

Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar

## Audience publique

## Public Hearing

L'Honorable juge /
Commissaire
The Honourable Justice
Commissioner
Dennis R. O'Connor

Tenue à:
Salon Algonquin
Ancien hôtel de ville
111, Promenade Sussex
Ottawa (Ontario)
le lundi 30 mai 2005

## APPEARANCES / COMPARUTIONS

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Me Marc David

Mr. Ronald G. Atkey

Mr. Lorne Waldman
Ms Marlys Edwardh
Ms Breese Davies
Ms Brena Parnes

Ms Barbara A. Mclsaac, Q.C.
Mr. Colin Baxter
Mr. Simon Fothergill
Mr. Gregory S. Tzemenakis
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Mr. Darrell Kloeze
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Attorney General of Canada Ontario Provincial Police

Canadian Islamic Congress

National Council on Canada-Arab Relations

Canadian Labour Congress/Council of Canadians and the Polaris Institute

Minority Advocacy and Rights Council

The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association

## APPEARANCES / COMPARUTIONS

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| Mr. David Matas | International Campaign Against <br> Torture |
| Ms Barbara Olshansky | Centre for Constitutional Rights |
| Mr. Riad Saloojee | Canadian Council on <br> American-Islamic Relations |
| Mr. Khalid Baksh | Canadian Arab Federation |
| Ms Amina Sherazee | Muslim Canadian Congress |
| Ms Sylvie Roussel | Counsel for Maureen Girvan |
| Ms Catherine Beagan Flood | Counsel for the Parliamentary Clerk |

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Ottawa, Ontario / Ottawa (Ontario)
--- Upon commencing on Monday, May 30, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. / L'audience débute le lundi 30 mai 2005 à 10 h 00

THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning.
Mr. Cavalluzzo?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Good morning,
Mr. Commissioner.
At the outset, prior to having
Mr. Graham testify this morning, we want to deal with two housekeeping matters.

The first will be a ruling
relating to the motion concerning questions
relating to parliamentary privilege.
Second, there are a number of
documents that $I$ want to introduce initially, prior to Mr. Graham's appearance, resulting from the government's agreement to have those documents disclosed, and Ms McIsaac will have some comments relating to that as well.

RULING / DÉCISION
THE COMMISSIONER: With respect to
the ruling, as indicated $I$ gather by Commission
counsel, I am ruling that the statements made in Parliament in the minutes of the parliamentary committees not be admitted at this stage of the inquiry. I will release a ruling with my reasons at the lunch hour break today.

The second issue then,
Mr. Cavalluzzo.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Commissioner,
the second issue relates to documents that were the subject of a motion brought on behalf of Mr. Arar's counsel, wherein they sought to be released from their undertaking, in effect to have these documents disclosed to the public.

In several discussions during the weekend with my friend, Ms McIsaac, the government has agreed to disclose those documents. We will be introducing those documents as exhibits and questioning Mr. Graham and Mr. Pardy in particular about those documents.

Prior to introducing them as
exhibits, I would call upon Ms McIsaac, who has some comments.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Ms McIsaac?

MS McISAAC: Thank you, sir.

As you are aware, last year the Commission released documents to Mr. Arar's counsel team for which the government had not yet completed its review for national security. Both the Commission and the government have undertaken a review of what happened, and the release appears to have been the result of a miscommunication between the government and Commission staff.

Be that as it may, we have to
figure out how to move forward on this. Mr. Arar's counsel team received the documents pursuant to an undertaking not to release them to the public until the Commission had itself filed them publicly, and Mr. Arar's counsel team have now applied to you to be released from that undertaking and have brought a motion to that effect. And it's that motion that $I$ am responding to.

I also want to take this
opportunity to thank Ms Edwardh and her counsel team for the way they have dealt with this matter, and recognized the importance of the undertaking. THE COMMISSIONER: I would join in that, if $I$ can interrupt. I appreciate their
respecting the undertaking.
MS McISAAC: Right.
I want to make it clear that the government remains of the view that some of the information in question does raise national security concerns as contemplated by the Canada Evidence Act, and it would have been the government's preference that the information in these documents be dealt with during in-camera proceedings, not because we wanted to hide anything but because of these national security concerns.

After considerable consultation and review of the complex issues involved, I can advise you that the government will not be calling further evidence on this matter or making any further arguments with respect to the national security concerns.

In the circumstances of the inadvertent disclosure of these particular documents to Mr. Arar and his counsel, if you rule that this information should be made public now, the government will comply with that ruling. It's important for the public, however, to understand the government's position,
and $I$ would like to take just a moment, if $I$ may, to explain that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Please do.
MS McISAAC: First, your terms of
reference make it clear that you and your counsel have access to all of the relevant information, so the fact that this was redacted, as we have used this term, does not mean that your counsel team and you have not had access to it.

You have received thousands of pages of material and heard dozens of witnesses from several agencies and departments, and you have received these documents in their complete form and all of the information relating to them either has been, or would have been, explored in the in-camera sessions as we move back into those.

Second, there are some very
important principles at play here.
The first relates to the government's responsibilities regarding a criminal investigation.

As you know, as a matter of sound public policy, the police and the government do not generally confirm who is or is not the subject of a criminal investigation. There are a couple
of reasons for this.
First, to do so may compromise the
investigation. But it's also simply not fair to
the individuals who are involved. In our legal system information about the subjects of an investigation is usually only released once charges have been laid, or at least imminent in the sense that perhaps a warrant has been issued. It's one thing for the media and others to speculate or piece together parts of a puzzle; it's an entirely different matter for the government to publicly comment on who is under investigation.

There are also some important principles relating to the security of the state and international relations, which we have tried to apply in a rational manner to the evidence before you.

> It is CSIS which is primarily
charged with providing the government with timely intelligence relating to national security. National security is the security of Canadians, both at home and abroad, the security of our democratic institutions, and the security of our allies and international partners.

CSIS, and indeed other agencies such as the RCMP, must rely on the security and intelligence services and policing agencies of other countries to provide much of the intelligence which is vital to their role in fulfilling this most important mandate.

Terrorism, in particular, is a global threat and it's important that we recognize that it is not just our closest allies that can assist in providing timely intelligence. It is important that we not lose our respected international reputation in the policing and intelligence community or jeopardize our relationship with countries which may be able to assist in countering this global threat and other global issues.

Similarly, the Department of
Foreign Affairs also provides vital information to the government. This information is gathered through Canada's membership in the U.N. and other international organizations, through both formal and informal contacts by embassy personnel, and through the relationships that officials develop with their counterparts in other countries. Canada's ability to conduct
foreign relations, including the provision of consular assistance, depends greatly on our foreign officials having confidence that their private, confidential discussions with Canadian officials will be protected from public disclosure.

Canada is a respected member of the international community, and its police and security agencies are respected internationally. But as we all recognize, Canada is a middle power, and we are a net importer of intelligence and information.

It is against this background, sir, that the government has undertaken its review of information being provided to this Commission. These principles are ones which I expect most right-thinking people would agree with. It's the application of these principles to thousands of documents, and as Mr. Atkey has recognized this is not an easy task. It's a very difficult process for all involved, and as far as I am aware it is unique for a Canadian commission of inquiry.

So in closing, sir, $I$ want to
assure you that $I$ and my counsel team will continue to work with the Commission to ensure
that we achieve the necessary balance between the public interest in disclosure of information and the public interest in the protection of information which, if released, would be injurious to international relations, national defence, or national security.

And over the weekend and this morning, I have had some additional discussions, both with Mr. Cavalluzzo and with Ms Edwardh, and I am hoping that going forward we can work together to resolve any of these issues so that we can move ahead as quickly and as expeditiously as possible.

Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much, Ms McIsaac. That's very helpful, and I appreciate the thoughts and the comments that you have made on behalf of the government.

Ms Edwardh, do you have anything to add to this? This, I think, started with your motion.

MS EDWARDH: Mr. Commissioner, we are very pleased with the decision of the government. As I understand Ms McIsaac's proposition, it requires a ruling from you and
they would be content if this matter went into the public domain. Certainly from our perspective, the documents are important and will advance the public part of the inquiry, and $I$ would ask that such a ruling be granted.

THE COMMISSIONER: Just so that I am clear, does the ruling that is being sought apply to four documents only? That's as I understand it.

MS McISAAC: That's correct, sir. There were -- let me just count them.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cavalluzzo and Ms Edwardh?

MS McISAAC: Actually there are three documents for which the motion originally applied, but we identified a fourth document which would also be involved. So there are four documents.

THE COMMISSIONER: So that the ruling would be that Mr. Arar's counsel, and Mr. Arar, be released from their undertaking with respect to those four documents and that those documents now form part of the public record of this inquiry?

MS McISAAC: That's correct. As a
matter of logistics, I think Mr. Cavalluzzo will actually file them.

MS EDWARDH: Thank you very much,
Mr. Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: Then I so
direct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Perhaps now,
Commissioner, is the appropriate time to file these documents.

THE COMMISSIONER: Should they be marked as a single exhibit?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I think they should be separate exhibits because we are going to be dealing with each document separately.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Registrar,
what numbers would those be?
THE REGISTRAR: 102.
THE COMMISSIONER: 102?
There are four of them?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes.
The first document is an action
memorandum to the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated June 3rd, 2003.

THE COMMISSIONER: That would be P-102.

EXHIBIT NO. P-102: Action memorandum to Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 3 June 2003

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The second document is another action memorandum to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated June 5th, 2003.

THE COMMISSIONER: 103.
EXHIBIT NO. P-103: Action memorandum to Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 5 June 2003

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The third
document really contains two e-mails, both of which are dated November 19, 2002; the difference being the second e-mail, or the third page in, has some handwriting on it.

THE COMMISSIONER: Ms McIsaac, did you have a comment?

MS McISAAC: Mr. Commissioner, we just recounted. I think there are five documents. MR. CAVALLUZZO: There are five documents.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
The two e-mails will be 104 .

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EXHIBIT NO. P-104: Two e-mails, dated 19 November 2003

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I will explain,
Mr. Commissioner, how it went from three to five.
In any event, the next one is an
e-mail dated December 2, 2003, which captures a conversation between Secretary of State Colin Powell and Minister Graham.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's 105. EXHIBIT NO. P-105: E-mail dated 2 December 2003 re conversation between Secretary of State Colin Powell and Minister Graham

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And the fifth and
final document is a DFAIT chronology which is dated March 10th of 2004.

THE COMMISSIONER: 106. EXHIBIT NO. P-106: DFAIT chronology dated 10 March 2004

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The two additional documents which are not part of the motion would be the e-mail, the second-last e-mail

## StenoTran

concerning the conversation between Mr. Powell and Mr. Graham, and the June 5th memorandum, which is virtually identical to the June 3rd memorandum. So those two documents would be outside the subject of the motion.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Are we to take a break now?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I think it would be appropriate to take a break of a few minutes and then we will have our witness.

THE COMMISSIONER: We will rise for five minutes.

THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
Veuillez vous lever.
--- Upon recessing at 10:15 a.m. /
Suspension à 10 h 15
--- Upon resuming at 10:23 a.m. /
Reprise à 10 h 23
THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning,
Mr. Minister.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Good morning,
Minister.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Good morning, sir.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I don't know if the cameras were for me or for you.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: They don't give me this much attention in the House of Commons, so they must have been for you.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I have a couple of introductory things, Mr. Commissioner.

I would like to introduce a few more exhibits. First of all, there are the redacted personal notes of Minister William Graham.

THE COMMISSIONER: That will be 107.

EXHIBIT NO. P-107: Redacted personal notes of Minister William Graham

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Second, there is going to be another Book of Documents, which are the redacted PSEP relevant documents. That's the Public Security Emergency Preparedness Ministry book of documents.

THE COMMISSIONER: That will be 108.

EXHIBIT NO. P-108: Redacted PSEP book of documents

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MR. CAVALLUZZO: And finally there will be an addition to $P-85$. It will be Volume 5 of $\mathrm{P}-85$.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Finally, just one last exhibit before the examination of Minister Graham, and that is Mr. Graham's curriculum vitae.

THE COMMISSIONER: The CV will be 109.

EXHIBIT NO. P-109:
Curriculum Vitae of Minister William Graham

THE COMMISSIONER: Do you wish to be sworn or affirmed, Mr. Graham?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sworn is fine by me, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. If
you would rise and take the Bible in your right hand, I will administer the oath.

SWORN: WILLIAM C. GRAHAM
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. You may be seated. EXAMINATION

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Graham, you are presently in the cabinet of the Government of

Canada?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, I am. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And your position?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I am Minister
of National Defence.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: At the material
time in 2002-2003, you were the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just some
introductory comments, Mr. Minister, in respect of your education and professional background.

You graduated with Honours with a
Bachelor of Arts from the University of Toronto?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You also
graduated from the University of Toronto Law School with an LLB?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir. MR. CAVALLUZZO: You received a Doctorate of Laws from the University of Paris? HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: In respect of your employment history prior to your role as a
politician and member of the cabinet, prior to 1993 you were a professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, I was.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In that capacity
you taught international trade law, public international law and the law of the European Community?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Between 1986 and
1988, you were the director of the Centre of International Studies at the University of Toronto?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I was.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And prior to your
teaching career, you practised law in the City of Toronto?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In respect of
your political career, you were initially elected in 1993?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In which riding
was that?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: It was at that
point called -- still perhaps Rosedale; became Toronto Centre Rosedale, and now it's known as Toronto Centre. But subject to some minor boundary changes, it's basically been the same riding ever since then.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you have been re-elected on three other occasions since 1993?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And as far as our
concern in respect of Mr. Arar's situation, I
understand that between January of 1995 and
January of 2002, you served as the Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, up until my appointment to the cabinet, $I$ was chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And on January
15th of 2002, you were appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir. Much
to my astonishment, if $I$ may say.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Not to others.
In any event, you have many
publications and honours and so on, and I will
just advise the public that you have those and we will not review those today.

I would like to start a little prior to your appointment to the cabinet in January of 2002, but after 9/11, after September 11th of 2001. Obviously you were appointed four months after that fateful day.

I would ask you, first of all, in terms of the subsequent events in Canada after 9/11, what impact it had, if any, on Canadian-U.S. relations?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, it certainly had a dramatic impact on Canada-U.S. relations because you will recall that in the United States at the time there was a significant thought, fed a great deal by some of the newspapers in the United States, that in fact the perpetrators of $9 / 11$ had come from Canada. This is in fact what our present ambassador, Mr. McKenna has said has achieved the level of urban myth and is still said by people in the United States, and still believed by some people. But at that time, it clearly was of great concern to us. I also at that time served on the

Canada-United States Parliamentary Committee, and we met with our parliamentary counterparts. I discussed with my colleague, Ben Gilman, who was then head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. congress, all of those issues. Basically $I$ would say since 9/11, and even going on through when I became Foreign Minister, the role of Mr. Manley in particular dealing with Governor Ridge and the rest of us was making sure that we had an open border which would satisfy Canada's need for open trade with the United States, our economic dependency on the United States, some $\$ 2$ billion a day in trade, the way in which families and people, and individuals, and students, and others moved back and forth across the border. Over a million people a year. And keeping that border open was a big preoccupation at all levels.

At the same time you will recall
that within Canada itself we were looking at adjustments to our own Criminal Code to deal with the problem of terrorism which we had become conscious and recognizing as a potential threat to Canada and Canadians as well, and there was therefore the debates around that bill, the
necessary balance to keep between civil liberties and at the same time protecting citizens.

