

Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar

## Audience publique

## Public Hearing

L'Honorable juge /<br>The Honourable Justice<br>Commissioner Dennis R. O'Connor

Tenue à:
Salon Algonquin
Ancien hôtel de ville
111, Promenade Sussex
Ottawa (Ontario)
le mercredi 25 mai 2005

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Ottawa, Ontario / Ottawa (Ontario)
--- Upon commencing on Wednesday, May 25, 2005 at 9:34 a.m. / L'audience débute le mercredi 25 mai 2005 à 09 h 34

THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning,
Mr. Pardy.
MR. PARDY: Good morning.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cavalluzzo.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you,
Commissioner.
At the outset, let me report back, Mr. Commissioner, concerning the meeting that was held last night with counsel concerning a possible motion relating to four documents which are in issue between the parties.

What I can report back is that the parties are still in negotiations and discussion and that there is a possibility that there may be no need for that motion. However, $I$ think it's important that we put a time limit on that, in that if nothing comes to fruition within a week or so, we may report back to you and ask for you to schedule a motion.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
That's fine.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Second, in
respect of the issue as to which counsel should question Mr. Pardy subsequent to my direct examination, that matter will have to be argued before you at the completion of my direct.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
PREVIOUSLY SWORN: HENRY GARFIELD PARDY EXAMINATION (Continued)

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Pardy, we were at tab 145 in Volume 2, which is October 28th.

Prior to you referring to that
particular e-mail, $I$ understand that subsequent to the proceedings yesterday you thought about the question $I$ asked you relating to the seven considerations which I had put to you which indicated that this case, Mr. Arar's case, is different than that of Mr. Baloch and Mr. Jaffri, and that you want to add one other consideration which you think is relevant on the other side of the scale.

Is that correct?
MR. PARDY: Yes.

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MR. CAVALLUZZO: Would you like to share that with us so that we have a full picture? MR. PARDY: Yes. I would point out that this information certainly was not available to us at the time when we were doing this consideration, but it certainly came to my attention shortly after these events occurred in New York.

This relates to information that $I$ had seen that Ms Oummih, when she visited Mr. Arar on the morning of October the 5th, the issue of deportation came up. She reported that Mr. Arar had told her that the American officials were asking him to sign a document agreeing to his deportation to Syria, and she assured him that under American law he had a right to choose the country of destination for the deportation, and that if there was a problem, that this could be argued before an appropriate American tribunal. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Of course, that is a double-edged sword in the sense that on the one hand she is saying that you have the legal right to choose otherwise, but on the other hand, once again, it indicates the Americans' interest in Syria and Mr. Arar.

MR. PARDY: And I mention it only
in the sense that the conclusions that we had reached on this information were not idiosyncratic. They were, in effect, founded in our general understanding of American law on this point.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then if we can move to October 28th of 2002, at tab 145, where we left off yesterday.

THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry, 148,
Mr. Cavalluzzo?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, 145.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We had discussed the last paragraph of the document, which is redacted.

This morning government counsel
has indicated to me that $I$ can read into the record and we will get a copy of this in the unredacted version. And there is only one point that is redacted and that is the name.

So let me read in, if $I$ can, paragraph 4.

Paragraph 4 of Mr. Pardy's e-mail
is as follows:
"Would appreciate if you could report if you obtain any information on possible visits by RCMP and CSIS officials, either to meet with Maher or ..."

Or "Syrian officials", I believe
it states. "Many thanks, Gar."
I don't know if $I$ read that
correctly, Mr. Baxter. Is that correct?
MS McISAAC: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Pardy, a week
into Mr. Arar's visit into Syria detention, we have a question that you are asking concerning possible visits by the RCMP and CSIS to meet Mr. Arar in Syria.

Can you tell us what gave rise to that particular instruction?

MR. PARDY: Generally, when you have very high-profile cases of this nature, certainly the involvement of Canadian police and security officials is -- their interest is not uncommon, as we have come to know in all of this.

My main concern in this, and I
think if you refer to the subsequent message that
went out on the same subject on October 30 th, I was much more specific in my question to the ambassador.

And my concern was not so much
in -- the concern was whether or not liaison officers, who are already posted overseas and representing those organizations, who have accreditation possibly to Syria, and as such are responsible and must report to the ambassador, that they could travel to Syria without our knowledge back in Ottawa. I think that was the general concern.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Actually, it may be useful at this point in time if $I$ do file with the Commission as the next exhibit that e-mail to which you refer, and it will give more sense to our discussion.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: Ninety-seven.
MS McISAAC: Excuse me. Is this the next one that doesn't have any redaction left on it, Mr. Cavalluzzo?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes.
No, it should be the unredacted --
and $I$ am trying to find -- there is a tab number.

It's tab 158, which is the
redacted version.
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Commissioner,
the redacted version is this one here.
MS McISAAC: We are getting a properly redacted one. Why don't we just reserve an exhibit number for it and file it when it arrives. We should have it by the break.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is an e-mail dated October 28th, which coincides with tab 145, if the unredacted version could be the next exhibit number.

THE COMMISSIONER: It would be P-98.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { EXHIBIT NO. P-97: Unredacted } \\
& \text { version of e-mail dated } 30 \\
& \text { October } 2002 \text { (Tab 158) } \\
& \text { MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then we have } \\
& \text { t, which is dated October } 30 \text { th. } \\
& \text { THE COMMISSIONER: I just marked }
\end{aligned}
$$ the next document, which is dated October 30 th. it P-97 so ...

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's fine, P-97.

And that coincides with tab 158.

EXHIBIT NO. P-98: Unredacted version of e-mail dated 28 October 2002 (Tab 145)

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So we have the
October $30 t h$ e-mail, and just let me read it into the record for those people that do not have copies of it.

It says:
"With respect to paragraph 6
of reference message, would
appreciate if Ambassador
could report if there have
been any contact with RCMP
and CSIS liaison officials
indicating interest in
visiting Arar or contact ..."
MR. PARDY: No, in visiting Syria.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: "In visiting
Syria"; sorry.
"... or contact with Syrian
officials with respect to
this case. There have been
indications of this from
RCMP, and letter is being

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prepared by ISI suggesting that this not happen in the current circumstances. Gar."

Once again, what you are
suggesting is that you are maybe concerned that the liaison officers of RCMP and CSIS, who had jurisdiction over Damascus, may wish to visit Mr. Arar.

Is that correct?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MS McISAAC: May I simply remind the witness of not to give any indication of where liaison officers with respect to CSIS might or might not be situated.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I was very
careful not to ask that question. I think I should be applauded for that.

In any event, let's move on.
What was your concern? What was
your concern?
MR. PARDY: Well, the general concern in this is when you are managing cases of this complexity, you want to be in control of all of the elements that could occur, that could affect the outcome of the case.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
MR. PARDY: And discussions
between other parts of the Canadian government and the Syrian authorities, $I$ have always -- and on many other cases I have always considered an element that we should be fully aware of.

And the way the arrangements that are in place with respect to liaison officers for these organizations, they would not necessarily, if $I$ can, report to Ottawa or seek permission from Ottawa before such visits would be made to their countries of accreditation.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I would think that one of your concerns would be that if your objective, as you have said throughout, was to get Mr. Arar back as quickly as possible, then if at the same time CSIS and/or the RCMP want to go and visit Mr. Arar to question or whatever, that would give a very mixed signal to the Syrians, wouldn't it?

MR. PARDY: I am not sure whether it would give them mixed signals or not, but it was an element that $I$ considered important and I would be aware of before it occurred. If I felt there was a potential for mixed signals, then $I$
would try to take action.
And as you will note from the October $30 t h$ message, this was a concern that was shared by our colleagues in ISI as well, and they were prepared at that point, if necessary, to prepare a letter.

It was not necessary, if my memory serves me right, to prepare such a letter.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You would agree with me, though, that if $I$ am a Syrian official with a large moustache and $I$ see CSIS coming down the street to see Mr. Arar, I see the RCMP coming to see Mr. Arar, I wouldn't think it was just for a social visit.

You would agree with that?
MR. PARDY: Oh, absolutely.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you would agree with me that if the RCMP or CSIS wanted to visit Mr. Arar, it would be in respect of their mandate. In respect of the RCMP, it's police activities or enforcement; in respect of CSIS, it's security intelligence?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess I come back to a question $I$ asked you yesterday, and that
is that if the RCMP -- and you say this in this October 30 th message after talking about the liaison officers. You say:
"There have been indications of this from the RCMP and letter is being prepared by ISI suggesting that this not happen in the current circumstances." But if the RCMP wants to go and question Mr. Arar in October of 2002 in order presumably to carry out their mandate, which is a police investigation, if $I$ was Mr. Arar, I would be very concerned that DFAIT was sharing any information on me, particularly relating to consular visits, with a police investigation body which now, in October, has expressed a clear interest in me.

Would you agree with that? MR. PARDY: In part. What I think
the key thing here is that the information that was critical with respect to this case as far as -- and $I$ am perhaps making a bit of an assumption here and reacting to information certainly that has come to me after the fact.

But the damaging, if $I$ want to use the term, information with respect to Mr. Arar was already in place long before the Department of Foreign Affairs was involved in this case.

And so what we are dealing here is a consequence of that information and not -- as I mentioned to you yesterday as well with respect to the sharing of information, the sharing of that information was highly selective and was done with the express purpose of seeing whether or not we could help Mr. Arar through the actions of some of these agencies.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And do you think
that when the RCMP expressed an interest to go over to interview Mr. Arar, they were trying to help Mr. Arar?

MR. PARDY: I am not sure. I
would not impute motive to any other part of the Canadian government on something of that magnitude. I think that would be erroneous for any of us to do at this stage.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But you would
agree with me that they do have a mandate of investigating criminal activity?

MR. PARDY: Absolutely, and --

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MR. CAVALLUZZO: And presumably they would only expend money, which is expensive -- as you know, it's very expensive to send somebody over to Syria to interview people. Presumably they would only do that in respect of carrying out their mandate? MR. PARDY: Carrying out their mandate, which is to develop information that could be either negative or positive with respect to a suspect.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And $I$ guess that brings me back to that question that $I$ asked you: that if you are going to share information in the future, DFAIT is going to share information with a police agency or a security intelligence agency in respect of a consular visit, surely you would agree with me that you should either tell the individual that is giving the information, that is the Canadian detained, or at least if you are going to give the information without their permission, you should be very circumspect in ensuring that only information that would not be prejudicial to that individual be given to the RCMP or CSIS?

MR. PARDY: And the judgment that

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I reached was that the information was not prejudicial and it was only done after careful consideration.
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess the final
question relating to this, and that is when you have a Canadian -- and we will get to this in terms of your deck presentation and the action memo you sent to Mr. Graham.

But in terms of this mixed signal that $I$ am talking about, it would seem to me that a reasonable result may be confusion or uncertainty in the minds of the Syrians in respect of: what does Canada want to do with Mr. Arar?

MR. PARDY: Yes, and as you -- I think we went over several points yesterday: that I, through my communications with the ambassador and other people involved, tried to ensure that the message that was delivered to the Syrian authorities by the ambassador, speaking for the Government of Canada, that there was absolutely no ambiguity on that point whatsoever.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. We will
come back to that, in particular on March $24 t h$, 2003.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let's move on
then to tab 147.
This is the second consular visit
that Mr. Martel makes to Mr. Arar in Damascus?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just from your
perspective -- I am not going to take you through
this nor any of the other consular visits in light of the fact that we are going to have both Mr. Martel and Mr. Pillarella testify. But is there anything in this particular visit report which gave you cause for alarm, or was it business as usual?

MR. PARDY: Could you give me a moment to read it, please?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Certainly.
--- Pause
MR. PARDY: No, I don't think there was anything unusual here, except in paragraph 4 we are again asking about where they were with respect to their own investigation, and suggesting that the ambassador speak to the senior military intelligence person; that we acted on that and very shortly thereafter there was another
meeting with that person, with the ambassador. MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come to that.

If you go then to tab 148, we see
this is a letter that you are sending to
Dr. Mazigh?
MR. PARDY: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It isn't? Oh,
this is from -- the originator is Laatar.
And Laatar is located in...?
MR. PARDY: Tunis.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In the embassy in
Tunis?
MR. PARDY: Yes. And she is
reporting on --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The birth

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certificate?
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MR. PARDY: Birth certificate and possible problems in terms of return to Canada by Ms Mazigh and the two children.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: There are going
to be a number of tabs which relate to your
assistance to Dr. Mazigh in getting her back to Canada, and I am going to take you quickly through those. If there is anything that you want to add,
please do.
MR. PARDY: All right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: At 152, we see
this that is an e-mail from you to Mr. Martel
attaching a letter from Monia?
MR. PARDY: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this,
presumably, is to be given to Mr. Arar in the next consular visit?

MR. PARDY: That's correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: At tab 153, this
is a Q\&A that is being developed as it evolves over time?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess in
respect of the exchange of letters, and certainly throughout the piece from this point on to the last consular visit, the exchange of letters, either from Monia to Maher or from Maher to Monia, is the way that these partners or spouses communicated during this difficult period?

MR. PARDY: Yes, and we tried to supplement it with the possibility of a telephone call, which we didn't succeed. And one of the elements as well was the possibility that

Dr. Mazigh might go to Damascus as well, yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 154 is once again a series of questions and answers that presumably you were preparing for the Minister, and we have seen these throughout as they evolve over time.

For the Commissioner's notice and counsel's notice, $I$ just refer to a couple of things.

This is at page 5 of the tab. A possible question to the Minister or another member, official of DFAIT is:
"Is it true that the Syrians
are investigating Mr. Arar
for terrorist connections?" And the answers are:
"Syrian authorities are currently conducting an investigation. Until that investigation is completed, he will remain in their custody. We do not expect to be informed of the Syrian investigation."

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That one there, that is not really totally correct, is it, because Pillarella was expecting to get something from a person in Syria? MR. PARDY: Well, I think the date on this is -- what date are we talking about here? This is the $29 t h$ of October.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
MR. PARDY: Three to four days
later, Mr. Pillarella was provided with certain information.

But again, as with other elements of this case, we were totally surprised that the Syrians provided us with that information. But at the time this was written, in terms of past experience, the Syrians basically wouldn't even tell us whether the sun was up at 12 noon.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If we just go through it, at page 10 the question is, the possible question is:
"Does the Department of
Foreign Affairs suspect Mr.
Arar of being a terrorist?"
And the answer is:
"The Department of Foreign
Affairs has no information to

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support this allegation."
And the second possible answer is:
"This issue falls under the mandate of other organizations in the Canadian government."

And then, finally, at pages 11 and
12, I would point out in terms of the backgrounder, which is prepared by Myra Pastyr-Lupul and approved by you, the last line says:
"The Syrian authorities
initially responded on
October 20 that he was not in
Syria. They responded again
on October 21 saying that Mr.
Arar had just arrived in
their country from Jordan.
Previous to this, we had made
enquiries of the Jordanian
authorities as to whether
Arar was in their country.
At the time, they replied
that he was not but on
October 21 reported that he

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had been in Jordan but 'in transit' to Syria."

And that confirms what we talked about late yesterday afternoon.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: At tab 155, there
is another exchange of e-mails between you and Dr. Mazigh. This is dated October $29 t h$.

You are talking about the message,
as well as you are talking about speaking to
Mr. Edelson, who was the counsel for Mr. Arar at the time?

MR. PARDY: That is correct. I
would add that the other point here is that we discussed yesterday that I sent the two letters, but throughout this whole period, there were detailed conversations with Ms Mazigh in terms of conveying to her the full flavour of the information that was available to us.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. At tab 158, that's the e-mail that we looked at earlier, which is one of the new exhibits.

MR. PARDY: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this, once again, is from you and it's to Mr. Pillarella.

You are seeking that information and you say:
"Many thanks for the detailed report, contents of which have been shared with Maher's wife. She was most appreciative of the exchange and will prepare another letter and send it to us for delivery during next visit. She now plans to return to Canada early next week." And we have already dealt with paragraph 2.

Now at tab 160, two days later, on October the 31st, we see that GXD -- who is GXD?

MR. PARDY: The "X" signifies an
official that has been appointed at the Director General level to deal with a specific subject, and I believe that this particular official was concerned with the -- I believe at this time largely with refugee issues in the Middle East, largely the Palestinian issue of refugees.

Subsequent he took on the responsibility of coordinating the Canadian government's response in terms of the war

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preparations that were under way in early 2003. MR. CAVALLUZZO: In any event, this mystery person meets with Deputy Foreign Minister Mouallem on October $30 t h$, and the Deputy Foreign Minister raised the issue of Mr. Arar and he said:
"He indicated that when he first investigated Canadian press reports that the USA had deported Arar to Syria, Arar was not in the country..."

Was GXD going to Syria just to
discuss Mr. Arar's situation, or was it brought up independently by the Syrians?

MR. PARDY: No, he was there. As I indicated, that his responsibility at the time. And I would appreciate if I could check this particular fact, but my recollection was that he was responsible for -- Canada was chairing an international committee that was dealing with refugee issues in the Middle East, and he was going out for consultations with the regional governments on that particular issue. And certainly any high level contact that we had
with the Syrians at that point, we wanted to discuss Mr. Arar as well, of course.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And it goes on in
the second paragraph to say:
"Ambassador Pillarella
thanked the Deputy Minister
for his cooperation in the
Arar case. He noted that
Canada understood that
according to Syrian law, Arar
was a Syrian national, and
appreciated that Syria had on an exceptional basis accorded consular access."

And then he goes on:
"This access had helped to assuage some concerns raised by the Canadian press.

Nonetheless, the case was continuing to generate considerable interest in Canada."

I guess the point that $I$ would ask you -- certainly Ambassador Pillarella points to the Canadian press' interest in Mr. Arar's case,
and indeed the Deputy Foreign Minister himself talks about investigating Canadian press reports. And it would seem to me that a reasonable implication from this memorandum is that the Syrians are sensitive to concerns expressed in the Canadian press.

Would you agree with that?
MR. PARDY: Certainly they appear
to suggest that certainly the reporting by their ambassador in Ottawa, Ambassador Arnous, was keeping them informed, as he should have, and that material of course would have gone to the Deputy Foreign Minister. A chance to discuss this particular issue with a senior Canadian official arose, and he did so.

The level of sensitivity to these issues would be a matter of conjecture on my part. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. But I guess the point that you can directly testify to is the fact that you were aware that the Syrian officials were looking at the Canadian press in terms of this particular period of time when Mr. Arar was in detention? MR. PARDY: Yes. This is an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
part of their mandate would be sensitive to issues that arose in terms of the bilateral relationship, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And then
finally in this document, it would seem that there was a discussion in the third-last line, where it says:
"Ambassador Pillarella agreed that the US action was very difficult to comprehend."

So very early on, as they did
right throughout the piece, the Syrians kept saying repeatedly, "We don't understand why the Americans sent Mr. Arar to us."

MR. PARDY: Yes, they mentioned
that fact several times in exchanges, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we could move
now to tab 181, once again $I$ am not going to take you through this, but these are a series of e-mails between you and Dr. Mazigh about her returning to Canada.

You say:
"Monia, thank you for the good news of your plans to return home. Look forward to
the final details and we will make arrangements..."

And so on and so forth.
We will come back to how you
assisted Dr. Mazigh in her return to Canada.
MR. PARDY: Yes. I would only
note that the date, 5 November at the top of the page, is not indicative of when this exchange took place.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct.
It's November the 1st.
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I would
like to come now to a letter that Mr. Edelson sent.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You are smiling.
You are anticipating my question. I went to law school to learn how to ask them, so let me ask and you can answer.

MR. PARDY: Okay. I will take the
smile off my face.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, no. I like the smile.

If you could go then to Exhibit

P-83, and if you go behind tab 1, at pages 228 and 229, we have a letter from Edelson \& Associates which is dated October 31st, 2002 .

THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry. I
missed the reference to it.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Pages 228 and 229
in $P-84$.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Got it.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is $\mathrm{P}-83$.
Don't worry, Mr. Registrar,
lawyers were never good with numbers. It is $\mathrm{P}-83$. THE COMMISSIONER: Right. MR. PARDY: This is the October 31
letter, is it?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You have it.
MR. PARDY: I have it.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You have the
right book?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: What $I$ would like
to do is just to read portions to you, and once again it's to the legal counsel for the RCMP IPOC Unit, Ms Ann Alder.

It says in the body of the letter, in the first paragraph:
"As you know, I have met with H.G. Pardy, Director General, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and he has advised me that in his view a letter from the RCMP, or yourself for that matter, would be of significant assistance in facilitating the return of Maher Arar to Canada. If such a letter contained the following specifics, Mr. Pardy is confident that it would be a critical factor in the Department's efforts to return of this Canadian citizen to Canada."

And the four points are:
"1. That the RCMP made no request to have Mr. Arar deported to Jordan or Syria. 2. That Mr. Arar does not have a criminal record.
3. That Mr. Arar is not

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wanted in Canada for any
offence, nor is there a warrant for his arrest. 4. That Mr. Arar is not a suspect with respect to any terrorist-related crime." And then it goes on asking her to contact him.

Obviously you have seen this
letter before, and we have also seen that you did have contact or a meeting with Mr. Edelson prior to this time. I would ask for your comments respecting this letter that Mr. Edelson sends the RCMP.

MR. PARDY: Yes. As you noted, a week or ten days previous to this, Mr. Edelson called a person that he knew in the Department, Mr. John McNee, the Assistant Deputy Minister for the Middle East and Africa, wanting to discuss the Arar case and indicating that he had been retained by the family.

Mr. McNee referred Mr. Edelson to me and we made telephone contact and then arranged to meet shortly after to discuss the case.

At that point, we were casting
about for any mechanism that could be of possible assistance to us and to Mr. Arar, and the fact that Mr. Edelson had indicated to me that he was quite knowledgeable in activities of the RCMP in this area, since he had other clients that had worked in this area, and that he was familiar with the officials at the RCMP who dealt with these matters, we discussed it and I suggested to him that the information that he was seeking from me was not available from me and that he might profitably approach the RCMP with respect to this. We discussed the kinds of questions that he might wish to put to the RCMP, and he said, "Well, can $I$ make reference to the fact that we had discussions?" And I said absolutely.

Quite open, quite transparent, no subterfuge involved here whatsoever.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And Mr. Edelson's letter is a fair representation of the discussion that you had with him?

MR. PARDY: Yes. The only thing that $I$ can't remember is whether or not we had agreed that he would do this via a letter or whether in effect he would speak direct to the
people, because he did have direct contact with some of these officials.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And once again
your goal, as stated at the outset, was to try to get Mr. Arar back as quickly as possible?

MR. PARDY: Absolutely.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this was done
in pursuance of that objective?
MR. PARDY: It was done in
pursuance of this.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let us stay in
Exhibit $P-83$ and go to page 230 , to see what response we get from the RCMP.

Page 230 is a memorandum from the
Project Manager of A-OCANADA to the officer in
charge of "A" Division, which as you know is located in Ottawa.

The point that $I$ would ask you
about is in the second and third paragraphs, where it is stated:
"It would appear that..."
That should be "Mr. Pardy".
"... suggested that an official letter from the RCMP attesting to the points
listed in Edelson's correspondence would greatly assist DFAIT's efforts in securing the return of Mr. Arar to Canada. While at this juncture our project is aloof to Mr. Arar's status, the suggestions and comments of Mr. Pardy are highly problematic in that they seek to shift the responsibility of Mr. Arar's future status squarely on the RCMP. I believe DFAIT has to be sensitized on the possible impact these types of discussions can have on ongoing investigations."

And then in the final paragraph he states:
"We will be preparing a
response to Mr. Edelson's
request in the coming days.
While we had no role to play
in Mr. Arar's detention and

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subsequent deportation from the United States, we are not in a position at this time to categorically determine Mr. Arar's role. To be asked to do so at this stage is unreasonable."

Now, you wouldn't have seen this particular internal memorandum?

MR. PARDY: No. I saw it as a result of this particular process, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let us move on and $I$ will come back to these comments.

At page 232, on November the 6th, we have that officer in charge of "A" Division, Mr. Couture, writing to Mr. Proulx, who is the headquarters head of the CID, which is responsible for national security investigations.

He refers to the Edelson letter and your comments or recommendations to Edelson, and then he goes on in the second paragraph, third sentence:

> "However, I agree with ...
> that if the comments by Pardy are accurate, DFAIT must be

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sensitized to the possible impact that such suggestions may have concerning ongoing investigations to which Arar may be associated. Project A-OCANADA investigators are not in a position to provide any comment with respect to the status or role of Mr. Arar in connection with the investigation. As this matter impacts the relationship and responsibilities of the RCMP and DFAIT, I believe discussions between our agencies should be initiated at your office ..."

MR. PARDY: They spelled my name correct this time.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, that is
true.

You wouldn't have seen this internal memorandum either?

MR. PARDY: No.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then if we move on to Exhibit $P-84$ and start at pages 65 and 66.

This is another memorandum to
Assistant Commissioner Proulx or Chief Superintendent Killam, and both are responsible for national security investigations, and it is from Wayne Pilgrim, who is the officer in charge of the national security investigation branch. Mr. Pilgrim's comments are, in the middle paragraph -- he obviously attaches the correspondence and says:
"You will note that I have
attached a draft response to
DFAIT outlining our concerns
relating to this matter. The
suggestion that DFAIT/Pardy
may have advised defence
counsel to seek our
assistance in the release and
return of the subject is, in
my opinion, outrageous and a
clear abuse of the respective
office. However, I am
prepared to give the benefit
of the doubt to DFAIT and

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accept the fact the defence misunderstood."

Well, he obviously shouldn't have given the benefit of the doubt there because defence did understand.

And it goes on:
"You will also note that the tone of the draft letter is to the point you may wish to have it reworded to a more softer approach."

And then at 233 --
MR. PARDY: In the other document?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes. This is
still behind tab 1.
We see there the response, dated
November the 16 th of 2002 , which is sent to
Mr. Edelson. This is from the officer in charge of IPOC, or Project A-OCANADA, and basically says that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "While I sympathize with the } \\
& \text { present situation of Mr. } \\
& \text { Arar's family and your plight } \\
& \text { in securing his release and } \\
& \text { return to Canada, I am not in }
\end{aligned}
$$

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a position to acquiesce to your request at this time. As you can understand, the RCMP as a matter of course does not involve itself in subjects of foreign policies. Furthermore, it would be improper for me to comment on Arar's present situation relative to our ongoing investigation."

I am wondering if you did see this
response that was sent to Mr. Edelson from the project manager of A-OCANADA?

MR. PARDY: Yes. My recollection
is such that Mr. Edelson called me shortly after he had received this letter.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall
what your view was as to the position taken by the RCMP in attempting to assist DFAIT in their mandate to try to seek Mr. Arar's release as soon as possible?

MR. PARDY: I think we both took encouragement from the phrase "I am not in a position to acquiesce to your request at this
time".
MR. CAVALLUZZO: "At this time"?
MR. PARDY: "At this time".
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So you were still
hoping that the RCMP may be of assistance to you
in your role of getting Mr. Arar back?
MR. PARDY: And as you know
from -- I am sure we will discuss over the next
while that there are other initiatives that $I$ took
to try to achieve that.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, why don't
we just complete the piece in terms of your
expectations and go to the final letter.
This is dated December 10 th of
2002, which can be found behind tab 248 .
MR. PARDY: I think I need another
book.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, it's Volume
3.
--- Pause
the second page in.
This is when Mr. Proulx -- as you
know, the memos were going to Mr. Proulx, who is
the Assistant Commissioner and head of CID --

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writes to Mr. Livermore, Dan Livermore, and refers to the Edelson letter and references your recommendation that he seek this kind of letter from the RCMP and points out the four conditions. And then on page 2 of the letter, which once again is dated December the 10th, he says:
"The RCMP had previously responded to DFAIT's concerns with respect to Mr. ARAR and the circumstances surrounding his deportation to Jordan/Syria from the United States. In that
correspondence it was confirmed that Mr. ARAR is a subject of interest in the Project 'A O Canada' investigation. Also, in the same communications, the RCMP advised that it played no role in the decision of the US Government to deport Mr. ARAR.

