is not
20	absolutely true with all of the witnesses.
21	In any event, it seems to me that
22	we have to make a decision as to how we are
23	treating this in-camera evidence. And this isn't
24	suggesting that we are going to start releasing
25	all sorts of transcripts of the in-camera

1	evidence, because that obviously will be a huge
2	undertaking.
3	THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think
4	that is the suggestion, is it? You are not
5	implying that?
6	MS EDWARDH: No, Mr. Commissioner
7	As you know, we have not had the privilege of
8	joining you in the in-camera process and have
9	always harboured under the belief, rightly or
10	wrongly, that the reason they are going on is to
11	assist you in the resolution of National Security
12	Confidentiality.
13	To the extent that this can be
14	made public and it will assist us in further
15	disclosure of what is to be said as well as to
16	potentially ask questions and clarification from
17	Mr. Arar's perspective, unless there is some
18	unfairness here, it should be granted and will
19	enhance the public component of the process.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: I guess the
21	only point, Ms Edwardh, that Ms McIsaac is making
22	is that I don't suggest she is necessarily
23	agreeing to this, but to embark upon a process
24	that would have us now looking at in-camera
25	transcripts with a view to making them public to

1	the extent we can, that would be and you are
2	not asking that. That is not where you are
3	headed.
4	MS EDWARDH: No, that is not my
5	request. I'm asking for those portions of her
6	testimony that relate to the subject matter of
7	today's proceedings.
8	THE COMMISSIONER: And it is
9	simply with respect to that one witness and
10	nothing more?
11	MS EDWARDH: That is what I'm
12	asking.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. And do
14	you envision that type of request arising with
15	respect to any other witnesses? We now know the
16	finishing line in terms of the evidence.
17	MS EDWARDH: Yes. And quite
18	frankly, Mr. Commissioner, I don't even know who
19	testified in camera.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
21	MS EDWARDH: It just struck me as
22	obvious, when we got the excerpt from Dave Dyet,
23	that there must be another side to this coin, and
24	I would be ill of serving my client's interests to
25	not request it.

1	I do not even have a list of who
2	has provided evidence before you, so I'm not
3	making a request that was broader than the one I
4	am putting before you now.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cavalluzzo?
6	MR. CAVALLUZZO: My concern,
7	Mr. Commissioner, is one of fairness. Both
8	Ms McCallion's counsel and Mr. Hooper's counsel,
9	who will be testifying tomorrow, have had full
10	access to Ms McCallion's in-camera evidence. It
11	just seems, as a matter of fairness, that if there
12	are no NSC concerns in respect of Ms McCallion's
13	evidence and there clearly isn't relating to
14	this one particular situation that we are going to
15	be discussing today I say as a matter of
16	fairness counsel for Mr. Arar should have access.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: My concern, on
18	the other hand I hear what Ms Edwardh says
19	is just one of establishing a precedent. We
20	haven't been doing this, I think for good reason,
21	because in most instances, virtually all
22	instances, in-camera evidence had components of it
23	that had to remain in camera, so we haven't set
24	about the exercise of parsing it as to what would
25	be and what wouldn't be. That would be yet

1	another incumbrance on this inquiry.
2	This, it seems to me, if I recall
3	correctly, is a different situation.
4	MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is a much
5	different situation. This is a situation in which
6	we have already released certain transcripts of
7	the in-camera evidence.
8	There was a question as to you
9	may recall that one of the counsel didn't have top
10	security at the particular point in time and
11	couldn't cross-examine one of the witnesses and as
12	a result of that the procedure had to be
13	accommodated along the way. This event has turned
14	out to be a public event.
15	I should advise counsel that
16	Mr. Hooper did not testify on this point in
17	camera. We were unaware of this particular
18	conversation when he did testify, so there's no
19	concern about his in-camera evidence. We are only
20	talking about Ms McCallion's evidence, which
21	obviously is very important, if we look at the
22	public transcripts that are about to be released
23	now in respect of Mr. Dyet and Ms Burns.
24	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
25	Ms McIsaac, do you have anything

1	further?
2	MS McISAAC: Yes, sir. Just in
3	the circumstances, I don't believe there is
4	anything that raises a national security concern
5	in Ms McCallion's testimony. I have not read it
6	with that in view. It would have been rather
7	helpful if somebody had raised this earlier,
8	because I know that Mr. Shore's motion deals with
9	the order of witnesses, and I don't know whether I
10	can have it read and reviewed and provided in time
11	for
12	THE COMMISSIONER: Ms McCallion is
13	currently scheduled to testify this afternoon,
14	isn't she? It is a very short transcript.
15	MS McISAAC: Yes, it is, sir.
16	THE COMMISSIONER: At least as I
17	recall the evidence.
18	MS McISAAC: Perhaps you should
19	hear Mr. Shore's motion. I understand your ruling
20	is that it will be made public and we will review
21	it as quickly as possible.
22	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, that is
23	what I'm inclined to do in the circumstance. I
24	can't see anything unfair to Ms McCallion or
25	Mr. Hooper in doing so.

1	MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just one final
2	comment on timing.
3	As Commission counsel, we were
4	spoken to, I understand, earlier this week by
5	Mr. Shore about the public release of
6	Ms McCallion's transcript. We said to Mr. Shore
7	that we would agree to its public release so long
8	as the Government agreed to it. I thought that
9	that was going to take place, and I assume it
10	didn't. But certainly there was a discussion
11	between Commission counsel and Mr. Shore about
12	releasing that evidence.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you,
14	Mr. Cavalluzzo.
15	Let me hear your suggestion,
16	Mr. Shore.
17	MR. SHORE: Yes, thank you. If I
18	may come forward?
19	THE COMMISSIONER: Please do.
20	MR. SHORE: Mr. Commissioner, I
21	understand that my friend intends to call
22	Mr. Livermore, Mr. Gould and Ms McCallion, in that
23	order.
24	THE COMMISSIONER: And they are
25	all going to be called today.

1	MR. SHORE: All going to be called
2	today, dealing with the Hooper-McCallion phone
3	call.
4	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
5	MR. SHORE: My concern is this:
6	Mr. Livermore, whatever information he received
7	with regard to that phone call, received it third
8	hand. Mr. Gould's information, which resulted in
9	his note, which gives rise to this whole aspect of
10	the hearing, was received from Mr. Dyet.
11	Mr. Dyet, according to him, and
12	his transcript that is released or is presently
13	about to be released, indicates that he spoke to
14	Ms McCallion prior to the phone call with
15	Mr. Hooper and he will indicate that during his
16	conversation with Ms McCallion, Ms McCallion
17	advised him that she was going to sign off on the
18	memo even before she returned Mr. Hooper's phone
19	call. We understand this is June 5th or June 6th.
20	Mr. Dyet goes on to say that he is
21	not sure where he got the information that he gave
22	to Mr. Gould that ends up in Gould's notebook, and
23	it is based on Mr. Gould's notebook that all this
24	other evidence is being called.
25	So we are going to have

1	Mr. Livermore, who heard it from Mr. Gould, talk
2	about the phone call. We are going to have
3	Mr. Gould, who heard about it from Mr. Dyet, talk
4	about the phone call, and we are not going to hear
5	from the person who actually was involved in the
6	phone call until all the other witnesses
7	Livermore and Gould have speculated with regard
8	to that phone call.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, not
10	necessarily speculate. They will tell what they
11	heard.
12	MR. SHORE: Well, they are going
13	to tell what they heard, but they are going to be
14	asked more than that.
15	And what they heard is I
16	realize this is not a court of law and the rules
17	of evidence don't apply, but there's hearsay and
18	there's hearsay, and reliable hearsay, I suggest,
19	can be admitted with ease. But this hearsay is
20	unreliable.
21	THE COMMISSIONER: You are not
22	suggesting we don't hear the evidence?
23	MR. SHORE: Not at all. Not at
24	all. I'm suggesting that we hear from
25	Ms McCallion first, because she is the one who was

1	involved in the phone call, and that will reduce,
2	in my submission, the amount of time we are going
3	to need with regard to Mr. Gould and
4	Mr. Livermore, because we will already know what
5	the phone call was about.
6	That is my submission.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: Is that it?
8	Commission counsel, I take it,
9	have looked at this issue and decided that this is
10	a sensible order to call it, as what is now
11	proposed?
12	MR. CAVALLUZZO: Exactly the way
13	we called it in camera.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
15	Does anybody else have something?
16	MS McISAAC: I would like to add,
17	sir, the fact that this evidence was called in
18	this order in camera is, in my view, of no import
19	to how it should be called publicly. It was
20	called in camera in this order because the fact of
21	the Gould note first came to the attention of the
22	Commission when Mr. Gould testified.
23	It was then deemed necessary to
24	call Ms McCallion and Mr. Dyet. The evidence from
25	Mr. Dyet's testimony, which is now public, is

1	quite clear: No one spoke to Ms McCallion after
2	the phone call with Mr. Hooper.
3	It strikes me as being unhelpful
4	in the extreme, particularly to the public, to
5	have a great discourse about what people thought
6	the telephone call was about rather than starting
7	by having the individual who participated in the
8	telephone call get on the stand, tell you, and
9	more importantly the public, since you have
10	already heard it, what they talked about, and then
11	the other individuals can testify.
12	That, in my submission, is the
13	fair and proper way to proceed.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, the
15	public will hear all the evidence today. I think
16	we are getting to a new level of trying to
17	micromanage this inquiry through suggestions.
18	There is more than one way to call evidence, and
19	typically in proceedings like this, there is a
20	great deal of discretion left to parties,
21	Commission counsel, to hear the order they call
22	evidence.
23	I must say I can't conceive that
24	there be any unfairness. I think the evidence
25	will be called, it will be fully tested and it

1	will all be heard today.
2	We will proceed as proposed.
3	I also direct that the transcript
4	of Ms McCallion's evidence be made available to
5	Ms Edwardh and the Government have a chance to
6	review it for NSC first.
7	But that should take place over
8	the course of the day so that we complete
9	Ms McCallion's evidence this afternoon.
10	Anything else?
11	Mr. David?
12	MR. DAVID: Good morning,
13	Mr. Commissioner.
14	Today you will hear the evidence
15	from three witnesses. You will hear the evidence
16	of Mr. Daniel Livermore, who you have already had
17	the opportunity of hearing both in camera and in
18	public. Following Mr. Livermore's testimony,
19	Mr. Jim Gould will testify. And finally, Ms
20	Kathryn McCallion will testify.
21	Essentially the issue that will be
22	dealt with is a phone call that was placed between
23	Jack Hooper, who was the ADO, the Assistant Deputy
24	Director of Operations at CSIS, and Kathryn
25	McCallion who was at the relevant time Assistant

1	Deputy Minister within DFAIT. And the timing of
2	the call was approximately on June 5th of the year
3	2003.
4	So before we hear the testimony of
5	Mr. Livermore and his involvement in this phone
6	call, I would like to file a number of documents
7	that will be useful for today's proceedings.
8	The first will be and we have
9	referred to it already the transcript of
10	Barbara Burns' testimony.
11	Ms Burns was, at the relevant
12	time, the executive assistant of Kathryn
13	McCallion.
14	Could we file her document?
15	THE COMMISSIONER: 234.
16	EXHIBIT NO. 234: Transcript
17	of testimony of Barbara
18	Burns, dated April 18, 2005
19	THE COMMISSIONER: I note this is
20	a transcript, Mr. David. Should it be placed on
21	the Commission's website with the other
22	transcripts of proceedings?
23	MR. DAVID: I think that that
24	would be appropriate
25	THE COMMISSIONER: rather than

1	have it entered as an exhibit?
2	MR. DAVID: I would suggest both,
3	Mr. Commissioner.
4	The reason why I think it is
5	useful to file it as an exhibit is, one, it is a
6	redacted version of her testimony.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
8	MR. DAVID: Though there are no
9	redactions that I know of. But it has been
10	reviewed for NSC concerns.
11	And second, it is simply for ease
12	of reference during today's proceedings.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
14	MR. DAVID: The second document
15	would be a transcript of Mr. Dyet's testimony,
16	in-camera testimony.
17	And in both cases, for both
18	Mr. Dyet and Ms Burns, they testified on April
19	18th, 2005, in camera.
20	Again, concerning Mr. Dyet's
21	transcripts, this is a version that has been
22	reviewed for NSC concerns. It is a redacted
23	version, but to my knowledge there are no
24	redactions.
25	THE COMMISSIONER: 235.

1	MR. DAVID: 235. Thank you.
2	EXHIBIT NO. 235: Transcript
3	of testimony of Dave Dyet,
4	dated April 18, 2005
5	MR. DAVID: The next document I
6	would like to file are a compilation of Mr. Jim
7	Gould's personal notes.
8	THE COMMISSIONER: 236.
9	EXHIBIT NO. 236: Compilation
10	of Jim Gould's personal notes
11	MR. DAVID: And finally, I would
12	like to file a Book of Documents that will be
13	useful to today's proceedings. It is entitled
14	"Newly Redacted Documents for the Testimony of Jim
15	Gould, Kathryn McCallion and David Livermore", and
16	that will be P-237, I believe.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, 237.
18	EXHIBIT NO. 237: Book of
19	Documents entitled "Newly
20	Redacted Documents for the
21	Testimony of Jim Gould,
22	Kathryn McCallion and David
23	Livermore"
24	MR. DAVID: Before beginning with
25	the testimony per se of Mr. Livermore, for the

1	public's benefit, Mr. Commissioner, given that
2	Mr. Dyet and Ms Burns will not be testifying viva
3	voce, by agreement of all counsel their testimony
4	will be in the form of these transcripts that have
5	been filed today.
6	I would like to summarize for you
7	both their testimony.
8	In the case of Mr. Dyet
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Just before you
10	do that, this is a summary you prepared of the
11	MR. DAVID: It is a summary of
12	what I believe are the most salient points out of
13	the testimony.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: That's fine.
15	If any others that have seen it
16	I guess everybody has seen these transcripts
17	thinks that the summary that is about to be given
18	is not complete or is inaccurate, please let me
19	know and add to it.
20	But, yes, go ahead.
21	MR. DAVID: In the case of
22	Mr. Dyet, there are 17 points I would like to
23	raise or flag for the public's benefit.
24	The first is that at the time of

the -- there was a memo that was being processed.

25

1	The final version of this memo is dated June 5th
2	of the year 2003 and has been filed already before
3	this Commission as an exhibit. It is Exhibit No.
4	P-117, tab 75.5.
5	So at the time that this memo was
6	being processed by Ms McCallion, Mr. Pardy was
7	away. That is the first point.
8	Second, Mr. Dyet, when he the
9	testimony reveals that he went to see
10	Ms McCallion. The memo was in the possession of
11	Ms McCallion at that time.
12	Third, Mr. Pardy, as he had to
13	leave and knew he had to leave, asked Mr. Dyet to
14	reassure Kathryn McCallion that in terms of the
15	content of the memo, it had been arrived at with a
16	consensus amongst CSIS, the RCMP and DFAIT. So
17	the product of the June 5th memo was a product of
18	a consensus amongst Canadian government agencies.
19	THE COMMISSIONER: That is what
20	Mr. Pardy said?
21	MR. DAVID: This is what Mr. Pardy
22	says, and this is what Mr. Pardy asked Mr. Dyet to
23	say to Ms McCallion.
24	THE COMMISSIONER: And

Ms McCallion, just for the record, her position

25

1	was?
2	MR. DAVID: She was the Assistant
3	Deputy Minister in charge of consular affairs,
4	passports and corporate services.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: At the
6	Department of Foreign Affairs?
7	MR. DAVID: At the Department of
8	Foreign Affairs.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: She was being
10	asked to approve the memo?
11	MR. DAVID: The memo was in terms
12	of an approval process and therefore on her desk
13	to be then forwarded to the Deputy Minister's desk
14	for eventual review by the Minister.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
16	MR. DAVID: The fourth point is
17	that Kathryn McCallion requested Dave Dyet to come
18	to her office before calling Mr. Hooper and that
19	Mr. Dyet, in being so called to Kathryn
20	McCallion's office, made the link between the call
21	and the processing of the memo.
22	THE COMMISSIONER: Was
23	Ms McCallion going to call Mr. Hooper of her own
24	initiative or was she returning a call?
25	MP DAVID: The diraumstances of

1	the phone call is that it was initiated by
2	Mr. Hooper.
3	Number 5 is that the meeting
4	between Ms McCallion and Mr. Dyet lasted for
5	approximately ten minutes.
6	The sixth point is that Mr. Dyet
7	had heard a rumour and this is how he
8	characterized it, a rumour that CSIS was not
9	thrilled with the fact that Mr. Graham's letter,
10	or the project that Mr. Graham sign a letter to be
11	issued to his counterpart in Syria, the Foreign
12	Minister of Syria, was going forward. So there
13	was a rumour that there was discontent that CSIS
14	was not thrilled, is the way he put it, that the
15	Graham letter was going forward.
16	The seventh point is that Kathryn
17	McCallion clearly indicated to Dave Dyet that she
18	was processing and going ahead with the memo even
19	before calling Jack Hooper; that her decision was
20	made in that regard.
21	The eighth point raised by
22	Mr. Dyet's testimony is that he agreed, or he
23	acknowledged, that if Mr. Hooper was to identify
24	where the memo was, he had identified the right
25	person, and his timing was appropriate in terms of

1	speaking to the person on whose desk the memo was
2	being assessed. So both he had the right person
3	and he had the right time.
4	The ninth point is that after the
5	meeting between Mr. Dyet and Ms McCallion,
6	Mr. Dyet met Jim Gould, who is the Assistant
7	Director of ISI at DFAIT.
8	The tenth point is that
9	Mr. Gould's notes, as reviewed by Mr. Dyet,
10	accurately reflect what Mr. Dyet said to him, and
11	we will review those notes, quite obviously.
12	The eleventh point, and in
13	reference to Mr. Gould's notes and I think for
14	clarity of the record I will read you the portion
15	that is concerned by Mr. Dyet's testimony.
16	Mr. Gould's notes state the
17	following at page 9 of 16: that there was a call
18	from Jack Hooper to Kathryn McCallion saying that:
19	"CSIS didn't want us to get
20	Arar back in the country as
21	they would have to devote too
22	many resources to watching
23	him."
24	Mr. Dyet, in regard to those
25	notes, to what is noted in Mr. Gould's notes, says

1	that he is unsure as to who said that to him; that
2	it is possibly Kathryn McCallion and it is
3	possibly somebody else within DFAIT.
4	The twelfth point,
5	Mr. Commissioner, is that Mr. Gould, following
6	Mr. Dyet's disclosure, pursued his inquiry
7	concerning the phone call and the processing of
8	the memo on Monday, the 9th of June.
9	The thirteenth point is that
10	Mr. Dyet was upset in his reaction in terms of
11	what he perceived CSIS was making representations
12	that the Graham letter should not go forward.
13	And the fourteenth point is
14	Mr. Dyet confirmed to Mr. Gould that the memo was
15	in fact on the Minister's desk on the 9th of June.
16	The fifteenth point is that
17	Mr. Dyet says and I think this has already been
18	referred to, but he reiterated this in his
19	cross-examination that there is nothing that
20	Jack Hooper could have said that would have
21	influenced Kathryn McCallion's decision with
22	regard to the processing of the memo.
23	The sixteenth point is that Dave
24	Dyet did not witness firsthand the phone call
25	hetween Mr. Hooner and Mc McCallion

1	And the final point is that the
2	issue, as referred to in Mr. Gould's notes about
3	resources, CSIS resources, or lack of CSIS
4	resources to monitor Mr. Arar, related to the
5	phone call, in his mind.
6	So those are the points I wish to
7	flag in terms of Mr. Dyet's testimony.
8	THE COMMISSIONER: Anybody else
9	wish to add anything with respect to what is in
10	Mr. Dyet's testimony?
11	Mr. Shore?
12	MR. SHORE: If I can address you?
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Sure, please
14	do.
15	MR. SHORE: Mr. Dyet also
16	indicated, sir, that this was a rumour that he had
17	heard, and he had heard it only within the
18	confines of CSIS. He had never spoken to
19	anybody within the confines of DFAIT, I'm
20	sorry. He had never spoken with anybody from CSIS
21	with regard to that rumour.
22	He also indicated, as my friend
23	had said, that he is not sure where he heard it,
24	but that it was a rumour floating around.
25	He indicated that he had no idea

1	at all what Ms McCallion and Mr. Hooper discussed
2	during her return call to him. He indicates that
3	what he said to Mr. Gould could have been
4	speculation. He indicated that he was speculating
5	on the conversation because, of course, he didn't
6	hear it, and he indicates very clearly that he had
7	no idea whatsoever what the conversation was
8	about.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
LO	MR. SHORE: He also indicates, if
L1	I can just conclude with part of his testimony,
L2	that he doesn't know whether or not there was any
L3	truth to the rumour which he had heard, which
L4	resulted in his discussion with Mr. Gould.
L5	Thank you, sir.
L6	THE COMMISSIONER: Ms McIsaac, do
L7	you have anything else?
L8	MS McISAAC: No, I don't, sir,
L9	thank you.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, I
21	didn't ask you, Ms Edwardh. You have read this
22	transcript.
23	MS EDWARDH: I did. But I'm
24	content with the summary of Commission counsel.
25	THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

1	Thank you.
2	Mr. David?
3	MR. DAVID: The second testimony I
4	would like to summarize, again for the public
5	benefit, as the testimony of Ms Burns will only be
6	by way of transcript, filing of a transcript is
7	to provide you with a summary of her testimony.
8	And Ms Burns' testimony was very brief in camera,
9	Mr. Commissioner.
LO	As I said before, she was the
L1	executive assistant of Kathryn McCallion, and we
L2	have already filed two pages of phone slips, phone
L3	message slips, that she drafted, she wrote,
L4	concerning the phone call between Mr. Hooper and
L5	Ms McCallion. We will be reviewing those with the
L6	testimony of today's witnesses. She also wrote a
L7	second phone slip concerning a call from Mr. Gould
L8	to Ms McCallion, again concerning the phone call.
L9	So the essence of her testimony
20	concerned those slips, and her drafting of those
21	slips, and the circumstances of her drafting of
22	those slips.
23	But other than that, Ms Burns did
24	say, did testify to the fact that she did not have
25	any recollection of the processing per se of the

1	June 5th memo by Ms McCallion, except that she
2	does remember or she did remember about a phone
3	call about it, and she does remember that
4	Ms McCallion was waiting for the memo to arrive in
5	her office. And she made the point that
6	Ms McCallion, before returning Mr. Hooper's call,
7	wanted and wished to see the memo first.
8	So that, in essence, is the
9	summary of Ms Burns' testimony.
10	THE COMMISSIONER: Does anybody
11	have anything to add to that?
12	MS EDWARDH: My only request is I
13	am unaware that these phone slips have already
14	been filed
15	MR. DAVID: They have already been
16	filed and they are at P-85, volume 5, tab 15.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: Is there a
18	phone slip particularly a phone slip, I take
19	it, is a message to call back?
20	MR. DAVID: Correct.
21	THE COMMISSIONER: Is there a
22	message that relates to this particular call?
23	MR. DAVID: There are two phone
24	slips that relate to this call.
25	THE COMMISSIONED: I think you

1	should provide them to Ms Edwardh.
2	MS EDWARDH: P-85, tab what?
3	MR. DAVID: P-85, volume 5, tab
4	15.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: What do the
6	phone slips say?
7	MR. DAVID: As I say, there are
8	two pages of phone slips. The first
9	THE COMMISSIONER: You have those?
10	You are operating at a disadvantage here.
11	MS EDWARDH: I do. My apologies.
12	THE COMMISSIONER: Go ahead.
13	MR. DAVID: The first page,
14	Mr. Commissioner, we have to refer to the third
15	slip because there are four slips that are
16	photocopied on this page.
17	The third slip is not dated. It
18	says, "For KEM", and KEM is Kathryn Elizabeth
19	McCallion.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
21	MR. DAVID: There is no date or
22	time indicated. It says "from Jack Hooper, CSIS",
23	and the phone number has been redacted in
24	question. And then the message is "Re: Arar".
25	So the message that Ms Burns noted

1	for Ms McCallion is that Jack Hooper was calling
2	Ms McCallion about Arar.
3	Again, the testimony of Ms Burns
4	concerned the date that she may have drafted this
5	slip, because there is no date indicated on it.
6	But on the slip that is previous to that, which is
7	fully redacted in terms of its content, we know
8	that the date is June 3rd of 2003. And then the
9	date that follows that, again it is fully redacted
LO	because it is not relevant to the phone call in
L1	question, the date indicated is June 5th, 2003.
L2	THE COMMISSIONER: So this
L3	was between the 3rd and
L4	MR. DAVID: Which led Ms Burns to
L5	think that this was on or about June 5th, the slip
L6	that she wrote.
L7	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
L8	MR. DAVID: I'm sorry. What she
L9	said is that it was no later than June 5th.
20	On the second page, the first slip
21	is relevant to the phone call, and again it is for
22	Kathryn McCallion. There is a date on this slip,
23	and it is June the 6th, 2003.
24	It is from Jim Gould, identified
25	as being from IST, with the phone number in

1	question, and then the message is: "Re: your
2	phone call with CSIS on Arar".
3	THE COMMISSIONER: Is that it?
4	If you will proceed with the first
5	witness then.
6	MR. DAVID: Yes, Mr. Livermore,
7	please.
8	MR. SHORE: Excuse me,
9	Mr. Commissioner.
10	Mr. David, if I can just add one
11	note to Ms Burns' testimony, she indicated as well
12	in her testimony, sir, that she knew nothing about
13	the phone call nothing about the contents of
14	the phone call, excuse me, and that Ms McCallion
15	didn't talk to her about the call.
16	MR. DAVID: Mr. Livermore?
17	PREVIOUSLY SWORN: DAN LIVERMORE
18	THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning,
19	Mr. Livermore. You are still under oath.
20	MR. LIVERMORE: Thank you very
21	much, sir.
22	EXAMINATION
23	MR. DAVID: Good morning
24	Mr. Livermore.
25	Could we show Mr. Livermore

1	Exhibit P-117, volume 2, tab 75.5, please.
2	MR. LIVERMORE: Could I have that
3	number again, please, Mr. David.
4	MR. DAVID: 75.5.
5	Simply to put you in context,
6	Mr. Livermore, you are aware of the contents of
7	the June 5th Pardy memo.
8	MR. LIVERMORE: I am, yes.
9	MR. DAVID: And you were aware of
10	the contents of the June 5th memo at the relevant
11	time, that is, in the month of June of 2003.
12	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I was.
13	MR. DAVID: And you were consulted
14	or you were involved, put it that way, in the
15	drafting or in the preparation of the memo at the
16	time with Mr. Pardy.
17	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I was.
18	MR. DAVID: And you supported the
19	contents of this memo and indicated so to
20	Mr. Pardy?
21	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I did.
22	MR. DAVID: You were aware,
23	furthermore, Mr. Livermore, and I remind you
24	perhaps that this was a final product of a draft
25	memo that had a previous life, that is dated May

1	the 5th, 2003.
2	If you wish, you can refer to it
3	at tab 3.
4	There was an initial version of
5	this memo, dated May the 5th, and you were aware
6	of that initial version and that it eventually
7	evolved into the June 5th version?
8	MR. LIVERMORE: I believe I was.
9	I can't say for sure at what point I was involved
10	in the various drafts.
11	MR. DAVID: You were aware also,
12	Mr. Livermore, that the May 5th version led to
13	discussions and meetings with your partner
14	Canadian agencies, CSIS and the RCMP, amongst
15	others?
16	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I am.
17	MR. DAVID: And you were also
18	aware that the June 5th memo was a compromise of
19	positions between CSIS, the RCMP and DFAIT?
20	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I am.
21	MR. DAVID: This is a memo, the
22	June 5th version is a memo that ended up on the
23	Minister's desk. It was drafted and prepared by
24	Mr. Pardy?
25	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, it was.

1	MR. DAVID: Can you explain how a
2	memo prepared by a director general what is the
3	flow to end up on the Minister's desk?
4	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the norm in
5	our department is to, first of all it is the
6	responsibility of the drafting official in this
7	case it would have been Gar Pardy or one of his
8	staff to consult widely to make sure that all
9	views in the department have been taken into
10	account. And usually on what is called the
11	transmittal slip, which is the first piece of
12	paper, usually you see the record of consultation.
13	It is also the responsibility of
14	the drafting officer to ensure that there is
15	interdepartmental consultation so that the
16	consultation line, if you wish to call it that,
17	reflects consensus. In other words, putting down
18	the list of individuals, or divisions, or bureaus
19	consulted more or less means that they have been
20	taken on board the particular line of reasoning in
21	a memo, unless there are contrary opinions
22	expressed either in the transmittal slip, or
23	possibly in the memo itself.
24	MR. DAVID: And so you are
25	referring, in fact, to the first page of tab 5?

1	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
2	MR. DAVID: It is entitled
3	"Transmittal Slip", and we see in terms of
4	consultation for the contents of the memo involved
5	were GMR, which is within DFAIT.
6	MR. LIVERMORE: That is the Middle
7	East Division.
8	MR. DAVID: Geographic office or
9	bureau, we could say?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
11	MR. DAVID: There is ISD, which is
12	your box.
13	MR. LIVERMORE: That's me.
14	MR. DAVID: That's you. And then
15	there is ISI, which is or was Mr. Heatherington's
16	box at the time, as well as RCMP, CSIS and PCO?
17	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
18	MR. DAVID: So they were involved
19	in the contents, in the development of the
20	contents of this memo that went up to Minister
21	Graham's office?
22	MR. LIVERMORE: They presumably
23	would have been, yes. I think they were.
24	MR. DAVID: We understand from
25	previous testimony, Mr. Livermore, if you look

1	underneath where there is two black there is
2	F-something, I-U, I believe, and there in a box,
3	and just below that there is a stamp. It is my
4	understanding that stamp indicates the date it
5	arrived in the Minister's office.
6	You see there is a it is in
7	the
8	MR. LIVERMORE: I really am not
9	the best authority on that.
10	MR. DAVID: All right. That's
11	fine.
12	The distribution box on the
13	left-hand side simply indicates to whom the memo
14	was distributed?
15	MR. LIVERMORE: That's correct.
16	MR. DAVID: And so we see that it
17	was distributed, among other people, to the Deputy
18	Minister, USS?
19	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
20	MR. DAVID: MKM, which is Kathryn
21	McCallion?
22	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
23	MR. DAVID: And to yourself, ISD?
24	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
25	MR. DAVID: And to

1	Mr. Heatherington of ISI?
2	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
3	MR. DAVID: And JPO is Dave Dyet?
4	MR. LIVERMORE: That would be him
5	yes.
6	MR. DAVID: So Mr. Dyet also
7	received a copy of this memo.
8	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
9	MR. DAVID: In terms of
10	authorization, if Mr. Pardy drafts a memo it
11	doesn't go directly to the Minister's office?
12	MR. LIVERMORE: The norm in our
13	department is that a director or director general
14	signs off the memo, and you can see Mr. Pardy's
15	signature block and his signature in the memo. It
16	is then sent up through the line.
17	You see at "To" at the top, it
18	normally it always goes to USS, who is the
19	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then
20	usually you have a bracketed section which
21	indicates the routing of the memo. In this case,
22	the routing is through Kathryn McCallion, who is
23	the Assistant Deputy Minister to whom Gar Pardy
24	reports.
25	MR. DAVID: Essentially the flow

1	follows the hierarchy of DFAIT?
2	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
3	MR. DAVID: So it went from the
4	Director General's office.
5	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
6	MR. DAVID: To the Assistant
7	Deputy Minister, Kathryn McCallion.
8	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
9	MR. DAVID: And then to the Deputy
10	Minister, and then it is permitted to go on to the
11	Minister's office?
12	MR. LIVERMORE: The norm is then
13	on the on the second page you see the Deputy
14	Minister's sign-off. If the Deputy Minister
15	agrees with the line of argument and the
16	recommendations that are put forth, the Deputy
17	Minister signs the memo and it is sent to the
18	Minister's office.
19	MR. DAVID: And the initials that
20	we see on the transmittal slip on the "To" line,
21	MKM, we see initials there's a slash through
22	MKM and there are initials KEM above that. That
23	indicates to you that Kathryn McCallion has read
24	and approved this memo?
25	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, it does.

1	MR. DAVID: And the fact that
2	there is a similar annotation on USS also
3	indicates to you that the Deputy Minister has read
4	and approved the contents of this memo.
5	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
6	MR. DAVID: For processing, for
7	final reading by the Minister?
8	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
9	MR. DAVID: In terms of content,
LO	let's go to paragraph 11, which is on page 4.
L1	You were aware that CSIS officials
L2	had visited Syria earlier this year and discussed
L3	Mr. Arar with their counterparts? You were aware
L4	of that?
L5	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
L6	MR. DAVID: And you were also
L7	aware that they did not meet Mr. Arar?
L8	MR. LIVERMORE: That's correct.
L9	MR. DAVID: And you were also
20	aware that subsequent to these discussions, Syrian
21	officials informed us that they were informed by
22	CSIS officials that Canada did not want to have
23	Mr. Arar returned?
24	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
25	MR. DAVID: And that the CSIS

1	officials denied that they had said this to the
2	Syrians?
3	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
4	MR. DAVID: This was information
5	that was to your knowledge?
6	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
7	MR. DAVID: Finally in paragraph
8	13, Mr. Livermore, it says:
9	"In recent days, we have
10	discussed the case with both
11	CSIS and the RCMP. They have
12	maintained their positions
13	that Mr. Arar, while not
14	under investigation in
15	Canada, is a person of
16	interest to them because of
17	the evidence of his
18	connections with others who
19	are. In these circumstances,
20	they will not provide any
21	direct support in having
22	Mr. Arar returned to Canada.
23	Should Mr. Arar return to
24	Canada, CSIS and the RCMP
25	have both indicated they want

1	to interrogate him. As such,
2	the best we can do in these
3	circumstances is to again
4	raise the matter direct with
5	the Syrian Foreign Minister
6	and to that end we have
7	attached a letter for your
8	signature. We would also
9	recommend that you call in
10	the Syrian Ambassador and
11	deliver the letter."
12	So clearly what is being proposed
13	here by Mr. Pardy and his superiors to the
14	Minister is a compromise; it is a diluted
15	solution?
16	MS McISAAC: Excuse me, that's not
17	clear at all from that sentence.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: Perhaps
19	rephrase the question?
20	MR. DAVID: Mr. Livermore, you are
21	aware that previous to this final version, the
22	original intent of Mr. Pardy was for the Solicitor
23	General of Canada and the Minister of Foreign
24	Affairs to jointly sign a letter that would have
25	been addressed to the Syrian Foreign Minister?

1	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I am.
2	MR. DAVID: And that the Solicitor
3	General, on the advice of his people, refused to
4	do so?
5	MR. LIVERMORE: I'm not aware of
6	the precise channel of communications on that
7	issue. I am aware that both CSIS and the RCMP
8	were reluctant to pursue that course, but I'm not
9	sure to what extent that reached the Minister's
10	office.
11	MR. DAVID: But in the end, the
12	only thing that was possible was for your
13	Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to sign
14	a letter to the Syrian Foreign Minister?
15	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, that's
16	correct.
17	MR. DAVID: In that context,
18	Mr. Livermore, you understood that there was an
19	environment where CSIS, RCMP and DFAIT were not
20	necessarily seeing how things should proceed at
21	this time in terms of further actions and further
22	efforts to get Mr. Arar back to Canada. There
23	wasn't exactly unanimity amongst the three
24	agencies?
25	MR. LIVERMORE: I wouldn't

1	characterize it quite that way. There was
2	unanimity within Foreign Affairs, and there had
3	been since the beginning of course, that we wanted
4	Mr. Arar back, and that had been communicated
5	quite clearly to the Syrians.
6	At this stage, my recollection was
7	at this stage, in the month of May, Mr. Pardy had
8	mooted the suggestion, put forward the suggestion,
9	that it would be a good idea for the Solicitor
10	General to put his signature on a letter and that
11	the phraseology of the letter would indicate that
12	Mr. Arar had no connection at all to international
13	terrorist activities.
14	My recollection is that the RCMP
15	and CSIS first of all, they were reluctant to
16	get their Minister involved in these activities
17	because I think, quite rightly, they said that
18	consular affairs don't fall within the mandate of
19	
10	CSIS and the RCMP. But that was relatively minor.
20	CSIS and the RCMP. But that was relatively minor. More importantly they didn't agree
20	More importantly they didn't agree
20 21	More importantly they didn't agree with the letter that Gar Pardy had drafted. And

the Foreign Minister making representations. I

25

1	think that they simply felt that, to the extent
2	that their agencies were going to be involved in
3	the démarche, or in the phraseology put forward,
4	it had to be accurate, and what Gar Pardy had
5	drafted was simply not accurate.
6	So my recollection is that in the
7	month of May, that is more or less what the tenor
8	of debate was.
9	MR. DAVID: So the language which
10	is the compromise language we can find at tab 439
11	of volume 5 of the DFAIT collection, C-42.
12	MR. LIVERMORE: 432?
13	MR. DAVID: 439.
14	And in the second paragraph, the
15	language that has been accepted is:
16	"I can assure you that there
17	is no Canadian government
18	impediment to Mr. Arar's
19	return to Canada."
20	MR. LIVERMORE: That among other
21	things. There was another sentence which had been
22	suggested in an earlier draft by Mr. Pardy which
23	was taken out.
24	MR. DAVID: And do you recall the
25	gist of that sentence?

1	MR. LIVERMORE: The draft letter
2	should be in the material somewhere. I don't
3	recall the exact gist of it. But my recollection
4	of the phraseology was something to the effect
5	that: I can assure you that Mr. Arar has no
6	connection to something.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: Am I right,
8	Ms McIsaac, that that was actually a suggestion
9	from the Minister's office, the sentence that
10	Mr. Livermore is referring to?
11	I'm not sure anything turns on it
12	at this point.
13	MS McISAAC: I think perhaps what
14	Mr. Livermore is referring to is there was some
15	draft wording in the body of the May 5th memo.
16	That may be it, that Mr. Pardy
17	THE COMMISSIONER: And that it was
18	a suggestion from the Minister's office to
19	strengthen
20	MS McISAAC: Subsequently, yes.
21	MR. LIVERMORE: My recollection,
22	though, is that the Minister's office was changing
23	the phraseology of something that was already in a
24	draft letter.
25	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.

1	MR. DAVID: If you go to the May
2	5th draft version of the memo at tab 3,
3	Mr. Livermore, and if you go to page 4 of 5
4	MR. LIVERMORE: Page 3?
5	MR. DAVID: Four of 5, if you go
6	to the bottom right-hand corner.
7	You will see at the very top that
8	Mr. Pardy is saying:
9	"There is a need for an
10	unambiguous statement by the
11	government of Canada,
12	preferably signed by the
13	Solicitor General and the
14	Foreign Minister, to the
15	effect that we have no
16	evidence in Canada, or from
17	foreign sources, that
18	Mr. Arar is or was a member
19	of al-Qaida, that we do not
20	believe that such information
21	exists and that Mr. Arar
22	should be permitted to return
23	to Canada."
24	Is that what you were referring
25	to?

1	MR. LIVERMORE: That is the gist
2	of the disagreement, yes.
3	MR. DAVID: So in that context,
4	Mr. Livermore, you are visited upon by Mr. Jim
5	Gould, Assistant Director of ISI in the early part
6	of June.
7	Do you recall when that visit was,
8	what date?
9	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall the
10	date, but it would have been around the 5th or 6th
11	of June. It was around the time when the final
12	memorandum was proceeding up the line.
13	He didn't exactly visit me. His
14	office physically was next to mine, and my
15	recollection is either he popped into my office
16	and said something to me or I popped out of the
17	office and he was there. But it was more or less
18	one of those meetings.
19	MR. DAVID: And what did he tell
20	you?
21	MR. LIVERMORE: He told me that
22	the gist of it, and I can't remember his exact
23	words, but the gist of it was
24	MR. DAVID: Let me ask you first,
25	Mr. Livermore. I'm sorry to interrupt you. Did

1	you take any notes in regard to what he told you?
2	MR. LIVERMORE: No.
3	MR. DAVID: So you have no notes?
4	MR. LIVERMORE: No.
5	MR. DAVID: Thank you.
6	MR. LIVERMORE: Could my memory be
7	refreshed on where I could find the memo of July
8	30?
9	MR. DAVID: Yes. We have filed a
10	new document today, and that is P-237, if we could
11	show that to Mr. Livermore. And I will bring you
12	to tab 3.
13	It is today's document, P-237, and
14	if you go to tab 3 you will have the July 30th
15	memo.
16	The relevant paragraph that you
17	are looking for is paragraph 5 on page 2.
18	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes. That's the
19	gist of what I recall Jim Gould told me on that
20	occasion.
21	MR. DAVID: Let's read that. It
22	says:
23	"Another senior CSIS officer
24	told MKM"
25	MKM is Kathryn McCallion.

1	"that DFAIT should curtail
2	its efforts to have Arar
3	released as it was CSIS's
4	preference that Arar not
5	return."
6	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
7	MR. DAVID: This in summary
8	reflects what Mr. Gould told you?
9	MR. LIVERMORE: I believe it does,
10	yes.
11	MR. DAVID: I would like to refer
12	you, Mr. Livermore, to Mr. Gould's notes, because
13	Mr. Gould took some notes down about what he found
14	out from Mr. Dyet.
15	I would refer you to P-236, which
16	we filed today.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: P-236, that's
18	Mr. Gould's notes?
19	MR. DAVID: These are Mr. Gould's
20	notes, yes.
21	If you go to tab 1 and go to page
22	9 of 16, at the very top there's an "i" and a
23	double "ii", and this is what Mr. Gould noted from
24	Mr. Dyet's statement to him.
25	It says:

1	"First of all, the memo from
2	JPD, Gar Pardy, about
3	Arar"
4	And then he notes:
5	"Status: Did it go to MKM?
6	Probably up today."
7	And just for your reference, the
8	record clearly indicates that these notes are
9	dated June the 5th, 2003.
LO	MR. LIVERMORE: Right.
L1	MR. DAVID: So one is there is a
L2	concern about the memo and where it's at. The
L3	second point in Mr. Gould's notes is that:
L4	"Call from Jack Hooper,
L5	ADDO"
L6	Which is not entirely accurate; it
L7	is ADO.
L8	"to MKM saying that CSIS
L9	doesn't want us to get Arar
20	back into the country as they
21	would have to devote too many
22	resources to watching him."
23	Did Mr. Gould, in his conversation
24	with you, say anything that resembles any of those
25	two entries?