This was all going on at once, if
I can put it that way.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In terms of the Americans' heightened response to terrorism, would you venture to say that the threshold for terrorist activities in the United States was somewhat lower than in Canada?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well,
certainly -- yes. The United States, as you know, had the process where they would go to orange alert when they felt there was a possible incidence. I don't believe in Canada we ever went to that. I don't believe that Canadians saw themselves threatened in the same way that Americans saw themselves threatened. That's not to say Canadians weren't killed in terrorist incidents. They were in New York, they were in Bali, they were in Moscow.

Canadians were killed in terrorist incidents, but we did not have the same level, if you like, of heightened awareness in terms of what we were doing in Canada to protect ourselves against terrorism as they did in the United

States. That's not to say we were less protective, but our level of approach to it was different.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In terms of the American response, one of the things that we have seen, and this would have been after you became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that is that on September 11th of 2002 , one year after 9/11, the Americans introduced something called the NSEERS program, which targeted in particular five Middle Eastern countries in respect of people coming into the United States.

You were no doubt aware of that?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is, by the way, just for counsel, Exhibit $P-90$, which is the travel alerts that we reviewed with Mr. Pardy. In respect of the application of the NSEERS program, which as I said would have affected five countries in particular, did you experience any responsibilities relating to this in terms of your constituency responsibilities resulting from the impact of this American policy? HON. BILL GRAHAM: Prior to my becoming Foreign Minister?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Either before or after.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, I did. I had many constituents come to my office, particularly those of the Islamic faith, who pointed out that it was becoming very difficult for them to cross the border into the United States. It wasn't just those that were subject to the NSEERS.

And at the same time, while dealing with the anguish of people who were used to going back and forth across the border with the United States -- of course we were engaged with the United States itself, pointing out that these were Canadian citizens -- I can't remember the exact details, but my recollection was that at one point the United States took the position that if your passport showed you were born in a certain place, you were going to be singled out for special treatment as opposed to other people. We strongly objected to that; that all Canadians were Canadians.

There was a different approach to people that were of landed immigrant status, and that was also a problem for many people, and this
was clearly an issue for many of my constituents. I happen to represent a very multiethnic riding, and there were a lot of people affected by this and I discussed it regularly.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Through the evidence of Mr. Pardy, we understand that shortly after the implementation of the NSEERS program, the American government agreed to exempt Canadian citizens from the application of that program sometime in November of 2002?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I believe it would have been Mr. Manley would have negotiated that with Governor Ridge, but that was certainly the position of the government, and our position as well.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The other
contextual fact $I$ would like to discuss with you prior to coming to your role as Minister of Foreign Affairs is your knowledge, if any, of what we have been referring to either as rendition or extraordinary rendition that seems to have been practised by the Americans.

What this means, of course, is that it would involve the transfer of a citizen from one country to another country for the
purposes of interrogation and perhaps harsher treatment.

I would ask whether you were aware of this American policy in or about 2000 , prior to the time that Mr. Arar was detained?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: All $I$ can say is that once of course this terrible incident happened with Mr. Arar, there was no question we became focused on it and immediately aware of it. Whether $I$ might have read something in the newspapers prior to that -- I don't know how public it was or to what extent. But we certainly became more than aware of it afterwards.

Of course, since that time there has been a great deal of treatment of this issue in the American press itself, as well as in our own press. So I certainly became aware of it. I wouldn't have said it was something that $I$ was particularly focused on prior to Mr. Arar's having been sent to Syria.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I would
like to come then to your position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and, in particular, your relationship with the Consular Affairs Bureau, because we have heard a great deal of evidence
from officials within the Consular Affairs Bureau.
I am wondering what your relationship was with them in terms of reporting structures.

You obviously know who Mr. Gar
Pardy is.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: He was the
Director General of Consular Affairs.
I wonder if you might review with us the mechanics as to how you would be briefed in respect of consular issues, such as Mr. Arar's case?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. Well, consular issues in the department tended to be a rather separate department and focus of the department. Of course, I was responsible for the general conduct of Canada's foreign policy and so was constantly being briefed on all issues: the U.N., G-8, all of the other issues that we were engaged in at the time.

So I would have been briefed on consular issues and specific cases that were important, bearing in mind there are some 3,000 Canadians in jail in various places around the
world at any one time. So I would have been briefed on those which became important.

Clearly Mr. Arar, Mr. Sampson -there were other issues, other consular cases, which $I$ personally got engaged in, in which case $I$ would have been brought in to them both through the Deputy Minister or through people in my office who would have been speaking to the consular officials directly.

I understand Robert Fry will be giving evidence before the Commission. He personally was directly involved with Mr. Pardy, with other people, managing many of these consular issues on a day-to-day basis while $I$ was doing other things.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And what position did Mr. Fry hold in your office?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: He was senior policy advisor. He would have been very much considered the number 2 after Mr. Costello, who was my chief of staff.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So what you are saying is that most of the communications between your office and Mr. Pardy would be through Mr. Fry or another person employed in your office?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Possibly either
through -- if it was through the -- the departmental channels would have been Mr. Pardy would have reported to his Director General who would have reported to the Deputy Minister -- to the ADM, who would have reported to the Deputy Minister, and thereby would have come to me through that channel.

Or if there was a direct political
engagement, it would have been through largely either Mr. Costello or Mr. Fry.

I did meet Mr. Pardy on, I think, two occasions during the course of doing these issues, but largely $I$ would have discussed these matters with the Deputy Minister and with my political staff.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I understand you sit on something called the security cabinet meetings?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: What is that? I wonder if you could briefly tell us what its role is, what its duties are.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, since the recommendations of our national security policy
which came forward last year, and a restructuring of our cabinet, now there is a cabinet committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister Anne McLellan, as Solicitor General and responsible for security matters, and with myself, the Foreign Minister, and other Ministers on it. It is all public as to who sit on that committee. We consider issues of national security interests to the country. That is a new cabinet committee that was set up to try and deal with the issue of national security and arose out of that report. It was put into place by Prime Minister Martin.

In Prime Minister Chretien's time, the issues generally would have been discussed in terms of national security. There was no specific cabinet committee, but there was a sub-committee which would meet in order to determine whether or not entities would be listed on the United Nations' terrorist list pursuant to the United Nations' regulations, or whether they would be listed under the Criminal Code after it was amended to be terrorist lists under the appropriate provisions of the Criminal Code. That was a committee of cabinet
which was convened by Mr. Boudria, as the chair, and we met to discuss these issues.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: On this cabinet committee would you discuss any operational issues about CSIS or RCMP, or was it just more of a general kind of policy discussion and debate? HON. BILL GRAHAM: What we would do is we would be advised by the officials as to what were the characteristics of given persons, individuals, or entities, as to whether or not they should be listed as a terrorist entity. We would get recommendations from them, but we never discussed operational issues and never instituted operational issues. Those were very much for the police and CSIS to institute and manage without us particularly knowing the details of any of them. MR. CAVALLUZZO: In some of the recent texts, indeed in some of the evidence that we have heard, it seems different in the United States. We hear something of briefing up right up to the President of the United States wherein he may be engaged in discussions on operational matters, and it seems to be different in Canada.

I am wondering if you could
comment on that difference and why there is that
difference?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, the United States obviously operates in a very different constitutional framework than we do. It's not a parliamentary democracy; it's a congressional one, and one with a President. As Mr. Powell would say to me: I am not like you, Bill, I am not an elected Member of Parliament, and $I$ work for the President. I am the President's Secretary of State, not anybody else's. That is the way the whole U.S. system works, so ultimately everything goes to the President of the United States.

So the National Security Advisor
and others in the White House have quite a different role than, say, the Solicitor General in our system, or our system. We have to accommodate the nature of a parliamentary democracy which, given cabinet responsibilities, is fundamentally different than the nature of the U.S. cabinet. I often discussed it with Mr. Powell and he said, "We don't have cabinet meetings. I meet with the President, with Mr. Rumsfeld, with others, to discuss these issues and he calls us together when he calls us
together."
It is a totally different system. So apart from that, $I$ think we have to recognize that.

But there is no doubt about it -whether or not these matters would get on to the desk of Mr. Bush is one thing. But there is no doubt about it, everything of a national security nature, whether it was through Mr. Ashcroft or other members, Mr. Ridge or others, went directly to the National Security Advisor in the White House who was directly responsible for coordinating their cabinet responses to these issues.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. We will
come back to that theme a little later on.
I would like to move on now to the bulk of your evidence, which will be dealing with the situation of Mr. Arar.

I would ask the clerk to give you
Volume 1.
I wonder if we might start, Mr. Graham, with tab 65?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: All right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this is an
e-mail which is dated October 11th of 2002 , from Helen Harris, who is in the emergency desk of consular affairs, to Mr. Pardy, and it basically says:

> "I had a call ... is putting together the briefing package for a lunch Minister Graham is having with US Ambassador Cellucci on Tuesday, October $15 . "$

We are going to come to that luncheon you had with Mr. Cellucci, the American ambassador, but prior to that time I would ask you: Was this the first indication that you had respecting the situation of Mr. Arar?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: October the

## 15 th ?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: October 14th. HON. BILL GRAHAM: October 14 th. THE COMMISSIONER: It's actually October the 11th.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: October the 11th, sorry.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: October the 11th, which is -- do you know what day of the week
would that be? How close would that be to the weekend of --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, October 11th, if you look at the calendar here, it's a Friday.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Friday. And Mr. Arar disappeared on the weekend of the 6th -MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, he would have disappeared around the 7 th or 8 th.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Seventh or 8th.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, this
would then probably -- this might have been the first time that $I$ would personally -- at this point, obviously we were concerned about the whereabouts of Mr. Arar, and we know that he disappeared from the United States, so it would be logical for someone to say, "You are going to have lunch with Cellucci. You had better bring this up."

And I see there was somebody else there that would have been talked about too, but I don't know who that person was.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In terms of the public awareness of Mr. Arar's situation, if you
go to tab 80, you will see that there was a report in The New York Times, dated October 12th of 2002, and it talks about -- for example, in the third paragraph, it says:
"It is not clear what caused Mr. Arar's detention as he arrived in New York City on Sept. 26 on a flight from Tunisia and Zurich ..." And then you will see there are quotes from Muslim groups in Canada, two paragraphs below, and there is a quote there from Riad Saloojee which says:
"There is a significant risk that he will be tortured and punished in Syria."

And he said that Mr. Arar had not
fulfilled his obligation to perform military service in Syria when he left the country and could face legal repercussions there.

Certainly at that point in time
there seemed to be a public awareness that Mr. Arar had disappeared, as you stated, and at that point in time there seemed to be an indication that he might be headed off for Syria.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: That may be
October 12th. That was pure speculation as far as we were concerned in the department because I had a meeting later, the following week, with the Syrian ambassador, where I specifically asked him if he could help trace Mr. Arar.

So we didn't know even until certainly the following week where Mr. Arar was. But the two countries mentioned were Jordan and Syria.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And in
respect of your luncheon engagement with Mr. Cellucci, the American Ambassador, if you go now to tab 74, we see that there are certain -this is what Is called a CAMANT note, but you will see that there is attached a briefing note for talking points, the points you will raise with Mr. Cellucci.

And in particular on page 2, there are references to Mr. Arar and the statements are -- the talking points are:
"We are most concerned with the procedures that were used to remove Mr. Arar from the United States."

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And so on and so forth. Second:
"The information from the American authorities on Mr. Arar's whereabouts has been far less than timely or complete. We have been unable to locate Mr. Arar in either Syria or Jordan despite high level representations to those governments."

And so on and so forth. And then the third point is that in future cases there should be some kind of prior consultations.

These were the talking points that
you were given by your officials in respect of going in to see Mr. Cellucci.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And I am
wondering if you raised those points with Mr. Cellucci?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, I did. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you
registered a protest in terms of this man was carrying a Canadian passport, and so on and so
forth, and you felt he was dealt with unfairly by the Americans?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, and the background was by then $I$ would have been briefed by our officials as to what $I$ was told had occurred from our consular person in New York, to the effect that her understanding was that after calls from Mr. Arar's wife and her intervention with the authorities, that Mr. Arar had a lawyer, there had been a hearing planned. She had assumed the lawyer was going to go to that but for some reason the lawyer didn't. She came into her office at 9:00 in the morning and she finds that Mr. Arar has totally disappeared into the -- and nobody will tell her where he is or what happened to him.

And I made the point to
Mr. Cellucci that $I$ believed that was totally inappropriate.

His response was we were completely entitled to do what we did. There was evidence that Mr. Arar had contacts with people that we believe made him a danger to the United States of America, and the fact that he didn't have just Canadian citizenship gave us the right
to deport him elsewhere.
I believe, in fact $I$ have been informed the United States takes the position that they can deport people of any citizenship -- they don't necessarily have to deport them to their country of origin, which was a surprise to me. I would have assumed if they were Canadian, if deported somewhere would be deported to Canada.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you demand
that Mr. Cellucci report back to you as to the whereabouts of Mr. Arar --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I certainly
asked for his help to find out what had happened to Mr. Arar. I said, look, this is someone who is a Canadian who has gone missing and you know more about this than $I$ do, or your government does -recognizing, of course, that Mr. Cellucci, as well, the State Department are not responsible for these matters. It is, I believe, INS or it was Mr. Ashcroft's office.

So their ability to find out would be the same in our own bureaucracy. He wouldn't know immediately. He would have to go to somebody, who would ask somebody and go into it. But I certainly asked his help in
finding out what had happened. We had to first know what happened to Mr. Arar before we could know what to do about it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We can't go into detail concerning what Mr. Cellucci told you, but there is on the public record, if you go to tab 84, a briefing note to the Commissioner -- or actually it's a briefing note to you.

First of all, let's just go to the public statements that were made by Mr. Cellucci subsequent to that meeting, and I am referring now to tab 84. It is at the bottom of the page, the bottom bullet point, which is dated October $16 t h$ of 2002 .

The introductory sentence is:
"Further to our briefing note
to the Minister on Mr. Arar
for use in his meeting with
the American Ambassador on
October 15, we can report the following:"

And then the bottom paragraph
states:

> "This afternoon a Globe and Mail correspondent called the

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departmental press office and advised that he interviewed the American ambassador this afternoon..."

Of course, that's Mr. Cellucci.
"In summary, the American will be quoted as saying 'I think that the USINS authorities acted properly in deporting Mr. Arar to Syria. You should talk to your local people who may know the reasons.'"

And we can show you the newspaper article or the several newspaper articles.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall
that Mr. Cellucci was taking that public position at that particular point in time?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: And that would be inconsistent with the position he took with me in private as well. Basically, he took that position publicly a lot of times subsequent to this, too.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, I
would also like to go to another briefing note, and this is in Exhibit $P-84, ~ M-2$.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Is this 84 in
my book?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come back
to that. Keep that volume. We are just going to get you another volume.

And if you refer to --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Starting at page
53.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Fifty-three of
this document? The pages are numbered in kind of writing at the bottom?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: At the bottom, in writing, right.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Fifty-three.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is a
briefing note, once again to the Commissioner of the RCMP, dated October $18 t h$, and $I$ am just reading it to you for those that do not have it. It talks about the issue being Maher Arar's deportation from the U.S. to Syria, and then it goes on:

> "The Minister for the

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Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bill Graham, met with the U.S. ambassador to Canada, Mr. Paul Cellucci, to voice his concerns over the deportation of Maher Arar to Syria. Following the meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs voiced his concern to his staff that he was not aware of information that the Americans had regarding Arar and felt that he should be briefed in more detail on this matter."

And then it goes on:
"During a meeting hosted by DFAIT and attended by ... in the RCMP, a request was made for additional information regarding Arar, that is, what role did Canada play in Arar's deportation from the U.S. to Syria? What information had been provided

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to U.S. authorities regarding Arar? And what prompted the decision to deport Arar to Syria instead of allowing him into Canada?"