RCMP 'A' Division will

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    respond to Mr. Edelson..."
Of course, they already had done
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by that time.
"...however there will be no
reference made to Mr. ARAR's
present status relating to
Syria or to Project
'A O Canada'.
In closing, assuming that the
statements of Mr. Edelson is
an accurate depiction of the
advice provided to him by Mr.
Pardy, the RCMP has serious
concerns with the obvious
misunderstanding of the role
of the RCMP in matters of
this nature, therefore, I
would like to meet with you
at your earliest convenience
to discuss the matter
further."
We asked Mr. Livermore about that.
No meeting was held, and asked Mr. Livermore if he
shared this letter with you, and he said that he
did.

Can you confirm that?
MR. PARDY: Yes, he did, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And what was your
response to Mr. Proulx's, shall we put it, admonition as to your misunderstanding of the role of the RCMP?

MR. PARDY: Well, I -- overall I
just saw this as another rock on the road that we had to go over. I didn't see it as being anything by way of a final judgment on this issue.

With respect to the phrase
"obvious misunderstanding", I think it would be a fair comment to say that short of being a uniform member of the RCMP, I knew more about RCMP operations and their procedures than perhaps anybody else in the Department of Foreign Affairs. I have had long experience with the Force. I have worked with the Force on any number of issues over the years, and $I$ have great admiration for their work.

I was surprised that they would suggest that $I$ had some obvious misunderstanding, or that $I$ had some ulterior motive in terms of shifting responsibility of this matter from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the RCMP. That

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was not the case whatsoever.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You say that this
is just another "rock on the road". It seems to me we are getting to the point of being a boulder, in the sense that we are pretty high up in the RCMP and they are certainly indicating to you that as far as participating in the efforts to get Mr. Arar back, certainly they have their own view of their own mandate, and they will do what they think is in the interests of the RCMP.

MR. PARDY: Quite understandable.
And $I$ know all of the people that are involved in this; $I$ have worked with them closely. And I could form my own judgment independent of the words that were on the paper here.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Surely by
December the 10 th of 2002 , when you see this letter from Mr. Proulx, that Mr. Arar is a subject of interest in the A-OCANADA investigation and they are not prepared to share his status with you or with the Syrians, surely at that point in time, doesn't that give you cause for concern in sharing any information whatever that you get from Mr. Arar in these consular visits with this organization that has now stated on the record
that he is a subject of interest?
MR. PARDY: No. I knew that quite
early on, $I$ think arising from our meeting on
October $16 t h$ and the letter that Superintendent Pilgrim sent to us. The phrase "person of interest", the assessment $I$ think as reflected in the memorandum to Mr. Graham about that, I think that this was at the lower end, if $I$ could use that term, of concern.

But as time developed, I did not waiver in my belief that it was important that once this issue moved out of the Department of Foreign Affairs into the central agencies of the Government of Canada, the role of the RCMP would be an important consideration. And throughout I felt it my responsibility to try to bring them into that process in a way that was going to be helpful to Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And certainly we will come to that.

But certainly as of December of 2002 , it would appear that the RCMP was not prepared to jump on board with DFAIT in terms of the efforts of their pursuing in getting Mr. Arar back? They may have disagreed with your
methodology or whatever, but certainly they weren't prepared to accommodate, shall we put it that way, accommodate the request that you had made?

MR. PARDY: Well, if $I$ took these disappointments, you know -- I mean, I wouldn't get out of bed in the morning if $I$ took them in any way.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
MR. PARDY: I mean $I$ got up after
they occurred and continued to try to walk forward on this case. That was not the way that I worked in terms of letting these kinds of disappointments get in the way of the main objective here, and that was Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let us go back to the chronology, Mr. Pardy.

We are still in Volume 2, and I
would ask you to go to tab 161, and we are back at November 1 of 2002 .

Once again, $I$ am going to go
quickly through these items, and this is a chronology that you had prepared at this particular point in time.

MR. PARDY: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I leave that to counsel to read.

There is a point that $I$ would ask in this particular chronology, though, and no doubt other counsel may ask you, and I will just give you the opportunity to comment on it.

I note in this chronology, which is presumably prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs, and presumably for the Minister, that in my view three key facts are not indicated. One is the fact that Taufik Arar told DFAIT on October the 1 st that his brother had told his mother-in-law that the Americans were threatening him to be deported to Syria. Second is the INS official's recommendation that this be brought up to higher levels because of the seriousness of the case.

And the third is the October 3rd visit of Ms Girvan to Mr. Arar, wherein he told her that two INS officials had threatened to send him off to or deport him to Syria.

So those three facts are not set out in this chronology, and some may question why they are missing.

MR. PARDY: I don't think there is
any -- I am not quite sure the date on this document. The redacted sections would indicate that it takes us into, $I$ would assume, late October here.

## Is that correct?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It should be probably November 1st.

MR. PARDY: Oh, November 1st, exactly. And those kinds of things I used to do on a regular basis, as much for my own edification, if you like, sort of to help the memory on specific points, and I would sit down and add to them as specific events occurred.

It was never meant to be the detailed chronology of everything that went on. It was just hitting the highlights with regard to specific dates and what happened on those dates.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If we move along in terms of time, if you go to the next tab, 162, you were in contact again with the -- or Girvan is in contact with the CCR, the Centre for Constitutional Rights, concerning representing Mr. Arar in Syria, and you are copied on that.

The point here is that DFAIT seems to be cooperating with the Centre for

Constitutional Rights in terms of whatever assistance they may give Arar?

MR. PARDY: Absolutely, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then I
understand, according to your notes, between November the 1 st and November the 7 th that you are in Beruit, Lebanon?

MR. PARDY: That's correct, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And just for that context.

Then if we go to tab 172 , we just have e-mails with Mr. Fry.

You are relating to him about your contacts with Mr. Arar's family, but the point here is that you seem to be persistently and usually keeping the Minister's office informed of the progress of the file?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now we come to tab -- go back to tab 164.

This is a fax both to the RCMP headquarters and the RCMP "A" Division from Scott Heatherington, who is, as you know, with ISI in DFAIT. He has faxed to these two divisions of the RCMP Mr. Pillarella's November 3rd memo wherein he
is meeting with a Syrian official: met for an hour on November 3rd to review the Arar case.

He goes on in paragraph 3:
"When I asked the [Syrian
official] whether I could get
a resume of information
obtained so far from Arar
that I could take to Canada
with me, he agreed to do so.
He promised I would receive
it before my departure,
unfortunately only in
Arabic."
And then he finally -- this is
Pillarella -- finally comments:
"Comment: It is obvious that
the Syrians continue to be well disposed towards us."

If we go to the next tab, we have
an indication, at 165 -- this is from
Mr. Saunders. As you know, Mr. Saunders is with ISI.

This is dated Sunday, November 3rd, and it states:
"On November 3, 2002, the

Canadian Ambassador to Syria received a document (written in Arabic) from [a Syrian official]. The Ambassador brought the document to Canada personally and gave it to ISI on November 6. ISI sent it to CSIS for translation. The document, an undated three-paragraph bout de papier, was translated on November 7 . The document alleges that Arar spent time in Afghanistan in Mujaheddin camps and that he knew [unnamed persons]. The document was sent to CSIS for translation by [whomever]. The translated document was returned to ISI and the information was shared with Mr. Pardy, the RCMP and CSIS."

If I am in Mr. Arar's shoes,

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knowing what the RCMP is up to in carrying out their mandate, that he is a person of interest in an investigation, and $I$ find out that my ambassador, who is supposedly trying to help me, gets this statement -- and we will come to the reliability of that statement -- but gets this statement, brings it back to Canada, and shares it with the RCMP, with whom $I$ am the subject of investigation or a person of interest, however you want to frame it, and CSIS, $I$ think $I$ would be very concerned about that.

Do you think it was appropriate
for Mr. Pillarella to bring back this statement or, if it wasn't him, ISI, or anyone in DFAIT, to share this information, which was obtained in the course of consular functions and duties, to share this information with the RCMP and CSIS? MR. PARDY: Well, we go back to the issue of the role of the Canadian ambassador in a foreign country. There are many aspects to his role. One of them, as you have noted, is to provide and assist in providing consular assistance to Canadians in difficulty. The other role is to obtain information from a foreign government of relevance
to other parts of the Canadian government in terms of their operations. And when a foreign official of this rank provides such information to a Canadian ambassador, then it is quite appropriate and quite normal -- it happens in any number of circumstances -- that that information is then shared with the appropriate parts of the Canadian government that has a responsibility to deal with it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Certainly $I$ am not going do debate that point. It seems to certainly be a very good public policy question. But in any event, it would seem to me that if that's the position of the Canadian government, then the Canadian government should advise -- should advise -- a Canadian detained in a foreign detention centre or a jail: By the way, the ambassador is not just representing your interests but is also representing the RCMP, is also representing CSIS, and any other organization that may be interested in you.

Don't you think that's a fair
warning?
MR. PARDY: Well, the problem that we had, of course, was our ability to communicate
with Mr. Arar in any specific sense. And quite clearly it would have been.

I did the next best thing in the circumstances, and that was to share the information with his wife.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And we are
going to come back to the sharing of the information with the wife.

But do you not think -- and you have 35 years' experience in the foreign service, a lot more experience than $I$ have. But as a typical Canadian, what $I$ think is my ambassador is wearing two hats there, and indeed my ambassador is wearing conflicting hats. On the one hand, he is going to try to help me get back to Canada; and on the other hand, he is the agent for the RCMP and CSIS, who may be trying to investigate me, get as much information on me as possible so that they could charge me.

Do you not see that there are conflicting duties there that the ambassador has to --

MR. PARDY: I am not sure whether they are conflicting duties to the extent that you suggest. I think all senior officials -- and I
shouldn't say "senior officials", but persons in positions of responsibility at a senior level, and I would suggest in the private sector, in the legal profession. I mean, you have duties when you represent a client that could be as an officer of the court, that could be balanced off in terms of your duties to the client or in terms of being a member of a law firm.

These things are not unusual in the way that the world works out there.

What I considered important in all
of this was to get the information that could, in effect, form the core of any trial that the Syrians might subject Mr. Arar to, and to have that information available to us and to try to have it investigated as to whether or not we could, through our own sources, prove the accuracy or the inaccuracy of such information or, in this case, the issue of Afghanistan in the time that this was made, the validity of that information. MR. CAVALLUZZO: But couldn't you have done that without getting the RCMP involved, getting CSIS involved? You have your own law department in DFAIT in terms of international law, Syrian law. You have your own ISI department that
can perform functions.
Can't you do this without the conflict that I see?

MR. PARDY: No. I think the problem you run into is, I mean, we have no investigative arm, if $I$ can use that term, available to us in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The key issue surrounding this information was whether or not Mr. Arar was out of the country for a period of time, and the period under consideration was almost ten years previous to what we were dealing with, which in effect requires professional investigators to go and see whether or not they could find records of that.

I mean, short of going to the -- I mean, do I go to the CBC and ask them to investigate? No, it's not going to work.

And there are no resources in the Department of Foreign Affairs, despite your suggestion, to do this.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Last question,
and that is: If $I$ am a Canadian detained in a Syrian jail, or any other foreign nation's jail, particularly with a human rights record that is
not stellar, and $I$ know up front, I know that that ambassador, my Canadian ambassador, may try to help me through consular services in getting me back or whatever else he or she can do, but at the same time know that that ambassador may share information on me with the RCMP and CSIS, I may refuse consular assistance.

The point is that Canadians should be aware that the ambassador, when he is wearing his or her consular hat, at the same time may be sharing information about me with a police agency or a security intelligence agency. Canadians should know that.

You would agree with that,
wouldn't you?
MR. PARDY: I think you are collapsing the process in this particular incident.

Mr. Pillarella was given the
information, and it is my understanding that Mr. Pillarella did not make the decision with respect to the sharing of that information. But Mr. Pillarella had a responsibility to report that information to Ottawa, and the decision to share was not for Mr. Pillarella to make; it was a
decision to be made by officials back in Ottawa. MR. CAVALLUZZO: But if I am Mr. Arar, I really don't care who makes the decision. I don't care if it's Mr. Pillarella, or Mr. Martin, indeed. The fact is that this information is being shared with a police service that has told you that $I$ am a person of interest? MR. PARDY: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It seems to me that you are assisting -- DFAIT is assisting the police investigation, which $I$ would think that most Canadians would be surprised at. MR. PARDY: Well, I go back to something that $I$ said earlier. The availability of information of this nature could have gone the other way and could have been proved that the comments that were being made here were wrong, and that would have been helpful to Mr. Arar. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I want to give you the opportunity -- you said that you did the next best thing, since you didn't have access to Mr. Arar, that you shared the information with Dr. Mazigh.

Why don't you tell us how that
came about and what in fact you told her?

MR. PARDY: Well, the information came to me -- as you mentioned earlier, I was in Beruit during this period, and on November the 3rd I spoke with Ambassador Pillarella. We had a lengthy conversation where he reported to me, even before he did the message that we had been discussing earlier. We went over the information and I tried to elicit from him additional details. And the fact that he was able to get a written record -- I had not seen the written record but I think I saw it when $I$ came back to Ottawa or subsequent to all of that.

My memory is that the information, I shared it with Dr. Mazigh early in the New Year, I think it was, when there was a suggestion that the Syrians were about to proceed to trial again.

I had not received any information
back from the Canadian agencies with respect to the status of their investigation of this information and the reliability of it, and the suggestion was that the family might have some information that would be valuable here, should it proceed to trial.

There is a written record not of that particular conversation with Dr. Mazigh, but
later on in the summer when the issue of the trial came up again, I sat down with Dr. Mazigh and her brother-in-law and we discussed all of this again. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now,
before we leave November the 3rd, what
Mr. Pillarella brings back to Canada is a statement which the Syrians have told Canada that they miraculously got within less than 24 hours. Remember they said that he just showed up at the border, and by the way, within that time he has given us a statement in which he has admitted to certain terrorist activities.

And the question that $I$ have for you is that, in light of all of the circumstances, including the public record that $I$ have taken you through, Exhibits P-27 and P-28, did you have any views as to the reliability of the statement which Mr. Pillarella brought back to Canada?

MR. PARDY: No. The judgment I made was can we investigate this information in some sort of a systematic way and establish whether there is any validity to this?

My assessment of the information, though, given the time frame, and particularly $I$ am talking about the alleged trip to Afghanistan
in -- I don't know whether I am allowed to give the date here, whether it's in the public record or not.

But that particular time frame --
you mean in terms of my own knowledge of the region at that time -- was that al-Qaeda was in the Sudan. There was a civil war going on in Afghanistan --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let's not be oblique here so that the public is aware.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The allegation was that he was involved in Mujahedin training in Afghanistan in 1993, and you are saying now that in 1993, al-Qaeda was in the Sudan, was not even in Afghanistan?

MR. PARDY: Well, there could have been some elements in Afghanistan going back, but I think after the Soviets pulled out in 1989, then there was -- I think most people would agree that there was a civil war under way, and the Mujahedin of course were the freedom fighters --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's right.
MR. PARDY: -- if you want to use that term during the period that the Soviets were
there and were strongly supported in their efforts by various western governments.

So the value that $I$ attach to the allegation that Mr. Arar might have been in Afghanistan at that point of time, it didn't ring any bells whatsoever. I just did not see that as being an important element.

And my view was that it was important that people understand the time context of that particular piece of information.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess the other
aspect to this -- and that is very important what you have just stated concerning the political conditions in Afghanistan. And of course you bring to bear a great deal of experience. You spent some time dealing with Afghanistan in the late 1980s.

Isn't that correct?
MR. PARDY: Yes, and previously I
had visited the country earlier as well.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess the only
other question $I$ would have relating to that statement that Mr. Pillarella brought back is whether you considered the possibility that it might be the product of torture in light of the
public record?
MR. PARDY: All information that
comes from governments, $I$ look at it in a fairly sceptical way, unless $I$ can prove it by some independent means that $I$ have some reliability in, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And presumably, your scepticism, being a fairly seasoned professional your scepticism arises with a lack of human rights in a particular country?

MR. PARDY: Yes, I think
generally. Not so much the level of human rights here, it's really the conduct of a government generally.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we continue on
then in terms of the chronology, we are still in Volume 2. And we can move to tab 186.

This is an e-mail dated November 7th from Jonathan Solomon, who we understand was in ISI at the time, and you told us yesterday was a lawyer.

He states:
"Gar, $I$ understand from
Reynald..."
I understand that Reynald is the
head of the communications division at DFAIT?
MR. PARDY: He was the desk
officer responsible for this case in our media relations division, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: All right.
"... that a reporter has called and cited diplomatic sources as having told him that the Canadian Ambassador to Syria has visited Arar and that the Syrians gave our Embassy a report on the progress/completion of their investigation into Arar."

It goes on:
"While I am concerned about how he received this information, we need to craft an amendment to our Arar Q\&A."

Is this the first, if $I$ can put it nicely, leak that we see concerning Mr. Arar's file that you are aware of?

MR. PARDY: No. I think there was an earlier report in The Globe and Mail in

October -- and I would need to go back -- where there was a suggestion of use of information that generally $I$ didn't believe was in the public domain.

But I would have to go back and check the records on that, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But it would be the first or second leak.

MR. PARDY: Oh, yes. At this point it's very early on in the matter, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And obviously,
once again being a longstanding professional in this regard, you would have concerns about anybody inside the Canadian government leaking information about Mr. Arar at this point in time?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 189
captures -- before we do that, why don't we go to 167. This really confirms your conversation that you had with Dr. Mazigh concerning the November $3 r d$ visit.

This is 167. It's dated November $3 r d$ and it's an e-mail to you.

Dr. Mazigh says:
"Good afternoon.

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I hope that you are fine. You promised me that you will receive a report from Damascus regarding the meeting of today between Canadians and Syrians ..."

That presumably confirms the conversation you had with her from Beruit and she is talking about that meeting.

Or am I incorrect in that?
MR. PARDY: No, I did not have a conversation with her from Beruit. This came in -- I came back, I think, on the night of the 6th, and $I$ think it was some point subsequent to my return to Ottawa that we had a conversation, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did she ever get a copy of that report?

I guess she didn't because that would have been top secret.

MR. PARDY: Not from me,
certainly.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then if we go to tab 189, which attests to your meeting with -- a conversation at least you had with Bassam Arar?

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MR. PARDY: I would assume so. There is no indication in the message of that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is dated -well, $I$ guess for privacy reasons the name is blacked out. But in any event, it would indicate you talked to somebody in Mr. Arar's family concerning the file?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I apologize for raising his name.

MR. PARDY: Well, $I$ think we had said earlier that he was the principal contact during this period in Canada, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
At the next tab, 190, there are a
series of e-mails of your communications with Dr. Mazigh concerning, I guess, the plans to return home. And she is going to be returning home very shortly thereafter.

Tab 196 is also a series of e-mails concerning Dr. Mazigh's trip back to Canada with her two children.

Rather than taking you through every e-mail related to the trip, because there are numerous e-mails in here of your
communications with her, could you tell us, in effect, what efforts you expended in terms of making her trip back to Canada from Tunis as easy as possible in light of all of the circumstances, unfortunately, in which she found herself?

MR. PARDY: Well, the principal one I think was to ensure that she was able to leave Tunis. As you know, she was interviewed by Tunisian officials prior to her departure -MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's a very
important point. Unfortunately, prior to her departure from Tunis, we have a young woman with two very small children, whose husband has been, to put it nicely, deported to Syria and is in certain conditions in Syria. She is returning to Canada and she is interviewed by Tunisian officials.

Did you ask, or did you inquire, as to what gave rise to the interview of Dr. Mazigh by Tunisian officials?

MR. PARDY: No. But $I$ would assume by this time of course there was a lot of material in the press. And the fact of her Tunisian citizenship was in the media, and the fact that she was resident in Tunisia, and the
fact that she needed an exit permit from the Tunisian authorities in order to leave.

So all of this information was available, I think, from public sources for them. That's all I am aware of.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did any Canadian officials attempt to assist Dr. Mazigh during this interviewing or questioning by Tunisian officials?

MR. PARDY: No, I think -- my recollection is that that particular interview -well, there were two things: One, she went to the appropriate office of the Tunisian government in order to get the exit permit, and in that process, for want of a better word, the people with the large moustaches intercepted her and spoke to her for a period of time and then was allowed to leave.

But when that was told to us, we instructed the embassy in $T$ unis that at the point of departure at the airport that they be there to ensure that there would be no problems in terms of her departure.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Her plane left from Tunis, and it went through Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris. Did you have anybody --

MR. PARDY: Yes, we arranged for the senior Canadian consular officer in Paris to be at the airport.

The point that you registered, a young woman travelling with two very young kids in these circumstances, even in normal times, can be very difficult, and we tried to assist her to the maximum.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And then she flew from Paris to Dorval Airport in Montreal? MR. PARDY: To Montreal, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And did you have
anyone --
MR. PARDY: No, but we had alerted the Immigration authorities at Montreal that she was coming through, because through a mistake we had put the wrong date on the emergency passport that we had provided her son.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you know if
she had any trouble at the Montreal airport?
MR. PARDY: No, I am not aware of
that -- no, sorry.
After the fact, I have heard that they -- that somebody had gone through her luggage or something like that? But having gone through

Canadian Customs myself, going through luggage is not something that --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But do you know why they went through her luggage?

MR. PARDY: I have no idea, no. I only learned about that after the fact.

I think -- and I am not quite sure where I heard of it. It wasn't from Dr. Mazigh because she came up to Ottawa shortly after her arrival and we met, and $I$ do not recall that she raised it with me in terms of the discussions that we had.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Just to give time context, this would have been November 14th, the middle of November, when Dr. Mazigh returned to Canada?

MR. PARDY: Yes, I think that was a Thursday or Friday, if I remember correctly, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then if we move, Mr. Pardy, to tab 202, this is an e-mail from Jonathan Solomon once again, dated November 15 th, which included another e-mail from Reynald Doiron to a number of individuals, and the message is:
"As indicated during our

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> phone conversation at lunch time, US side indicated to Canadian side yesterday, during Powell-Graham meeting, that 'US government' had indicated to 'Canadian government' reasons/rationale behind Arar's deportation to Syria. It does not look, however, that reason/rationale was given by State to DFAIT, but rather from one law enforcement agency to their Canadian counterpart."

We know -- and we are going to be questioning Mr. Graham on Monday about this meeting he had with Mr. Powell on November 14th.

But in terms of this statement, that the reason/rationale was not given by State to DFAIT but rather from one law enforcement agency to their Canadian counterpart, do you know what is being said in this? What is the meaning of that?

MR. PARDY: No, I do not know. I
mean, $I$ can read the words, and the words are fairly obvious. I have not spoken to Mr. Doiron in terms of this particular message, in terms of trying to find out, and it doesn't really tell the source of his -- where his information came from. He certainly would not have been present during the meeting between Mr. Graham and Mr. Powell.

My recollection is that the
meeting itself was in Mexico? I think this was on the margins of the trilateral for the NAFTA agreement, although $I$ could stand to be corrected for that.

I think the next meeting, I am trying to think, was in Ottawa, and then there was one subsequent to that in Prague.

I am trying to see whether -yes -- whether $I$ was even copied on this message. I am trying to do a quick read here of all of this.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, if you
can't help us there, what you can help us with is obviously you cannot tell us what Mr. Powell told to Mr. Graham in that meeting that was held on November the 14 th. But are you aware of any public statements that Mr. Powell made at this
time concerning how Mr. Arar ended up in Syria from the United States?

MR. PARDY: I am trying to -- I
don't think there was a public statement by Mr. Powell at this time. I do not believe. And I know that Mr. Graham was interviewed by the media at this time, and he was very circumspect in what he said Mr. Powell told him.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will deal with that with Mr. Graham on Monday. If you go to 212, which is the
letter --
MR. PARDY: Can $I$ just make one other comment on that document? MR. CAVALLUZZO: Certainly. MR. PARDY: When you go to paragraph 2 in the November 15 from Mr. Doiron, the work that we did in the spring of 2003 was in part precipitated by this. This is the work associated with the deck.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And this
is the interdepartmental communication that you talk about --

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- in the deck in
order that Canada might speak with one voice in dealing with foreign countries.

Tab 212 is the last document in Volume 2 that we will refer you to.

I guess the important point here is the e-mail at the bottom. This is from Scott Heatherington's computer, but the e-mail at the bottom indicates that:
"Minister Graham has decided over the weekend to call by telephone his Syrian counterpart sometime Tuesday morning prior to Cabinet... Can you arrange for this call to take place?"

What we do know is that on November the $18 t h$ Mr. Graham made a phone call to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Syria relating to Mr. Arar's situation in Syria.

We will move then to Volume 3.
Mr. Commissioner, it's eleven
o'clock. Why don't we go to Volume 3 but before opening Volume 3 --

THE COMMISSIONER: Whatever suits
you. Do you want to take a break now?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I am fine, I can keep going. It's really up to the witness.

THE COMMISSIONER: Why don't we go
to 11:15. We will break from 11:15 to 11:30 and then sit from 11:30 to 1:00. That will sort of divide it up.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you.
Do you have Volume 3 in front of
you, Mr. Pardy?
MR. PARDY: Yes, I do.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We are at tab
228, and we are now at November 25 th.
Before we go to this tab, I am
advised by government counsel that $I$ can ask you two questions relating to a visit to Syria.

The first question is: I
understand that officials from CSIS visited Syria some time in November 2002. Is that correct?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: However, I
understand that the official from CSIS did not meet Mr. Arar during that visit. Is that correct?

MR. PARDY: That is correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And that is the
extent of the --

THE COMMISSIONER: That is the extent of the information over which the government doesn't claim NSC.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct.
MS McISAAC: I should indicate, sir, that as part of our discussions with counsel for Mr. Arar regarding the documents that were at issue, it may be that we would be prepared to allow additional information to be discussed. But I understand at the moment Mr. Arar's counsel does not believe the disclosure would be fair and doesn't wish to have it made.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, Commission counsel, in light of the discussion, agrees with Ms Edwardh that there should be more information given rather than what the government is proposing to give at the present time.

So I think that we would agree that the information proposed to be disclosed leaves an unfair impression, and we are in the middle of discussions on that point. Hopefully we can encourage government to release a little more.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right. And what I can say for the public is that we have heard in camera the complete evidence.

That would be a fair statement, Mr. Cavalluzzo?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, complete evidence, and certainly thoroughly and rigorously questioned.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right. So those are the two questions to which there is no objection.

I take your comment, Ms McIsaac.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we go to --
MS EDWARDH: Excuse me,
Mr. Cavalluzzo, if $I$ might just have a moment.
I didn't know that these two
factual matters were going to be put on the record this morning.

THE COMMISSIONER: The two questions that Mr. Cavalluzzo asked.

MS EDWARDH: Yes. And Ms McIsaac had agreed that these two matters of fact could be put before you, Mr. Commissioner.

In light of our discussion last evening and in light of my expectation that there would be an attempt by Ms McIsaac and her team to get further instructions from her principals, I must admit $I$ am surprised because it's not only --
it's helpful to have some information about the visit, but the second answer, that CSIS went to Syria and did not meet with Mr. Arar, is fundamentally misleading, and I am deeply troubled that she can't then go on and indicate other -- I mean, it's not any more subject to national security than what she has admitted.