1	MR. LIVERMORE: That was the gist
2	of what he told me, yes.
3	MR. DAVID: So that also reflects
4	what he said to you.
5	And how did you react,
6	Mr. Livermore?
7	First of all, let me ask you, how
8	did you sense Mr. Gould was reacting to what he
9	was saying to you?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, he will have
11	an opportunity to speak for himself
12	MR. DAVID: I'm asking you for
13	your perception of it.
14	MR. LIVERMORE: My perception is
15	that what and my perception myself, I think we
16	both probably shared the same perception. What
17	was interesting was not particularly these
18	comments; what was interesting was that Jack
19	Hooper would call Kathryn McCallion because this
20	issue had been handled for months personally by
21	Gar Pardy and that Ms McCallion, although
22	notionally she is in the line of hierarchy above
23	the consular bureau, she did not deal with
24	consular cases per se, or she dealt with the
25	management of the bureau perhaps but not consular

1	cases per se. So it struck us odd that there
2	would be a phone call between Jack Hooper and
3	Kathryn McCallion.
4	That was about the only thing
5	unusual that struck me about this conversation.
6	MR. DAVID: I think there are two
7	concerns, Mr. Livermore: One is the message that
8	Mr. Gould is giving you is that CSIS doesn't want
9	Arar back in Canada; that CSIS cannot handle the
10	situation because of resources, or an issue of
11	resources, if Arar does come back to Canada.
12	So they are indicating that they
13	are content with where he is, Syria? That's the
14	message?
15	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, I'm not sure
16	that was the message, but I take it that
17	MR. DAVID: Well, did you not
18	understand that to be the message?
19	MR. LIVERMORE: I took that to be
20	the message that Jim Gould gave to me.
21	MR. DAVID: Correct.
22	MR. LIVERMORE: I cannot attest
23	that that indeed was the message.
24	MR. DAVID: I fully agree with
25	you. But I'm sure that when Mr. Gould told you

1	this, you didn't think that Mr. Gould was making
2	this up?
3	MR. LIVERMORE: Oh, no. Not at
4	all.
5	MR. DAVID: You took Mr. Gould to
6	be acting professionally and seriously?
7	MR. LIVERMORE: Absolutely. He is
8	a first class officer, and I have no reason to
9	doubt that what he told me was entirely in good
LO	faith.
L1	MR. DAVID: So my first concern is
L2	this information is very significant. On one hand
L3	you have been spending months and months and
L4	months in efforts to get Mr. Arar back. It is
L5	DFAIT's mandate to do so. And here you are
L6	finding out from Mr. Gould that CSIS is not
L7	online, that CSIS is in fact perhaps working
L8	against that objective.
L9	MR. LIVERMORE: Well
20	MR. DAVID: So I'm asking you:
21	How do you deal with that information?
22	MR. LIVERMORE: In fact, our view
23	at the time was that it was not significant and
24	not very important, and I will tell you why. At
25	the very time that the phone call took place, or I

1	guess took place, the memo going forward with the
2	strategy that we had proposed all along and that
3	in fact we had worked with CSIS to propose, was
4	gone. It had gone to the Minister's office.
5	There was a letter to be signed. The strategy had
6	been set. And that was it.
7	If there were a possibility of
8	reservations on the part of another government
9	agency, that was too bad. That was not going to
10	be taken into account at that time.
11	So it didn't worry me at all, and
12	it was not particularly significant because a
13	different course of action had already been
14	entered into.
15	MR. DAVID: And the second area
16	where you seem to have expressed surprise is the
17	fact that Kathryn McCallion is dealing with Jack
18	Hooper. That surprised you.
19	MR. LIVERMORE: On a consular
20	case, yes. Not of itself. I'm not saying that a
21	call between a senior member of CSIS and Kathryn
22	McCallion would have been unusual, but on a
23	consular case, yes.
24	MR. DAVID: Now, clearly Arar is a
25	consular case.

1	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
2	MR. DAVID: But clearly the memo
3	is addressing an approach that the Government of
4	Canada is going to take.
5	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
6	MR. DAVID: And clearly the memo
7	is addressing concerns of different parties in
8	terms of coming to an agreement on a course of
9	action?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right, and
11	we had already agreed with CSIS on a course of
12	action. You saw that their name was put down on
13	the transmittal slip as being consulted and in
14	agreement, and the memo had gone forward with that
15	in mind. And that memo, as far as I was
16	concerned, had been signed off and was on its way
17	to the Minister. We had agreed on it.
18	MR. DAVID: As I understand how
19	DFAIT operates, or operated at this time, is that
20	Mr. Pardy in fact could answer to two different
21	Assistant Deputy Ministers: one was for the
22	geographic region of Syria; and, two, it was to
23	Kathryn McCallion, who was in charge of consular
24	affairs?
25	MR. LIVERMORE: Formally it is to

1	Kathryn McCallion rather than to the geographic
2	Assistant Deputy Minister, yes. But in fact
3	everyone was on board the approach taken in that
4	memo. GMR represents the Middle East Division,
5	which is part of the geographic branch headed by
6	the person who was at the time John McNee I
7	think it was John McNee who was in charge of
8	Europe and Middle East. So all of the parties
9	within Foreign Affairs were on board that
10	particular memo at the time.
11	MR. DAVID: So I'm not quite
12	understanding then why you thought it to be
13	surprising that Jack Hooper would be phoning
14	Kathryn McCallion about the memo.
15	MR. LIVERMORE: Because if someone
16	wanted to talk to the person in charge of this
17	particular consular issue, the person to talk to
18	was Gar Pardy.
19	MR. DAVID: And if Gar Pardy was
20	not around?
21	MR. LIVERMORE: Presumably you
22	would have to find a Deputy Minister. You would
23	have to take it to a deputy, or presumably someone
24	else could have handled it. But it was unusual
25	that Kathryn McCallion would have been involved.

1	MR. DAVID: But Kathryn McCallion
2	was an Assistant Deputy Minister. Jack Hooper was
3	No. 3 in his organization.
4	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
5	MR. DAVID: So they are basically
6	the same level.
7	MR. LIVERMORE: Basically.
8	MR. DAVID: So Mr. Hooper, if he
9	is going to call somebody within DFAIT, the
10	appropriate person to address would be the person
11	of his same rank?
12	MR. LIVERMORE: One might argue
13	this, but I had never heard of that happening
14	before. That's my point.
15	MR. DAVID: Had you ever heard of
16	Mr. Hooper ever calling anybody else about a
17	consular matter within DFAIT?
18	MR. LIVERMORE: I can't recall,
19	no.
20	MR. DAVID: Did you ever speak to
21	Ms McCallion about what you had heard from
22	Mr. Gould?
23	MR. LIVERMORE: No, I didn't.
24	MR. DAVID: Did you ever think of
25	raising the matter with her?

1	MR. LIVERMORE: Not at all.
2	MR. DAVID: Did you ever speak to
3	Mr. Hooper or anybody else at CSIS about the
4	matter?
5	MR. LIVERMORE: Not at all, no.
6	MR. DAVID: Did you ever speak to
7	your people internally at DFAIT, Scott
8	Heatherington?
9	MR. LIVERMORE: I can't recall
LO	whether I spoke to Scott Heatherington about it,
L1	but he would have been possibly part of the
L2	preparation of that memo of July 30, so he
L3	probably would have known.
L4	I can't recall whether I spoke to
L5	him about it at all.
L6	MR. DAVID: And we have seen this
L7	in P-237, tab 3, the July 30th memo. Clearly, the
L8	call, and what the call concerned, was on or about
L9	June the 5th, 2003.
20	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
21	MR. DAVID: And so two months
22	after, at the end of July, in a memo that is being
23	prepared for the Deputy Minister, the substance of
24	what you understood the call to be is reflected in
2.5	this memo?

1	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
2	MR. DAVID: So you felt that even
3	two months after, that what Mr. Gould had
4	described as being the reason for the call was
5	accurate?
6	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
7	MR. DAVID: And that remains so,
8	Mr. Livermore, until the time that DFAIT prepared
9	a chronology in November of 2003 for PCO?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
11	MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are
12	my questions.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: What happened
14	in the November chronology? Did that change then?
15	MR. DAVID: Yes. I was going to
16	deal with that with Mr. Gould, but I would be
17	happy to do so with Mr. Livermore.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: No, that's
19	fine.
20	MR. DAVID: Mr. Gould is more
21	hands-on in terms of the preparation of the
22	chronology.
23	But for your understanding,
24	Mr. Commissioner, in November of 2003, all
25	involved Canadian agencies are being requested to

1	prepare detailed chronologies for PCO, and
2	Mr. Gould suggested that the entry about the phone
3	call between Ms McCallion and Mr. Hooper be
4	included in the DFAIT chronology. In the end it
5	was not included, and that's in November of 2003.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
7	MR. DAVID: I'm sorry, one last
8	thing.
9	Did you ever discuss the matter
10	with the CSIS liaison officer within your office?
11	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall
12	doing so, no.
13	MR. DAVID: Okay. Thank you.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Just before we
15	start the cross-examinations, it strikes me that
16	the need to review Ms McCallion's transcript for
17	NSC, could that take place now so that what I
18	envision is that Ms Edwardh have a chance to
19	review it over the lunch hour so we don't delay.
20	MS EDWARDH: It is being done
21	right now.
22	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
23	Ms Edwardh?
24	EXAMINATION
25	MS EDWARDH: I will be brief,

1	Mr. Commissioner.
2	Mr. Livermore, you have testified
3	at length before, but it is clear that the
4	building of a consensus, as we have heard about
5	it, was a consensus that could only be reached
6	once no reference was made to the RCMP, or to
7	CSIS, and their "position" in respect of
8	Mr. Arar's return. In other words, they wanted
9	nothing said about whether they had any evidence
10	or didn't have any evidence; they simply wanted to
11	be written out of the equation?
12	MR. LIVERMORE: I wouldn't put it
13	precisely that way. As I indicated earlier, there
14	was on the part of both of them a reluctance to
15	play a role in consular matters for the very
16	reason that consular issues don't fall within
17	their mandate.
18	MS EDWARDH: And they were
19	reluctant, sir, though, with respect to more than
20	that. They were reluctant to have any statements
21	made about assertions that fell directly within
22	their mandate?
23	MR. LIVERMORE: The assertions
24	it is hard to answer that question, forgive me.
25	But to go back a bit, the type of discussions that

1	took place were on an initial draft letter that
2	Gar Pardy had drafted.
3	MS EDWARDH: And if you want to
4	refer to it, it is in the exhibit that my friend
5	first referred you to, in the Wayne Easter
6	documents, P-117.
7	MR. LIVERMORE: P-117.
8	MS EDWARDH: At 75. I think we
9	start at
LO	MR. LIVERMORE: Which?
L1	MS EDWARDH: I think it is tab 3,
L2	75.3.
L3	This is the May 5th initial
L4	attempt to build an interdepartmental approach, a
L5	I understand it.
L6	MR. LIVERMORE: But in some place
L7	in the documents is the initial draft document by
L8	Mr. Pardy.
L9	MS EDWARDH: Yes. And he wanted
20	to make statements about the absence of evidence
21	linking Mr. Arar to terrorist activity.
22	MR. LIVERMORE: That's on page 4
23	of 5. But there is also the draft letter itself
24	that he drafted.
25	MS EDWARDH: But that was the

1	issue, was it not?
2	MR. LIVERMORE: The issue was, as
3	reflected in page 4 of 5, at the top there. He
4	wanted what he called an unambiguous statement of
5	non-involvement in terrorist activities.
6	MS EDWARDH: Yes.
7	MR. LIVERMORE: CSIS and the RCMP
8	came back and told us that they could not give
9	that statement.
10	MS EDWARDH: No. And indeed at
11	the same time that CSIS and the RCMP, and
12	particularly CSIS, was taking that position, the
13	Department of Foreign Affairs was aware that CSIS
14	had travelled to Syria?
15	MR. LIVERMORE: Oh, yes, yes.
16	MS EDWARDH: That CSIS had met
17	with Syrian Military Intelligence?
18	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
19	MS EDWARDH: And that CSIS had
20	either directly or indirectly with its
21	counterpart, the RCMP, received information in the
22	past from Syrian Military Intelligence?
23	MS McISAAC: I'm not sure that
24	that is on the record.
25	MS EDWARDH: It certainly is.

1	MS McISAAC: And the extent of any
2	information received by CSIS is a matter of
3	MS EDWARDH: I am not at all
4	concerned about what was received or the extent of
5	it, but we do know from the conversation held with
6	Mr. Cabana, et cetera, that in making his offer to
7	provide information to Syrian Military
8	Intelligence, he did so on the basis that they had
9	been helpful in the past in providing information
10	to the RCMP.
11	MS McISAAC: To the RCMP.
12	MS EDWARDH: We also have been
13	given a document, as of two or three days ago,
14	Mr. Commissioner, that has as part of a chronology
15	the fact that DFAIT, on December 16th, 2002,
16	through ISI, is the way I translate the document,
17	receives a memo summarizing CSIS' liaison visit to
18	Syria, and further, CSIS' message to ISI providing
19	translated transcript of Arar's statement during
20	interrogation and interviews with Syrian Military
21	Intelligence.
22	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
23	MS McISAAC: I think that was the
24	one the Ambassador brought back.
25	MS EDWARDH: There's no suggestion

1	it is. That's November the 3rd. This seems to be
2	an entirely different "document" relating to a
3	transcript of Mr. Arar's statement, not the
4	three-paragraph bout de papier.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: I don't have
6	the document in front of me, but as I listen to
7	it, that does seem what it seems to be.
8	MS EDWARDH: That's my
9	understanding, yes.
10	THE COMMISSIONER: Something
11	different than the three paragraph
12	MS McISAAC: It is the
13	translation.
14	MS EDWARDH: Mr. Commissioner, let
15	me argue by at least referring you to the document
16	that I have.
17	If you look at Exhibit 237, and
18	turn to tab 4, under page 2, at the bottom of page
19	2 you will see two references to the date of
20	December 16th, 2002. You will recall we have
21	already heard ample evidence about Ambassador
22	Pillarella's removal or return to Canada on or
23	about November the 3rd, his bringing a very short
24	three-paragraph document called a bout de papier,
25	it being handed at that time, almost immediately,

1	over for translation to CSIS, but it being the
2	subject matter of meetings in the early part of
3	November, well before CSIS travels to Syria.
4	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
5	MS EDWARDH: So I took this as
6	clearly being a reference to other information.
7	We also have Mr. Edelson's
8	testimony. You will recall, when he met with the
9	RCMP, he was told by the RCMP that they believed
10	CSIS had further information from Syria, and the
11	RCMP were anxiously awaiting it. And this was
12	well after the November 3rd date.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: But I think
14	this refers, though, the first reference under
15	December 16th refers to a memo to USS summarizing
16	CSIS' liaison visit to Syria.
17	MS EDWARDH: Yes.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: But it doesn't
19	then go on to say what was included in
20	MS EDWARDH: It is the next entry,
21	Mr. Commissioner.
22	THE COMMISSIONER: I think
23	Ms McIsaac's point, the translated transcript 1
24	want to be careful how I say this, Ms McIsaac
25	hut that refers to the November 3rd document

1	Is that your point?
2	MS McISAAC: That's what I believe
3	that refers to, sir.
4	The point is we know Ambassador
5	Pillarella brought back the document
6	THE COMMISSIONER: That was
7	translated.
8	MS McISAAC: That needed to be
9	translated. That document, unfortunately, is not
10	part of the public record, or the summary of it is
11	not, because my friend has refused to allow that
12	to be made public, the summary that Mr. Atkey
13	prepared.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
15	MS McISAAC: That has been
16	acknowledged that that information was brought
17	back about Mr. Arar by the Ambassador. The
18	Government has not provided any further
19	information and claims National Security
20	Confidentiality with respect to any other
21	information received from the Syrian government by
22	anyone, including CSIS, with respect to this or
23	related matters.
24	I don't know where this goes with
25	my friend's question, if she can just rephrase it.

1	THE COMMISSIONER: I was just
2	going to come back to it. The question that
3	struck me was that it indicated that he was aware
4	that CSIS had visited, and he was aware that the
5	RCMP had received information, and I guess to the
6	extent that it is referred in this document that
7	CSIS had as well.
8	Why don't we just leave it at that
9	and without getting
10	MS EDWARDH: Well, with respect
11	then, do I take it Mr. Commissioner, let me
12	just go through this process.
13	In Ambassador Pillarella's
14	materials that are marked as Exhibit P-134, at tab
15	6 in those materials we have a description. I am
16	not precisely concerned with accurately describing
17	who it generates from, but this clearly comes out
18	of ISI and it may come from Donald Saunders, just
19	so my friend can follow along.
20	It is dated November 3rd, 2002,
21	Sunday, and it then describes:
22	"On November 3rd, 2002, the
23	Canadian Ambassador to Syria
24	received a document (written
25	in Arabic) from Syrian

1	Military Intelligence. The
2	Ambassador brought the
3	document to Canada personally
4	and gave it to ISI on
5	November 6th."
6	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
7	MS EDWARDH: "ISI sent it to CSIS
8	for translation. The
9	document, an undated
10	three-paragraph bout de
11	papier, was translated on
12	November 7th. The document
13	alleges that Mr. Arar spent
14	time in Afghanistan in
15	Mujahedin camps and that he
16	knew [redacted]. The
17	document was sent to CSIS for
18	translation by the CSIS
19	liaison officer in ISI. The
20	document was returned to ISI,
21	and the information was
22	shared with the RCMP and
23	CSIS."
24	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
25	MS EDWARDH: Then a month later,

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1	we have reference both to and of course this
2	statement is made well before CSIS goes.
3	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. I
4	understand that.
5	MS EDWARDH: A month later, on
6	December 16th, we have a record in the chronology
7	as put forward by ISI that ISI now has a summary
8	of the CSIS liaison visit to Syria.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
10	MS EDWARDH: Point 1.
11	And point 2, CSIS' message to ISI,
12	providing translated transcript of Arar's
13	statements during interrogations/interviews with
14	Military Intelligence.
15	So in my respectful submission
16	what I have before me is totally consistent with
17	the evidence of Mr. Edelson and also with the
18	potential inferences available that CSIS received
19	further transcripts of the interrogation.
20	MS McISAAC: My friend can
21	speculate all she wants, sir. We are not
22	confirming what, if anything, CSIS may or may not
23	have received from the Syrians.
24	THE COMMISSIONER: I think what I
25	can say fairly, having listened to the evidence,

1	that I think the reference at the very bottom of
2	the page, whether it is accurately drafted and the
3	timing, refers to the one Mr. Pillarella received
4	on November 6th.
5	MS EDWARDH: I'm content with
6	that. But the purpose of my question let me go
7	back to the purpose of my questioning.
8	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
9	MS EDWARDH: Obviously, from your
10	perspective, both CSIS and the RCMP had an
11	interest in maintaining relations with Syrian
12	Military Intelligence for their own purposes and
13	their own mandate.
14	MR. LIVERMORE: I can't answer
15	that question. One has to assume yes, but in
16	fairness, we know that Syrian Military
17	Intelligence was less interested in talking to the
18	RCMP than CSIS.
19	MS EDWARDH: Then let's talk about
20	CSIS. From your dealings with them in trying to
21	build a consensus, and given your involvement in
22	the world of intelligence, it became apparent to
23	you that in the discharge of their own mandate
24	that their interest in relationships was with
25	Syrian Military Intelligence, and they did not

1	want to undermine their position by signing on to
2	a letter?
3	MR. LIVERMORE: No, I don't think
4	that was quite the situation. The situation had
5	nothing to do with well, let me go back,
6	because there are two different phases, and I
7	think there is a mixture of two different phases
8	being entered into.
9	There was a phase when there was
10	some confusion allegedly on the Syrian side as to
11	Canadian intentions, and that was
12	MS EDWARDH: No, not Canadian
13	intentions.
14	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
15	MS EDWARDH: There was allegedly
16	confusion with respect to CSIS' intentions.
17	MR. LIVERMORE: No, I would call
18	it Canadian intentions because they were arguing
19	that they were getting mixed messages. You are
20	getting one message from one department, one
21	message from another. So that's Canadian
22	intentions.
23	MS EDWARDH: Just for the purpose
24	of clarifying the record and to refresh everyone's
25	memory, the Syrians said that they had received a

1	message from CSIS that CSIS did not want Mr. Arar
2	back in Canada.
3	Is that not fair?
4	MR. LIVERMORE: Not quite, with
5	respect.
6	MS EDWARDH: Okay.
7	MR. LIVERMORE: They said that
8	someone in CSIS, or CSIS had told them. Not that
9	they had received a message. Someone had told
10	them.
11	MS EDWARDH: Someone had told
12	them.
13	MR. LIVERMORE: Someone had told
14	them.
15	MS EDWARDH: And the message that
16	they were told, sir?
17	MR. LIVERMORE: Someone had told
18	them that CSIS did not want Arar back. That was
19	the message that we had been given in Damascus.
20	We didn't know where that came from. We didn't
21	know the routing of that. That was reported back
22	by Ambassador Pillarella.
23	MS EDWARDH: Let me just stop you.
24	You knew who it came from in the sense of what
25	Syrian spoke for us.

1	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, absolutely.
2	MS EDWARDH: High-ranking Syrians
3	involved in military intelligence?
4	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, absolutely.
5	Yes.
6	MS EDWARDH: What you didn't know,
7	with the greatest of respect, was who in CSIS may
8	have said that, unless it was in the course of
9	their visit?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, more than
11	that. That is one thing we didn't know, but
12	another thing we didn't know was whether it had
13	been said at all. There were lots of things we
14	didn't know about that.
15	MS EDWARDH: Fair enough. And
16	when you learned that CSIS had failed to comply
17	with their obligations of reporting in to
18	Ambassador Pillarella after their visit and simply
19	vanished from Damascus, do you recall there being
20	anything on your part you did in order to get a
21	briefing about those events and what had
22	transpired and what had been said during the
23	meeting that should have gone to Franco Pillarella
24	at the time?
25	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, what had

1	happened we understand what had happened was
2	that Franco Pillarella, quite rightly, as Head of
3	Mission, had insisted on a debriefing from the
4	team, and the team had left Damascus without
5	phoning him.
6	So my understanding is that and
7	I'm recalling I don't think this was in my
8	will-say, so I wasn't looking at it. My
9	recollection is that Franco sent us a message and
10	said it didn't happen; it was supposed to happen.
11	We then contacted CSIS to inquire
12	why. And they said the circumstances of their
13	departure, whatever they were, did not allow them
14	to contact Ambassador Pillarella.
15	MS EDWARDH: Or send a written
16	briefing after the fact to the Ambassador?
17	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes. A written
18	MS EDWARDH: Excuse me. Are you
19	aware of a written briefing by CSIS to the
20	Ambassador, an account to him as Head of Mission?
21	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall
22	that myself, no.
23	MS EDWARDH: So all my point to
24	you, sir, is: It was apparent to you that CSIS
25	had a relationship. However primitive, it had a

1	relationship with Syrian Military Intelligence?
2	It had been to Syria
3	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
4	MS EDWARDH: It had met with
5	Syrian Military Intelligence. You are clear about
6	that?
7	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, absolutely.
8	MS EDWARDH: And I'm simply going
9	to suggest to you that it is obvious to anyone
10	looking at the involvement of CSIS that they would
11	not want to undermine their asset by saying
12	anything that made them look foolish.
13	I want to put this proposition to
14	you. If the RCMP gave information, including CSIS
15	information, to the Americans, and we didn't know
16	what the Americans made of that information except
17	to send Mr. Arar to Syria, then any statement by
18	CSIS or any statement by the RCMP could make them
19	look very foolish if the U.S. had handed on all
20	that information?
21	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't think that
22	was the issue, with all due respect.
23	And if I could return,
24	Mr. Commissioner, to my recollection of events?
25	The confusion of messaging is very

1	important because you are suggesting, it seems to
2	me, that the confusion of messaging continues on
3	until June and the confusion of messaging is part
4	of the June leading up to the June
5	deliberations.
6	Well, the confusion ended very
7	quickly. We had heard of the confusion through
8	the reporting of Ambassador Pillarella. Within
9	about a month a memo was prepared by the Middle
10	East Division, which advised the Minister as to
11	how we should approach the subject with the Syrian
12	Foreign Minister.
13	A call might have taken place in
14	that pre-Christmas period, but for a variety of
15	reasons logistical, I think, I recall it
16	didn't take place. It took place, I think, in the
17	middle of January. I don't recall the date, but
18	around the 15th or 16th. Mr. Graham spoke to the
19	Syrian Foreign Minister, and that was the end of
20	the confusion.
21	There was no more confusion in the
22	minds of the Syrians about Canadian intentions. I
23	say Canadian because we are talking here about
24	Foreign Affairs, CSIS the RCMP. Confusion over as
25	of January the 15th.

1	What you are talking about, it
2	seems to me, is a different issue: namely, what
3	is it that we put into the letter that we write to
4	the Syrians?
5	MS EDWARDH: Let me stop you,
6	because you make a very interesting point, sir,
7	that the confusion was resolved vis-à-vis the
8	Syrian Foreign Minister by Minister Graham's clear
9	statements.
10	But I am a little puzzled then
11	about why that same confusion appears when MPs
12	from Canada travelled to Syria
13	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, remind me of
14	the occasion.
15	MS EDWARDH: I'm just going to
16	look to see if I can find it.
17	Pause
18	MS EDWARDH: I'm looking at
19	Exhibit P-99, if the witness could be provided
20	with that.
21	This is a document that originates
22	under the hand of Myra Pastyr-Lupul, who of course
23	you know as someone who was working with
24	Mr. Pardy?
25	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.

1	MS EDWARDH: Now we move forward
2	from the complete resolution of any confusion in
3	January, as you have described it, to March 24th,
4	2003.
5	There is a telcon, which I take it
6	to be a telephone conference call, between Marlene
7	Catterall, the Member of Parliament, and
8	Ms Pastyr-Lupul.
9	In the second paragraph well,
10	perhaps we have to refer to the first paragraph
11	Ms Catterall and Sarkis Assadourian have met with
12	the Syrian Ambassador and they did so Wednesday,
13	March 21st, as reflected in this memorandum;
14	correct?
15	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
16	MS EDWARDH: And in the course of
17	their meeting, the Ambassador makes some
18	observations, and they are:
19	"They learned that"
20	And I take that to mean Ms
21	Catterall and Mr. Assadourian.
22	"They learned that initially
23	during this case that CSIS
24	officials told the Syrians
25	that they have 'no interest

1	in Mr. Arar'. The Syrians
2	took this to mean that CSIS
3	have no interest in having
4	Mr. Arar back. They may have
5	meant that they had no
6	security reason to
7	investigate Mr. Arar in
8	Canada. Due to the
9	miscommunication, the Syrians
10	believed the Canadians did
11	not want Mr. Arar back in
12	Canada and therefore decided
13	to detain him, keep him in
14	Syria."
15	Let me go on.
16	"What we need to do now is
17	send a clear message in
18	writing to the Syrians"
19	Now, this is March 24th, sir.
20	" clear message in writing
21	to the Syrians from CSIS that
22	outlines clearly that we have
23	no information that led us to
24	believe that Mr. Arar poses a
25	security threat to Canada.

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1	Furthermore, the Syrians need
2	to hear from the security
3	people and DFAIT in writing
4	that if we do have any
5	information that shows any
6	involvement in terrorist
7	activities that we will
8	charge him in Canada and deal
9	with his case through the
10	usual law enforcement
11	channels."
12	So at least one inference from
13	this, sir and I take it you weren't present at
14	the meeting is that the alleged confusion has
15	not been in any final dispositive way cleared up
16	by mid-January?
17	MR. LIVERMORE: Absolutely not.
18	The confusion was cleared up January the 16th.
19	This memo says even they learned that initially
20	during this case, past tense; initially they
21	learned during this case
22	MS EDWARDH: But there still needs
23	to be on March 24th it is very clear that the
24	effect of the communication from the Syrian
25	Ambassador to the two Mps communicated to DFAIT is

1	there needs to be clarification of CSIS' position?
2	MR. LIVERMORE: Not on that point.
3	Not at all. That is not what the memo says.
4	Now, the second paragraph, it's a
5	bit unclear who is saying what here. But the
6	logic it's clearly a compilation of
7	misunderstandings that Myra Pastyr-Lupul is
8	talking about, which is almost total speculation.
9	"What we need to do now is send a
10	clear message" was about a statement which
11	eventually found its way into an initial draft of
12	a Gar Pardy letter
13	MS EDWARDH: Quite so, sir. My
14	only point is this
15	MR. LIVERMORE: Excuse me,
16	Ms Edwardh, may I be permitted just to finish.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: Please, yes.
18	MR. LIVERMORE: What is important
19	to note is that the initial draft of the letter
20	that the Foreign Minister would sign had a
21	sentence to the effect that Mr. Arar had no
22	connections to terrorist activity. That is the
23	letter that Gar Pardy, to my recollection,
24	attempted to have agreement on throughout the
25	interdepartmental community. And that's what this

1	thing refers to.
2	The difficulty was how do we
3	describe in a letter to the Syrians what his
4	involvement in terrorist activity was, and on the
5	CSIS and RCMP side or this is my
6	recollection they will have to speak for
7	themselves on this issue. My recollection is they
8	said quite clearly to us, "If you want us to say
9	in a letter what his position is, we have to be
10	entirely accurate about what that is. We cannot
11	say there are no connections."
12	MS EDWARDH: My point is simply
13	this, sir: In March of 2003, a senior person,
14	Myra Pastyr-Lupul, at the Department of Foreign
15	Affairs, having met with Marlene Catterall and
16	Sarkis Assadourian, concludes on the basis of
17	their conversation with the Syrian Ambassador that
18	there is a need for a clear statement, which
19	includes a statement from CSIS. Fair enough?
20	MR. LIVERMORE: A clear statement,
21	yes.
22	MS EDWARDH: Including a statement
23	from CSIS.
24	MR. LIVERMORE: That's her
25	conclusion, yes.

1	MS EDWARDH: That's her
2	conclusion. Fine.
3	And that is indeed what causes
4	Mr. Pardy to try and build an interdepartmental
5	consensus and is reflected in his May 5th
6	memorandum?
7	MR. LIVERMORE: I assume so. I
8	have not prior to a few weeks ago, I had never
9	seen this memo, so I'm not sure what caused Gar
10	Pardy to do so.
11	MS EDWARDH: Well, it's this kind
12	of thinking.
13	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't object to
14	the kind of thinking, yes.
15	MS EDWARDH: All right. And we do
16	know that the only letter that ever came into
17	existence is the one that makes no reference to
18	information from the RCMP or CSIS?
19	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
20	MS EDWARDH: In effect, as I think
21	Inspector Cabana said, the letter proposed, of
22	course, was counterproductive. It wouldn't have
23	got Mr. Arar anywhere?
24	MR. LIVERMORE: Absolutely.
25	MG FDWAPDH: In your dealings with

1	CSIS, was it not apparent to you that they had no
2	interest in taking positive steps to facilitate
3	Mr. Arar's return?
4	MR. LIVERMORE: The mandate of
5	CSIS is completely different. They have nothing
6	to do with consular issues. They certainly never
7	posed a hindrance to his returning.
8	MS EDWARDH: We will leave that
9	for the Commissioner. None that you know of?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: None that I'm
11	aware of, yes.
12	MS EDWARDH: Let me go back to the
13	question. From your conversations with persons in
14	CSIS, was it not apparent to you that they wanted
15	to take no step that would facilitate Mr. Arar's
16	return to Canada and indeed took none?
17	MR. LIVERMORE: I think that the
18	way the question is posed, I would have difficulty
19	answering it in a yes-or-no fashion. They did not
20	see their mandate as a consular mandate. They
21	don't have a role in returning Canadians to
22	Canada. If Gar Pardy was successful, if Foreign
23	Affairs was successful in seeking Mr. Arar's
24	return to Canada, they had no problems with that.
25	But, in fact, they are not a facilitator

1	MS EDWARDH: Who did you speak to
2	that conveyed that they had no difficulty in
3	having Mr. Pardy do whatever he felt like doing in
4	order to discharge his mandate under consular
5	affairs? Who in CSIS said that?
6	MR. LIVERMORE: You are saying
7	something that is pretty exaggerated, with all due
8	respect.
9	MS EDWARDH: I thought I was
10	paraphrasing what you said.
11	MR. LIVERMORE: No. You said do
12	whatever whatever you said.
13	What they were always insistent
14	on, and they were very insistent on this, was
15	absolute accuracy in any letter. They didn't have
16	any problem with the letter per se, and the letter
17	clearly was designed to help secure his release.
18	No one ever said to me, "We don't like the letter.
19	The letter is impossible. We are not accepting
20	the letter." No one ever said that to me.
21	But, as initially drafted by Gar
22	Pardy, the letter was unacceptable to them,
23	because Gar Pardy was attempting to speak for
24	security officials in Canada in his initial draft,
25	and they took exception to what he said.

1	MS EDWARDH: Do you recall anyone
2	ever suggesting that someone write the Syrians and
3	say, "Mr. Arar may be an important witness in a
4	Canadian criminal case, and we would like to
5	effect his return in order that that case can go
6	forward"?
7	MR. LIVERMORE: No one said
8	anything along those lines to me, no.
9	MS EDWARDH: No. So let me go
10	back to my question.
11	It would be fair to conclude that
12	CSIS' insistence on its mandate meant nothing more
13	or less, in this case, that they would take no
14	step of any kind to assist DFAIT in effecting
15	Mr. Arar's return. And I'm talking about
16	assistance.
17	MR. LIVERMORE: Again, I think the
18	question is a bit unfair to what the import was.
19	I sat through a number of sessions and I was of
20	course bouncing in and out of the country, so I
21	can't say I was in all of them where Gar
22	Pardy's letter was being discussed. No one ever
23	said, "We are not helping you at all. We are not
24	helping you with this process. This process is
25	not going forward." No one ever said that.

1	They basically said, "If you want
2	to do a letter, Mr. Pardy, go ahead with the
3	letter. The letter must be accurate. The letter
4	must state the CSIS position, or the RCMP
5	position, accurately. And, by the way, you
6	haven't done so in your initial draft." That's
7	basically the position.
8	I didn't regard that no one
9	ever said, "We're not going to help you with his
10	return." So I think that would almost be a
11	speculative leap of faith on my part, and possibly
12	on your part, to say they were not prepared to
13	help.
14	They cooperated in the
15	interdepartmental process. It was clearly the
16	intention of the interdepartmental process to get
17	Mr. Arar back to Canada. They simply insisted
18	upon accuracy.
19	MS EDWARDH: When CSIS sat at the
20	table, was there any suggestion made to them, "All
21	right, if you can't sign on to this kind of
22	letter, will you speak to your counterparts and
23	tell them that we would like Mr. Arar to be
24	returned and he will be dealt with under Canadian
25	law if there is any evidence that justifies a

1	criminal prosecution"?
2	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall
3	that we did but there was a very good reason for
4	that, and that is that we regarded and I would
5	love to put this question to CSIS too. We
6	regarded the CSIS relationship with Syrian
7	Military Intelligence as a pretty preliminary one.
8	They didn't have much of a relationship.
9	The strongest relationship among
LO	Canadian government officials to Syrian Military
L1	Intelligence was Ambassador Pillarella. We
L2	mandated Ambassador Pillarella to say to Syrian
L3	Military Intelligence, "We want Mr. Arar back."
L4	He had the strongest link to
L5	General Khalil. He told General Khalil quite
L6	clearly, "I, Ambassador Pillarella, am the
L7	spokesman for the entire Canadian government, and
L8	we want him back."
L9	MS EDWARDH: Well, I have no way
20	of evaluating that statement, Mr. Livermore,
21	because I don't know what the CSIS relationship
22	was, other than to know that there was some
23	relationship.
24	I accept well, I hear your
) 5	vi ow

1	But certainly there was nothing
2	said. We have heard that Syrian Military
3	Intelligence preferred to deal with CSIS. I think
4	that statement has been made by a number of
5	individuals.
6	MR. LIVERMORE: As opposed to the
7	RCMP, not as opposed to Franco Pillarella.
8	MS EDWARDH: In any event, I take
9	it you were never at a table where it was
10	suggested CSIS go through its own channels and
11	communicate the position of the Government of
12	Canada?
13	MR. LIVERMORE: No, not at all.
14	MS EDWARDH: I just don't
15	understand the message that Mr. Gould gave you.
16	The message that Mr. Gould gave is accurately
17	reflected in your memorandum I'm sorry, the
18	memorandum of Scott Heatherington on July 30th.
19	Is that fair?
20	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, it would have
21	been, yes.
22	MS EDWARDH: I just want to make
23	some observations and have you comment about this
24	memorandum I'm sorry, I've just lost the
25	reference.

1	THE COMMISSIONER: It's tab 3
2	of the newly redacted documents.
3	MS EDWARDH: Do you have that in
4	front of you, Mr. Livermore?
5	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I do.
6	MS EDWARDH: Certainly there was
7	nothing about Mr. Gould that in any way caused you
8	to be suspicious or sceptical about the
9	information he provided to you?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: Not at all.
11	MS EDWARDH: And I take it you had
12	absolute confidence in Mr. Gould that he was
13	reporting not just something that he picked up by
14	gossip and rumour but something that he felt was
15	newsworthy and important for officials in DFAIT to
16	know?
17	MR. LIVERMORE: I would not
18	characterize it as newsworthy and important. I
19	would characterize it as interesting.
20	MS EDWARDH: Fair enough. But it
21	was the kind of thing a man in Mr. Gould's
22	position wanted to make sure that other senior
23	officials in the department knew?
24	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, yes.
25	Certainly me. He wanted me to know.

1	MS EDWARDH: And I take it that
2	not only did he want you to know, he wanted
3	Mr. Heatherington to know?
4	MR. LIVERMORE: I would assume so,
5	yes.
6	MS EDWARDH: And subsequently we
7	have learned he had conversations with others, and
8	I take it we can assume that he wasn't about the
9	business of simple gossip but felt that the
10	information ought to be conveyed to persons who
11	ought to know?
12	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes. And we in
13	fact, as you can see in the memo, we put that
14	subsequently into a memo.
15	MS EDWARDH: Yes. And this goes
16	to the Deputy Minister?
17	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
18	MS EDWARDH: So I would take it
19	that matters that are brought to the Deputy
20	Minister's attention are brought not on the basis
21	of rumour but on the basis of matters the deputy
22	must be aware of in order to conduct the affairs
23	of the department?
24	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, I would think
25	so.

1	MS EDWARDH: So at least it is
2	clear that on July 30th there was still a view
3	held by Mr. Heatherington, and indeed yourself,
4	that this information, that CSIS would like the
5	department to curtail its efforts to have Mr. Arar
6	released, was a matter you felt ought to be
7	brought to the deputy's attention?
8	MR. LIVERMORE: To be fair to the
9	memo, it has to be put into some kind of context.
10	The subject of the memo is really about a
11	newspaper article which appeared, I think, that
12	morning, possibly the day before, which quoted the
13	then Solicitor General as saying that there were
14	rogue elements in the RCMP that were responsible.
15	MS EDWARDH: Yes.
16	MR. LIVERMORE: So we were trying
17	to address what appeared to be a rather odd
18	situation in the media. We dealt with that
19	particular part in part of the memo, and then
20	later on we dealt with the other one.
21	This, by the way, was long after
22	the fact. It was almost three or four weeks after
23	the course of action that we had decided on in the
24	June 5th memo that had already gone up.
25	MS EDWARDH: I appreciate that.

1	What is interesting, though, from the perspective
2	of the reader of this memorandum, once the rogue
3	element story comes out, the tenor of this memo,
4	as reflected in paragraph 5 by Mr. Heatherington,
5	is nothing more or less to say that it's odd that
6	the media is blaming the Mounties for passing
7	intelligence. We have information that CSIS may
8	have done little to assist us or, in fact,
9	actively curtailed the efforts.
10	That is what this memo says.
11	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, not exactly.
12	What it says is it expresses some curiosity,
13	and that's how the paragraph 5 starts. It is
14	curiosity in the media about the relative
15	attention paid to the RCMP as opposed to CSIS.
16	But it does clearly state that the
17	Syrians have maintained.
18	MS EDWARDH: Yes.
19	MR. LIVERMORE: So we tried to
20	describe the situation fairly.
21	MS EDWARDH: And it is also
22	interesting, sir, that when you say that the
23	Syrians have maintained that a senior CSIS officer
24	told them we did not want Arar back in Canada
25	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.

1	MS EDWARDH: although CSIS
2	denies this, one thing that you don't say to the
3	deputy in your writing in July of 2003, you don't
4	say to the deputy but of course the Minister made
5	a telephone call in January, and any suggestions
6	that the Syrians could harbour such a belief is
7	ill-conceived, ill-founded and was set to rest.
8	I am going to suggest to you it
9	was obvious that there were elements in the
10	community, including the Syrians, who may well
11	have continued on with this "misunderstanding" and
12	that the origins of this misunderstanding have yet
13	to be certainly placed clearly into this public
14	domain.
15	MR. LIVERMORE: I think your
16	latter comment is probably fair enough, but with
17	respect to the first half I would say
18	categorically no. The misunderstanding was put to
19	rest definitively and finally within weeks of it
20	occurring.
21	Now, reporting on it yes,
22	reporting on it continued to take place, but it's
23	in the past tense.
24	MS EDWARDH: And as of July, of
25	course, you are still reporting to your superiors

1	that there is this outstanding concern at least of
2	CSIS' interest or lack of interest in having
3	Mr. Arar returned. All you can say is it is
4	there. We can read it. You approved it and it
5	went to the deputy.
6	MR. LIVERMORE: And one of the
7	reasons we did so, if I may just add a
8	supplementary note, I think it was in June the
9	deputies changed. We had a new deputy coming in.
10	So by and large there were more notes going to an
11	incoming new deputy than there were normally.
12	He had been, of course, I think,
13	briefed on the issue. I wouldn't have been
14	responsible for that. But we did send him the
15	occasional note to keep him up to speed on new
16	things that he might not have known from his
17	previous function in the public service.
18	Pause
19	MS EDWARDH: I would like to ask
20	the witness one other question, and of course this
21	has happened as a result of the changes in
22	redaction policy as we have gone along.
23	I will give my friend an
24	opportunity to consider her position.
25	It might be helpful,

1	Mr. Commissioner, if you have in front of you
2	Ambassador Pillarella's material, P-134; also the
3	DFAIT documents, volume 1 of 9, tab 61.
4	These are memorandums that are
5	essentially the same, but the version has become
6	less redacted since the witness first testified.
7	MS McISAAC: I'm sorry, 134,
8	tab?
9	MS EDWARDH: Volume 1 of DFAIT,
LO	tab 61.
L1	So when Mr. Livermore first came
L2	to testify, we had before us a document that was
L3	redacted in the form of volume 1, tab 61,
L4	Mr. Commissioner.
L5	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
L6	MS EDWARDH: And there is a
L7	paragraph the second-last paragraph in this
L8	document is of interest because it is authored, of
L9	course, by Mr. Livermore:
20	"At the direction of JPD, JPE
21	Harris has contacted Léo
22	Martel and asked that he make
23	official inquiries about Arar
24	as well as asking the
25	immigration control officer

1	to use his contacts to gather
2	information. Martel has also
3	been asked to locate Arar and
4	determine as quickly as
5	possible his condition and
6	situation."
7	That's all we had when
8	Mr. Livermore was here, and he was very, as I
9	recall and I don't have all of his testimony in
10	front of me. He did not discuss at length at all
11	his concerns about the conditions of confinement
12	in Syria.
13	The new document that is now
14	available to us is identical in all respects
15	except that the phrase and let me just read it
16	in context:
17	"Martel has also been asked
18	to locate Arar and determine
19	as quickly as possible his
20	condition and situation.
21	There are concerns that Arar
22	may be aggressively
23	questioned by Syrian security
24	services."
25	And then Mr. Livermore signs off.

1	I appreciate that this is not an
2	area that is on the list, but I would like to ask
3	Mr. Livermore, in light of his quite narrow
4	testimony on the first occasion on this specific
5	issue, a few questions about that statement.
6	May I?
7	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
8	MS EDWARDH: Mr. Livermore, do you
9	see the document in question that I'm referring
10	to?
11	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
12	MS EDWARDH: This was written by
13	you, and sent on Thursday, October 10th, 2002?
14	MR. LIVERMORE: I can't guarantee
15	that I wrote it, but I accept responsibility for
16	its contents, certainly.
17	MS EDWARDH: All right. And it
18	goes back to a period when Mr. Arar has not
19	clearly been found by the Department of Foreign
20	Affairs.
21	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
22	MS EDWARDH: I take it, sir, that
23	when Mr. Martel and we will hear from him is
24	being tasked to locate Mr. Arar, the reason you
25	use the language "as quickly as possible" is you

1	are in fact concerned about the nature of the
2	interrogation he may be undergoing?
3	MR. LIVERMORE: I think that's
4	fair to say, yes.
5	MS EDWARDH: And that the language
6	that you choose in your memo, or that you have
7	certainly adopted here today, the language
8	"aggressive questioning" also includes
9	interrogation, where the use of physical force,
10	improper interrogation techniques and even torture
11	might happen?
12	MR. LIVERMORE: I think if you
13	phrase it that way, I would agree with you.
14	MS EDWARDH: Those are my
15	questions then.
16	Thank you very much,
17	Mr. Commissioner.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Shore? No,
19	the Government is next? Mr. Shore goes last.
20	I think that is probably the
21	proper way.
22	EXAMINATION
23	MS McISAAC: Could I ask you to go
24	to the June 5th memorandum, which is P-117, volume
25	2, tab 3, I believe?