And it goes on.
Now, the question $I$ have for you
is: Does this ring true: that is, subsequent to this meeting, you felt that Mr. Cellucci had far more information than you did, and you felt that, as result of that, you wished to be further briefed on Mr. Arar's situation?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. Well, I certainly felt that Mr. Cellucci was making allegations that $I$ had no way of either analysing or being able to refute. I mean, he made allegations both in respect of Mr. Arar's conduct, which was justification in their terms, in terms of what they had done, and he also made allegations about the fact that Canadian authorities have been either complicit or implicit in the decision to send him abroad, both of which were matters of which $I$ had no independent way of verifying whatsoever and wanted to get to the bottom of it from our own people on those two key
points.
There were two dimensions to it, and $I$ wanted more information, as we see here. I am the Foreign Minister, and as you will see through the piece, I had to talk to Mr. Powell. I got the same thing back from the Americans all the time, and $I$ was getting one story from them, another story from our own people. We were constantly trying to work through to find out which was accurate and how we could verify both of those.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This briefing
note finally states at the bottom.
It says:
"DFAIT also advised that they
are pursuing an option to
request through the Solicitor
General a thorough briefing
to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs regarding Arar and
other individuals of interest
to DFAIT that may be subject
to investigations by the RCMP
and .... and of interest to
foreign agencies."

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And $I$ am asking whether in fact that objective was carried out: that at that point in time you asked for and received a thorough briefing from the Solicitor General who, of course, is responsible for the RCMP --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- and CSIS?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: No. My
recollection is no. My recollection is that we were informed that -- obviously we would be given every bit of information that the police considered it appropriate, but that it was their practice not to share operational details, even with the Solicitor General, for the purpose of making sure that there is no political interference in the operations of the police, and that therefore anything we would be given would not go beyond that.

So any information $I$ would get was very general and related to the basic facts being that, yes, Canada and the United States share information on files, whether national security, police, kidnappings, crime, or anything -- drugs, everything else, on a regular basis every day; and that, yes, information was shared back and forth
about Mr. Arar; and that, to their knowledge, nobody, however, in the police, RCMP or anywhere else in the Government of Canada had anything to do with the decision of the Americans to deport him, and in their view they were quite astonished that this had taken place.

But that was sort of the level of information which I got.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, in light of
the fact that you were dealing with such people as Secretary of State Powell -- and we will see a number of conversations and meetings that you held with him over the course of the year -- were you of the view that you were entitled to know more than you were being told on Mr. Arar's file?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, the real frustration $I$ had with, I guess, Secretary Powell and the Ambassador was that they consistently asserted that somebody in Canada had given them the go-ahead, if you like, to deport Mr. Arar, and Mr. Powell said that to me when he came in November to Ottawa. He said it to me when $I$ talked to him again about this matter in Prague. He said it to me as late as after Mr. Arar was back. He still had that position.

So my frustration was very much around that. Why couldn't we get to the bottom of absolutely whether anybody here had anything to do with it?

Now, there is obviously two organs which would have been engaged, and that was CSIS and the RCMP.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: But $I$ had the impression that our officials in Dan Livermore's shop, which would be this --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Security.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: -- this
security thing, were very much given limited information by their RCMP counterparts.

I wasn't asking to know the specific details myself, but $I$ felt that the security people in our department should be able to get all the information that the police or others had, and I did not believe that was taking place.

I therefore was concerned about the level of briefing that $I$ was getting. And of course when Mr. Powell looks you in the eye and says, "Bill, you don't know what's going on, and I
do because I've talked to the people that know," this obviously makes it difficult because you are sitting across the table from him saying, "Hey, that's not my advice." But you don't have quite the same confidence in terms of the level of information you are getting. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If we can come back to the green book in front of you, to your left, let's look at perhaps tab 90. We are still in the middle of

October.
This is just a media report which basically captures your meeting with Mr. -HON. BILL GRAHAM: I am sorry, which tab is that, sir?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is tab 90.
It is dated 16 October 2002 on the top, and the title of the article is: "Graham protests to U.S. over treatment of Canadian citizen deported to Syria. It is a Canadian Press report.

If we just read you a couple of paragraphs, it says in the third paragraph down:
"But Graham said he was informed by U.S. officials that Arar was deported to

Syria instead of Canada. He met with U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci on Tuesday to discuss the matter."

And you are quoted as saying:
"'I have registered our
protest to the United
States.'"
And it says you said this after a speech on global governance and civil society, which we will get back to.

It goes on:
"'Our position is a person
travelling on a Canadian
passport ... has a right to
be treated as a Canadian
citizen and we have, in
international law, a right to
have consular access to that person.'"

And then you go on at the bottom:
"Graham said Arar's case is one of many in which

Canadians who hold a second passport don't have their

Canadian passports recognized. He added that U.S. officials told him they felt they had every right to send Arar to Syria because he has citizenship there."

Finally, it says:
"But Arar's supporters in Canada have said he could face severe punishment in Syria because he avoided compulsory military service before leaving the country..."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come back
to the Syrian human rights record in a bit.
In fact, maybe at this point in
time you could go to tab 94 of the same book, where you will see that there is a letter from Amnesty International to the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the United States, with a copy going to you and Mr. Powell, on the second page, you will see.

In that letter, in the fourth
paragraph down, it states:
"Amnesty International is further concerned that deportation to Syria would place Maher Arar at risk of serious human rights abuses including torture and incommunicado detention. Expulsion in such circumstances, without being given an opportunity for a fair hearing, would be in violation of the US Government's obligations under international law and the principle of non-refoulement."

And I would just ask you: In the course of your responsibilities as Minister, would you have read a copy of this Amnesty International protest to the INS in the United States?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: It certainly would have come to the attention of Mr. Fry and others in my office, who would have been in touch with Amnesty and with other organizations
throughout this piece.
Whether I actually -- I don't have
any personal recollection of seeing this letter in the context of everything else going on at the time. I couldn't speak to whether I saw this letter or not.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I wonder just generally then at this point in time, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and with your extensive background in international law, whether in October of 2002 you were aware of the human rights record of Syria in respect of security forces; that there is a risk of security forces torturing detainees who are held incommunicado for a period of time to get information from them, that kind of thing, that Mr. Pardy discussed in his evidence?

Were you aware of the Syrian human rights record?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I certainly would have been generally aware of Syria's human rights record, and the regime and how it had repressed internal dissent of any kind. And I believe later on, when we came to the question of the consular access and actually dealing with

Mr. Arar, one of the concerns $I$ had was there was an allegation that he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and I certainly know they had been severely repressed in Syria.

So there was no question that I
knew Syria's human rights record was not in any way anything like our own. I wouldn't have known of specific acts of torture and things like that. I wouldn't be that familiar with it.

But $I$ certainly had no illusions that these people were going to conduct themselves the way we would expect a western democracy would do it, and $I$ made that point to the Syrian ambassador when $I$ talked to him in Halifax. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Would you have been aware at this particular point in time that in the previous year, for example, a Canadian detainee by the name of El Maati, in August of 2002, alleged publicly that he had been tortured while he was detained in Syria between November of 2001 and the early part of 2002? Were you aware of those allegations?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: It certainly was brought to my attention at some point during
the course of this, but whether it was at that immediate time -- I probably would not have known that at this immediate time. As we became more and more engaged in Mr. Arar's case, all of these other issues of the other detainees, people's evidence was there.

I certainly was also, as you know, engaged in the case around Mr. Sampson in Saudi Arabia. So we were becoming very sensitized to issues of these kind around these consular cases, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And a final
question in terms of context before we go on, and that is: Were you aware of the difficulties that your consular affairs division was having in respect of consular access regarding Mr. El Maati and another Canadian who were detained in Syria around this point in time?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, I didn't know about those two cases until in fact we got into trying to get consular access to Mr. Arar. MR. CAVALLUZZO: I would like to move on to October 17th. Between October 17th and October 19th, apparently you were attending at some conference in Halifax?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you were going to be making a speech at this international conference?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We have heard evidence from Alexa McDonough, Member of Parliament for Halifax, and $I$ just want to ask and give you the opportunity to comment on her evidence.

She stated and testified under oath that during the course of that conference that she spoke to you and specifically asked you about Mr. Arar's case and problems of locating him, and so on, and what happened to him in the United States, and she stated that you indicated to her words to the effect that Mr. Arar is a bad guy and she should be careful in terms of putting representations forward on his behalf.

So I am wondering if you recall
that conversation at that time.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, I don't specifically recall that particular conversation. I am sure I did have it with Alexa in Halifax, if she says so. That was the occasion when I raised
the matter with the Syrian Ambassador. At that particular point, we didn't know that Mr. Arar was in Syria at all.

All $I$ would have said -- I don't believe I would have said to Alexa that Mr. Arar was a bad guy, because $I$ know nothing about Mr. Arar. All $I$ can say to Alexa, as $I$ would have to any Member of Parliament, I would have repeated to her on other occasions that $I$ am getting information. The American ambassador has told me that they had justification to do what they did; that they had evidence that he had had contact with people. We are all concerned about terrorism, and $I$ think you want to know the background of that.

Now, if she wanted to take that as my saying that he was a bad guy -- I didn't make value judgments about Mr. Arar. We have to be careful about that. Our job is to make sure that people and Canadians get consular access and their rights are protected. We can't prejudge their own conduct.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: She also
testified that you made comments like that or similar to that throughout the piece, throughout
the period from October 2000 --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I reinforced, when $I$ spoke to any Member of Parliament who came to speak to me about this case, basically the information that $I$ had, that $I$ did not consider classified information, which was basically, frankly, nothing more than what the American ambassador was saying publicly: that they had every reason to do; they had evidence; that they were making this allegation, and that there were allegations against Mr. Arar.

Therefore, any Member of Parliament or any of us dealing with the case had to function in the light of those allegations and understand them. I think that was appropriate, to warn any Member of Parliament of the context in which they were dealing.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. She also
said that at times you expressed frustration as to the amount of information you were getting from CSIS and the RCMP relating to Mr. Arar.

Do you recall discussions like that with --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, they would have been similar to the conversation you
and I just had about that. Alexa is a parliamentary colleague and I tend to be frank with my parliamentary colleagues, and I probably could have said the same to Marlene Catterall and Sarkis Assadourian and anybody else who wanted to discuss the case with me, that there was a real problem here about the role of the Foreign Minister trying to help people in these circumstances and the ability to get the information and know exactly what you are up against, if $I$ can put it that way. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If you go to tab 108, this is a letter from Mr. Pardy of your ministry to Monia Mazigh, dated October 19, 2002 .

The reference in the second paragraph $I$ want to ask you about. It states:
"The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham, raised the matter with the Syrian Ambassador to Canada on October 18 and asked for the cooperation of the Syrian authorities in locating

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Mr. Arar."
I understand that the Syrian
ambassador's name is Mr. Arnous?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And he was
attending at Halifax as well?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, he was
there. This was a diplomatic forum. There would have been ambassadors from all over the world.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall at
that point in time, on or about October 18th, raising the issue of Mr. Arar with Mr. Arnous in an attempt to get Syrian authorities' assistance in locating him?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. At that point $I$ was saying, "Rumours are that Mr. Arar has been sent to Syria. We can't trace him. Can you help and find out from your authorities whether or not he's actually in Syria; and if so, can we get access, consular access to him, so we can know what's going on?"

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And what was Mr. Arnous' response? Was he of any assistance to you?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, he was
supportive. He said he would try to find out what he could from his government. But obviously he knew nothing about the case at that point himself. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. So that at this point in time you still don't know where Mr. Arar is. There is some idea that he's in Syria --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: But that had not certainly been ratified. HON. BILL GRAHAM: Or possibly Jordan. That was the other country that was spoke of.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If we move on then to tab 111, this is another e-mail. This is dated October $20 t h$ of 2002 from Mr. Pardy to Myra Pastyr-Lupul, who is an assistant in his department, as well as several others.

It states in the second paragraph, and $I$ am reading it:
"The lines have been updated
to reflect the response from
the Syrians that Mr. Arar is
not with them. As well, I
have updated some of the

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earlier lines to reflect additional information. I have included the facts that the Minister and the Prime Minister will be meeting Powell and Bush later this week in Mexico and that the matter will be raised if we do not have a response by then. If there are any comments or changes they must be with Ms Pastyr-Lupul by 10:00am."

Do you have a recollection of a meeting sometime in late October between yourself and the Prime Minister and President Bush and Secretary of State Powell?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, my
only -- if it was in Mexico and the Prime Minister and $I$ were there together, it would have been a meeting of APEC, probably in Los Cabos, and that would have to be the site of that meeting.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And do you recall in Los Cabos, raising with Mr. Powell any protest or objection in respect of Mr. Arar?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I may have. am sure this was top of mind at the time and I would have, but there was a lot of other things. That meeting was around APEC and around a lot of other issues, as you can imagine. And at that type of meeting -- the way these meetings work, sometimes you have what are called a bilateral with your counterpart.

I mean, at the APEC meeting there would have been some 20, or whatever there is, government leaders, plus 20 foreign ministers. You are sitting in a big room and you are talking to one another. So any opportunity you get to raise anything is if you can get your officials to go over to his officials and say, Mr. Powell, I want to get a pull-aside with you and I want to discuss with you.

I definitely remember I did that
in Prague. Whether or not at this point we were still trying to find out more matters, I certainly had raised it with the ambassador, I probably would have raised it with Powell. A lot would have depended at that meeting as to the opportunity. These meetings go over time. There are a lot of other people there, and when you ask
to see the Secretary of State, you don't necessarily get a meeting. You may just have to tug his sleeve as you are going into dinner and say, "Hey, what's going on here?"

That's the way it also worked. MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come back to the two later meetings that year with Mr. Powell.

If we can move on then to tab 120, which is a scrum, or a series of public interviews you gave on or about October the 21st, I have a couple of questions relating to this.

First of all, on the very first
page, about halfway down, it stays "Question" and then it says:
"(Inaudible) actually had
been deported?"
And then it goes on.
"Was the consular staff aware that he was going --"

Presumably, to finish that, going
to be deported? And your answer was:
"No, the consular staff had access to him but were not aware that he was going to be

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deported."
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: First of all, does that reflect a fair description of what your answer was to that question?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Oh, I am sure it does. That's probably what $I$ would have said at that time, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. The question $I$ have is that, during the period while Mr. Arar was detained in the United States, the evidence that we have before us was that on at least two occasions your officials would have been advised of a threat that Mr. Arar said that the Americans had given him, that they were going to deport him to Syria.

I am just wondering at this point in time would your officials have advised you of these threats that Mr . Arar had related to them?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No. At this point, no, I don't believe so. I wouldn't have got that level of detail.

What $I$ was informed, when I inquired as to what on earth happened in New York, was that basically the consular officials who were
responsible for getting consular access to Canadians and doing everything else they do in New York as part of their daily routine, contacted Mr. Arar. I think $I$ was informed that they had two opportunities of meeting with him personally, certainly one; that they had had discussions with various officials, I don't know who, about how he was being handled; that there had been a conversation, $I$ believe with his wife, who was concerned; that the consular official in a question had understood that he had retained a lawyer and that there was going to be an immigration hearing, at which he would be represented by the lawyer and therefore it was not appropriate for her to be there.

Therefore, on the Monday morning, or whatever day it was, she got something on her voicemail when she came back to the office saying that Mr. Arar has been deported and is no longer -- or he is no longer in our custody or whatever it was.

At that point, obviously, she was completely shocked. And I understand now from going over all of the events there is all sorts of things about whether the lawyer was retained or
was not retained. All of that, of course, I wouldn't have known at the time.