This enures to the government's benefit and misleads the public about Mr. Arar. MR. CAVALLUZZO: What $I$ can say in
response to that is there is a good deal more information and no conclusion should be drawn by anybody in respect of those two questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right. And I think obviously it's a difficult matter for us to deal with when we get, as here, claims that don't permit the full body of evidence to be put forward.

I can just reassure the public
that we have, in camera, heard all of the evidence. I will be reporting fully on it in reaching my conclusions on the basis of all of the evidence.
I understand your point,

Ms Edwardh.

Carry on.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you.
If we go to tab 228 , we see an
e-mail dated November the 25 th. This is a direction from you to Mr. Martel, who is the consular officer who visits Mr. Arar in Damascus, and this just represents your continuing interest in asking Mr. Martel to get certain information relating to Mr. Arar, particularly his medical condition and overall assessment of his wellbeing and so on?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let's move to tab
229. We have a consular report of the fourth visit to Mr. Arar by Mr. Martel. This was the visit that took place on November 26 th.

One thing I notice in these consular visits, and ask you if this is the normal practice, and that is it would appear that Mr. Martel spends time with, as you refer to them, the men with moustaches prior to seeing Mr. Arar, and sometimes spends more time with the men with moustaches than he does with Mr. Arar.

Is that normal in this kind of situation?

MR. PARDY: In countries like Syria, that is quite normal. When you make visits to -- well, if you look at the report from Ms Girvan in terms of the MDC visit, of course she had no contact or any discussions with the officials inside the prison.

But certainly in this context, we consider it important that these people are willing to engage in a conversation with Mr. Martel, and it -- how can $I$ put it? You know, it's not conclusive in any significant way, but it's helpful that -- I mean, one of the things of doing consular visits is to, if $I$ can use the term, humanize the individual in the eyes of the people, of his jailers, and the fact that they are outsiders, the fact that there is family deeply concerned about him, and those kinds of things, that kind of information available, we find it very helpful.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And the only question that $I$ would ask -- and, please, if you have any other comments that you want to make in respect of this fourth visit, please do.

The question that $I$ would have relates to paragraph number 7, and it states:
"Maher appeared to be in good physical and mental health. Officials made him stand up to show he was well being taken care of. No change could be seen in his state of health from that of the last visit. Upon being questioned on his current health compared to the day he was first visited he indicated he had been afraid at the beginning as the investigation was more intensive."

That statement there, even though it's being made in front of the men with moustaches, certainly is consistent with what I was asking you about before; that is, the initial period where the Syrians may hold somebody incommunicado, extract the information they want, and then disclose his whereabouts.

Isn't that correct?
MR. PARDY: That is correct. And
it's also, I think, consistent with the comments
that Mr. Arar made publicly after his return to Canada.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It goes on and it says:
"He seemed more relaxed and he said his only moment of joy was when he received our visit."

And then finally it says:
"He continued to say he was being treated well and when prompted by..."

If $I$ could put in "by the men with moustaches":
"... he said 'my brothers are treating me very well.'"

Now, that prompt $I$ think is obviously a signal to you that Mr. Arar is not exactly in a situation of true freedom of speech? MR. PARDY: No. I can mention at this point -- as you know, the range of behaviour of officials in prison sometimes do not vary from country to country. And one can look at a commonality.

I had very direct experience with
another case in the Middle East in which a Canadian had been involved, and we subsequently were able to return his release and his return to Canada. I spent a considerable amount of time with that individual in terms of the procedures that were being used, and this was previous to Mr. Arar's case.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
MR. PARDY: And $I$ was using some of the signposts that were available to me in that case to measure this information.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And was that -- I am not going to ask you the individual involved. But was that a country that was in the Middle East?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And was its
initials S.A.?
MR. PARDY: Yes. It was -- yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: All right. We can move on.

If we could move on from the fourth consular visit to November 28th, and this is tab 233.

This is a confidential message to
the Head of Mission at Damascus, of course Mr. Pillarella, with copies to the Deputy Minister, GMD, the head of security and intelligence, Mr. Heatherington, Solomon, and yourself, and Ms Pastyr-Lupul.

In paragraph 2, much of this is redacted, so $I$ just want to ask you about a couple of sentences here.

In paragraph 2 it states: "In view of this information believe that it would be appropriate for you to seek another meeting with General Khalil in order to further explore Syrian intentions."

Just to clarify for us, is this a message coming from you to Mr. Pillarella?

MR. PARDY: Yes, this is the
format.
Unfortunately $I$-- is there any
indication of date here?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, the date that we are putting to it is November 28 th.

MR. PARDY: I do not -- I think it might have been a little earlier.

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MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. We may be
incorrect.
MR. PARDY: Yes. I think it's
certainly in November, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It goes on in
that paragraph 2:
"At the same time, we balance
that view against the openness with which the Syrians have permitted consular access and the increasingly easy format for Leo's meetings."

Finally, in the third paragraph it
states:
"At this stage would suggest
that you simply explore
further the intentions of the
Syrian authorities and
whether or not their
investigation is coming to a conclusion."

So, obviously in that you are
seeking as much information as possible relating to their investigation which would be of
importance, obviously, to you in fulfilling your objectives?

MR. PARDY: And that was the key consideration in all of these discussions.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then you go on,
in the last two sentences, to state:
"We would want this
information as soon as possible as we will want to raise our future approach on the case with the Minister.

In all of this, would appreciate your views as to whether or not a direct appeal by the Government of Canada for the release of Mr. Arar and return to Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds is worth considering at this time."

So at this time, some time in late November, you are considering the option of a direct appeal to the Syrian government?

MR. PARDY: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Is that a good
time then, Mr. Cavalluzzo?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, it is.
THE COMMISSIONER: All right. We will break to 11:30.

THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Upon recessing at 11:15 a.m. /
Suspension à 11 h 15
--- Upon resuming at 11:37 a.m. /
Reprise à 11 h 37
THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cavalluzzo.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you,
Mr. Commissioner.
Just a question. In November of 2002, you stated that you sought information from Dr. Mazigh and Mr. Arar's family concerning Mr. Arar.

Do you recall that?
MR. PARDY: No, I didn't say
November. I said early in 2003 .
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
MR. PARDY: Roughly at the time that the Syrians made suggestions about a possible
trial.

> MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And do you recall the kind of information you were seeking from Mr. Arar's family?
> And of course at this time he is in Syria.

MR. PARDY: Right. This relates to the 1993 information. It was very specific to that, and whether the family had any records that related to that particular period in Mr. Arar's life.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And did they ever bring you any records?

MR. PARDY: No, they did not. I returned to the issue in August 2003 again, as I said, because at that point the threat of a trial was much more imminent at that point, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come to
that because it's even to the point of retaining lawyers in Syria at that point in time in terms of the upcoming trial.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we can
continue on then with Volume 2 --
THE COMMISSIONER: Volume 3?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, it's
Volume -- excuse me, Volume 3, at tab 240.
We are now into December of 2002.
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is an e-mail
from you to Mr. Pillarella?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And what is this
about?
MR. PARDY: We had received
information that they were, $I$ think, trying to make another consular visit.

The second paragraph, I think, makes reference indirectly to the suggestion that this related in some way to the Muslim Brotherhood and the problems that Mr. Arar was having, and I was asking the ambassador for his views with respect to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria at that point.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And there
was a period of time when there was some suggestion by the Syrians that Mr. Arar was associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and then that changed over time to al-Qaeda, to nothing?

MR. PARDY: Yes, and it morphed
back and forth there. They moved back and forth, those two points of the Brotherhood.

And the other point $I$ think it is
important to realize is that in some instances there was direct collaboration between the Brotherhood and al-Qaeda.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you go to 242,
this relates to a question from a journalist
concerning a consular visit. Do you see that?
And halfway down:
"Myra:
Question from the journalist: Gar already told me we didn't know where Mr. Arar was being held in Syria (the prison). Do we know if our Consular official has been meeting Mr. Arar at the same place during his visits?"

And so on and so forth.
So we don't know at this point in
time -- and we are in December of 2002 -- that Mr. Arar at that time is being held in the Palestine Branch?

MR. PARDY: No, I think we knew

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that, but the geographic location is what is at issue here.

I think the question in our minds was that Mr. Arar was brought to the possibility of another location, and we were not absolutely certain -- we had no information as to the place where he was being held.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. At tab 243, the next day, December the 6th, and this is from -- the CAMANT is December the 6th, but the e-mail is dated December the 3 rd.

This would appear to be ongoing
questions concerning Mr. Arar's status and press lines, media lines, and whatnot?

MR. PARDY: I think it's an
indication, from the level of daily interest, on this matter by Mr. Graham's office.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 246 ,
there is a message from you.
It says:
"Pardy called Pastyr-Lupul
from BC today. He is away
this week on business.
He asked if you can follow up on 2 matters:

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a) Would you be allowed to take a digital photo of Maher on your next visit, that you can send to us via e-mail." Obviously this is to Mr. Martel, the consular official that is visiting Mr. Arar. And secondly:
"b) Would the Syrians allow a visit by Mr. Arar's wife, if she is willing to come to Syria?"

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And I understand
that as far as the digital photo is concerned, the answer turned out to be no?

MR. PARDY: That's correct, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come to
the visit by Dr. Mazigh subsequently.
On December the $10 t h$, if we go to
tab 248 , we come to the fifth consular visit, which occurs on December 10th.

Is there anything in this consular visit that gave you concern, that was out of the ordinary or that, indeed, any way you can help us in terms of understanding what was going on at
that time?
MR. PARDY: No. I think the important thing in this particular message was that Mr. Martel was able to see Maher almost immediately upon arrival. As you know from his reports on the previous visits, the Syrians established that -- I mean, almost an interview with Mr. Martel -- made it a condition almost for Mr. Martel to see Mr. Arar, and he spent some minutes with Syrian officials before Mr. Arar were to arrive. In this case he was taken straight in. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And it says here in the second paragraph:
"He asked to be told again about the Prime Minister's press attache's story."

We will hear from Mr. Martel that
Mr. Arar liked to be kept abreast of what was going on in Canada during this period of time?

MR. PARDY: Yes, we gave him
copies of Canadian newspapers and magazines.
This was one of the first
indications that we had that that material was being given, because $I$ think we had to give it to the guards and they said that they would
scrutinize it and then make a decision whether it could go to Mr. Arar.

This was certainly an indication that the material was made available to Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you know that
he never got to read it because of the location in which he found himself?

MR. PARDY: No, I didn't know
that, no.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
MR. PARDY: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 253 is from Mr. Pillarella. It's dated December 12th. It's to Michael Chesson.

Could you remind us again of
Mr. Chesson's position?
MR. PARDY: Yes. He was the desk officer for Syria in the political division.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess this is Mr. Pillarella's response to you when you are asking questions as to the nature and extent of the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood?

MR. PARDY: I would need to
review --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Particularly in
the second paragraph.
MR. PARDY: No. He sent me a separate message with respect -- he just makes reference to the fact that I had asked for information about the Muslim Brotherhood, and you will see there that he said:
"See my reftel on Muslim
Brotherhood."
There was a separate message on
his comments on the Muslim Brotherhood.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess the
important comments that $I$ would ask you to comment on would be in the second paragraph.

In the middle line it says:
"Following his interrogation,
Arar is considered to be a
case of internal security
linked it seems to the Muslim
Brotherhood, not to
al-Qaeda."
And as you said, it says:
"... (see my reftel on
Muslim Brotherhood) and
therefore the Syrians will
act with extreme prudence

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having in mind their national interest as the foremost priority. Should they consider that by releasing Arar and returning him to Canada he could still represent a potential menace for Syria, they will likely refuse to release him." And did you agree with that assessment of Mr. Pillarella: that if the Syrians viewed him to be a menace to Syria, that they would not release him?

MR. PARDY: It's not a question of whether I agreed with it or not. It was an assessment done by our ambassador who was closest to the action on this with respect to the possible decisions by the Syrian authorities. And he stated for us -- I mean, the question for us was: How do you get around that assessment, or whether that assessment was correct in any absolute way?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But certainly you would have deferred to the judgment of Mr. Pillarella, who basically said to you that they won't release him if they think he is a

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menace to Syria?
MR. PARDY: He is closest to the action and, yes, that is one of his roles, is to provide us with that kind of an assessment.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We had referred earlier to a phone call that Mr. Graham was going to make to the Syrian Foreign Minister in late November, and we see in the first paragraph that for whatever reason that phone call was cancelled?

MR. PARDY: Yes, that is correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And it
subsequently took place in January?
MR. PARDY: That's right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we can go now to 258 , this is another secret message from Damascus to a number of people at headquarters, including yourself.

What is this e-mail about
concerning Colonel Saleh Majed?
MR. PARDY: I think he was just
informing the embassy. As you know, we were
trying to see Mr. Arar as often as we possibly could, but all visits were subject to the agreement of the Syrian authorities. And he said that it was not possible.

This was the first indication that we had that frequent -- and I will quote from the message:

> "He also indicated that frequent visits like the ones we have so far been offered were unusual."
> And an indication that maybe the unusual would not continue.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let us give some political context to this. We are now in the middle of December of 2002 .

Would it be fair to say that at this point in time that the second war in Iraq or the second Gulf War is on the horizon?

MR. PARDY: Not on the horizon at this point, but certainly a lot of issues were being debated internationally.

I am trying to remember when the Security Council was involved with respect to another resolution that would give authority, say, for a coalition to go in. But there was a lot of activity, and certainly the international community was balancing as to where we would go. But it was some time before, I
think, anybody had a sense that the United States was going to go into Iraq.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, certainly
Mr. Powell's famous address to the U.N. was on February 5th of 2003.

MR. PARDY: That's right. MR. CAVALLUZZO: So there is that period of time where people are seriously looking at that.

MR. PARDY: Oh, absolutely. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And presumably
the Syrians --
MR. PARDY: What $I$ was commenting
on was the specific thing that you said in your question here.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And I guess the
other thing at this point in time -- well, we will
come to that in terms of the specifics later. If we now go to Exhibit $P-85$,

Volume 3, and look at tab 107.
THE COMMISSIONER: P-85?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, P-85, which
is the redacted loose exhibits, Volume 3 of 4 . THE COMMISSIONER: I have it. MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is a secret

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information memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as other cabinet ministers associated with DFAIT. It's dated December 16 th, 2002, and it's authored by Jonathan Solomon, once again, who is with the S\&I Foreign Intelligence Division.

I would refer to paragraph number
2 wherein it states:
"The Canadian embassy in Syria has been granted consular access to Maher Arar and officials have visited him on several occasions. However, visits for this week and next have been put on hold, and there has been some speculation by our embassy in Damascus that this may be linked to ... and possible confusion with 'consular' access."

And then on page 5 -- so we are seeing that consular access, as you indicated, is becoming a little problematic at that point in time?

MR. PARDY: Yes, that's reflected
here.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And in paragraph
5, which $I$ think is important, it says:
"The Syrians appear to view
these connections as
sufficient grounds to detain
Arar, although ....
activities. It is clear that
the Syrian standard of what
constitutes a detainable
terrorist is lower than
ours."
And you would no doubt agree with
that?
MR. PARDY: Yes. I should just mention that $I$ was out of town during this whole period when this memo was under preparation.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I guess
that's something to reflect on, isn't it?
If their threshold for detaining
somebody for terrorism is lower than ours, and they release Mr. Arar in October of 2003, that is an important comment, one would think, in terms of Mr. Arar's status?

MR. PARDY: Yes, and in terms of subsequent issues associated with consular access to Mr. Arar, quite clearly. And as I mentioned earlier, this was the first indication that they were backing away from their initial commitment on October the 22 nd.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That commitment on October the 22 nd was you could see him every three to four days?

MR. PARDY: That's correct.
MS EDWARDH: Excuse me,
Mr. Commissioner, I don't mean to interrupt my friend, but since we know on the basis of an admission of fact put forward this morning that CSIS went to Syria in November, and if the comment that is blacked out is speculation that the visit of CSIS may have disrupted consular access, it would seem to me there could be no possible basis to not put those words in here, given the admission that has been made this morning.

MS McISAAC: I don't actually
recall what that refers to. It may actually be something else, but we will look into that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms McIsaac. I can't recall either, actually.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: My recollection is that it does relate to something else, which I wouldn't have thought should be -- I don't think should be protected by national security. But in any event, government counsel will review it. I think we can all agree on that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you for

> that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we could move on, I am back once again to the chronology in Volume 3, Mr. Pardy, at tab 261. We are still in December of 2003, and we see that there is a memorandum, an internal memorandum, to MINA, which we know is the Minister's office.

Just to keep up with what is going
on at this particular time, we see in paragraph 3 that reference that there are practical difficulties in getting this phone call between Mr. Graham and Mr. Shara'a, who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Syria.

$$
\text { And then on page } 2 \text { we see }
$$

something that says:
"Indications are that Syria

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has concerns that Mr. Arar's links are not with Al-Qaeda but with ..."

I assume that should not be redacted since we saw in the previous document "with the Muslim Brotherhood".

Finally in paragraph number 9, we see that this is the beginning of an interest in Canadian parliamentarians having expressed a desire to intervene on Mr. Arar's behalf.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then moving
along, if we can go on to 262, in terms of Mr. Graham's activities, this is December 19th. We see that Minister Graham called the Syrian ambassador to Canada, Mr. Arnous, to discuss the Maher Arar case, and this is December the 19th of 2002.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then I think I
should ask you about three paragraphs in the middle of the message.

It says:
"Minister Graham stated that
in the international war

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against terrorist ..."
I guess that's "terrorism".
"... it is necessary to
respect human rights. He
then said was making a
representation to the Syrian government to return Arar at the earliest possible time or if Syria suspects that he is guilty, if they would charge him so that he could defend himself against the accusations. He noted that he should not be held in limbo for a long time not knowing what he is accused of doing.

Minister Graham added that
Canada would be prepared to
provide the Syrian
authorities the appropriate
assistance to get his
release.
Ambassador Arnous said that
this is a complex case and

> that the Syrian authorities were still investigating. He noted that there were several factors that caused concern, including Arar's travels to Afghanistan. He said he would continue to work on the case."

This is a situation where Minister Graham, $I$ think, is clearly saying that the war on terrorism is a very important struggle, but at the same time we have to respect human rights, which I think is a very good message to be giving at this point in time.

But then he goes on and says we want Arar released at the very earliest opportunity or charge him as quickly as you can, try him, and so on and so forth.

What some people may say is: What is the Minister doing? We know the public record on the legal and judicial process in Syria. We know what kind of due process they have, if any. Why would we suggest to the Syrians that they should charge him and try him in their courts? It doesn't make sense.

What would your comment be to
that?
MR. PARDY: Well, I understand
that Mr. Graham is going to appear before the Commission I think next week, and certainly you will have an opportunity to obtain that information, $I$ think, direct from him. I think it would be most appropriate to get it from him rather than my speculating on his motives. MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's fine. The final reference in the memorandum is on page 2. It just says "For Damascus" in the second paragraph from the bottom: "Please do not take any action at this time about a possible telephone call from MINA to Minister Shara'a. This possibility was not mentioned to Ambassador Arnous. We are uncertain regarding the timing of a possible call ..."

And so on and so forth, talking about the practical difficulties.
"In the meantime, we support

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your continuing efforts to meet with [an unknown person] to pursue the points raised in your earlier message."

And then appended to that is what's called a note verbale. What is this last document of this tab?

MR. PARDY: I think this was talking points that had been prepared for Mr. Graham in his meeting with Ambassador Arnous.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So these are the
talking points. Okay.
MR. PARDY: And may have been --
since it is titled "note verbale", it is not uncommon in these situations that you give the ambassador then a piece of paper saying these are the key points here.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In terms of -- I am sorry, were you going to add something?

MR. PARDY: I was just going to
say that the possibility of a trial, as you will note, is not mentioned in these particular points.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. In terms
of the phone call between the two Foreign
Ministers which was cancelled in November, were
you aware as to why it was cancelled?
MR. PARDY: My understanding was
that it was in December. I think we were -- or was it in November? It first started in November.

I think the conflicting schedules of Mr. Graham and the Syrian Foreign Minister was such that it was very difficult to bring them together at the same point.

The conversation with the Syrian ambassador in mid-December was in part -- was a reflection of those difficulties. So Mr. Graham spoke to the Syrian ambassador.

But then, as you will recall, in mid-January, their schedules permitted such a call.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. The next event which $I$ think is of importance is perhaps 274, where we see a continuing problem in seeing Mr. Arar.

This is a note from Mr. Pillarella, the Head of Mission, expressing his efforts to get the next consular visit.

And then at 275 and 276 , we see that the next consular visit takes place the next day.

MR. PARDY: 276? Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 276 is the best representation of that visit. MR. PARDY: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is the sixth consular visit which takes place on January 7th of 2003.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And $I$ would ask once again, since we are going to have Mr. Martel testifying, whether there is anything in this consular report which we should be interested in in terms of anything unusual in it, anything that we should be concerned about?

MR. PARDY: The only point $I$ would
bring you is to the information in paragraph 7.
Mr. Martel was pushing them on
this whole issue of their investigation and we said, well, what's the future here? And he quoted a reply from an official:
"We do not think so but at the moment this is a question of national security of Syria."

This sort of connects up with the

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comments that Mr. Pillarella had made to us earlier.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If we move on at 279 , we see --

MR. PARDY: I would bring your attention to paragraph 9 again, in terms of it provides a description of the conditions under which Mr. Martel, if you like, had to deal with in terms of these visits. He met with Mr. Arar first, but then the officials were determined to sit him down and talk to him about the "special treatment" that Mr. Arar was receiving at their hands.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And in the last paragraph we see that Mr. Pillarella is seeking a meeting --

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- with General
Khalil concerning the political events at the time?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If we go then to 279, we see that there is a note to -- or, excuse me, I guess this relates to the request that had been made about a possible phone call.

MR. PARDY: A phone call and the questions about the location of Mr. Arar's computer.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. At 285 we
have a document, once again a secret message, dated January 15th, 2003, to the Head of Mission in Damascus. And it's from GMR?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It says:
"Minister Graham would like to telephone Syrian Foreign Minister Shara'a to discuss the Maher Arar matter as well as other issues. We have attached for your information a copy of the Briefing Note and Key Messages..."

Then it says Mr. Graham will be available to place the call between those periods, and so on and so forth. Please organize this.

And in terms of the next document, it's redacted, so that we should move on.

And just to note that in terms of this, we will be reviewing this in camera with Mr. Graham.

Tab 286 is a contact that you made with Mr. Edelson to review the latest developments in the case. So you were in contact with him throughout the piece as well?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
MR. PARDY: And I would draw your attention to the second sentence there, at the end, there was increasing publicity about the matter in the Canadian media, which we were concerned with, and I shared our concerns with Mr. Edelson.

And as you will see there, he agreed with our concerns that the increased level of attention to the case in the Canadian media was not helpful to Mr. Arar, and he said that he would speak to Dr. Mazigh about this.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is really
the first indication -- and we are going to deal with this issue later on. But it would seem that your view was that the press attention which was being drawn to Mr. Arar's plight in Canada was not necessarily advantageous to your efforts to getting Mr. Arar released as soon as possible.

Is that correct?

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MR. PARDY: That is correct, and it wasn't specific to this case. It was based on experiences in a number of other cases, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We are going to
come back to that question, but this is the first indication, in terms of time, that you have indicated that to us.

Moving in terms of time at 292, we see another secret message to the Head of Mission in Damascus.

It states that Mr. Graham --
MR. PARDY: I am sorry, what
number?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Two nine -- oh, excuse me. 292, I guess, and I am going to come to 293 as well.

But at 292 it says:
"Spoke to Monia on January
16."

This is from you, and you set out a number of items that you discussed with her?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Were you meeting with her at this time, or were you just e-mailing and talking on the telephone?

MR. PARDY: All of the above. MR. CAVALLUZZO: All of the above?

Okay.
I want to refer to 293.
This is a secret message from
Mr. Hickman to Damascus concerning Mr. Graham's call to the Syrian Foreign Minister on January 16th, and it says in the middle paragraphs: "Mr. Graham noted that the Syrians were carrying out an investigation and that he was not commenting on Arar's legal situation. He thought that if charges were brought then Arar could defend himself. Mr. Shara'a assured Minister Graham that if their investigation shows Arar was associated with Al Qaida, he will have a fair trial."

And then it states:
"Mr. Graham noted that there had been a suggestion that Canada did not want Arar returned. He emphasized that
he wanted to make it clear that the preferred option of the Canadian government was that Arar be returned to Canada."

This reference in this telephone call between Ministers, that there has been a suggestion that Canada did not want Arar returned, do you know anything about that suggestion?

MR. PARDY: Yes, I know about the information, but $I$ am not sure about the NSC claim with respect to this material.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, we are going to be dealing with a document dated March 24 th of 2003, of a conversation that Ms Catterall had with the Syrian ambassador which discusses that point.

So there has been no claim as far as that is concerned.

Do you know the document I am talking about?

MR. PARDY: Yes, I do.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Maybe we should show it to you now.

THE COMMISSIONER: Is this in the
material, or do we have a new document?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is a new document that we have provided to the parties. THE COMMISSIONER: P-99. EXHIBIT NO. P-99: Confidential note on Arar case taken by Myra Pastyr-Lupul, dated 24 March 2002, Re: Telecon with Marlene Catterall March 21

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is a note which was taken by Ms Pastyr-Lupul, a confidential note dated March 24 th, 2002 , and it concerns a telephone conversation with Marlene Catterall on March 21st, which would have been a month before Ms Catterall went to Syria.

MR. PARDY: It was part of her preparation. We had originally thought we could get her there in March, but the war occurred and we hoisted the visit until April, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It says in the first paragraph that Ms Catterall and Sarkis Assadourian, who is another parliamentarian, met with the Syrian ambassador on March 21. They discuss the case of Maher Arar and made a personal

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and humanitarian pitch for his release.
And then it goes on:
"They learned that initially during this case that CSIS officials told Syrians that they, 'have no interest in Arar'. The Syrians took this to mean that the CSIS have no interest in having Arar back. They may have meant that they have no security reasons to investigate Arar in Canada. Due to miscommunication, the Syrians believed that CSIS did not want Arar back in Canada and therefore decided to detain him, keep him in syria."

If we can bring your mind back to January 16 th, is this the suggestion that is set out in this e-mail: that Canada did not want Mr. Arar back?

> MR. PARDY: Yes, it is my
understanding that that's what that relates to. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And what we see,

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unfortunately, is that our Minister of Foreign Affairs has this telephone conversation with Mr. Shara'a -- and we will discuss this with Mr. Graham on Monday -- and tells Mr. Shara'a there may be a misunderstanding here; Canada wants him back.

Two months later, on March 21st, two parliamentarians have a discussion with the Syrian ambassador to Canada, who is keeping a close watch on this file obviously, and he says the same thing. He in effect says the same thing.

And $I$ want to know -- I assume at this point in time something must have been done.

And before you answer that
question, let's look at what Ms Pastyr-Lupul said should be done in the next paragraph.

She says:
"What we need to do now is
send a clear message in
writing to the Syrians from
CSIS that outlines clearly
that we have no information
which has led us to believe
that Mr. Arar poses a
security threat to Canada.

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Furthermore, the Syrians need to hear from the security people in DFAIT in writing that if we do have any information that shows any involvement in terrorist activity that we will charge him in Canada and deal with his case through the usual law enforcement channels."