1	THE COMMISSIONER: I think it's
2	75.5.
3	MS McISAAC: Pardon me, 75.5.
4	Mr. Livermore, what is being
5	contemplated here is that the Minister of Foreign
6	Affairs will write a letter to his counterpart in
7	Syria with respect to the Canadian government
8	position that Mr. Arar should be released from
9	custody.
LO	In your experience with the
L1	Department of Foreign Affairs, is that an event
L2	which would be considered unusual, or would it be
L3	a commonplace event to have such a letter written?
L4	MR. LIVERMORE: I can speak based
L5	on my experience but not as, of course, head of
L6	the consular bureau.
L7	It would be fairly unusual, but
L8	it's not unheard of.
L9	MS McISAAC: And before such a
20	letter is written by a Minister of the Government
21	of Canada on a highly public issue, what is the
22	process in order to ensure that the Minister is
23	acting in accordance with government priorities as
24	opposed to simply his own priorities?
25	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the dominant

1	feature of any consultation that takes place prior
2	to a Ministerial letter is consultation across
3	departments and agencies to make sure that what is
4	put forward to the Minister is accurate.
5	MS McISAAC: And when we look at
6	the first page of the document at tab 5 or at
7	tab 75.5, which is the June 5th memorandum, and
8	the cover transmittal slip, under the consultation
9	we have the references that Mr. David took you to
10	for the RCMP, CSIS and PCO.
11	What is that information under
12	"Consultation" conveying to, first of all, the
13	Deputy Minister, who must approve this, and then
14	the Minister and his officials, with respect to
15	those government-wide consultations?
16	MR. LIVERMORE: Under the
17	"Consultation" line of the transmittal slip, it
18	conveys concurrence in the recommendations which
19	are contained in the memorandum that goes forward,
20	and by and large it also conveys concurrence in
21	the line of argument that is contained in the
22	memorandum.
23	In other words, people who are
24	consulted are assumed to be in agreement with the
25	course of action recommended.

1	MS McISAAC: So we can take from
2	it that the RCMP, CSIS and the Privy Council
3	Office, PCO, as institutions, were in agreement
4	with the recommendation that Minister Graham sign
5	the proposed letter?
6	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
7	MS McISAAC: Now in terms of the
8	process for arriving at the wording of the letter,
9	what would be the concerns with respect to the
10	wording of the letter on the part of the
11	Department of Foreign Affairs itself as to
12	accuracy?
13	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, basically,
14	of course, the contents of the letter would have
15	to vary enormously from situation to situation,
16	but it would be the responsibility of the consular
17	bureau to make sure that the entire background
18	which is described in the letter is factually
19	correct. And then there might be additional
20	elements that go into the letter.
21	Again, it might be the consular
22	bureau that takes a first stab at a draft,
23	suggesting other elements that might usefully be
24	engaged in this exercise, and then the draft would
25	usually come back to the interdepartmental

1	community to make sure that everyone is happy with
2	the language chosen.
3	MS McISAAC: And forgive me if
4	this is a leading question, but I think it is
5	fairly obvious: Would it be unwise for the
6	bureaucracy, or the Department of Foreign Affairs
7	as an institution, to recommend to the Minister
8	that he sign a letter which was not completely
9	accurate, as best they could assess accuracy for
10	him?
11	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, it would be
12	more than unwise, it would be irresponsible of
13	officials to put forward a letter which contained
14	inaccuracies, and it would be doubly irresponsible
15	to place the Minister in a position where he was
16	to sign a letter that somehow were to cause
17	difficulty. One could easily visualize a letter
18	going forward where, in other circumstances, the
19	situation looked fairly straightforward but it
20	wasn't, and the Minister got into the soup, so to
21	speak, because his signature was on that letter.
22	MS McISAAC: And indeed that goes
23	back to the reason for the need for extensive
24	consultation to ensure that all aspects of a
25	matter are fully discussed before a final

1	recommendation is made?
2	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, yes.
3	MS McISAAC: Thank you.
4	With respect to the initial
5	suggestion that the Solicitor General participate
6	in signing a letter to the Syrians in some manner,
7	along with Mr. Graham, the Minister of Foreign
8	Affairs, in your experience and, again, I'm
9	only asking you to speak from your own
10	experience would it be usual or is it something
11	that you would contemplate the Solicitor General
12	would participate in a communication of this
13	nature with a foreign government?
14	MR. LIVERMORE: I would think it's
15	relatively unusual. But to put it in some
16	context, it's relatively unusual to have two
17	Ministers sign any letter, in part for simple
18	bureaucratic reasons; it's pretty cumbersome to
19	try to get two ministerial signatures on the same
20	letter.
21	It's doubly difficult in this area
22	because the authority for Canada to speak abroad
23	is the Foreign Minister. That is the individual,
24	that is the office that speaks on behalf of
25	Canada. It would be odd to have another Minister

1	with a signature block on a letter. It's not
2	unheard of, I would imagine, but it's unusual.
3	MS McISAAC: Now, with respect to
4	the issue of a separate communication on the part
5	of CSIS to the Syrian Foreign Ministry or, pardon
6	me, the Syrian Foreign Intelligence, whichever the
7	case may be, to your knowledge was CSIS ever
8	requested to provide some kind of separate letter
9	or to independently communicate with the Syrian
LO	authorities as to the Canadian government's
L1	position with respect to Mr. Arar?
L2	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't believe
L3	so.
L4	MS McISAAC: I would like to put
L5	to the witness, if I may, sir, and ask him whether
L6	he agrees with it or not, evidence of Mr. Pardy
L7	with respect to a separate communication on the
L8	part of CSIS.
L9	Perhaps do we have transcripts
20	here? Oh. I thought we did. I'm sorry. I would
21	have brought an additional copy.
22	Actually, maybe we do.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: I think if you
24	summarize it
) 5	MS McTSAAC: All right Actually

1	I was going to read it, sir, so I'll do it that
2	way.
3	THE COMMISSIONER: If anybody has
4	difficulty following, let me know.
5	MS McISAAC: All right. This is
6	the examination of Mr. Pardy at pages 4969 of the
7	transcript, and the date, I believe let's just
8	clarify I'll give you the date after, sir.
9	This is a question by
10	Mr. Cavalluzzo at line 16, page 4969:
11	"certainly as a Canadian,
12	I'm very concerned that we
13	have a Canadian lingering in
14	jail in a foreign country
15	such as Syria, with, as I
16	said before, not a stellar
17	human rights record, while it
18	would seem to me a simple
19	letter of three lines, or no
20	more, could have clarified
21	this confusion in the
22	Syrians' minds and could have
23	activated them in some way so
24	that Mr. Arar could have
25	returned to Canada earlier

1	than he did
2	MR. PARDY: That's one
3	inter I'm sorry, I'm
4	interrupting you.
5	MR. CAVALLUZZO: No.
6	MR. PARDY: That is one
7	interpretation.
8	Another interpretation, I
9	mean, over a long experience
10	of dealing with governments.
11	Governments interpret
12	information to their maximum
13	advantage.
14	My view would have been,
15	or one element in certainly
16	my views on all of this, is
17	that the Syrians themselves
18	found it advantageous to
19	establish some ambiguity as
20	far as the position of the
21	Government of Canada was
22	concerned.
23	I don't think they were
24	ready to release Mr. Arar
25	much before they actually did

1	so, for a variety of reasons
2	that we went over in my
3	direct testimony.
4	And so in the sense of
5	whether or not a, as you put
6	it, a three-line letter from
7	CSIS to the Syrian Military
8	Intelligence would have made
9	much difference, I'm I'm
10	not sure.
11	The Syrians were quite
12	comfortable, I think, in
13	terms of where they found
14	themselves and whether or not
15	they overinterpreted or
16	misinterpreted a comment by
17	CSIS officials, well, maybe
18	next week or the week after
19	you might have a chance to
20	examine some of this."
21	That was June 2nd in terms of the
22	testimony.
23	Do you have any comments on
24	Mr. Pardy's interpretation of the Syrian position
25	vis-à-vis Canadian efforts to have Mr. Arar

1	returned to Canada?
2	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the only
3	difficulty I would have with that I don't
4	really have much difficulty with his testimony,
5	nor do I have too much difficulty with the way Gar
6	Pardy handled the entire management of the case
7	from the outset, but I would think that there are
8	a couple of minor nuances in that that I wouldn't
9	quite agree with.
10	The one that I would say is
11	useful, and I would agree with, is that it might
12	have benefitted the Syrians momentarily to have
13	some ambiguity. In other words, we're not sure of
14	where matters stood.
15	But as I said, by January 16th or
16	17th, the ambiguities cleared up and there is no
17	ambiguity anymore.
18	What I would disagree with though
19	is in saying that the Syrians were comfortable
20	I'm not sure of the context of that statement in
21	Mr. Pardy's testimony, but I don't think the
22	Syrians were comfortable at all with the
23	situation.
24	I think the Syrians were being
25	squeezed in important ways, and we will never

1	know, I'm afraid, how much pressure was exerted on
2	them in ways that were diametrically opposed to
3	the way the Canadian government was pressuring
4	them.
5	So I don't think they were
6	comfortable at all with the situation.
7	MS McISAAC: All right. Would, in
8	your assessment, assuming somebody had asked CSIS
9	to write a letter, and, again, we realize you're
10	speculating, what effect, in your assessment,
11	would that have had, if any?
12	THE COMMISSIONER: I just
13	wondered, do you feel qualified to answer this? I
14	mean, have you had contact with the Syrians in
15	this type of situation?
16	MR. LIVERMORE: I have never put
17	this question to the Syrians myself.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: From your
19	position and your experience. All I'm asking you
20	is, Ms McIsaac said we want you to speculate
21	actually we don't on an issue like that. If you
22	feel you have an expertise or an experience that
23	would enable you to answer the question, then go
24	ahead.

MR. LIVERMORE: My experience

25

1	leads me to conclude that it would not be useful,
2	for reasons I addressed in a previous question.
3	We had a much better line in to General Khalil
4	than through CSIS, and I could go on about that.
5	But in different countries, the
6	systems work in different ways. That are lines
7	that are established.
8	In some countries, you can't have
9	contacts with officials until you've taken those
10	officials out to lunch or had dinner with them
11	because what you need is a personal rapport before
12	you can conduct business.
13	It comes as a bit of a shock
14	sometimes for Canadians to realize that, and it
15	comes often as a surprise to our department
16	because we're asked to make appointments for
17	visiting officials to go to other countries and
18	conduct business with people in other countries.
19	Very often they don't get very far
20	because it's almost like a cold call. They show
21	up on the doorstep of someone, and they expect
22	that right away you'll get into the business end
23	of whatever you're interested in.
24	Well, in some countries, it
25	doesn't happen that way. Unless you have an

1	established relationship of some kind, it goes no
2	further than that.
3	We felt, and I certainly it was
4	my view, that Ambassador Pillarella's relationship
5	with General Khalil was the strongest relationship
6	the Canadian government had.
7	CSIS had nothing to parallel that,
8	even though they had visited, and the RCMP had
9	nothing at all, that I'm aware of, of any
10	significance.
11	So the channel to be used was
12	Ambassador Pillarella.
13	MS McISAAC: And what was the
14	message that Ambassador Pillarella was instructed
15	to convey to the Syrians regarding Mr. Arar?
16	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, it was a
17	pretty unequivocal message which he did quite
18	effectively on the ground to everyone, namely,
19	that the Canadian government wanted Mr. Arar
20	returned to Canada.
21	MS McISAAC: Thank you.
22	MS EDWARDH: If my friend would
23	refer us to the document that supports that I'm
24	sure there are some, or there may be some.
25	THE COMMISSIONER: Certainly.

1	MS EDWARDH: The instructions
2	given by the department in respect of the
3	communication.
4	MS McISAAC: Well, the
5	instructions were being given by Mr. Livermore and
6	others, and I refer actually to Mr. Pillarella's
7	transcript, where he said that was his instruction
8	as well.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: I guess in
10	answer to Ms Edwardh's question, if there's any
11	documents that support that, if you could just
12	advise her? Would that be satisfactory?
13	Mr. Shore, are you going to be
14	long? I notice we've been sitting for a while,
15	but I'd just as soon complete the witness, if we
16	could.
17	MR. SHORE: I shouldn't be too
18	long.
19	THE COMMISSIONER: How are you
20	doing, Mr. Livermore? Is everybody okay? Not too
21	long is how not too long?
22	Okay. I'd be inclined, unless
23	there are contrary objections, to get the witness
24	done.
25	MR. SHORE: It will depend on his

1	answers.
2	EXAMINATION
3	MR. SHORE: Mr. Livermore, my
4	interest is in the phone call between Mr. Hooper
5	and Kathryn McCallion.
6	What we understand is that you
7	learned of that phone call through Mr. Gould.
8	MR. LIVERMORE: That's my
9	recollection.
10	MR. SHORE: Either outside your
11	office or outside his office.
12	And when he told you about that,
13	did he tell you where he had heard about it?
14	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall
15	precisely, no.
16	MR. SHORE: Did he tell you that
17	he had spoken to Kathryn McCallion, and this is
18	what she said?
19	MR. LIVERMORE: He did not say
20	that, but from whatever source, I did not infer
21	that he had spoken to her directly, yes.
22	MR. SHORE: Do you understand, or
23	did you understand at the time, that it was
24	through Mr. Dyet that he had heard about the
25	conversation

1	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't think I
2	had inquired as to the routing of this
3	information. As I said, inferred that it was not
4	directly
5	MR. SHORE: That it was at least
6	secondhand from him, and to you it's then third
7	hand, basically.
8	And you indicated that you both
9	expressed concern, not about the substance of the
LO	call, but about the fact that it was made to
L1	Kathryn McCallion, who was not involved in this
L2	particular matter?
L3	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, it wasn't
L 4	concern that we expressed, it was interest. It
L5	was just a matter of interest that
L6	MR. SHORE: Isn't it interesting
L7	that Mr. Hooper called Kathryn as opposed to
L8	Mr. Wright?
L9	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
20	MR. SHORE: Do you know whether
21	Jim Wright was there at that time, that day?
22	MR. LIVERMORE: The only memory
23	jogger that I have, if we could go back to the
24	June the 5th memo well, that may not be the
25	right excuse me. That will not be the memory

1	jogger. No, I'm not aware whether Jim Wright was
2	there or not.
3	MR. SHORE: How would you describe
4	Mr. Gould's demeanour when he told you that?
5	MR. LIVERMORE: I think it was
6	rather matter-of-fact.
7	MR. SHORE: So he wasn't outraged,
8	wasn't upset, wasn't astonished. Just "Isn't it
9	interesting"?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: It was
11	interesting, yes.
12	MR. SHORE: And that's as high as
13	you'd put it?
14	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
15	MR. SHORE: To you it had, as
16	you've indicated, no significance whatsoever.
17	MR. LIVERMORE: It had no
18	operational significance, no.
19	MR. SHORE: I think as you said on
20	another occasion, the train was out of the
21	station, the matter was going forward. Even if it
22	happened the way Gould said it happened, did it
23	MR. LIVERMORE: No.
24	MR. SHORE: Did you in your own
25	mind have any reservations whether in fact the

1	conversation even happened the way it was reported
2	to you?
3	MR. LIVERMORE: Not if Jim
4	Gould reported it to me, I took it on faith,
5	because he's a first-class officer, that he got it
6	from someone.
7	MR. SHORE: Right. The fact that
8	he got it from someone else didn't lead you to ask
9	Mr. Gould, "Well, check with Kathryn McCallion
10	whether this actually happened"?
11	MR. LIVERMORE: No, I think in
12	we found it curious, we found it interesting. Had
13	we found it of any significance at all, we would
14	have checked it out, but, in fact, it wasn't.
15	MR. SHORE: Right. And so you
16	didn't even ask him to check with Ms McCallion
17	whether it even occurred the way the person
18	reported it to him?
19	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't recall
20	asking him, no.
21	MR. SHORE: Right. And was there
22	any suggestion of checking with Mr. Hooper
23	whether
24	MR. LIVERMORE: No.
25	MR. SHORE: this is how the

1	conversation went down?
2	MR. LIVERMORE: No.
3	MR. SHORE: Therefore, it had no
4	impact whatsoever, apparently
5	MR. LIVERMORE: Not on the course
6	of action that we had already chosen.
7	MR. SHORE: on either of you
8	with regard to what was happening?
9	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right.
10	MR. SHORE: And I think you
11	indicated also earlier that it was a question
12	of it was noise. There was noise around, and
13	this was another piece of noise as to
14	MR. LIVERMORE: It was
15	interesting. That was about it.
16	MR. SHORE: Okay. And I think you
17	said that the decision with regard to the letter
18	had been taken much before this time, much before
19	June 5. We're assuming it's June 5th because of
20	the
21	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the decision
22	within the department, and the decision
23	interdepartmentally to send a letter had been
24	taken.
25	MR. SHORE: Right.

1	MR. LIVERMORE: The memo I think
2	is dated June the 5th.
3	MR. SHORE: Your understanding is
4	that there was never a problem with the letter
5	going to the Syrians; the only issue was how it's
6	languaged?
7	MR. LIVERMORE: That's my
8	understanding, yes.
9	MR. SHORE: Right. And DFAIT was
10	interested in languaging so that they can include
11	RCMP, CSIS, PCO into their decision-making?
12	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
13	MR. SHORE: As you indicated
14	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
15	MR. SHORE: do the responsible
16	thing. If DFAIT wanted to send a letter on their
17	own without consultation, not responsible, but
18	they could have done it?
19	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, they might
20	have been able we might have been able to do
21	it, but it's not a very good practice to do that.
22	MR. SHORE: No. Of course not.
23	And the role of CSIS here was simply to advise
24	DFAIT on these types of issues, on security
25	intelligence issues?

1	MR. LIVERMORE: On the particular
2	letter, it was to advise on what was acceptable to
3	them in the contents of that letter.
4	MR. SHORE: All right. I think
5	that's all, sir. Thanks, Mr. Livermore.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. David.
7	MR. DAVID: Two brief areas,
8	Mr. Commissioner.
9	EXAMINATION
10	MR. DAVID: Concerning the call,
11	Mr. Livermore. When Mr. Gould spoke to you, did
12	he indicate to you that he was going to follow up
13	in any way on what he had been telling you about?
14	Did he indicate to you that on June 6th or June
15	9th he had been pursuing the matter concerning the
16	memo, the processing of the memo, and the phone
17	call?
18	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't I don't
19	recall that he did, no.
20	MR. DAVID: Okay.
21	MR. LIVERMORE: But the memo
22	the memo had already gone up by that stage.
23	That's my recollection.
24	MR. DAVID: Our understanding is
25	that the memo went up on June 9th.

1	MR. LIVERMORE: My understanding
2	is it went up earlier than that, but
3	MR. DAVID: Well, if you want to
4	look at tab 5.
5	MR. LIVERMORE: Okay.
6	MR. DAVID: And this is the stamp
7	I was telling you about and what has been
8	explained to us through other testimony, and
9	that's P-117.
10	MR. LIVERMORE: Mm-hmm.
11	MR. DAVID: Go to tab 5, the front
12	page. You'll see that it's a bit it's poor in
13	quality in terms of but there is a some sort
14	of stamp with a date below the box, and it says
15	03, 6 and then the 9 and then there's the hour.
16	MR. LIVERMORE: Yeah.
17	MR. DAVID: And our understanding
18	is that that is the stamp that indicates the day
19	and the time that the Minister's office receives
20	the memo.
21	MR. LIVERMORE: It could be the
22	time of receipt. I'm referring to the time that
23	it was signed off by Gar Pardy and others.
24	MR. DAVID: All right.
25	MR. LIVERMORE: But in any event,

1	it certainly wasn't coming back to us. We had
2	already agreed on a course of action and we had
3	lent our concurrence to the memo that was going
4	forward.
5	MR. DAVID: And had Kathryn
6	McCallion decided that she wanted additional
7	information, additional background, she wanted to
8	clarify an issue, it was within her authority to
9	do so?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: Absolutely.
11	Anyone up the line, so to speak, can send a memo
12	back and ask for clarification of certain
13	portions, or ask why something has been left out,
14	or why something is included
15	MR. DAVID: And she can, in fact,
16	contribute to the memo?
17	MR. LIVERMORE: She could, yes.
18	MR. DAVID: The second area,
19	Mr. Commissioner, has to do with your testimony
20	concerning how the matter was resolved about the
21	information coming from Syria, from Syrian from
22	Syrian authorities that CSIS had somehow informed
23	the Syrian authorities, "Let's keep Arar in
24	Syria."
25	And your testimony has been that

1	this ambiguity was cleared up on January 16th,
2	2003.
3	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
4	MR. DAVID: And that it was
5	definitely resolved as of that date.
6	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
7	MR. DAVID: And it was resolved
8	insofar as your Minister phoned the Syrian Foreign
9	Minister to address the issue.
10	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
11	MR. DAVID: And that's how it was
12	resolved.
13	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
14	MR. DAVID: And it was resolved,
15	therefore, at a political level.
16	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
17	MR. DAVID: However, the
18	information per se that was coming from Syria that
19	went to Ambassador Pillarella was not from a
20	political source. It was from the Syrian Military
21	Intelligence.
22	MR. LIVERMORE: I don't I'm not
23	sure that in Syria you can separate the two levels
24	that neatly. In Canada it's a fairly clear
25	separation. In Syria, it's a little less clear.

1	MR. DAVID: But my question,
2	again, Mr. Livermore, is that your understanding
3	was that the information that was coming from
4	Syria was not coming from the Syrian Foreign
5	Minister, it was coming from the Syrian Military
6	Intelligence organization?
7	MR. LIVERMORE: I think initially
8	that's where Ambassador Pillarella picked up that
9	information. I think so.
10	MR. DAVID: Correct. I think that
11	that is the case.
12	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
13	MR. DAVID: So would you agree
14	with me, as a general proposition, that in terms
15	of the Syrian Military Intelligence organization,
16	that they would lend greater ear, they would be
17	more responsive to a counterpart to CSIS than to a
18	politician? Is that a general proposition that
19	you're willing to accept?
20	MR. LIVERMORE: I can't accept
21	that, no. First of all, I don't I can't speak
22	authoritatively on Syria, but also we had a
23	relationship I don't think the Syrians regarded
24	Ambassador Pillarella as belonging to Foreign
25	Affairs as opposed to any other ministry. He

1	represented the Government of Canada in Damascus,
2	and therefore when he said that he spoke with one
3	voice for the Government of Canada and was
4	informing them of something, I think he took
5	their they took his word at face value.
6	MR. DAVID: But clearly,
7	Mr. Livermore, it's been your testimony that the
8	RCMP was not in the good books of the Syrian
9	Military Intelligence?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, not exactly.
11	We had heard
12	MR. DAVID: Let me put it to you
13	differently then.
14	MR. LIVERMORE: Yeah.
15	MR. DAVID: That the Syrian
16	Military Intelligence preferred to deal with an
17	intelligence organization in Canada
18	MR. LIVERMORE: That's right, yes.
19	MR. DAVID: which is CSIS,
20	rather than the RCMP?
21	MR. LIVERMORE: That's the
22	preference they expressed to us.
23	MR. DAVID: That's a proposition
24	you agree with?
25	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.

1	MR. DAVID: And so it's a cultural
2	aspect in terms of the relationship?
3	MR. LIVERMORE: Yes.
4	MR. DAVID: And there's simply
5	it's like if you're stopped on the street for a
6	speeding violation, if you're a cop, you're more
7	likely to be able to convince your police officer
8	not to issue the ticket than if you're just Dan
9	Livermore?
10	MR. LIVERMORE: I hope not.
11	MR. DAVID: So the point I'm
12	simply trying to understand and to elicit from you
13	is that, in fact, to well-communicate the issue,
14	the message, that Canada has no objection to
15	Arar's return, would it not have been preferable,
16	would the Syrian Military Intelligence not have
17	lent a better, more attentive ear, had CSIS issued
18	the statement rather than a Canadian politician?
19	MR. LIVERMORE: Frankly, I don't
20	believe so. I would accept your argument if CSIS
21	had had a mature relationship of several years'
22	standing, which possibly had been cemented over
23	the years with visits back and forth between the
24	head of the Syrian organization and the head of
25	CSIS, establishing a dialogue and the basis of

1	relationship. But, in fact, they had none. The
2	basis of their relationship was basically one
3	visit to establish the relationship. So it wasn't
4	there.
5	MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are
6	my questions.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: Are you
8	familiar with the relationship between the Syrian
9	Foreign Minister and the SMI? Is that we've
LO	heard some evidence from others. All I'm worried
L1	about is you're treading on areas that and it's
L2	not fair to you you're not
L3	MR. LIVERMORE: Well, the
L4	difficulty is, I'm familiar with some things but I
L5	have to claim National Security Confidentiality
L6	over
L7	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. In
L8	MR. LIVERMORE: in this
L9	particular area.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Let's
21	leave it at that.
22	We'll rise and take the morning
23	break for 15 minutes.
24	MR. SHORE: Mr. Commissioner?
25	Sorry. May I just, before the break, address one

1	issue?
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Sure. Please
3	do.
4	MR. SHORE: It's similar to what
5	Ms Edwardh addressed with regard to the release of
6	the Kathryn McCallion transcript before she
7	testifies?
8	I think it only fair as well that
9	Mr. Gould's transcript, with regard to the phone
10	call only, be released as well.
11	THE COMMISSIONER: No problem.
12	Anybody have any objection to
13	that? It will have to be reviewed for NSC. I
14	think if it's in respect of the phone call only,
15	there's not going to be any NSC problem
16	MR. SHORE: Oh, no. Absolutely,
17	only the phone call. That's my only interest, and
18	it's not a lot of transcript with regard to the
19	phone call.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: Ms Edwardh will
21	join wholeheartedly
22	MR. SHORE: I'm sure she would.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: More rather
24	than less. I'm concerned about delays.
25	Can I guagest this: Is Mr Gould

1	the next witness?
2	MR. DAVID: Yes.
3	Off microphone / Sans microphone
4	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. So we'll
5	deal with Mr. Gould next. We'll carry out with
6	the cross-examinations. People can look at the
7	transcript, once it's released, over lunch hour.
8	This will ruin your lunch, Ms Edwardh. And if
9	there's any further questions that arise as a
10	result of the release of the transcript, then we
11	could deal with those after lunch.
12	But we will carry on.
13	MR. SHORE: Sure.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Fifteen
15	minutes.
16	THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
17	Upon recessing at 11:23 a.m. /
18	Suspension à 11 h 23
19	Upon resuming at 11:40 a.m. /
20	Reprise à 11 h 40
21	THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
22	Veuillez vous asseoir.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning.
24	Before we begin, Commission
25	councel raised with me the issue of the

1	transcripts for Mr. Gould and Ms McCallion.
2	They, of course, were heard in
3	camera, so the Commission has our copies within a
4	secure situation so that it's not easy for us here
5	to make copies of that.
6	I am wondering if the Government
7	has facilities here, that copies could be made?
8	MS McISAAC: The problem is that
9	I'm not sure I have clean copies to make copies
10	from, sir.
11	MS EDWARDH: You know, this could
12	all have been resolved if somebody had raised it
13	earlier and it could be dealt with.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, it could.
15	Unfortunately, we are all doing our best.
16	Actually when these things
17	happened, at least as I sit in this objective
18	chair, sometimes it is one person's difficulty,
19	sometimes it is another. I don't think anybody is
20	in a glass house here.
21	MS McISAAC: I will certainly
22	facilitate. My concern is that I'm not sure that
23	we have available clean copies of the transcripts
24	in order to make copies, but I will make inquiries
25	and see what we can do.

1	THE COMMISSIONER: If we can do
2	it. Otherwise, they can be produced when they can
3	be produced. Having made the direction, if we
4	need to recall the witnesses on another day, we
5	will do that and I'm not being critical of you,
6	Ms Edwardh.
7	I think the facilities may be here
8	in this building that we can get copies made and
9	hopefully that we can do it that way.
10	Thank you.
11	Mr. David, please proceed.
12	Mr. Gould, welcome back. You are
13	still under oath.
14	PREVIOUSLY SWORN: JIM GOULD
15	EXAMINATION
16	MR. DAVID: Mr. Gould, we haven't
17	had the opportunity of having your public
18	testimony, so for the benefit of the public, I
19	will refer you to your CV, which has been filed at
20	P-85, volume 3, tab 113.
21	So just to introduce you, if you
22	will, I will refer you briefly to your CV.
23	MR. GOULD: What tab is it?
24	MR. DAVID: I'm sorry, tab 113.
25	First thing. In terms of

1	education, you have a Bachelor of Arts in Middle
2	Eastern Studies from the University of Toronto.
3	You have a Masters of Arts in Islamic History from
4	the American University in Cairo, and you have a
5	doctorate, a Ph.D., in Islamic History from the
6	University of Edinburgh.
7	MR. GOULD: Right.
8	MR. DAVID: And you presently
9	teach at the University of Ottawa.
10	MR. GOULD: Part-time. Sessional.
11	MR. DAVID: Sessional lecturer.
12	MR. GOULD: Yes.
13	MR. DAVID: You teach in Middle
14	Eastern affairs.
15	MR. GOULD: I have given courses
16	on Modern Middle Eastern History, 20th century. I
17	will be giving a course on politics in the Middle
18	East in January, and Medieval Middle East as well.
19	MR. DAVID: You are recently
20	retired from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
21	You have worked in the Department of Foreign
22	Affairs since 1975.
23	MR. GOULD: Correct.
24	MR. DAVID: You lived in the
25	Middle East for about 15 years.

1	MR. GOULD: Somewhere around
2	there, yes.
3	MR. DAVID: You also worked in
4	various Canadian embassies in the Middle East?
5	MR. GOULD: Correct.
6	MR. DAVID: Cairo, for instance,
7	Maghreb?
8	MR. GOULD: No, no.
9	MR. DAVID: Maybe just
10	MR. GOULD: Cairo, Saudi Arabia,
11	and Iraq.
12	MR. DAVID: Okay. You, at the end
13	of your tenure at DFAIT, were the Assistant
14	Director of ISI.
15	MR. GOULD: Deputy Director.
16	MR. DAVID: Deputy Director of
17	ISI, and you were a close collaborator of Scott
18	Heatherington at the time.
19	MR. GOULD: Correct.
20	MR. DAVID: Thank you.
21	Mr. Gould, first let me ask you to
22	describe the role and responsibilities of the
23	Deputy Director of ISI?
24	MR. GOULD: The full title, if I
25	recall correctly, was Deputy Director (Policy).

1	(Policy) at the end of the Deputy Director. That
2	meant a variety of things.
3	I was required to provide policy
4	advice through Mr. Heatherington, through
5	Mr. Livermore, through Mr. Wright, up to the
6	Deputy Minister on intelligence matters when
7	required.
8	Under my purview came such matters
9	as liaison within the division, we had a CSIS
10	liaison officer, an RCMP liaison officer. I was
11	responsible for managing, in a loose sense, that
12	relationship, correspondence, et cetera, back and
13	forth between the department and the two agencies.
14	It's been a long time.
15	Pretty much that kept me busy.
16	I'm sure there were other things.
17	MR. DAVID: Coming to Project
18	A-OCANADA, which you became familiar with, you
19	were involved with the project
20	MR. GOULD: For a short time, yes,
21	I was.
22	MR. DAVID: For a short time. I
23	understand that the name of Maher Arar came across
24	your desk approximately July 29th of 2002?
25	MR. GOULD: I think that was the

1	date it was.
2	MR. DAVID: And that basically we
3	have reconstructed from your personal notes that
4	have been filed.
5	MR. GOULD: Yes.
6	MR. DAVID: And you had a
7	relationship with Superintendent Cabana of the
8	project?
9	MR. GOULD: Correct.
10	MR. DAVID: There was a
11	consultational relationship between the both of
12	you?
13	MR. GOULD: Yes. He and I had met
14	on one matter, when the A-OCANADA task force was
15	struck, when it was deemed the division or
16	consultation within the division, we thought we
17	should inquire as to whether Foreign Affairs had a
18	role or something. I suggested that I call
19	Mr. Cabana because I knew him. That's how I did
20	it.
21	MR. DAVID: Mr. Gould, just to
22	advise you, I will be dealing with two issues with
23	you today in your testimony: One is the phone
24	conversation as you have well heard and
25	understand.

1	MR. GOULD: Yes.
2	MR. DAVID: The other, though,
3	before I get to the phone conversation and your
4	notes, has to do with a conversation that you had
5	with Mr. Cabana on October 21st of 2002, and let
6	me put you in context.
7	MR. GOULD: Okay.
8	MR. DAVID: October 21st, as you
9	recall, 2002, the Syrians confirm in a definite
10	way that they hold Mr. Arar. You were advised of
11	that and you called Mr. Cabana to advise him of
12	that also. So there was official notification,
13	put it that way, that Mr. Arar was in Syria.
14	There was also a question of you
15	having been mandated or were requested to assist
16	your ambassador in Syria in a meeting that he was
17	about to have with General Khalil in Syria, and in
18	that context, you called Mr. Cabana and you wanted
19	information from
20	MR. GOULD: Oh, I'm sorry.
21	MR. DAVID: Is that
22	MR. GOULD: As I recall
23	correctly you had me wondering whether I was
24	flying to Syria.
25	MR. DAVID: No, no.

1	MR. GOULD: Yes, I think the
2	MR. DAVID: And let me, for your
3	reference, refer you to page first of all, the
4	document is P-236. These are an extract of your
5	personal notes.
б	Let me refer you to page 2 of 16
7	in tab 1.
8	They were a challenge in camera;
9	they are more of a challenge in public because of
LO	the redactions. These are basically your notes
L1	for that day, so I'm just putting them in front of
L2	you. I don't want you to read them. I just want
L3	you to have them in front of you if you care to
L4	refer to them.
L5	You essentially asked Mr. Cabana
L6	three questions
L7	MR. GOULD: Excuse me, Mr. David.
L8	Is there any merit given as you say they are a
L9	challenge and I'm assuming everyone has got
20	them for me to explain to people, because I
21	think I had to explain in camera how I used my
22	little black book.
23	MR. DAVID: Sure.
24	THE COMMISSIONER: Just before we
25	proceed with this, I notice Superintendent

1	Cabana's counsel is not here today. Was there
2	MR. DAVID: This was on the
3	will-say, Mr. Commissioner.
4	THE COMMISSIONER: And those were
5	distributed, were they?
6	MR. DAVID: Yes. And there are
7	four bullets that deal with the issue.
8	THE COMMISSIONER: Carry on.
9	MR. DAVID: So
10	Off microphone / Sans microphone
11	THE COMMISSIONER: The difficulty
12	is when you speak, if you don't speak into the
13	microphone, the court reporter can't hear you.
14	MR. DAVID: I'm sorry.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: So that I'm
16	clear, this is in the will-say. There were four
17	bullet points dealing with this area.
18	MR. DAVID: Let me just read you
19	those bullets if it
20	THE COMMISSIONER: It's not
21	necessary, but the will-say was circulated to all
22	counsel, including Superintendent Cabana's
23	counsel.
24	MR. DAVID: I can only assume,
25	Mr. Commissioner.

1	THE COMMISSIONER: Let's go ahead
2	and hear the evidence, and if there is any
3	difficulty with Superintendent Cabana's counsel
4	not being here, we can address it later.
5	MR. DAVID: I understand.
6	Mr. Gould, you were proposing in
7	terms of your notes
8	MR. GOULD: Just to clarify,
9	perhaps, and it came up in earlier testimony.
10	Typical of all books, there is a right and a left
11	when you open the book. I tended to keep notes on
12	the right-hand side. And what you have on 2 of 16
13	is a right-hand page.
14	The left-hand page was left blank,
15	and that is where I usually took telephone voice
16	messages off my machine. I would write down
17	telephone numbers. That made them faster for me
18	to find.
19	And we get confused later because
20	I would make notes there which supplemented things
21	that I had written on the right-hand page. But
22	don't expect to be flipping from page to page.
23	When you get things like this page
24	with arrows, I made points that I wished to
25	discuss with Mr Cahana and obviously didn't

1	leave enough room, and that is the reason for the
2	arrows. So I apologize. That's the way I use it.
3	These were very transitory notes
4	that were there. They are not complete in any
5	way, shape or form. They are just things to keep
6	me directed and hopefully jog my memory when I
7	needed to have it jogged.
8	MR. DAVID: Certainly you never
9	expected them to end up in the public domain.
10	MR. GOULD: It is normal for me to
11	shred them when I leave a division. You asked me
12	before I left the division.
13	MR. DAVID: Mr. Gould, if you want
14	to refer to your notes, you asked three questions
15	to Mr. Cabana, and these questions were asked to
16	him concerning both Mr. Arar and Mr. Almalki?
17	MR. GOULD: Correct.
18	MR. DAVID: The first is: Is he
19	wanted in Canada? The second is: If he is, why?
20	And third: Will charges be laid in Canada?
21	And I would like to understand how
22	Mr. Cabana responded to your questions.
23	First of all, let me ask you:
24	What did Mr. Cabana inform you of in terms of
25	Mr Arar's status as of this date Ostober 21st

1	2002?
2	MR. GOULD: My notes indicate to
3	me, and I have I remember the call because I
4	paged him and he called me back. The details of
5	the call are long gone. So I'm going to be
6	dependent upon the notes that we all have before
7	us.
8	Mr. Cabana came up, commented that
9	Mr. Arar came up in an investigation, but they
10	were a long way from any charges. He was just a
11	person of interest, I think was the phrase. They
12	are still trying to figure out who he is. They
13	would like to talk to him.
14	The problem is his associations, I
15	mean, who he was connected with. It wasn't him
16	directly so much as who he was associated with,
17	but being police, you follow all leads. That was
18	the context.
19	MR. DAVID: Okay. Second, there
20	is an issue that was raised and discussed that day
21	about sharing information with the Syrians about
22	these two individuals.
23	MR. GOULD: Yes.
24	MR. DAVID: And my question to you
25	is, Mr. Gould: Had DFAIT, had ISI sanctioned

1	then, on this date or before, such a possibility?
2	MS McISAAC: Commissioner, could I
3	ask the witness, please, to confine his answers to
4	matters relating to Mr. Arar rather than any
5	discussions that might have taken place regarding
6	Mr. Almalki?
7	MR. DAVID: That's fine.
8	MR. GOULD: Yes. And on this I
9	recall from earlier testimony that this was an
10	issue. I cannot recall I do not recall any
11	occasion where we sanctioned the sharing of
12	information on Mr. Arar with the Syrians.
13	MR. DAVID: In other words, I'm
14	asking
15	MR. GOULD: I don't think they
16	asked us, I don't think we said yes. I don't
17	think we said I don't think it came up.
18	I notice here, it obviously came
19	up there was something in this conversation
20	because there is a "possibly already transmitted
21	to them" reference. I think that is what that may
22	have been. Some information may already have
23	gone, but I don't know.
24	MR. DAVID: And my third question
25	to you concerning this date is: What was the

1	follow-up in terms of this raised possibility of
2	sharing information on Mr. Arar with the Syrians?
3	Did anything come of it? Was there anything that
4	was pursued in that line?
5	MR. GOULD: Not that I recall.
6	MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those were
7	my questions, Mr. Commissioner, concerning October
8	21st.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
10	MR. DAVID: We move now to the
11	telephone conversation that you have heard already
12	described. You were present in the room when
13	Mr. Livermore testified, Mr. Gould, so I'm not
14	going to give you a very lengthy introduction in
15	that regard.
16	I'm going to ask you to refer to
17	your notes once again, and I ask you to go to page
18	9 of 16. There are five pages of your notes that
19	concern this phone call, and it goes from pages 9
20	to 13.
21	There is an entry, and we have
22	seen this before in your previous testimony, but
23	page 9 of 16 is essentially dated June the 5th.
24	Is that correct?
25	MR. GOULD: As I understand it,

1	yes.
2	MR. DAVID: And you have certain
3	inscriptions. In what context did you make these
4	notes and these inscriptions?
5	MR. GOULD: Again, I was going to
6	speak to Dave Dyet from JPO. Has he testified
7	already?
8	MR. DAVID: Well, we filed his
9	testimony.
10	MR. GOULD: You discussed you
11	summarised his testimony this morning.
12	And number (i) and number (ii)
13	which is (i) and (ii) are notes that I took.
14	The first question
15	MR. DAVID: First of all, let me
16	ask you: Do you recall approximately when in the
17	day you met Mr. Dyet?
18	MR. GOULD: No.
19	MR. DAVID: Do you recall how it
20	is that you met Mr. Dyet about the contents of
21	your notes: that is, the memo; the processing of
22	the memo; and, thirdly, the phone call between
23	Mr. Hooper and Ms McCallion?
24	MR. GOULD: I called on
25	Mr. Dyet and I'm quite certain in my own mind I

1	called on him to determine the status of the
2	memo. Excuse me, we refer to it as a memo. It's
3	the memorandum which covered the draft letter for
4	the Minister's signature.
5	MR. DAVID: For your benefit, I
6	would like to refer you to that document so you
7	can have it in front of your eyes.
8	That is at P-117, volume 2, tab 5.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: 75.5?
10	MR. DAVID: 75.5, yes, or 5.
11	MR. GOULD: Thank you.
12	MR. DAVID: This is the memo in
13	question?
14	MR. GOULD: It may indeed be. I
15	will make a random jump in assumption and say yes,
16	it is.
17	MR. DAVID: Okay. So you were
18	saying
19	MR. GOULD: We, the division. I
20	wanted to know how did it stand. Has it gone
21	from because there had been at one point
22	considerable to-ing and fro-ing with CSIS over the
23	wording. Has it gone forward?
24	MR. DAVID: We know that there was
25	a meeting, for instance, on May 8th. There was a

1	meeting on May 12th.
2	MR. GOULD: I was rarely involved
3	in those meetings, if ever. I was aware they were
4	going on. I knew there was a controversy going
5	on a controversy a discussion over the
6	wording.
7	For whatever reason, I said I am
8	going to see David. It could have been as simple
9	a matter as I'm walking past there, or I know
10	David and I will go over and see him and ask him
11	where it stands. So that was the idea.
12	MR. DAVID: So your concern
13	basically is: Where is the memo?
14	MR. GOULD: Where's the memo?
15	MR. DAVID: Where is it at?
16	MR. GOULD: And it was in that
17	conversation that he said it had gone up to MKM,
18	Kathryn McCallion, and then he commented on this
19	telephone call, that there was to be a telephone
20	call with Mr. Hooper.
21	MR. DAVID: So he indicated to you
22	that the call had not taken place?
23	MR. GOULD: My notes indicate that
24	he indicated that the call had taken place, and as
25	far as I know that was my first notification that

1	the call was in train.
2	MR. DAVID: When you met Mr. Dyet,
3	your impression was that Mr. Hooper had already
4	spoken to Ms McCallion, and in effect you are
5	noting the contents of that conversation?
6	MR. GOULD: Yes.
7	MR. DAVID: And the contents of
8	the conversation were being relayed to you by
9	Mr. Dyet?
10	MR. GOULD: Correct.
11	MR. DAVID: So my next question to
12	you is: Do you know what Mr. Dyet's source was?
13	Did you ask him? Did he tell you? Was it
14	discussed?
15	MR. GOULD: I don't think it was
16	discussed. My notes indicate to me that there was
17	to have been a call at 1100 hours that day. So
18	your timing question? Obviously it was after
19	1100. Gar was to be there, that's Mr. Pardy, was
20	to be there, but probably wasn't, so it's in the
21	past. So it's after that. It's not clear from my
22	notes as to whether Mr. Dyet was there or whether
23	he was recounting. I have no idea what his source
24	was.
25	MR. DAVID: When you're affirming

StenoTran

1	that the call was to have taken place at eleven,
2	you're now reading further on, you're about
3	halfway down your notes for that day.
4	MR. GOULD: Yes I am. The notes
5	on this section are probably more for that day.
6	MR. DAVID: Let's take the very
7	top of the page and it days Dave Dyet, JPO, and
8	there's a phone number. That's Mr. Dyet's phone
9	number, I gather.
10	MR. GOULD: Correct.
11	MR. DAVID: And there's an (i),
12	and it says, "memo from JPD about Arar ? status.
13	Did it go to MKM probably up today."
14	So was this the fundamental basis
15	for you contacting Mr. Dyet that day.
16	MR. GOULD: That's correct.
17	MR. DAVID: And then the (ii)
18	"call from Jack Hooper ADDO to MKM saying that
19	CSIS doesn't want us to get Arar back in the
20	country as they would have to devote too many
21	resources to working"
22	MR. GOULD: To watching.
23	MR. DAVID: "To watching him." I'm
24	sorry.
25	Again, this is something that is