I really was basically informed, look, we did our job in New York to try to make sure we were in contact, and we understood that there was legal representation; that the U.S. system would function with the lawyer there, that it wasn't -- you know, that was what we did.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The other
question $I$ have relating to Mr . Arar's detention in the United States is whether you were apprised or advised by your officials that during the course of his detention in early October of 2002, that a person from the INS advised your consular officials of the seriousness of the case and that they should raise this matter with the ambassador in Washington who would raise it with officials in Washington, D.C.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, I only know that as historical hindsight. It wouldn't have been contemporary information I had.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I wonder
if we might move on then to Volume 2.
I would ask you to turn,
Mr. Graham, to tab 129.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Which is what we have been referring to as questions and answers, or Q\&A's, that evolve over time and are given to you to deal with any questions that may arise regarding Mr. Arar.

Then if you go into page 7 within the tab -- the pagination is at the bottom of the page.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: There's a bunch of different numbers here. Is this the page that is in rather small print?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, 7 of 19.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Okay.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is the background assessment or evaluation advice to the Minister, and it is dated October 23rd "For Minister's Eyes Only".

Is this the kind of document that you would have read, or would somebody in your office have read it and briefed you?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: For Minister's eyes only obviously doesn't mean exclusively me. It is the political staff in the office.

This I would assume is what is
accompanied quite often, prepared answers for questions in the House of Commons in case something is brought up, and sometimes those answers have a backgrounder attached to them.

But it would be rare $I$ think for it to say "Minister's eyes only" on it because it is background information to answers.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, let's look at it.

In the first paragraph on the third line, it states -- this is obviously the Syrians have now said that Mr. Arar is in Syria. You may recall they said he appeared the day before at the Jordanian border and that he was now in their custody.

There was a consular visit with your official, Mr. Martel, on October $23 r d$.

And then if we pick up in the third line of the first paragraph, it says: "Mr. Arar appeared to be healthy. We learned that he had been detained in the US for two weeks before being transferred by private jet to Jordan. It was not clear

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from the conversation exactly how long Mr. Arar had been in Syria, given that the Syrian officers intercepted the questions."

The evidence that we have in the consular report of Mr . Martel is that Mr. Arar, in that very first meeting, advised him that he had only been in Jordan for a few hours, or a number of hours, which would have indicated that he would
have been in Syria at least from October -- say October the 9th, thereabouts, to the $23 r d, a$ period, as you can see from the calendar, of approximately two weeks.

Would you not have been advised of
that at that point in time; that Arar was saying that he had only been in Syria in transit for a period of hours and certainly not days? HON. BILL GRAHAM: I can't answer
that. I mean, I have no recollection. My only recollection is that we knew that he had been in Jordan before he went to Syria, and there was some confusion around how long he had been in Jordan. Clearly this information is saying that we were told that in fact from this visit
with Mr. Arar that he had only been in Jordan for a few hours, and so this clearly is something we would have known in the office at that time.

But we wouldn't have known this before we received this memo.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I think it's
significant because $I$ want to ask you the next question. If that is the case, that Mr. Arar had only been in Jordan for a number of hours and had been in Syria for approximately two weeks before the Syrians disclosed his whereabouts, then that would be consistent with the public record, and that is that there was a tendency of the security forces in Syria to hold somebody incommunicado for a period of time, whereby they get the information they want, or some information, and then they will disclose his whereabouts.

And in respect of that public record, we heard evidence last week from Mr. Gar Pardy, who suspected that there was a reasonable suspicion that that in fact had occurred in the case of Mr. Arar.

I am wondering whether that knowledge or suspicion, or whatever one wants to call it, that Mr. Pardy had at that point in time,
was shared with you as the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No. Someone might have said to me, "Look, Mr. Arar was in Syria a lot longer than we thought." I honestly can't recall at this time whether that was or was not.

At that particular point, the focus of our attention was on getting consular access to Mr. Arar. I mean, that was my focus, was (a) to ascertain where he was, not to worry about all the details of how long he had been there, but rather finally we know exactly where he is; and (b) that we got consular access.

Our experience has been in these cases of other cases of people with dual citizenship, our rights under the Vienna Convention, as you know, are extremely limited. We don't have the same rights if they were exclusively a Canadian citizen.

In other cases we had been familiar with, the country in case took -- and Syria did say in this case, well, he's a Syrian citizen. You know, that comes through the thing. But at least in this case they are
willing to recognize his Canadian nationality in the sense they gave us consular access. That was not true of some other people.

We were particularly pleased at
this point, (a) that we had identified where he was and (b) that we had consular access. We felt that was a great step in the right direction.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, in terms of what was going on at this point in time, we see shortly thereafter that in fact in the very first consular report -- or the meeting with Mr. Pillarella, that the Syrians said, "He has already admitted to having terrorist connections", which, if he had only been there for less than 24 hours, was a very quick interrogation and result therefor.

So this was part of the equation that Mr. Pardy considered in terms of making that determination; that likely the human rights record of Syria bore itself out in Mr. Arar's case.

But coming back to Mr. Pardy's knowledge or suspicion at that point in time, is that something that he should have shared with the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was going to be fighting on behalf of Mr. Arar in gaining his
release?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, I have a lot of respect for Gar Pardy, so he might well have passed it up the chain. As I say, it may have been brought to my attention, it may not. I don't have any specific recollection, because at this time $I$ see the whole continuum of what took place over the case of Mr. Arar.

My recollection at this time is we were particularly anxious to make sure that we had consular access, and that we did have consular access and the information in fact came back saying that while Mr. Arar clearly was in detention in a place where he was not being treated the way we would treat people that he had not been tortured.

That was the information $I$ had all through the piece. That was consistently given to me by my officials and so that was what I would have focused on.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And just a final question perhaps before the break.

If you were advised very firmly early on, like in October of 2002 , that Mr. Arar was the subject of torture within the first two
weeks of his detention in Syria, would that have changed at all as to how you would have dealt with the Syrians and Americans in terms of getting his release?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, it certainly would have -- it certainly would have raised alarm bells and pushed the urgency element of what we were trying to do. There is no question about that.

Whether it would have changed the results we got into something different -Mr. Arar was in the custody of Syria. I had to deal with the Syrian authorities. We had to get our consular officials to get in touch. Then I had to see the ambassador. Then I tried to get through to the Foreign Minister.

I mean, I really feel very strongly that that knowledge certainly would have, you know, energized us, but $I$ don't think it would have fundamentally changed our ability to change the picture, because we didn't have control over Mr. Arar. And even the Americans didn't at this point when $I$ raised it with Mr. Cellucci and others. "Well, he's now in Syria. Go and talk to the Syrians."

And when you talk to the Syrians,
they say, "We've got him. He has confessed to terrorist activities, and we are going to put him on trial", or whatever they are going to do.

So our object as the consular
officials was to, first, find out how he was, get consular access, which is limited in international law to access only, as you know; ascertain his wellbeing; and then move forward from there, as we did, trying to see we could do, what measures we could bring to bring him home as quickly as possible.

So we would have certainly had an increased sense of urgency, if we had known that, but I am not sure that we could have moved the Syrians any faster or have done anything differently than we did do to ensure his wellbeing.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Commissioner, we are about to come to a meeting with Mr. Powell, and it may be an appropriate time to have the morning break.

MR. COMMISSIONER: All right. We will take the morning break for 15 minutes.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Thank you, sir.

THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
Veuillez vous lever.
--- Upon recessing at 11:31 a.m. /
Suspension à 11 h 31
--- Upon resuming at 11:48 a.m. /
Reprise à 11 h 48
THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cavalluzzo?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you,
Commissioner.
Mr. Graham, prior to coming to
this meeting with Mr. Powell in the middle of November, a couple of questions relating to the evidence you gave earlier this morning.

And that is first dealing when
Mr. Arar is New York. Now, you have told us that you weren't aware that there were a couple of threats concerning his possible deportation to Syria, and you weren't aware of the statement of the INS official that you should ratchet this up, bring it to the ambassador, and so on and so forth. You weren't aware of that.

But I would ask you: If you were aware of those two specific factors and taking
into account by this point in time that the Americans were alleging that Mr. Arar was a member or associated with al-Qaeda and the lower threshold that the Americans had concerning terrorism or terrorist activities than Canadians, would you have ordered your consular officials to have acted differently if you were furnished with that information?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, certainly -- I guess if $I$ had been furnished only with that information. But $I$ think $I$ have to go back.

I mean, we asked our consular officials to act responsibly and correctly in the circumstances. We don't divine to -- we don't demand, or we cannot require perfection. So with hindsight, yes. But I think if I had raised that with that particular consular official, I think the answer I would have got back would be the answers I got, which was: Look, there is a lawyer involved in this. The lawyers will deal with this. It's the United States where the lawyers go and do what do. We are consular officials, and we have done the right thing here.
So in hindsight, with the
knowledge you now have, and particularly the knowledge we know of everything else that has transpired since that time, would we have immediately contacted the embassy? Of course. With hindsight, yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, the second question relates to arming you with sufficient information to deal with people like Secretary of State Powell, who we will come to in respect of that meeting, and that is that if you take a situation like this -- and I am talking now in terms of a policy judgment call. If you take a situation like we have with Mr. Arar, he is in custody at this point in time. We know that he is in custody in Syria, which does not have a stellar human rights record. And you are about to come and meet with Secretary of State Powell, one of the matters being Mr. Arar that you were going to discuss.

Do you not agree with me that in that situation, in that situation, you are a Minister of the Crown, that information from the RCMP or CSIS, operational information about what they know about Mr. Arar, could have been given to you in confidence so that you could sit down with

Mr. Powell on a level playing field, so to speak, in respect of making a plea on behalf of Mr. Arar? Would you agree with that? HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, as I said earlier, my frustration about the information was at two levels: One was at the level of trying to find out whether somebody in Canada was involved in this decision, which is different really from the question you are asking me now, which is really, how much -- in other words, should the RCMP have come to me and said, "Look, here's what we found. Here's what the computer was. This is the information especially that was shared with the United States of America. Here is what they had, here is what we had", et cetera.

That would require my personal engagement in operational details in a way that I think, as a Minister of the Crown, I think we would have to be very careful of. I would have to think about that a lot.

I would have been more comfortable with a higher level of information, but $I$ am not sure whether it would have been appropriate to drill down to the level you are going. I think the level you are going is something even the

Solicitor General normally would not get, and he is the person responsible, or at least was responsible before we had the new system, for managing these cases. Would I have preferred more information? Yes. And of course here, in this circumstance, what would that have changed? In fact, it would have been probably information suggesting that what information the Americans had about Mr. Arar's contacts were accurate.

I was at that point interested in telling Mr. Powell we wanted to get Mr. Arar back. We wanted to find out why the United States had done this.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I understand the concerns and the concept of the independence of the police, but once again it would seem to me -and I am putting it to you. It would seem to me that if a rookie RCMP officer who happened to be working on the file had access to that information, it would seem to me that surely in these circumstances, where we have a Canadian who is detained in a country with a very poor human rights record, that a Minister of the Crown can
also be given that information in confidence so that you can fulfil your cabinet responsibilities? It just seems counter --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, obviously
this is something that you and the Commissioner are going to have to decide, I mean, about the nature from the public policy concerns around here and what lessons are to be learned from this event.

But $I$ just have to tell you, given the parameters under which we operated under at that time, we were very limited in having operational details, and there are strong public policy reasons for that and they were respected in this case.

Whether or not a case of a similar nature in the future will be handled differently will be for this Commission to decide.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then, Minister, if you go back to Volume 2, and if we can pick up at tab 199, we are coming to a meeting with Secretary of State Powell.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry. 199?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct.
There is a lot of black --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: It looks like my conversation with Mr. Powell was one big black hole.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's right.
--- Laughter / Rires
HON. BILL GRAHAM: What happened to Mr. Powell? Oh, we are all down a black hole, are we?

I can assure you we had more to
talk about.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It looks like the
meeting lasted about 30 seconds.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, exactly.
Then we went to lunch. Diplomacy.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Anyway, let's
pick it up at page 2. We see that the date of this briefing note for you -- that is "Briefing Note for MINA" -- is dated Wednesday, November 13th, and the subject matter of course is the meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, which is to take place Thursday, November 14 th.

And under the Summary we can read
two lines there. It says:

> "You will want to register with the Secretary Canada's
serious concerns about the U.S. handling of ... and Maher Arar."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So there may have been another subject matter that you would have discussed?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, that would have been another consular case in that context, because there were obviously dozens of other issues.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Then if we go to page 3 of 6 , a couple of pages in, there is some portions there relating to Mr. Arar.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And the statement
there, or the talking point, is:
"We remain troubled by the
decision of the American
authorities to deport
Mr. Arar to Syria. While we
recognize that we have to
work together on these files,
such deportations without
full consultation undermine

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public support for the anti-terrorism campaign."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then you go on to

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the future:
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"We would hope if such cases occur in the future that there would be appropriate consultations with Canada before such decisions are taken."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I want to bring
your attention back to that meeting with Mr. Powell, and if you could just describe what protests, what objections, or what comments you made to Mr. Powell concerning Mr. Arar?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, this
would have summarized it. I think to give you some context, this was the first time Mr. Powell had come to Canada on an official visit. He had been here at the G-8 in Whistler before.

It was just around the time of the decision of the United Nations to send the inspectors back into Iraq. So the top-of-mind

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issue with Mr. Powell would have been security issues, particularly Iraq, but other things, the International Criminal Court, a whole host of issues around the sort of international climate in which we were operating; maybe North Korea nuclear as well.

And then we had the U.S.-Canada bilateral issues, of which NSEERS would have been one, softwood lumber, other issues -- the open border, which was a preoccupation with us.

And within that context, I raised three consular cases with him, of which Mr. Arar was the most prominent and the most troubling at that time.

And as $I$ say, as we said here in the memo, $I$ think this was good advice from the officials as a way in which to put it to Mr. Powell, to say, "Look, Mr. Powell, we all have an interest in security. We believe very strongly in security. But security will only come if our own citizens believe that it is being handled in a way where the right balance is being, and we don't believe the balance was maintained here."

That was a good way to put it to the Secretary of State, and I would have done
that.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall -HON. BILL GRAHAM: And as you see here, I said let's have a consultation mechanism. As we know, as the piece goes on, that did not occur until a lot later.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come to that. That happens about a year or so later. Do you recall what Mr. Powell's response was to your pleas about the appropriate balance and so on?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well,
Mr. Powell's response was substantially that which
Mr. Cellucci's response was to me, which was also public because Mr. Cellucci said it. "We had evidence about Mr. Arar's contacts and we were justified in doing what we were doing. He was a national security threat to the United States of America, which we were entitled to ascertain ourselves in our own sovereign right You don't tell us who are our security threats. We make up that decision. We had a right to deport him the way we did and we acted within our own rights." And, by the way, as Mr. Cellucci said, "By the way, your guys knew what we were
doing all along," which is something Mr. Powell consistently said to me until the very end when he said, "I was mistaken." But for over a year he maintained, or for the better part of eight months he personally maintained very strongly that this was a matter which Canadian authorities were aware of.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you ask him
to do anything, to check his facts --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I said to him, look -- whether it was at this meeting, or the subsequent meeting in Prague where we discussed this, because again we were getting the answer back, "Look, nobody was." The Americans were saying, "Yes, yes, we can assure you there was."

So we are trying to ascertain, are
we getting the full information from our own system or not? And so how do you do that?

I said to him, "Okay, if somebody
by a wink or a nod or explicit said something, tell us who it is, and we can go to that person and say what did you do?"