Now, that's the recommendation of
Ms Pastyr-Lupul of DFAIT.
Are you aware of any communication
that CSIS gave to the Syrians that there is a miscommunication? "You guys have got it wrong. We want Mr. Arar back"?

MR. PARDY: I would take some
guidance on this issue with regards to NSC as to whether it is an issue to be discussed here or in my testimony with you next month in camera.

MS McISAAC: I certainly think you
can talk about the letter, Mr. Pardy, that you tried to have the Minister send.

MR. PARDY: My comments go beyond that letter and my understanding.

THE COMMISSIONER: The question, as I understood it -- and there may be an objection. But the question that Mr. Cavalluzzo asked is: Are you aware as to whether CSIS wrote a letter as referred to by Ms Pastyr-Lupul?

I don't know the answer -- I am not suggesting. But if the answer was "no", then that wouldn't be subject to the claim, would it, because nothing happened?

MS MCISAAC: Well, our position
would be, depending on what Mr. Pardy is aware of, that he cannot and should not discuss any communications that may or may not have been had by Syrian authorities and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

THE COMMISSIONER: Even ones going
from Canadians to the Syrians as opposed to --
MS McISAAC: That's correct, if
there were any, and only if he is aware of them.
If he is not aware of anything, he
may say that.
THE COMMISSIONER: The question, it would seem to me, is potentially answered by: "No, I am not aware."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Are you
aware of any communication in writing from CSIS to the Syrians which was an attempt to disabuse the Syrians of the confusion they appeared to have in their minds concerning whether Canada wanted Mr. Arar back or not?

MR. PARDY: No, I am not aware. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you. If we could go back to where we were in the chronology, at tab 294, we are at January 21, which is a couple of weeks after the consular visit on January the 7th.

This is, once again, a
communication that you had with Dr. Mazigh on two occasions?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And here, once
again, you are keeping her abreast of the outlook of the case, what things were happening and so on and so forth?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In the bottom paragraph it states, and $I$ just want to ask you about this -- or the second bottom paragraph, it states:
"I also mentioned to Monia
that I spoke with ... of subject yesterday, who claims the RCMP are requesting a meeting with him to see what he knows about his brother. I advised ... of our consular role, and the fact that we are not controlling what is happening on the RCMP side, nor are we necessarily informed of their investigative procedures. He thought that since we are all 'the government', that we all know what each other is doing. I advised him that we are trying to see Maher as often as possible, when granted permission for visits by the Syrians, but that we are not doing the investigation. Monia's comments on the RCMP's activities were to 'stop intimidation of the family,

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that the RCMP have lack of good intentions and a lack of understanding of the situation, that these are nonsense actions...'"

So you became aware at this time, which would be the third week in January, that the RCMP were attempting to interview members of Mr. Arar's family in order to get information on him?

MR. PARDY: I presume so, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And presumably
advancing their investigation? You don't know that but --

MR. PARDY: I don't know that.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: At tab 313 we are
now into February, and we have the seventh consular visit on February the 18th?

MR. PARDY: That is correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Is there anything
in this consular report, once again, Mr. Pardy, that may give us cause for --

MR. PARDY: Can you give me a moment and $I$ will look at it?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Certainly.
--- Pause

> MR. PARDY: The troublesome one is
> in paragraph 4(b) there.
> We were still trying to get
> information about Syrian intentions, and the fact that should charges be laid, then consular access might cease, even on the limited basis that we were dealing with at that point gave us considerable concern.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
MR. PARDY: Even though there is a procedure for this in civil law countries.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Then the
last tab in this volume that $I$ want to refer to --
MR. PARDY: I should just -- I am
still reviewing that previous document.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I am sorry.
MR. PARDY: And I think paragraph
6 is of interest here as well.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I am sorry. Go
on.
MR. PARDY: With the statement
that Minister Graham had made to the Syrian Foreign Minister, the preferred option that Mr. Arar be returned to Canada, and the comment by

Mr. Martel and Mr. Pillarela that that is something, certainly at that point, that finds no echo on the part of the Syrians.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then if we go
on, I think this is important where it goes on to say:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "We suspect that the only } \\
& \text { possibility of a return to } \\
& \text { Canada could happen only at } \\
& \text { the end of an investigation } \\
& \text { that could not justify the } \\
& \text { laying of charges against } \\
& \text { Arar." }
\end{aligned}
$$

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Which ultimately

> happened.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 317 is what
we have calling "the deck", which is really a PowerPoint presentation. There are a number of versions on this, and $I$ don't think they are that different. And $I$ would, without objection hopefully, like to take you through the one that is in the book itself, which appears to be the eighth version, February $28,2003$.

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If you could, just before I ask you some questions relating to the deck, what is the purpose of this PowerPoint presentation?

MR. PARDY: The purpose here was a
suggestion by one of our Deputy Ministers that given the issue of Canadian government coordination in terms of cases like this -- and you will recall that earlier on I mentioned there was a message from Mr. Doiron regarding an earlier case where there was some confusion.

That case and then this one I
think gave rise in the minds of the Deputy Minister -- the associate Deputy Minister, I should say -- that we should try to sit down and reflect the variety of interests within the Canadian government with respect to those cases.

And you made allusions to this in one of your questions earlier this morning.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
MR. PARDY: And I was tasked with the job of trying to bring this together in a coherent way.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And in the course of preparing the deck, did you consult with other agencies, such as CSIS, RCMP and PCO?

MR. PARDY: I did not consult direct myself, but other parts of the small group that $I$ had working with me on this did make such consultations.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And $I$ think it's important that we spend a little bit of time on this because based on your years of experience in the foreign service, you raise some very important and crucial points that are relevant to the public inquiry that we have.

I am going to start at page 2 of
7.

Under "Detention Cases" you say
that:
"Most consular cases do not engender public debate or bring into question issues of public policy. Only the client, the consular officer and the immediate family are involved."

Then it goes on:
"The standard approach to detention cases is threefold
(a) to ensure the wellbeing
of the person and to provide a channel of communications with their family. (b) to assist the detained Canadian in receiving equitable treatment, and (c) to have charges adjudicated as quickly as possible by an appropriate judicial body. We do not make judgment as to whether or not persons are guilty or innocent. We do not seek preferential treatment for Canadians."

And then you go on:
"Cases related to terrorism and certain cases in the armed conflict in Afghanistan engender public debate and raise issues of public policy."

And then it goes on at the bottom: "The exercise of Canada's Consular responsibility in support of these persons has

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not affected bilateral relations with the countries concerned. However, such cases have the potential to affect bilateral relations depending on the manner in which representations are made or harsh actions (torture, death penalty) by the arresting state or fact Canadian security played a role in the detention of the Canadian."

Just that last part there, what do you mean by what you have stated there in terms of the exercise of Canadian consular responsibility and possible problems in these kinds of cases?

MR. PARDY: Before answering that, can $I$ just make one comment on the paragraph, and particularly the sentence "We do not seek preferential treatment for Canadians".

While legally that is correct, in
practice we do, almost in every case, seek to provide some measure almost of preferential treatment, and whether that is a hastening of the
laying of charges, or the timing of a trial and things like that, or prison conditions. Certainly that has always been an element in our work.

Our responsibility -- I mean, for the most part, consular activities, and its name "consular activities", for a very specific reason it is not meant to cut across in terms of political and economic relationships that we have with other countries. That is why under international law you see a two-tiered system with respect to all of this.

And for the most part, in about 11 years that $I$ was dealing with, I think there was only two or three cases where there was a serious impact on a bilateral relationship as a result of a consular case. So it is extremely rare for this to happen.

Usually what gives rise to that effect on bilateral relationships is some unique feature of that case.

One particular case which I can mention to you was the execution of a Canadian citizen in Vietnam, despite assurances that we had from the Government of Vietnam that that would not take place, and as a result of that execution,
quite literally we tore apart the bilateral relationship as part of our reaction.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
MR. PARDY: We had other cases.
But here the issue never rose -- I
think Mr. Arar never rose to a point where there was -- how can $I$ put it? -- the same level with respect to the Government of Syria.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Where you say
here on this same page -- you say under the title "Canadians Detained On Terrorist Activity":
"Consular responsibilities overlap and sometimes are in conflict with the role and responsibilities of other agencies of the government such as CSIS, RCMP and Justice."

What do you mean by that, or what did you mean by that?

MR. PARDY: By that what we are trying to achieve here is direct assistance to the individual that finds themselves in difficulty in a foreign country. That responsibility is very specific to us and it's not necessarily specific

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to other parts of the Canadian government, who have other responsibilities and other issues to deal with that have been legitimately given to them by the Government of Canada.

Not surprisingly, and particularly
in this area of terrorism, where since 9/11 I think most governments are still trying to work their way through this new environment -MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. MR. PARDY: -- and certainly in this case, that was -- and this document, I should say, was trying to reflect to the Deputy Ministers and others, and possibly to the Minister, these elements and these new types of cases. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let me just take that one head on, where you are talking about overlapping responsibilities and possibilities of conflict. On the one hand, the consular official may be trying to get the release of an individual, having them come back to Canada on whatever ground it might be, and on the other hand you have other agencies, such as the police or CSIS wanting to go there into this country and question the individual in order to advance their investigation.

It would seem to me, as I said before, that that kind of to and fro would leave a mixed message in the mind of the detaining country, saying: "What do these guys want? Do these guys want him back or do they want to advance the investigation of him?"

Do you agree that that could be a problem?

MR. PARDY: I agree with it up to a point. But $I$ think, as we indicated earlier, that what $I$ was interested in was trying to manage all of those things to try and ensure that those misunderstandings did not occur because the efforts that other parts of the Canadian government were making here were legitimate ones, and would -- yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You go on and you talk about Canadians detained for terrorist activities on slide 5.

And if you go on to the next page, under that title, it says:
"Syria/Arar: Unusual
deportation procedures by the United States; lack of confirmed information on his
role, in any, terrorism.
Uncertainty as to what the Syrians may do."

That is just a comment at that particular point in time, in February of 2003, of Mr. Arar's case.

What I would like to refer to, though, is at the bottom, under "Terrorism Cases", the next slide.
It says:
"Many of these
terrorism-related consular
cases engage the interests of
other agencies of the
Government of Canada,
including the RCMP, CSIS and
the Department of Justice.
There is occasional
consultation with these
agencies on all such cases.
Nevertheless, the differing
mandates and responsibilities
and associated laws limits
the full exchange of
information in some

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instances. For example the Privacy Act protects consular information except in specified circumstances."

And we dealt with that yesterday.
You mentioned the two exceptions were consistent use disclosure and when the individual consents to the sharing of information.

MR. PARDY: And by this time I
would add a third factor: that the Privacy Act provides authority to share this kind of information with Members of Parliament.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And then
it goes on in the final bullet -- or the second-last bullet:

> "The problems are exacerbated when there is a Canadian law enforcement interest (and there usually is) in the individual."

And then the next part is taken out.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { And finally it states: } \\
& \qquad \text { "In these cases there is an } \\
& \text { inter-departmental coherence }
\end{aligned}
$$

problem. Senior level and where necessary ministerial consultations should be more common on terrorism related cases."

And $I$ guess what you are saying there, that in these kinds of situations where there could be conflicting mandates, that the situation is too important to be dealt with at the front line level but should be brought upscale, indeed to the ministerial level, to people that are accountable.

Is that correct?
MR. PARDY: Yes, you could read that into these comments, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then at the bottom of the page -- and we are at 5 of 7 : "In cases such as that of Mr. Arar which is an exception, ministerial involvement has taken place due to the involvement of the US government and its unusual action in deporting Mr. Arar to Syria, the alleged

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complicity of Canadian police and security officials in that process and the increasing demands for political action."

You are referring there to the involvement of Mr. Graham that we have been reviewing as time goes on?

MR. PARDY: Yes and, to a limited extent, the Prime Minister.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Finally, at page
6 of 7 , there is a section dealing with "Communicating a Government Response to the Media", and $I$ just refer to the last two bullet points.

It states:
"The RCMP and CSIS do not as a rule provide the media with substantive comment (although
'leaks' do occur)."
MR. PARDY: I am sorry, where are
you reading?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is page 6 of 7, the second bullet point from the bottom.

MR. PARDY: Oh, I am sorry. Yes,
from the bottom.
repeat:
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I will just
"The RCMP and CSIS do not as a rule provide the media with substantive comment (although 'leaks' do occur) on their involvement in specific cases. As a result, often only the consular work of the department is highlighted by the media.

Without a coordinated approach, differences in mandates and responsibilities are exploited by the media as differences within the government."

And then you make certain recommendations relating to these intergovernmental issues.

Then if we go to tab 325 in Volume
4 --

MR. PARDY: Will we come back to this document at some subsequent time?

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MR. CAVALLUZZO: No. If you want to comment on it, I would ask you to do it right now.

MR. PARDY: No. I think the only comment $I$ would make, of course, was that none of these recommendations went beyond the Department of Foreign Affairs --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We are coming to that now.

MR. PARDY: Okay.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you go to tab
325, Volume 4.
MR. PARDY: 325?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct.
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is entitled
"Action Memorandum for the Minister".
The issue is: "Consular Cases
Related to Terrorism: Need
for better, more consistent
coordination and consultation
across government."
And the recommendation is:
"You agree that the deputy be authorized to consult with

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his colleagues. as the need arise, and ensure that there is inter-departmental coherence in the management of such cases; and That the exchange of information for such cases be done in full conformity with the appropriate laws and regulations."

And then the remainder of the memo just cribs really what we have referred to already in the deck itself.

So this was the recommendation
that you made. Why don't you tell us what happened to the recommendation?

MR. PARDY: Well, my
understanding -- this memorandum was done in draft here. It was finalized and went to the Minister. I think it was considered by the Minister, and for reasons that perhaps he will discuss with you during his testimony, he decided that this was not something that he wanted to see leave the department.

My understanding was that one of
the considerations in play here, and certainly was one that $I$ shared, was that we should not yield up our consular responsibilities to decision-making made elsewhere in the government.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And as a result
of that concern -- at least that's one consideration, you are saying; and as you say, we will deal with Mr. Graham on this -- the recommendation was not accepted?

MR. PARDY: That's right. But,
nevertheless, the exercise was a beneficial one I think in terms of sensitizing other people in the government to these sets of issues that were discussed in the deck.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. If we could go back to Volume 3 for the last three tabs, and then we will move on to Volume 4.

Tab 318 is dated February 27, 2003, and these are just really older e-mails relating back to January 7th, because as your CAMANT system quite frequently --

MR. PARDY: It's not the system;
it's the way we use it.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It's the person
using it, okay. These are just once again
communications, and $I$ just bring them to the attention of the Commissioner and counsel; e-mails between you and Ms Mazigh and Mr. Pillarella and so on as to what is going on in Damascus MR. PARDY: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 319 is, once
again, older e-mails back in January concerning discussions between you and Ms Mazigh.

Of course, there was a consular visit on January 7 th which is being referred to.

And then finally tab 320 is a late
January e-mail from Alex Neve of Amnesty, and it would appear that at this point in time you are communicating with some organizations who are making representations on behalf of Mr. Arar. MR. PARDY: Yes. With Amnesty, it started quite early on in the process, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. We can move to Volume 4. Just to give us a realistic idea of what is going on in your life at this particular point in time, in tab 321 we see that you are dealing with Alexa McDonough. She is obviously asking a number of questions about Mr. Arar, and you are providing responses to her.

Is that correct?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 322 is
a situation where both you and Myra call
Dr. Mazigh on February 21st as a follow-up to the visit of February 18th?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is where you
asked if she would be interested in visiting Mr. Arar, if that could be arranged, in Syria?

MR. PARDY: Yes, because earlier the Syrians had indicated to Mr. Martel that such a visit would be possible.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now tab 323, this is a message from Mr. Martin, and he is raising a few concerns about the upcoming visit of two Members of Parliament; that is, Marlene Catterall, who is Mr. Arar's Member at that point in time, and Mr. Assadourian.

So this is the beginning of the preparations for that particular visit. There are a number of e-mails relating to that, and I am not going to take you through each and every one, other than just to say that the arrangement was originally set for March of 2003 .

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And in terms of the political context, of course, the second Gulf War breaks out in March.

MR. PARDY: I think the 21st or -somewhere in that time frame, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And presumably the Syrians had more on their mind than awaiting a visit from two parliamentarians from Canada, and as a result of that, the meeting was deferred somewhat.

MR. PARDY: And I think, as the record would indicate, what we were concerned with -- we still tried to push the visit in that time frame because we considered it to be important, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 327 is a note to you, and it's dated, I guess, February 27th, is the date of that.

MR. PARDY: I think so, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And it's related, once again, to the Catterall visit. I just want to make reference to the message.

About halfway down, it says:
"I spoke to Ms Marlene

Catterall last evening. Following points were covered:
(a) In her conversation with Mr. Easter..."

Mr. Easter, at this point in time, is the Solicitor General?

MR. PARDY: That is correct, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
"... with Mr. Easter, he checked with both the RCMP and CSIS before providing her with a green light for the visit. Neither organization objected to Ms Catterall's visit. Mr. Easter cryptically seemed to remark that Mr. Arar's problems were caused by this department! I will follow up further on this one."

Mr. Easter has made a cryptic
comment here that Mr. Arar's problems seem to be caused by this department. I assume that reference is being made to DFAIT.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you have anyone ever follow up with Mr. Easter as to what his cryptic comment meant?

MR. PARDY: I tried to, but I did not have any success. I tried to establish what he meant by this.

Ms Catterall could not elaborate on what he meant by all of this, and she was puzzled by it equally.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Tab 329 is a note in which you are attaching a message from Monia, Dr. Mazigh, who is requesting a meeting with the Minister?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And at this point in time, Mr. Graham had not met Dr. Mazigh, to your knowledge?

MR. PARDY: I am not sure about
that. If not a meeting, certainly a telephone call? But $I$ would stand to be corrected on that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 331, dated March 2nd or 3rd, once again is a reference to -- Dr. Mazigh says:
"Hello,

Now that $I$ heard that the Canadian diplomatic missions in the Middle East will come back to Canada, I have hard time to think how this is going to be the fate of Maher Arar? I have the impression that the Syrian reply will never come. Mr. Pardy, I am so disappointed. I would like to have a meeting with Mr. Bill Graham. I don't find the actions being taken so far having any effects. The war in the Gulf is more and more becoming true and my chances to see my husband back are diminishing."

And what were your views on that? Was your view that, "Holy God, I am working hard on this case, and I get this kind of message, which doesn't show any appreciation?" What is your reaction?

MR. PARDY: I mean, she was right.
She was observing that we were drawing down our
staff at all of our Middle East missions in the expectation that a war was going to occur. And not knowing the full ramifications of that war, we wanted the embassies to be as small as possible.

I think in Damascus we removed -we had, as you know, a very large immigration staff there. Those people were removed.

But the key people with respect to Mr. Arar stayed in Damascus, the ambassador and Mr. Martel, plus two or three other people, and so I think -- I am not sure whether it's reflected, but I did speak to her and tell her that while these events were occurring, they did not affect in any material way our efforts with respect to her husband.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 332 is a letter -- I guess it's just a series of messages wherein, once again, Dr. Mazigh is seeking a meeting with Mr. Graham?

MR. PARDY: Yes. Again, I would pass those on to Mr. Graham's office, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 333 is a diplomatic note to the Syrian Embassy, which is dated March 5th of 2002 .

Could you give us an idea of what
is this diplomatic note and what is its purpose?
MR. PARDY: We were giving
Canadian government sanction to the visit by Ms Catterall and Mr. Assadourian, and we are asking the Syrian ambassador to issue visas for them.

Normally this would be a standard
thing that one would do in these circumstances, because normally Members of Parliament are in a special category, as you probably know.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
If we could just move along, the
next documents $I$ am going to take you through quickly because they relate to the visit.

At tab 338, this is dated, we
estimate, as March 9th, and this is from the Head of Mission, Mr. Pillarella, to head office.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: He is saying
that:

> "Neither the President nor the Foreign Minister had given any indication of their willingness to meet with our visitors. Vice-Minister

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Mouallem gently reminded me that everyone in Damascus, from the President down, was concentrating solely on one issue at present: Iraq and the U.N. Security Council."

MR. PARDY: Yes, this was a debate on the resolution.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 340 is --
MR. PARDY: Can $I$ just point out
one additional fact in terms of the middle of paragraph 2 ?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Please do.
MR. PARDY: I think the deference
to the general here with respect to these activities by the Foreign Ministry.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So what you are saying is that your view was probably concurred in by Mr. Pillarella, who is right on the front lines, is that the Foreign Ministry would be, to put it nicely, subservient to the wishes of General Khalil?

MR. PARDY: They would certainly take the general's concerns into consideration, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. At 340 is another note relating to the upcoming visit.

Tab 342 is a message to Franco Pillarella, and this is from you -- excuse me, from Tim Martin --

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- who is the
Acting Director, GMR, if you could remind us what GMR is?

MR. PARDY: It's the Political
Relations Division for the Middle East countries.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And this
just relates to him dealing with the Syrian ambassador in Canada, laying down the groundwork for the upcoming meeting of the two politicians? MR. PARDY: Yes. And it sort of follows on, to a certain extent, from the message that I -- I guess it's the March 10 th one from myself. I was going to meet with Ms Catterall and Mr. Assadourian on the following morning, and I was hoping that $I$ could get some definitive word as to whether the visit was going to be on or not. Ms Catterall was leaving for, I think, a trip to Australia at this point. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then there

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are other e-mails relating to that.
I just want to bring you to 344 . This is to Ms Catterall and copies to you. The subject is "Canadian delegation visit to Syria this week".

What is this? These are just talking points or directions or instructions given to the two parliamentarians?

MR. PARDY: Yes. This was prepared by our colleagues in the Political Division. I mean, there is a certain sharing of labours here in terms of the sheer intensity of activity that was under way here, and they prepared this as a piece of paper that we gave to Ms Catterall and Mr. Assadourian with respect to this visit, and the context of this visit of course, as well, in terms of what was going on in the international arena on the war.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 345, dated March 12th, from Mr. Pillarella. He advises that:
"Not unexpectedly (now that the departure date of our MPs has passed) I received a call this morning from

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Vice-Minister Mouallem. He did not offer any explanation for the non issuance of visas for Mrs. Catterall and Assadourian."

And it goes on:
"When I confirmed to him that neither the President nor the Foreign Minister would be solicited for a meeting, Mouallem immediately said that not only would he meet with the MPs, he would also make arrangements so that they could meet with Arar."

And the last visit with Mr. Arar was February 18th. So this is some good news that you are receiving.

MR. PARDY: And that was one of the reasons for pushing the visit, was to try to get another visit with Mr. Arar as quickly as possible, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So it would
appear that the two parliamentarians would be dealing with the Vice-Minister, Mr. Mouallem.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 349 is a note, or $I$ guess e-mails back and forth between you and Dr. Mazigh about the situation of Mr. Arar.

Tab 351, once again a series of -and I am not going to take you through them, but a series of e-mails between you and Dr. Mazigh.

Tab 352 is an e-mail going back to March 19th relating to your following up with the Americans about, I guess, the money that they were withholding, and so on?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 354
is, once again, communications between you and
Dr. Mazigh concerning the call that she was supposed to get from Marlene Catterall?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then, of
course, just in terms of time, March $24 t h$ is the date that we have this communication that we have referred to between Catterall -- it was actually March 21st, between Catterall and Assadourian and Mr. Arnous.

This would give context to what we
talked about earlier. We don't have to review it again.

MR. PARDY: Yes. It was part of their efforts. When the visit didn't take place as scheduled, Ms Catterall took the initiative to set up a meeting with Ambassador Arnous.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then if we go to 356, we see a change in Syrian procedures. This is a secret message from Damascus to Ottawa, and could you tell us what this is about?

MR. PARDY: Well, as you know, up until now, the General really said, "Look, when you want a visit, deal with my people, and we will make the arrangements outside of dealing with the Foreign Ministry."

This message -- and this, I
assume, came from some official in the General's office, and basically they told us we had to go to the Foreign Ministry and deal with them any time we wanted to arrange a visit.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this was not good news, was it?

MR. PARDY: If you look at the first part or the latter part of 2002 and the frequency of visits and then the increasing space
between the visits in the early part of 2003 , this was not good news.

And as you will know from the record, we had seven visits up until February 18th, and then we had another visit on April 23rd, and then we had another visit on August 14 th. They were extremely tenuous, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 358 is an
e-mail to you and it's from Myra, who tells you:
"Just to let you know that I had a long conversation with Monia today. We discussed the MDC and the lack of attention to the refund."

Once again, this was dealing with
the money that you were trying to retrieve from the Americans; is that correct?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now tab 363 is dated March 30th, and it's about the possibility of visiting. There is an exchange of messages between you to somebody.

Do you know who this is to?
MR. PARDY: Well, on page 1 of
this is certainly messages from Dr. Mazigh.

But I think they are also -- I
think they are almost -- yes, $I$ think they are all from Dr. Mazigh, and she included a press clipping there as well and that sort of thing.

But I think they are all from Dr.
Mazigh.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: At tab 364 you
are communicating now with a person whose name has been removed for privacy reasons.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this relates
to, once again, the upcoming visit of the parliamentarians, and we are going to move to that meeting fairly quickly.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I am just going
to refer to counsel now, that in terms of the visit tabs 369 and 370 deal with that.

Tab 373 is somewhat different.
Tab 373 is an e-mail from Monia,
and it says:
"For the record, Pardy and
Pastyr-Lupul called Monia on
April 7 to provide her with
reassurances that we are
still trying to arrange a visit to Maher. We explained to her the difficulty of making contact with the Syrians at this time of war so close to their borders. We advised that we are also pursuing the visit by the MPs ... during Easter week."

MR. PARDY: Yes. Certainly the shock part of the war was still under way, and we were still trying to elbow our way in, in the minds of the Syrians, with respect to Mr. Arar.

And in the meantime, of course, the press was made aware of the fact that there was a lack of consular access.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just one final
document before we break for lunch.
If you would go to 376 , it is an
e-mail from you to Dr. Mazigh and it opens by saying:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "Monia, following the refusal } \\
& \text { of the Syrian authorities to } \\
& \text { authorize a visa ..." } \\
& \text { And this is dated April } 14 \text { th. }
\end{aligned}
$$

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"... authorize a visa for Ms Catterall and Mr. Assadourian in early March, they subsequently informed the Canadian ambassador that visas would be issued..." And then if you go to the second paragraph from the bottom, it states: "I do not agree with your analysis of the relationship between Syria and Canada, or Syria and any other country for that matter. A major part of the problem here is that not everyone in the Government of Canada agrees with what we are doing in support of Maher. The Syrians are well aware of that and that undoubtedly influences their willingness to be more cooperative."

Just that statement there, I would ask you to comment on that because you are clearly indicating that not everyone in the government is
agreeing with the support that you are showing for Mr. Arar and that the Syrians are aware of that, and that obviously impacts on their willingness to be more cooperative.

MR. PARDY: I would point out that
the message was sent at 11:32 p.m. The SARS
outbreak in Canada was increasingly occupying some of my time, and $I$ can say that it is the only cranky message $I$ ever sent to Dr. Mazigh.

I was tired and frustrated myself in terms of the lack of progress. But I did want to indicate to her -- and she was fully aware of this information, by the way. This was not news to her, but $I$ wanted to bring her back to that focus, that part of the problem here -- and I said "part of the problem" or "a major part of the problem" was that we needed to have the Canadian government speak with one voice.

I thought we were by and large doing so in terms of Mr. Graham who is, under Canadian law, the spokesperson internationally for the Government of Canada, and $I$ just wanted to bring home to her this issue.