1	coming to you from Mr. Dyet?
2	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
3	MR. DAVID: And the way you draft
4	it, is it drafted in a way that reflects that the
5	call has taking place or is about to take place?
6	MR. GOULD: I understand that the
7	call had taken place. This was Mr. Dyet's
8	recounting to me of the substance of the call.
9	MR. DAVID: And moving down the
10	page now, it says and you tell me if it's
11	"done" or "Dave"?
12	MR. GOULD: We've been on this one
13	before, sir. I do not know.
14	MR. DAVID: You're not sure. It's
15	either one.
16	MR. GOULD: Let me guess. I think
17	it's probably "Dave." It's reflecting a note.
18	My and, again, I go back. These are sketchy
19	notes. I seem to recall I called back just to
20	clarify, was there what time was the call, that
21	sort of thing, and "Dave (ii)" because it's a
22	reference back to the (ii) above, "there was to
23	have been a call at 1100 today. Gar was to have
24	been there but probably wasn't."
25	MR. DAVID: Okay. So now I just

1	want to be clear about that. The note that says
2	"Dave" or "done" is not contemporaneous with the
3	first annotations?
4	MR. GOULD: I do not think so.
5	MR. DAVID: It was a follow-up
6	that you gave?
7	MR. GOULD: I think it is.
8	MR. DAVID: Let me ask you how you
9	reacted to the information at the top of the page,
10	when you first got it?
11	MR. GOULD: The first information
12	about the fact that the memo had gone up, that's
13	fine. The question, of course, has to do with the
14	Hooper telephone call.
15	Surprise. CSIS had been very
16	involved with the drafting of the letter, so why
17	are they calling? Why are they calling Ms
18	McCallion? Why are they not going through the
19	liaison function? Remember I said that I I
20	don't like to use the word but I think it's the
21	government word, manage the liaison function which
22	CSIS did as far as the division went. The
23	day-to-day to and fro-ing. They have a liaison
24	officer in the division. Would that have been the
25	appropriate channel? Just, what happened? Why is

1	CSIS going to Kathryn? What's the issue? And
2	some surprise at the substance of it.
3	MR. DAVID: And Mr. Dyet
4	volunteers this information to you?
5	MR. GOULD: Oh, yes.
6	MR. DAVID: You knew nothing about
7	it beforehand?
8	MR. GOULD: I don't recall knowing
9	about it beforehand. I'm sure he's the one that
10	told me about it.
11	MR. DAVID: And what was
12	Mr. Dyet's attitude or reaction to the information
13	he was giving you?
14	MR. GOULD: Matter-of-fact. I
15	mean, he was just passing on information.
16	MR. DAVID: Okay. So you're
17	surprised.
18	MR. GOULD: Surprised,
19	interested I don't I don't want to put too
20	strong a word on it. I don't want to put
21	"alarmed." Even "concerned" would probably be too
22	strong a word. But surprised and interested and
23	what's this mean? What's happening here?
24	MR. DAVID: And did you understand
25	that you had to follow up on this information, or

1	that you should
2	MR. GOULD: I thought I should
3	just to confirm, has it slowed this letter down,
4	which I know that my Director and my Director
5	General, that's Mr. Heatherington and
6	Mr. Livermore, were very involved in the
7	drafting not necessarily the drafting, but the
8	approvaling
9	MR. DAVID: The processing?
10	MR. GOULD: The processing of the
11	letter. Again, back to my policy work, to advise
12	them if I thought there was something. If it was
13	coming back down, for whatever reason, then it
14	might be up to me to advise. I didn't know.
15	MR. DAVID: To your knowledge was
16	ISI or ISD, or both for that matter, involved in
17	the negotiation or in the processing of the memo
18	in terms of its dealings with the RCMP and CSIS
19	and coming to a consensus?
20	MR. GOULD: In the sense of
21	facilitating the arrival at consensus or
22	MR. DAVID: Yes.
23	MR. GOULD: I would think their
24	role was more peripheral in that being party to
25	the consensus and ensuring that the right that

1	people did communicate, but you'd have to speak to
2	either Mr. Heatherington or Mr. Livermore on that
3	one.
4	MR. DAVID: When you take these
5	notes concerning (i), the first (i), was it
6	understood by you that the first memo had been
7	authorized by Kathryn McCallion at this point, or
8	was it still in her hands?
9	MR. GOULD: It's not clear from my
10	notes. When it says they probably went up to
11	today, that could mean it went to Kathryn today
12	excuse me, Ms McCallion or it could mean that
13	it moved past. But it's not clear to me what's
14	meant by that.
15	MR. DAVID: Then, as you say, you
16	called back Mr. Dyet to follow up. You try to get
17	more detail, and what you find out is there was to
18	be a call. The call was to be at eleven.
19	MR. GOULD: Yes.
20	MR. DAVID: He tells you that?
21	MR. GOULD: Yes, that's my sense
22	of what my notes say.
23	MR. DAVID: And Mr. Dyet also
24	informs you that Gar Pardy
25	MR. GOULD: Gar was to be there, I

1	probably should have said, "was to have been there
2	but probably wasn't."
3	MR. DAVID: And then further down
4	the line, in the notebook, it says: "MKM's EA"
5	executive assistant?
6	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
7	MR. DAVID: Barbara Burns, with a
8	phone number, "about call from CSIS/Hooper."
9	What's that about?
10	MR. GOULD: That's my saying I
11	should call Ms Burns. (a) Did the call happen?
12	(b) What was the substance of it? Is it going to
13	affect?
14	MR. DAVID: So again you're
15	following up.
16	MR. GOULD: Just a minor follow-up
17	to keep, you know
18	MR. DAVID: Is this page a
19	right-hand side or left-hand side
20	MR. GOULD: This is a right-hand
21	side, this is one of my telephone conversations
22	that I was
23	MR. DAVID: Let's move on now to
24	the next page, page 10 of 16, and there's a date
25	indicated at the top, it's June 6. Is this a

1	left-hand or a right-hand
2	MR. GOULD: It's a right-hand, and
3	it indicates on June 6th, for whatever reason, I
4	had not contacted Ms Burns on the previous day,
5	the 5th.
6	MR. DAVID: Okay.
7	MR. GOULD: I was trying again on
8	the 6th.
9	MR. DAVID: For the record the 5th
10	is a Thursday, and the 6th is a Friday.
11	MR. GOULD: Thank you. And the
12	substance why was I calling? About the call
13	from CSIS from CSIS about Arar. Then there's
14	an answer there, and it says "Call happened." So
15	I was able to confirm in conversation with Ms
16	Burns the call happened. But that's all I
17	obviously have.
18	MR. DAVID: No content.
19	MR. GOULD: No content.
20	MR. DAVID: Okay. Then we go to
21	page 11. Is this a right-hand or a left-hand?
22	MR. GOULD: Right-hand.
23	MR. DAVID: And the indicated date
24	is June the 9th, which is the Monday.
25	MR. GOULD: Monday.

1	MR. DAVID: It says Barbara Burns,
2	again her phone number, "about calls from
3	ADDO/Hooper to MKM." Can you tell us what that is
4	about?
5	MR. GOULD: Again that's a tasking
6	to myself saying please call Ms Burns about the
7	same call.
8	MR. DAVID: Okay.
9	MR. GOULD: Probably it doesn't
10	say why, but it is probably what was said.
11	MR. DAVID: Content.
12	MR. GOULD: Content.
13	MR. DAVID: You're seeking
14	content.
15	MR. GOULD: Probably. I have no
16	indication here, but I can't imagine why if I knew
17	the call happened that I wasn't, you know, calling
18	to ask if the call happened twice it would
19	be down that way.
20	MR. DAVID: You're simply
21	following up.
22	MR. GOULD: Absolutely.
23	MR. DAVID: Page 12, Mr. Gould.
24	Is this a left-hand or a right-hand
25	MR. GOULD: This is the left-hand

1	one.
2	MR. DAVID: So should we go to the
3	right-hand page first?
4	MR. GOULD: If you would, please.
5	MR. DAVID: So that would be
6	page 13.
7	MR. GOULD: Yes, indeed.
8	MR. DAVID: At the top it says
9	"Dave Dyet 992-1152, WCB, will call back."
10	MR. GOULD: Correct.
11	MR. DAVID: And then hyphen or
12	slash:
13	"He spoke to MKM & she signed
14	off on the memo."
15	And there's a star. What's this
16	about?
17	MR. GOULD: Well, I'm speaking to
18	Mr. Dyet.
19	MR. DAVID: You did speak. Okay.
20	MR. GOULD: I tried to phone him.
21	Left a message. WCB, means he will call me back.
22	He obviously did. He spoke to Ms McCallion, and
23	she confirmed that she had signed off the memo.
24	That means, in our jargon, that she has signed it,
25	I think Mr. Livermore explained, and it has gone

1	up to the deputy's office.
2	MR. DAVID: This was confirmed by
3	Mr. Dyet on Monday, June 9th.
4	MR. GOULD: Correct. The star
5	throws me. Obviously there was something more.
6	MR. DAVID: Another reference.
7	MR. GOULD: Yes, now, again,
8	right-hand, left-hand. I had carried on with my
9	day, he called me back, and I had already added a
10	few lines of stuff that has been redacted. So, in
11	order to make space for it, a star and across to
12	the left-hand side.
13	MR. DAVID: We go back to page 12.
14	MR. GOULD: Right. So now go back
15	to page 12, and this is the expansion on
16	whatabout the call.
17	MR. DAVID: And this is coming
18	from Mr. Dyet?
19	MR. GOULD: From Mr. Dyet.
20	MR. DAVID: So it says: "About
21	call-confirmed story. We had heard."
22	MR. GOULD: Correct.
23	MR. DAVID: "We" being?
24	MR. GOULD: David and I.
25	MR. DAVID: David Dyet and

1	yourself?
2	MR. GOULD: Correct. And I had
3	actually heard it from David, so I mean it's not
4	perhaps
5	MR. DAVID: It's a grammatically
6	correct "we."
7	MR. GOULD: It is indeed.
8	MR. DAVID: Then it says: "-may be
9	a bit more to it, but she didn't want to go into
10	it."
11	Who is saying that to you?
12	MR. GOULD: As I recall, this is
13	David saying this to me in light of a conversation
14	which he had with Ms Burns.
15	MR. DAVID: Okay. And not with Ms
16	McCallion?
17	MR. GOULD: Not with Ms McCallion.
18	MR. DAVID: The next line says:
19	"MKM signed the memo so she seems to be ignoring
20	the request from the ADDO"?
21	MR. GOULD: Correct.
22	MR. DAVID: And what does that
23	translate that.
24	MR. GOULD: It tells me that the
25	memo has gone up. Whatever if it is correct

1	that Mr. Hooper asked Ms McCallion, or implies
2	said to Ms McCallion you don't want him back
3	because of the resource problems or for whatever
4	reason, she was ignoring that and going forward
5	with what had been decided within the department
6	and interdepartmentally with the memo to the
7	deputy and then the Minister.
8	MR. DAVID: Okay. And that's the
9	end of your notes on this call.
10	MR. GOULD: That's yes, it is.
11	MR. DAVID: You were present
12	during Mr. Livermore's testimony?
13	MR. GOULD: Yes, I was.
14	MR. DAVID: I'll get directly to
15	the point. You go and see Mr. Livermore and speak
16	to Mr. Livermore about this call?
17	MR. GOULD: I don't I wouldn't
18	want to say I go that implies I got up, walked
19	around the door
20	MR. DAVID: Put it this way, you
21	had a conversation
22	MR. GOULD: I certainly had a
23	conversation with Mr. Livermore. Whether it was
24	the next moment, or half an hour or an hour later,
25	I don't recall.

1	MR. DAVID: What day would that
2	have been on?
3	MR. GOULD: I assume it would be
4	on that Monday the 9th, after I had had that tale
5	confirmed.
6	MR. DAVID: And your reason for
7	going to see Mr. Livermore about the call?
8	MR. GOULD: Again, I'm not
9	comfortable with the "going to see."
10	MR. DAVID: Okay. Discussing.
11	MR. GOULD: My discussing this
12	with Dan. It could literally have been a matter
13	of I walked out of my office, Mr. Livermore was
14	there, and on that topic, which I would guess we
15	probably talked about before, I just confirmed to
16	him that the memo was gone forward. That was the
17	whole point to it. It's gone up to the Minister's
18	office. Case closed.
19	MR. DAVID: Did you discuss it
20	with Mr. Heatherington?
21	MR. GOULD: Almost certainly, and
22	almost certainly in the same informal manner.
23	MR. DAVID: Did you discuss it
24	with Gar Pardy?
25	MP COULD: I don't recall but

1	unlikely.
2	MR. DAVID: And did you pursue the
3	matter with Kathryn McCallion herself?
4	MR. GOULD: No, I did not.
5	MR. DAVID: Did you raise the
6	issue, or discuss the matter, with the liaison
7	officer of CSIS that works within your office
8	MR. GOULD: I don't think so. I
9	think I was just doing this on my own.
LO	MR. DAVID: I'd like to bring you
L1	now to the Book of Documents we filed today,
L2	Mr. Gould, and that is P-237, and if I could bring
L3	you to tab 2.
L4	MR. GOULD: Two?
L5	MR. DAVID: Tab 2.
L6	The call is on June the 5th.
L7	Perhaps June the 6th. Your dealing with the call
L8	directly is over the course of three days, the
L9	Thursday, Friday, and the Monday, and then in the
20	weeks that follow, we will see that on July 30th,
21	a memo is drafted for the Deputy Minister, and
22	we'll come to that. But before that, on June
23	24th, you drafted this draft memo
24	MR. GOULD: Yes.
25	MR. DAVID: And it was destined

1	for two people. It was destined for Jim Wright,
2	who was the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible
3	for your
4	MR. GOULD: Correct.
5	MR. DAVID: office, for the
6	ISD office, so in terms of a reporting structure,
7	Mr. Wright had authority over your office. And it
8	was also destined for Kathryn McCallion, who was
9	the authority in terms of consular affairs.
10	MR. GOULD: Correct.
11	MR. DAVID: And it was to those
12	two people that you were addressing this draft.
13	And it says "Via ISD".
14	So this is via Dan Livermore?
15	MR. GOULD: Correct.
16	MR. DAVID: And also JPD, this is
17	Gar Pardy, the Director General of Consular
18	Affairs and the Director General of ISD, so
19	respecting again the chain of command.
20	MR. GOULD: Sure.
21	MR. DAVID: It's dated June 24th.
22	It says at the very top:
23	"It is very clear that there
24	has not yet been, on the
25	institutional level, a

1	meeting of minds between the
2	Department of Foreign Affairs
3	on the one hand and CSIS and
4	the RCMP on the other with
5	regard to the case of Maher
6	Arar. Recent exchanges have
7	been almost testy and there
8	is a fear that the working
9	relationship between DFAIT
10	and CSIS, in particular,
11	might be poisoned if
12	agreement is not reached on a
13	government-wide approach to
14	this case."
15	Can you tell us, what was going
16	through your mind at this time when drafting this
17	memo that allowed you to use this kind of language
18	and to speak of the fact that there was discord
19	between CSIS and DFAIT and the RCMP about Arar?
20	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm. Again,
21	because I was drafting the memo because of my
22	policy function, and the fact I manage policy,
23	which means I get to draft a lot of memos. My
24	concern about managing that relationship with
25	CSIS.

1	Now, what had happened? Well, we
2	had had the and if I recall it went on for some
3	days, this negotiating or discussing of the
4	wording of the letter, Mr. Pardy wanted it to go
5	much farther than CSIS and the RCMP were prepared.
6	That's one point.
7	There was the phone call, which I
8	had understood Mr. Hooper to have made to
9	Ms McCallion. That was another point.
10	And there were other meetings
11	which had occurred, some of which I had been privy
12	to, some of which I had not been but about which I
13	knew, and about by I really cannot go into details
14	for reasons of national security. But it was a
15	summing up of.
16	MR. DAVID: Okay. And this first
17	paragraph in this draft memo, did it reflect
18	accurately your thinking at this time?
19	MR. GOULD: It was the desire to
20	head something off. "Might be poisoned." I'm
21	trying to do something in advance.
22	I was concerned as I read this,
23	I was concerned that if we didn't come to a
24	conclusion, if Foreign Affairs couldn't sit down
25	with CSIS and I think the PCMD is implied

1	although it's not named, that the relationship
2	could become difficult.
3	So I was trying to get a
4	conversation started, first in-house, and then, if
5	successful, a bilateral conversation with our
6	colleagues in the service so that we really did
7	have a one-voice, one-channel, one-line approach
8	on these matters. I was concerned that it would
9	spread, that if it didn't work well with this then
10	it might go into other areas. There's a fairly
11	rich relationship between the department and the
12	service.
13	MR. DAVID: And obviously
14	Mr. Pardy shared your concerns in that regard?
15	MR. GOULD: I don't know whether
16	Mr. Pardy shared the concerns or not, but I
17	thought Mr. Pardy should be part of this
18	discussion, first in-house and, second, with the
19	service, because this seems to be stimulated by
20	the Arar case, a consular case.
21	MR. DAVID: Right. Let's move
22	down to the last paragraph of your draft memo, and
23	you say:
24	"There is not sufficient
25	evidence against Arar for him

1	to be charged with anything
2	in Canada. CSIS has made it
3	clear to the Department that
4	they would prefer to have him
5	remain in Syria, rather than
6	returned to Canada."
7	Let me ask you. You're asserting
8	this in a draft memo?
9	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
10	MR. DAVID: I understand that it
11	was never finalized, it never actually went up the
12	chain of command.
13	MR. GOULD: No.
14	MR. DAVID: It remained a draft in
15	your computer?
16	MR. GOULD: Yes.
17	MR. DAVID: Okay. When you
18	assert, "CSIS has made it clear to the department
19	that they would prefer to have him remain in Syria
20	rather than returned to Canada," what are you
21	basing that on?
22	MR. GOULD: Meetings, et cetera,
23	that I mentioned a moment ago that I really don't
24	want I can't go into the details for national
25	security, but there was sufficient grounds to make

1	me concerned.
2	The wording is dramatic because I
3	wanted to start a dialogue. Not all memos are
4	intended to be finalized. I wanted to bring my
5	concerns to people's attention.
6	MR. DAVID: And so did this
7	sentence, this I should say this allegation, go
8	beyond simply the Hooper-McCallion phone call?
9	MR. GOULD: There were well, if
10	nothing else, and you discussed it this morning,
11	the debate over the wording of a letter, which
12	went on for some date it was not a one
13	half-hour meeting. And there was certainly not a
14	meeting of minds on that. And although a decision
15	was reached, there may not have been a true
16	meeting of minds. They may not have totally
17	agreed.
18	MR. DAVID: You go on and you say:
19	"CSIS officials do not seem
20	to understand that, guilty or
21	innocent, Maher Arar has the
22	right to consular assistance
23	from the Department and that
24	in the circumstances in which
25	he presently finds himself,

1	the best outcome might be his
2	return to Canada. Even
3	though there is a risk that
4	Arar might later be found to
5	have been involved in
6	extremist activities of one
7	sort or another, his right to
8	consular assistance must be
9	honoured."
10	So there's you're raising the
11	issue of understanding; that is, you're saying
12	that maybe there's misunderstanding
13	MR. GOULD: That's right. I was
14	concerned, from my position as the Deputy Director
15	(Policy), that I wanted to bring my slightly more
16	senior people into it, and possibly more senior,
17	depending on how far up this went, to ensure that
18	they that I obviously had a concern that CSIS
19	might not be understanding here. We've got to be
20	a little clearer.
21	We have a mandate to deliver
22	consular a consular program to Mr. Arar. He
23	has certain rights and privileges as a Canadian
24	citizen. We've got to do that. And make sure
25	they understand that And if as I say in here

1	if later he might be found to have an extreme
2	was involved, well
3	MR. DAVID: So be it.
4	MR. GOULD: So be it. That's
5	that's a criminal matter.
6	MR. DAVID: And thus your
7	recommendation we find this at paragraph 3:
8	"It is important that the
9	Minister and his staff be
10	made aware of the evidence
11	that can be marshalled
12	against Arar and a way must
13	be found for the Department
14	to respond to allegations
15	that there is no suggesting
16	that Arar has a connection to
17	the activities of Muslim
18	extremists."
19	MR. GOULD: That's back to the
20	wording question, as came out during the debate
21	over the letter. To me, it is.
22	MR. DAVID: And, finally, your
23	assertion:
24	"CSIS must accept that DFAIT
25	has a duty to assist Arar,

1	even though this may result
2	in him regaining his freedom
3	in Canada."
4	MR. GOULD: That's reiterating the
5	same point I made in paragraph the previous
6	paragraph, which I think is numbered wrong. Oh,
7	well. Yeah.
8	MR. DAVID: And so this reflected
9	basically your understanding of the environment at
LO	this time?
L1	MR. GOULD: Yes. That's well-put.
L2	That it was the environment that I was trying to
L3	address.
L4	MR. DAVID: Okay. We go now to
L5	tab 3, Mr. Gould, and there's a memo that has been
L6	reviewed also with Mr. Livermore.
L7	MR. GOULD: Yes.
L8	MR. DAVID: From this memo, and
L9	it's at paragraph 5 of page 2 of the memo, the
20	assertion comes that another senior CSIS officer
21	told MKM that DFAIT should curtail its efforts to
22	have Arar released and that it was CSIS's
23	preference that Arar not return.
24	Again, that was the operating
25	understanding of the phone call

1	MR. GOULD: Correct.
2	MR. DAVID: almost two months
3	after it occurred?
4	MR. GOULD: At least in the mind
5	of the drafter and Mr. Heatherington, yes.
6	MR. DAVID: And at this time, July
7	30th, as far as you're concerned, this is an
8	accurate statement?
9	MR. GOULD: This was our
10	understanding of the situation.
11	MR. DAVID: On July 30th?
12	MR. GOULD: Yes. Or at least my
13	understanding of the situation, and I can't
14	imagine it being different.
15	MR. DAVID: Okay. And then we go
16	to tab 4, Mr. Gould, and, again, I'll put you in
17	context.
18	November the 6th is the date.
19	Bill Gusen is one of your colleagues, he's one of
20	your underlings in ISI?
21	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
22	MR. DAVID: And the task at hand
23	was to draft a chronology.
24	MR. GOULD: Correct.
25	MR. DAVID: And it was to be a

1	detailed chronology, factual chronology, and it
2	was for the purposes of PCO. PCO had I don't
3	want to say "ordered," but certainly requested,
4	and there was to be follow-through on that
5	request.
6	MR. GOULD: Right.
7	MR. DAVID: And so in a fairly
8	intense environment, a chronology was prepared?
9	MR. GOULD: Yes.
10	MR. DAVID: Okay. And this first
11	e-mail that is going from Mr. Gusen to
12	Mr. Heatherington concerns the drafting of that
13	memo and you're being cc'd on it.
14	MR. GOULD: Correct.
15	MR. DAVID: And it says, "As
16	okayed by Don and Jim."
17	And "Don" is Don Saunders and
18	"Jim" is Jim Gould, yourself.
19	MR. GOULD: Correct.
20	MR. DAVID: So you have reviewed
21	the contents.
22	MR. GOULD: Yup.
23	MR. DAVID: And then it says, "To
24	be hand-delivered to Chesson."
25	MR. GOULD: Yes.

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1	MR. DAVID: Now, let's go to the
2	next page, page 2, and at the very top we see,
3	"Chronology of Maher Arar case," and then it says,
4	"ISI input."
5	So this is ISI's contribution to a
6	chronology that was prepared by other
7	MR. GOULD: Was being prepared at
8	the department.
9	MR. DAVID: Okay. So here is your
10	contribution.
11	MR. GOULD: Correct.
12	MR. DAVID: And if we go to page 2
13	or or page 3 of 3. We'll see that there's an
14	entry for July 30th, 2003, and I bring you to the
15	last sentence. It says:
16	"It also reports"
17	I'm sorry. Let's read the whole
18	thing, just for clarity. It's in reference to the
19	July 30th memo, and it says:
20	"ISI Top Secret memo to USS
21	concerning Sol Gen's comments
22	about rogue elements in the
23	RCMP. The memo mentions the
24	cross-border information
25	sharing on individuals of

1	interest such as Arar. It
2	also reports on a call from a
3	very senior official at CSIS
4	to DFAIT/MKM (responsible for
5	consular affairs) suggesting
6	that DFAIT curtail its
7	efforts to secure Arar's
8	return as that would not be
9	CSIS' preference."
10	So clearly, again, a reference to
11	the phone call, a reference to what Mr. Dyet told
12	you, a reference to the July 30th memo. This you
13	had found was not included in the draft chronology
14	that was circulating. You suggested, "Let's put
15	this in." "This is ISI's input. Let's put it
16	in."
17	MR. GOULD: I don't know whether I
18	suggested putting it in. It was in.
19	MR. DAVID: Well, it's because the
20	e-mail, at the first page, says, "As okayed by Don
21	and Jim"
22	MR. GOULD: Yes, but it's not I
23	didn't necessarily go through and say, "Stick this
24	item in." I read that draft input and said,
25	"Yeah, it looks good"

1	MR. DAVID: Okay. So you felt it
2	appropriate to refer
3	MR. GOULD: Yes.
4	MR. DAVID: to that reference?
5	MR. GOULD: Yes.
6	MR. DAVID: And in point of fact,
7	Mr. Gould, if I compare the ISI input suggestions
8	on those two pages with the final chronology that
9	was actually released to PCO, almost the totality
10	of the suggestions made by ISI were included in
11	the draft in the final memo, in the final
12	chronology.
13	MR. GOULD: Okay.
14	MR. DAVID: Except for this
15	reference to July 30th, in terms of the phone
16	call, and except for the entry for the 8th of
17	September, 2003. Other than that, in some form or
18	another, all of ISI's input has been included in
19	the final chronology.
20	We go to tab 5, please, and this
21	is the next day, November 7th, and it's from
22	Mr. Gusen once again and it's going to Scott, and
23	it says Gould and it's being cc'd to you, and
24	the message is as follows:
25	237, TAB 5"I've picked up the

1	typos, et cetera, refer.
2	Jim's comments on having
3	missed the ADDO call to MKM
4	in early June. I leave it to
5	those here then to decide.
6	I've left it out for now."
7	And in terms of the identified
8	subject matter on the e-mail, it says, "Arar chron
9	with Jim Gould's recommended changes."
10	MR. GOULD: Yup.
11	MR. DAVID: Could you tell us what
12	that is about?
13	MR. GOULD: Well, it's some
14	it's a day or so later, I think?
15	MR. DAVID: It's one day later.
16	MR. GOULD: One day later, it's
17	come back down. More comments and more other
18	things to add. The chronology went through
19	several combinations and permutations as more and
20	more information was added. Items were put in as
21	they went into more detail. Items were taken out
22	because they were deemed as no longer relevant or
23	superfluous, unnecessary; it added nothing to the
24	chronology.
25	MR. DAVID: Okay. And if you go

1	to page 9 of 12 within that tab
2	MR. GOULD: Yup.
3	MR. DAVID: You'll see that on
4	July 30th, the reference to the phone call is not
5	there.
6	MR. GOULD: Yup.
7	MR. DAVID: So are we to
8	understand that you're saying, "Hey, let's put it
9	back in" or "This should be in"? Is that
LO	MR. GOULD: It sounds if I
L1	recall correctly, I noted I noted that it was
L2	not there
L3	MR. DAVID: And you make a
L4	recommendation
L5	MR. GOULD: And the reference to
L6	Bill as in you know, that's out. You know, did
L7	you drop it or I don't know whether I asked who
L8	dropped it but why you know, is it out? Why is
L9	it out? I thought it should be in there, but
20	others thought it was because it had been
21	overtaken. The memo had gone. The letter
22	had been you know. So that was the context.
23	MR. DAVID: Okay.
24	Then we have, at tab 6 this is,
0.5	again it's a draft version of the chronology

1	which is dated the 11th I'm sorry, the 7th of
2	November. And if you go to page 7, you'll see the
3	entry on July 30th; there is no reference to the
4	phone call?
5	MR. GOULD: Yup.
6	MR. DAVID: And then at tab 7,
7	Mr. Gould, you have a version that seems to be
8	dated November 13th, and this, from previous
9	testimony, I can tell you, are the manuscript
10	notes of Jim Wright, because Jim Wright was
11	actually responsible for the production of the
12	chronology.
13	That is correct?
14	MR. GOULD: I don't recall.
15	MR. DAVID: No, but that
16	Mr. Wright was in charge of
17	MR. GOULD: I don't recall.
18	MR. DAVID: You don't recall.
19	MR. GOULD: GMR was doing it
20	excuse me. GMR was compiling it, putting it
21	together. Now, whether they were doing that on
22	behalf of Mr. Wright or Mr. McNee, their ADM, I'm
23	not sure.
24	MR. DAVID: That's fine. We have
25	testimony to that effect.

1	MR. GOULD: Good.
2	MR. DAVID: I simply note that at
3	tab 7, the version of the chronology at page 14
4	stops, and it stops on July 22nd, '03. So we
5	don't have the benefit of Mr. Wright's comments on
6	July 30th or after, thereafter.
7	And then we have the final version
8	of the chronology at tab 8. And if you go to
9	page 16, you'll see that the entry for July
10	30th I'm sorry. The entry for the phone call,
11	in terms of the events for July 30th, is not
12	referenced.
13	MR. GOULD: Okay.
14	MR. DAVID: Do you have any
15	knowledge, Mr. Gould, as to why it was who
16	decided to exclude it?
17	MR. GOULD: No idea. No, I do
18	not.
19	MR. DAVID: And do you know why it
20	was decided to be excluded? Who
21	MR. GOULD: No, only in the sense
22	it was no longer relevant. The memo had gone.
23	Whatever the discussion was, whatever the phone
24	call was about, the memo was up, gone, finished.
25	MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are

1	my questions, Mr. Gould.
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. It's
3	12:30, and we'll take the lunch break.
4	Just before we do, two things: If
5	the lawyers, counsel could look at I may have
6	made a misstatement to you, Ms Edwardh. In tab 4
7	of P-237, you will recall that you asked, down at
8	the bottom of the second page, the 16th of
9	December, 2002, providing the translated
10	transcript, and we had a discussion about that. I
11	had expressed certain views. Ms McIsaac had as
12	well.
13	It's pointed out to me that at
14	tab 5, if you turn over to page 7 of 12 in tab 5,
15	the second entry from the bottom is that same
16	date. So we're at the 16th of December, 2002, and
17	it refers to:
18	237, tab 5, p.7"In response to
19	a request for a debriefing on
20	the CSIS visit to Damascus,
21	CSIS provides a report
22	summarizing what appears to
23	be information provided to
24	SMI by Arar under
25	interrogation."

1	So that I'm not sure how one
2	reconciles the two entries, but I thought I
3	don't think it's necessarily as clear as I had
4	indicated to you, but I'm just not sure. I
5	just simply bring it to your attention.
6	MS EDWARDH: Well, thank you,
7	Mr. Commissioner, because it was a matter I was
8	hoping to discuss with Commission counsel because
9	I had failed to point out to you if you go to
10	tab 4, at the very top of the chronology, that
11	subsequently refers to December 16th, it starts
12	with an undated three-paragraph translation.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
14	MS EDWARDH: And it seems to me
15	unlikely it's the same document being referred to
16	at the bottom of the page.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: In any event, I
18	wanted to bring that to your attention, and I'll
19	let you make of it what you will.
20	MS EDWARDH: Thank you.
21	THE COMMISSIONER: The second
22	point is that there are the two transcripts being
23	prepared. I don't know how your time we were
24	going to just take an hour for lunch, but if you'd
25	like longer in order to read that let me ask

1	counsel how long we're likely to be. We have to
2	finish today.
3	MS EDWARDH: I understand.
4	THE COMMISSIONER: We have
5	Ms McCallion. How long do you think you'll be in
6	chief with Ms McCallion?
7	MR. DAVID: I'd say between 30 and
8	45 minutes?
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, then, I
10	think we're fine.
11	Is an hour long enough, or would
12	you like more
13	MS EDWARDH: Could we have an hour
14	and 15 minutes? It will allow us to both grab
15	something to eat and review the materials.
16	THE COMMISSIONER: It's
17	twenty-five to one now. We will resume at ten to
18	two.
19	MS McISAAC: Sir, I have not yet
20	received confirmation that both transcripts are
21	ready, but
22	THE COMMISSIONER: If they're not,
23	then we'll follow Plan B.
24	MS McISAAC: Because we had to
25	obtain Mr. Dyet's as well because we didn't have

1	the full transcript
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. I
3	appreciate
4	MS McISAAC: And part of
5	Mr. Gould's.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: I appreciate,
7	Ms McIsaac, the assistance you're giving us. It's
8	one of those situations that come up.
9	If they're not ready, we'll go to
10	the other plan, and somehow we'll manage.
11	In any event, we'll resume at ten
12	to two.
13	MR. DAVID: Ten minutes to two?
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
15	MR. DAVID: All right. Thank you.
16	THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
17	Upon recessing at 12:35 p.m. /
18	Suspension à 12 h 35
19	Upon resuming at 1:51 p.m. /
20	Reprise à 13 h 52
21	THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
22	Veuillez vous asseoir.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: Ms Edwardh?
24	MS EDWARDH: Thank you,
25	Mr. Commissioner. I wonder if I could just make

1	this observation.
2	I was handed about 30 seconds ago
3	a transcript from Ms McIsaac, and it is the
4	transcript in relation to Ms McCallion.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
6	MS EDWARDH: It runs from 14609 to
7	14687, which is about 80 pages, and while I am
8	sometimes a quick read, I'm not nearly that quick.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Fair enough.
LO	MS EDWARDH: I understand the
L1	other transcript is in the course of preparation.
L2	I'm in your hands, of course. I
L3	am ready to commence my cross-examination, and
L4	maybe would ask for an opportunity to look at
L5	Mr. Gould's transcript when it is done, just to
L6	see that I've covered everything that I need to
L7	cover.
L8	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. The
L9	other one was Mr. Gould's, okay. Why don't we
20	finish the cross-examinations and any other
21	examinations. We will take a break for you to
22	look at the two transcripts, as long as you need,
23	and then we will call Ms McCallion.
24	MS EDWARDH: Thank you. I promise
0.5	to read quickly

1	MS McISAAC: Sir, if I might just
2	make one observation, I spoke at the lunch hour to
3	both Ms Edwardh and Mr. David. I personally felt
4	rather uncomfortable being given the task of
5	deciding which portions of these transcripts were
6	in fact relevant. It will probably come as no
7	surprise that I've taken a narrow view of
8	relevance.
9	I did that actually for the very
10	specific reason in some cases because it avoided
11	issues of National Security Confidentiality where
12	I would have had to consult.
13	What I had suggested is that, in
14	the days following, your counsel take a look at my
15	choices, they identify additional materials that
16	they believe ought to be to give context to what's
17	there. We will take a look at that as well.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: And we will
19	address it if there have been any problem.
20	Is that satisfactory to you,
21	Mr. David?
22	MR. DAVID: That is correct,
23	Mr. Commissioner. Everybody is working in pretty
24	tight circumstances right now.
25	THE COMMISSIONER: Mostly,

StenoTran

1	Mr. David. I guess you are, but
2	Laughter / Rires
3	THE COMMISSIONER: No, just
4	kidding. Sure, okay. Let's go ahead on that
5	basis.
6	MS EDWARDH: Thank you,
7	Mr. Commissioner.
8	EXAMINATION
9	MS EDWARDH: I should call you
LO	Dr. Gould. Is that correct?
L1	MR. GOULD: No, I don't use it.
L2	MS EDWARDH: Okay. I want to just
L3	ask you a little bit about your earlier
L4	involvement in this case, Mr. Arar's case.
L5	I take it that you had some
L6	consultative arrangements with A-OCANADA and
L7	therefore had become aware of Mr. Arar as early as
L8	July 29th, 2002?
L9	MR. GOULD: Yes. We asked for a
20	briefing, just sort of after the events of
21	9/11, there were a variety of individuals started
22	to come to our attention. We asked for a briefing
23	as to who were people of concern, what was
24	happening, and I think that is how his name came
25	up as one of in that briefing, he was one of

1	several, if I recall correctly.
2	MS EDWARDH: And that briefing was
3	provided by?
4	MR. GOULD: I'm not sure, I'm
5	sorry.
6	MS EDWARDH: A-OCANADA. Do you
7	know whether it was Cabana himself, Inspector
8	Cabana?
9	MR. GOULD: I do not recall. It
10	may well have been, but I'm not sure.
11	MS EDWARDH: And in respect of the
12	purpose of your involvement, although you may have
13	asked for a briefing and I take it the members
14	of A-OCANADA provided you with some of the details
15	of their investigation post-9/11?
16	MR. GOULD: Almost no details of
17	an investigation to my knowledge were ever passed
18	over.
19	MS EDWARDH: They provided you
20	with names of people who were targets?
21	MR. GOULD: People who were of
22	interest. They confirmed that people were of
23	interest, that sort of thing, but we didn't get
24	details of the investigation.
25	MS EDWARDH: What would be the

1	purpose of providing that information to the
2	Department of Foreign Affairs?
3	MR. GOULD: We are talking about
4	people who were abroad. So they were either
5	consular cases, or potential consular cases, or
6	might come to the attention of our missions
7	abroad, that sort of thing.
8	Certainly we weren't getting
9	information we didn't ask for and didn't
10	receive information about people in Canada.
11	MS EDWARDH: And so you would have
12	then been told that sometime in June 2002 no,
13	excuse me.
14	So you would have been told that
15	Mr. Arar was believed to be in Tunisia in July
16	2002 and had recently left Canada?
17	MR. GOULD: I don't recall the
18	details of how much I was told. It was very
19	little.
20	MS EDWARDH: All right.
21	MR. GOULD: I mean, the note that
22	is in my notes, there is one handwritten squib, I
23	think.
24	MS EDWARDH: I'm not sure I have
25	that squib.

1	MR. GOULD: Excuse me, could I
2	I thought that is where it came from. Maybe I'm
3	wrong.
4	The first no, I guess it's not
5	there, unless it's
6	MS EDWARDH: Could it be in tab 2?
7	MR. DAVID: Tab 2, perhaps page 1
8	of 6.
9	MS EDWARDH: I hope that
10	clarifies.
11	MR. GOULD: Yes, that's "RCMP". I
12	can't read the first word, "for their info. We
13	are having our people seek" something.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: "Consular"?
15	MR. GOULD: "Seek consular".
16	That's probably after he was
17	MS EDWARDH: July 29th.
18	MR. GOULD: I'm not sure what that
19	is in aid of, I'm sorry, because that is before
20	Mr. Arar was sent off, I think.
21	MS EDWARDH: Certainly.
22	Considerably before.
23	MR. GOULD: It was that sort of
24	information. Almost nothing.
25	MS EDWARDH: There is certainly

1	nothing in that note that would confirm that
2	Mr. Arar's name was given to you on that day.
3	MR. GOULD: No. And I don't know
4	where that came from. I thought that that's where
5	that was from. Perhaps I'm mistaken.
6	MS EDWARDH: You could be mistaken
7	with respect to that, and it could have been the
8	names of other persons?
9	MR. GOULD: It could indeed have
10	been.
11	MS EDWARDH: Now, did you have an
12	ongoing relationship of consultation with
13	A-OCANADA?
14	MR. GOULD: No, not excuse me.
15	I attended, if I recall correctly,
16	two or three part-sessions I did not attend the
17	entire sessions of the task force meetings.
18	Colleagues attended, I think, one other, perhaps
19	two others, so it was not a long ongoing regular
20	consultation in that sense.
21	MS EDWARDH: And was there any
22	purpose from your perspective of your
23	participation in what was a police investigation?
24	What were you contributing to it?
25	MR. GOULD: We probably only

1	contributed that information that would have been
2	received from the embassy in Damascus: items,
3	diplomatic reports on his state or the latest
4	consultations with General Khalil, something like
5	that.
6	MS EDWARDH: Were you aware or
7	privy to Mr. Pardy's decision to pass on consular
8	visit notes?
9	MR. GOULD: No. I was not aware
10	of it, nor would I be privy to it.
11	MS EDWARDH: Were you aware or
12	privy to were you aware of the fact that CSIS
13	came into possession of certain consular notes?
14	MR. GOULD: No.
15	MS EDWARDH: Notes of visits with
16	Mr. Arar
17	MR. GOULD: I believe they were
18	copied or we shared with them. I would have to
19	see the documents to see if they were copied by
20	the mission, or whether we shared with them. But
21	we may have shared parts of those reports from the
22	post.
23	I can't recall an example of where
24	I did that or where that was done.
25	MS EDWARDH: We have heard

1	evidence that at least there are, leaving aside
2	the RCMP, there are two consular notes written
3	MR. GOULD: From the CAMANT notes?
4	Is that what you mean by consular notes?
5	MS EDWARDH: Yes, they record the
6	contents of a consular visit with Mr. Arar, and
7	are written by Leo Martel
8	MR. GOULD: Okay, no, I did not
9	have access to those myself and I didn't see them.
10	MS EDWARDH: And you would have
11	had no knowledge that they were placed in CSIS
12	hands?
13	MR. GOULD: I certainly. No, I
14	don't know no.
15	MS EDWARDH: And were you aware of
16	any system within the department whereby approval
17	could be given for release of those notes to other
18	interested entities like CSIS? And who, from your
19	perspective, would be the person to give that
20	approval if you were going to seek the release of
21	those notes to someone like the RCMP or CSIS?
22	MR. GOULD: If
23	MS EDWARDH: Let me give you
24	MR. GOULD: I would in the first
25	instance refer to JPD, Gar Pardy, and quite

1	possibly to the lawyers. I would take advice from
2	the Director General first, and then after that
3	consultation I may have gone to the departmental
4	lawyers.
5	But I don't recall it ever having
6	come up.
7	MS EDWARDH: All right. And so
8	while you were, if I can for want of a better
9	term, the manager of the liaison both with RCMP
10	and CSIS and DFAIT, I take it you were never
11	involved in any process whereby information of
12	that kind flowed either to the RCMP or to CSIS?
13	MR. GOULD: Coming out of the
14	CAMANT notes, no, not that I recall.
15	MS EDWARDH: I would like to go,
16	just for clarification, to your discussion with
17	Inspector Cabana.
18	MR. GOULD: Okay.
19	MS EDWARDH: I take it that your
20	knowledge of him, sir, arose because of your
21	contacts with A-OCANADA and that was a formal
22	relationship?
23	MR. GOULD: He had approached me
24	some time earlier. We had dealt with another
25	matter on another case. I presume successfully

1	So when it came up that we discovered that there
2	was an A-OCANADA task force that was following
3	these individuals on whom we were certainly having
4	an interest because they were becoming or
5	potentially consular cases, I said, "Well,
6	Mr. Cabana is running it or on it. I will call
7	him." I knew him. I called him.
8	MS EDWARDH: So you call
9	Mr. Cabana, I take it as best you can recall, the
10	first time when you make your note about Mr. Arar
11	has been confirmed
12	MR. GOULD: In this context. As I
13	say, there had been previous contexts.
14	MS EDWARDH: But in this
15	context
16	MR. GOULD: Some months before.
17	MS EDWARDH: In this context, this
18	is the first occasion, and you make the overture
19	to Inspector Cabana to let him know that Arar has
20	now been identified as being confirmed as being
21	in Damascus?
22	MR. GOULD: It sounds strange that
23	I would have phoned; but just, by the way, we
24	haven't spoken on this issue before, but you might
25	like to know that he is there.