That's just a natural way to do it. Mr. Powell and I had a pretty good relationship. I said, "Listen, if you've got a
name, give us the name. We can track it down and we will find out who it is. But $I$ have to tell you we are going through the system at the moment and everybody is saying nobody did."

So we had two totally inconsistent
stories. One of the ways we could have unscrambled it was to have got an actual name. And we consistently had that conversation, as I said, up until November, when finally he came back and said, "We don't have a name and it didn't occur." But at that time we were trying to get to the bottom of it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you go now to tab 202, there is a recollection of what occurred at this meeting.

This is an e-mail from Jonathan Solomon, who was in your security and intelligence department. It is dated November 15, 2002.

The body of the e-mail says:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "As indicated during our } \\
& \text { phone conversation at lunch } \\
& \text { time, US side indicated to } \\
& \text { Canadian side yesterday, } \\
& \text { during Powell-Graham meeting, } \\
& \text { that 'US government' had }
\end{aligned}
$$

indicated to 'Canadian government' reasons/rationale behind Arar's deportation to Syria. It does not look, however, that reason/rationale was given by State to DFAIT, but rather from one US law-enforcement agency to their Canadian counterpart."

And is that consistent with your understanding from your discussion with Mr. Powell, that the Canadian law enforcement, or the RCMP --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, it seems to suggest that there were more details given. But, I mean, Mr. Powell was consistent with what Mr. Cellucci had told me earlier about phone numbers and a telephone -- you know, the things, the reasons they had. They had reasons to do what they did.

Mr. Powell's story was substantially not the same. So Mr. Powell would have told me that -- whether or not the security officials, when talking to one another, were more
explicit as to the details of what and everything, which is quite likely. We would have kept it at a level of a conversation between Mr. Powell and myself, about, "Look, we are protesting that you did this," and his protest back is, "We were entitled to do what we did."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Would it be fair
to say at this point, in the meeting on the 14 th between Powell and yourself, Powell would have likely had all the information from his security and police agencies whereas you had gaps, obviously, because of what we talked about earlier?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I honestly don't know what information Mr. Powell had from his security.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: We do know of
circumstances where security briefings were less-than-perfect on both sides of the border. MR. CAVALLUZZO: On both sides of the border?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: And you will recall Mr. Powell's appearance at the United Nations --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Which occurred on February the 5 th of 2003 , which we will not -HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- get into today.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: So security --
I don't know. I will say, without revealing anything particularly about the United States, that Mr. Powell and I on occasion shared some frustration together with the level of information both of us had in terms of the fact that security in the two countries is run by totally different agencies than the diplomacy people, and sometimes things that affect our diplomacy, or what we are going to do with a foreign country are done in the name of security without us necessarily either being pre-informed or even after-informed.

This is the nature of the silo nature of government and often of these particular operations, which tend to be particularly protected from a lot of people knowing what is going on.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will be coming back to that theme subsequently.

I wonder, Mr. Clerk, if you could
give Mr. Graham Volume 3?
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Perhaps we could start at tab 241.

If you would refer to page 2, once again we are in the middle of November.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Really the
reference would be the media lines, that is two-thirds of the way down, November 18th, 2002. HON. BILL GRAHAM: The Ottawa Citizen.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, the Issue. And it says:
"The November 18 Ottawa Citizen carries a story claiming that Foreign Affairs officials were 'embarrassed to learn' from Secretary of State Colin Powell that RCMP officials had received information linking Maher Arar to Al Qaeda."

And then it goes on:
"The report also states that

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Mr. Arar's wife is returning to Canada today after vacationing in Tunisia. Arar is currently being held in Syria after he was detained at New York's Kennedy airport."

And then if you go on to the next page, $I$ won't take you through it, but there is a CFRA-AM interview of the reporter concerning the issue here as framed that: "Foreign Affairs were embarrassed to learn from Powell that RCMP official had received information linking Arar to al-Qaeda."

Do you remember at this point in
time that at least in the public it appeared that DFAIT was operating on the basis that it didn't have all of the information that the RCMP had?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, clearly.
Yeah, for sure.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And do you also
recall around this point in time that certain opposition, and I won't name them, but certain opposition politicians were saying to you that this guy, Arar, is a bad guy and Canadians had
missed the boat on him, and it took the Americans to get Mr. Arar, so to speak?

Do you recall discussions along those lines from the opposition politicians at that time?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, I can certainly recall them because $I$ was in the House of Commons and the subject matter -- I was accused by the Leader of the Opposition as going to bat for a known terrorist, a terrorist. And I was absolutely attacked by other members of the opposition for the same thing at the same time.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So that you were obviously in a situation where you didn't necessarily have all of the information. You have opposition politicians that are alleging that Mr. Arar is not such a good guy, and on the other hand you have other people that are saying you are not doing enough to get Mr. Arar back.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is normally, presumably, part of the job of a Minister of Foreign Affairs?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. And I
think you do have to make a significant
distinction in these cases between people's legal rights, and particularly in these murky areas where you are not being told everything, we did have a consistent line, which was that Mr. Arar had consular rights. Regardless of what the allegations were -- and we will go through that as we go on.

I mean, whatever the allegations were, he had rights. And one of them was our consular right to see him, try and give him as much as we could possibly do in Syria when he was there, and do what we could to get him released.

If in fact Mr. Arar is guilty of
an offence of some kind, then there is a
prosecution -- there is a process to deal with that. Our job is to protect Canadian citizens within the full framework of the law, recognizing the limits on that in international law and in international practice, particularly when you are operating in countries that don't operate to the same standards we do.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. In terms of your basic relationships with the Syrians, we can see that we are now at November the 18th. If we look at an e-mail at 241 , at the very first
page, we see the beginning of your strategy, if we can call it that, in respect of the Syrians.

For example, the e-mail itself
says:
"Minister Graham has decided over the weekend to call by telephone his Syrian counterpart..."

That would have been the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir. MR. CAVALLUZZO: "...on Tuesday morning... Can you arrange for this call to take place?" HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry, is that 241 again?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, 241 , the very first page, the e-mail at the top there. HON. BILL GRAHAM: The problem with these e-mails is they always go backwards. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. HON. BILL GRAHAM: The most recent one is at the top and the earlier ones are at the bottom, and you are always totally confused reading them.

Yes. Sorry about that.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And if you
go now to tab 215, we see on the same date,
November 18th, there is a briefing note that is prepared for you concerning a possible telephone call to Mr. Shara'a, the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In effect what
this does, it just sets out the talking points that you would raise with Mr. Shara'a?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I understand that
this particular telephone conversation with the Foreign Minister of Syria did not take place at this particular point in time?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, I don't
think I got through to him until early the next year, actually.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's right, on
January the $18 t h$, and we will come to that.
Do you recall why that particular phone call did not take place at that time?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I don't
specifically. It could have been the result of
two things. It could have been the result of his schedule. At one point, when we tried to get him, it was said that he was out of the country and we couldn't get at him. Whether it was this time or at a later time -- it is difficult often, given the travel schedules of two foreign ministers, to sometimes make these hook-ups.
And it may well also -- my
recollection is that we decided we should speak to the Syrian ambassador directly, and it may have been on the basis of advice from the department, that let's work on the ambassador first and then work up to the foreign minister, because if we can get -- we always do this. If we can get satisfaction at one level -- as you move up the chain, your options are getting limited more and more, and once you have shot that bolt of that phone conversation -- so we may have felt there was more underbrush to clear away before we actually made the specific call, but I can't recall that.

I just know, as you suggested,
that we weren't able to make it at that time. But clearly from the memo here, this is the position that we were taking and we wanted to try and get
him returned to Canada.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We have evidence now that CSIS went to visit the Syrians, although they didn't see Mr. Arar. But CSIS went to visit the Syrians around this time, around November the 21st-22nd of 2002 .

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall
whether the fact of the CSIS visit would have impacted on the timing of your phone call to the Foreign Minister?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, I don't. I have reviewed the documents where it is suggested that we put off the call to accommodate the CSIS visit. That is not in accordance with my recollection of the events. I don't think $I$ knew anything about the CSIS visit until after it took place, and well after that.

Certainly it says the Minister's office, or the Minister said this. But my recollection strongly is $I$ didn't know anything about the CSIS visit until early in the following year.

I probably knew about it before I had the second call with him -- before I actually
got through. But $I$ wouldn't have known it at this time, I don't believe.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Once again on a question of policy, here we have the Minister of Foreign Affairs that is trying to get a Canadian released from Syria, and we have a security intelligence agency having a visit to the Syrians, apparently now without the knowledge of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Is that information something which you should have known in light of your responsibilities as the main communicator with foreign nations?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: It would depend on what was the nature of the CSIS visit. Normally the Director General of CSIS would speak to the Deputy Minister, and they would decide what information should be conveyed.

Again, I am only going on my review of these documents, because $I$ knew nothing of this at the time. But my recollection of the document is that in fact the CSIS visit was not specifically about Mr. Arar. They didn't see Mr. Arar. They were going to talk about CSIS matters with the authorities in Syria, in which
case there would be no particular reason for me to be advised in this context.

MS McISAAC: Mr. Commissioner, if
I could just remind the Minister and
Mr. Cavalluzzo that while we are acknowledging the CSIS visit, the fact that CSIS did not meet with Mr. Arar, we are not in a position to provide public evidence about any details regarding what was discussed, who it was discussed with, or the objectives of the visit itself.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I would like to
respond to that, Mr. Commissioner.
Of course, we have heard extensive
evidence about that already, and certainly when Mr. Graham is recalled in camera $I$ will be questioning Mr. Graham about that visit. HON. BILL GRAHAM: For sure. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you. Mr. Graham, if you go now to tab 218, this is once again an e-mail dated November 19th from Jonathan Solomon, who is within your ISI, or security and intelligence division.

In the first paragraph it talks about your meeting with Secretary of State Powell, et cetera, and then in the lines between the two
redactions it says -- and this is you:
"He also questioned an assessment of Arar's possible involvement in terrorist activities. Any further information beyond your report of November 3 would be extremely useful in this respect."

Do you recall asking for a further assessment relating to Mr. Arar's possible activities in respect of terrorist activities? HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, I don't recall this specifically, but $I$ certainly would recall. As I said, going back to our earlier conversations, $I$ was anxious to be armed with as much information as $I$ could so that if the Americans were making allegations, or somebody else, I could say, well that's not in accordance with our information, or it is, or something.

I am sure I would have pressed for that, but $I$ don't specifically remember this date or that memo. But it's consistent with what we were trying to do to get more information at the time.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, this is also around the time, late November, where you had mentioned earlier that there was a meeting at Prague in late November of 2002?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And did you see Mr. Powell at this meeting in Prague?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I did, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you discuss Mr. Arar's situation with Mr. Powell in Prague?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. Again, like I described the Los Cabos situation, this is a heads of government and ourselves. I was there with Mr. Chretien, with NATO, so there would have been 26 countries there. Mr. Powell is obviously there with Mr. Bush and others.

I just went around the room and said, "Look, I want to speak to you for a couple of minutes around the troubling issues around Mr. Arar. We spoke about this when you were in Ottawa. My information still is that nobody in Canada had any participation in the decision that Mr. Arar be taken to Syria, and would you please continue looking into this." And he said, "Bill, my story is exactly the same. You are not getting
the straight goods from your guys. I am telling you my information is there were people involved in this decision in Canada."

So that was basically that. We obviously talked about other things as well.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: What $I$ am getting
at -- and if $I$ put it humbly, if $I$ was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I am meeting the American Secretary of State and he says to me, "Bill, you are not getting the goods from your guys," I would go and see my guys and scream like hell.

> Did you do that? I assume you did.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, of course. Do you see the frustration? We are saying "what the hell?" But as it turns out -- and you know and $I$ know now, in the benefit the hindsight -- in fact it was Mr. Powell that was wrong, and our guys were telling us the truth; that in fact there was nobody in Canada.

But that didn't stop Mr. Cellucci
and Mr. Powell saying it to me on every occasion until November of that year.

So, in fact, my frustration was
certainly right. But in terms of the information, you know, who was involved -- which I was trying to get from him. I mean, if he had given me a name, we could have quickly tracked it down and said to the person, "Look, did you or didn't you?" We could have found out. But we never got a name, we never got a lead into Canada of anybody that we could go to. That was the frustrating aspect of it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let us go now to
your diary, and to the entry for December 4th. This is Exhibit P-107. HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry, December

4 th ?
first page. It says "Cellucci reception". HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And:
"Arar - Syria - Sarkis /
Diane St. Jacques"
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We do find out subsequently that Sarkis Assadourian does become a parliamentary envoy to Mr. Arar in April of 2003. I assume that is the reference to that.

Is that correct?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, this
actually -- I looked at my actual note as usual when you cut things out. The context of this is this is a note that $I$ would have made in caucus on my schedule, which I get every day. So on that schedule I make follow-up notes for myself, or I may make notes about who said what to who, or something like that. I keep fairly extensive notes; sometimes they are rather cryptic.

This, in fact, if you look at the total document you would find it says "To follow up". So this would have been an advice to me to speak to Dan Costello about the Cellucci reception -- I don't know what that reference is -- and to follow up with Sarkis on the Arar and Syria thing, because, as you say, Sarkis, being of Syrian origin and a good friend of mine, thought maybe he could be helpful in this respect. And he certainly offered his good offices.

I don't know what the reference to Diane St. Jacques is. I don't think it has anything to do with this case.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The next entry is for December 11th of 2002 .

We see it says:
"Follow up Arar: Irwin C."
I assume that is Irwin Cotler?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Again, this is
caucus days so it would have been follow-up after caucus.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And Sarkis, is
that right?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: "Mrs. A". I
assume that's -- is that Mrs. A?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Mrs. Arar.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mrs. Arar?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It says possible meeting with her. You were thinking about one at that point in time?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, because I believe there was a request that we should get together, and would a meeting have been productive or helpful and what would we do about it?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then it says "Alexa". Presumably that's one of the discussions you --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Alexa McDonough
as well, to go and speak to her, or whatever. These would have been people -- Irwin Cotler was at that time $I$ think engaged by the family, or had something to do with the case, so I would have spoken to him about it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sarkis. These would all have been follow-up notes to myself or to my staff.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then in terms of
time, if we move to December 18th, going back to Volume 3 at tab 261.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry, 261?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: 261, correct.
These are the steps in terms of
your dealings with the Syrians. This is a memo that is dated December 18th. In the memorandum to you, it is recommended that you call in the Syrian ambassador, Mr. Arnous, to discuss the case of Arar, and to pass over the attached talking points.

And then in the next paragraph it talks about the difficulties in arranging that telephone call with the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then it sets
out some talking points.
It also makes reference in the
next page, in paragraph 9, that:
"Several Canadian parliamentarians have expressed a desire to intervene on Mr. Arar's behalf."

And then there was a suggestion of
a possible visit to Syria.
Do you recall calling in the
Syrian ambassador to express more protests?
Actually, if you go to 262 , we see a minute, or minutes, of that meeting.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
Exactly. Yes, certainly. Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: For those who
don't have it, $I$ will read certain aspects of
this. This is the meeting that you had with Mr. Arnous on or about December 19th.

If we go to the third paragraph,
it says:
"The Minister noted that

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Syria was still conducting its inquiries into the case. He then explained that he had been discussing the case with Mr. Arar's wife just this morning as well as with several Canadian parliamentarians and that there is an interest in the case in Canada.

Minister Graham stated that in the international war against terrorist it is necessary to respect human rights. He then said he was making a representation to the Syrian government to return Arar at the earliest time or if Syria suspects that he is guilty, if they would charge him so that he could defend himself against the accusations. He noted that he should not be held in limbo for a long time not
knowing what he is accused of doing."