And in a sense, this is reflected in our efforts with respect to the deck that we
discussed earlier this morning as well. All of these things were coming together.

But I did want her to know that, look, there was no lack of effort on our part; that we were still Mr. Arar's champions and this was something that we were not going to give up on in any circumstances, and she should take heart from that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But certainly not
an unreasonable message to her in light of the fact that we have that document three weeks earlier on March 24 th of what Catterall and Assadourian are learning from the Syrian ambassador, that they are confused as to what Canada wants.

MR. PARDY: Yes, and I don't think -- I think this particular message was given to the media $I$ think in June. But certainly I received no comment from anyone within the Canadian government as to what I had said to Dr. Mazigh at this time.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No one corrected
you?

MR. PARDY: Nobody corrected me. MR. CAVALLUZZO: I have no further

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questions at this time, and perhaps we could resume, Mr. Commissioner, at 2:15?

In terms of my progress, if we continue at the pace that we are going at, $I$ will complete Mr. Pardy's examination today. THE COMMISSIONER: That will be good. And then we can do the cross-examinations tomorrow.

We will rise until 2:15. THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Upon recessing at 1:03 p.m. /
Suspension à 13 h 03
--- Upon resuming at 2:18 p.m. /
Reprise à 14 h 18
THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cavalluzzo?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you,
Commissioner.
Mr. Pardy, we've reached to the point in April of 2003, when the two parliamentarians are going to visit Mr. Arar in Damascus.

But prior to asking you about
that, just one question relating to our discussion
this morning, particularly in regard to the CSIS visit which, you advised us, took place in November of 2002 .

I've got a couple of questions relating to that. First of all, at the time of the visit, were you aware that it was going to take place?

MR. PARDY: I think this is
covered by NSC.
MS McISAAC: Maybe you can answer what you knew -- whether you knew it was going to take place.

MR. PARDY: Thank you. I have searched my memory for that period in November of 2002, and I cannot recall any specific consultation taking place with me on that visit. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And if you were consulted at that point in time by CSIS, that they wanted to visit Syria, would you have objected? MR. PARDY: Yes, I would have. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And could you
tell us why you would have objected? MR. PARDY: For the reasons that we discussed this morning when we discussed the two messages that $I$ sent to Damascus with respect
to possible other visits by liaison officers from CSIS and the RCMP.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, if we come back to the middle of April of 2003, and pick up once again in volume 4. Just prior to getting to that meeting on April 23, if you initially refer to tab 382. And this, if you go on the second page, incorporates what appears to be a draft letter from Mr. Graham?

MR. PARDY: Yes, it is.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: To the -- I guess
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria relating to the visit of the two parliamentarians?

MR. PARDY: That's correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Would that letter have gone, have been transmitted, to the Minister through the parliamentarians?

MR. PARDY: Yes, it was finalized
and it was given to Ms Catterall, and she
delivered it to the -- I think -- was it the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs? Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We've been
referring to him as the Vice-Minister; is that the same person?

MR. PARDY: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 383, we see that finally the two parliamentarians are permitted to visit so that it's going to take place. At 384 is a letter that is forwarded to Mr. Martel by you?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Which is a letter
from Monia to Maher.
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That the two
parliamentarians would carry with them?
MR. PARDY: Or would be given to
them upon arrival in -- I think at this point Ms Catterall was in North Africa on a separate visit, and we were filling in some of the gaps here, so that this material was available to her when she arrived in Damascus.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And finally, at 389, we see that there's a message to you, and it says:
"Gar, I..."
This is from -MR. PARDY: Tim Martin. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tim Martin.
"Gar, I spoke with Ambassador

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Arnous today who said that Mrs. Catterall and Mr. Assadourian would be able to visit with Mr. Arar."

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So that brings us to the meeting itself, and if we would go to tab 395.

I guess we could refer to this as the eighth consular visit, the second-last visit, to Mr. Arar?

MR. PARDY: That is correct, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In terms of the
meeting -- we'll come to that -- but the first note at the top is from Pierre, and I assume Pierre is with the Minister's office?

MR. PARDY: It's Pierre -- he is the -- yes, he's in MINA.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And his note to you and Dan Livermore is.
"Further to the report below and the apparent unhappiness of Ms. Catterall, o/MINA/Fry..."

That's Mr. Fry, the executive
assistant.
"...would like a more complete read out of what the Syrian intelligence would have told her and how this corresponds to the most recent information we, in this government, have about Mr. Arar. We would need a complete report from Damascus on what the Syrians told Ms Catterall about Mr. Arar and how much of it we believe to be accurate."

And we'll come, in particular, to the point in the memo --

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- which
summarizes that.
MR. PARDY: That's paragraph 9 in
the reporting memo.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. So just in
terms of the summary, we see that the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Mouallem, meets with the two parliamentarians before Mr. Arar's arrival.

Mr. Pillarella, we understand, accompanies them, along with Mr. Shaw, who's the political officer --

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- in the
Damascus embassy.
And if we go to the second page, I
guess -- if we can just pick up at paragraph 5.
Initially there's a great deal of
discussion concerning world affairs, Middle East affairs, and so on, and Mr. Arar becomes the subject of attention in paragraph 5.

MR. PARDY: He's also discussed in
paragraph 3 as well.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The reference in paragraph 3, do you think this is in terms of --

MR. PARDY: Handing over the
letter to the Foreign Minister.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It says
that -- if we can just pick it up about halfway through, it says:
"She..."
That obviously is Marlene
Catterall.
"...thanked Mr. Mouallem for

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the opportunity to discuss the Arar case, and handed over a letter from Foreign Minister Graham to Foreign Minister al-Sharaa, in which the former reiterated Canada's hope that Mr. Arar would be permitted to return to Canada. She explained that Mr. Arar was not wanted in Canada for any criminal activity and that Mr. Arar's wife and two young children were experiencing a very difficult time since his deportation to Syria. Mr. Arar was the breadwinner..."

And so on and so forth.
In paragraph 5 it says:
"Turning to the Arar case, the Deputy Foreign Minister explained that the US decision to deport Arar to Syria via Jordan had taken
his government by surprise." This is no surprise, they have said that in the past, consistently. MR. PARDY: What was surprising in this particular thing was that the Syrians said they had expected him to be deported to Canada. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. How they would have been involved in that, $I$ ask you. A very interesting question? MR. PARDY: I have no idea. MR. CAVALLUZZO: You have no idea either?

MR. PARDY: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And then
it goes on to deal with his dual citizenship and so on, and it talks about his alleged affiliation with al-Qaeda, and then it goes on:
"The result of this
questioning was that the
Syrian Security Services
still had concerns that
Mr. Arar could be connected
to al-Qaida. Then in the
presence of the MPs, the
Deputy Foreign Minister

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phoned General Hassan Khalil, the head of Syria Military Intelligence, to arrange for an immediate visit with Mr. Arar."

And then $I$ guess they -- it says: "At Syrian Military Intelligence..."

Presumably they may have left to
move to the location of the SMI?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And it's stated:
"The Colonel explained that
they had finished their investigation of Mr. Arar and would shortly be sending him to stand trial on charges of belonging to al-Qaida and having received military training in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan."

Now, do you know how they moved from the Muslim brotherhood to al-Qaeda? Do you know the point in time that that --

MR. PARDY: No, and they came back

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to the Muslim brotherhood later on as well.
One, I think, piece of information
that is worth noting is that, I think, it was in 1980, when the Muslim brotherhood was extremely active in Syria, and there was -- the Syrian government enacted a series of regulations and laws to deal with the Muslim brotherhood, which basically allowed them to pretty much do what they wanted with anybody suspected of being a member of the Muslim brotherhood.

So I think the government found it
fairly convenient to use the Muslim brotherhood label to keep people in prison.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then it goes on, and Ms Catterall once again explains that the Solicitor General indicated that Arar was not wanted in Canada for criminal activity and talks about the young family he has and the impact it had on his family.

And the Colonel said that the case would now be the responsibility of the Syrian courts.

And then in paragraph 7 we see that Mr. Arar is brought into the room, introduced to the Mps and the embassy staff. He appeared
tired and disoriented, but generally in good health.

He was instructed by Colonel
George to speak only in Arabic so that the Syrian staff could understand what he was saying, and then it says:
"During the interview, this
restriction was relaxed
several times, especially
when it came for Mr. Arar to
dictate a letter to his wife.
The Colonel also told
Mr. Arar to refrain from
commenting on security
aspects of this case and to
speak about his health,
prison conditions and family
matters."

And then the comments which gave rise to that e-mail at the top of this document, in paragraph 9, it states:
"In a debriefing with the Ambassador, Mrs. Catterall and Mr. Assadourian expressed disappointment that all the

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security aspects of the Arar case, as seen by the Syrians, had not been explained to them earlier. Mrs. Catterall even suggested that perhaps Minister Graham had been kept in the dark concerning some of this information, a view that was not shared by Mr. Assadourian. Both Mps indicated that had they had been more fully briefed in Ottawa, they would have reconsidered undertaking their mission to Damascus. On the humanitarian side, Mrs. Catterall was very concerned the news of an
impending trial against
Mr. Arar on charges of
terrorism would devastate
Mrs. Arar. She has requested
that no part of this report
be conveyed by DFAIT to
Mrs. Arar before she has the

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> chance to speak to her directly."

And I'm wondering if you wanted to comment on these statements -- at least the --

MR. PARDY: Yes, when I read
these --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Go on.
MR. PARDY: Yes, when $I$ read this
particular section of the report, $I$ was clearly surprised because it was my view, and the view of others in the department who had met with Ms Catterall and Mr. Assadourian before they left, that we had provided them with all information that we had received and the briefing was complete.

And Mr. Graham, as you can see from the material that we've gone over, over the last day and a half, there was absolutely nothing that we knew that was not communicated to Mr. Graham.

When Ms Catterall returned to Ottawa, $I$ raised this issue with her, and she told me that, that was not an accurate reporting of her views, or what she had said, and we -- I think I spoke to the ambassador, and I think there was

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some subsequent correspondence on this, and I think the best $I$ can say is that there's some genuine misunderstanding here with respect to this.

And certainly in terms of
Ms Catterall's activity, after she returned to Ottawa from this visit, there was no diminution in her interest or activities and, as a matter of fact, there was a marked increase in her involvement in the case.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, this
e-mail from the Minister's office at the top, beginning of the document --

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- wherein he is
basically saying, "I want to meet you and Mr. Livermore to get a more complete understanding as to what's going on in light of the information that seems to be disclosed in the report", did you meet with the Minister's office pursuant to this e-mail request?

MR. PARDY: Most likely, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And what was the concern, if any, that the Minister's office had, as a result of the information disclosed?

MR. PARDY: I think the comments
in paragraph 9 was a genuine concern, where -- I mean, we -- a Member of Parliament had gone out to Syria to meet with Mr. Arar, and the idea that she had gone and was not completely briefed on what was going on $I$ think was of concern.

Certainly I didn't -- it became my concern the moment $I$ read this, and that it certainly was not my view, nor the view of other people, when we briefed both Ms Catterall and Mr. Assadourian previous to this visit.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. So, in effect, that was clarified, and it was left on the basis that there appeared to be a genuine misunderstanding, and as a result of that, things moved on?

MR. PARDY: That's correct, yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 397, once again, shows the history of the evolution of these Q\&A's. As time goes on, new information is added as you obtain more information on the file. At tab 405, I see that this is an e-mail in early May --

MR. PARDY: I'm sorry, the tab
number again?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: 405 .
MR. PARDY: No, the tab number 405 fast-forwards to August 13, in my book. MR. CAVALLUZZO: That is a
fast-forward.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mine, too.
--- Off Record Discussion / Discussion officieuse MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is where experience will show, Mr. Pardy. We're at May, and I guess it's 408 in your documents, and this would appear to be another communication with Amnesty International where there seems to be an open letter to Mr. Graham?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'd like to deal
with the last document before dealing with another discrete issue. This is tab 409 in your volume, and just let me read it to you, as part of it is redacted. This is May 15, 2003:
"On Wednesday May 15th, Canada's Ambassador to Syria, Franco Pillarella, handed over to DFAIT/ISI a document received earlier that month

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from... The document, an undated three-paragraph bout de papier in Arabic, alleges that Arar spent time..."

This is obviously the document that we referred to earlier in November 2002 .

MR. PARDY: The November 3
document, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, do you know
why -- the question that $I$ have is that, we have the date of May 15, 2003, which is incorporating the very same e-mail that we reviewed in early November, and I'm just wondering if you know what's going on within the DFAIT as to this particular document?

MR. PARDY: I know many things, but the intricacies of DFAIT filing is still a great mystery to me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. I guess the point is this -- I just want to be sure that we're on the same page on this. This is just -this is just a mistake -- unless we're dealing with another document?

MR. PARDY: It's dated twice on May 15, above the text and then in the text
itself, which $I$ find -- but the document -- but message itself, it strikes me there was an earlier message that is almost the same as this.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is identical.
MR. PARDY: It's identical, is it?
Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So there is no explanation for that that you can help us with? Okay. That's fine.

I would like to move to a discrete area, and this is what $I$ am going to refer to, an area of your efforts to make or have Canada speak with one voice.

I am leading up to the May 5th, 2003 document which can be found in Exhibit P-85, the loose exhibits, at tab 7 .

MR. PARDY: $P-84$ or $P-85$ ?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Volume 1, P-85.
We are leading up to that
memorandum of May 5 th, but $I$ want to give some context to it in terms of the evidence that we have covered with you in the last day and a half.

Just to refresh our memories, on October the 16th of 2002, you met with CSIS and RCMP concerning information you needed, the day

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after the Minister's meeting. What you were trying to do is trying to get as much information as possible dealing with Mr. Arar's activities.

On November the 4 th of 2002 , we received an alleged confession from Syria, which is actually the document we just looked at, the May 15 th document, wherein the Syrians said, "We got this statement from Mr. Arar", and Mr. Pillarella brought that statement back to Canada.

We now know that in late November 2002, there was a visit by CSIS to Syria.

On December the $10 t h$ of 2002 , we see that there is a letter from the RCMP, Assistant Commissioner Proulx, telling us that Mr. Arar is a person of interest, and as a result they are refusing to give Mr. Edelson the letter he requested, and we took you through that as well.

On February the $20 t h$ of 2003 , we see that you are thinking about -- this is the deck -- how to get Canada speaking with one voice when we are dealing with a terrorist, an alleged terrorist activity.

That's tab 317, by the way.

On February 24, 2003, we saw the action memo to the Minister, tab 325, and this was after there were consultations with CSIS, the RCMP and the Department of Justice and PCO.

MR. PARDY: That was not a memo
from me, $I$ do not believe, was it?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, the --
MR. PARDY: I am sorry, yes. That
was the covering.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. It was the covering memo at 325. It's back in Volume 3, I believe, if you want to look at.

It is Volume 4.
MR. PARDY: 324?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 325.
MR. PARDY: Yes. I think my only concern -- you used a date in February for this, and $I$ don't think that that is correct.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Oh, I am sorry. The middle paragraph says:

Presumably it was shortly after that.

MR. PARDY: I don't -- it went on
for a little bit here. It strikes me that -- I only started the deck, $I$ think, it was in February. And I think the one we used this morning, there were eight versions of that. I think it was a little later than February when this all came together, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. That's helpful.

Then on March 21st, we have this conversation between the Syrian ambassador and the two parliamentarians concerning the miscommunication and the misimpression -MR. PARDY: That's right. MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- that Syria has concerning what Canada wants in respect of Mr. Arar? MR. PARDY: Mm-hmm. MR. CAVALLUZZO: We also have the April 12, 2002 e-mail -- that we just reviewed prior to lunch -- to Monia saying that a major part of the problem is that not everyone in the Government of Canada agrees what we are doing in support of Mr. Arar. And indeed throughout we have
these Q\&As where it is consistently stated that there is no information that Mr. Arar is engaged, or has engaged, in terrorist activities or terrorist organizations.

So that that is the backdrop we have. We are now in May. That's about, I guess, eight or nine months while Mr. Arar has been in prison in Syria, and as a result of that --

MR. PARDY: The war was winding down at this point, in terms of that particular issue.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You decide to draft a memorandum, and that brings us now to tab 7, the May 5th, 2003 memo.

And it has your name at the top. It is another action memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs and with other Ministers associated with Foreign Affairs?

And then I just read to you the first page.

It says in the first bullet point
under "Recommendations":
"Efforts continue to
establish a common
understanding within the

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government of Canada on this case with the objective of the issuance of a statement signed by the Solicitor General and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that could be used with the Syrian authorities."

In effect what you are looking for
is a joint letter, signed by both Ministers, the Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs and the Minister responsible for the RCMP and CSIS, to send to the Syrians.

Secondly:
"The visit to Syria by the Deputy Minister be used to again impress upon the Syrians the seriousness with which we view this case, make an appeal that charges not be laid and that Mr. Arar be released and permitted to return to Canada."

I guess that is an interesting one to me, because what you seem to be suggesting is
you don't want charges laid. What you want is his return to Canada, presumably because you are quite aware of the track record of the Syrians as far as the judicial process is concerned?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The third
recommendation is:
"That you call in the Syrian ambassador at an appropriate time and provide a response to the Syrian stated intentions to prosecute." And the final recommendation is: "If necessary that you meet with the Solicitor General and the Deputy Prime Minister to arrive at a common understanding on the case." So those were the recommendations. Then the body of the document itself gives a background in terms of what has happened, and obviously $I$ leave that to counsel to read. But $I$ want to focus on a couple of points. The first is at page 3 of 5 , and in paragraph 6 it states:
"The central issue in our dealing with the case is the fact that there are inconsistencies in what we are being told by the American authorities and what the Canadian police and security officials have reported."

What are you talking about there? Are you talking about what Mr. Cellucci has said publicly and what you are hearing from the RCMP and CSIS?

MR. PARDY: Yes, primarily it's Mr. Cellucci's comments to the media. Up to this point $I$ think he had made three public statements to the media. The gist of all of those statements were to the effect that American actions were predicated upon information that came from Canada and that the Canadian government should look to its own house first in dealing with this matter.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we stay on
that page, we see in the next unredacted portion it states:

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"Initially, the Syrians
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advised us they had established that Mr. Arar was a member of the Syria Muslim Brotherhood but as indicated above they informed Ms Catterall that they believed he was a member of al-Qaida which corresponds to what the Americans claimed at the time of his deportation."

And then in paragraph 9, which is the next unredacted portion, it states: "It remains our view that the following elements need to be in place if there can be any expectation that the Syrians might be prepared to release Arar and permit him to return to Canada."

And the first point at the top of page 4 is that:

> "There is a need for an unambiguous statement by the government of Canada, preferably signed by the

Solicitor General and the Foreign Minister, to the effect that we have no evidence in Canada, or from foreign sources, that Mr. Arar is or was a member of al-Qaida, that we do not believe that such information exists and that Mr. Arar should be permitted to return to Canada."

And secondly:
"In the above statement we should also state categorically that the information used by the United States in deciding to deport Mr. Arar did not originate with the Canadian authorities since we have no information that he was a member of al-Qaida."

And then the final portion, in terms of what has to be done, is in paragraph 10: "In the days ahead, our
efforts will concentrate on:

- convening a meeting of Canadian officials
representing CSIS, RCMP, PCO, and office of the Deputy

Prime Minister to adopt a common Canadian approach that could be sufficiently clear to communicate to the Syrians authorities.

- communicating that approach
to the Syrian authorities.
This could be done in calling in ... and as well have the Deputy Minister raise the matter...
- making representations to the Syrians not to charge Mr.

Arar and put him on trial.
If a trial were to take place
we must assume that it will
take place in secret, Mr .
Arar will not have
appropriate representation and it is certain he will be

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convicted and sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment."

So that clearly sets out your view because of, as I said before, the track record of judicial process in Syria: that, obviously, the route to go is to have his immediate release from Syria.

I accordance with this memorandum, I understand that a meeting was held on or about May 12th?

MR. PARDY: Yes, that is correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And the meeting was attended by PCO, DFAIT, Solicitor General, CSIS and RCMP?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just let me -MR. PARDY: There might have been other people in that room. There was quite a crowd.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And just let me
read a portion from the Garvie report to you.
This is Exhibit P-19.
MR. PARDY: The page?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We are going to
start at page 40.
THE COMMISSIONER: Page?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Forty, four-zero.
It says 03/05/14 at the bottom of
the page. This could be incorrect. It's our supposition that this should really be May 12 th, but in any event, it's around that time.

It states:
"A briefing note to the Commissioner was prepared by Inspector Reynolds, and provided an update following a meeting ..."

Excuse me, that is the correct

## date.

"... following a meeting that took place on 03/05/12 with
... RCMP, PCO, DFAIT and
SOLGEN in attendance. The discussion at the meeting was about the current status of ARAR and the current interest, if any, of the RCMP and ... with respect to him. Also, Mr. Gar Pardy presented
the contents of the action memorandum that he had prepared, and the RCMP ... and SOLGEN expressed concern about certain wording contained therein. With respect to the position of the RCMP at this time regarding ARAR, the following excerpt from the briefing note is relevant:"

And then the top of page 41, there is a redacted portion, and then it picks up after the redaction:
"RCMP was asked by DFAIT if
we were interested in
interviewing ARAR. RCMP
advise that while we are
interested in interviewing
ARAR, it is not a priority at
this point. DFAIT advised
that they had earlier
indications from Syrian
authorities that they would
not be open to law

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enforcement contact with ARAR. (He is being held by military intelligence.)"

That is a public description of
the meeting that was held on May the 12 th by Mr. Garvie.

It would appear that no consensus
was reached at this meeting on May the 12 th
concerning your action memorandum and
recommendations?
MR. PARDY: No consensus in the largest sense, but people were willing to look at what $I$ was trying to achieve through this memo and were to get back to me with specific comments on the memo itself.

I did receive some comments from different people in that room, that they suggested as changes to my memorandum.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I understand that the proposed language brought forward by the other agencies, in particular the proposed language of CSIS and the RCMP, was not helpful in terms of what your view would be in terms of the Syrians?

MR. PARDY: No, not at this point.
We achieved a consensus which I thought I could
live with on the language in the letter that Mr. Graham would be sending. That letter went up to the Minister's office, and the Minister's staff felt that it was not strong enough and then asked me to go back to the charge again on all of this, after labouring up the hill with this thing for almost a month, and I did so.

Nothing really changed.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: But I want to
know in respect of the language proposed by the police agency or the security intelligence agency, do you think it would have helped you in terms of your efforts of getting Mr. Arar released? MR. PARDY: Not the language that was suggested the second time around, no. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And we will come to this; we will look at the letter itself. But eventually what happens is that no letter ever went from the Minister -joint letter went from the Minister and the Solicitor General. No letter went from the Minister. And eventually what happened is a letter went from the Prime Minister on July 22 nd. MR. PARDY: Yes. This initiative then overlapped with another initiative that I had
in play, and this was with the Prime Minister -well, the initial part of all of that was the Prime Minister, $I$ think on June 13, signed a letter to Dr. Mazigh giving a commitment on the part of the government in terms that we would be extremely active in all of this.

And I had another initiative under way with respect to another country, with a Prime Ministerial envoy being named, and I talked to the people at the Privy Council Office and they agreed that we would overlap and have -- Mr. De Bane had been named as the special envoy. It was agreed that Mr. De Bane would add Damascus to his itinerary, and we were able to put that together and out of that got a Prime Ministerial letter.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will take you
to that, but if we could just stay with this May 3rd memo, which eventually turns into another memo on June the 3rd, or June the 5th, which we will come to, eventually it would appear, as you say in the second attempt, the language proposed by the RCMP and CSIS was not helpful in terms of your efforts in getting Mr. Arar returned.

You must have been disappointed after all of your efforts. Or is this just
another day in government?
MR. PARDY: Another day in the
office. One door is shut and you open another.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you could give me a second, Mr. Commissioner, I want to make sure my book is correct.
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Somehow the photocopying of our book has mixed up. It seems to be the only book that is -- how that happened, I won't question.

We are in Volume 5 now. Why don't
we start at tab 412?
If we go to 412, we have some handwriting, and $I$ wonder if you can identify that handwriting?

MR. PARDY: I think it's Miss
Pastyr-Lupul.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And what it seems to say is that:
"- we need to send a clear message to Syrians that speaks on behalf of the whole government

- Syrians may not take


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message seriously if it does
not come from all
departments/agencies

- Still send memo to Min.

Graham."
There is no date on it,
unfortunately.
MR. PARDY: May 15th. I can help
you here on this one. I think this was a
telephone call that came in to my assistant,
Ms Cyr, and we had a recording of those incoming calls. If I was not there, she did.

Ms Cyr passed it on to
Ms Pastyr-Lupul, and she spoke to Dr. Mazigh, and these notes $I$ think reflect the conversation with Dr. Mazigh and Ms Pastyr-Lupul.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And this
is the information that she has taken from Dr. Mazigh?

MR. PARDY: That is correct. That
is my understanding, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You didn't attend
the meeting?
MR. PARDY: No. It's a telephone call.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
MR. PARDY: I wasn't there when
the message came in, and $I$ think Ms Cyr said -and probably, $I$ don't know, maybe $I$ was not going to get back to the office in any reasonable time, so she gave the message to Ms Pastyr-Lupul to return the call.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So you did meet with Dr. Mazigh and Bassam Arar on May the 9th to discuss Dr. Mazigh's concerns.

That is, unfortunately, in the previous volume, if you could give the witness the previous volume. It is the last tab, 407?

Do you see that there on May 9th?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: When you met
Mr. Arar's brother and spouse to discuss Monia's concerns and to advise what options you are pursuing at this particular point in time.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You mention the
visit of J. Lavertu to Syria, and that was referred to earlier in your action memorandum of May 3rd? That's the Deputy Minister. He would be travelling to Syria in the near future, and he was
going to raise Mr. Arar's situation with the Syrians?

MR. PARDY: That was the intention, and $I$ think that the record will show that for a variety of reasons, that did not happen.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. At tab 414, if we can just move along now in Volume 5, this is an e-mail from Dr. Mazigh on either May 20 or 21. Do you see that?

Really, this is once again a
troubled partner expressing concerns about Mr. Arar and frustrations and whatnot as to what is happening to her husband?

MR. PARDY: Yes. That is an e-mail message to me from Dr. Mazigh, yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you would regularly respond to those e-mails, either by responding e-mail, or telephone, or meetings?

MR. PARDY: Or meetings, yes. I am not quite sure just what the delay was during this period. I was in Toronto on the $20 t h$ and 21st, and I think that occasioned the delay in responding to it, yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: At 416 there is
another e-mail, but there is a draft letter. I think we may have seen this letter before.

There is a series of e-mails that are going back and forth between you and Dr. Mazigh.

The second page there, the Bill Graham letter to Shara'a, who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Syria -- do you see that letter?

MR. PARDY: Yes, I do.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Was this letter
ever sent?
MR. PARDY: No, I think this was all sort of part and parcel of the actions associated with the May 5 th memorandum, the June 3 rd and June 5 th memorandum, and this also was overtaken by the agreement that we had from the Prime Minister's Office that he would become involved in all of this, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: At tab 419 -excuse me, let's go to 418 first, which is something called "Canadian Eyes Only - The Maher Arar Case", and there are three points made. Do you know what this document is? MR. PARDY: It looks to me like
these are speaking points that were usually set up for the Minister, and he might have been having either the possibility of a discussion with the -it strikes me the Syrian Foreign Minister -- or the Syrian ambassador.

Normally that sort of -- when you
look at the language of it, it strikes me that that is what this was meant to do, was to give Mr. Graham some talking points, although I am not absolutely certain of that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: All right. We will ask him that on Monday.