1	I would guess I must have spoken
2	to him before, but I have no memory of it and no
3	record of it, I don't believe, that I know of.
4	MS EDWARDH: You are talking a
5	little bit to yourself there. I take it you have
6	no memory or record of a prior conversation about
7	Mr. Arar's whereabouts?
8	MR. GOULD: That's right. Before
9	the one that is recorded there.
10	MS EDWARDH: So the only record we
11	have suggests that you made the telephone call?
12	MR. GOULD: Yes.
13	MS EDWARDH: Although you are
14	surprised that you would have made that call?
15	MR. GOULD: Yes, not having
16	unless there had been previous conversations like,
17	"Do you know where he is? Oh, we don't know where
18	he is. Do you know where he is?" Sort of thing.
19	MS EDWARDH: Did you receive
20	instructions to communicate that information to
21	Inspector Cabana?
22	MR. GOULD: No idea. I don't
23	recall.
24	MS EDWARDH: In any event, the net
25	effect of it, the issue I wish to pursue, you have

1	described the three questions: Is he wanted in
2	Canada?
3	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
4	MS EDWARDH: And just so I can
5	confirm it, I'm having trouble reading your
6	writing, sir, my apologies.
7	MR. GOULD: No, no. I have
8	trouble reading my writing, so don't apologize.
9	MS EDWARDH: That's comforting.
LO	The answer "Is he wanted in Canada?" is "no".
L1	MR. GOULD: Is he wanted in
L2	Canada. Why if so, why? And will charges be
L3	laid?
L 4	MS EDWARDH: The first question,
L5	did you ask that of Inspector Cabana?
L6	MR. GOULD: Yes, I did.
L7	MS EDWARDH: And by using the term
L8	"wanted", would I be correct that you were asking
L9	were there allegations that would give rise to
20	charges against Mr. Arar? That's what "wanted"
21	means. Either there is a warrant or there could
22	be a warrant.
23	MR. GOULD: I think perhaps you
24	are seeing a non-legal person using words more
25	less correctly than you or Mr. Cabana would have,

1	but that's "is he wanted?" Are you
2	investigating him? Are you looking for him? You
3	know, are you
4	MS EDWARDH: So it's broader
5	than
6	MR. GOULD: Broader than the legal
7	term, definition, you just gave it.
8	MS EDWARDH: And his answer
9	MR. GOULD: I think I included the
10	legal in the third question, which is: "Will
11	charges be laid?"
12	MS EDWARDH: And what was his
13	answer again to the first one, is he being
14	investigated, or do you want him here, or
15	whatever?
16	MR. GOULD: As I read my notes, he
17	came up in an investigation, but it's a long way
18	from any charges. They are still trying to find
19	out who he is. They would like to talk to him.
20	Problem is association.
21	MS EDWARDH: So he conveyed to
22	you, at least from his perspective, that the
23	problem was not any knowledge of Mr. Arar's
24	activities themselves but rather his connection to
25	persons?

1	MR. GOULD: That is my reading of
2	my note, so I would think you are probably
3	correct.
4	MS EDWARDH: Inspector Cabana also
5	answered implicitly, "will charges be laid", by
6	saying really there are no charges in sight.
7	That's your understanding?
8	MR. GOULD: That is my
9	understanding that was my understanding.
10	MS EDWARDH: But he does make the
11	offer to provide evidence or information from
12	their investigation to the Syrians?
13	Pause
14	MR. GOULD: My notes, as I have
15	them before me, don't confirm that, but they imply
16	that.
17	MS EDWARDH: Yes. They
18	certainly and your recollection?
19	MR. GOULD: About the same.
20	MS EDWARDH: Okay. But then there
21	is other evidence, sir, that suggests that such an
22	openness to the sharing of information about
23	Mr. Arar was there for the RCMP.
24	So the question really is: Once
25	this is on your plate, what steps, if any, do you

1	take to inform the relevant persons that such a
2	sharing from the RCMP perspective is at least on
3	the table?
4	MR. GOULD: I would have informed
5	Messrs. Heatherington and Livermore, and almost
6	certainly Mr. Pardy, but I can't guarantee that 99
7	per cent. I was gathering information on this
8	occasion in order to provide information to our
9	Ambassador in Damascus who was going to meet a
10	senior representative of the
11	MS EDWARDH: General Khalil?
12	MR. GOULD: It was General Khalil.
13	Probably.
14	I would guess I don't recall
15	that I phoned Ambassador Pillarella. I would
16	guess that it was probably Mr. Livermore who did
17	so, although I may have. I don't recall.
18	MS EDWARDH: You can't exclude
19	that as being
20	MR. GOULD: I cannot exclude it.
21	But I would certainly think those two at least,
22	and probably Mr. Pardy. But I can't confirm it.
23	MS EDWARDH: All right. So
24	assuming that once you have in your hands this
25	information that the RCMP is prepared to share

1	this, isn't that, sir, exactly the kind of
2	information that the Ambassador would want to have
3	for his meeting with General Khalil that is
4	upcoming in the next day or so?
5	MR. GOULD: I would think that
6	although I went seeking information about Mr. Arar
7	specifically, to give him context and background,
8	yes, he would like to know that.
9	MS EDWARDH: Certainly, because he
10	is going to meet the General. Mr. Arar is in
11	detention in Syria, and the RCMP are in theory
12	offering, at least, to provide information to the
13	Syrians that they may find of relevance to their
14	own investigation.
15	I mean, isn't that the sum and
16	total of it?
17	MR. GOULD: As you say, so it
18	would seem.
19	MS EDWARDH: And I take it that it
20	would have been either your job or someone to whom
21	you report to let the Ambassador know that that
22	was on the table?
23	MR. GOULD: Yes, in the context of
24	the other information on Mr. Arar himself, yes.
25	MS EDWARDH: Yes.

1	MR. GOULD: Okay.
2	MS EDWARDH: You are not
3	uncomfortable with that conclusion.
4	MR. GOULD: No, no.
5	MS EDWARDH: And do you know, sir,
6	should the Ambassador have passed on that general
7	offer to Syrian Military Intelligence or General
8	Khalil, thereafter would the information have
9	flowed through your good offices or would the
10	information have flowed directly then to the
11	Ambassador or through the LO Rome or some other
12	circuit?
13	MR. GOULD: I had no idea if the
14	offer was made. If the Ambassador even raised
15	that, he may have it may have been sufficiently
16	vague that he didn't feel comfortable raising the
17	prospect of sharing information.
18	As you say, I think you said there
19	is other information which implies that he did
20	know this or
21	MS EDWARDH: I'm going to leave
22	that aside.
23	MR. GOULD: Okay. The information
24	almost certainly would have gone through their LO.
25	MS FDWAPDH: Their LO being the

1	liaison officer in Rome?
2	MR. GOULD: I'm sorry, the liaison
3	officer in Rome.
4	MS EDWARDH: And that would be the
5	CSIS liaison
6	MR. GOULD: No, the RCMP liaison.
7	MS EDWARDH: The RCMP liaison
8	officer in Rome.
9	MR. GOULD: Is it Rome?
10	MS EDWARDH: Yes, I think we now
11	know that. And so that would be the ordinary
12	channel.
13	So if the Ambassador had made the
14	suggestion, then indeed if it had been accepted
15	and we will leave the Commissioner to determine
16	what did happen, but the route that it would go is
17	through LO Rome?
18	MR. GOULD: Probably.
19	MS EDWARDH: Not back through ISI
20	or ISD?
21	MR. GOULD: It could have gone
22	that way, but it is more likely to have gone
23	police force to police force, but
24	MS EDWARDH: Now, to the best of
25	your knowledge, I take it you have no recollection

1	or there is no record that any RCMP information
2	flowed through the Department of Foreign Affairs
3	to Syrian Military Intelligence?
4	MR. GOULD: Correct.
5	MS EDWARDH: And is that also the
6	case of any information that may have somehow been
7	reposed in ISI or ISD? Nothing went to Syrian
8	Military Intelligence?
9	MR. GOULD: From us?
10	MS EDWARDH: Yes.
11	MR. GOULD: No.
12	MS EDWARDH: Were you aware, sir,
13	of information that flowed from CSIS through DFAIT
14	to Syrian Military Intelligence?
15	MR. GOULD: No
16	MS McISAAC: May I take a moment
17	just to consult on whether that question may be
18	answered?
19	Pause
20	MS McISAAC: My instructions are
21	that we are refusing to confirm or deny whether or
22	not any information travelled from CSIS to the
23	Syrian authorities.
24	MS EDWARDH: That's not the
25	question, though. It has travelled from CSIS to

1	DFAIT to be transmitted to the Syrian authorities.
2	MS McISAAC: The objection would
3	apply to that question or an answer to that
4	question as well.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
6	MS EDWARDH: Mr. Gould, I take it
7	when Inspector Cabana made this offer, that the
8	RCMP were prepared to share the fruits of their
9	own investigation with Syrian military, that was a
10	fairly unusual offer from your perspective to be
11	told about?
12	MR. GOULD: It's unusual, yes. I
13	don't have the wording before me of his offer and
14	I don't know what the reference is, but it's
15	certainly unusual.
16	MS EDWARDH: Right. I am going to
17	suggest to you, sir, that you weren't aware of
18	other cases, leaving aside the names, where you at
19	least, or ISI and ISD, had been conduits for
20	police information to foreign intelligence
21	agencies?
22	MR. GOULD: Can I answer this or
23	does it fall under the excuse me.
24	Can I speak to my counsel or
25	Ms McIsaac?

1	THE COMMISSIONER: Ms McIsaac?
2	MS McISAAC: I'm sorry, sir, I
3	have no idea what the answer would be, so I'm
4	having some difficulty here.
5	If it deals with other
6	individuals, I have some difficulty, and out of an
7	abundance of caution I have to say that if we are
8	dealing with whether or not ISI or ISD facilitated
9	the transfer of policing information to other
10	police or security authorities in respect of other
11	individuals, I would first argue that it is not
12	relevant, and out of an abundance of caution I
13	would have to take the position that we claim
14	national security with respect to any answer
15	relating to that.
16	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
17	MS EDWARDH: If the offer, as I've
18	described it although I appreciate you are not
19	precisely clear, there certainly is other evidence
20	that such an offer was made for the sharing of
21	information in respect of Mr. Arar.
22	What I wanted to simply ask you is
23	this: To your knowledge, was there ever any
24	discussion with Inspector Cabana's superiors or
25	anyone between yourself or anyone else in DFAIT

1	about the propriety of such a sharing?
2	MR. GOULD: Not to my knowledge.
3	MS EDWARDH: Were you ever
4	consulted one way or the other about DFAIT's
5	perspective on the sharing of police investigative
6	information with entities like Syrian Military
7	Intelligence?
8	MR. GOULD: Not to my knowledge.
9	MS EDWARDH: So as someone who was
10	on the policy side, and someone who also watched
11	over the relationships between CSIS and the RCMP
12	and DFAIT, do I take it then you were never
13	specifically asked to give advice about whether or
14	not such sharing carried with it certain risks
15	attached for the individual who might be the
16	subject of investigation, if they were detained in
17	Syria?
18	MR. GOULD: I do not recall ever
19	being so asked.
20	MS EDWARDH: And hypothetically,
21	sir, if you had been asked the question about
22	whether a Canadian citizen who is being detained
23	by Syrian Military Intelligence, and who is under
24	investigation by Canadian police forces should be
25	a nergon whose information is shared with Syrian

1	Military Intelligence, would you have had any
2	advice to offer about the risks associated with
3	such information-sharing?
4	MR. GOULD: You want my comments
5	on the propriety of it, the legality of it, or the
6	risks associated with it?
7	MS EDWARDH: The risks associated
8	with it.
9	MR. GOULD: Had I been asked
LO	and I do not recall being asked I believe I
L1	would have said that there would be some risk to
L2	the individual, just because the enforcement of
L3	laws in Syria is rather more rigorous than it is
L4	in Canada, physically rigorous.
L5	MS EDWARDH: Physically rigorous.
L6	Let me just explore that a bit further.
L7	This would be particularly the
L8	case if in fact the person was being detained
L9	without charge and there being no trial in sight,
20	simply being detained?
21	MR. GOULD: No difference.
22	MS EDWARDH: No different? So am
23	I correct, sir, that the risks that you would have
24	identified would have been both the risks
25	associated with a much more severe penalty, as

1	well as the risks of the use of force during
2	interrogation?
3	MR. GOULD: I would have been
4	concerned about the use of aggressive or rigorous
5	questioning tactics, you know, however you want to
6	call them. I worry about the terminology, but I
7	think you understand what I mean.
8	MS EDWARDH: I understand what you
9	mean. And that language
LO	MR. GOULD: Strictly hypothetical
L1	I was never asked
L2	MS EDWARDH: I know. I clearly
L3	understand that, sir. And I want to assure you
L4	there is no document that suggests you were asked.
L5	MR. GOULD: Okay, good.
L6	MS EDWARDH: But it just seems to
L7	me that you are simply one of those persons who
L8	could have opined about the risks and were about
L9	the business of managing those two entities, CSIS
20	and RCMP, in their relationship with DFAIT.
21	And so when you use the term
22	"aggressive interrogation", just so there is no
23	illusion here, hypothetically such interrogation
24	could involve the use of torture?
25	MR. GOULD: I don't know at what

1	line torture starts but certainly physical force,
2	violence.
3	MS EDWARDH: In the course of
4	interrogation?
5	MR. GOULD: In the course of an
6	interrogation.
7	MS EDWARDH: And had then you been
8	asked hypothetically, you would have alerted
9	Inspector Cabana or CSIS that one of the concerns
10	that they would have to factor into any decision
11	is that that kind of interrogation was a
12	possibility, if you had been asked.
13	MR. GOULD: Had I been asked, I
14	would like to think I would, but that's yes.
15	MS EDWARDH: Yes. I mean, that's
16	what you said.
17	MR. GOULD: Yes.
18	MS EDWARDH: Let me go on then, if
19	I could, Mr. Gould. I just want to take you, if I
20	could, to the little volume of documents that is
21	associated with your testimony, Exhibit 237.
22	Do you have that there?
23	MR. GOULD: 237?
24	MS EDWARDH: Yes. And in
25	particular I would like you to turn to tab 5

1	page 7. I would like you, sir, to look at the
2	date, $16/12/02$, which is at page 7.
3	MR. GOULD: Yes.
4	MS EDWARDH: And the entry reads:
5	"In response to a request for
6	a debriefing on the CSIS
7	visit to Damascus, CSIS
8	provides a report summarizing
9	what appears to be
10	information provided to
11	Syrian Military Intelligence
12	by Arar under interrogation."
13	Do you see that reference?
14	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
15	MS EDWARDH: Is there anything
16	wrong with that statement? Is it factually
17	accurate or is it accurate?
18	MS McISAAC: Mr. Commissioner, we
19	have taken the position on a number of occasions
20	that details of what transpired during the CSIS
21	visit to Damascus is a matter of a claim for
22	National Security Confidentiality, and I would
23	object to the witness answering any questions in
24	this area in terms of the national security
25	implications of any answer he might he able to

1	give.
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I
3	understand that, and if there is an objection,
4	there is an objection. But there is no claim over
5	this statement. Is there an objection to simply
6	asking I understood the question was just is
7	this statement correct?
8	MS EDWARDH: That's correct,
9	Mr. Commissioner.
10	MS McISAAC: It's one of those
11	difficult areas, sir, where we keep we can't
12	tell the whole story in public. We are not
13	telling the whole story in public, and these
14	little snippets, in my submission, end up being
15	rather misleading for most people.
16	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I know
17	the whole story.
18	MS McISAAC: I know you do, sir.
19	But we are doing this for other reasons.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: I don't want to
21	quibble, but I have a hard time understanding how
22	answering that question would be misleading
23	because of anything that was in camera.
24	MS McISAAC: As long as the
25	witness is confined to a statement as to whether

1	that is accurate or not and we don't get into the
2	details going beyond that.
3	THE COMMISSIONER: When I saw it
4	and I raised it before the lunch hour, that is
5	what was in my mind.
6	MS EDWARDH: Well, that's why I'm
7	doing this, Mr. Commissioner, because I have taken
8	the witness to the next tab where the reference to
9	this date is a little different, and I want to
10	know which is correct.
11	I am troubled by my friend's
12	statement, you know, little bits get us into
13	trouble. Well, all Mr. Arar has is what you give
14	us in this forum, Mr. Commissioner, and I'm
15	content to pursue little bits, if that's all I
16	get.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: The answer is,
18	you can ask if that statement is correct.
19	And you can answer that question.
20	MS EDWARDH: Mr. Gould, I have
21	taken you to tab 5, and I am looking particularly
22	at page 7, under the date December 16th, 2002.
23	First of all, there is a reference
24	"TS". Can I ask what "TS" means?
25	MR. GOULD: Top secret.

1	MS EDWARDH: I see. All right.
2	Then it says:
3	"In response to a request for
4	a debriefing on the CSIS
5	visit to Damascus, CSIS
6	provides a report summarizing
7	what appears to be
8	information provided to
9	Syrian Military Intelligence
10	by Arar under interrogation."
11	Sir, to the best of your
12	knowledge, is that statement true or false?
13	MR. GOULD: To the best of my
14	knowledge, it is true. But it's to the best of my
15	knowledge. I cannot recall.
16	MS EDWARDH: You don't have all
17	the records in front of you, but is there anything
18	that you can identify as incorrect about that
19	assertion?
20	MR. GOULD: No.
21	MS EDWARDH: Thank you.
22	I must admit, Mr. Gould, and I'm
23	going to ask you to help us, we have heard that as
24	of June 5th we have heard evidence, and I'm not
25	suggesting it came from you, but as of June 5th

1	there had been a consensus and resolution reached
2	that led to a memorandum in support of a letter
3	that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was to write
4	and that really finished off the kind of
5	difficulties or institutional friction that
6	existed between DFAIT and the Mounties and CSIS.
7	Even with that sign-off, sir, on
8	June 5th, and the consultation process that had
9	gone on, it's clear, is it not, that there were
10	and this leads to your memorandum. But it's clear
11	that there were ongoing concerns and I'm going
12	to call it conflict, in the broadest sense
13	between the RCMP and CSIS and DFAIT about the
14	course of action that should be followed in
15	Mr. Arar's case, and what CSIS and the RCMP could
16	or would not agree with?
17	MR. GOULD: In my mind, there was
18	the potential for more friction.
19	MS EDWARDH: We will come to your
20	mind in a little bit.
21	But it was quite clear, too, that
22	that was not you just operating in isolation of
23	your colleagues. It is my understanding, sir,
24	that Mr. Heatherington shared your concerns.
25	MR. GOULD: You would have to ask

1	Mr. Heatherington that, I'm sorry. I haven't read
2	his testimony.
3	MS EDWARDH: Well, let me take you
4	to tab 4 in these materials, and there is a brief
5	outline. It is tab 4, page 3 of 3.
6	Well after the June 5th memo is
7	cleared through the Deputy Minister's office,
8	there is a reference to a June 18th, 2003,
9	proposal from ISI which I believe comes from
10	Mr. Heatherington to Gar Pardy, struggling
11	again with the language of a possible draft. So
12	we are now two weeks after the deputy signed off.
13	What is being proposed by ISI is
14	language that is designed to suit the interests of
15	the RCMP.
16	Do you see that?
17	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
18	MS EDWARDH: Now, first of all, I
19	am correct, am I not, to suggest that when ISI
20	proposed that language to Mr. Pardy, it was in aid
21	of a continuing attempt to bring the RCMP and CSIS
22	into some kind of formal letter?
23	MR. GOULD: I really don't recall.
24	MS EDWARDH: You don't recall.
25	MR. GOULD: I do not recall.

1	MS EDWARDH: Certainly the date of
2	this suggests that June 5th was not the end of the
3	matter?
4	MR. GOULD: That would be
5	suggested by the dates.
6	MS EDWARDH: And of course
7	Inspector Cabana testified that language which
8	indicated that Mr. Arar was the subject of a
9	national security investigation, et cetera, was
10	recognized I'm sorry, it wasn't Inspector
11	Cabana. It was Mr. Loeppky who testified that he
12	appreciated that that language would be
13	counterproductive to effecting Mr. Arar's release.
14	Do you agree that the use of that
15	language in a letter to the Syrians would be
16	counterproductive to effecting Mr. Arar's release?
17	MR. GOULD: I don't know enough
18	about the case to be able to make a judgment call.
19	I really don't.
20	MS EDWARDH: You are certain about
21	that?
22	MR. GOULD: Yes.
23	MS EDWARDH: You were asked a
24	whole series of questions about how the telephone
25	call vanished from the chronologies, and let me

1	just understand your evidence, sir.
2	I take it you yourself did not
3	remove the telephone call.
4	MR. GOULD: No.
5	MS EDWARDH: You yourself would
6	have chosen to put the call in had you been
7	drafting the chronology?
8	MR. GOULD: Yes.
9	MS EDWARDH: And who was it that
10	removed the telephone call, to the best of your
11	knowledge?
12	MR. GOULD: I do not know. Do not
13	know.
14	MS EDWARDH: Do you know if that
15	was within the Department of Foreign Affairs or
16	was it after a I don't know. Or PCO? Any
17	knowledge about where it disappeared?
18	MR. GOULD: This was a
19	departmental chronology. I would therefore assume
20	it was someone in the department or it was a
21	decision taken in the department.
22	MS EDWARDH: All right. Now, I
23	take it the removal of that didn't cause you to
24	make any objection about the reliability of the
25	chronology?

1	MR. GOULD: No.
2	MS EDWARDH: You were still
3	prepared to sign off on it?
4	MR. GOULD: Yes.
5	MS EDWARDH: One of the things
6	that puzzles me is not only is the call not
7	mentioned when it disappears from the chronology,
8	but as I read the chronologies, the call
9	disappears, a lengthy discussion with CSIS and the
10	RCMP to try and forge an agreement disappears, the
11	memo on June 5th going up to the deputy
12	disappears, and that's all just taken out of the
13	chronology.
14	And if you would just like to take
15	a moment to take a look do you agree with that?
16	MR. GOULD: I will take your word
17	for it.
18	MS EDWARDH: Well, no, I don't
19	want you to take my word. I'm not testifying,
20	sir. I may be making suggestions and I want you
21	to satisfy yourself.
22	Certainly we can start by looking
23	at the very last chronology.
24	THE COMMISSIONER: That's tab 8?
25	MS EDWARDH: Which is tab 8. It

1	is the final chronology.
2	The way I read it, this whole
3	series of meetings from May 5th to June 5th, and
4	the letter that is so much the subject of concern
5	just doesn't exist in here, unless I have misread
6	something.
7	MR. GOULD: There is certainly a
8	reference on the 18th to an agreed text to be used
9	in a ministerial letter.
LO	MS EDWARDH: You help me with
L1	this.
L2	MR. GOULD: Page 15 of 19, tab 8.
L3	MS EDWARDH: Fifteen.
L4	MR. GOULD: Fifteen of 19, under
L5	18 June '03, under TS it's got an acronym. And
L6	there is reference to a
L7	MS EDWARDH: Well, the problem
L8	that's so kind of let me stop about this.
L9	When CSIS and the RCMP provide an
20	agreed text, it's June 18th.
21	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
22	MS EDWARDH: The attempt to get an
23	agreement is long gone because the Deputy Minister
24	or Assistant Deputy Minister has signed off. It
25	appears, from what we have heard, that everything

1	was honky dory with CSIS, and the RCMP say, no, go
2	write a letter that doesn't mention us.
3	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
4	MS EDWARDH: There is no mention
5	here we will try it in small bits.
6	There is no mention in this
7	chronology of the meetings held to discuss an
8	agreed text that occurred in May, is there?
9	MR. GOULD: Correct.
LO	MS EDWARDH: There is no mention
L1	that on June 5th Mr. Pardy signed off and placed
12	on Ms McCallion's desk a document which
L3	recommended to the Minister that he write his own
L4	letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in
L5	Syria? No mention of that?
L6	MR. GOULD: Correct.
L7	MS EDWARDH: No mention of the
L8	alleged phone call between Mr. Hooper and
L9	Ms McCallion where Mr. Hooper is alleged to have
20	made remarks about CSIS's concerns?
21	MR. GOULD: Correct.
22	MS EDWARDH: And when you read
23	this chronology, sir, one of the remarkable things
24	about it and we haven't really addressed it
25	is if on June 5th Ms McCallion is recommending to

1	the Deputy, and the Deputy is recommending to the
2	Minister, we all of course know that the Minister
3	never signed it?
4	MR. GOULD: Correct.
5	MS EDWARDH: Correct?
6	MR. GOULD: Okay, yes.
7	MS EDWARDH: You are aware that
8	the Minister never signed this letter?
9	MR. GOULD: Yes, I am.
10	MS EDWARDH: Mr. Pardy told us
11	something about institutional politics, and I
12	would like you to comment about it.
13	The effect of what he said is, you
14	know, discussions are expected to take place
15	interdepartmentally, so if CSIS has a difficulty
16	with what we are doing, or the RCMP, we are
17	expected to be responsible and try to address our
18	concerns with our colleagues in another
19	department.
20	Do you agree with that?
21	MR. GOULD: I agree.
22	MS EDWARDH: And if we cannot
23	agree and we are not able to come to some
24	consensus, we go up the hierarchy. Is that
25	correct?

1	MR. GOULD: Yes.
2	MS EDWARDH: And ultimately the
3	resolution, if you have to go all the way up to
4	the hierarchy, is to be found in the Prime
5	Minister's Office?
6	MR. GOULD: Yes.
7	MS EDWARDH: So from an outsider
8	looking in, it seems awfully like somewhere after
9	Ms McCallion signed off, this whole issue
10	continued to percolate, and on June 18th there is
11	another proposal. But ultimately the PMO
12	addresses this issue by calling upon a special
13	envoy to deliver a letter from the Prime Minister
14	and he is the one who ultimately bridges the
15	consensus or makes the consensus, does he not?
16	MR. GOULD: So it would appear
17	from the chronology.
18	MS EDWARDH: Yes.
19	MR. GOULD: Or that could yes.
20	MS EDWARDH: So it would appear
21	from the chronology.
22	So the concerns you fairly
23	identify and let me go back to your letter, if
24	I could, or your memo at tab 2.
25	I got a little puzzled by what

1	this document was. Commission counsel fairly
2	described it as a draft that is the kind of thing
3	that is obviously on your computer?
4	MR. GOULD: Correct.
5	MS EDWARDH: Then obviously you
6	also described it, not only as a draft, but as
7	something that was meant to provoke discussion and
8	therefore in some respects the language was a bit
9	dramatic.
LO	Do you recall that testimony?
L1	MR. GOULD: Yes, I do.
L2	MS EDWARDH: So even though it is
L3	a draft, we are to take it that this was a draft
L4	that was shared for the purposes of discussion?
L5	MR. GOULD: Yes.
L6	MS EDWARDH: And can you tell us,
L7	sir, who it would have been shared with for the
L8	purposes of the discussion you wanted to have?
L9	MR. GOULD: My assumption is that
20	this would have been shared with Mr. Heatherington
21	and Mr. Livermore.
22	MS EDWARDH: Anyone else?
23	MR. GOULD: I cannot think of
24	anyone else. In the first instance, I would have
0.5	just delivered to them a hard conv of the two for

1	comment, suggestion, "What do you think?" And
2	that's the way it would start.
3	MS EDWARDH: And is it the case
4	that you did deliver a hard copy of this to Mr
5	MR. GOULD: I don't recall, sorry.
6	MS EDWARDH: But logically
7	MR. GOULD: Logically, that is
8	what I would have done.
9	MS EDWARDH: That is not
10	inconsistent with its character as a draft. It is
11	there for the first level of discussions
12	MR. GOULD: There are typing
13	mistakes and that sort of thing, so it was a very
14	early push-out on the machine and hit print.
15	MS EDWARDH: Right. But my point
16	is, even as a draft, this is the kind of document
17	you expect that you at least shared within the
18	inner circle of ISI.
19	MR. GOULD: Yes.
20	MS EDWARDH: And that it was the
21	subject of discussion for your group.
22	MR. GOULD: Yes.
23	MS EDWARDH: You perhaps would
24	appear more than anyone to have been a person
25	bridging the relationships between DFAIT, the RCMP

1	and DFAIT, and CSIS in this management role, for
2	want of a better term, between CSIS and the Los
3	MR. GOULD: Yes, I will accept
4	that.
5	MS EDWARDH: You used the term,
6	unsatisfactory though it may be, so I'm just
7	following up with it.
8	MR. GOULD: It is. I wanted to be
9	facilitating a relationship, managing a
LO	relationship, assisting a relationship, but
L1	MS EDWARDH: But you are there to
L2	help smooth over the
L3	MR. GOULD: Whatever.
L4	MS EDWARDH: Whatever. Okay.
L5	And there was no one else that had
L6	that responsibility, to the best of your
L7	knowledge, in ISI? That was your obligation.
L8	MR. GOULD: Excuse me. I was
L9	given that responsibility, but we all worked at it
20	when necessary, Mr. Heatherington, Mr. Livermore,
21	Saunders, the others, but it was on my
22	MS EDWARDH: It was part of your
23	job description.
24	MR. GOULD: Yes.
25	MS EDWARDH: And they would of

1	course assist you if circumstances required it?
2	MR. GOULD: And direct me.
3	MS EDWARDH: And direct you.
4	MR. GOULD: Yes.
5	MS EDWARDH: Do you have any
6	recollection of the conversation that this
7	memorandum precipitated?
8	MR. GOULD: No, I don't. No, I do
9	not.
LO	MS EDWARDH: Certainly your
L1	concerns and I just want to tap into this for a
L2	moment, if I could.
L3	Your description that CSIS has
L 4	made it clear to the department that they would
L5	prefer to have Mr. Arar remain in Syria rather
L6	than returned to Canada do you see that?
L7	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
L8	MS EDWARDH: Sir, as someone who
L9	had been to meetings with CSIS, had struggled
20	through the issue of the language in the letter,
21	or had seen the letter issue develop, had heard
22	about the phone call, I take it you are not
23	relying on any single event but rather on the kind
24	of collection of conversations, discussions,
25	innuendos, all those things that go into

1	interpreting and understanding a position?
2	MR. GOULD: Correct.
3	MS EDWARDH: So it's not just what
4	someone may have said on one occasion but the
5	total dealings and the institutional culture and
6	mandate of the organization?
7	MR. GOULD: Yes.
8	MS EDWARDH: And I take it that
9	your overall conclusion from weeks and months of
10	dealings is that this was their position with
11	respect to Maher Arar, otherwise you would not
12	have set it down as such?
13	MR. GOULD: Yup.
14	MS EDWARDH: It also strikes me,
15	and I have seen this in other contexts, that the
16	comment that you make is very important to the
17	provision of consular services, that the consular
18	services persons providing assistance to Canadian
19	citizens overseas can't constitute themselves as
20	judge and jury.
21	So when you say guilty or
22	innocent, Canadian citizens have the right to
23	these kinds of services?
24	MR. GOULD: Yes.
25	MC FDWARDH: And I take it that

1	was one of the things that CSIS appeared to you
2	CSIS and the RCMP, I think you said in chief
3	appeared to you to be reluctant to accept?
4	MR. GOULD: Yes, if you accept
5	that the wording may be more dramatic than it
6	but, yes.
7	MS EDWARDH: In general the sense
8	that providing, at enormous cost sometimes and a
9	great deal of energy, services to people who may
10	have been even found guilty in a serious criminal
11	case, may be something that they had difficulty
12	or a serious criminal case with intelligence
13	components was something that CSIS appeared to
14	have difficulty with?
15	MR. GOULD: Yes, okay. Yes, fair
16	statement.
17	MS EDWARDH: Now, post-9/11, one
18	of the concerns it would appear that CSIS had
19	conveyed to you, and to I'm going to suggest
20	others, is that there wasn't enough evidence to
21	charge Mr. Arar with anything but they were
22	concerned that maybe out there there may be
23	something that could show that Canada's efforts
24	brought back someone who was an extremist and a
25	terrorist? They were afraid of that, although

1	they had no information that that was the case?
2	I'm drawing that from
3	MR. GOULD: No, I see where you're
4	drawing it from and I'm trying to think of
5	occasions there were meetings about which
6	MS EDWARDH: You can't maybe tell
7	me about meetings, but I think you can answer the
8	question that I've asked you, unless there's an
9	objection, but I don't hear one, so if you
LO	wouldn't mind, sir, answer the question.
L1	MR. GOULD: I'm trying to think of
L2	how I should phrase it because I don't want to
L3	give undue weight to something.
L4	I certainly had that impression,
L5	and that's drawing on a variety of experiences.
L6	MS EDWARDH: Yes, and I think we
L7	have before us information to indicate that CSIS
L8	was mindful of the example with Mr. Khadr, and the
L9	efforts made by the Prime Minister that resulted
20	or may have affected his release and then
21	subsequently information arose indicated he had
22	been obviously much more involved in activities
23	than people had initially understood.
24	So that what seems to be at the
25	heart of this as well.

1	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
2	MS EDWARDH: Is that correct?
3	This fear
4	MR. GOULD: It may indeed be, yes.
5	That example I am not using, but that may indeed
6	be it.
7	MS EDWARDH: It's one of the
8	examples that was floating in the environment, was
9	it not?
10	MR. GOULD: Yes.
11	MS EDWARDH: Were you aware of any
12	discussion that CSIS itself could take steps
13	through its own channels to assist by
14	communicating with Syrian Military Intelligence a
15	message of send Mr. Arar home? Was there any
16	discussion or were they so far away from that
17	there was no point in having the discussion?
18	MR. GOULD: I'm not sure I can
19	answer that because should I fall back, I can
20	neither confirm nor deny the relationship between
21	CSIS and Syria. I don't know the state of that.
22	MS EDWARDH: Well, Ms McIsaac.
23	MS McISAAC: Well I basically
24	understood the question to be, if I can
25	paraphrase, if Foreign Affairs ever asked CSIS to

1	make contact with Syria to ask for Mr. Arar's
2	release.
3	MS EDWARDH: Through the
4	intelligence channels.
5	MR. GOULD: Okay. Then, no. Not
6	to the best of my knowledge.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: The second part
8	of the question I think was was that because
9	you said there would be no sense
10	MS EDWARDH: Yes, I think I
11	have to ask you to finish the question.
12	Would one of the reasons that such
13	a request would not be made is CSIS had made its
14	position clear that Mr. Arar it would be better
15	if Mr. Arar remain in Syria?
16	MR. GOULD: No, I don't think that
17	would have been a factor.
18	MS EDWARDH: So why not ask?
19	MR. GOULD: Don't know. Don't
20	know.
21	Pause
22	MR. GOULD: Excuse me. If I can
23	just?
24	Laughter / Rires
25	MR. GOULD: I'm sorry, I just

1	reconsidered not reconsidered, I don't know.
2	But it may have been, and I do not recall our
3	conversation, but it may have been the fact that
4	Ambassador Pillarella had a personal relationship
5	with General Khalil, and that that was deemed to
6	be as good a pipeline into that organization as
7	one could ever ask for. That there would have
8	been no merit in asking a CSIS liaison officer,
9	who would have gone in at a lower level. That
10	could have been it. That would be very logical in
11	the circumstances of the
12	MS EDWARDH: And even if one were
13	to accede to the logic of that for a moment, I
14	take it your evidence today, sir, is you can never
15	remember sitting around a table and mooting the
16	issue of should CSIS do this or do we have a more
17	effective entree?
18	MR. GOULD: I don't recall that I
19	sat around and table and discussed that, correct.
20	MS EDWARDH: And I take it you
21	have no reason to believe it was mooted by others.
22	MR. GOULD: I have no reason to
23	believe it was not, so I have no comment on that.
24	MS EDWARDH: Mr. Gould, thank you
25	for answering my questions, sir.

1	MR. GOULD: Oh? That's all?
2	MS EDWARDH: That's it. Thank
3	you, Mr. Commissioner.
4	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Boxall, do
5	you have any questions?
6	MR. BOXALL: I do.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: You're next.
8	EXAMINATION
9	MR. BOXALL: Mr. Gould, I
10	represent Inspector Cabana, and just to pick up
11	with respect to the last comment. You were asked
12	if you ever sat around with in a totally
13	different context than where I'm going but
14	Ms Edwardh is asking you if you sat around and
15	discussed or mooted the possibility with respect
16	to the letter she was talking about from CSIS.
17	My question is going to be more
18	general in nature, and that is, the process of
19	putting something out for discussion, either in a
20	memo to attract discussion from people that you
21	work with, or sitting around and mooting
22	possibilities, I take it that's something you do
23	do in your everyday work?
24	MR. GOULD: I'm fortunately able
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1	MR. BOXALL: That you did do.
2	Okay.
3	MR. GOULD: Thank you.
4	We were a very collegial, and I
5	assume the division or bureau still is. Many
6	issues would be discussed standing in a doorway or
7	meeting in the open area as often, or probably
8	more often, than you would put a draft together,
9	as I did here, to force an issue. So when you say
10	"moot," I see us literally three people standing
11	with a coffee, it could be Mr. Heatherington,
12	Mr. Livermore, and myself standing there saying,
13	"What should we do about this?" As easily as it
14	could have been as, "What did you think of last
15	night's hockey game?"
16	MR. BOXALL: And as perhaps
17	lawyers could well understand who accept the
18	adversarial decision gets to the best decision and
19	the result, there is often a value in taking pros
20	and cons of different positions and determining
21	what the best route might be to go. It allows for
22	that discussion to consider all alternatives?
23	MR. GOULD: Yes.
24	MR. BOXALL: Right. Okay. Now
25	I'm not quite certain what material is public and

1	what isn't, so I'm going to try and be fairly
2	general here, but clearly you had an ongoing
3	consultative relationship with Inspector Cabana
4	in 2002?
5	MR. GOULD: I spoke with
6	Mr. Cabana a dozen times over a period of six or
7	eight months.
8	MR. BOXALL: And this wasn't about
9	hockey games?
10	MR. GOULD: This was almost
11	certainly not.
12	MR. BOXALL: Right. It and it
13	would be about Canadians abroad?
14	MR. GOULD: Correct.
15	MR. BOXALL: And it would be about
16	RCMP interest in Canadians abroad?
17	MR. GOULD: Or any information
18	they could share about Canadians abroad that were
19	coming to our attention.
20	MR. BOXALL: And that would be
21	part of his job and your job
22	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
23	MR. BOXALL: to discuss, to
24	consider information-sharing about Canadians
25	abroad?

1	MR. GOULD: To discuss
2	information-sharing, or to discuss the
3	information?
4	MR. BOXALL: To discuss the
5	possibility of information-sharing.
6	MR. GOULD: I don't recall ever
7	discussing with Mr. Cabana the policy and
8	principles of information-sharing.
9	MR. BOXALL: Okay. You don't
LO	recall ever discussing with Inspector Cabana the
L1	possibility about sharing information?
L2	MR. GOULD: It was more along the
L3	lines of, do you know anything about Individual
L4	"A"? Yes, no. Can you tell me anything about
L5	him? Yes or no. And whatever information. Not
L6	the principle or policies.
L7	MR. BOXALL: So he would just ask
L8	you about specific persons?
L9	MR. GOULD: And I might ask him
20	about specific persons.
21	MR. BOXALL: And what about
22	specific countries? He might ask that?
23	MR. GOULD: He might.
24	MR. BOXALL: And would you agree
25	with me that this may not be the best choice of

1	words but my characterization is you're not a very
2	good note taker?
3	MR. GOULD: I'm a terrible note
4	taker.
5	MR. BOXALL: All right, good. And
6	so the discussions that you would have with
7	Mr. Cabana, your notes are not really of much
8	assistance to you in trying to recollect what was
9	said.
LO	MR. GOULD: Not now. At the time
L1	hopefully they would have been. These are not
L2	meant as permanent records.
L3	MR. BOXALL: And that's the notes
L4	that you do have, which are limited?
L5	MR. GOULD: Yes.
L6	MR. BOXALL: There would be a lot
L7	of material that is not put in the notes?
L8	MR. GOULD: Oh, almost certainly.
L9	MR. BOXALL: And it's even more
20	difficult to be able to recall what was said when
21	there is no entry at all?
22	MR. GOULD: Yes.
23	MR. BOXALL: So your recollection
24	of what you discussed with Inspector Cabana over
25	these meetings is very limited?

1	MR. GOULD: Yes.
2	MR. BOXALL: Now, you agree that
3	it is you that called Inspector Cabana on
4	October 21st?
5	MR. GOULD: That's the one with
6	all the squiggles, yes. Because I have got his
7	pager number listed at the top, so, yes, I
8	initiated the call.
9	MR. BOXALL: You initiated the
10	call, and you had some questions that you wanted
11	to ask?
12	MR. GOULD: Correct.
13	MR. BOXALL: And you knew that he
14	was the appropriate person to call?
15	MR. GOULD: I knew he was a person
16	to call.
17	MR. BOXALL: You knew he was a
18	person to call.
19	MR. GOULD: Very often if he's not
20	the appropriate person, he could identify the
21	appropriate person.
22	MR. BOXALL: Fair enough. Just as
23	if he was speaking with you and you weren't the
24	appropriate person, you could direct him to the
25	appropriate person.