And then you go on to say that:
"... Canada would prepared to provide the Syrian authorities the appropriate assistance to get his release.

Ambassador Arnous said that this was a complex case ..."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Maybe if we just complete this, we see at the bottom where it says that you:
"... discussed the case with Mrs. Arar who asked how long her husband may be detained. The Minister replied that we did not know and ..."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I think that must have been a telephone conversation because I don't believe $I$ met personally with Mrs. Arar at that point.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
"... did not know and did not

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have any control over the length of the process. She also expressed concern about her husband being in limbo and not having any charges against him that he could defend himself against. She asked what the government was doing. The Minister stated that the Canadian Embassy in Damascus was in frequent contact with Mr. Arar, that the Department was working hard on the case and that he would call the Syrian Foreign Minister to discuss the situation."

Now, there were two questions I have relating to this, Mr. Graham.

The first relates to the statement
that you are making here that you are impressing upon the Syrians the interest that Mr. Arar's case has achieved in Canada.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I just want to

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know your views, as an experienced diplomat, as to the strategies that may be pursued in Canada when a Canadian is being detained in a country like Syria with a human rights record that is not nearly as good as Canada's.

Is there a general rule that we should be doing everything we possibly can to make the issue of Mr . Arar, or whoever the citizen is, as public as possible so that we apply pressure on the Syrians, or whatever the government is, to release Mr. Arar?

I am wondering if you have any views that you can share with us on that important issue.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, clearly this is a matter very much of judgment and very much a matter of individual cases as to how we can be most effective in trying to secure the release of the person or their proper treatment. Many people are in jail in foreign countries that have committed an offence in that place, and we are just trying to make sure that they are properly looked after.

So individual cases will require a very different approach.

Where the public pressure on someone like myself -- and I met with Mr. Neve, I met with other people. I have total respect for NGOs saying, "Look, we want you guys to do your job, we want you to be more active," and things like that.

That is then where I -- and you will see this. This is a regular refrain through here when $I$ speak to the Foreign Minister, when $I$ met with him eventually personally in New York, my position is -- and $I$ have done this not just in this case but with other countries, Ukraine, Iran, others -- to say, "Look, you, I assume, want to have good relations with Canada. There's an interest in good relations both because there are people of Syrian descent here, there is business, everything else. You want good relations. The Canadian public is not going to be satisfied with conduct which is totally inconsistent with what our belief is in human rights standards and what we should be doing."

This gives me a strength and $I$ can say this case is raising huge concerns. I raised this with Amir Moussa when I met with later on in the year. I said, "Amir," -- who I happen to
know. I said, "The Arab world's credibility is being called into account by cases like Mr. Arar, Mr. Sampson, and other cases in your region where the conduct of governments is regarded by Canadians as being offensive."

So editorials in The Globe and Mail, or in any newspaper, or any conduct of pushing by NGOs or by the family, yes, very helpful in making that argument.

Is there a point sometime where that can become counterproductive? That's the big issue.

And later on you will see we come to my meeting with Mr. Shara'a in New York, and he is accompanied by an intelligence officer, and he says to me, "Bill I'm working with you on good relations," and the intelligence officer says, "You'll never see Mr. Arar. We are not going to let him out because of all the fuss that is being made in Canada. Why the heck would we let him go home and cause more trouble for us?"

So how do you make that balance?
It's a very, very delicate balance in any case, and we have to do that on a regular basis.

In the end, $I$ think that public
scrutiny -- I mean, we live in a society where public scrutiny and public conduct is what we live in. I have to answer questions in the House of Commons. I have to answer questions in scrums. We live in that nature of a democracy.

So these matters will be publicly discussed. And in the end, we have to manage them. But we do have to recognize that sometimes there can be other consequences to that.

My view is in the long run they are helpful because it enables us to say, look, we want to have relations with your country, but those relations are being interfered with by these activities. And it's not just Syria. There is a whole host of countries where that same argument applies.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come back to that conversation you had with that security individual. That is the one that took place on September 25th, 2003?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, it was whenever $I$ was in New York for the United Nations meeting.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come back to that.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The other
question that $I$ would raise, and perhaps we could get your views on this, and that is in your discussions with the Syrian ambassador when you called him in on December the 19th, you talk about human rights and so on and you say that you want Mr. Arar's release at this earliest possible time. Then you also say, don't leave him in limbo, and if you have anything on him, you should charge him as quickly as possible so that he can be tried.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: What I would say to you as a Canadian is: Why on earth would you ever, ever recommend to the Syrians that they charge Mr. Arar and have a trial in light of the fact that the public record is clear that Syria's judicial process is corrupt, not independent -HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- and so on and so forth.

Why would you even make that suggestion to Syria?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, it's a
fallback position. The first position we took
strongly was we want Mr. Arar back. We want him in Canada. My position was if he is guilty of some offence in Canada that relates to terrorism or anything else, we are perfectly capable to prosecute him in this country in accordance with our laws; that that prosecution will take place and he will have a chance to defend himself.

But as you can see from the
conversation that $I$ had with his wife, she too was saying, you know, don't leave him in limbo. Give him a chance to defend himself against charges. So everybody was saying, look, you
know, at least if you are not going to release him -- I have no way to force them to release him. I am asking, but $I$ can't -- there is no lever I have to force the release.

We are saying, "Look, as an alternative, you've got to give this person an opportunity to defend themselves in a fair and open process, so that he can say, look, maybe there is something on my cell phone, but what do I know about that person? I could have talked to anybody."

You might have something on my
cell phone that is something to do with somebody
who is undesirable, but that doesn't mean that $I$ have had some conduct myself. You have to have a chance to deal with that.

So I don't think it was -- it
certainly was not the preferred option, but it was not an unreasonable suggestion in the circumstances to say to the Syrian authorities, look, as usual, either prosecute or release. But we would prefer -- we want you to release him. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And do you feel that if they were to prosecute him that there were certain checks and balances that could be encouraged by Canadian authorities so that it would be a fairer process than normal? HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, this is
not -- this is very complicated. In this particular case it was complicated by virtue of the fact at one point, $I$ forget exactly when, there was some suggestion that he would be tried by a military tribunal, at which point I said, "Look, that's not satisfactory. Any trial has got to be something that is in open court where somebody can understand and see."

And they moved off that and said
there would be a civilian trial, if there was a
trial in Syria.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: So that was certainly better than the suggestion of a military court.

But we have had other cases of other countries where our presence in the court to watch and everything has not necessarily given us the level of comfort we would like to have.

You can think of Iran and other countries where we have sought to do this, and we have had some success but it's tended to be limited and particularly in countries where they have a judicial system that is entirely different from our own.

So this was not the preferred option but it was an option, that if they were not going to release him, that was preferable to him sitting in limbo in a jail cell for the next 20 years, never knowing what he was being charged with or having any opportunity to defend himself.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let us move on to the phone call you had with the Syrian Foreign Minister in January.

If you go initially to tab 271, we
see an e-mail to Mr. Pardy dated January 3rd from Dr. Mazigh.

If you go to about ten lines up, it just captures the phone call. It says: "On December 20th, I got Mr. Bill Graham on the phone with Mrs. Marlene Cateralle my deputy..."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: "... Mr. Graham assured me that people at the very high level of the government are working in order to have this situation clarified. He promised me to call the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and let him know about his concern."

And so on and so forth.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You are now in direct contact with Dr. Mazigh, although by telephone?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. And I think other people in my office too were in
contact. I think Robert Fry would be able to testify to other contacts with her.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And if you
go to tab 288, we see the briefing note for this important phone call with the Syrian Foreign Minister.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And in
particular, what $I$ would like to do is focus on page 2 at the bottom bullet point in terms of the Maher Arar case, and what it states -- and I am quoting now.

It says:
"I understand from recent
reports that the Syrian
authorities may have the
impression that Canada has no
wish to see Mr. Arar return
to Canada. I would like to
make it very clear that the
Canadian government would
like Mr. Arar to be returned
to Canada."
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you have any

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information about this impression that the Syrians have that Canada doesn't want Mr. Arar returned to Canada?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, clearly
this would be based on information from my officials they are giving me to raise this with the Syrian Foreign Minister. So this clearly was a significant concern on our part.

I believe I discussed it with Ms Mazigh, actually, in a subsequent meeting that we had, that there was a definite feeling that while the foreign department was saying, look, we want Mr. Arar released, there were other people saying that's not really the Government of Canada's position; that the Foreign Minister will always say nice things but the real truth is somewhere else.

That was definitely a rumour that was there.

I have no idea where it started or ultimately how it came about, but it clearly was a rumour. There were suggestions of this nature, and it was our belief we had to knock it on the head very strongly and say, "This is not true. The Government of Canada consistently wants to get
him back."
And that is why in all conversations with Mr. Chretien and others subsequently, we strongly took the position we wanted to get him back. And there was no kind of other agenda.

Now, this got murkier because when Sarkis got back, he said maybe it is the Americans that are saying this. And there is a whole host of theories out there that people shared with me in the course of events.

But this is something -- my
position was consistent. We want him back. There is no hidden agenda of the Government of Canada that is inconsistent with that message.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I have a couple of questions.

One is: Did you get that impression from Ambassador Arnous when you met with him on December $19 t h$; that Canada was not necessarily speaking with the one voice?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, I don't think $I$ would have got it from him, sir, no. I would have got it from our own officials.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Your own
officials?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And your own
officials presumably got that from Syrian authorities?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: They might have, yes. I can only assume that was so, and it might have been Mr. Arnous amongst them, and others, and maybe conversations in Damascus as well.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And as you said, this is a very serious situation. In other words, if your responsibility is to get Mr. Arar released as soon as possible and the party with whom you are dealing, that is the Syrians, are of the view that someone is saying we don't want him back, then that's a very serious situation.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, it makes it impossible, really, because -- yes, exactly. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And did you express your concerns to Syrian Foreign Minister Shara'a and tell him in no --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- unambiguous
terms that this is the position of Canada?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Absolutely. MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is the position of Canada. We want Mr. Arar home. HON. BILL GRAHAM: I consistently made that case when I spoke to him, or any of the Syrian officials right up to when I had the actual face-to-face meeting with him in New York. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.

If you go to the third page of this briefing note, in the final paragraph it says:
"The Ambassador reports..." This would be Mr. Pillarella, the Canadian ambassador in Syria.
"... reports that the Syrians believe Arar has been involved with the Muslim Brotherhood and is part of a terrorist cell. The

Ambassador expects that Mr. Arar is destined to remain in Syria for a long time and that he will be prosecuted."

Then it goes on:

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"The Syrian Vice Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Pillarella that according to their information, Arar does not wish to return to Canada (this contradicts the information contained in Arar's letters ..."

And so on.
Did you ever hear that one, that Mr. Arar does not want to return to Canada?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: This is the first time recently that's been brought to my attention. We certainly would have -- we would have discussed that, $I$ guess, in the office, but nobody gave any credence to that suggestion.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I don't think
that was taken seriously by anybody -- at least not on our side. Maybe the Syrian side.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
Okay, then if we can move on to 293, tab 293, which is an e-mail dated January 17.

And this summarizes the phone call between you and Mr. Shara'a, and it talks about,
in the second paragraph there, under the redaction:
"Mr. Graham raised the case of Maher Arar, noting it has attracted media and

Parliamentary attention in Canada and that the manner of his deportation from the USA had upset many Canadians." And thereby you're advising of the political situation in Canada.

And it goes on in the next
paragraph:
"Mr. Graham noted that the Syrians were carrying out an investigation and that he was not commenting on Arar's legal situation. He thought that if charges were brought, then Arar could defend himself. Mr. Shara'a assured Minister Graham that if their investigation shows Arar was associated with Al-Qaida, he will have a fair trial."

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And then it goes on:
"Mr. Graham noted that there had been a suggestion that Canada did not want Arar returned. He emphasized that he wanted to make it clear that the preferred option of the Canadian government was that Arar be returned to Canada."

And then it goes on, finally: "Mr. Shara'a ended this part of the conversation by noting that they would remain in contact with the Canadian Ambassador and that 'Your concern is as much as our concern, we respect his Canadian citizenship. He's a dual national, and you respect he is Syrian.'"

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I think
that's -- I think -- I can't say -- this is obviously a note-taker's interpretation of what was said. I don't think $I$ would have said it that
way.
I think I said, "He's a dual
national. As far as we're concerned, he's
Canadian. As far as you're concerned, he's
Syrian." But, you know, I don't say, "You respect he is Syrian."

I would have said, you know, "I understand the position: we're taking the position he's Canadian; you're taking the position he's Syrian. But we want him back."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay, then. If
we could move on then to tab 456. It's
unfortunately in another volume. It's out of order. It's in volume 5.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: 456?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Correct.
And this is, $I$ guess, a press
scrum after Question Period on January 29.
And at page 3 of 4, you're asked a question about Mr. Arar, and once again, you capture your conversation with Mr. Shara'a. You say:
"Well, I personally spoke to the foreign minister of Syria about this case just before

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Christmas..."
Now, that obviously should be just
after Christmas, presumably.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO:
". . and made clear our point.
Our preference would be to have Mr. Arar return to Canada. My point is that Mr. Arar, while technically a Syrian citizen, left Syria at the age of 13 and was carrying a Canadian passport. But the Syrian government's position is that he is a Syrian citizen, that he is properly in their jurisdiction, that they believe and are conducting an investigation which they believe will lead to charges against him and I got assurance from the Syrian foreign minister that they will either lay charges,
which Mr. Arar can defend himself against, or he'll be returned to Canada."

And then you say:
"I can't of course get an undertaking from them as to how long the investigation will take."

And so on and so forth.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, in February,
if we go back to volume 3 ?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry. Which
number?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Volume 3 again,
and tab 307.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: 307?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes. And in
terms of the public situation, if we go to the second page of the Q\&A's, we will see -- we see that at that time there's a suggested possible question that you might get, and the question:
"Is there confusion among agencies of the Government of Canada with respect to the

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information on the activities of Mr. Arar?"

And the proposed answer there is: "There is close cooperation and coordination among all Canadian agencies on such matters."

You would agree with me that
certainly, at least publicly, there seems to be a suggestion that there is confusion, or certainly not unison or consensus, among Canadian agencies as to the situation of Mr. Arar?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you would agree with me that certainly your position is that, in retrospect and in hindsight, there should have been more cooperation and coordination amongst the Canadian agencies. Is that correct?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, I think more coordination, particularly in these matters, would always be helpful, and that's from lessons we learn from everything we do.

There's no doubt about it, the whole purpose of trying to deal with these very difficult issues of the -- in something like
asymmetric threats of the nature we're talking about, is coordination.

And knowledge and information is the single most important asset we have in dealing with them. We often make that point.

I guess there's a difference between how high up you go in terms of that coordination and how public you make any of that information. That's a different discussion, which would be different in different circumstances, and where you take that coordination.

I mean, I hope our authorities are coordinated with one another very closely on this issue. My understanding, as the Defence Minister today, is that, yes, they are coordinated, and we have very good working relationships between our agencies to ensure the security of Canadians.

So that is not a -- that is not for -- that is a totally acceptable proposition. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let us look at a recommendation that was made to the Ministry by Mr. Gar Pardy about the kinds of coordination and consultation which really should be necessary in this kind of a situation. And if we go to tab 325 in the next volume.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: 325?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, in the next volume.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I'm getting a bit of a pile here, counsel.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's okay. You
won't have to do your weight workout tomorrow.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry, 325?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct.
This is an action memorandum to you, and just let me give you some context here by reading it.

The issue is "Consular Cases
Relating to Terrorism: Need for better, more consistent coordination and consultation across government."