Tab 419 seems to be some kind of a PowerPoint presentation?

MR. PARDY: That's the deck.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is what the
deck looks like in reality.
MR. PARDY: We project it on the
wall, and we have talking points that go along with it.

A lot of the talking points you saw earlier are not necessarily reflected in the deck itself but are talking points for the person making the presentation.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And that
makes the presenter look much smarter than the person looking at the screen?

MR. PARDY: Absolutely.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you.
Tab 423 is the next attempt at the
action memorandum. We saw the first one, which was May 5 of 2003, and this one is dated June 3rd of 2003, and was also authored by you?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Why are you now at a second draft? What would have happened?

You obviously had the meeting on May the 12 th.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No consensus was
reached. As a result of that, what happened?
MR. PARDY: At this point $I$ am
still trying to rescue something out of that effort which we started on May 5. As you can see, the recommendations have been reduced down to one, versus the four in the earlier memo. There was some language changes.

Still, if $I$ can use that term, the focus was still a letter from Mr. Graham to the Foreign Minister at this point.

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MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And was
it a joint letter, or just a letter from Mr. Graham?

MR. PARDY: It was just a letter
from Mr. Graham.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: There are a couple of points in this memo. It is shorter than the other; information is taken out.

But there is some new information that $I$ think we should raise with you.

In particular at page 3 of 4 , we see what happened in fact to the visit of the Deputy Minister that we just talked about.

In paragraph 6 it states that: "The Deputy Minister visited Syria during the week of May 19 and while it was intended that he raise Mr. Arar's case, the end conditions were such that it was not possible for him to do so. His meeting with the Vice Foreign Minister was cancelled at the last moment and his discussions with the Foreign

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Minister were short and preoccupied with the Syrian position in Security Council on the lifting of sanctions and the American and British mandate for Iraq."

So we see that through extraneous circumstances Mr. Lavertu did not raise Mr. Arar's case with the Syrians?

MR. PARDY: That is correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then in terms of what you might be able to achieve, if you go to the final page, page 4, in the paragraph under the redactions it says:
"As such, the best we can do in these circumstances is to again raise the matter direct with the Syrian Foreign Minister and to that end we have attached a letter for your signature. We would also recommend that you call in the Syrian Ambassador and deliver the letter."

If we go to 439, we see the letter

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that was appended to these memos.
Is that correct?
MR. PARDY: Yes, that is the
letter, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: At tab 429 we see
another, and the final, action memorandum. This is the final draft. This is signed by yourself and Mr. Lavertu?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We see that the
recommendations now are twofold, not just recommending that he sign the attached letter to the Syrian Foreign Minister but, second:
"We also recommend that you meet with Mrs. Arar at a mutually convenient time." MR. PARDY: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And ultimately
this is the final memorandum?
MR. PARDY: Yes, it is.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
MR. PARDY: But it was -- well, we will come to that later, $I$ am sure.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Certainly as far as that is concerned, there was further -- and
this is what you related before so that we can put this in context. There were further discussions with the agencies, the RCMP and CSIS?

MR. PARDY: Not discussions. They provided language that they thought was appropriate for their position in the memo, and I think in the letter itself as well.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Once again that was the language that you thought would clearly be of no assistance to Mr. Arar and as a result of that another avenue was pursued. And we will come to that in terms of the --

MR. PARDY: That was a subsequent development, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In fact, it is on the public record, and just to complete that picture, if you go to the Garvie report, which once again is $P-19$-- you should have that in front of you.

MR. PARDY: Page 40, I guess, is
it?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, it's 41.
MR. PARDY: Forty-one this time.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You know the
Garvie report well.

MR. PARDY: First time $I$ have seen
it.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You must be referring to the first edition. I have got the second.

MR. PARDY: Okay. MR. CAVALLUZZO: I am looking in particular at the middle of the page there, June 17, 2003.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It says:
"Mr. Gar Pardy, Director
General, Consular Affairs
Bureau, was asked by his
Minister's advisors to clarify with SOLGEN, RCMP and... an aspect of the text in his memorandum and draft letter from Minister Graham to Syrian Foreign Minister Shara'a. The new suggested text was:
'I assure you that there
is no evidence he is
involved in terrorist
activity nor is there any Canadian Government impediment to Mr. ARAR's return to Canada.'"

And we will see that that language
was not satisfactory either to the unknown agency and the RCMP?

MR. PARDY: Sparked a reaction, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And the unknown agency and RCMP came back with language which would not have assisted Mr. Arar?

MR. PARDY: Clearly unacceptable
to the efforts that were under way.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: At 425, we need
not -- you may refer to it briefly -- but you will
see there that Dr. Mazigh expresses frustration
that the Deputy Minister did not deal with the
Arar issue when he was in Syria, and you explained the circumstances that we have just related?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And at 426, we see an e-mail to you from Mr. Heatherington, Scott Heatherington, who is in ISI, the Director of Foreign Intelligence.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And he says --
this once again relates to the language in those proposed letters.

He says:
"Gar, I suggest that you amend the text of paragraph 8 beginning with 'it is clear the RCMP...' I suggest the following text be inserted in place of the last four lines of paragraph 8. The new text would read 'The RCMP has confirmed that the Americans consulted them prior to deporting Arar, but did not raise the issue of possible deportation of Arar to Syria nor did the RCMP give any indication that such a course of action would be acceptable to them.'"

Do you know whether Mr. Heatherington was doing that after consulting the RCMP as to what the appropriate wording of

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paragraph 8 should be?
MR. PARDY: Yes, that would be as a result of language provided by the RCMP.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Could you go to June 24 th at tab 451.

This is dated June 24 th, and the subject matter title is "Maher ARAR: What to do?"

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this is a memorandum. Who was it composed by, and who was it sent to?

MR. PARDY: I think you need to help me here. This is a format that $I$ have not seen before.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You will see the J.F. Gould, under "Comment" on the first page. Under "Header A" it says:
"Comment: This memorandum
was composed by Zmemo..."
And then it goes:
"jfgould/995-0750."
MR. PARDY: Mr. Gould was an officer in ISI.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Obviously the subject matter was a memo that was to be
signed by MJW. That is Jim Wright, who is an Assistant Deputy Minister?

MR. PARDY: That's right, yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And KM, that's

Kathleen or --
MR. PARDY: Katherine McCallion. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Katherine McCallion, and she is an Assistant Deputy Minister as well?

MR. PARDY: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: What it says in
the opening paragraph is:
"It is very clear there has
not been, on the
institutional level, a
meeting of the minds between
the Department of Foreign
Affairs on the one hand and
CSIS and the RCMP on the other with regard to the case of Maher Arar. Recent exchanges have been almost
testy and there is a fear
that the working relationship
between DFAIT and CSIS, in

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particular, might be poisoned if agreement is not reached on a government-wide approach to this case."

And then he reviews what the
situation is in terms of the background.
And if you pick up on the second page, you will see in paragraph 3:
"It is important that the Minister and his staff be made aware of the evidence that can be marshalled against Arar and a way must be found for the Department to respond to allegations that there is no evidence suggesting that Arar has a connection to the activities of Muslim extremists."

And then there is a redaction.
And then it goes on:
"The Minister should seek a briefing from his colleague, the Solicitor General, about the evidence facing Mr Arar.

In that same meeting, the Minister should spell out Mr. Arar's consular rights. The two Ministers should also agree on a plan of action to deal with Mr. Arar and wording to used with the public and the media."

So that this is clearly --
although not signed, it's a draft -- a memorandum from people in the ISI suggesting that, first of all, there hasn't been a meeting of the minds. In fact the relationship with CSIS and the RCMP is to the point of becoming testy, and goes on to suggest that the Minister should get a briefing from the Solicitor General, who is responsible for the two other agencies, that is RCMP and CSIS, and get a briefing, in other words, as to what information do they have so that he can perform his functions as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The question $I$ have for you is whether that meeting ever occurred, to your knowledge?
MR. PARDY: This, I think, is
dated June 24. Some time earlier than this, and I
think it might be in March or April, and maybe the Minister or Mr. Fry can give you something, I had suggested to Mr. Fry that arrangements be made for the Minister to receive a briefing from the RCMP and CSIS using the fact that he was a Privy Councillor and was entitled to receive all information that might be available on this issue. And my recollection is that a briefing was done at that time, but not in the context of what's been said here on June 24 . This is very late in the day and other initiatives were underway at this time.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. So at
this point in time and, in fact, during that course, we're talking about the beginning of May when your first action memo is drafted through the final piece, you're unaware of any briefing that the Solicitor General gave the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

MR. PARDY: That's correct. And at this point, like others have done, I'm appealing to the Prime Minister to get involved. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, June 24 is also a significant day because you also received -- or there was also a letter that was
sent to the National Security Directorate, Mr. Michel D'Avignon, and if you again refer to P-19, the Garvie report, at page 41?

This is a letter from Deputy Commissioner Loeppky of the RCMP, and he advised the National Security Directorate that the RCMP had major concerns about the text of the proposed letter of DFAIT, and the concerns were, and he -I'm quoting now from the Garvie report:
"with the misleading
statement made in paragraph 2
of the attached letter "I
assure you that the
Government of Canada has no evidence Mr. Arar was involved in any terrorist activities...""

It goes on:
"These concerns have been expressed on a number of occasions to DFAIT officials by the RCMP... and the Solicitor General. Mr. Arar is currently subject of a national security

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investigation in Canada."
And there's a redaction.
"He remains a subject of great interest..."

Redaction.
"...given this situation, we do not believe it would be advisable for Mr. Graham to send his letter to his Syrian counterpart."

And it goes on, on the next page: "Additionally, D/Comm. Loeppky addressed his concerns by PCO for the Prime Minister's signature in his correspondence to D'Avignon.

This issue was with respect to the apparent release of information, by DFAIT, to Dr. Monia MAZIGH, ARAR's wife. D/Comm. Loeppky concludes by stating, "It is important to emphasize, however, that any information concerning the RCMP's

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investigative interest in this individual should not be relayed to ARAR's family, his supporters, or Syrian political authorities.""

Now, did you ever see a copy of the letter that Deputy Commissioner Loeppky sent, which was dated June 24,2003 ?

MR. PARDY: No, I did not.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No one ever
shared that letter with you?
MR. PARDY: No. But, again, I
emphasize to you, by this time, the issues that
are being dealt with here by and large are gone by the board, and we had underway an effort to forge a consensus at the top of the Canadian government.

The first element in that, of
course were the -- I think there were two letters from the Prime Minister to Dr. Mazigh in June, and that was the basis under which in effect we forced the -- did away, if you like, with the differences at the working level.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, in terms of the diverging opinions, if we can call it that, in the Canadian government, we see that the
press reported that, at tab 452, on June 25.
--- Pause

You see on the second page, there's a note there -- Renaud, once again, is your communications person?

MR. PARDY: On page 2, you said?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm.
MR. PARDY: Oh, yes, we're now
the -- okay. This concerns a Globe and Mail reporter, Mr. Freeman.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's right.
Why don't we just pick it up actually at the beginning, which is the last page. Unfortunately, it goes backwards, as usual, and this is 24, June?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And it says --
this is in paragraph 1 of this e-mail from your communications person:
"The reporter above contacted BCM..."

And "BCM" stands for -- if you can help us?

MR. PARDY: Sorry. I was daydreaming for a moment there. This is the Media

Relations Division at the Department of Foreign Affairs.

MR. CAVALLUZZO:
"...and indicated, that subject's wife had retransmitted to him an e-mail that you had sent her in which it was suggested that there are diverging views within Cdn govt circles on her husband's case. Sallott..."

Of The Globe and Mail. "...wants to interview on the record and obtain more info/precisions on those diverging views."

And that's the e-mail that I
referred you to just prior to the luncheon break?
MR. PARDY: Yes, April 14.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: April 14 , which was subsequently, as you said, reported in June of 2003?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let's come to the

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intervention --
MR. PARDY: May I ask one question
of you? Will we come to the whole issue of
information in the media as a separate discrete
item or -- because we touched on it briefly
earlier in terms of a conversation $I$ had with
Mr. Edelson back in January, and one of my --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, that's one
of the issues $I$ want to ask you at the end.
MR. PARDY: Yes, please.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I think your
views would be very important --
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- to the
Commissioner.
Now, let us come to -- I was going
to say the divine intervention, but let us come to
the intervention of the Prime Minister, beginning
on July 1, and if we start now at tab 459.
MR. PARDY: I would not quibble
with your characterization at this point.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's how you
lasted 36 years in the public service.
--- Laughter / Rires
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Why don't you
tell us what this document is? Obviously the PCO is now involved and there's the appointment of Senator De Bané. Why don't you tell us the background on this?

MR. PARDY: I'm trying to see whether there is a date on when $I$ actually sent this. Is there somewhere a date here? But I think this is early July -MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, we estimate it to be July.

MR. PARDY: July 4, it may be. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Early July, yes. MR. PARDY: Early July in any event. But all of the elements in terms of the involvement of the Prime Minister had come together here.

By this time we had the two
letters from the Prime Minister to Dr. Mazigh, we had approached Senator De Bané about adding Damascus to his itinerary, the Prime Minister had agreed to his appointment as a special envoy to the President of Syria, and here I'm putting all of this together in a message of instructions to Mr. Pillarella in Damascus, and including a draft letter from the Prime Minister to the President of

Syria.

> MR. CAVALLUZZO: Is that the same letter that can be found behind tab $469 ?$ MR. PARDY: $469 ?$ MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes. MR. PARDY: There is no letter there -- below is a draft, yes. I'm not sure. But in the end,

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
It's redacted. But can you
explain to us, how were there two letters going to the Syrian President from the Prime Minister?

MR. PARDY: The letter that I
drafted, of course, was very specific to Mr. Arar, and had the Prime Minister making a request to the President of Syria.

As we got into the actual
negotiations over the visit, it was suggested that perhaps we -- the Prime Minister would have Mr. De Bané, as well, discuss with the Syrian authorities the geopolitical situation in the Middle East as seen from the perspective of the Canadian government.
And that second letter, which was
a short one, was saying to the President that Mr. De Bané is available to discuss these issues with you as well.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And I understand
that Mr. De Bané did travel to Syria?
MR. PARDY: Yes, he did.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And on or about July 22 delivered the letters to Syria officials? MR. PARDY: Both letters, yes. Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And did he deliver it directly to the President of Syria, or was it to a lower official?

MR. PARDY: No, it was not possible for him to see the President but he did meet with the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Mouallem, and delivered both letters and had a substantive conversation with him.

And I think there was, from the report, a meeting of minds on this issue.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And one of the letters that was delivered presumably can be found behind tab 472, which is dated July 17, "Dear Mr. President," a letter from Mr. Chrétien?

MR. PARDY: Yes, that's the second
letter.


#### Abstract

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And the first letter, $I$ don't think we have unredacted. MR. PARDY: I don't think there was a lot of changes to the draft that you see under tab 459.


MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right, okay. MR. BAXTER: I believe the other letter is among the loose exhibits, and it may be in $P-85$ or in the $P C O$ exhibits, one way or the other.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. We will, during the break, Mr. Commissioner, we will find that tab for you.

Okay. Now, I'd like to move on. We're still in July -- and move on to another area of interest, Mr. Pardy, and ask you to refer to tab 478, and this is the 2003 annual report of the Syrian Human Rights Committee, and in this document, as you know, there are statements to the effect that Mr. Arar is being tortured in Syria, and the date that this became public was sometime in July of 2003?

There is a date at the bottom.
Whether this is the correct date, I don't know. I
assume it is July 24 of 2003?
MR. PARDY: Yes. My recollection
was that $I$ may have seen it on July 29.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And how
did this particular report come to your attention?
MR. PARDY: Ms Pastyr-Lupul, who was following these kind of issues, brought it to my attention.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And just for counsel's purposes, and for yours, if you go to page 4 of 8 , you'll see under the title, "The forcibly deported," it states: "Security forces continue to hold Maher Arar, who is also a Canadian national, and was forcibly deported by American Immigration authorities to Syria whilst passing by a Transit lounge on his way back to Canada. SHRC had received confirmed reports that Mr. Arar has been subject to severe torture and intensive interrogation and charged with cooperating with

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Al-Qaeda."
It goes on and deals with other
persons.
You're saying that on or about July 29, this was brought to your attention by Ms Pastyr-Lupul?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And how was it
brought to your attention? Was it --
MR. PARDY: Well, $I$ think if you
see on page 1 of 8 there, she says, "Gar, see page 4, MPL." I think she put it into the interoffice mail for me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And did you do anything as a result of receiving this annual report from the committee?

MR. PARDY: Not at that time, no.
That day -- I think it was July 29 -- I flew to Toronto with a Canadian ambassador from Iran and met with Ms Edwardh on another case.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I may call
Ms Edwardh to testify and therefore avoid cross-examination.
--- Laughter / Rires
I won't do that.

On July 24 as well, if you go to tab 4 -- or 28 , excuse me, July -- 479 --

MR. PARDY: Can I go back, though,
in terms of -- provide you some general comments about organizations like SHRC?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Absolutely, I was
going to do that later. Why don't we do it now, that's fine.

MR. PARDY: I was going to
volunteer. Emigre organizations are
particularly -- how shall $I$ put this? -- unusual organizations in dealing with information that they provide.

It has been my experience that their information is perhaps less reliable than that from other people.

One, you're never quite sure who
is running the emigre organization. I've seen instances, $I$ think, where the government has run emigre organizations and used these emigre organisations for a variety of purposes, or there's even been suggestion that this organization is run by the Government of Israel. There's any number of these suggestions out there. So there's a tendency here, and

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particularly in terms of the briefness of the reference to Mr . Arar on page 4 -- you know, it's not a lot of -- I mean, they make certain statements, but $I$ mention to you that -- I didn't react to this -- but a few days after this, they sat down and wrote a letter to Dr. Mazigh, which had a lot more detail into it, and it's that letter that we reacted to, and then $I$ was able, within a few days, to arrange for a visit with Mr. Arar on August 14.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, you say
you're somewhat sceptical with emigre organizations and presumably you were aware that -- or you're of the view that the Syrian Human Rights Committee was an emigre organization? MR. PARDY: Yes, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And had you had
experience with them in the past?
MR. PARDY: No, but I would go
into their site from time to time. They would carry information on their site about developments in Damascus and would look at them, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, you
made reference to a letter -- a more detailed letter that you received, and I'm looking at --
it's tab 573 in the next volume, I believe. This is volume 6. You'll see behind tab 573 there are a number of tabs. If you go to tab 11?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this is also a letter dated July 29, 2003, re Maher Arar, and it's sent to Dr. Mazigh from the Syrian Human Rights Committee.

Is that the letter to which you made reference?

MR. PARDY: That's correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And how did you get a copy of this letter, the letter from the committee to Dr. Mazigh?

MR. PARDY: I think on August 6, Dr. Mazigh decided that she would have a press conference on August 7 in order to release this letter, and we, I think, were provided a copy on August 6.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If you go to tab 486, that $I$ guess gives reference to that press conference, presumably. This is an e-mail --

MR. PARDY: 486 .
MR. CAVALLUZZO: 486 in the
previous volume, volume 5.
--- Pause
It says in the August 6 e-mail
from Mr. Dorion, the communications person:
"My understanding now is that
Monia Mazigh is speaking
abundantly to the
Ottawa-based media today, even if her formal press conference is set for
tomorrow."
So it would appear that perhaps
the press conference was August 7?
MR. PARDY: That's correct, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And then
in terms of -- in terms of how you were going to deal with that, if you go to 489, there seems to be some internal discussion, e-mails back and forth, and in particular -- this is from Scott Heatherington's computer, but it's an e-mail dated August 6, from Myra Pastyr-Lupul to a number of people, and it says:
"Since I did not yet do the Q\&a due to handling a myriad of cases in the Middle East
today... here is the line
from Gar:"
And it says:
"'We are equally troubled by the statements regarding the use of torture as noted in the report of $S H R C$, and are very concerned that we have not had consular access to Mr. Arar since April, despite repeated efforts by our Embassy in Damascus to obtain access. We will not relent in our efforts to seek consular access to

Mr. Arar.'"
So that became the press line, the
media line, that the Minister would have in
response to questions relating to the allegations
in the Syrian human rights report.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: At 490, we do
have the Q\&A's prepared?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And the very

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first question we see deals with that issue. It says:

> "What is the Canadian government's response to the reports of the Syrian Human Rights Committee that Mr. Arar is being tortured?" And then the answers are set out below.

Once again, you would have participated in the drafting of these Q\&A's? MR. PARDY: Yes. The last page refers to that fact.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Commissioner, it's a quarter to four. I don't know if you want to have the afternoon break, and then if we return at about four o'clock, $I$ should be finished in an hour.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Well,
that's good. We'll take a fifteen-minute break. THE REGISTRAR: Please stand. --- Upon recessing at 3:42 p.m. / Suspension à 15 h 42
--- Upon resuming at 4:04 p.m. /
Reprise à 16 h 04

THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated. Veuillez vous asseoir.

MS EDWARDH: Mr. Commissioner, before my friend begins, as he's looking through his volumes, there was a moment this morning when we referred to a document that was identified as P-98, and this is a document that Ms McIsaac was hoping to produce after the break.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MS EDWARDH: We have not yet received a copy and I am just wondering whether any progress has been made.

MS McISAAC: Ms McIsaac left it
upstairs. I will send somebody up to get it right away.

MS EDWARDH: Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: If you were
thinking of preparing for your cross-examination tonight, we were just served with the material from the Clerk of Parliament, which has 29 authorities in it. So you will probably have to spend the night reading those.

MR. WALDMAN: I have to spend the night reading those.
--- Laughter / Rires

THE COMMISSIONER: I will speak to that issue later because $I$ have some specific questions -- I know their counsel is not here --that $I$ think might shorten the argument of that motion.

Go ahead, Mr. Cavalluzzo.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you.
We have four volumes to go through in about an hour, Mr. Pardy. Fortunately, there are only a few tabs in each, so let's take you through it.

MR. PARDY: I still have lots of energy.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Good. More than me.

MR. PARDY: I noticed.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You noticed, did
you?
--- Laughter / Rires
THE COMMISSIONER: You think you can wear him down, Mr. Pardy.

MR. PARDY: Absolutely.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I usually get a fresh breath around four o'clock and am raring to go.

If we go to tab 496, once again we are dealing with the press conference.

I just wanted to point out to counsel that at page 5 of tab 496, at 5 of 8 , we have a transcript of the press conference that was held on August 7th concerning the Syrian Human Rights Committee report, so that you have that available for you.

Then if you go to tab 500, which
is the last tab in Volume 5, this seems to be a communication between you and Myra Pastyr-Lupul as to the report itself. She said that she showed it to you a couple of weeks ago.

What is going on in terms of the exchange of these e-mails?

MR. PARDY: When the issue of the letter came up, I knew that she had shown me something and $I$ had read it, that one paragraph out of the SHRC report, and I asked her to reacquaint me with exactly what happened on July 29th or thereabouts. And she refreshed my memory then in terms of what she had actually showed me, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then if you go to the next volume, Volume 6, it is tab 504.

This is an e-mail from yourself --
it looks like from yourself to yourself?
MR. PARDY: No, it's to Peter
Harder, who is the Deputy Minister at this point. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. So he has
replaced Mr. Lavertu as of early June of 2003? MR. PARDY: June 15th is my
recollection.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And it concerns
an article that Mr. Cotler, who was not then in
the Cabinet, had written in the Ottawa Citizen.
Is that correct?
MR. PARDY: I'm sorry, what tab
are you looking at?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 504.
MR. PARDY: Oh, 504; sorry.
No, I take it back. I was looking
at 501 when I said Mr. Harder.
Tab 504 is --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It's to Donald
Sinclair from yourself?
MR. PARDY: No. I think the start of this issue is the message from a man by the name of Jean-Paul Ruszkowski, and he was an executive assistant to what is known as a

Secretary of State, one of our Ministers in the department.

He sent down this and he had a series of questions arising out of the article that Mr. Cotler had written that morning.

The questions are there, and in between the questions you will see my replies.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So the first
question is:
"Did our government make any
representations to the U.S.
Government? What was done?
Did you have any input?"
Your answer was.
"Yes, the Minister raised the matter both with the American Ambassador and Secretary Powell. As well, the matter was raised with officials in the Department of Justice and there were exchanges between the RCMP and FBI."

The second question that is posed: "Did the US Government share any of the information they

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may have on Maher Arar?"
The answer is:
"No, the Americans consistently claim that Mr .

Arar's arrest and deportation
was based on information
provided by Canadian security
organizations."
What are you relying upon for that
statement, which is a response to Question 2 ?
MR. PARDY: On August the 12th?
The last ten months of involvement in the issue.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The third

## question:

"Is it possible that our Ambassador was not able to meet the Canadian prisoner? If accurate how can this be?"

And the answer:
"Not true."
It goes on.
And then Question 4:
"How did you react to the article?"

And your response is:

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"Typical Cotler article.
Gar."
I won't ask you --
MR. PARDY: I am glad I am not
working for the government today.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And we will be
introducing that article as an exhibit to these proceedings.

MR. PARDY: And I would assume at
that point $I$ would have an opportunity to comment on the article to justify the comment.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, we will
recall you for that.
If you go then to tab 507, we
reach the final consular visit in respect of Mr. Arar. Once again, this is the ninth visit? MR. PARDY: That's correct, the ninth and last visit, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The ninth and last visit, thank you.

The first two pages deal with a meeting between Mr. Pillarella and, as stated, General Khalil, and you notice in the third paragraph it talks about:

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"... according to General
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Khalil, Arar will be put on trial within one week."

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So obviously the
situation at that point in time, by August 14 th, is becoming quite serious.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: As to the
consular visit itself, we can find that at the third page of tab 507?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And I guess the
important portion of that consular report is the
third paragraph, where Mr. Martel writes that:
"He was able to express
himself freely at times and he indicated that prison conditions had been more difficult in the past than now. He mentioned he did not wish to have adverse media publicity as he felt this would only harm his case."

And he i's quoted:
"'The Press will know the

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truth when I return home.' He confirmed he had not been beaten nor tortured. He also said he had not been paralysed. When asked to explain he could not find another word for it. He also said his long detention had destroyed him mentally. He indicated that as far as he knows he was not receiving worse treatment than that given to other prisoners."

What were your general
observations concerning this final consular report, particularly after having heard the allegations made by the Syrian Human Rights Committee?

MR. PARDY: I think the comments that were made in paragraph 3 were not unlike some of the comments that Mr. Martel had made during earlier visits, and the comments arising out of the visit by the two Members of Parliament.

I think, in terms of looking at this in terms of what $S H R C$ had said in their
annual report, what they said in their letter to Dr. Mazigh, SHRC did not attach a time frame to their comments with respect to the torture. And while nothing was confirmed at this point, the understanding we had was that the abusive treatment usually took place very early on in the incarceration, and certainly our assessment that we made over the subsequent months was that it was very difficult times but $I$ don't think it was quite as bad as it was in the early days. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. So that certainly as of August $14 t h$, in respect of somebody that may have been held incommunicado between October 8th and October 21st of 2002 , it would be very difficult to observe somebody, almost a year later, and come to a conclusion as to whether in fact they had been tortured in the previous October?

MR. PARDY: Yes. There are some medical tests that one can do, but that's something that you need access to. There is a couple of institutes around the world that can do that kind of work.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I have a couple of questions related to that.

In terms of the way you were performing your job in trying to get Mr. Arar back, the first question $I$ have is: Does it matter whether Mr. Arar, or indeed any Canadian, in terms of the conditions in which they find themselves, does it matter whether they are guilty or not in terms of their rights to consular access?