1	MR. GOULD: Correct.
2	MR. BOXALL: And this would be an
3	example of the ongoing consultative relationship
4	you had with this man?
5	MR. GOULD: Correct.
6	MR. BOXALL: And you asked him a
7	series of questions?
8	MR. GOULD: Correct.
9	MR. BOXALL: And that would be
10	part of your responsibility to attempt to learn
11	what information you could be provided to assist
12	your department.
13	Correct?
14	MR. GOULD: In this case
15	specifically the Ambassador in Damascus, yes.
16	MR. BOXALL: Right. And would you
17	agree with me that a police investigator would
18	have a responsibility himself to complete his own
19	investigation and to gather information for his
20	investigation?
21	MR. GOULD: Of course.
22	MR. BOXALL: Of course. And from
23	time to time that police investigator would have
24	to deal with foreign sources?
25	MR. GOULD: I suppose that would

1	depend on the case he was pursuing, yes.
2	MR. BOXALL: Right. But if it
3	involves an international component, it may be
4	necessary, in order to get information, to deal
5	with foreign sources.
6	It makes sense to you, right?
7	MR. GOULD: Yes.
8	MR. BOXALL: That would be the
9	types of things you may have contact with
LO	Inspector Cabana or other police officers if it
L1	came up.
L2	Correct?
L3	MR. GOULD: Yes.
L 4	MR. BOXALL: And, generally
L5	speaking, is it a recognized principle that in
L6	order to get information from foreign sources that
L7	you had to give? It's a two-way street?
L8	MR. GOULD: It is normally seen as
L9	a two-way street.
20	MR. BOXALL: And that would be
21	made clear, in a hypothetical sense, that if you
22	were asked by a police officer, if you have to
23	give to get, you would tell them it's normally a
24	two-way street?
25	MR. GOULD: If a police officer

1	were to ask me what it takes to get, I would
2	probably say you may be asked questions back and
3	maybe you should be prepared to answer some.
4	MR. BOXALL: Because you have to
5	give to get. It's that simple, isn't it?
6	MR. GOULD: Hypothetically, yes.
7	MR. BOXALL: All right. And
8	beyond hypothetically, in the everyday working
9	world of DFAIT, you have to give to get?
10	MR. GOULD: You have to be
11	prepared that when you're dealing setting aside
12	these cases as a working diplomat abroad
13	dealing with a representative of a foreign
14	Ministry of your host country, you may go in one
15	day and ask six questions, and the next time
16	you're talking to him he asks you eight. You have
17	to be prepared to the best of your ability, within
18	the constraints, to answer them.
19	MR. BOXALL: Right. Because if
20	you want to get answers to yours, you have to
21	answer theirs.
22	MR. GOULD: Yes, right.
23	MR. BOXALL: Now, you've
24	indicated perhaps I'm just going to ask it
25	again. What exactly, if you're able to say

1	exactly, did Mr. Cabana say in this offer to
2	share? What did he say?
3	MR. GOULD: I'm sorry, the notes I
4	have available to me don't clearly tell me what he
5	said.
6	MR. BOXALL: What was said
7	immediately before that?
8	MR. GOULD: Again, they do not
9	clearly these are very sketchy notes.
LO	MR. BOXALL: And what was your
L1	response to him, if any?
L2	MR. GOULD: No response that I
L3	have noted, so therefore, I don't recall.
L4	MR. BOXALL: Okay. All right.
L5	And did you invite Inspector Cabana, did you ask
L6	Inspector Cabana, do you have any message to
L7	deliver to the Syrians? Did you invite that, if
L8	he had any message or anything to tell him?
L9	MR. GOULD: I don't recall doing
20	that.
21	MR. BOXALL: But you don't recall
22	what was said before it.
23	Correct?
24	MR. GOULD: Correct.
25	MP ROYALL: And the nurnose of

1	the call seems to be for you to ask certain
2	questions?
3	MR. GOULD: Correct.
4	MR. BOXALL: All right. So the
5	inference would be, when the topic switches from
6	the answers to your questions to what's
7	characterized as an offer, the inference may well
8	be that you asked him if he had anything to say t
9	them?
LO	MR. GOULD: I don't know why I
L1	would have. My Ambassador was going in to meet
L2	the Head of Syrian Military Intelligence. I
L3	wouldn't have thought that the RCMP in an
L4	investigation would have something, but
L5	MR. BOXALL: You can't deny that
L6	you may have? Right.
L7	Your evidence is, sir, in this
L8	forum, that you were never asked any for your
L9	opinion or advice about sharing information with
20	the Syrians?
21	MR. GOULD: I don't recall.
22	MR. BOXALL: No recollection of
23	ever being asked that?
24	MR. GOULD: I think the question
) 5	was did we sit about in the division or the

1	bureau and discuss this matter.
2	MR. BOXALL: Forget the bureau.
3	MS EDWARDH: If my friend wishes
4	to put the question I asked, I'd ask that he put
5	it fairly to the witness.
6	MR. BOXALL: All right. So that
7	you never you never discussed it within the
8	bureau.
9	Is that what you're saying?
10	MR. GOULD: I don't recall being
11	asked, or sitting about discussing the merits of
12	information-sharing by the RCMP I think, or
13	CSIS I'm not sure which, whichever you're
14	discussing.
15	MR. BOXALL: Let's deal with the
16	RCMP sharing information with the Syrians. You
17	have no recollection of discussing that with
18	anyone? That's your evidence?
19	MR. GOULD: The merits of sharing
20	information with
21	MR. BOXALL: The possibility of
22	doing it.
23	MR. GOULD: No.
24	MR. BOXALL: The pros and cons?
25	MP COULD: No

1	MR. BOXALL: You're saying,
2	though, that hypothetically, if you ever had been
3	asked, you would like to think that you would have
4	indicated there would be some risk to doing so, or
5	sharing information with respect to a person
6	detained in custody?
7	MR. GOULD: Yes.
8	MR. BOXALL: And yet with respect
9	to Mr. Cabana's offer, communicated to you, of
LO	being open to the possibility of sharing with the
L1	Syrians, you made no response?
L2	MR. GOULD: I do not recall having
L3	made any response.
L4	MR. BOXALL: You certainly didn't
L5	tell him of any risks at that time, did you, sir?
L6	MR. GOULD: I don't recall having
L7	done so.
L8	MR. BOXALL: All right. Well,
L9	what I'm suggesting to you, sir, is that you
20	didn't at that time.
21	MR. GOULD: Okay.
22	MR. BOXALL: All right? And who
23	did you pass that on to
24	MS EDWARDH: I think I have to
05	object I want to make an objection

1	We've heard from Cabana. As I
2	recall his evidence was he never asked, and I
3	don't think it's fair to say to this witness, "I'm
4	going to put it to you that you didn't share." I
5	mean, he's answered as best he can in his
6	recollection. We know what the officer said. But
7	I don't think that the last suggestion was fair to
8	the witness.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, as I
LO	understand his evidence, he said it several times,
L1	he doesn't recall whether he did or not.
L2	MR. BOXALL: That's fair enough.
L3	MR. GOULD: Is there evidence to
L 4	suggest that I that Mr. Cabana did say, "How
L5	about we go and share information?" Did he put a
L6	distinct offer to me through us. Is there
L7	evidence to that effect?
L8	MR. BOXALL: What exactly did he
L9	say then?
20	MR. GOULD: I don't know. I
21	phoned him up and asked I listed out three
22	questions I wanted answered. If you take a look
23	at my notes, I think I only got to the first one
24	because it seemed to cover the other two. I would
25	quess this conversation lasted a few moments at

1	best. That was the information I needed. There
2	was nothing else. Bang.
3	MR. BOXALL: This possibility,
4	this comment about sharing information with the
5	Syrians, did you pass it on to anyone?
6	MR. GOULD: I would assume that I
7	did. There's no reason to hold on to it and
8	there's no reason not to have told it, but I don't
9	recall and it would have been an informal
10	passing on to Heatherington or Livermore.
11	MR. BOXALL: So you don't know if
12	you did?
13	MR. GOULD: No.
14	MR. BOXALL: All right, sir, those
15	are the questions I have.
16	MR. GOULD: Super.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: Just in the
18	order, earlier I think I may have mixed the order.
19	I don't think it really matters. Is there a
20	preference between Mr. Shore and Ms McIsaac?
21	MS McISAAC: I'm content to let
22	him go last.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. If that
24	suits you, Mr. Shore.
25	MR. SHORE: Thank you.

1	THE COMMISSIONER: I think
2	Ms McIsaac was saying she'd go before you,
3	Mr. Shore. But, as I say, it doesn't matter to
4	me. Mr. David will be the last re-examiner.
5	EXAMINATION
6	MS McISAAC: Do you have your
7	notes in front of you, Mr. Gould, P-236?
8	MR. GOULD: Yes, I do.
9	MS McISAAC: I want to go to the
10	telephone conversation that you had with Mr. Dyet,
11	which is referenced at page 9 of 16 at tab 1 of
12	your notes.
13	MR. GOULD: Okay.
14	MS McISAAC: Now, to the best of
15	your recollection, at the time that you spoke with
16	Mr. Dyet and recorded this note, was it your
17	understanding that Mr. Hooper and Ms McCallion had
18	already spoken or were about to speak?
19	MR. GOULD: My notes the tense
20	of the second point, or point 2 of my notes,
21	implies to me it is post-conversation.
22	MS McISAAC: All right. Now, I
23	just want to clarify your notes, given the way you
24	make your notes.
25	MR. GOULD: Sorry about that.

1	MS McISAAC: I understood your
2	evidence, and correct me if I'm wrong, that you
3	had written down the question you wanted to ask
4	Mr. Dyet, which was.
5	"memo for JPD @ Arar
6	did it go to MKM"
7	You had written that question down
8	before you spoke with Mr. Dyet?
9	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm, yup.
10	MS McISAAC: Now, number 2 though,
11	would you have as I understand it, you then
12	record your answer, when you're speaking with
13	Mr. Dyet was, "status: Probably up today."
14	MR. GOULD: Yes.
15	MS McISAAC: So you've written the
16	question, you speak to Mr. Dyet, you write the
17	answer.
18	MR. GOULD: Yes.
19	MS McISAAC: Number 2, however,
20	presumably was not written before you spoke with
21	Mr. Dyet?
22	MR. GOULD: No it was not. This
23	is as if it there's no question, it's just an
24	answer.
25	MS McISAAC: So, during that

1	conversation, you record what Mr. Dyet is telling
2	you, or what you understand him to be telling you?
3	MR. GOULD: Either during the
4	conversation or after the conversation. I do not
5	recall when it was done.
6	MS McISAAC: Then if we go down to
7	the second part of the notes, I know there was
8	some discussion about whether it was "done" or
9	"Dave," quite frankly it looks more to me like
10	"done." I don't know if you have a view. You put
11	number 2.
12	Now, when you have recorded the
13	second part of that? Concurrent with the number 2
14	above or at a later date?
15	MR. GOULD: I think at a later
16	time on the same day, and I have no idea how much
17	later that would be. It looks to me as if I made
18	the note, the first note (2), went back to my
19	office. There's two names there. People that I
20	probably tried to phone or discuss
21	MS McISAAC: Yes.
22	MR. GOULD: And then went back to
23	and I think it's probably "Dave," because it's a
24	reference back up, and I said and I went back
25	just to clarify something, and that's basically

1	the time of the call, but I got the tenses wrong.
2	There was to be it's not a particularly clear
3	note, but that's probably done a couple hours
4	after the first one or within, you know
5	MS McISAAC: But there was to be a
6	call. Is there still some confusion as to whether
7	the call had taken place or not?
8	MR. GOULD: No, because the next
9	one, "Gar was to be there, probably wasn't." It
10	implies as I say, it's not a clear
11	MS McISAAC: More importantly,
12	though, at any point in time do you recall
13	speaking with Ms McCallion about the substance of
14	the telephone conversation she had with
15	MR. GOULD: No. No, I did not.
16	MS McISAAC: Now, I'd like to move
17	on to another topic. During examination by
18	Ms Edwardh, we were reviewing, or you were
19	reviewing with her, the discussion you had with
20	Inspector Cabana on October the 21st, I believe,
21	when it was first confirmed that Mr. Arar was in
22	Syria.
23	MR. GOULD: Yes.
24	MS McISAAC: And why were you
25	seeking information to pass on to the Ambassador

1	about the status of Mr. Arar?
2	MR. GOULD: It was the status of
3	Mr. Arar in Canada, and it was for background
4	information for the Ambassador's background.
5	Information to give him some context. As the
6	notes say, we had just had it confirmed, that the
7	Syrians had you will recall there was the great
8	to-ing and fro-ing trying to find him. It has now
9	been confirmed that he's in Damascus, or he's in
10	Syria. The ambassador is going to meet the head
11	of Syrian Intelligence, or a senior officer, a
12	senior representative. Who is he? Is this guy a
13	mass murderer in Canada? Is he you know? Just
14	strictly context for the background of the
15	Ambassador.
16	MS McISAAC: And the information
17	that would then be passed on to the Ambassador by
18	way of background for the purposes of his
19	discussions, how would that normally be provided
20	to him? Would it be provided by a telephone call
21	or some kind of C-4 message?
22	MR. GOULD: Either way, and it
23	would depend on timing. If you have the luxury of
24	time and if there's sufficient to warrant it, you
25	type out a C-4 message. If the time differential

1	between post and headquarters and it's short, you
2	phone.
3	MS McISAAC: And would that type
4	of information normally be passed directly by ISI,
5	or would it be passed back through Mr. Pardy and
6	the Consular Affairs Bureau?
7	MR. GOULD: Oh, in this case, this
8	would have been passed probably by Mr. Livermore,
9	possibly by Mr. Heatherington, possibly by myself,
10	although I don't recall phoning
11	MS McISAAC: You don't recall
12	phoning.
13	MR. GOULD: I don't recall phoning
14	Ambassador Pillarella.
15	MS McISAAC: Now, with respect to
16	the Book of Documents that constitutes your
17	documents for the purposes of today, exhibit
18	P-237
19	MR. GOULD: Yes?
20	MS McISAAC: and the draft
21	memo at tab 2, I understood you to say that you
22	I just want to clarify this.
23	Do you have any clear recollection
24	of actually providing a copy of this memo to
25	Mr. Livermore and Mr. Heatherington or anyone

1	else?
2	MR. GOULD: No, I don't.
3	MS McISAAC: So your evidence
4	earlier was based on what you might have done?
5	MR. GOULD: Yes, it is what I
6	assume I did with it. It died. It didn't go any
7	further. That's one version. We never cleaned
8	the typos up. My guess is I my guess is I
9	handed it to either/or, or possibly both, of
10	Livermore and Heatherington, and for whatever
11	reason, it just never went anywhere, nor do I
12	recall a conversation discussing it, which should
13	be your next question.
14	MS McISAAC: Those are my
15	questions. Thank you.
16	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Shore?
17	MR. SHORE: Mr. Commissioner, just
18	to make it clear with regard to Mr. Gould's
19	transcript, do I understand that we're proceeding
20	with the cross-examination, but that once the
21	transcripts have been reproduced, we will have an
22	opportunity to review them and then recall
23	Mr. Gould if anything arises that requires
24	THE COMMISSIONER: If necessary,
25	yes.

1	MR. SHORE: No, I understand that
2	you prefer it not happen but
3	THE COMMISSIONER: I take it
4	you've seen Mr. Gould's transcript, though?
5	MR. SHORE: I had read it earlier.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. So that
7	if you need to cross-examine if you have a
8	question, you should do it now so that we don't
9	have to
10	MR. SHORE: Well, I don't have
11	I don't the transcript.
12	THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, you don't
13	have it with you. I see.
14	MR. SHORE: No, I
15	Off microphone / Sans microphone
16	MS McISAAC: Well, the
17	ever-obliging Ms Mcisaac can provide.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, there you
19	go.
20	MR. SHORE: I don't propose to
21	read it while I'm asking Mr. Gould questions
22	THE COMMISSIONER: We expect you
23	to do that. We have high standards around here.
24	MR. SHORE: I understand that. I
25	realize I may not be up to scratch. I'm pedalling

1	as fast as I can.
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Well,
3	let's go ahead with the cross-examination
4	MR. SHORE: I'm prepared to go
5	ahead, and then at the break review it and if I
6	have to I
7	THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
8	MS McISAAC: I just want to be
9	sure that it's the entire transcript, that if
10	there is a question it relates to a part that I
11	have, in fact, produced.
12	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Thank
13	you.
14	EXAMINATION
15	MR. SHORE: Mr. Gould, I act for
16	Mr. Hooper, so my questions will be restricted to
17	events that involve him.
18	I just want to start, though, with
19	clarification with regard to your memo of
20	June 24th, 2003, which is in tab 2, that you have
21	described as being a dramatic memo in order to
22	stimulate conversation?
23	MR. GOULD: There's some wording
24	in there which, yes, I would characterize as
25	dramatic.

1	MR. SHORE: Or provocative?
2	MR. GOULD: Or provocative,
3	perhaps.
4	MR. SHORE: And you say at the
5	very beginning that there hasn't been a meeting of
6	minds on an institutional level between CSIS,
7	RCMP, and DFAIT.
8	Apart from what you've told us
9	about your knowledge of the alleged conversation
10	between Mr. Hooper and Ms McCallion, is there
11	anything that you rely on there that comes from
12	Mr. Hooper to indicate that there hasn't been a
13	meeting of the minds?
14	MR. GOULD: With specific
15	reference to Mr. Hooper, no.
16	MR. SHORE: Just Mr. Hooper.
17	Mr. Hooper is my client.
18	MR. GOULD: No.
19	MR. SHORE: That's my mandate.
20	MR. GOULD: Nothing.
21	MR. SHORE: And when you say in
22	the next sentence that "recent exchanges have been
23	almost testy," I take it nothing that you rely on
24	for that provocative comment is related to
25	Mr. Hooper?

1	MR. GOULD: No.
2	MR. SHORE: And if you go to
3	MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry, I don't
4	think the witness has answered the question.
5	MR. GOULD: I said "no." I'm
6	sorry.
7	I apologize.
8	MR. SHORE: I thought he said no.
9	And if you go to the last
10	paragraph on that page, the second sentence:
11	"CSIS has made it clear to
12	the Department that they
13	would prefer to have him
14	remain in Syria, rather than
15	returned to Canada."
16	Apart from what you've told us
17	about your understanding of the Hooper-McCallion
18	phone call, anything in that comment that would
19	come, in your view, from Mr. Hooper?
20	MR. GOULD: No.
21	MR. SHORE: The next sentence:
22	"CSIS officials do not seem
23	to understand that, guilty or
24	innocent, Maher Arar has the
25	right to consular

1	assistance"
2	Anything that you have, any
3	information you have to say that coming from
4	Mr. Hooper?
5	MR. GOULD: Part of that, the
6	wording of that sentence, may have been drawn from
7	my understanding of the telephone conversation
8	about which we're discussing, but it would be an
9	element of it. It was not
10	MR. SHORE: I'll get to the
11	telephone conversation
12	MR. GOULD: I'm sure you will.
13	MR. SHORE: later. But apart
14	from that, nothing that any information you
15	have, or any culture within your department
16	derives from Mr. Hooper?
17	MR. GOULD: I'm not sure I
18	understand your question.
19	MR. SHORE: Well, you indicated to
20	my friend, Ms Edwardh, that your opinion is based
21	on a myriad of sources
22	MR. GOULD: Several, yes.
23	MR. SHORE: with regard to
24	CSIS's position generally.
25	MR. GOILD: Mm-hmm.

1	MR. SHORE: And I take it this
2	opinion from these sources are solely from within
3	your department, basically. You never spoke to
4	anyone at CSIS.
5	MR. GOULD: No, I did speak to
6	people at CSIS, but at meetings about which I am
7	not prepared to speak.
8	MR. SHORE: You never spoke to
9	Mr. Hooper?
10	MR. GOULD: I do not recall he was
11	in the meetings to which I just referred.
12	MR. SHORE: And you never spoke to
13	him outside the meetings?
14	MR. GOULD: On this topic, no.
15	MR. SHORE: Whereby you got an
16	indication of where he stood with regard to these
17	matters?
18	MR. GOULD: No.
19	MR. SHORE: So you're not prepared
20	to refer to any document or other source of
21	information, apart from the phone call, which we
22	will deal with, where Mr. Hooper doesn't believe
23	that Mr. Arar has the right to consular
24	assistance?
25	MR. GOULD: No.

1	MR. SHORE: And on the next page,
2	paragraph 3, last sentence:
3	"CSIS must accept that DFAIT
4	has a duty to assist Arar,
5	even though this may result
6	in him regaining his freedom
7	in Canada."
8	Anything that you have that
9	suggests that Mr. Hooper is not pursuing his
10	mandate in good faith, apart from the phone call?
11	MR. GOULD: Apart from the phone
12	call, no.
13	MR. SHORE: And then you conclude
14	your memo with, "Do you agree?"
15	And you are asking Mr. Livermore,
16	Mr. Heatherington who else?
17	MR. GOULD: No, I'm actually
18	had this been finalized, had this gone up the
19	chain, I'm asking Ms McCallion and Mr. Wright, do
20	they agree that the Minister should seek a
21	briefing? That would have instituted a whole
22	other memo up to the Minister.
23	MR. SHORE: I see. And over their
24	initials you have a line for their signature, if
25	they agreed.

1	MR. GOULD: Excuse me.
2	MR. SHORE: The last page. Right?
3	MR. GOULD: Badly drafted.
4	MR. SHORE: Pardon me?
5	MR. GOULD: Badly drafted.
6	MR. SHORE: Badly drafted in what
7	way?
8	MR. GOULD: It was to them. I
9	guess I was leaving room for them to put your
10	initials
11	MR. SHORE: If they agreed, you
12	would expect them to put their initials?
13	MR. GOULD: Yes.
14	MR. SHORE: If they don't agree,
15	you would expect that they wouldn't put their
16	initials?
17	MR. GOULD: Or they could easily
18	write "I do not agree," or no, not unusual, not
19	uncommon.
20	MR. SHORE: Anyway, there was
21	certainly no indication that anyone agreed with
22	this?
23	MR. GOULD: No, other than myself.
24	MR. SHORE: You agree with that?
25	MR. GOULD: Right.

1	MR. SHORE: So this is your
2	ramblings, basically, conveying your frustration
3	about your interpretation of the events?
4	MR. GOULD: I wouldn't
5	characterize them as ramblings, but there's
6	obviously a level of frustration there. But I
7	think I'm more concerned about the state of the
8	Foreign Affairs relationship with CSIS and the
9	RCMP rather than just frustrations.
10	MR. SHORE: And are you sure that
11	you gave it to anyone to look at, or did it just
12	remain on your computer
13	MR. GOULD: As I just said, I
14	don't recall physically giving it, but it is
15	normal that I would have done that. I wouldn't
16	have done it just for myself and left it on the
17	hard drive to sit there.
18	MR. SHORE: Do you recall who you
19	gave it to?
20	MR. GOULD: I do not recall, but
21	it would have been normal for me to give it to
22	Mr. Livermore and/or possibly both, Livermore and
23	Heatherington.
24	MR. SHORE: And I take it that
25	neither responded?

1	MR. GOULD: I don't recall.
2	Certainly there was no formal the memo went no
3	further. The response may have been: "Crumple it
4	up and throw it away, Jim," or "We don't agree,"
5	or "Let's let it sit for a while," or "Let's think
6	about it." I don't recall.
7	MR. SHORE: If they had said we
8	don't agree, would you have made a note of that
9	somewhere?
LO	MR. GOULD: No.
L1	MR. SHORE: It's over. This is
L2	your personal views, and for whatever reason, you
L3	couldn't get anyone else to sign on to it.
L4	MR. GOULD: That's fine. That's
L5	correct.
L6	MR. SHORE: You couldn't get
L7	anyone else to sign on to it, assuming
L8	MR. GOULD: Yes, no. The fact
L9	that it did not go anywhere means exactly that.
20	MR. SHORE: Now, dealing with the
21	phone call do you have your notes in front of
22	you? Momentarily sorry to take you back to
23	them again.
24	MR. GOULD: Not at all. Where are
25	we starting?

1	MR. SHORE: Let's start at page 9
2	of 16.
3	MR. GOULD: Yeah.
4	MR. SHORE: So is there a date
5	that contextualizes that note?
6	MR. GOULD: Is there a date for
7	that note?
8	MR. SHORE: Yes.
9	MR. GOULD: It's not noted on the
10	paper but if I recall correctly it's June the 5th
11	It's certainly in the hard copy text there is a
12	date for that page and it is June 5.
13	MR. SHORE: All right. So you're
14	satisfied
15	MR. GOULD: Excuse me.
16	MR. SHORE: Sorry.
17	MR. GOULD: To confirm that, do
18	you have a copy of the one that I dated with each
19	date?
20	MS McISAAC: My recollection was
21	that we had to reconstruct the dates. That they
22	weren't actually on the page, and that you
23	reconstructed the date as being June the 5th
24	MR. GOULD: That's right. That's
25	my recollection. But I don't on each page, if

1	you recall, when I did my in camera testimony, I
2	went back, took out my black books and wrote the
3	date I'm confident in my own mind it's June
4	5th, but
5	MR. SHORE: That's fair enough.
6	So on page 9 of 16, June 5, is that your first
7	notation for that day?
8	MR. GOULD: No.
9	MR. SHORE: There are other
10	notations for that day that come earlier than
11	that?
12	MR. GOULD: Yes.
13	MR. SHORE: And do you have any
14	times beside them?
15	MR. GOULD: No.
16	MR. SHORE: And you have no time
17	beside this one?
18	MR. GOULD: Correct.
19	MR. SHORE: Apart from these
20	notes, do you have any personal recollection of
21	these events?
22	MR. GOULD: I recall sitting down
23	with David in his office and him telling me this,
24	yes.
25	MR. SHORE: You don't know the

1	time?
2	MR. GOULD: No, I do not.
3	MR. SHORE: You don't know whether
4	it was morning or afternoon?
5	MR. GOULD: No, I do not. I would
6	guess it's after 11 p.m. because the second note
7	has an eleven o'clock or 1100 hours as the time
8	the call was to have been made
9	MR. SHORE: But that doesn't
LO	necessarily mean that the earlier part
L1	MR. GOULD: It does not
L2	necessarily mean, no.
L3	MR. SHORE: Well, you have
L4	something intervening that has nothing to do with
L5	this matter.
L6	MR. GOULD: Correct.
L7	MR. SHORE: You have two names
L8	there, Peter Bailey and Delores
L9	MR. GOULD: Peter Bates and
20	Delores Nowak.
21	MR. SHORE: Dolores?
22	MR. GOULD: N-O-W-A-K. I'm not
23	sure of the pronunciation.
24	MR. SHORE: They're not relevant.
25	Have nothing to do with this matter?

1	MR. GOULD: Nothing.
2	MR. SHORE: So those notes were
3	separated by some period of time.
4	MR. GOULD: Yes, they were.
5	MR. SHORE: So the fact that under
6	"done," you think it may say "Dave," but if you
7	look at how you've written "Dave" beside "Dyet" on
8	the top line, it doesn't look the same as that.
9	MR. GOULD: I can only say that
LO	I'm orthographically challenged.
L1	MR. SHORE: Well, you may be. But
L2	are you suggesting that that could be "Dave"?
L3	MR. GOULD: I suggest it could be
L4	"Dave." I think it is "Dave." Other people have
L5	said it might be "done," and I can see how it
L6	might be read as "done."
L7	MR. SHORE: Because it certainly
L8	doesn't look like the earlier "Dave."
L9	MR. GOULD: No, it does not.
20	MR. SHORE: And you sometimes
21	write
22	MR. GOULD: Sometimes I write in
23	different scripts.
24	MR. SHORE: In different ways on
) 5	the same day within hours of each other?

1	MR. GOULD: Within hours.
2	MR. SHORE: What we can assume is
3	that the top note on the top part of the page, on
4	top of the names and the bottom note under "done"
5	or "Dave" were written at different times?
6	MR. GOULD: Oh, yes.
7	MR. SHORE: No question about
8	that?
9	MR. GOULD: No question.
10	MR. SHORE: And I take it when
11	you're writing these notes on June 3rd
12	MR. GOULD: June 5th.
13	MR. SHORE: June 5th, thank you,
14	2003, you were writing them in a normal way using
15	normal language?
16	MR. GOULD: The normal language
17	with which I make notes, yes.
18	MR. SHORE: And the first
19	notation, "Memo from JPD," and "Status, did it go
20	to MKM," "Probably went up today;" is that what
21	you wrote?
22	MR. GOULD: Yes, it is.
23	MR. SHORE: That was your
24	understanding at that time?
25	MR. GOULD: Yes.

1	MR. SHORE: That it had already
2	gone up to her?
3	MR. GOULD: Yes. Oh, excuse me.
4	MR. SHORE: Yes?
5	MR. GOULD: "Probably went up
6	today" could mean it that it went past
7	Ms McCallion, if she had signed it off, and went
8	up to the Minister. It's not clear from that. I
9	think from the context it's clear later it didn't
10	hit the Minister's office until the 9th, so this
11	is unlikely.
12	MR. SHORE: So you're probably
13	referring
14	MR. GOULD: Probably, with a fair
15	degree of certainty.
16	MR. SHORE: to Ms McCallion.
17	And then the bottom part of the page, under "Dave
18	or "done." "There was to be a call at 1100 hours
19	today, " normal languaging was to suggest would
20	suggest that there has not yet been a call, there
21	was to be one, but perhaps it didn't happen. Is
22	that not right?
23	MR. GOULD: You're absolutely
24	correct. Badly, badly drafted note.
25	MP CHOPF: Well it may be But

1	if you're using normal language in the normal way,
2	a well educated
3	MR. GOULD: The original note to
4	above places it quite clearly in the past.
5	MR. SHORE: I understand that.
6	MR. GOULD: From
7	MR. SHORE: I understand that.
8	But a well-educated person saying there was to be
9	a call at 1100 hours today doesn't say by that
10	that there already was a call.
11	MR. GOULD: To me, as I say, it's
12	badly drafted
13	MR. SHORE: It's worse than badly
14	drafted, it's misleading.
15	MR. GOULD: Absolutely.
16	MR. SHORE: If there was a call at
17	1100 hours today
18	MR. GOULD: Absolutely.
19	MR. SHORE: You would have said
20	that there was a call at 1100 hours today.
21	MR. GOULD: Had I thought that
22	this going to become as important as it has
23	become, I would have taken much more care with my
24	wording.
25	MR. SHORE: Well that's my point.

1	MR. GOULD: As it was, it was a
2	busy day.
3	MR. SHORE: My point is you're
4	reconstructing now what you wrote then, but
5	looking at the normal languaging then, the call
6	had not yet taken place.
7	MR. GOULD: Fine.
8	MR. SHORE: Do you agree that that
9	is a normal interpretation of that language?
10	MS EDWARDH: May I make an
11	objection? I don't represent the witness,
12	obviously, but I think my friend is not fair. The
13	line that he's reading to the officer not the
14	officer, the witness, has two prongs to it. One
15	implies the future; the other implies the past.
16	THE COMMISSIONER: The very next
17	sentence, Gar was to be there
18	MS EDWARDH: It's not even the
19	next sentence, there Commissioner. There's a
20	dash. "There was to be a call." "Gar was to be
21	there, but probably wasn't," brings it into the
22	past. So I think in fairness to the witness the
23	whole phrase should be put to him.
24	MR. GOULD: You can put the phrase
25	to me, and I will agree you can interpret it that

1	way. I will interpret it the way I believe it was
2	meant, and I will say I am sorry for my bad
3	drafting but that's the way she came down.
4	MR. SHORE: Underneath that, you
5	have Barbara Burns with her phone number.
6	MR. GOULD: Correct.
7	MR. SHORE: Why is that written
8	there?
9	MR. GOULD: Because that is a
10	phone call that I made to Ms Burns about the call
11	from CSIS Hooper basically asking if she had any
12	information on it.
13	MR. SHORE: And when did you
14	make when did you make that call?
15	MR. GOULD: Later that same day.
16	MR. SHORE: And I take it you
17	didn't get through to her?
18	MR. GOULD: Correct. That's the
19	way I understand that note.
20	MR. SHORE: And you were calling
21	her with regard to whether that phone call took
22	place.
23	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
24	MR. SHORE: Is that right?
25	MR. GOULD: Correct.

1	MR. SHORE: Right. And if you
2	turn over the page, 10 of 16, again, you have:
3	"Barbara Burns EA to Ms McCallion," with her
4	telephone number and it's about a call from CSIS.
5	MR. GOULD: Correct.
6	MR. SHORE: Is that right?
7	MR. GOULD: Correct.
8	MR. SHORE: That's on page 10 so
9	that's a left-hand side?
10	MR. GOULD: No, that's a
11	right-hand side.
12	MR. SHORE: That's a right-hand
13	side?
14	MR. GOULD: The date above it sets
15	it into context because that's the way I start
16	each working day, by putting the date.
17	MR. SHORE: So the odd numbers are
18	the right-hand side?
19	MR. GOULD: No. You cannot do
20	that in here. That's the reason I tried to
21	explain, because they didn't photograph every
22	page.
23	MR. SHORE: I see. Okay. So
24	June 6 then, is this your first entry on that
25	page?

1	MR. GOULD: Yes. That date.
2	MR. SHORE: On that date, I mean.
3	MR. GOULD: There may have been
4	some voice mails which would have been on the
5	left-hand side, but whoever photocopied my black
6	book decided if there were any voice mails that
7	they were not relevant.
8	MR. SHORE: And your note is, on
9	June 6, "Call happened."
10	MR. GOULD: Yeah, right.
11	MR. SHORE: So that's your
12	confirmation.
13	MR. GOULD: Right.
14	MR. SHORE: That's your
15	confirmation of the call.
16	Isn't that right?
17	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
18	MR. SHORE: Well, isn't it
19	interesting that you get confirmation on June 6th
20	of the call when you thought that the call had
21	happened and you had spoken to Mr. Dyet about it
22	on June 5th? If you knew that the call in
23	other words do you follow me?
24	MR. GOULD: No.
25	MR. SHORE: If Mr. Dyet is telling

1	you about a phone call that has taken place, why
2	do you have to, the next day, get confirmation
3	that the call has taken
4	MR. GOULD: I was also asking
5	about the substance. I didn't get that confirmed.
6	I got the call happened confirmed; I didn't get
7	any comment on the substance.
8	MR. SHORE: Did you ask for
9	comment on the substance?
10	MR. GOULD: Yes.
11	MR. SHORE: You asked Barbara
12	Burns that?
13	MR. GOULD: If I recall correctly,
14	yes.
15	MR. SHORE: Did you ask her person
16	to person or via voice?
17	MR. GOULD: No, this would have
18	been person to person.
19	MR. SHORE: Person to person. And
20	what did you ask her?
21	MR. GOULD: One, did Ms McCallion
22	receive a call from Mr. Hooper, happened? Two,
23	was it and probably rehearsed or reviewed the
24	details as I received them from Mr. Dyet.
25	MR. SHORE: And what was the

1	response?
2	MR. GOULD: As I recall, she
3	didn't know. She knew the call had occurred but
4	she had not yet spoken to Ms McCallion about the
5	substance of the call.
6	MR. SHORE: So do you not
7	understand that I would find it odd that you would
8	have to confirm a call on June the 6th that you
9	understood took place the day before? Did you
10	have any doubt about what Mr. Dyet told you?
11	MR. GOULD: No.
12	MR. SHORE: No?
13	MR. GOULD: No.
14	MR. SHORE: So then why would you
15	have to confirm the call if you believed what he
16	had said?
17	MR. GOULD: Perhaps I was more
18	interested in the confirmation of the substance of
19	the call, and the did-the-call-happen would be a
20	polite entry into that. I don't know. I don't
21	recall my thinking at the time.
22	MR. SHORE: You have no note here
23	about the contents of the conversation?
24	MR. GOULD: No, I don't.
2.5	MR. SHORE: Would it surprise vou

1	to know that Ms Burns doesn't recall speaking to
2	you?
3	MR. GOULD: No.
4	MR. SHORE: About this call?
5	MR. GOULD: No.
6	MR. SHORE: If we go over to the
7	next page, 11 of 16, you have Barbara Burns again.
8	MR. GOULD: That's correct.
9	MR. SHORE: Same number, same re.
10	MR. GOULD: Right.
11	MR. SHORE: What is that referring
12	to? That's June 9th.
13	MR. GOULD: That's Monday, and
14	that's me trying to phone Ms Burns to see if she
15	has she has now confirmed on Friday that the
16	call happened, and now perhaps she can give me a
17	brief a debrief on the substance of the call.
18	MR. SHORE: And did you speak to
19	her on June 9th?
20	MR. GOULD: There's no indication
21	there that I did.
22	MR. SHORE: Did you leave a voice
23	mail?
24	MR. GOULD: Probably.
25	MR. SHORE: Did she call you back?

1		MR.	GOULD:	I have no no
2	indication that	she	did.	
3		MR.	SHORE:	And then we go to, I
4	take it, 13			
5		MR.	GOULD:	Yes.
6		MR.	SHORE:	Is the right-hand
7	side.			
8		MR.	GOULD:	Correct.
9		MR.	SHORE:	And 12 before that
10		MR.	GOULD:	Is the left-hand side,
11	that's right.			
12		MR.	SHORE:	And here you're
13	speaking with M	r. D	yet?	
14		MR.	GOULD:	Correct.
15		MR.	SHORE:	And you have written
16	here: "He spoke	e to	Ms McCa	llion. She signed off
17	on the memo."			
18		MR.	GOULD:	Yeah.
19		MR.	SHORE:	Is that coming from
20	Mr. Dyet?			
21		MR.	GOULD:	Yes.
22		MR.	SHORE:	And it's not coming
23	from Barbara Bu	rns?		
24		MR.	GOULD:	No.
25		MR.	SHORE:	It's Mr. Dyet?

1	MR. GOULD: My notes would
2	indicate to me that it's Mr. Dyet.
3	MR. SHORE: And if you go back to
4	page 12, "About call," is that information coming
5	to you from Mr. Dyet?
6	MR. GOULD: Mr. Dyet.
7	MR. SHORE: And everything in that
8	paragraph is from Mr. Dyet?
9	MR. GOULD: Correct. Just a
10	second.
11	MR. SHORE: I'm sorry?
12	MR. GOULD: Yeah.
13	MR. SHORE: And you say "Confirmed
14	story we had heard."
15	MR. GOULD: Yes.
16	MR. SHORE: Are you referring to
17	the phone call as a story?
18	MR. GOULD: I'm referring to the
19	conversation Mr. Dyet and I had on the 5th, where
20	he told me that Mr. Hooper had called Ms McCallion
21	and then went on to say that CSIS doesn't want us
22	to get Arar back into the country because they
23	would have to devote too many resources to watch
24	him. So he so he told me that's my notes
25	that in speaking

1	MR. SHORE: I'm suggesting to you
2	that "Story we have heard" has nothing to do with
3	the phone call. It has to do with the rumours
4	circling throughout DFAIT.
5	MR. GOULD: What rumours?
6	MR. SHORE: That CSIS did not want
7	Arar back into Canada.
8	MR. GOULD: I find that hard to
9	believe. I was talking to the same person about
10	the same topic about which we have been discussing
11	and I don't recall the rumours.
12	MR. SHORE: You don't recall any
13	rumours?
14	MR. GOULD: No.
15	MR. SHORE: Within DFAIT?
16	MR. GOULD: No.
17	MR. SHORE: I see. I find it odd,
18	sir, that you would use the word "story,"
19	"Confirmed story."
20	MR. GOULD: Sloppy drafting again.
21	MR. SHORE: Why would you not say
22	"Confirmed contents of call" or "Confirmed call"?
23	MR. GOULD: Possibly because story
24	is shorter than "contents of call." Sloppy
25	drafting is all I can put it down to.

1	MR. SHORE: How about just "call"?
2	MR. GOULD: No, it's the
3	information within the call, the story within the
4	call.
5	MR. SHORE: And are you getting
6	all this from Mr. Dyet maybe a bit more to it
7	because he didn't want to get into it?
8	MR. GOULD: Yes.
9	MR. SHORE: And are you assuming
10	here that Dyet had spoken to Ms McCallion about
11	this?
12	MR. GOULD: I am.
13	MR. SHORE: Did you check with him
14	to see whether
15	MR. GOULD: I did not follow up on
16	it.
17	MR. SHORE: Did you ask him when
18	he's telling you this, "Did you get this from
19	Kathryn McCallion"? Did you ask him that?
20	MR. GOULD: I do not recall being
21	that specific about it. I wrote down he spoke to
22	MKM, so he must have said that he did. I wouldn't
23	have made it up or at least I don't think I
24	would have. She signed off a memo. And then we
25	just carry on. Those are my notes because

1	MR. SHORE: All right. Where you
2	say: "MKM signed the memo so she seems to be
3	ignoring the request from ADDO," is that your
4	conclusion, Mr. Dyet's conclusion, or Kathryn
5	McCallion's conclusion?
б	MR. GOULD: I don't recall. It
7	certainly it wouldn't be Mr. McCallion's
8	conclusion, it might be Mr. Dyet's. I don't
9	recall whether Mr. Dyet said that to me or whether
10	I wrote that down. Sorry. Don't.
11	MR. SHORE: And thinking back, of
12	course, is not going to help you now?
13	MR. GOULD: Probably not.
14	MR. SHORE: Could that have been
15	your conclusion?
16	MR. GOULD: Yes, it could easily
17	have been.
18	MR. SHORE: And you're sure that
19	this information is not coming from anybody else
20	than Mr. Dyet through Kathryn McCallion?
21	MR. GOULD: The information is
22	coming from Mr. Dyet, it's not coming through Ms
23	McCallion.
24	MR. SHORE: Well, from
25	Ms McCallion.

1	MR. GOULD: I only report what
2	I
3	MR. SHORE: You're satisfied
4	with
5	MR. GOULD: I'm very comfortable
6	in my own mind.
7	MR. SHORE: All right. Subject,
8	Mr. Commissioner, to reading the transcript.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
10	Mr. David, any re-examination?
11	MR. DAVID: I will be brief,
12	Mr. Commissioner.
13	EXAMINATION
14	MR. DAVID: The first is I'd like
15	to bring Mr. Gould to tab 2 of our new Book of
16	Documents, and it's your draft memo, June 24th.
17	MR. GOULD: June oh, I believe
18	it is, you're right.
19	MR. DAVID: 2003. I've read this
20	many times.
21	MR. GOULD: I'm sure you have,
22	sir.
23	MR. DAVID: Mr. Shore just brought
24	you through it and asked you at several points
25	whether the basis for your affirmations were Jack

1	Hooper.
2	MR. GOULD: Yes.
3	MR. DAVID: And in all cases I
4	believe you said no.
5	MR. GOULD: With the one exception
6	that things that I may have interpolated from the
7	telephone call.
8	MR. DAVID: Correct. So, I bring
9	you to the last paragraph of the first page, in
10	the second sentence, where you claim that CSIS has
11	made it clear to the Department that they would
12	prefer to have him remain in Syria rather than
13	returned to Canada. My question very simply, and
14	just for clarity of the record, is that a
15	reference to the Hooper-McCallion call?
16	MR. GOULD: I think it, as I think
17	I said to Mr. Shore, that it may be partially
18	drawn from that, but it's partially drawn from
19	other meetings as well, other incidents.
20	MR. DAVID: All right. And the
21	question begs, Mr. Gould, insofar as you did have
22	meetings with members of CSIS, and insofar as some
23	of the language conveyed in this draft memo is
24	based on meetings with members of CSIS personnel,
25	my question to you is: Is your thinking, some of

1	your thinking, based on direct conversations with
2	CSIS personnel?
3	MR. GOULD: Yes, some of it is.
4	MR. DAVID: And would those
5	members of CSIS be junior or senior to Mr. Hooper?
6	MR. GOULD: Oh, junior. In CSIS
7	it was there were two people who were not
8	junior to him, if I recall correctly.
9	MR. DAVID: Okay.
10	MR. GOULD: And I didn't associate
11	with them.
12	MR. DAVID: I'd like to now bring
13	you to the phone slips concerning the call itself,
14	and the phone slips have been filed in volume
15	P-85, volume 5, tab 15.
16	MR. GOULD: Sorry? Tab 15?
17	MR. DAVID: Tab 15. And if you
18	could go to the second page, and I'm going to ask
19	you to also refer to your notes, but the first
20	message on the very top, it's a phone slip that is
21	addressed to Kathryn McCallion. It is dated June
22	the 6th.
23	MR. GOULD: Yup.
24	MR. DAVID: And the message says
25	that it's from you.

1	MR. GOULD: Yup.
2	MR. DAVID: And the contents of
3	the message is "re your phone call with CSIS on
4	Arar."
5	MR. GOULD: Correct.
6	MR. DAVID: It would seem from
7	this phone slip that you called Kathryn McCallion
8	on June 6th
9	MR. GOULD: Yes.
10	MR. DAVID: seeking her input
11	on the phone call.
12	MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm.
13	MR. DAVID: Do you recall doing
14	so?
15	MR. GOULD: No, I will contend
16	that I called Ms Burns. I don't recall whether I
17	asked to speak to Ms McCallion. I may have
18	just but for whatever reason she has passed it
19	on to Ms McCallion. I may have said I could
20	easily have said I would like to speak to
21	Ms McCallion about this topic and that's the
22	message being passed, but that's the day in which
23	my note says "Call happened," so I would
24	Ms Burns confirms that the call happened. She may
25	have been I may have said I'd like to talk to

1	Ms McCallion about what was said and that's the
2	substance of it.
3	MR. DAVID: But you never spoke to
4	Ms McCallion?
5	MR. GOULD: No, I did not.
6	MR. DAVID: The final question,
7	Mr. Gould, concerns your notes once again, and on
8	page 9 we've dated these as June 5th. You take it
9	and your testimony is to the effect that the phone
10	call the understanding that you have is that
11	the phone call has already taken place
12	MR. GOULD: Yes.
13	MR. DAVID: and that is the
14	way you understand the language that you've used.
15	MR. GOULD: That's correct.
16	MR. DAVID: If you go to your
17	notes on the next page for June 6th let me
18	first say that on June 5th the confirmation that
19	the call has occurred is coming from Dave Dyet.
20	MR. GOULD: Correct.
21	MR. DAVID: And on June 6th you
22	note call happened, and this confirmation is
23	coming from Barbara Burns.
24	MR. GOULD: Correct.
25	MR. DAVID: Is there any

1	inconsistency in your mind between those two
2	references and the fact that you're noting that
3	the call is confirmed happened
4	MR. GOULD: Not, not in my mind.
5	MR. DAVID: Could you just
6	explain?
7	MR. GOULD: I was still interested
8	in the content of the call, the substance of the
9	conversation, and I phoned Ms Burns. She
10	confirmed that the call happened, was not
11	perhaps had not yet received a briefing, or Ms
12	McCallion had not yet told her she hadn't asked
13	her or thought to tell her what the substance was.
14	I would guess by the fact that there's a phone
15	message there, that I probably said, "Well, can I
16	speak to Ms McCallion about it?" She wasn't
17	available. A phone message went in.
18	MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are
19	my questions.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you,
21	Mr. David.
22	Just wait a second. I'll address
23	the timing issues.
24	It seems to me there's two issues.
25	The first is the time to read the two transcripts.