And the recommendation is:
"You agree that the deputy be
authorized to consult with
his colleagues as the need
arise and ensure that there
is inter-departmental
coherence in the management
of such cases; and
That the exchange of

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information for such cases be done in full conformity with the appropriate laws and regulations."

You will see -- we have heard
evidence that this is a memorandum that went through about eight or nine drafts and culminated in this ultimate action memorandum.

And if you go to page 3 --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I'm sorry.
You're saying this is the ultimate action memorandum?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, this is the action memorandum, yes.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, not that would have come to me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's what we're going to ask you. Let me give you the context first, okay?

What it's about, if you go to page 3 of 5, you will see that the author, who we heard in evidence is Mr. Pardy, really picks it up at the top of the page where he says:

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"As noted above, a
significant element in the
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terrorism related cases is the involvement of Canadian security and police officials. This involvement relates in part to investigations of possible contravention of Canadian law while in others relates to assistance to foreign governments. For the most part the involvement of Canadian security and police agencies becomes publicly known within the same time frame as when the case becomes known to Canadian consular authorities. In these circumstances there is a need for a higher degree of inter-departmental coherence to ensure that from the outset there are common press lines or articulation by the different authorities involved of the respective
jurisdictions and responsibilities."

And he talks in the next paragraph about occasional consultations with RCMP and CSIS. "However, for the most part, these consultations have occurred because of apparent public differences in the comments make to the media or to apparent confusion in the minds of the public as to whether the government has a coherent approach on such cases."

And then he concludes:
"The primary responsibility
of this department for such
cases is to the consular. As
such, particular care must be
taken not to create the
perception that this
responsibility does not take
second place in order to meet
the responsibilities of other
governmental agencies. The

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issue in closer consultations and coherence is not to diminish the responsibility of any department or agency. Rather, the effort is to create an environment in which all can carry out their specific responsibilities more effectively and efficiently."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Certainly we've heard evidence from Mr. Pardy as to this memo, and I'm asking you whether this memorandum ever reached your desk as Minister of Foreign Affairs? HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, no. It's not in the form of a memorandum. Any memorandum that would come to me would have to be signed by the Deputy Minister and also signed by Mr. Pardy. So clearly this is a draft somewhere in the process that might have come up in another form to the office, whether it got to me directly on my desk or whether it would be dealt with by someone else and I'd be briefed on it.

But clearly this is Mr. Pardy laying out his thoughts and his consideration around these issues; and Mr. Pardy, as we said earlier, is very experienced in these matters, and I believe he's testified as to these issues.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: His testimony was
that he completed this memorandum, and he was under the impression that it went up the ladder and, for whatever reason, the Minister decided not to go with it, not to accept the recommendations.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, I'd have
to see the memorandum that $I$ got, see what recommendations $I$ got, before $I$ can testify as to what I refused to do. So...

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But do you recall
seeing anything like this during this period of time where Mr. Pardy is clearly saying, "We've got a problem. We've got a problem of coordination amongst agencies."?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. There's no doubt about it, Mr. Pardy was frustrated with the level of coordination.

He wouldn't have come to me personally; he would have talked to officials on my floor.

As I say, I know I met Mr. Pardy a couple of times. Once $I$ think was around the Sampson case; once may have been involving this case.

He was very experienced in dealing with these issues, wanted deeper coordination.

So there's nothing in this memo that, if $I$ had seen it or had discussed it at the time, I would have -- I personally would have, you know, refused.

I mean, clearly this is a matter that has to go through the various levels and get to the deputy minister and he has to consider its relationship to other departments before any recommendations get to my desk.

So we cannot assume that this memo
in this form got to me, but we can assume that there was a discussion around two things in the department at this time: what is the appropriate level of coordination, so that we can all do our job properly, as Mr. Pardy said; and, secondly, how can we manage these consular cases in a way that the department could be more effective for the Canadians that were involved, because we were now getting involved in a series of consular cases
which raised similar issues, and we wanted to improve our performance on how we could do that.

So those two issues were certainly
issues that were discussed on a policy level. I would have discussed them with my staff, I probably would have discussed them with the deputy, but $I$ couldn't speak to the specific recommendations in this memo.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But you would agree with the points that are being made by Mr. Pardy as to certainly the need, in this kind of case, terrorist allegation, where you've got a police agency, you've got a security intelligence agency, that a great deal of coordination is required --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- in order to advance the interests of the Canadian?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. I think that's a -- yes, I would have. Yes, sir.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this is
particularly so when it's just a month after -- a month after -- you're getting reports that the Syrians are getting a message from other parts of government that Canada doesn't want this guy back.

This is a serious issue, you stated --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- and $I$ would
think that -- and if we move on, that is even
emphasized further. If we go now to Exhibit $P-89 ?$
If you could give that to the
Minister, please?
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Give me a second.
It's P-99.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: P-89? 99?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'm sorry. It's
P-9 9 .
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I wondered how we got into this Israeli raid thing. We're kind of straying far afield. But anyway -- there's lots going on in the world, as we know.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. P-99, as
you will see, is dated March 24, 2003, and the subject matter is a telephone conversation with Marlene Catterall. It's notes by one of your officials, and it says:
"Marlene Catterall and Sarkis Assadourian met with the Syrian Ambassador last

Wednesday, March 21. They discussed the case of Maher Arar and made a personal and humanitarian pitch for the release of Arar and asked what the Syrians need for this to happen. They learned that initially during this case that CSIS officials told the Syrians that they have no interest in Arar. The Syrians took this to mean that the CSIS have no interest in having Arar back. They may have meant that they have no security reasons to investigate Arar in Canada. Due to the miscommunication, the Syrians believed that CSIS did not want Arar back in Canada and therefore decided to detain him -- or keep him in Syria." (As read)

Now, this, it would seem to me,
must have been a terrible surprise to you, because you had your conversation with the Syrian Foreign Minister on January 16 , where you clearly said to him that Canada is speaking with one voice, "We want him back."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then two months
later, over two months later, your two parliamentarians meet with the Syrian foreign ambassador who is still stating that there is this mixed message that -- at least they're confused or there's some miscommunication, and they feel that CSIS does not want Mr. Arar back. HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Does that concern you, if you were advised of this -- were you advised of this telephone conversation? HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, whether I was advised of this -- I certainly met with Marlene and with Sarkis upon their return to Syria -- from Syria, and they shared their concerns with me, that would be accurately reflected in this memo, whether $I$ saw it -MR. CAVALLUZZO: Are you saying that they said that when they returned on April 23
or 24? Because this is a -- this talks about a meeting they had before they went to Syria.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: That could be.
I'm sorry, I'm confusing two things then. I mean -- that's the problem with these memos. I mean -- these are shorthand form of people -- of conversation between other people that were not me and $I$ wasn't there and $I$ don't know who said what to who.

It says in here -- maybe the Syrians misinterpreted "We have no interest in Arar" might well have meant "We've got no interest" -- CSIS said we've got no interest in him.

So that would have been a clear indication that there was no problem. But you'd have to get the CSIS people to testify to that. I can't speculate on, you know, what --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But the question
I have for you is whether you were advised on March 24, or thereabouts, that the Syrians had given this message to Marlene Catterall and Sarkis Assadourian?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: That $I$ wouldn't specifically know. But $I$ would agree with you,
sir, that $I$ was aware of the fact there was still confusion on this issue.

In fact, it came up when we had a meeting with Ms Mazigh in my office and others. This was clearly an issue which had remained unresolved.

Where its source was, who said what to who or how it came about, I couldn't help you in any way as to that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let's see what the note goes on to say. It says:
"What we need to do now is
send a clear message in
writing to the Syrians from
CSIS that outlines clearly
that we have no information
which has led us to believe
that Arar poses a serious
threat to Canada.
Furthermore, the Syrians need
to hear from the security
people and DFAIT in writing
that if we do have any
information that shows any
involvement in terrorist

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activities, that we will charge him in Canada and deal with his case through the usual law enforcement channels." (As read)

Now, the question that $I$ have is whether, at this point in time, there was any direction, suggestion, encouragement, recommendations to CSIS through, presumably, the Solicitor General, over whom they were responsible to, that they send a message, a clear and unequivocal message, to the Syrians saying, "You have misunderstood us. We want Mr. Arar returned to Canada."?
--- Pause
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, it certainly -- that would be consistent with the position we had taken consistently, you know, up to date. But $I$ cannot remember specifically saying to the Solicitor General personally or giving a direction that CSIS be told to do this, particularly the idea that CSIS will write a letter.

But you will recall there is a
later discussion about what might be contained in
a letter, and we got different feedback from them about what to --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We're going to
come to that. That's a few months later --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I'm not sure
that a CSIS letter would have been very helpful if it was to be along the lines of what was suggested.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. We'll
come back to that. That's in May and June.
But I just want to know, at this particular point in time, what you're testifying to, is that you were unaware as to whether CSIS was encouraged or recommended to send a letter to the Syrians saying, "Don't get confused. We want Arar back."?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I honestly
don't know the answer to that. I would have thought it would be unusual practice for CSIS to -- I mean, I guess, obviously, CSIS must communicate with its foreign counterparts, so those must take place. But in terms of an official Government of Canada communication between government to government, that would be from the Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister
rather than from another federal government agency.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will see in
the evidence later on, through some discussions that you had, that you would not disagree that a communication from CSIS to Syria, in light of the fact that Mr. Arar is being held by security forces there, would be effective in the sense that they are security people, they would prefer to deal with security people?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right, and make the point, as I said here, that if there's an offence being committed, that we will deal with it under Canadian law. We have the capacity to deal with it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Mr. Commissioner, it's one o'clock.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Is 2:15 the suggestion?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: 2:15 should be fine.

Now, just in terms of counsel, $I$ probably will be to the afternoon break. So I'm wondering if we might sit a wee bit late tonight,
depending on the Minister's schedule, and also start tomorrow morning at nine o'clock in order to accommodate the number of witnesses we have this week?

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
What's the anticipation? Are we going to finish with Minister Graham today or do you think...

HON. BILL GRAHAM: That is
certainly -- well, I'm only the witness, but that's my anticipation, if I'm allowed to speak about this matter.
--- Laughter / Rires
MS McISAAC: I can say we weren't anticipating that Mr. Graham would be testifying tomorrow, and $I$ don't know if his schedule can accommodate it or not.

THE COMMISSIONER: Ms Edwardh, do you know how long you will be?

MS EDWARDH: I will endeavour, Mr. Commissioner, to ensure that Minister Graham is out of here today.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, thank you.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Could you specify the time?
--- Laughter / Rires MS EDWARDH: That, sir, I cannot do.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I was afraid of that.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think what we will do, then, and if people can look at their schedules, is we will do whatever is necessary to accommodate you so we will finish today.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I appreciate
that, Commissioner.
Obviously, tomorrow I do have to be back in the House. I have leave from the House today, but --

THE COMMISSIONER: What may be necessary is that we would sit later than normal. If you can accommodate that in today's schedule, we would appreciate it.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Thank you, yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: We'll rise
until 2:15.
THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
Veuillez vous lever.
--- Upon recessing at 1:03 p.m. /
Suspension à 13 h 03
--- Upon resuming at 2:18 p.m. / Reprise à 14 h 18

THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated. Veuillez vous asseoir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Good afternoon.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Good afternoon, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cavalluzzo?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you,
Mr. Commissioner.
Mr. Graham, just before we move on
into April, there is one last question $I$ have relating to Exhibit P-99, the Catterall note -HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- about the confusion that the Syrians may have had and the clear and unequivocal letter from CSIS.

I just want to be clear that you understand that when $I$ am referring to a letter from CSIS, I don't think that anything need be disclosed in terms of operational matters or whether or not Mr. Arar was a threat or not to the security of Canada.

But don't you agree with me that even though normal channels are through the

Department of Foreign Affairs, that a letter from CSIS, a simple letter from CSIS saying, "We want to clarify your confusion if you miscommunicated our message. We, as every other part of the Government of Canada, want Mr. Arar returned." Don't you agree with me that that would have been an effective letter, particularly in light of the fact -- and we will come to this. We know that the Syrian security people like to deal with the Canadian security people as opposed to other emanations of government.

So a simple letter like that could have done the trick?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I just don't know whether or not it was appropriate to send such a letter in the system of government and how it works, because that is CSIS and RCMP business. But I totally agree with you that if there had been some form whereby we could have conveyed clearly that these were the security people saying there is no impediment, whatever else they want to say, there is no reason why Mr. Arar couldn't come back to Canada, that would have been good. Now in the end, $I$ think when the Prime Minister sent his letter and said that as
the Prime Minister of Canada, that includes not just the foreign ministry but includes CSIS, the RCMP, and the whole of the Government of Canada. So in the end we got that, if you like. But at this point it would have been helpful. I don't disagree with your analysis. I just don't know the form that might have taken. MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will come to the form.

Now we are in April, at April 3rd, and there is a tab that $I$ could refer you to. Perhaps if we go to tab 368 , it's letter from Dr. Mazigh to you. It's tab 368. Basically Dr. Mazigh is talking about the length of time now since the last consular visit. I just want to put some context into a concern that Dr. Mazigh had, or indeed any wife would have in these circumstances, and that is the political context.

We are now in April of 2003, and something started in March of 2003 , I understand? HON. BILL GRAHAM: March 17 th . MR. CAVALLUZZO: What was that? HON. BILL GRAHAM: My birthday. Also there was an invasion of Iraq.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I thought you were going to say it was also St. Patrick's Day. HON. BILL GRAHAM: It might have been St. Patrick's day, but it happens to be my birthday, and that's how $I$ happen to remember it. MR. CAVALLUZZO: The war in Iraq started on that date, and that obviously created certain added complexities in your job as Minister?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And added
complexities in terms of the relationship that the Canadian government had with Syria?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Could you
describe what complications those are as a result of the Americans going into Iraq?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, clearly
there would be various factors -- and these are alluded to in some of the documents, and certainly would have been in my conversations with Sarkis and others -- as to what position the Syrians might take in respect of Mr. Arar, not bearing in mind what Canada's wishes might be but what the United States' reaction might be. Given the fact
that the United States was now in Iraq, Syria was a potential perhaps future subject matter for their consideration. So there is no question about it, that was one factor that complicated things.

And I can't -- that's all
speculation as to how that played and how that influenced events. But $I$ believe it was there in the back of people's minds.

The other thing, of course, was the fact that at this time then, the role of our Damascus embassy became more important than ever as a listening post in the Middle East and as a place where we needed to be to closely follow events.

So there were additional
complicating factors as a result of the conflict in Iraq, there is no question about it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Some people would argue that the conflict in Iraq should have improved Canada's leverage with Syria because, of course, Canada decided not to join the American forces and go into Iraq, which presumably would have been pleasing to the Syrians at that point in time.

So our leverage may have improved, which would have assisted Mr. Arar's situation. Would you agree with that?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: It could have, and maybe it was countered by this other factor of how they perceived relations with the United States, which is, as I say, speculative. But there was no doubt about it, Canada's position in respect of the Iraq war was appreciated by many countries around the Middle East.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The other factor which I think we should bring to bear in terms of the complicating relationship, or complicated relationship with Syria, and that is in December of 2002 I understand that the Canadian government listed Hezbollah as one of the terrorist organizations under the new provisions of the Criminal Code.

Do you recall that?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. We already listed Hezbollah under the U.N. regulations and we added them to the Criminal Code.

Was it in December? It was certainly around that time, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And I understand that perturbed the Syrians as far as our relations with Syria are concerned?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, Hezbollah was a clear ally to Syria, both in Lebanon, where it is, as you know, an important political force, as well as a military force. And that certainly did affect relations as well, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I would like to move now to the meeting in Syria. This is on April 22nd of 2003, at tab 395, which is the meeting between Catterall, Assadourian, Pillarella and Syrian officials.