MR. PARDY: None whatsoever. The issue is not one that we pay any attention to, other than in this kind of a case, of course, it's not a case, strictly speaking, in terms of guilty or innocence here. Allegations have been made.

Most of the cases we deal with are normally adjudicated into some system of law, and you take note of those things, but at the end of the day, the care and attention that you pay to Canadians has really nothing to do with it. And that's the vast majority of our cases.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The second question $I$ would have: In terms of you attempting to seek the immediate release of Mr. Arar through your efforts, did the issue of torture have any bearing on that?

MR. PARDY: It didn't have a
bearing on my activities. It's something that you lend -- or lent urgency to your work. You wanted this to be achieved as quickly as possible, irrespective of whether there was torture throughout the whole period that he was there. You knew that the conditions in prison were quite difficult. I mean, that was an assumption that you made. And that's what lent urgency to the work.

Making public allegations about these conditions was what concerned me more, because those were issues then that could delay our action.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And we are going to come back to that when we talk about methodologies or methods in terms of diplomatic efforts to retrieve or get Canadians released from prison.

MR. PARDY: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Are there any
other comments you want to make relating to this consular report? As I said before, Mr. Martel will be testifying.

MR. PARDY: The key thing, of
course, was the previous report from

Mr. Pillarella, which said that within a week Mr. Arar was going to be in trial in downtown Damascus, that spurred us into action immediately, and as you can see there, quite a number of things were achieved in a very short period of time. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let me take you briefly through those, and at tab 512 we see that the Ministry is talking about lawyers. He is going to be allowed a lawyer of his choice at the civil court next week and has asked for you to take care of his defence through his family, given his wish --

MR. PARDY: I am sorry, what tab
is this?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I am sorry, tab
512, five-one-two.
MR. PARDY: That's different from
what I have here.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. What do
you have?
MR. PARDY: I have an e-mail
message from Ms Pastyr-Lupul to Dr. Mazigh -- oh, I see what you are referring to, is that paragraph, which is a summation.

There is a better message there
which summarizes all of these activities, yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: You have the same
thing?
MR. PARDY: Yes, now I do.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You were just
trying to trick me, were you?
MR. PARDY: No.
--- Laughter / Rires
MR. CAVALLUZZO: But you are
starting to get the process in motion. The Syrians have advised you that there is going to be a civil court suit, and you are starting to attempt to procure legal services or help to procure legal services on behalf of Mr. Arar. At tab 513 --

MR. BAXTER: Mr. Cavalluzzo, before you leave that, $I$ think the witness was referring to the -- the summarizing memo is the last page of tab 507, if that is what the witness was referring to. Perhaps that would be appropriate to cover before you move forward? MR. PARDY: Yes, that was my response to the reporting messages from Ambassador Pillarella and Mr. Martel on the visit. I went right back to them almost immediately with a list
of instructions.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Tab 515, you have an e-mail there,
dated August 15?
MR. PARDY: Yes, that is correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And what is this
about? This is from you to Damascus? MR. PARDY: Yes. I think they had
replied to this message, which is found under tab 507, and I had gone back to them with some additional -- no, I am sorry, that's the same message. I am sorry. Yes, it is the same -MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is the same message?

MR. PARDY: It is the same message, just a slightly different format. Yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 518 relates to a meeting that you had with Dr. Mazigh? MR. PARDY: Yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And this meeting was held on August 18th? MR. PARDY: Yes, it was, and Ms Pastyr-Lupul wrote it up and entered it into the system on the 19th, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In particular, there seem to be eight issues or eight questions that were posed by Dr. Mazigh and Kerry Pither, who accompanied her to the meeting?

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And we see that he is in Sidneyia prison now from the Palestine branch?

MR. PARDY: Well, there were suggestions to that effect, yes, that he had been transferred from the SMI group. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And it says:
"The meeting lasted two hours, and we agreed to be in touch on a regular basis over the next few days to see what transpires with respect to
the court date and
preparations for trial." It goes on:
"Myra also spoke to Bassam
Arar ... last Friday, during
intermittent power
outages..."

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MR. PARDY: That's when Toronto
turned off the lights in Ottawa.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Toronto turned off the lights, right.

I would like to introduce as an exhibit minutes of this meeting which were taken by Kerry Pither.

THE COMMISSIONER: One hundred?
P-100.

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\begin{aligned}
& \text { EXHIBIT NO. P-100: Minutes } \\
& \text { of meeting with Consular } \\
& \text { officials at DFAIT on } 19 \\
& \text { August } 2003
\end{aligned}
$$

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In the early part
of the minutes there is a discussion of lawyers, and you give your advice as to the appropriateness of going with certain kinds of lawyers which may aggravate the Syrian government.

Do you recall that?
MR. PARDY: Very much so, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And $I$ don't want
to take you through the whole thing, but if you stay at page 2 of 8 --

MR. PARDY: But can I just add to that on my position with respect to the selection
of lawyers, one of the scenarios that certainly you always bear in mind is that this would be a trial that would reach a certain conclusion, and then following that conclusion there would be an executive decision made by the Syrian government for deportation.

What $I$ was concerned with is that the trial not become an opportunity where the Syrian government itself is attacked by people who had other agendas to play other than the wellbeing of Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. In terms of page 2, about five paragraphs down it says: "Monia asked when the Syrians would tell us the charges, and Pardy replied that we can never tell with Syria, and that Arnous..."

Of course, that is the ambassador. "...told them he would do what he could to get the answers to their questions."

Then it says:
"Pardy said that a theory is that this is now happening as

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a result of the letter from the Prime Minister, and that the Syrians now know they cannot just drift forever without doing something."

I just want to know, first of all,
if that fairly captures what you said at the meeting; and, secondly, whether that is still your view, that the Prime Minister's intervention had an effect on the Syrians?

MR. PARDY: I would not use the
term "theory". It certainly was my view that once we had the Prime Minister involved in writing to the President of Syria, I think a new dynamic had been added to the case. And my view was that this was certainly more than a theory.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If you go down about five or six lines, it goes on and it states that:
"Monia noted that it was her preference not to have a trial in Syria."

And it states:
"Pardy responded that he did not know how he could be
tried anywhere else, especially here..."

Obviously in Canada.
"... because 'there is no basis for charging him in Canada.'"

Do you recall saying that?
MR. PARDY: Well, my preference
was not to have a trial in Syria either, but there was a force majeure at work here, and the suggestion that there was going to be something that could be done elsewhere on these issues, I think, was just a chimera.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But do you recall saying words to the effect that there was no basis for charging him in Canada?

MR. PARDY: I can't recall
specifically, but certainly this would be something that would be a conclusion that I had reached based on the information available to me, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then at the bottom, in terms of as to why a trial might take place, it states:

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need to save face by
legitimizing what they have
done to him -- this may be
what the trial is about."
Do you recall words to that
effect?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then on page
3 of 8 , eight lines down, it states:
"Pardy said that this is
Syria there is no question it will be a sham. The
important question is what
the results of the sham will
be."
Do you recall saying that?
MR. PARDY: Yes, and $I$ think when
I say "results" in this context, it wasn't the results in terms of the actual trial itself but the actions that could flow from having that trial.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And then about a paragraph below that it says:
"Gar Pardy said that it is
all about the objective. The

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                    objective is to get Arar out,
                    not to beat on Syria. Pardy
                    said that this could be done
                    when Maher is back at home.
                    Now is important to give
                    Syria the benefit of the
                    doubt."
                            MR. PARDY: Yes. I return to this
    theme, I think, a couple of times in this
document: that there was a need to be very focused
in what we were doing here, and the focus had to
be Mr. Arar and no other extraneous issue.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Below that there is reference that Mr. Lockyer has agreed to be an independent observer at any trial which is held?

You have arranged that yourself? MR. PARDY: Yes, I did. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And at the bottom, it says:
"Pardy assured her that both
the ambassador, and Leo
Martel (consular official who
had been at all of the
visits) would be present
throughout the proceedings. He said that the current ambassador was supposed to have left Syria last month, but they have kept him there because of this case. The new ambassador goes in at the end of September."

Do you recall making that
assurance as well?
MR. PARDY: Yes, I think we had --
Mr. Pillarella had made arrangements for him to stay on. But then, as you know, the idea of a trial became fairly elastic, and in the end I'm not sure whether there was a trial as such or a decision by the -- for want of a better name in this context, a prosecutor, that there was no basis on proceeding and certainly led to then the release of Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then if we go to page 5 of the minutes, about a third of the way down, it states:
"Kerry asked if the Canadian
government had requested a
private meeting with Arar.

Pardy said that private meetings never happen in these countries, they can never expect that."

Do you recall saying that?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then portions
of the report, the consular report that we have reviewed, were read to Kerry Pither and Monia Mazigh by Myra Pastyr-Lupul.

Do you recall that happening?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then if you
go to page 6, about halfway down it states: "Monia asked about the assertion by the Syrian Human Rights Committee that there had been foreign interrogators present during his interrogation."

And then it states: "Pardy said it was possibly the United States. CSIS had made a routine visit earlier, in October or November, but
it was probably not them. The RCMP had initially thought they would go to question him and ended up not going. Pardy said that as we knew these issues were a problem before (referring to RCMP and CSIS thwarting efforts to help Arar) but that the Prime Minister had 'come down on our side' by sending the letter to the Syrian President, and speaking for the whole government."

Do you recall saying that at this
meeting?
MR. PARDY: I have some trouble with some of the comments there in terms of this particular statement, but $I$ think the general thrust of it certainly would reflect my views.

But I subsequently have tried to find out where this allegation was with respect to foreign interrogators. It certainly was not in the SHRC report itself, nor do I believe was it in
the letter from SHRC to Dr. Mazigh.
I haven't had a chance to follow it through, but certainly $I$ wasn't sure where this particular statement had come from.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I do not recall
it being said either. We will check it this evening and --

MR. PARDY: It could have been.
Is it in the letter itself?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Oh, it is in the
letter.
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Where it says
SHRC was told also that Syrian and foreign investigators interrogated Mr. Arar.

MR. PARDY: Okay. I stand
corrected.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Finally, on page
7 --
MR. PARDY: I would just bring
your attention to the next paragraph below that, what we have just mentioned on page 6 of 8 , and this was the fact that Mr. Edelson was well aware of some of the discussions that were going on in the Government of Canada here.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And just for the public, what that says is: " (Note: this is very, very interesting - Monia said that she had also heard from

Michael Edelson, Arar's past lawyer, that the RCMP had hoped to go there. This is quite alarming, and raises the possibility that the RCMP are considering mimicking the US tactic of participating in overseas interrogations."

And that of course wasn't said at the meeting, but was an observation made by the taker of the minutes?

MR. PARDY: Yes. My particular point was the information that was becoming available to Mr. Edelson on some of these issues, but the last observation is not one that $I$ necessarily share.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Finally, in the
last page of Exhibit 100 , there is discussion concerning methodology in terms of -- I guess in terms of diplomacy, and about a third of the way
down:
"Monia asked if we are effectively using bilateral relations.

Pardy responded that our trade relations are insignificant and that we have little leverage. Syria sees Canada as positive on the Middle East generally. Their key issue is the Golan Heights. Syria has an overall sense that Canada is at least trying to be balanced. Canada is chair of a refugee committee formed out of the Oslo or Madrid process and there was an informal meeting of this committee two months ago in Ottawa."

Do you recall expressing those views?

> MR. PARDY: Yes, we had a discussion in terms of Syria and its role in the

Middle East and its relationship to Canada on Middle Eastern issues, and I think $I$ was trying to convey to them that we were generally -- how can I put this? -- well-regarded.

And I think it is important to
realize at this point as well the Syrian relationship with the United States was going downhill at an ever-increasing rate at this point, and in some ways $I$ think the relationship with Canada took on additional importance for Syria in this process.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this is at the time that the Americans had put an embargo on Syria?

MR. PARDY: Yes, the American Congress had passed legislation that provided for economic and -- I think there were mainly economic sanctions against Syria, and I think the Syrians were quite nervous about that, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just a couple of
final points in these minutes $I$ would ask you to confirm.

Halfway down it says:
"Monia asked why the
President had not replied to
the Prime Minister's letter. Pardy replied that he is going to reply about this process -- this is his reply. The question is whether it is going to come out in our favour. Are they putting him on trial to establish if he committed a crime? Pardy said that if he is found guilty the next step will be to put in a request for executive clemency."

Do you recall saying that?
MR. PARDY: Yes, that was one of
the scenarios that certainly $I$ saw as possibly playing out here in the aftermath of any trial.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let
us move on.
I am not going to take you through
this, but at tab 526, we see that you did appoint Mr. Lockyer as Canada's observer at the trial in Syria.

I would like to go now to tab 527.
You should have a CAMANT note
dated August 22 nd. Is that correct?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I would refer your attention to the third page.

This is a message dated August the 19th of 2003, and it's from one Sylvia Thomson.

Could you tell us who she is?
MR. PARDY: She was a producer for
the CBC, documentary producer -- I'm not quite sure, but certainly CBC Television as well, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And she says:
" Hi again.
How do you know that Arar went to Pakistan/Afghanistan? What is the source of this information?"

And your answer is:
"Sylvia, it was and is my understanding that hundreds of Canadians went to Pakistan and Afghanistan either for religious training at the madrassas or to offer support to the Taliban which at that time was not as closely

> associated with al Qaida as it subsequently became. My understanding of this is limited and based on occasional references to the movement in various articles and case files."
> And then you go on to recommend
that:
camp south of Kabul. Hope this helps. Gar."

And I assume that she is in the process of producing some kind of --

MR. PARDY: The time line here was something in the fall. She had been referred to me by our press offices to speak to her, to provide background information, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
At tab 528, you seem to be talking to Maureen, and you are talking to Mr. Watt of the Centre for Constitutional Rights about the litigation about, in particular, Mr. Arar's claim in the U.S.?

MR. PARDY: Yes. This goes back to an earlier exchange with Mr. Watt, I think, in May or June, I think it was, where he provided a very rough draft of a Statement of Claim that he wanted to file and was asking whether or not we could contribute information to that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If we go to 530, we see another e-mail exchange between you and Sylvia Thomson, the producer for the CBC, and she is giving you the name of the BBC producer and is asking certain questions about the information
about Arar having spent time in Afghanistan, and your response is:
"Sylvia, the information on Afghanistan was provided to the embassy in Damascus last fall. What was reported was that he received military training at a base south of Kabul. Very thin but was the only bit of time and location specific information that was provided. Will be available later this morning for call. Gar."

What are you referring to here, where you talk about "provided to the embassy last fall"? Is that the document that Mr. Pillarella came back to Canada with?

MR. PARDY: No, that was the
conversation $I$ had on November the $3 r d$ with Ambassador Pillarella, and that's the context and the information which had then been provided to the family, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And we have discussed the reliability of that statement --

MR. PARDY: Absolutely, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- and we need
not go back into that.
I wonder if you might identify
this note at tab 535. It looks like an article entitled "Canadians Abroad" or some type of periodical or publication?

MR. PARDY: I think that was something that I wrote. Somebody had asked for some general information, and $I$ think this was put together after I retired, and it subsequently got turned into an article that was published in a magazine called Beau de Papier. Not quite in this form, but basically it was to try to provide an overview of the consular process.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Your counsel did provide us with one article that you could retrieve called "Canadians".

Is that the article --
MR. PARDY: Yes, that's the article there, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I
wonder -- we may share that with counsel. We already have? Okay.

I guess we could refer to the
article, or we could refer to tab 535. This may be an opportunity for you to share with us your views about how we deal with countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Iran?

In particular, I'm looking at page
3 of 4 . This is two paragraphs from the bottom, and I quote to you, and then I will ask you for your comments. It says:
"Nevertheless, we accept that the best measure of the quality of such service is when we act on behalf of Canadians who have the misfortune to encounter unusual difficulties, whether caused by governments, by god or by their own hand. Helping persons such as Mr Sampson, Mr. Arar or Ms Kazemi is not and cannot be through raised voices or raised fists. To do so would only make their difficulties and those of their families worse. And indeed, it would

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bring into question the safety and security of other Canadians."

At this point in time, with that
context in mind, I would like to ask you as to your view, based on your experience, as to the effectiveness, when a Canadian is detained in a country like Saudi Arabia, Syria or Iran, the effectiveness of press strategies and so on and so forth in Canada, trying to embarrass the foreign government so that they will release the Canadian? Do you have any views on that?

MR. PARDY: My experience has been just about in all cases it made the situation worse and our job much more difficult.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And let me just ask you some further questions on that.

What do you feel was the important event, intervening event, which gave rise to the Syrians' response to finally release Mr. Arar in October of 2003?

MR. PARDY: I think it was -- a letter from the Prime Minister was the key one, in the sense that we raised the level and it was a clear articulation of a position by the very top
of the Canadian government. I think that was a key element in all of that.

The second element, I think, that played some part in all of this was the serious erosion of the relationship between Syria and the United States. I think those two together.

And Syria does not have a lot of friends in the world, and particularly in the Western world, and $I$ think they saw taking action on this case being of some significance to them.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, leaving
aside -- if we could isolate the deteriorating relationship with the Americans, I want to focus on the letter from the Prime Minister.

Most people would say -- most Canadians would say, "The only reason the Prime Minister sent that letter was because he was getting a lot of pressure from the public through the strategies in the press, and that is that the Prime Minister of the country wouldn't have looked at this case unless it was a public or political issue, and as a result of that, he did something." Would you agree with that? MR. PARDY: Yes, he did something, and I'm -- one can always discuss what was the
motivation in the Prime Minister coming on board, but certainly in terms of my own discussion, and $I$ think that there has been some documents that have been released, PCO documents, where the advice from senior officials in the PCO was not to get involved in all of this, but $I$ think, at the end of the day -- and the first step in this process was the decision by the Prime Minister to write to Dr. Mazigh on this set of issues.

And $I$ think it's fair to say that the Prime Minister, given his experience on a previous consular case and his own involvement in that case, and he is still being criticized today for the action that he took, I think he -- this goes back to 1996, that particular thing, and the press have been quite unmerciful in terms of their criticism of the Prime Minister as far as involvement.

So I saw, in my view, the key thing for the Prime Minister was when we went to his people and said to him, "Look, it is not possible for officials at our level to come to a conclusion with respect to a position. The only way out of this was for you to intervene, Prime Minister, send a letter to the President of Syria.

Then we sort out the issues once Mr. Arar is back in Canada, assuming that there were issues to be worked out at that time."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. But wouldn't you agree with me that the Prime Minister is a politician, who are sometimes susceptible to political or public pressure, and that, as a result of Mr. Arar's case being such a public issue, the Prime Minister, at least in part, was responding to the press or public strategy that was pursued by Mr. Arar's friends and family?

MR. PARDY: The ultimate decision on the case, of course, was taken by the Government of Syria, and $I$ think the balance, the positive aspect of publicity in Canada on our Prime Minister, has to be balanced with the negative impact of that publicity on the Government of Syria.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess you don't know in particular what the reaction of the Syrian officials were. I would put it to you it's probably reasonable to assume, from reading the documents from Syria, that they were, as $I$ pointed out in the earlier consular report, the Syrians were sensitive to political pressure which was
being expressed in Canada through the press. We saw that. You would agree with that?

MR. PARDY: Sensitive in the sense
that they were a bit -- in their eyes I think it would be that they were being very forthcoming and very helpful on this case, and yet at the same time they were being roundly criticized in Canada for everything that they did.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
MR. PARDY: And so $I$ think the
balance as far as that side of the equation is concerned, it was entirely negative.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But whether it's negative or positive, the fact is that -- I think that you would agree from the reports and from Mr. Pillarella's reporting back, that the Syrians were closely watching the public reaction to Mr. Arar's plight in Canada through the Syrian ambassador, Mr. Arnous, back to Damascus -MR. PARDY: Yes, they were following these events. I think there's good evidence of that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, are there
any other views that you want to express on the role of press strategies in terms of assisting

Canadians who are detained abroad?
MR. PARDY: Yes, I'd come back to
the basic premise here -- I mean, you can have publicity -- the problem is that press comment is, for want of a better word, a beast that has a smiling cat at one end and a snarly dog at the other, and the press did both in terms of this particular case.

You know, they reported faithfully
the various statements made by Dr. Mazigh and those of her supporters, but by the same token, the press was also reporting very negative stories with respect to Mr. Arar, and it's that dichotomy, if you like, in terms of the reflection.

And I would refer to one press report in particular of July 24 of 2003 , where a reporter put together two quite separate stories -- I withdraw the -- it wasn't necessarily -- but there were two separate stories that were certainly current at that time, and somebody at the paper put those two stories together and made connections for which there was absolutely no evidence.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And certainly,
you would agree, that even more negative reports
in the press were the leaks relating to Mr. Arar, in particular the leak into the Ottawa Citizen on November 8, and the leak to the CTV network on or about October 23 of 2003?

MR. PARDY: Yes, certainly those leaks were, you know -- I think -- but this is the problem. Once you get the media involved, it is a situation over which nobody has control anymore. And so the balance, in my experience, has never been such that is a force for good with respect to the Canadian that is -- finds himself in a foreign jail.

And the classic case on this, which the Commission might refer to here, is a case of a number of years ago in Brazil involving two Canadians. There has been a couple of very good books written about this case, and clearly these two Canadians spent several years longer in a Brazilian jail than was necessary as a result of the publicity -- or the activities in Canada of their supporters.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, if we could just move on. There are a couple of related questions $I$ would like to ask you.

Leaving aside the impact of press
strategies and publicity back home when we have Canadians detained abroad, and that is in the case of Mr. Arar. Do you have any views as to what made his stay in Syria so long? Why did it take close to a year to get Mr. Arar back?

MR. PARDY: Well, as you know, issues in this area, whether there is a direct involvement of the courts, or if you want to use a loose term, criminal justice system, it is not known for the speed in which it works. I have been in -- well, $I$ would make one comment.

Fifty-odd years ago, a
fourteen-year-old Canadian was sentenced to death in a court in Ontario. Fifty years later, the judicial system in Canada is still trying to come to grips with this.

While that is a very extreme case, it's illustrative that when somebody is involved in these situations, the action to get something done in about a year is quite remarkable. Certainly what delayed the action, certainly in our view, was a certain amount of bewilderment on the part of the Syrians as to what they were dealing with here. In the end, the conclusions that they had told us they had
reached, that -- they said there was nothing here with which they should be concerned about, which was quite contrary to everything that they had said to us previously.

But I think what was playing out here was a number of larger issues in terms of Syria's relationship with the United States, Syria's position in the Middle East, and Syria's relationship with Canada, and I think the key thing was to take action at the most opportune time.

One can argue whether that should have happened a bit earlier. I'm not sure whether that -- if you acted too soon, whether you would have had the same results. So, again, it's a balancing act that you're doing.

But certainly in my experience, in dealing with these cases, to get a Canadian returned to Canada in just about a year, that is a remarkable achievement on these kinds of cases.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, you would agree with me, though, that one factor that you didn't mention, that I'm putting to you would have had an impact, a negative impact on Mr. Arar's return, is the mixed messages the Syrians were
getting from Canada, that certainly was not speaking with one voice until July of 2003, when the Prime Minister intervened. You would agree with that, that that would have impacted -MR. PARDY: It could have had an impact, but again $I$ have no direct information. As you know, the record is muddied with respect to that information. But certainly what $I$ was working towards constantly here was to try to achieve a consensus within the Canadian government on this issue, and it was difficult to achieve, and in the end, we didn't achieve it, other than through the Prime Minister intervening directly.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But you would
agree with me that if you reached a consensus earlier, if you reached a consensus earlier, so that the Syrians saw Canada speaking with one voice, that it's reasonably likely that Mr. Arar's return would have been quicker than it eventually was?

MR. PARDY: Possibly. But, again, as you know, we're balancing a number of different factors here, and whether the Syrians earlier on were prepared to cut their losses with the

Americans, no matter what the position of the Government of Canada's concern, I think that's an issue open to debate.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, do you think that the fact that while these consular efforts were going on, the visit of CSIS that we've learned about today impacted the length of time that Mr. Arar spent --

MR. PARDY: There is no evidence in the record to suggest that it had any specific impact.

As you know, the timing and then the subsequent action of the Syrians, it was later in January and February that the Syrians started to withdraw their earlier level of cooperation, and there is no evidence in the record that that is directly related to that visit.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And let me
put another question to you, and that is, that we saw a very clear -- a very clear -- memorandum
from your employee, your assistant, Myra
Pastyr-Lupul, which is around March 24, 2003, where she clearly set out that the Syrians misinterpreted -- there was some miscommunication --

MR. PARDY: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- and that CSIS
should clearly and unequivocally in writing disabuse the Syrians of the notion that Canada did not want Mr. Arar back.

I'm putting it to you, if CSIS had sent a letter in or about March of 2003, clearly and unequivocally stating the position of the Government of Canada is "We want Mr. Arar back", that Mr. Arar would have returned to Canada earlier than October of 2003?

MR. PARDY: Well, $I$ took action on that suggestion through Ms Catterall, who had access into rooms at the Canadian government that I did not have direct access to, and she sought to achieve that, and you will have a chance to talk to her next week about all of these, and she did not succeed either on that point --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And please do not -- you know, do not take this as a criticism of you --

MR. PARDY: No, no, I'm not.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do not take it as a criticism of Ms Catterall.

What I am suggesting to you though
is that, if CSIS had sent a letter clearly and unequivocally stating to the Syrians, "You have misunderstood us. We, like the rest of the Canadian government, want Mr. Arar back forthwith", I'm putting it to you that Mr. Arar would have returned to Canada much earlier than he did?

MR. PARDY: No, I do not believe
that that would necessarily be the case because I think the Syrian relationship with the United States at that point was still of some significance to them.

They were still trying to achieve some operational -- what's the word here? -- some operational agreements with the United States on a number of issues, and it was only when the demands of the United States reached the point that the Syrians felt they could not accede to them that basically the relationship with the United States went downhill and that was $I$ think in July -- the June-July period, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. But I'm
putting it to you, Mr. Pardy, March 24 , the Americans were already on the road --

MR. PARDY: That's right. And the

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relationship --
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MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- to Baghdad. MR. PARDY: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: They were in
Baghdad. In fact, it took them about three minutes to get into Baghdad. And it was clear to the Syrians at that point in time, it would seem to me, that the American relationship had gone kaput, so $I$ don't think the relationship in late March would have impacted on --

MR. PARDY: I do not believe that
the record will support your conclusions on that.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I just
wanted to give you an opportunity to comment --
MR. PARDY: Okay.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- on these
issues.
Just a couple of final matters,
Mr. Pardy.
If we go back then to the books at tab 535 -- or, excuse me, not 535, but 602. This would be in volume 7.

This is dated October --
obviously, in order to have some context here, you left the employ of the Canadian government on

August 31, 2003?
MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. So this is dated October 7, 2003. It's an e-mail which incorporates what is called a rough transcript of an interview with Gar Pardy based on closed captioning of CBC Newsworld on October 6, and there are a couple of portions that I would refer to.

In the second paragraph, this is presumably you speaking, in response to some questions:
"I think the release..." That's obviously of Mr. Arar. "...is a culmination of many months of intense work on the party of Canadian officials. But I think it's also
important to accept that his
detention in Syria must be
looked at in the backdrop of
American/Syrian relations
an..."
I guess that's "and".
"...things generally in the

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middle east. And certainly on the war on terrorism. I think at the end of the day, I think the Syrians took a hard look at this. Largely as a result of the representations that the prime minister made through the senator earlier this summer and $I$ think came to the conclusion that look, it made no sense to continue with Mr. Arar's detention in Syria and so they released them."