1	The second, with that in mind, is does Mr. Gould
2	need to stand by in case there are further
3	questions.
4	As a matter of process, one way of
5	dealing with it, which may be the most efficient,
6	would be to take a short break now Ms McCallion
7	is here and to have Mr. David do the
8	examination, his examination, then to take a break
9	for the cross-examinations to give people a chance
10	to read the transcripts, having heard the main
11	examination, may shorten the exercise. That's
12	just a suggestion, and I'm open to suggestions
13	from all counsel.
14	I'd like to finish all of this
15	today.
16	Does anybody disagree with that
17	approach?
18	Okay. Well, then we'll take a
19	ten-minute break right now. Mr. Gould,
20	unfortunately we're going to have to ask you to
21	stand by for some time, and get a newspaper and
22	entertain yourself and we'll resume in ten
23	minutes.
24	Thank you.
25	THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.

StenoTran

1	Upon recessing at 3:46 p.m. /
2	Suspension à 15 h 46
3	Upon resuming at 3:49 p.m.
4	Reprise à 15 h 49
5	THE REGISTRAR: Please, be seated.
6	Veuillez vous asseoir.
7	MR. DAVID: Mr. Commissioner,
8	Ms McCallion is before you, and has testified in
9	camera.
10	THE COMMISSIONER: Good afternoon,
11	Ms McCallion.
12	MS McCALLION: Good afternoon,
13	sir.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: You are still
15	under oath.
16	Go ahead, Mr. David.
17	PREVIOUSLY SWORN: KATHRYN McCALLION
18	EXAMINATION
19	MR. DAVID: Ms McCallion, I'd like
20	to, for the benefit of all present, review briefly
21	your CV, as this is your first appearance in
22	public.
23	Your CV has been filed as
24	exhibit P-85, volume 5, tab 14.
25	MS McCALLION: Okay, yes.

1	MR. DAVID: You have a bachelor's
2	in political science in 1972, and you have a
3	partial completion of a masters in political
4	science from Carleton University.
5	You have been employed by the
6	Department of Foreign Affairs since 1973 ?
7	MS McCALLION: Two.
8	MR. DAVID: Nineteen
9	seventy-two (1972).
LO	And you have been an Assistant
L1	Deputy Minister since 1994.
L2	MS McCALLION: Yes, correct.
L3	MR. DAVID: So for over ten years?
L4	MS McCALLION: That's correct.
L5	MR. DAVID: You are presently
L6	or I should say at the relevant time you were
L7	Assistant Deputy Minister of Consular Affairs,
L8	Corporate Services and Passport since 1999,
L9	September of 1999?
20	MS McCALLION: Yes.
21	MR. DAVID: And previous to that,
22	Ms McCallion, you were also the Assistant Deputy
23	Minister, since the very beginning of 1998, again
24	for consular affairs?
25	MS McCALLION: Yes.

1	MR. DAVID: So in fact, in point
2	of fact, since 1998 you have been Assistant Deputy
3	Minister of Consular Affairs?
4	MS McCALLION: Yes.
5	MR. DAVID: And is this a position
6	that you hold to this day?
7	MS McCALLION: No.
8	MR. DAVID: When did you lose the
9	consular affairs portfolio?
10	MS McCALLION: January 16 of this
11	year.
12	MR. DAVID: Of 2005?
13	MS McCALLION: Of 2005. It was a
14	reorganization of the Department of Foreign
15	Affairs, after the split that the government had
16	announced of DFAIT being split into two
17	departments.
18	MR. DAVID: All right. Can you
19	describe briefly the role the responsibilities
20	attached to your position in terms of the relevant
21	time, in terms of 2002, 2003?
22	MS McCALLION: As it pertains to
23	consular or the whole package?
24	MR. DAVID: No, as it pertains to
25	consular affairs.

1	MS McCALLION: My role was the
2	day-to-day management of the consular bureau as
3	Gar Pardy, who was Director General, it was a
4	direct report. So it was concerning how they
5	spent their money, the staffing actions, all the
6	regular things that go on in a bureau of the
7	department, and at the senior level he reported to
8	me. So it was concerning primarily the day-to-day
9	management of consular affairs.
10	However, I was also briefed
11	regularly on key issues of concern and how they
12	were being managed. Normally, who collectively
13	were managing them; so if you had a crisis, like
14	this last year, the tsunami, then you would have
15	the consular bureau as part of a task force. That
16	task force would be chaired by an ADM, usually an
17	ADM geographic, but I was kept in the loop of
18	where we were, what was happening, in particular
19	if more resources were required or not, as an
20	example.
21	MR. DAVID: So is it that priority
22	files were brought to your attention even though
23	they were consular matters?
24	MS McCALLION: Yes.
25	MR. DAVID: And does Mr. Arar's

1	file fit into that category?
2	MS McCALLION: Yes.
3	MR. DAVID: And when did you
4	become first aware of the Arar file? Obviously
5	there were media reports, and I'm not referring to
6	that. We were well aware of at least since
7	October of 2002, but in terms of your position as
8	Assistant Deputy Minister?
9	MS McCALLION: There would be two
LO	ways of informing me. One is sort of an update on
L1	hot cases, and secondly it would have been the
L2	intensity when he had been deported and we were
L3	trying to get him back.
L4	I distinctly remember being
L5	briefed. He has gone from New York and we have to
L6	find him.
L7	MR. DAVID: So as of at least
L8	October 2002
L9	MS McCALLION: October of 2002.
20	MR. DAVID: you were being
21	briefed more than what the media was reporting in
22	your position as Assistant Deputy Minister?
23	MS McCALLION: Correct.
24	MR. DAVID: Is it fair to say that
25	since that time the Arar file was one of the files

1	that you were regularly briefed on by Mr. Pardy
2	and others?
3	MS McCALLION: Yes.
4	MR. DAVID: Ms McCallion, I don't
5	know if you have had the benefit of hearing
6	today's testimony from Mr. Livermore and
7	Mr. Gould. We have reviewed extensively the June
8	5th memo. I would like you to refer to it
9	briefly.
10	That is found at tab 5 of P-117,
11	volume 2. In fact, it's 75.5.
12	The front page, the first page is
13	the transmittal slip. Your name appears on it,
14	and in fact your signature also appears on this
15	document.
16	My first question to you and I
17	gather you are familiar with the contents of this
18	memo?
19	MS McCALLION: Yes.
20	MR. DAVID: My first question to
21	you: Is there anything unusual in terms of
22	internal processing for this memo to land up on
23	your desk for authorization?
24	MS McCALLION: No.
25	MR. DAVID: Is this in the normal

1	course of business that you would have received
2	such a memo from Mr. Pardy?
3	MS McCALLION: Yes. Yes, sir.
4	MR. DAVID: Were you aware of the
5	background of this memo and by "background", I
6	will define that.
7	We have and it's been filed in
8	fact at tab 3 seen a draft memo, a draft
9	version of this memo that Mr. Pardy wrote that is
10	dated May the 5th, 2003. We have heard also much
11	evidence about meetings that followed the draft
12	memo, the circulation of the draft memo to CSIS
13	and to the RCMP. Meetings occurred to come to a
14	consensus on a course of action.
15	Are you aware of that background
16	to the June 5th memo that came up to you?
17	MS McCALLION: I'm aware of the
18	background. I'm not aware of all of the
19	ramifications or all the details. So the nature
20	of the briefing would have been Mr. Pardy
21	reporting to me what was being attempted and how
22	they were doing it and how they were progressing,
23	but not a blow-by-blow, nor was I at any of the
24	meetings, nor was I asked to be at any of the
25	meetings.

1	MR. DAVID: But you did have a
2	general understanding
3	MS McCALLION: A general
4	understanding that work was proceeding to, to the
5	best of our ability, bring Mr. Arar home and
6	processes and conversations, dialogues between
7	partners were carrying on.
8	MR. DAVID: And was it to your
9	understanding that the process of trying to arrive
10	to a recommended course of action for your
11	Minister involve discussions with the RCMP and
12	with CSIS?
13	MS McCALLION: Yes.
14	MR. DAVID: And was it to your
15	understanding that in fact at one point there was
16	the hope, put it that way, that a joint letter, a
17	joint letter signed by both your Minister and the
18	Solicitor General could be signed and sent over to
19	Syria in terms of an effort of getting Mr. Arar
20	back to Canada?
21	MS McCALLION: That one I'm not as
22	comfortable with agreeing with. I don't recall
23	being told specifically who would sign the letter.
24	I remember we now need to propose a letter. But I
25	can't agree that I knew that it would have two

1	signatures on it.
2	MR. DAVID: All right. Can you
3	tell us the date that this memo ended up in the
4	Minister's office, by looking at the transmittal
5	slip?
6	MS McCALLION: My assumption is it
7	was Monday the 9th.
8	MR. DAVID: And what do you base
9	that on?
LO	MS McCALLION: The date stamp in
L1	the corner.
L2	MR. DAVID: In the right-hand
L3	corner of the box
L4	MS McCALLION: 3/6/9, 11:30, I
L5	think it is.
L6	MR. DAVID: And there's a time
L7	that is indicated.
L8	So that is your understanding of
L9	the date at which it would have arrived at the
20	Minister's office?
21	MS McCALLION: Registered.
22	MR. DAVID: Registered in the
23	Minister's office?
24	MS McCALLION: Right.
25	MR. DAVID: Do you know when this

1	memo left your office to end up in the office of
2	the Deputy Minister?
3	And just to help you or assist
4	you
5	MS McCALLION: It was sometime
6	between Thursday and Friday at close of business.
7	MR. DAVID: Okay. Which brings me
8	to my next question: When did you receive this
9	memo?
10	MS McCALLION: I'm not precisely
11	clear as to when, but it was very around the
12	whole discussion of the phone calls, I received
13	the memo. I did not have the memo sitting in my
14	office gathering dust. So it's with the same
15	timeframe and the same rather vagueness. It was
16	within a day, day and a half.
17	I clearly had asked to see the
18	memo prior to dealing with it, either by a phone
19	call or I couldn't deal with it or sign it if I
20	didn't have it. So where is it? Please get it
21	here.
22	MR. DAVID: So you were expecting
23	this memo?
24	MS McCALLION: Yes.
25	MR. DAVID: And this expectation

1	was created by the fact that Mr. Pardy told you
2	that this memo was coming to you?
3	MS McCALLION: I believe so.
4	MR. DAVID: And you have already
5	mentioned just now that you wanted to read the
6	memo before speaking to Mr. Hooper?
7	MS McCALLION: Correct.
8	MR. DAVID: So am I to understand
9	or are we to understand, I should say, that
10	Mr. Hooper had placed a call to you before you
11	received the memo?
12	MS McCALLION: I really don't
13	recall the exact chronology of this, but around
14	that time I had received a call from Mr. Hooper.
15	I clearly would not have taken the call without
16	knowing why he was calling, and I would normally
17	ask my DG, "Do you know what this is about?"
18	And if it had been about this,
19	which we assume it was, then could you show it
20	to if it's something to be discussed, could I
21	see it and read it before I call back?
22	So that's perfectly normal
23	behaviour.
24	The precision of how it happened
25	in this occasion I'm not as clear on as I would

1	like to be.
2	MR. DAVID: Let's see if I can
3	help you reconstruct that.
4	First of all, did you know who
5	Jack Hooper was?
6	MS McCALLION: Yes.
7	MR. DAVID: Had you ever spoken to
8	Mr. Hooper before?
9	MS McCALLION: I think, as I had
10	said to you previous well, let me repeat
11	myself. I may have, but not on a specific
12	consular case. There are other occasions in
13	Ottawa where ADMs get together and they are on
14	working groups, et cetera, et cetera.
15	MR. DAVID: So not specifically
16	MS McCALLION: Not specifically or
17	this, work-related.
18	MR. DAVID: And you knew
19	Mr. Hooper to have a very senior position within
20	CSIS?
21	MS McCALLION: Yes.
22	MR. DAVID: Can I say that you
23	knew that he was basically the Number 3 man of the
24	organization?
25	MS McCALLION: I would have done

1	it the other way, which is I assumed he was
2	more or less my counterpart.
3	MR. DAVID: Fair enough. Your
4	position as an ADM puts you basically at Number 3
5	position
6	MS McCALLION: Yes.
7	MR. DAVID: within your
8	organization?
9	MS McCALLION: Yes.
10	MR. DAVID: And you understood
11	Mr. Hooper to be your counterpart?
12	MS McCALLION: Yes, without
13	counting.
14	MR. DAVID: Let me now refer you
15	to Barbara Burns, your executive assistant's phone
16	slips for that day.
17	Could you go to tab 15 of P-85,
18	volume 5, please.
19	MS McCALLION: Yes.
20	MR. DAVID: There are two pages in
21	this tab and they are in chronological order, Ms
22	McCallion. The second box has been redacted.
23	However, the date that appears for that on the
24	first page, I'm sorry, if you go to the first
25	page?

1	MS McCALLION: Yes.
2	MR. DAVID: The second box is
3	redacted. It does not concern this inquiry.
4	However, the date that is indicated is June 3rd,
5	2003.
6	The next message, Jack Hooper, is
7	not dated. And the bottom message is dated, and
8	that is June 5th, 2003.
9	So by Ms Burns' reconstruction,
10	she has testified to the fact that this message of
11	Jack Hooper was registered by her no later than
12	June 5th.
13	MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
14	MR. DAVID: And the message reads
15	"For KEM."
16	Is that her common way of
17	addressing you, KEM, on phone slips?
18	MS McCALLION: Yes. We have been
19	together for 13 years and they keep changing my
20	acronym but not my initials.
21	MR. DAVID: So far.
22	MS McCALLION: So far. They are
23	working on that one.
24	MR. DAVID: And the message is:
25	"Jack Hooper CSIS"

1	MS McCALLION: Yes.
2	MR. DAVID: And the message is:
3	"re: Arar"
4	So you knew that Mr. Hooper was
5	calling you about Arar?
6	MS McCALLION: Right.
7	MR. DAVID: Did that puzzle you?
8	MS McCALLION: No.
9	MR. DAVID: At first?
10	MS McCALLION: No.
11	MR. DAVID: Okay. You have
12	mentioned that your position was you are not
13	returning Mr. Hooper's call until you have read
14	the memo?
15	MS McCALLION: Correct.
16	MR. DAVID: So you have made the
17	link between the call and the memo?
18	MS McCALLION: Yes.
19	MR. DAVID: And why?
20	MS McCALLION: Because I knew we
21	were going up to the Minister around that time
22	with the strategy of what next steps we were
23	taking to get Mr. Arar released.
24	MR. DAVID: And you knew that that
25	strategy included a letter to be issued by your

1	Minister to the Foreign Minister of Syria.
2	If you want, I can refer you to
3	the document in question that it is attached to
4	the memo.
5	MS McCALLION: The memo now had
6	the letter. You are asking me did I know in
7	advance? Yes and no. I knew we were going to the
8	Minister with a briefing. I knew we had been
9	asked for one and we had been asked for our
10	strategy and various strategies had been outlined
11	and I probably knew that it had got to the point
12	of sending a letter.
13	MR. DAVID: And there was a letter
14	that was attached to the memo?
15	MS McCALLION: Yes, there was.
16	MR. DAVID: And you read that
17	letter?
18	MS McCALLION: I did.
19	MR. DAVID: And you understood
20	that the letter was going from your Minister to
21	the Foreign Minister of Syria?
22	MS McCALLION: Yes.
23	MR. DAVID: And it included this
24	language that was arrived at by consensus as it
25	was indicated in the memo, that "there was no

1	Canadian government impediment to Mr. Arar's
2	return to Canada"?
3	MS McCALLION: Correct.
4	MR. DAVID: And this you
5	understood to be a language to be coached
6	coached in the sense that it was the product of a
7	consensus between various Canadian government
8	agencies, including CSIS?
9	MS McCALLION: Correct.
LO	MR. DAVID: Including the RCMP?
L1	MS McCALLION: Correct.
L2	MR. DAVID: And obviously DFAIT.
L3	Okay.
L4	Other than the phone slip that we
L5	have just seen, what other heads-up, if any, did
L6	you have that Mr. Hooper was going to call you, or
L7	calling you about Mr. Arar?
L8	MS McCALLION: The best I can
L9	recollect was I was aware that the town was not in
20	agreement at the outset, 100 per cent agreement.
21	Well, I must have been told by someone because I
22	don't have any briefing notes to that effect, that
23	we are trying to get the town to agree and we are
24	working on it but we are not there yet.
25	MS FDWAPDH: Mr Commissioner I

1	didn't understand the word. You are trying to get
2	the "town" to agree?
3	MS McCALLION: I'm sorry. Other
4	departments in Ottawa. Keep your eye on me; I do
5	things like that.
6	So I was aware that it wasn't,
7	what would we say, a done deal at the start; that
8	it was going to take some collaboration and some
9	discussions.
10	MR. DAVID: And that was including
11	on June 5th to be the situation?
12	MS McCALLION: No.
13	MR. DAVID: No?
14	MS McCALLION: By the time I got
15	the memo, I had been told this was an agreed memo.
16	MR. DAVID: And do you recall who
17	told you that?
18	MS McCALLION: Gar.
19	MR. DAVID: Gar Pardy told you
20	that this was now a final product and that you had
21	the green light and this could go ahead?
22	MS McCALLION: From his level.
23	MR. DAVID: From his level.
24	Director General level?
25	MS McCALLION: Director General

1	level.
2	MR. DAVID: Below you?
3	MS McCALLION: They had done their
4	work interdepartmentally. The interdepartmental
5	community could agree with this letter.
6	MR. DAVID: And that was for the
7	interdepartmental community of all the concerned
8	organizations?
9	MS McCALLION: I wasn't in the
10	room, so I'm not sure who was there. I had been
11	following it with CSIS, RCMP. I think other
12	people from the Solicitor General, I believe PCO;
13	but the community of concerned departments.
14	MR. DAVID: And did you understand
15	that on June 5th, when you received this memo,
16	that there were potential outstanding issues in
17	terms of agreement on the manner to proceed?
18	MS McCALLION: No, the contrary.
19	MR. DAVID: The contrary, okay.
20	MS McCALLION: That this was now
21	understood around town, the role that Foreign
22	Affairs was going to take, how they were going to
23	take it, and the content of the letter.
24	MR. DAVID: So did you read the
25	memo hefore returning Mr. Hooper's call?

1	MS McCALLION: I did.
2	MR. DAVID: And do you recall the
3	date that you did that on?
4	MS McCALLION: No.
5	MR. DAVID: No. Did you
6	understand that the processing of the memo, there
7	was some maybe "urgency" is a strong word, but
8	there was some
9	MS McCALLION: Urgent.
10	MR. DAVID: You will qualify it as
11	being urgent?
12	MS McCALLION: Urgency.
13	MR. DAVID: Urgency?
14	MS McCALLION: There was some
15	level of urgency.
16	MR. DAVID: There was some level.
17	And that concern for some urgency in treating of
18	the matter, how did you understand that there was
19	some urgency to dealing with the memo and
20	processing the memo?
21	MS McCALLION: My understanding
22	was the Minister or the Minister's office was
23	asking where are we on the next steps? This was
24	in the public domain at the time, and there was
25	pressure for Ministers to answer questions about

1	what were they doing and how were they doing it.
2	MR. DAVID: And so you understood
3	that your Minister wanted to act in this manner
4	MS McCALLION: A manner.
5	MR. DAVID: I'm sorry?
6	MS McCALLION: He wanted action.
7	This was our recommendation.
8	MR. DAVID: Okay, fine. So he was
9	waiting upon the memo, and he was waiting upon the
10	letter? Yes?
11	MS McCALLION: No.
12	MR. DAVID: No?
13	MS McCALLION: He was waiting for
14	us to suggest something to him. This is what we
15	were suggesting to him.
16	MR. DAVID: Okay, fine. Good
17	enough.
18	Did you have any issues in reading
19	the memo when you read the memo?
20	MS McCALLION: No. Issues? No.
21	I may have asked for clarification, but I don't
22	recall. But it was very clear.
23	MR. DAVID: And did you read the
24	letter?
25	MS McCALLION: Yes.

1	MR. DAVID: And did you agree with
2	the contents, the language of the letter? Did you
3	make any suggestions? Did you seek any
4	clarification as to the letter?
5	MS McCALLION: No.
6	MR. DAVID: Now, before calling
7	Mr. Hooper back, what did you do? Did you try to
8	speak to Gar Pardy?
9	Do you recall having a meeting
10	with Dave Dyet in your office?
11	MS McCALLION: No. But I
12	understand Mr. Dyet recalls having a meeting with
13	me, and therefore we had a meeting. I mean, if
14	Mr. Dyet recalled it, we did.
15	It is customary for me to say,
16	"I've read the memo. What do you want me to know
17	prior to a meeting I'm going to, a briefing I'm
18	going to," and in this case probably prior to the
19	phone call. Background. Like, how did we get to
20	where we are.
21	MR. DAVID: But clearly you
22	understood that there was a link between the memo,
23	the phone call and Mr. Arar?
24	MS McCALLION: Correct.
25	MR. DAVID: And this phone call

1	lasted approximately how long with Mr. Hooper?
2	MS McCALLION: To my best
3	recollection, it was longer than five minutes and
4	it wasn't half an hour, so I would say 15, 20
5	minutes.
6	MR. DAVID: Okay. And clearly you
7	had read the memo?
8	MS McCALLION: Yes.
9	MR. DAVID: And from Mr. Dyet's
10	testimony, you are satisfied that you had sat down
11	with Mr. Dyet previous to calling Mr. Hooper?
12	MS McCALLION: Yes.
13	MR. DAVID: Did you call
14	Mr. Hooper back, or did he call you back to speak
15	to actually
16	MS McCALLION: I believe I called
17	him.
18	MR. DAVID: I would like you now
19	to describe in as much detail as possible the
20	contents of your conversation with Mr. Hooper.
21	MS McCALLION: This isn't as easy
22	as it sounds because it was a general conversation
23	as well as a specific conversation. It was
24	specific, we should be talking about Arar, but
25	rather than talk about the details of Arar, we

1	were talking about the global situation, relations
2	with the United States and other states
3	post-September 11, my role, or the role of Foreign
4	Affairs vis-à-vis our mandate and our obligation
5	on consular affairs, his role and mandate
6	vis-à-vis his obligation as a member of CSIS,
7	previous ways and means of cooperation.
8	Did I understand the full
9	ramifications of promising more than we could
10	deliver or not? Were we clear?
11	It was of that magnitude like,
12	it was of that kind. It was not a specific
13	request. It was not acrimonious. It was not
14	confrontational. It was a dialogue between two
15	ADMs representing two different mandates that were
16	being obliged to work together, and I think it was
17	a verification that I knew what consular was
18	doing, that I understood what the memo was about,
19	and that I was aware of the contents of the memo
20	and the letter. Like, I wasn't just signing
21	something.
22	So to the best of my ability, that
23	was the nature of the conversation.
24	MR. DAVID: So Mr. Hooper was
25	asking you to reflect upon how you do your work in

1	terms of processing this memo?
2	MS McCALLION: No, because that
3	makes it sound like he was questioning how I did
4	my work, and that's not what I said.
5	We were acknowledging that in some
6	instances departmental mandates were not always
7	100 per cent complementary, and that efforts would
8	be made to get them as close as possible,
9	understanding the mandates of each department, why
10	they might be in conflict.
11	For instance, with the RCMP, in
12	previous times with criminal cases the RCMP have
13	been known to be upset when they help put someone
14	in jail, and the first thing that happens is the
15	consular division tries to offer them consular
16	assistance, with or without any prejudice about
17	whether they are or aren't guilty.
18	So I think it was again with CSIS,
19	"This is our mandate, national security. We have
20	to be careful, we have to be thorough." And I'm
21	saying, "I do consular. This person is obliged to
22	get the assistance we are giving." And then we
23	talked about it.
24	MR. DAVID: Let me ask you,
25	Ms McCallion, was it your understanding that when

1	you spoke to Mr. Hooper, he was in possession of
2	the memo?
3	MS McCALLION: No, I don't
4	think I never we never asked whether he
5	agreed to the contents or had seen the memo. The
6	only reassurance was that the contents of the
7	letter as drafted had been sufficiently negotiated
8	that CSIS was not objecting to it.
9	MR. DAVID: So there was reference
10	to the letter?
11	MS McCALLION: No, not
12	specifically. It's, "Are you comfortable with the
13	steps? Do you understand I am sending my memo or
14	my letter up?" That was my job.
15	MR. DAVID: But I just want to
16	understand very clearly here.
17	Mr. Hooper, in his conversation
18	with you, did he understand that there was a
19	letter to be issued by your Minister to Syria?
20	MS McCALLION: Yes. I would say
21	he was.
22	MR. DAVID: And did you understand
23	that he was aware of the language of the letter,
24	the contents of the letter?
25	MS McCALLION: I don't know if he

1	was or not.
2	MR. DAVID: But he was aware of
3	the fact that DFAIT was contemplating this course
4	of action?
5	MS McCALLION: Yes, and that there
6	had been meetings.
7	MR. DAVID: Meetings between
8	MS McCALLION: The agencies.
9	MR. DAVID: The agencies,
LO	including the RCMP, CSIS and DFAIT?
L1	MS McCALLION: Yes.
L2	MR. DAVID: And he made reference
L3	to that course of action?
L4	MS McCALLION: I don't recall. I
L5	don't recall specific step-by-step what the
L6	conversation like, step-by-step.
L7	MR. DAVID: Okay.
L8	MS McCALLION: So my hypothesis is
L9	we were discussing the fact that there had been
20	consultations, things were progressing, and we
21	would be going ahead with our plan of action.
22	MR. DAVID: So one of the things
23	that you have mentioned is that he explained to
24	you CSIS' mandate?
25	MS McCALLION: Yes.

1	MR. DAVID: What did he tell you
2	in that regard?
3	MS McCALLION: It was in general
4	terms; that they have to take great care of
5	national security and that's what their job was.
6	MR. DAVID: And did you not know
7	that already?
8	MS McCALLION: Sure, I did.
9	MR. DAVID: Did you learn anything
10	about CSIS' mandate
11	MS McCALLION: No.
12	MR. DAVID: from Mr. Hooper
13	that day?
14	MS McCALLION: No, nor do I think
15	he learned anything about consular.
16	MR. DAVID: So in terms of an
17	education process between two ADMs, you learned
18	nothing about CSIS' mandate and their role in the
19	Canadian government, and you are saying that he
20	learned nothing about DFAIT's role in the Canadian
21	government and its mandate?
22	MS McCALLION: I think both of us
23	were reassuring each other that we were aware of
24	the issue in the context of our mandates.
25	MR. DAVID: Aware of what issue,

1	Ms McCallion?
2	MS McCALLION: The Arar case.
3	MR. DAVID: The Arar case. So he
4	was contextualizing for you what you should be
5	considering in terms of CSIS' mandate with regard
6	to what you had to decide in terms of processing
7	the memo.
8	MS McCALLION: No. I think it was
9	more an acknowledgment of the mandates on both our
10	parts.
11	MR. DAVID: So what did he want
12	you to acknowledge in terms of CSIS' mandate with
13	regard to what you had to do?
14	MS McCALLION: The role they had
15	been playing up till then in the interdepartmental
16	community. Discussions.
17	MR. DAVID: That doesn't quite
18	answer my question.
19	I mean, you clearly understood
20	what your role was and what DFAIT's mandate was.
21	MS McCALLION: Yes.
22	MR. DAVID: And clearly Mr. Hooper
23	had nothing to tell you about what you had to do
24	in terms of DFAIT's mandate.
25	MS McCALLION: No. I think what

1	I'm trying to say is the discussion was around the
2	fact that in some instances the mandates of the
3	two departments are not necessarily 100 per cent
4	concurrent, and how do we resolve the need
5	again, you have heard it today to speak with
6	one voice. How does the government make sure that
7	all considerations that have to be taken into
8	account have been taken into account?
9	And it was simply, "Are you taking
10	into account?" "Yes." "Are you taking me into
11	account?" "Yes." "Are we still more or less in
12	the middle of the road?" "Yes." "Are we in
13	agreement that what we have done so far we can
14	live with?" "Yes." "Thank you." "Thank you."
15	So it's not a lecture. It's not
16	an instructive thing. It is a reassurance.
17	MR. DAVID: It's a reassurance of
18	what, Ms McCallion?
19	MS McCALLION: Well, I would
20	imagine he was reassuring himself that I was aware
21	of the content of the discussions that had
22	occurred at a junior level and that they weren't
23	actually as easy as they might have been, but they
24	have been resolved.
25	MR. DAVID: But your understanding

1	is that a consensus had been arrived at already.
2	MS McCALLION: Yes.
3	MR. DAVID: That is your
4	understanding?
5	MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
6	MR. DAVID: Was it not
7	Mr. Hooper's understanding?
8	MS McCALLION: I think so.
9	MR. DAVID: So what was the point
10	of his call?
11	MS McCALLION: You will have to
12	ask him.
13	MR. DAVID: And his conversation
14	to you.
15	MS McCALLION: Well, you will have
16	to ask him.
17	MR. DAVID: Did you perceive it as
18	being a pointless call to you?
19	MS McCALLION: No. Reassuring.
20	MR. DAVID: Reassuring for himself
21	or reassuring for you?
22	MS McCALLION: Both of us.
23	MR. DAVID: And how did the call
24	reassure you?
25	MS McCALLION: Because it ended

1	well. "Thank you for calling."
2	MR. DAVID: So you discussed the
3	mandate of CSIS in the context
4	MS McCALLION: In the context of
5	the issue at hand. It was the role and function
6	each of us play, from a slightly different
7	perspective on a very complex issue, that was in
8	the public domain.
9	MR. DAVID: And what did you
LO	explain to him about your mandate?
L1	MS McCALLION: That the memo would
L2	be going forward.
L3	MR. DAVID: You told him that?
L4	MS McCALLION: Yes.
L5	MR. DAVID: You asserted that?
L6	MS McCALLION: Yes.
L7	MR. DAVID: And how did he react
L8	to that?
L9	MS McCALLION: He agreed. He
20	didn't disagree.
21	MR. DAVID: He did not disagree
22	with the fact that your Minister was writing to
23	the Foreign Minister?
24	MS McCALLION: Right.
) 5	MP DAVID: Did he give you any

1	warnings?
2	MS McCALLION: No.
3	MR. DAVID: Did he raise any
4	flags
5	MS McCALLION: This is part of the
6	reassurance because sometimes you can end a phone
7	call with, "Then I'm afraid I will have to have my
8	Minister talk to your Minister" or "My Deputy will
9	talk to your Deputy."
10	And I think both of us were
11	reassured that after our conversation he did not
12	refer it upwards in his system and I did not refer
13	it upwards in my system. I did not debrief
14	upwards on the phone call.
15	MR. DAVID: And what did you
16	discuss concerning Mr. Arar per se? What was
17	shared between the both of you about
18	MS McCALLION: To my recollection,
19	nothing.
20	MR. DAVID: the case?
21	MS McCALLION: Nothing.
22	MR. DAVID: Now, in terms of
23	timing, clearly Mr. Hooper had well-identified the
24	time where this memo was in the machine, if I
25	could say, in terms of processing, and clearly he

1	had identified the person on whose desk the memo
2	was for the purposes of processing?
3	MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
4	MR. DAVID: Did that not strike
5	you as an odd coincidence?
6	MS McCALLION: No.
7	MR. DAVID: Did it not strike you
8	as being perhaps an indirect attempt to influence
9	your decision-making in terms of processing the
LO	memo?
L1	MS McCALLION: I would put it more
L2	that I was willing to listen to him, but I didn't
L3	assume what he was going to say. So I wasn't
L4	surprised he phoned me. I wasn't surprised he
L5	knew where the memo was. I assumed all the DGs
L6	had been told it has been finalized and it is
L7	starting up the system, and each department would
L8	have so informed their immediate superiors. And
L9	if you wanted to touch base, you would.
20	MR. DAVID: But the situation is
21	as follows: The memo is on your desk. It is
22	there for the purposes of your review.
23	MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
24	MR. DAVID: It is there for the
25	purposes of your contribution, and it is there for

1	the purposes of your authorization.
2	MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
3	MR. DAVID: And Mr. Hooper is
4	calling at that exact moment
5	MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
6	MR. DAVID: where it's before
7	you
8	MS McCALLION: Right.
9	MR. DAVID: for that purpose.
10	MS McCALLION: Mm-hmm.
11	MR. DAVID: And on one hand, you
12	understood from your people, Mr. Pardy and others,
13	that a consensus had been arrived at with, amongst
14	others, CSIS?
15	MS McCALLION: Right.
16	MR. DAVID: So in your mind, or in
17	the mind of a reasonable person, I'm asking you:
18	Could it not be understood that Mr. Hooper's call
19	was an attempt to influence your decision-making
20	in terms of the memo?
21	MS McCALLION: Not at all. He was
22	probably phoning to find out if I was going to
23	change the letter. But I don't know. You will
24	have to ask Mr. Hooper. But he did not ask me to
25	change anything.

1	MR. DAVID: Did he refer to the
2	language of the letter?
3	MS McCALLION: Not directly.
4	MR. DAVID: Well, indirectly, how
5	did he refer to it then?
6	MS McCALLION: That we have agreed
7	language around town that we can all live with.
8	MR. DAVID: And this call, to the
9	best of your ability to recall it, lasted from 15
LO	to 20 minutes?
L1	MS McCALLION: Approximately.
L2	MR. DAVID: So if you had to
L3	describe the purpose of the call, Ms McCallion, at
L4	the end of the day, how would you describe the
L5	purpose for that call?
L6	MS McCALLION: He was reassuring
L7	himself I was aware of the intricacies of the job
L8	at hand.
L9	MR. DAVID: That you were aware of
20	the intricacies? In other words, that you were
21	not only
22	MS McCALLION: That I knew this
23	had been talked about around town. It wasn't
24	agreed around town at the beginning. It was
25	difficult. Sensitivities. Did T know there had

1	been a lot of work going into this? An awareness.
2	And I suggest I was.
3	MR. DAVID: So was it to try to
4	make it that the language that the letter
5	contained remained that language and didn't
6	change
7	MS McCALLION: You will have to
8	ask Mr. Hooper. He did not ask me about it.
9	MR. DAVID: Did he tell you that
LO	he was content with the present form of the
L1	letter?
L2	MS McCALLION: No. We did not
L3	discuss happiness, contentment, anything at all of
L4	that nature.
L5	MR. DAVID: Did he tell you that
L6	the language in its present form, as it was
L7	attached to the memo, was satisfactory to CSIS?
L8	MS McCALLION: Not to my
L9	recollection.
20	MR. DAVID: Did he tell you that
21	any other language would not be satisfactory and
22	there would be no consensus if any other language
23	was considered?
24	MS McCALLION: I don't recall that
) 5	he did

1	Pause
2	MR. DAVID: It was understood by
3	you, Ms McCallion, that the language was an
4	agreed-upon language in town, as you say?
5	MS McCALLION: Yes.
6	MR. DAVID: And it was also your
7	understanding that Mr. Hooper understood that it
8	was agreed-upon language
9	MS McCALLION: Yes.
10	MR. DAVID: when he called you?
11	MS McCALLION: Yes.
12	MR. DAVID: That was his
13	understanding?
14	MS McCALLION: That was my
15	understanding of his understanding.
16	MR. DAVID: So, again, what is the
17	point of the call?
18	MS McCALLION: You will have to
19	ask him. He initiated the call. We had the call.
20	I left the call not briefing up not worried I
21	had signed or was signing the memo. And to be
22	brutal, as far as I was concerned, that was it.
23	MR. DAVID: And so you informed
24	Mr. Hooper
25	MS Machilion: We didn't we

1	didn't plan to meet again, talk again. We had our
2	conversation. It was very cordial and very
3	professional, and we hung up.
4	MR. DAVID: And did you gain any
5	additional understanding from anything Mr. Hooper
6	said to you?
7	MS McCALLION: Hard to say. Hard
8	to say what I knew. Hard to say what I had
9	also been responsible for Passport, so I was very
10	aware of the ramifications of September 11th
11	internationally. Maybe he didn't know that I knew
12	that. I don't know. You will have to ask.
13	MR. DAVID: Did Mr. Hooper
14	acknowledge in any way that he was better educated
15	about DFAIT's mandate following your call, your
16	conversation?
17	MS McCALLION: Not to me, he
18	didn't.
19	MR. DAVID: I would like to bring
20	you to Mr. Gould's notes, Ms McCallion. This is
21	P-236.
22	MS McCALLION: No, I don't have
23	that. Or if I do, it's gone.
24	All right, I have it.
25	MR. DAVID: Could you go to page 9

1	of 16 at tab 1.
2	These are Mr. Gould's notes. You
3	know who Mr. Gould is. He is an officer within
4	ISI. He is the Deputy Director of ISI.
5	He notes the following on June
6	5th. It's at the top and it's ii:
7	"Call from Jack Hooper ADDO
8	to MKM saying that CSIS
9	doesn't want us to get Arar
10	back in the country as they
11	would have to devote too many
12	resources to watching him."
13	Did Mr. Hooper refer to the lack
14	of CSIS resources in terms of watching Arar if he
15	was to come back to Canada?
16	MS McCALLION: Not to my
17	recollection, no.
18	MR. DAVID: Did Mr. Hooper mention
19	to you that CSIS didn't want Mr. Arar back in the
20	country?
21	MS McCALLION: No.
22	MR. DAVID: To your knowledge,
23	Ms McCallion, had a member of CSIS ever called you
24	before about a consular case?
25	MS McCALLION: Not to my

1	recollection.
2	MR. DAVID: I would like to bring
3	you now to tab you have the Volume in front of
4	you. It's P-85, volume 5, tab 15. It's the phone
5	slips from Ms Barbara Burns.
6	If you could go to the second
7	page, the top message, it says "KEM" and it's
8	dated June the 6th, from Jim Gould, ISI. And,
9	again, the message in terms of content is "Re your
10	phone call with CSIS on Arar".
11	Did you have any conversation, to
12	your recollection, with Jim Gould concerning this
13	call?
14	MS McCALLION: No, I didn't.
15	MR. DAVID: Did you discuss the
16	call with anybody?
17	MS McCALLION: No.
18	MR. DAVID: Did you discuss the
19	call with Mr. Pardy, with Mr. Heatherington, with
20	Mr. Gould?
21	MS McCALLION: To the best of my
22	recollection, I never discussed the content with
23	anyone and discussed the fact that it had occurred
24	and the memo had gone forward with someone in
25	consular.

1	MR. DAVID: With some what?
2	MS McCALLION: Someone in
3	consular. And my understanding now is Gar Pardy
4	had left, so it would have been Dave Dyet.
5	I had the conversation. I've
6	signed the memo. It has left my office.
7	MR. DAVID: And did you take any
8	actions of any kind following the phone call with
9	Mr. Hooper?
10	MS McCALLION: No.
11	MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are
12	my questions.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Should we take
14	a break?
15	How long do you think it might be
16	Ms Edwardh?
17	MS EDWARDH: Could we have 20
18	minutes?
19	THE COMMISSIONER: Sure.
20	MS EDWARDH: I think I have found
21	the portions of the conversation that I need to
22	read, and then I will be able to proceed.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
24	And, Mr. Shore, you were going to
25	read the transcript. That will give you enough

1	time, I take it?
2	MR. SHORE: Yes, I've read what I
3	have to read. I will have some examination for
4	Mr. Gould.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: You will?
6	MR. SHORE: But brief. Yes. I'm
7	sorry to surprise you, but it won't be lengthy.
8	THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
9	We will break for 20 minutes.
LO	Upon recessing at 4:39 p.m. /
L1	Suspension à 16 h 39
L2	Upon resuming at 5:00 p.m. /
L3	Reprise à 17 h 00
L4	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. David.
L5	MR. DAVID: Thank you.
L6	Ms Edwardh, I have one more
L7	question for Ms McCallion.
L8	I just want to clarify a point,
L9	Ms McCallion.
20	After the phone call with
21	Mr. Hooper, I understand you did speak to the
22	matter to Mr. Dyet; that you confirm that the call
23	had taken place?
24	MS McCALLION: To the best of my
25	recollection, I informed consular that the call

1	had taken place and the memo had been signed. I
2	don't recall who I spoke to.
3	They were the originators of the
4	memo. They should not expect it back.
5	MR. DAVID: Assuming that
6	Mr. Pardy was away, was the next in line be Dave
7	Dyet?
8	MS McCALLION: Yes.
9	MR. DAVID: Not being 100 per cent
10	sure as to who you spoke to from consular that day
11	about the memo, processing the memo and the phone
12	call, did you describe to the person your
13	discussions with Mr. Hooper?
14	MS McCALLION: No.
15	MR. DAVID: And provide content
16	about the discussion?
17	MS McCALLION: No.
18	MR. DAVID: Thank you.
19	EXAMINATION
20	MS EDWARDH: Good afternoon,
21	Ms McCallion. My name is Marlys Edwardh. I
22	represent Maher Arar.
23	Why didn't you discuss the content
24	of the conversation with anyone? Is there any
25	reason?

1	MS McCALLION: It didn't affect
2	the actions being taken.
3	MS EDWARDH: For that reason you
4	treated the matter as confidential?
5	MS McCALLION: No. More did it,
6	done it, finished. It didn't affect what was
7	taking place.
8	MS EDWARDH: Let me ask you a
9	couple of questions.
10	This telephone call you have
11	described as being relatively short, something
12	less than 30 minutes, probably closer to 15 or 20?
13	MS McCALLION: I described it that
14	way, yes; not short, but about that length.
15	MS EDWARDH: I take it, from the
16	absence of any notes that you have referred to,
17	you didn't make any notes at all of the
18	conversation with Mr. Hooper.
19	MS McCALLION: I made no notes.
20	MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry?
21	MS McCALLION: I made no notes.
22	MS EDWARDH: Nor did you dictate
23	any report in respect of that contact or provide
24	any information to anyone who was your superior in
25	the department.

1	MS McCALLION: Yes, correct.
2	MS EDWARDH: You have described
3	yourself as having been kept abreast of
4	developments, at least in general terms, as they
5	related to Maher Arar. In particular, it is my
6	understanding that you met with or were briefed by
7	Mr. Pardy on a fairly regular basis.
8	Is that a fair statement?
9	MS McCALLION: Yes.
LO	MS EDWARDH: Would you also agree
L1	with me that Mr. Pardy is a man who makes clear
L2	generally his views of the matter? He is a blunt
L3	man.
L4	MS McCALLION: You could describe
L5	him that way.
L6	MS EDWARDH: In his memorandum
L7	before we get to his memorandum, I take it you
L8	knew that he was aware and had struggled with
L9	issues around differing views of Mr. Arar for some
20	time.
21	MS McCALLION: Differing views of
22	an approach to the case.
23	MS EDWARDH: Fair enough.
24	Differing views of an approach to the case.
)5	Would it he fair to gay that

1	Mr. Pardy undertook his consular obligations with
2	vigour and was fairly aggressive in his insistence
3	that consular services be provided to individuals,
4	regardless of their status?
5	MS McCALLION: Yes.
6	MS EDWARDH: He was a person
7	and you adverted to some difficulty in the past
8	with RCMP struggling to put someone in jail only
9	to have people like Mr. Pardy enthusiastically
10	throw themselves into positions of assisting. And
11	I think it is obvious that that happened
12	particularly in cases, for example, dealing with
13	death penalties in the United States. He was
14	active in trying to assist people and indeed
15	solicited the participation of the department in
16	those areas.
17	MS McCALLION: Well, if you will
18	excuse me, you are editorializing. If you are
19	asking about Mr. Pardy and his work habits
20	MS EDWARDH: Yes.
21	MS McCALLION: He was a committed
22	officer. He was very good. He was enthusiastic.
23	And he was persistent in trying to achieve his
24	goals.
25	MS EDWARDH: He was persistent in

1	defining the right of a Canadian to have access to
2	consular services.
3	MS McCALLION: Yes, because that
4	is our mandate.
5	MS EDWARDH: He had, had he not,
6	conveyed to you at least in general terms what the
7	differing views were as to the "approaches" that
8	should be taken to the case of Maher Arar?
9	MS McCALLION: No. He had
LO	referred to the fact that there was not a
L1	consistent approach around town.
L2	MS EDWARDH: Did you not at that
L3	time ask him what was the inconsistency and
L4	whether or not it formed an impediment to the
L5	actions that fell within your mandate?
L6	MS McCALLION: One of the things
L7	that concerned me is there were other players
L8	i.e., there were two other governments involved.
L9	So it was not only Ottawa.
20	And yes, there were issues of
21	coordination of federal departments around this
22	case.
23	MS EDWARDH: So you have other
24	governments and other departments.
25	MS McCALLION: Correct.