Which somewhat mirrors what you have just told us.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then the
questioner, his name is Harry, says:
"What do you think Canadian authorities would have said at this late date, 374 days after his initial seizure that would have changed

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Syrian minds?"
And you go on -- I'm just going to pick up in about the second or third paragraph, four lines down:
"...I think the Syrians were looking at this. They did not ask, as you know, for Mr. Arar to arrive in Syria.

The Americans almost literally dumped him in Syria. And I think they were trying to figure out where all of this played out for them. And $I$ think at the end of the day they came to the conclusion that their relationship with Canada was quite important to them. And so came to the conclusion that he should be released and allowed to return to Canada."

And then you talk in the next paragraph about, as you said before, not having many friends in the world generally. And then

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just at the bottom of the page, Harry asks:
"Knowing this case as you do, and understanding Syria as you do and without asking you
to pronounce a yumt before you know all the details, do you think it is likely that Mr. Arar may have been tortured in detention given the past record of Syria?" And the answer is:
"Oh, you look at the record of Syria in terms of the various reports that have been done by organizations that look at these things very carefully, I think there is -- I mean, there's no reason to believe that this is beyond the realm of possibility. The only specific information that we have on Mr. Arar of course was a report -- or a letter..."

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Referring to that Syrian agency.
Do these answers capture, in fact,
what you responded to on that --
MR. PARDY: Yes, I think they
reflect the comments that I made to you earlier this afternoon as well.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: All right.
MR. PARDY: But $I$ think going down
on page 2 of that report, again I came back to the issue of the involvement of the Prime Minister.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
There is another interview on CPAC at C12 which was given on October the $9 t h$ on the show "Talk Politics".

MR. PARDY: Is there a tab on
that?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 612.
MR. PARDY: I have it.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And that is about
four or five days after Mr. Arar returned?
MR. PARDY: Yes. And I think
again it reflects my -- and as you know, another case was successfully concluded a little while earlier than this and the two were certainly active in the public minds, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And I am not going to take you through that but just pointing out to counsel that this is another interview that Mr. Pardy has given respecting the situation of Mr. Arar.

There is one news article, though, that $I$ would like to file from The Globe and Mail. THE COMMISSIONER: That will be P-101.

EXHIBIT NO. P-101: Globe and Mail article entitled "RCMP passed along Arar's name, U.S. says", written by Jeff Sallot and Colin Freeze MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is an article in The Globe and Mail by Jeff Sallot and Colin Freeze, and it is dated Saturday, November the 8th, which is the ominous date of the other report.

$$
\text { I am referring now to page } 2 \text { of } 3
$$ where you are quoted at the bottom of the page, at page 2:

> "'The fundamental issue is the standards that are used here,' said Gar Pardy, former

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head of consular services at the Department of Foreign Affairs. 'Particularly the standards when information is transferred between countries. That's the key issue here.'"

And they go on to quote you: "'Nobody is saying that police shouldn't co-operate with one another, particularly given the issue of the bloody world out there. But there is a requirement for standards to be in place,' he said."

And then it's referring to you:
"He argued that Canadian agencies must place clear conditions on how other countries use the information Canada swaps."

And you are quoted:

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"'The standards that you use,
with respect to the
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information that is passed, and the hold you put on that information in terms of its use by another country: That's what you have to look for,' he said."

Referring to your quote.
"'If those two elements are not active in terms of the exchange of information, then you are going to get cases like Arar.'"

The quote is continued: "'You do it all the time. These are part of the agreements one works out with foreign governments. And if police are not prepared to place conditions on it, then we've got a problem.
'... We don't have a lot to bring to the table in these areas other than information about possible Canadian citizens. We're not active

> internationally in the way the agency or FBI is.'" And finally you are quoted as saying:
"'All of these issues take
place in the shadows. It's
not something that government
stands up and talk about.
And there is no question the
American agencies have been
given a lot more freedom to
act in the nasty areas of
this business after september
11.'"
this newspaper article
accurately reflect the statements that you made to The Globe and Mail, reflected in that article on November 8, 2003?

MR. PARDY: Yes, but it's based on whether -- I had no knowledge at that point whether or not $I$ was commenting in -- well, in part in the abstract about such standards based on my own experience over the years, because $I$ was involved in the exchange of information with foreign governments on a number of occasions.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
MR. PARDY: And $I$ was coming back to the fact that the absence of those standards could be a problem and could create problems for individual Canadians.

I think it's also important to understand that the changes that occurred in Canadian law in December of 2001 , where the Canadian anti-terrorism Act criminalized a number of activities in this area and as a result of that was transferred from the responsibility of CSIS to the RCMP, and whether or not the people directly concerned had the opportunity to look at these issues.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The final
question, Mr. Pardy -- I said you would be finished by five o'clock. I'm five minutes late, so I apologize.

MR. PARDY: I will stay until six o'clock.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you. The final reference $I$ will make unfortunately is back to Volume 8 of 9, and in particular, at tab 706.

There are a number of articles which are set out. I would like to refer to the
article at page 6 of 11.
If you look to the bottom
right-hand --
MR. PARDY: I'm sorry, the tab?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The tab is 706
and the page is 6 of 11 . And it happens to be the article of November 8, 2003, in the Ottawa Citizen by Juliet O'Neill, which is the subject matter of other proceedings.

But the reference that $I$ would ask you about is in her article at page 8, and at the bottom of the page, reference is made to you, and it says:
"Gar Pardy, the recently retired consular affairs chief from Foreign Affairs, says the RCMP and CSIS persistently opposed Foreign Affairs' efforts to bring Mr. Arar's case to the prime minister for intervention." And then there's a quote: "'The RCMP and the security people, that's where the division came down,' Mr.

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Pardy said in an interview.
'They were saying we have our responsibilities and we don't agree. I think it delayed our efforts to get him out of there to some extent, although I don't think by a heck of a lot quite frankly.'"

And I would ask you whether that is a fair reflection of what you advised the reporter --

MR. PARDY: I did not speak to Ms O'Neill. Another reporter called me and was asking for more general comments about this.

The first paragraph you read, I don't think it was that specific, but the quote itself is certainly in character with the kind of things that $I$ was saying, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Pardy, it's
been a long two days. Thank you very much for your evidence. That would complete the direct examination of you.

THE COMMISSIONER: You may step
down. I am going to deal with a couple of other
matters, but you may step down from the witness box.

MR. PARDY: Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: You are excused until -- what time do you think we would start the evidence tomorrow, Mr. Cavalluzzo?

How long are the cross-examinations likely to be? Do you know how long you might be, Ms Edwardh?

MS EDWARDH: I will certainly be three quarters of a day.

THE COMMISSIONER: Do you know how long you might be, Ms McIsaac or Mr. Baxter?

MR. BAXTER: Part of it will depend, Mr. Commissioner, on the issue of the order of examinations.

THE COMMISSIONER: We will deal with that shortly.

MR. BAXTER: Of course. I would assume in the range of an hour to an hour and a half.

THE COMMISSIONER: We will start this evidence at 9:30 tomorrow, and we have to finish it and I have a plane at seven o'clock so...

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Good. Let us
recall that we have a motion at 8:30.
THE COMMISSIONER: The argument of the motion will be finished by 9:30.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's fair. So
we will start the evidence at 9:30 then. That's fine.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. So
if you come back at 9:30 tomorrow, Mr. Pardy, that would be fine.

MR. PARDY: Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very
much. Then you are excused for this evening.
I think there are two matters that
we can deal with, actually, if people are prepared to sit for a bit longer.

Let me lead off, and don't take it wrongly that I've prejudged anything. But let me tell you my thoughts and it may shorten the matter.

Dealing first of all with the issue that has been raised, that came up the other day when Mr. Waldman was cross-examining and whether certain questions could be put to a witness without making a commitment to call

Mr. Arar to testify. Let's deal with that issue first?

Ms Edwardh has given me the case of Little v. The Supreme Court of Canada.

I haven't read the transcript, but as I recall the exchange, my sense -- and people, please correct me if my memory is not correct -but my sense of the exchange was as follows: that the question that was objected to posited that Mr. Arar would or could testify to certain events, and that question, if that is what was objected to, in my view would be an impermissible question unless there was a commitment to call Mr. Arar.

As I recall, I suggested to Mr. Waldman at some point that the question might be posited another way and reference could be made perhaps to statements that Mr. Arar had made in public.

Mr. Waldman then followed a line of questioning, which he didn't take me up specifically on the suggestion, but put a question that said to the witness: "Isn't it possible that", in effect making a suggestion with respect to another scenario. There was no objection to that.

My sense of the law on it, I think which is -- at least as I intended, consistent with what happened the other day -- is that it's certainly open to a cross-examiner to put suggestions of scenarios to a witness by using a phrase "Isn't it possible that" or "I suggest to you that", or something of that sort, so long as, as the Supreme Court says, so long as the scenario is not fanciful and is one that the lawyer, as a professional, has some basis to put forward.

If the question is asked if that fashion, there need not be a commitment then to call evidence to establish the scenario that is being suggested through that line of questioning.

What would be impermissible -- and
Little doesn't specifically deal with this, but it's always struck me has been the state of the law -- would be to say, "I'm suggesting to you, witness," or "What do you have to say about the fact that Mr. Arar or anybody else would testify to this scenario or that scenario".

As I understood the objection that came from the government that we dealt with, it was that type of suggestion that was objected to. So that is a long way of saying

I'm not sure that there is really an issue between the parties arising from what happened the other day.

Ms Edwardh, would I take it that you would be content with being able to ask questions that would say "I suggest to you the following scenario"? I don't want to start telling you how to form your questions, but leaving what Mr. Arar might testify to out of the picture.

MS EDWARDH: That specific
formulation $I$ am quite content, you know, that Mr. Arar would testify.

I think perhaps we went offside a little earlier than that, and it started when $I$ asked Ms Girvan did she have any recollection -- I was asking her something about Damascus, and then Ms McIsaac stood up and said, "Well, that gets into the problem of whether Mr. Arar" -- but, of course, the witness acceded to the suggestion, so we didn't crystallize the issue.

If what is prohibited is the phraseology, Mr. Arar would testify. I think you could say "Well, I put to you, witness, that Mr. Arar has a different recollection", and then
they are entitled to comment.
THE COMMISSIONER: I would probably have a little difficulty with that, other than if you could tie it to something that he has said.

It strikes me that that is the same as suggesting, you know, making a commitment that that is what he would testify to.

I must say I think it's open to you to put suggestions of scenarios to the witness: "I suggest to you what happened was this"; "I suggest to you what happened was that." You are not making a commitment to call evidence.

MS EDWARDH: I am content, Mr. Commissioner, to live within those boundaries until we get to a point where $I$ can't ask a question and $I$ think it's imperative that $I$ must. And if we have to cross that line, then we can deal with the argument at that point.

But I think it's important that we be able to put theories of the defence or suggestions to the witness knowing that we've got a good-faith basis for putting the suggestions but not be in a position necessarily to say the witness will be testifying.

THE COMMISSIONER: In fairness -well, let's see if we come to it, but also in suggesting that the witness would say that. For example, in the Little case, the questions that were put by defence counsel had to do with a drug scenario that the officers could testify. The argument was, well, the officers would have to be called to testify about it.

But I didn't understand the questions to be in the form that: "Now, witness, I'm saying that Officer $X$ and Officer $Y$ give this description of what happened." So they didn't tie it to the description itself. They simply put the scenario forward that if the officers had been called, they would have testified about.

Again, $I$ think we are splitting hairs on something that, as a practical matter, when you look at the issues that we are dealing with in this inquiry, it's not a trial.

MS EDWARDH: If I could just make one other comment, if one actually goes back to the original formulation of this rule --

THE COMMISSIONER: In Brown and Dunn?

MS EDWARDH: Not to Brown and Dunn
because I actually believe it has a different genesis, that Brown $v$ Dunn is really a case concerned with whether you can call evidence and what your ethical duties are. I don't believe they fall from the same lines of authority. THE COMMISSIONER: All right. MS EDWARDH: Going back to the decision of Privy Council in Fox and General Medical Council, of course that is a case that the Supreme Court of Canada relies upon.

Again, I suppose you are correct, Mr. Commissioner, because what is at issue in Fox is kind of interesting because, if you go to page 1023, just after the quote gets incorporated into the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Little -THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I have it. MS EDWARDH: About two-thirds of the way down there is a comment beginning "The whole episode apparently."
"Their Lordships do not know
the content of the letter
comes down to one question:
Question: Did you seduce her
in the surgery very soon
after that?

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Answer: I did not."
And then the question is does
there have to be some evidence that the person could qualify?

I understand your concern. I
think $I$ can live within the boundaries of suggesting that there were other possibilities and try to keep away from anything that is directly --

THE COMMISSIONER: That ties it to Mr. Arar said this or he would testify to that.

MS EDWARDH: If Mr. Arar has publicly said it --

THE COMMISSIONER: I think that's a different situation. You could say, for example, $I$ can't remember the date, November 4 th, Mr. Arar said this. What do you have to say about that? I think that would be fine.

And what Mr. Arar said obviously itself is not evidence, but $I$ think it's fair to put it to a witness in cross-examination what another person said.

MS EDWARDH: Especially when it's reasonable the witness may not be aware of it.

I will try to live within that framework. If I come to a line, I will raise the
issue again.
THE COMMISSIONER: Let me know.
I haven't heard from the government on this.

MS McISAAC: I agree, essentially, with your interpretation, sir.

The thing that concerned me about Little, of course, is what the Supreme Court is talking about in cases like that is innocence at stake. We are talking about a criminal trial, and in most cases it was the counsel for the accused who was limited in his or her cross-examination.

I think that the situation we are in here is distinguishable.

But $I$ have no difficulty with the idea of suggestions being put to a witness of alternate scenarios, or indeed, as you have said, if there is a public statement which has been made, putting that to the witness for their comment.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right. And then the only evidence is the witness' response. If the witness says $I$ disagree with the suggestion, then there's no evidentiary value other than the rejection by the witness.

MS McISAAC: Absolutely.
THE COMMISSIONER: I think that's useful and we can proceed on that basis and see if any problems develop.

With respect to the order of witnesses, let me just give a couple of thoughts, and then $I$ will hear from each of you.

It strikes me that the government counsel here in this inquiry, as in any inquiry, has a difficult role. I think that the government counsel -- and they have acknowledged this -- see it as part of their role to assist the inquiry to ensure that we get to the bottom of what has happened. So that they are present when witnesses are interviewed and produce documents and so on.

In that role, one would have thought that they should cross-examine after the Commission counsel so that they could assist with bringing out, if you will, the full story, to use lawyers' talk, as part of the examination-in-chief.

The Government counsel in this inquiry, and $I$ think it's true in other inquiries in which $I$ have been involved, also act for the institutions, and indeed some individuals who
could be subject to criticism in the report, and particularly in this case, the mandate directs me to look into the actions of Canadian officials. Government counsel are acting for institutions and officials who would fall within that part of my mandate.

In that sense, wearing that hat, Government counsel could be said to be responding to evidence that comes forward.

So that in the one hand,
Government counsel's role, it seems to me, is more akin to leading the evidence in chief.

On the other hand, this isn't a trial, I recognize. But on the other hand it's more akin to responding to evidence that's called. That would speak to cross-examining later rather than sooner. So that there is that dilemma.

In addition, Government counsel in this inquiry has taken the axe for all Government witnesses who aren't otherwise represented.

I must say, I see that as a narrow
role. Witnesses don't generally need counsel, absent some sort of allegation of impropriety, and in drafting the rules, we certainly didn't
envision, by saying counsel for witnesses would

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come last, that Government simply by saying "We act for all Government officials" would thereby move to the back end of the examination parade. That said, there's two ways of handling it, it strikes me: One is, for Government counsel to fulfil its role of ensuring that all of the evidence that needs to be called is called before Ms Edwardh cross-examines. Somehow that should -- we should have some assurance that should happen, and I'm not suggesting there was anything improper or intentional in what happened last Thursday, but we should avoid that situation happening again. That simply should not happen. So there should be no question
that Ms Edwardh cross-examines and then new information comes out that should have come out in front of the cross-examination. So that there's that issue.

It strikes me that if new
information comes out, after the cross-examination by Ms Edwardh, she should have an opportunity to respond to it.

So that I'm open to hear from you
as to how we address sort of that dilemma of the

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dual role, if you will, of Government counsel. There seems to me -- there's two ways of approaching it, and I'm not sure as a practical matter at the end of the day it will make any difference in terms of how $I$ receive the evidence. Go ahead. MR. BAXTER: If I might,

Mr. Commissioner. One of the problems with a witness like Mr. Pardy is that Mr. Cavalluzzo, in trying to get through as many documents as he had -- some 300 I think in two days -- and he's done a great job of covering the terrain, has by definition not been able to go deeply into many of the documents.

And therefore $I$ find myself, in
essence, at a crossroads: Do I go deeply into those documents now, in every one of them, or perhaps wait to see whether Ms Edwardh is planning to do so; therefore, not needing that?

I certainly would like to avoid a repeat of what happened on Thursday last as well. I agreed immediately that cross-examination should take place, and it didn't proceed at that time.
I can think of one area, for
example, that would -- that could risk such a
repeat, and $I$ would offer, for example, to do that first tomorrow with Mr. Pardy before Ms Edwardh started.

The rest of it $I$ think is true
re-exam and may be able to be eliminated.
But there are a number of
practical considerations also that $I$ think should enter into it and I don't think you want to get into a full argument of the motion, if there needs to be an argument.

I just call to your attention
there have been a number of new documents forwarded to counsel that haven't been put to this witness yet. How can I re-exam on those without knowing what my friend will do with them? THE COMMISSIONER: So there's new documents that have been entered as evidence now? MR. BAXTER: No, that have been provided to us and we've been given notice -THE COMMISSIONER: By Ms Edwardh. MR. BAXTER: A number of them, and I really don't know where they're going. THE COMMISSIONER: Right. Ms Edwardh?

MS EDWARDH: Mr. Commissioner,
it's my view that you are very correct to say that the government's role in acting for the witness is a much more minor and narrower role, and it was never intended by your rules to permit them, by consolidating their positions and represent all the witnesses at the inquiry, to then assert that the rule which governs representing an individual witness and allowing you to go last put them in that position.

I'm troubled because this inquiry, unlike many others, relies upon -- no, disclosure Mr. Arar has been an issue, I think it's fair to say. And usually in an inquiry those kinds of disclosure issues wouldn't be operative. And then the problems that $I$ sometimes face from time to time with redacted documents, or trying to understand what the history is, I wouldn't traditionally be faced with.

So given the history of the inquiry -- and $I$ know we have the documents from DFAIT, but there's a broader context that everything has gone on in, and $I$ am unfamiliar with it -- I think the emphasis should be on government acting to make sure the record is full. What that inevitably really requires is that the
government then go after Mr. Cavalluzzo and then I get an opportunity to cross-examine.

I realize as well that because we are in this awkward fit that there may be matters which I raise -- there aren't going to be very many of them -- that are new and unanticipated that may require some questions and clarification or response by government counsel.

It makes the proceedings a little more cumbersome, but if you look at overall what has happened so far it makes eminent sense to create a slightly different order to give the government this role to play and to have a proper cross-examination, but to recognize there may be exigencies when my friends are required to ask for permission or to automatically have the right to move to clarify.

THE COMMISSIONER: It seems to me whatever model I adopt, I raise the prospect of one or the other of you cross-examining twice. I don't say that in a critical way, and it may not be necessary.

But if you were to go first, I would surely say to you that you will have the opportunity to cross-examine on new matters that
are newly raised, which -- how would I put this? -- are of some significance, that have some bearing upon it.

So that if there was any
unfairness to Mr. Arar arising from the way the government's cross-examination took, you could then deal with those specific matters as, in effect, a type of re-examination. That would be one model.

MS EDWARDH: The other model --
THE COMMISSIONER: The other model
is to give them the opportunity, and I'm not encouraging, obviously, that we have two sets of cross-examination. But there may be circumstances that arise, and that's fine by me.

MS EDWARDH: I concede that would be a remedy, either model you choose. I don't think it is as good as the remedy of having the government go first so they can make sure the record in this inquiry is the fullsome one they want and then $I$ can cross-examine on that record. I think it's more coherent, given the interests at stake, to have the government counsel go first.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. I
think what $I{ }^{\prime} m$ going to do is direct actually that you go first, Ms Edwardh, but $I$ am going to make two conditions to that.

The first is $I$ am going to ask
that the government advise Commission counsel of any information which they are satisfied, having heard the examination-in-chief, additional information that they think should be brought out that would make the record complete.

And in that respect -- and I'm
sure government will take this as it is intended -- I would ask government to advise Commission counsel of document or viva voce evidence that would paint the full picture, whether that evidence is helpful to, as the government sees it, its position or not.

So the Government, I'm asking
then, assist Commission counsel, and it may be that with the benefit of that information Commission counsel will have some further examination. next, followed by the government.

And the second condition $I$ attach is that if there are matters that come up during

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the government's cross-examination that in my view warrant further cross-examination to avoid unfairness to Mr. Arar, then $I$ would permit further cross-examination.

And in the end, lest anybody be concerned about this, Commission counsel has the right to re-examine. And I would encourage both sets of counsel if at the end of the day they wish Commission counsel to ask any questions by way of re-examination, to feel free to approach Mr. Cavalluzzo, and I am sure you will find him in his usual, cooperative, non-grumpy mood. --- Laughter / Rires

THE COMMISSIONER: So we will
handle it that way with respect to Mr. Pardy. If any sort of serious problems arise with the procedure, you can always speak to me about future witnesses. But let's hope that we are on a course that makes sense for everyone.

Let me then turn to the motion that we are going to hear at 8:30 tomorrow and ask certain questions of counsel.

I guess, Mr. Waldman, you are the one that is involved from your side?

MR. WALDMAN: That's correct.

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THE COMMISSIONER: Do I understand correctly that what you seek to do is to enter questions and answers that were given in the House that are found in Hansard into evidence at this inquiry?

MR. WALDMAN: I have prepared a submission and I've given it to Mr. Cavalluzzo.

The relief we seek is twofold -there's two parts to it.

We acknowledge the privilege, but we submit that is doesn't preclude us from entering Hansard or minutes of committee meetings. That's the first point.

The second point is we also believe that it should allow us to ask clarifying questions that do not seek to impeach or challenge the evidence that was given in Hansard or in the minutes before the committee.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't obviously want to hear argument now.

MR. WALDMAN: Those are the two points and they are separate, obviously.

THE COMMISSIONER: The first is to simply enter it, which I understood had been the proposal the other day as part of the context or
the background, just to do nothing more than to say, "This question was asked, this answer was given. Full stop."

MR. WALDMAN: And my understanding was the solicitor for Parliament objected even to that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Objected to that and the basis of the objection -- we'll hear from them tomorrow -- was because, even if there weren't questions asked about it implicitly, there could be a challenge to the credibility or an effort to impeach.

But then you are asking then to go one step further and to be entitled to ask the witness, who either asked the question or gave the answer in the House, to clarify the question and answer.

MR. WALDMAN: Only to the extent
that the answer has some ambiguity in it that requires clarification.

THE COMMISSIONER: Absent ambiguity, then you would ask no questions.

MR. WALDMAN: Right.
THE COMMISSIONER: Don't let me put words in your mouth. I don't want to narrow
it too much or unfairly to you.
But is what you are saying is
there would then be no questions which either directly or indirectly would seek to challenge, impeach, or criticize the witness for what he or she may have said in the House?

MR. WALDMAN: Right, and indeed my understanding of the privilege is that we can't even suggest that it was misleading in any way.

THE COMMISSIONER: No. That would
fall within the criticism.
MR. WALDMAN: Exactly.
THE COMMISSIONER: Absent
questions needed to clarify an ambiguity, would I be correct that the proposal is that there would be no questions asked about what was said in the House; it would simply be a matter of entering into the record of this inquiry the question and answer that were said in the House?

MR. WALDMAN: Right. And that's the position I've taken in my submissions.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think then if you could communicate the discussion we just had -- it may be clear in your written material, I haven't seen it -- so that the lawyer who is
appearing for the Clerk tomorrow morning is aware of the proposal that you are making and the limits that you and $I$ have just discussed, on what would be entered into evidence.

MR. WALDMAN: I undertook to send her my submission, which $I$ will by e-mail today. But I already had a rather extensive discussion with her yesterday and $I$ think she is quite aware of the position.

THE COMMISSIONER: I appreciate that.

MR. WALDMAN: But $I$ will send it to her.

I haven't received her submission, so I'm not at all --

THE COMMISSIONER: That's the last thing I should mention. There are copies of two books of authorities. I don't know if there's a written submission with it, I didn't notice.

There is a copy for government counsel -- it's quite lengthy -- and there is a copy for you, Mr. Waldman, and there is one for Commission counsel. You can pick them up in the office out here on the way out tonight.

MR. WALDMAN: Thank you.

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And I apologize for my
submissions. They were done in a rush so they are not as finished as they might have been.

THE COMMISSIONER: No need to
apologize.
MR. WALDMAN: I wanted to give you
something because $I$ really understand the time constraints tomorrow.

THE COMMISSIONER: Who will be making submissions tomorrow on this issue?

MR. WALDMAN: Myself.
THE COMMISSIONER: You will be,
counsel for the Clerk will be. The Government?
MS McISAAC: We may, but I suspect
we will simply adopt what the Clerk has to say.
THE COMMISSIONER: What if you
disagree with them, Ms. McIsaac?
MS McISAAC: Well, I may have
to --
--- Laughter / Rires
THE COMMISSIONER: And Commission
counsel?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will be expressing certain observations.

THE COMMISSIONER: You are the
moving party, Mr. Waldman.
MR. WALDMAN: My view of it is
that it is the counsel for the --
THE COMMISSIONER: I was about to allocate times for argument. You probably would have been better off to hang in there as the moving party.
--- Laughter / Rires
MR. WALDMAN: I'm the moving party.

THE COMMISSIONER: What is the
sensible order? Is it the Clerk, probably --
MR. WALDMAN: I think the Clerk
should --
THE COMMISSIONER: They are
setting out. Well, they understand the facts. You could communicate this to the counsel for the Clerk, if you will, that they can argue first. I will give them half an hour to make their submissions. You can have 20 minutes to respond. And between Ms McIsaac and Mr. Cavalluzzo will be the remaining ten minutes.

So we will complete the argument of the motion in an hour, and I will probably reserve judgment.

What is the schedule for when this issue will first come up?

MR. WALDMAN: On Monday. Minister Graham is testifying on Monday, and there are Hansard questions. And he appeared before a Commons committee and he made statements.

THE COMMISSIONER: So your
proposal for Monday is to put in answers from the House and statements made before a parliamentary committee.

MR. WALDMAN: Right. In fact, they are already filed. I should point out that if you rule, we may have to purge some documents that are already in the record. They are filed in the motion record.

That's not an exhibit, I guess. And I was looking through the material and in here there are actually some minutes of some meetings already. So if you rule in favour of the government, we may have to remove some documents from the exhibits.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Well,
that's that.
We will rise now until 8:30
tomorrow morning.

MS EDWARDH: I'm sorry, Mr. Commissioner, could we have permission to arrive at 9:30? That would be satisfactory?

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, that's
fine.
MS EDWARDH: Thank you.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just before we rise, if counsel on the motion, on the parliamentary public motion, would meet at 8:15, perhaps we could have an attempt to discuss this and maybe avoid the motion.

So at 8:15, if we could meet in
this room here?
THE COMMISSIONER: Excellent idea.
THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5:37 p.m., to resume on Thursday, May 26, 2005, at 8:30 a.m. / L'audience est ajournée à 17 h 37, pour reprendre le jeudi 26 mai 2005 à 8 h 30 this roomere?

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