1	MS EDWARDH: That are players in
2	the Maher Arar case.
3	MS McCALLION: Correct.
4	MS EDWARDH: Leaving aside for the
5	moment other governments, Mr. Pardy, did he not,
6	speak to you generally about the issues of
7	divergence as it related to the players within the
8	Government of Canada?
9	MS McCALLION: Yes.
10	MS EDWARDH: Could you recount for
11	us what his descriptions, not necessarily in this
12	memo but over the months or so leading up to this
13	memo, what were his descriptions of the divergence
14	with respect to the Canadian government players,
15	starting with DFAIT.
16	MS McCALLION: I would simply say
17	it was how much was known and who knew what. I
18	did not go to those meetings and therefore it was
19	national security.
20	But who came at it from their
21	mandate and why.
22	MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry, I am
23	having trouble understanding that.
24	MS McCALLION: CSIS is in charge
25	of national security.

1	MS EDWARDH: Correct. RCMP is
2	supposed to conduct criminal
3	MS McCALLION: Criminal behaviour,
4	domestic criminal behaviour.
5	MS EDWARDH: Yes. They are at the
6	table.
7	MS McCALLION: They are at the
8	table.
9	MS EDWARDH: Right. And they have
10	a different approach, according to what you just
11	said.
12	MS McCALLION: Concerns, concerns.
13	MS EDWARDH: Well, you said
14	MS McCALLION: And approach.
15	Concerns around how the government as a whole
16	would approach the case.
17	MS EDWARDH: Right. It is not
18	probably uncommon for one department to think that
19	its view of the matter ought to prevail over
20	others, but nonetheless they are forced into the
21	position of recognizing that you speak for
22	consular services and are in charge of how they
23	will be delivered to a particular Canadian.
24	MS McCALLION: Correct.
25	MS EDWARDH: What I am trying to

1	capture is I don't have a handle and I know it
2	is late in the date on what those divergences
3	were.
4	MS McCALLION: I didn't get a
5	detailed list. It was in the hands of, not only
6	Mr. Pardy, but other parts of the department.
7	MS EDWARDH: Certainly, though,
8	one of the things you knew was that that
9	divergence was an impediment for Mr. Pardy to
10	gather together an intergovernmental consensus.
11	He made that clear to you.
12	MS McCALLION: I wouldn't use the
13	word "impediment". I think he was talking about
14	the process he was going through.
15	MS EDWARDH: Let's look at his
16	memo.
17	I don't use the word "impediment"
18	loosely.
19	If you go to 75.5 we will get
20	that for you.
21	This is Exhibit P-117,
22	Mr. Commissioner.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: I have it.
24	MS McCALLION: It is No. 5 here?
25	MS EDWARDH: Yes, that is correct.

1	This memo, which is ultimately
2	proposing a letter written only by Minister Graham
3	to his counterpart, has two interesting comments
4	that Mr. Pardy makes, to make sure you understand
5	the context, I think.
6	In paragraph 11 at page 4 of the
7	memorandum, Ms McCallion, it says:
8	"CSIS officials visited Syria
9	earlier this year and
10	discussed Mr. Arar with their
11	counterparts. They did not
12	meet Mr. Arar. Subsequent to
13	these discussions, Syrian
14	officials informed us that
15	they were informed by CSIS
16	officials that Canada did not
17	want to have Mr. Arar
18	returned. The CSIS officials
19	denied that they had said
20	this to the Syrians."
21	So there is a tension in
22	communication.
23	MS McCALLION: When I read this,
24	it was clear. You asked me if Gar told me these
25	things in his regular briefings, and I said no. he

1	did not go into it in great detail.
2	By the time I reached this memo,
3	it was very clear in para 11.
4	MS EDWARDH: Right. Now let's go
5	to paragraph 13:
6	"In recent days, we have
7	discussed the case with both
8	CSIS and the RCMP. They have
9	maintained their positions
10	that Mr. Arar, while not
11	under investigation in
12	Canada, is a person of
13	interest to them because of
14	the evidence of his
15	connections with others who
16	are. In these circumstances,
17	they will not provide any
18	direct support in having Mr.
19	Arar returned to Canada."
20	Clearly, I am going to suggest
21	that Mr. Pardy is making as obvious as can be that
22	after discussions, interdepartmental discussions
23	with the RCMP and CSIS, CSIS is not willing to
24	provide any direct assistance.
25	Is that fair? You don't draw any

1	different meaning from those words?
2	MS McCALLION: My interpretation
3	of it now from then, my understanding was that
4	they were no longer in a discussion about whether
5	their minister would sign a document.
6	MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry?
7	MS McCALLION: There was a
8	proposal that the Solicitor General would co-sign
9	the letter.
10	MS EDWARDH: Yes.
11	MS McCALLION: Withdrawing their
12	agreement to co-sign that letter could be deemed
13	that they would not offer support.
14	MS EDWARDH: So you were aware
15	that Mr. Pardy had made his best efforts to try
16	and see if a co-signed letter could go forward.
17	When you read this specific reference, you
18	understood that that proposal had gone by the
19	board. It was now dead.
20	MS McCALLION: All of this
21	happened around the time I got the memo. I was
22	not told most of this I understood you were
23	asking Mr. Pardy's frequent or regular briefings
24	to me, in what detail did they go into.
25	MS EDWARDH: No. I am asking

1	you
2	MS McCALLION: Hardly any. I was
3	aware of the case. I was kept abreast of the fact
4	that there was a case, the fact that it was
5	causing some concern.
6	MS EDWARDH: Ms McCallion, you
7	were the one who just testified that in reading
8	the language "they will not provide any direct
9	support in having Mr. Arar returned to Canada",
10	you were the one who said you understood that this
11	meant
12	MS McCALLION: No. I did when I
13	read it.
14	MS EDWARDH: Yes, at the time you
15	read it.
16	MS McCALLION: At the time I read
17	it.
18	MS EDWARDH: That this referred to
19	the letter that you had understood might be
20	co-signed and that it was no longer going forward.
21	MS McCALLION: No longer co-signed
22	and now we had the one that was attached.
23	MS EDWARDH: Right.
24	MS McCALLION: With agreed
25	wordings.

1	MS EDWARDH: So you understood
2	that when you read it.
3	And of course, I suppose it was a
4	an earlier briefing that you had been informed
5	about the co-signing process
6	MS McCALLION: No.
7	MS EDWARDH: because it is not
8	here. So it must have come from Mr. Pardy on an
9	earlier occasion.
10	MS McCALLION: Or at the time I
11	asked Mr. Dyet to talk to me.
12	MS EDWARDH: All right.
13	MS McCALLION: I don't recall
14	being involved in any great detail up until I was
15	asked to sign this memo.
16	MS EDWARDH: In any event, upon
17	receiving this and being confronted with this
18	choice
19	MS McCALLION: What does this
20	mean?
21	MS EDWARDH: You understood.
22	MS McCALLION: Yes.
23	MS EDWARDH: So then Mr. Pardy
24	goes:
25	"As such, the best we can

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1	do"
2	And that is, of course, DFAIT, the
3	best DFAIT can do. I think that is obvious there.
4	MS McCALLION: Right.
5	MS EDWARDH: " in these
6	circumstances is to again
7	raise the matter direct with
8	the Syrian Foreign Minister
9	and to that end we have
10	attached a letter for your
11	signature."
12	So it is quite clear that the
13	collaborative process has ended insofar as a joint
14	letter, and now there is a single letter going
15	from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to his
16	counterpart, and that is what has been left out of
17	this negotiation.
18	Is that fair?
19	MS McCALLION: It is an
20	interpretation.
21	MS EDWARDH: Did you interpret it
22	in any different way?
23	MS McCALLION: I don't recall
24	interpreting it either way.
25	MS FDWARDH: All right But you

1	certainly do know that CSIS and the RCMP are not
2	involved in any joint effort by way of a letter
3	where the Solicitor General will sign. That is a
4	given.
5	MS McCALLION: Yes. If I would
6	have been asked this is when the
7	"plus-que-parfait" always comes in handy I
8	would not have recommended asking for more than
9	one signature of one Minister.
10	I support others who have said it
11	is very complicated; it is not normal; we
12	shouldn't go there. The Minister of Foreign
13	Affairs had the direct responsibility and could
14	use that responsibility that rested in him by
15	virtue of the Foreign Affairs Act to send the
16	letter.
17	MS EDWARDH: But I take it you
18	were not asked.
19	MS McCALLION: I was not
20	consulted. My advice would have been this is
21	fine.
22	MS EDWARDH: I hear what you said
23	you would have said had you been asked, and we
24	will come back to that. I take it that it is very
25	clear from your evidence to date that you were not

1	asked.
2	MS McCALLION: Not asked.
3	MS EDWARDH: Mr. Pardy has
4	undoubtedly alerted you that this memo and letter
5	are coming.
6	MS McCALLION: Correct.
7	MS EDWARDH: I am going to suggest
8	to you that it is obvious that he, at least, is
9	not satisfied with the language of the letter. He
10	would have liked it to be more fulsome.
11	MS McCALLION: Okay.
12	MS EDWARDH: Would you agree with
13	that?
14	MS McCALLION: Probably.
15	MS EDWARDH: Thank you.
16	It is my understanding that
17	Mr. Pardy, prior to his departure, had at least
18	given you a heads-up that maybe Mr. Hooper would
19	contact you.
20	MS McCALLION: Yes.
21	MS EDWARDH: So you knew that this
22	matter retained some delicacy from CSIS'
23	perspective.
24	MS McCALLION: Okay.
25	MS FDWAPDH: They thought it was a

1	complex case, and even though they had written
2	themselves out of the letter, they had concerns
3	that they wanted you to be aware of.
4	MS McCALLION: Correct.
5	MS EDWARDH: When you looked at
6	that letter and you will find it at tab 439 of
7	volume 5 of the do you have it there?
8	No, not that volume. Let me get
9	you another volume.
10	MS McCALLION: No problem. Which
11	tab is it?
12	MS EDWARDH: It is tab 339.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Tab 439, I
14	think.
15	MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry, 439,
16	Mr. Commissioner.
17	MS McCALLION: I have it.
18	MS EDWARDH: The letter that you
19	agree that you will sign on to for the Minister's
20	consideration makes a very limited statement, and
21	I quote from the second paragraph:
22	"I assure you there is no
23	Canadian government
24	impediment to Mr. Arar's
25	return to Canada."

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1	It doesn't say anything about the
2	fact that he is not wanted or anything like that
3	in Canada.
4	That observation did not escape
5	you. It is a limited statement for the Minister
6	to make.
7	MS McCALLION: It is a correct
8	statement at the time.
9	MS EDWARDH: It could have said
10	Mr. Arar is facing no criminal charges in Canada.
11	Mr. Arar is a long-time resident; he has a wife
12	and family, blah, blah, blah. It could have said
13	all sorts of things.
14	This assertion on behalf of the
15	Government of Canada that there is no impediment
16	is a very limited statement of support that
17	represents the consensus reached.
18	MS McCALLION: It was a sentence
19	agreed to by consensus among the agencies, yes.
20	MS EDWARDH: That's right.
21	When you mean that it was a
22	sentence agreed to by consensus, it is fair to say
23	it was negotiated to the extent that no one
24	department took offence or was upset or disagreed
25	with the character of the letter going from the

1	Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2	MS McCALLION: If you look at it
3	from a different perspective, it is very rare for
4	the Minister to take a unilateral action when
5	other agencies are concerned. Therefore, we
6	consult with other agencies. We take on board
7	their views, and we do the best we can to
8	represent one voice, one view, when it goes to a
9	Cabinet Minister.
10	MS EDWARDH: I hear you saying
11	and I am interpreting something of what you are
12	saying, Ms McCallion that the contents of the
13	letter, be what they may be, are designed to
14	accommodate the concerns of entities outside the
15	Department of Foreign Affairs.
16	MS McCALLION: They are designed
17	to reflect the collective view of the Cabinet,
18	Cabinet Ministers and their concerns.
19	MS EDWARDH: Certainly it is not
20	simply the Minister of Foreign Affairs
21	MS McCALLION: He was writing on
22	behalf of the federal government.
23	MS EDWARDH: I see. So by
24	definition, then, must accommodate the concerns of
25	the Solicitor General. CSIS and the RCMP.

1	MS McCALLION: To the best of his
2	capacity.
3	MS EDWARDH: Yes. Knowing as you
4	did that Mr. Pardy felt the letter was a little on
5	the inadequate side, and knowing as you did that
6	he gave you a heads-up that Mr. Hooper may be
7	knocking on your door, don't you think it is fair
8	for us who were observers of this to see
9	Mr. Hooper's telephone call, as you have described
10	it, as a way of ensuring that this letter doesn't
11	change?
12	Let me give you an example.
13	Mr. Hooper conveyed to you in
14	general terms leave aside the precise words
15	that this has been the product of hard work.
16	Correct?
17	I thought that is what you said;
18	that Mr. Hooper had conveyed
19	MS McCALLION: I am waiting for
20	the next
21	MS EDWARDH: No, no. The question
22	is
23	MS McCALLION: This is the result
24	of collaboration
25	THE COMMISSIONER: Ms McCallion.

1	please just listen to me.
2	You will help this process if you
3	listen to the question and answer the questions
4	directly. This is not a fencing contest between
5	you and Ms Edwardh. She is asking clear
6	questions, and it will help me if you try to
7	answer them clearly. Thank you.
8	MS EDWARDH: I gathered from what
9	you testified to, Mr. McCallion, that Mr. Hooper
10	in the conversation said that this letter that was
11	now before you had been the product of hard work
12	on an inter-agency basis.
13	MS McCALLION: Yes.
14	MS EDWARDH: And that it had been
15	difficult to define a consensus that was
16	acceptable to the agencies, to everyone.
17	MS McCALLION: That is my
18	understanding.
19	MS EDWARDH: That is the effect he
20	left you with. That is the understanding he left
21	you with from his words.
22	MS McCALLION: That is my
23	understanding.
24	MS EDWARDH: He also, I think,
25	conveyed to you then, in a discussion of the

1	mandate of CSIS the general concerns CSIS had
2	about such complex security cases.
3	MS McCALLION: Yes.
4	MS EDWARDH: I am going to suggest
5	to you that the effect of conveying the extent of
6	the complexity was to share with you why he felt
7	the agency couldn't go any further, why it
8	couldn't be more of a participant; that he felt
9	they had done their best.
10	MS McCALLION: He didn't put it
11	that way, nor did I hear him say that.
12	MS EDWARDH: What was your
13	understanding of why he was telling you that this
14	letter was in fact the product of hard work and
15	cooperation?
16	MS McCALLION: I can't tell you
17	that.
18	MS EDWARDH: If you go back then,
19	in addition to talking about this being the
20	product of hard work and cooperation, you did also
21	say in your testimony that you and he discussed
22	your respective mandates.
23	MS McCALLION: Correct.
24	MS EDWARDH: I take it from that,
25	Ms McCallion, that in no uncertain terms you said

1	listen, consular affairs belong to us. We have an
2	obligation to a Canadian citizen. And this
3	letter, with this language, is going to go
4	forward.
5	MS McCALLION: I believe I was a
6	little more subtle than that, but that was the
7	message I imparted.
8	MS EDWARDH: Yes. What he
9	conveyed to you was that it was only this kind of
10	letter that could go forward.
11	MS McCALLION: No. He conveyed to
12	me the mandate of CSIS above all is the security
13	of Canadians in general an larger terms and that
14	individual cases are taken in that context.
15	MS EDWARDH: And therefore?
16	And therefore what?
17	MS McCALLION: I agreed.
18	MS EDWARDH: And therefore?
19	MS McCALLION: There was no
20	"therefore".
21	MS EDWARDH: Do you have any
22	information that after your conversation with
23	Mr. Hooper, because you signed off on this letter
24	and the Deputy signed off on this letter, this
25	letter dies. This letter doesn't go. No one ever

1	sends this letter.
2	Do you have any knowledge of
3	whether anyone else at CSIS spoke to any of your
4	superiors to say, "Better not this letter", so
5	that the only entity in Canada who could resolve
6	the dispute between CSIS and the RCMP and DFAIT
7	was the Prime Minister's Office?
8	MS McCALLION: I have no
9	knowledge. That was your question? I don't know.
10	MS EDWARDH: You have no
11	knowledge?
12	MS McCALLION: I have no
13	knowledge.
14	MS EDWARDH: Do you know how the
15	letter that was the product of such efforts and
16	hard work, do you know how it just died on the
17	vine?
18	MS McCALLION: No, I don't know.
19	MS EDWARDH: When the letter just
20	simply died on the vine, given the urgency that
21	you have described I don't want to over
22	emphasize it given the hard work to make it a
23	product, did you every inquire as to why it died
24	on the vine or who killed it?
25	MS McCALLION: My understanding

1	Commissioner, I have to object to
2	the premise of these questions. We have heard
3	evidence that the Minister sent it back with
4	changed wording. It didn't die on the vine. I
5	refer you to tab 75.6.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: I think that is
7	fair.
8	MS McISAAC: That's fair.
9	MS EDWARDH: If you turn to
10	tab 6
11	MS McCALLION: Which book, please?
12	MS EDWARDH: The one that has the
13	coloured tab.
14	MS McCALLION: The same one?
15	MS EDWARDH: Yes.
16	MS McCALLION: Okay.
17	MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry, it is the
18	large book. No, I'm sorry. You don't have it.
19	MS McCALLION: This one?
20	MS EDWARDH: It says Exhibit
21	P-117. I think you have it.
22	MS McCALLION: Yes, I have it.
23	MS EDWARDH: Do you get a copy of
24	this?
25	MS McCALLION: MKM C4 is my

1	office. It is not my personal it is not my
2	personal computer. It is my office.
3	MS EDWARDH: But having signed off
4	on the memorandum, I take it that this coming back
5	recommending changes would be of concern to you?
6	Or is it your evidence that
7	MS McCALLION: To be fair, I don't
8	recall seeing this, but yes, my office is on the
9	distribution list.
LO	MS EDWARDH: Do you recall
L1	participating, then, in any further discussions to
L2	try to resolve the issue that is created in this
L3	memorandum from the Minister's office saying they
L4	want more in the letter?
L5	MS McCALLION: I did not
L6	participate in any further discussions.
L7	MS EDWARDH: Were you alive to the
L8	fact that Mr. Pardy, who receives this memorandum,
L9	participated in further discussions? Did he
20	brief you with respect to those?
21	MS McCALLION: No, he didn't.
22	MS EDWARDH: So then we take it
23	that you were not involved in any further respect
24	in trying to build a consensus or a bridge in
) 5	respect of the differing views of the government?

1	MS McCALLION: Correct.
2	MS EDWARDH: Would you not have
3	been the I'm just trying to understand the
4	hierarchy and its respective responsibilities and
5	duties.
6	Is there some reason why you
7	wouldn't be the person who is having discussions
8	with your counterpart as an ADM with CSIS about
9	this
10	MS McCALLION: My understanding,
11	this was now over in Mr. Wright's shop.
12	MS EDWARDH: For the record's
13	sake, this is Mr. Wright, this is
14	MS McCALLION: The ISD world.
15	MS EDWARDH: So then he would have
16	handled the negotiations. Is that your
17	understanding?
18	MS McCALLION: I don't know if he
19	did or not.
20	Pause
21	MS EDWARDH: Those are my
22	questions.
23	Thank you.
24	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
25	Ms McIsaac?

1	MS McISAAC: Thank you, sir.
2	EXAMINATION
3	MS McISAAC: Just a couple of
4	questions, Ms McCallion.
5	Did Mr. Hooper ask you not to send
6	the memorandum up the chain of command to the
7	Deputy Minister and the Minister?
8	MS McCALLION: No, he did not.
9	MS McISAAC: Had there been
10	anything in the conversation you had with
11	Mr. Hooper to suggest that CSIS was going to take
12	the matter further, what would you have done?
13	MS McCALLION: I would have held
14	the memo, I would have asked for further
15	clarifications. Probably I would have asked
16	Mr. Hooper if we could have worked it out at our
17	level, I would have asked Gar or his deputy to
18	assist, and I would have let Gaetan know that we
19	had problems.
20	MS McISAAC: By saying "Gaetan",
21	you mean
22	MS McCALLION: The Deputy
23	Minister.
24	MS McISAAC: the Deputy
25	Minister Gaetan Lavertu.

1	And you didn't do any of those
2	things?
3	MS McCALLION: I didn't do any of
4	those things.
5	MS McISAAC: Thank you very much.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Shore?
7	EXAMINATION
8	MR. SHORE: Ms McCallion, you have
9	indicated that the discussion was both specific
10	and general with Mr. Hooper. There was some
11	specifics with regard to Arar, there was some
12	generalities with regard to the sensitivities of
13	the case, the high profit nature of the case, the
14	respective mandates in cases of this nature.
15	MS McCALLION: Correct.
16	MR. SHORE: Is that right?
17	You may not remember this because
18	you didn't make notes, but was part of
19	Mr. Hooper's concern that there were other cases
20	coming down the chute that were also sensitive,
21	difficult, high profile cases, dual national
22	Canadians in the post-9/11 era incarcerated
23	abroad?
24	MS McCALLION: I would agree that
25	we discussed that

1	MR. SHORE: And although you had
2	never spoken to him before, this was an
3	opportunity to sort of launch a new era with
4	regard to dealing with these difficult cases,
5	because
6	MS McCALLION: If I could change
7	the tense
8	MR. SHORE: Sure.
9	MS McCALLION: I would say we
LO	were in the new era and finding it difficult and
L1	trying to find ways of making it work.
L2	MR. SHORE: Right. As you
L3	indicated, there were a lot of difficulties in
L4	arriving at the negotiated language that was
L5	finally arrived at in this matter and Mr. Hooper's
L6	concern, if you recall, was to ensure that in the
L7	future the various departments could work together
L8	collaboratively to try and do it a little more
L9	smoothly?
20	MS McCALLION: I don't recall if
21	he said that, but I could agree that that was part
22	of the tenor of the kind of discussion we were
23	having.
24	MR. SHORE: Right. That was the
25	general nature. Of course the hook to talk to you

1	was the talk about Arar, because that was the case
2	that was presently receiving the high profile
3	interest.
4	MR. SHORE: I think we were both
5	concerned. There was political concern about the
6	departments getting along, as well as senior level
7	concern.
8	MR. SHORE: Right. This was a
9	matter in the press
10	MS McCALLION: In the public
11	record, absolutely.
12	MR. SHORE: it was high
13	profile. And there were other cases that DFAIT
14	and RCMP, CSIS, PCO were going to be involved in
15	and this was sort of an opening salvo, "Let's get
16	together on this stuff in a better way in the
17	future", and that is why perhaps the call went to
18	you as opposed to somebody else at
19	MS McCALLION: Again, I took the
20	call. I don't know why he chose to call me.
21	MR. SHORE: He will testify as
22	to that. But you are at equal levels, as you
23	indicated, counterparts without counting, as you
24	said.

25

So I think you have already told

1	us, he didn't ask you to do or not to do anything.
2	He made no request of you to perform or not
3	perform
4	MS McCALLION: No, he didn't
5	MR. SHORE: your function.
6	You indicated that you had no
7	discussions with anyone with regard to the content
8	of the phone call.
9	MS McCALLION: Correct.
10	MR. SHORE: You did have
11	discussion perhaps you are not sure with whom,
12	but I think you said Dave Dyet that the call
13	occurred, and you probably discussed it with
14	Barbara Burns that the call occurred.
15	MS McCALLION: She knew the call
16	occurred.
17	MR. SHORE: She knew the call
18	occurred.
19	MS McCALLION: She did not know
20	the content of the call.
21	MR. SHORE: Right. You didn't
22	discuss, why would you with your Executive
23	Assistant, the content of it.
24	Once you sign off you probably
25	gave her the memo and said

1	MS McCALLION: Send it on.
2	MR. SHORE: let it go. You are
3	finished with it.
4	MR. SHORE: You would never have
5	said to anyone about the call that there may have
6	been a bit more to it, because you didn't discuss
7	the contents of the call with anyone.
8	And you never shaking your head
9	means no for the purpose of the record.
10	MS McCALLION: Oh, sorry. Not to
11	my recollection. It is not something I would do.
12	MR. SHORE: And you would never
13	have said to anyone that you are ignoring the
14	request from Mr. Hooper because he didn't make a
15	request.
16	MS McCALLION: He didn't make a
17	request to me.
18	MR. SHORE: Right. So you would
19	not have told anyone that he did and you were
20	ignoring it?
21	MS McCALLION: Again, sorry for
22	shaking my head, no, I didn't.
23	MR. SHORE: No, that's fine.
24	MR. SHORE: And of course he never
25	suggested to you, as has already been indicated,

1	that you not forward the letter? That was a fait	
2	accompli. It had been negotiated, it was done.	
3	MS McCALLION: Correct.	
4	MR. SHORE: And he didn't try to	
5	undo it.	
6	MS McCALLION: No, he didn't.	
7	MR. SHORE: There was never any	
8	discussion about Mr. Hooper saying that CSIS did	
9	not want Arar back because they didn't have the	
10	resources to monitor him. That was not discussed	
11	in that conversation?	
12	MS McCALLION: In that context,	
13	no.	
14	MR. SHORE: Those are my	
15	questions. Thanks, Mr. Commissioner.	
16	Thank you, Ms McCallion.	
17	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. David?	
18	MR. DAVID: Three questions.	
19	EXAMINATION	
20	MR. DAVID: Ms McCallion, I	
21	understand that you have testified today to the	
22	effect that Mr. Pardy knew beforehand that	
23	Mr. Hooper was going to be calling you and that he	
24	told you so.	
25	MS McCALLION: No, I thought I	

1	said he would give me a heads up that Mr. Hooper		
2	might call me.		
3	MR. DAVID: All right.		
4	MS McCALLION: If I said he my		
5	recollection is, I was given a heads up as to a		
6	possibility.		
7	MR. DAVID: As to a possibility of		
8	a phone call from Mr. Hooper to you, and this		
9	Mr. Pardy told you?		
10	MS McCALLION: Yes.		
11	MR. DAVID: Did you understand		
12	where Mr. Pardy was getting this information about		
13	the possibility of a phone call?		
14	MS McCALLION: I assumed it came		
15	from the interdepartmental meetings.		
16	MR. DAVID: Did Mr. Pardy		
17	inform you?		
18	MS McCALLION: I don't recall		
19	that he did, but I don't recall why he said		
20	I like why he gave me the heads up, but he gave		
21	me a heads up.		
22	MR. DAVID: And was it your		
23	understanding that Mr. Pardy had spoken to		
24	Mr. Hooper?		
25	MS McCALLION: No.		

1	MR. DAVID: Was it your
2	understanding that Mr that's fine.
3	The second question, or second
4	area if I can say, Ms McCallion, I heard you say
5	during the testimony where Ms Edwardh's was asking
6	you some questions, that Mr. Hooper mentioned to
7	you that CSIS' mandate was to protect Canadians
8	and that individual cases are to be taken in that
9	context.
10	MS McCALLION: Correct.
11	MR. DAVID: I'm going to ask you:
12	Could a reasonable person interpret that as
13	meaning to sacrifice one to save and protect many
14	is an acceptable principle?
15	MS McCALLION: No. I withdraw all
16	of my comments if that is how you are interpreting
17	them. No.
18	MR. DAVID: So he did not say this
19	to you to try to dissuade you from your efforts
20	MS McCALLION: No, he did not.
21	MR. DAVID: in bringing
22	Mr. Arar back?
23	MS McCALLION: No, he did not.
24	MR. DAVID: The third area I wish
25	to ask you some questions is that you have

1	mentioned now with Mr. Shore that you discussed
2	the fate of other detained Canadians as well as
3	Mr. Arar during this conversation?
4	MS McCALLION: The possibility of
5	others. Not others in a highly specific list
6	sense, no.
7	MR. DAVID: Explain to me the I
8	don't quite grasp how this was referred to, then,
9	in your conversation.
10	MR. DAVID: I don't recall the
11	details of the conversation. It is a long time
12	ago. I didn't take notes.
13	The context would more likely be
14	there are other cases of similar nature on the
15	order paper now and potentially coming. The world
16	has changed. How we deal with a changed world
17	will involve cooperation between two levels of
18	agencies with two different mandates.
19	To my recollection, that is the
20	context.
21	MR. DAVID: Therefore, he
22	understood and he was trying to make you
23	understand that today's world's context meant that
24	DFAIT would be trying to repatriate other
25	Canadians involved in situations similar to Mr.

1	Arar's as well as Mr. Arar?	
2	MS McCALLION: Well, the	
3	complexity of dual citizenship, the complexity of	
4	international law, yes. In that context.	
5	MR. DAVID: In that context.	
6	MS McCALLION: We were on an oper	
7	phone, we did not go into details of any of the	
8	cases.	
9	MR. DAVID: In that context, did	
10	Mr. Hooper mention that this fact, that there are	
11	potentially many other cases similar to	
12	Mr. Arar's, could bring on a resource issue for	
13	CSIS?	
14	MS McCALLION: Not to my	
15	recollection.	
16	MR. DAVID: Thank you. Those are	
17	my questions.	
18	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Thank	
19	you, Ms McCallion, that completes your evidence	
20	and you may step down. The books can remain	
21	there, that's fine.	
22	Pause	
23	THE COMMISSIONER: That leaves	
24	only the recall of Mr. Gould, and Mr. Shore you	
25	had a few questions?	

1	MR. SHORE: Very short.
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Gould, you
3	have patiently waited in the back of the hearing
4	room. Please come forward. Thank you.
5	Pause
6	PREVIOUSLY SWORN: JAMES GOULD
7	EXAMINATION
8	MR. SHORE: Thanks for waiting
9	around, Mr. Gould. I just have a couple of
10	questions.
11	Earlier today when we talked
12	about the story we had heard, you indicated that
13	you were referring to the story that you and
14	Mr. Dyet had heard.
15	In your previous testimony at
16	page 12744 you indicated Mr. David was asking:
17	"`About call - confirmed
18	story we had heard.'
19	The `we' refers to?"
20	That is the question.
21	"MR. GOULD: To me. Sorry,
22	the `we' is an imperial `we'.
23	`I' here would have been more
24	accurate."
25	MR. GOULD: Okay.

1	MR. SHORE: So today you said that
2	the we was both of you. Your earlier testimony, I
3	forget the date do you have the date?
4	MR. GOULD: The date is fine. The
5	testimony
6	MR. SHORE: You testified April
7	MR. GOULD: I have no problem with
8	that.
9	MR. SHORE: I'm just trying to
10	MR. GOULD: The "we" I was
11	including that I had heard from David Dyet. Again
12	I go back to my sloppy drafting. The "we" quite
13	properly was an imperial "we". "I" had heard from
14	Mr. Dyet.
15	MR. SHORE: I'm not talking about
16	the drafting, I'm talking about evidence. You
17	gave evidence today that the "we" talked about
18	the "we" referred to David Dyet and myself.
19	MR. GOULD: It referred to a
20	conversation that I had with Mr. Dyet.
21	MR. SHORE: Right. That was the
22	"we". In your earlier testimony you said the "we"
23	is an imperial we and it means really "I". So I
24	am confused as to whether the "we" is just you or
25	the "we" is you and Mr. Dyet.

1	MR. GOULD: I would think the we
2	is the imperial "we". It is "I heard from Mr.
3	Dyet".
4	MR. SHORE: All right. So you are
5	going back to what you said earlier
6	MR. GOULD: I think so, yes.
7	MR. SHORE: as opposed to what
8	you said earlier today.
9	Is that right?
10	MR. GOULD: I think so, yes. Yes.
11	I am going back, yes.
12	MS McISAAC: I think it only fair
13	if the witness would like to have a copy of what
14	he said.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
16	MR. SHORE: Sure. I have no
17	problem with that. I was looking for it, but I
18	just have one.
19	MR. GOULD: I'm sure I have a copy
20	here.
21	THE COMMISSIONER: I don't have a
22	copy. Could somebody hand the witness a copy?
23	MR. DAVID: The other matter,
24	Mr. Commissioner, if I can just raise it, is for
25	the first time during these proceedings, whether

1	they be in camera or public, we are using
2	transcripts to
3	THE COMMISSIONER: That came out
4	of today's process.
5	I am a little concerned. I'm not
6	sure, I may have misunderstood his evidence
7	earlier today. I must say I'm having a bit of a
8	difficulty understanding there is a distinction in
9	substance between the two, but carry on. The
10	transcript will speak for itself.
11	MR. SHORE: Do you have the
12	transcript?
13	MR. GOULD: I do have the page in
14	front of me, 12744.
15	MR. SHORE: Page 12744. Did I
16	read it accurately?
17	MR. GOULD: Yes, you did.
18	MR. SHORE: Both the questions and
19	the answers?
20	MR. GOULD: Yes.
21	MR. SHORE: Just the next page,
22	12745 or perhaps I will just continue on and
23	put it all in context, and correct me if I
24	THE COMMISSIONER: Just follow
25	along.

1	MR. SHORE: Correct me if I no
2	the next page.
3	MR. GOULD: Sorry.
4	MR. SHORE: You only had the
5	one page.
6	MR. GOULD: It was hidden
7	underneath.
8	Carry on.
9	MR. SHORE: Page 12745. I am
10	going to read into that from page 12744.
11	"MR. DAVID: All right. It
12	says:
13	`- may be a bit more to
14	it, but she didn't want
15	to go into it.'
16	So the `she' there, this is
17	Barbara Burns?
18	MR. GOULD: Yes.
19	MR. DAVID: And:
20	`- may be a bit more to
21	it, but she didn't want
22	to go into it.'
23	You have no idea what that
24	refers to?
25	MR. GOULD: No, I have no

1		idea what that refers to.
2		MR. DAVID: But she is
3		indicating this to you
4		MR. GOULD: Yes.
5		MR. DAVID: that there is
6		more to the call than what
7		MR. GOULD: That there was a
8		reference to there having
9		been something to it, but she
10		didn't want to go into it.
11		MR. DAVID: Okay. Then it
12		says:
13		`- MKM signed the memo -
14		so she seems to be
15		ignoring the request from
16		the ADDO.'
17		MR. GOULD: Correct.
18		MR. DAVID: This is again
19		Ms Burns telling you this?
20		MR. GOULD: Yes."
21		Earlier today you understand you
22	gave	
23		MR. GOULD: Yes, I do. I do.
24		MR. SHORE: much different
25	testimony?	

1	MR. GOULD: Yes, I do.					
2	MR. SHORE: And they both can't					
3	stand beside each other.					
4	MR. GOULD: Yes.					
5	MR. SHORE: One has to fall and					
6	you have to choose if you can or					
7	MR. GOULD: I'm not sure I am					
8	able to.					
9	MR. SHORE: Or refuse to. You					
10	don't have to, but					
11	MR. GOULD: Excuse me. May I					
12	refer back to the copy of my handwritten notes					
13	here.					
14	MR. SHORE: Absolutely.					
15	MR. GOULD: Which is my only					
16	source, as you are aware.					
17	MR. SHORE: Absolutely.					
18	MS McISAAC: Mr. Commissioner, I					
19	should also point out that we brought to the					
20	attention of Commission counsel that the version					
21	of the note that has been produced is not the					
22	final version. There was a redaction at the top					
23	of the page, I believe it is page 12, if I'm not					
24	mistaken, which was originally made on the					
25	understanding that it related to an earlier note					

1	about a different matter and then it was
2	subsequently unredacted.
3	I believe that if you go to the
4	re-examination there is some clarification,
5	because at that point the second note was
6	available to give more precision as to who was
7	being discussed.
8	That is my recollection
9	anyway, sir.
10	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. That
11	is helpful.
12	That is the re-examination in
13	camera, so that the witness should be provided
14	with that as well, and the unredacted
15	Pause
16	THE COMMISSIONER: Just before you
17	answer the question, Mr. Gould, apparently there
18	is evidence in the re-examination that touches on
19	this and there is an unredacted version of what is
20	at the top of page 12 of your note that may assist
21	you in answering the question.
22	Can somebody provide the witness
23	with both of those things?
24	Pause
25	THE COMMISSIONER: Can you give

1	the note, the unredacted note?
2	MS McISAAC: We don't have it.
3	THE COMMISSIONER: Do you know
4	what it says?
5	MS McISAAC: My memory is not bad,
6	but it is not that good, sir.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
8	MR. DAVID: We certainly don't
9	have it here.
LO	THE COMMISSIONER: Nobody would
L1	have it here I guess because of the claim.
L2	In any event, let's see if we can
L3	complete this in some fashion.
L4	Pause
L5	MR. SHORE: Sir, have you read
L6	the what is this?
L7	THE COMMISSIONER: It is called
L8	the re-examination.
L9	MR. SHORE: The re-examination.
20	MR. SHORE: Re-examination,
21	thank you.
22	MR. GOULD: No.
23	MR. SHORE: Obviously the same
24	question came up because I obviously made the same
25	confusion the first time during the in camera.

1	If I can read
2	MR. GOULD: Sure.
3	"MR. GOULD:" this is myself,
4	excuse me.
5	"MR. DAVID: On Monday, do
6	you recall testifying that
7	you said the `she' was
8	Barbara Burns?"
9	This replicates what you have
10	just stated.
11	My response:
12	"Yes. And I was confused
13	because of exactly what you
14	are clarifying now, my left
15	page and right page."
16	You will recall I started today
17	with a short exposition on that.
18	"I have also since Monday had
19	the opportunity to look at
20	the originals. When I look
21	at my originals, it is much
22	clearer that I am writing
23	with the same pen, et
24	cetera"
25	I'm not sure what the "et cetera"

1	means.	
2		" if you look at that, I
3		don't use the same pen all
4		the time. I am of the belief
5		now that that star indicates
6		and directs me across,
7		because it is supplementary."
8	Tha	at is going from right side
9	to left side.	
10		"MR. DAVID; This is,
11		however, the same date,
12		Mr. Gould, that you tried to
13		call Barbara Burns.
14		MR. GOULD: Yes. I had tried
15		to call her sometime
16		before"
17		"MR. DAVID: Is it possible
18		that your reference `may be a
19		bit more to it but she didn't
20		want to go into it', is it
21		possible, Mr. Gould, that
22		that reference is to Barbara
23		Burns?
24		MR. GOULD: As I read it now,
25		very, very unlikely. I would

1	have put a name in if there
2	was a change in reference.
3	MR. DAVID: Then you say
4	`MKM signed'. You don't say
5	she signed the memo. Do you
6	understand what I am saying?
7	MR. GOULD: Yes. Once in a
8	while you put the person in.
9	MR. DAVID: How you refer to
10	the same person changes in
11	the course of the text.
12	MR. GOULD: Yes, it does.
13	MR. DAVID: And that doesn't
14	help in making you understand
15	that perhaps when you say
16	`she' that that would
17	refer to Barbara Burns.
18	MR. GOULD: You perhaps might
19	refer to it as bad style."
20	It really obviously confuses the
21	first time around and I don't really think the
22	matter is clarified in the original
23	re-examination.
24	MR. DAVID: Could you, just for
25	the clarity of the record, as confused as it may

1	be now, tell us what pages you just read from,						
2	Mr. Gould?						
3	MR. GOULD: I'm sorry. I'm						
4	reading from pages 12984 through to 12986.						
5	MR. SHORE: Can I ask you a						
6	supplementary question?						
7	MR. GOULD: Of course you can.						
8	MR. SHORE: Who is the "she"?						
9	MR. GOULD: That is the question I						
10	would love to be able to answer.						
11	MR. SHORE: Well, there are only						
12	two she's.						
13	MR. GOULD: There are two she's in						
14	play.						
15	MR. SHORE: Two she's in play.						
16	One is Barbara Burns						
17	MR. GOULD: And one of them is						
18	McCallion.						
19	MR. SHORE: and one is						
20	Ms McCallion.						
21	MR. GOULD: I find it						
22	MR. SHORE: Are you sure it was a						
23	she that told you that?						
24	MR. GOULD: Didn't tell me. I						
25	think perhaps the solution would be to ask Mr.						

1	Dyet.
2	MR. SHORE: Well, if you o back to
3	page 12745 at line 13
4	MR. GOULD: Yes.
5	MR. SHORE: the question is
6	MR. GOULD: This is again
7	Ms Burns, yes.
8	MR. SHORE: This is again Ms Burns
9	telling you this and the answer is yes.
10	MR. GOULD: An imperial "you"
11	again. I think I received this from it is
12	certainly not telling me.
13	MR. SHORE: But that is clearly
14	how you answer the question.
15	MR. GOULD: Then I mis-spoke.
16	MR. SHORE: You mis-spoke.
17	In the re-examination that I don't
18	have in front of me there is no mention of
19	Mr. Dyet being the one who gave you the
20	information, although that was the evidence you
21	gave earlier today.
22	MR. GOULD: That certainly I
23	thought was very clear, that I did not speak to
24	Ms McCallion about this and that the information
25	on this was passed to me by Mr. Dvet.

1	MR. SHORE: All right. So it is				
2	Mr. Dyet and you mis-spoke in your previous				
3	testimony on page 12745 when you said it was				
4	Ms Burns who told you.				
5	Is that what you are saying?				
6	MR. GOULD: Yes.				
7	MR. SHORE: All right. Those are				
8	all my questions. Thank you, sir.				
9	Than you, Mr. Gould.				
10	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.				
11	Anything arising out of that?				
12	Thank you very much, Mr. Gould.				
13	Thank you for your patience and remaining				
14	throughout the afternoon.				
15	MR. GOULD: I apologize for the				
16	confusion here, but these notes are just what				
17	they are.				
18	THE COMMISSIONER: That's fine.				
19	appreciate the time and effort you have devoted to				
20	giving your evidence.				
21	MR. GOULD: No, not at all.				
22	Thank you.				
23	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. We				
24	will rise until tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock.				
25	MS McISAAC: Sir, just one last				

1	housekeeping matter.
2	Will we be entering the two
3	transcripts that have been referred to as exhibits
4	as well?
5	THE COMMISSIONER: Were they not
6	entered? I thought they had been this morning.
7	Oh, those.
8	MS McISAAC: No, these are the
9	ones that we produced at lunchtime.
10	MR. DAVID: Is this the right
11	time, in the sense that
12	THE COMMISSIONER: Let's just talk
13	about that for a second.
14	I'm not sure the transcripts
15	should be entered as exhibits. They are evidence
16	that was given on an earlier occasion. To the
17	extent that they were referred to, as they just
18	were in a cross-examination, that part would
19	become part of the record, but I don't think the
20	transcripts in their entirety should go in.
21	MS McISAAC: I just wanted to be
22	sure that we had some method of identifying that
23	they were there and what they were.
24	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. I think
25	that's okay. If anybody has a different thought,

1	let me know tomorrow.				
2	Thank you, Ms McIsaac, for				
3	bringing to the attention of the hearing the				
4	reference to the re-examination. I appreciate				
5	that.				
6	MR. DAVID: A final thing,				
7	Mr. Commissioner, is that I have copies here of				
8	the CSIS chronology that was prepared that may be				
9	useful for counsel in terms of Mr. Hooper's				
10	testimony.				
11	THE COMMISSIONER: You can				
12	distribute those after we adjourn.				
13	MR. DAVID: I can distribute				
14	those, if anybody is interested in having a copy.				
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. We will				
16	rise until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.				
17	MR. DAVID: Thank you.				
18	Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5:52 p.m.				
19	to resume on Thursday, August 25, 2005				
20	at 9:00 a.m. / L'audience est ajournée				
21	à 17 h 52, pour reprendre le jeudi				
22	25 août à 0900				
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Lynda Johansson

Lynda Johansson,

C.S.R., R.P.R.

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