We are going to be hearing from a couple of separate witnesses directly involved in this, so that we need not hear you on the visit itself.

But there is one portion $I$ would ask you about in terms of the brief, and that is at paragraph 9, at page 3 of 3, wherein it states that:
"In a debriefing with the Ambassador, Mrs. Catterall and Mr. Assadourian expressed disappointment that all the

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security aspects of the Arar case, as seen by the Syrians, had not been explained to them earlier."

And this was the point here:
"Mrs. Catterall even suggested that perhaps Minister Graham had been kept in the dark concerning some of this information, a view that was not shared by Mr. Assadourian."

Now, that comment there in respect of her concerns that you had been kept in the dark, did you do somewhat of an investigation into that or have someone look into that?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, I would have discussed this matter with Marlene when she came back, obviously, and Sarkis.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I think the
problem here is -- well, you will have to hear from her, but $I$ think one of the problems was obviously the Syrians said things to Mrs. Catterall and Mr. Assadourian about Mr. Arar that
they had not heard from me. And while I had been very clear in telling people that there were security aspects to the case, I wasn't in a position, and $I$ would not have specifically told people specific information about Mr. Arar. As far as consular access was concerned and as far as what we were doing, that wasn't relevant.

So I think she was upset that the Syrians said, "Oh, we've got this, we've got that," all of these things. It came as a surprise to her. And certainly some of it probably I wouldn't have known myself, because $I$ wouldn't have any direct relationship with the security authorities in Syria either. So some of them might well have been a surprise to me as well. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 385 is the -- and I just want you to identify it -- the letter that went with Catterall and Assadourian which was delivered to the Syrians on your behalf? HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. HON. BILL GRAHAM: This is the text of the letter. I mean, it's obviously not signed, but this is the text of the letter, is it? MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then if we go to
your notes, Exhibit $P-107$, for the entry April $30 t h$ of 2003 , $I$ wonder if you might read that to us, because $I$ have difficulty reading it.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: It's like a doctor's prescription. It is not designed to be read.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: It says:
"Caucus follow-up. 1) Arar and Penny C. and Marlene's comments."

And then the next page:
"Marlene Catterall. The Ambassador said that he'd been sending advice back that Arar would be charged."

So this relates to the discussions around whether he would be charged and in what form.

> "This is an opening bid in negotiations with the Americans. Is this real or a 'ritual dance?'"

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In other words, these are things we would have discussed. Is this a threat? Are they really going to charge him? Or is this just sort of, well we'll charge him? Is this a ritual dance?

> "She's horrified with what Penny Collenette told me last night about what the American ambassador is saying about Arar (that the Americans were told that we didn't want him back.)"

That can only be a reference to a speech that the American ambassador gave, I believe, to the Harvard Club which Penny Collenette went to, and spoke to me about saying this is what Mr. Cellucci is saying around this subject. So I don't remember the exact details.

It clearly was the same thing Mr. Cellucci had been saying all along: that our officials agreed with the sending of Mr. Arar abroad.

Now, whether he went on to say that Americans were told that we didn't want him back, that's ...

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: He may have said that at that speech, in which case this would just be a statement as to what Penny had told me, and $I$ was relaying this information on to Marlene.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. You are talking about April 29th, which would have been a speech given by Mr. Cellucci at the Harvard Club in Ottawa, wherein he stated that Americans were told by Canadians that we didn't want Mr. Arar back.

Is that correct?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I think that's what the statement is that he made, and obviously Mrs. Catterall was horrified by it. And that would be the first time $I$ had ever heard that statement.

I mean, the statement $I$ had heard before was Canadians knew what the Americans were doing. But this is the first time we heard from somebody that -- or at least that I personally heard that we were telling Americans or, again, somebody was telling Americans -- this is the problem, because of the situation. We didn't know who was telling who what. It certainly wasn't me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Your
understanding, in terms of what Mr. Cellucci was saying, was this at the time that Mr. Arar was being deported from the United States to Syria, that Canadians didn't want him back, or while Mr. Arar is in Syria that Canadians didn't want him back?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I don't know the answer of what Mr. Cellucci would have intended by that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you pick up the phone and call him and say, "What are you talking about now, Cellucci?"

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, we would have had conversations with Mr. Cellucci. Whether I phoned him immediately upon this or whether we went back to the office and said, you know, let's get more information here on what is going on. We were in constant -- you know, in regular contact with my officials, and also our office staff was trying to figure out exactly what is going on.

I don't think I picked up the phone immediately to call Mr. Cellucci immediately after this, but $I$ certainly would have engaged him on it when $I$ had an opportunity to.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If you look at Exhibit $P-48$, $I$ am trying to nail down what Mr. Cellucci said.

THE COMMISSIONER: Which volume?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Volume 1 of
P-48 -- Volume 1 of 2.
And if we go to tab 21 there are
two letters from Dr. Mazigh. One is to Jean Chretien, copied to you. And then the second one, that $I$ am going to refer to, is to Wayne Easter, dated July 18th, with a copy to you as well.

And on the second page, we will
see that Dr. Mazigh says at the top:
"Indeed U.S. sources, including the U.S. ambassador
to Canada, have implied that
it is Canadian authorities which have information implicating my husband and that Canadian authorities had something to do with his deportation. On October 16, 2002, while at an awards luncheon in Toronto, U.S. Ambassador Cellucci was asked

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by reporters why the U.S. deported my husband. He replied, 'I think you may want to check with your local people on that.'"

Of course, that's the public
position, as we saw before, the day after the meeting with you.

And then it goes on to the meeting
we are talking about now, and it says:
"On April 29, 2003, the U.S. ambassador was again asked about my husband while speaking at the Harvard Club in Ottawa. He replied that it was Canadian elements that did not want Maher Arar returned to Canada, which is why the U.S. deported him to Syria."

So that at least the suggestion in
here -- and we will get that speech -- is that when he was saying Canadians didn't want him back in Canada, it was at the point where he was deported to Syria, rather than when he was in

Syria.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right, exactly. The suggestion being that they were consulted and said, no, don't send him here, send him there.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If you go
to your entry at the next date, April 30th, in
your diary?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And could you
read us once again that handwriting?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Again, this would have been a note about my conversation with Sarkis.

I don't know what day of the week.
What day of the week was this?
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, Wednesday
is --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: It's redacted in a way such that --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Wednesday, April
$30 t h$.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: So this is all part of the April 30th?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I think so.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: So:
"Sarkis Assadourian - Arar.
What an experience. There's a difference of opinion
between the Syrian Foreign
Minister and their
intelligence who are in
cahoots with the Americans?"
This is going back to what $I$ said
earlier: that there are wheels within wheels,
making it very difficult. This is obviously
Sarkis' opinion to me, based on his Syrian
background, that he believed there was a
difference of opinion between the Syrian Foreign Minister and the intelligence people, who he believed -- I can only assume from my note -- were in cahoots with the Americans.

That is Sarkis' opinion and that
is what he told me.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I would
like to move on now to May 5th.
If you go to Exhibit $P-85$, tab 7,
which is Volume 5.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Thank you, sir.
What tab?

THE COMMISSIONER: Tab 7, I think. HON. BILL GRAHAM: 7? Thank you, sir.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I am sorry, it should be Volume 1; P-85, Volume 1, tab 7. HON. BILL GRAHAM: This is Volume 5. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this is a draft memo from Gar Pardy, an action memorandum that was going to be prepared by you.

I understand that you did not see this, but $I$ just want to point out for context -ultimately you did receive a memo of June 5th, and I just want to point out certain aspects of this draft memorandum.

First of all, in the first page under "Recommendations", the recommendations are:
"Efforts continue to
establish a common understanding within the government of Canada on this case with the objective of the issuance of a statement signed by the Solicitor General and the Minister of

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Foreign Affairs that could be used with Syrian authorities."

Then it talks about the visit to
Syria by the Deputy Minister, et cetera.
Thirdly:
"That you call in the Syrian ambassador at an appropriate time and provide a response to the Syrian stated intentions to prosecute."

And finally:
"If necessary that you meet
the Solicitor General and the
Deputy Prime Minister to
arrive at a common
understanding on the case."
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And in terms of
the central issue which gave rise to this memo and the ultimate memo, if you go to page 3, at paragraph 6, under "CONSIDERATIONS", that very first sentence, it says, at paragraph 6:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "The central issue in our } \\
& \text { dealings with the case is the }
\end{aligned}
$$

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fact that there are inconsistencies in what we are being told by the American authorities and what the Canadian police and security officials have reported."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then if you go to the next page, page 4, top bullet, wherein it is stated:
"there is a need for an
unambiguous statement by the
Government of Canada,
preferably signed by the
Solicitor General and the
Foreign Minister, to the
effect that we have no
evidence in Canada, or from
foreign sources, that Mr Arar
is or was a member of
al-Qaida, that we do not
believe that such information
exists and that Mr Arar
should be permitted to return

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to Canada."
And then it refers to other issues in the days ahead, that there be a multi-agency meeting communicating a consistent approach with the Syrian authorities and making representations to the Syrians.

Now, that led to -- just for the record, if you go to tab 423?

THE COMMISSIONER: We're going to volume 5.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We're coming now to some new exhibits, Mr. Commissioner, so I just want to give you an indication of what they are.

423 is the June 3 memo.
THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: So what was the last -- so the draft is May 5?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: And June, this document, is the follow-on of that draft.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, June 3 is a draft, and ultimately, in 429, we have the final memorandum, which is dated June 5.

Okay. So that the June 3 memo, now in it's less-redacted form, is Exhibit $\mathrm{P}-102$.

And the June 5 memo, in it's less redacted form is Exhibit P-103.

What I'd like to do now is take
the witness through $\mathrm{P}-103$, which is the less redacted final version of the memorandum dated June 5, 2003.

THE COMMISSIONER: So is that the
only one we need to have regards to?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, thank you.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: This is the signed one by Mr. Pardy and by Mr. Lavertu.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Okay.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you have that
in front of you?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
And this is virtually identical to
the June 3 one, except on page 1, you will see
that there's a second recommendation, and that recommendation, which is new, states that:
"We also recommend that you meet with Mrs. Arar at a

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mutually convenient time."
Okay? Now, I'd like to ask you certain questions, starting at paragraph 9 of the less redacted form, okay?

Now, paragraph 9 talks about police investigations and as to how Mr. Arar came on the radar screen. It says, paragraph 9:
"From the early days of this case, Canadian police officials (the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) initially indicated that it had no interest in Mr. Arar) stated that their interest in Mr. Arar was based on his contacts with persons in Ottawa who were of interest to them. In a message dated October 18, 2002, the RCMP stated they maintain 'an interest in Mr. Arar as part of any ongoing criminal investigation'."

And then it goes on to talk about

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who those contacts were, including Mr. Almalki and Mr. El Maati, both former residents of Ottawa.

So paragraph number 9 deals with
the interest that the police agencies, including CSIS and the RCMP, have in Mr. Arar.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Paragraph 10
deals with information to and from the Americans.
It says:
"We have not been able to
engage the Americans in any
substantive discussion on
Mr. Arar outside of
intelligence and security
channels. At the time of his
deportation, the Americans
stated that their reasons for
doing so was Mr. Arar's
membership in al-Qaida. In
your..."
That's your, Minister -- in the
Minister's
"...meetings with the
American Ambassador and
Secretary of State Powell

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late last year, both stated that American action in deporting Mr. Arar was based on information from Canadian authorities. The American Ambassador reiterated this in response to a question from a member of parliament in a private meeting a few weeks ago."

Now, are you aware of that private
meeting that is being referenced in that memo -HON. BILL GRAHAM: I don't know -MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- who it was? HON. BILL GRAHAM: I would have to assume it would be Mrs. Catterall or Mr. Assadourian, but $I$ don't know.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
It goes on:
"The RCMP has confirmed that the Americans consulted them prior to deporting Mr. Arar, but did not raise the issue of his possible deportation to Syria nor did the RCMP

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give any indication that such a course of action would be acceptable to them."

Okay? Then in paragraph 11 it
deals with --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry. Right.
Well -- is this a statement that the RCMP at that point has confirmed that the Americans consulted them prior to deporting Mr. Arar?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct. HON. BILL GRAHAM: Or is that a
statement that the American ambassador said that? MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, we will
ask --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: If the American
ambassador said that, that clearly was consistent with everything he said up till now. But if, in fact, this is a bald
statement that the RCMP has confirmed that the Americans consulted them prior to deporting Mr. Arar, it would be totally contrary to everything else that we understood up until -MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, I think -HON. BILL GRAHAM: -- or least
that I have understood --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, I think
that's the response that the Americans gave DFAIT on October 18.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: That makes
sense.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you want to
see it, it's at tab --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, that
makes sense to me, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 104 . But, in
any event, it appears to be that. We can ask
Mr. Pardy that, as to what he meant by that.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, paragraph 11
deals with the CSIS visit. It states:
"CSIS officials visited Syria earlier this year and discussed Mr. Arar with their counterparts. They did not meet Mr. Arar."

So it looks like, according to this, they discussed Mr. Arar with their counterparts but did not meet him.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you see that?

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HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO:
"Subsequent to these discussions, Syrian officials informed us that they were informed by CSIS officials that Canada did not want to have Mr. Arar returned. The CSIS officials denied that they had said that to the Syrians."

So that here we are in early June of 2003, and we still see this --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Still
struggling with this thing, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- spectre of the CSIS communication or alleged communication to the Syrians, so that that's still up in the air on, certainly June 5 .

And then paragraphs 12 and 13.
Twelve deals with the leverage
that Canadians had with the Syrians concerning foreign policy, and we've really discussed that. That is, that the war in Iraq really complicated things because the Syrians may
have been discouraged from doing any things that would perturb the Americans in that very sensitive period of time.

And then finally, in paragraph 13, it talks about whether you're going to get any help from CSIS or the RCMP, and it stays:
"In recent days we have discussed the case with both CSIS and the RCMP. They have maintained their positions... of the evidence of his connections with others who are. In these circumstances, they will not provide any direct support in having Mr. Arar returned to Canada. Should Mr. Arar return to Canada, CSIS and the RCMP have both indicated that they want to interrogate him. As such, the best we can do in these circumstances is to again raise the matter with the Syrian Foreign Minister and to that end we have

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attached a letter for your signature. We would also recommend that you call in the Syrian Ambassador and deliver the letter."

And that letter that was appended to this particular memorandum can be found at tab 439.

And the key paragraph, as you can see, is -- you're requesting that the Government of Syria take into consideration Mr. Arar's return on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, and then these words are used:
"I assure you that there is
no Canadian Government impediment to Mr. Arar's return to Canada. Any actions by your Government to facilitate his return would be greatly appreciated..."

Now, those very words were used in
your letter of April that went with
Mr. Assadourian and Ms Catterall.
If you look at tab 385?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I'm sorry, 385?

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MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, 385. Unfortunately, it's in volume 4. HON. BILL GRAHAM: Mm-hmm. Yes. Yes, sir.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is the wording of a letter that you identified, and you can see that that very wording is used in the middle paragraph, the last sentence where it says:
"Let me again assure you that there is no Canadian Government impediment to Mr. Arar's return to Canada." HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And of course the letter, which was delivered on April 22, did not get Canada anywhere as far as Mr. Arar's release was concerned. And here we are, I guess a month or so -- month and a half later, where, because CSIS and the RCMP are not prepared to directly support DFAIT's efforts, you're left with the same language, which is appended to this June 5 memo?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You're not making progress.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, we're not
being -- we're not going any further in a more explicit way in telling the Syrians that, not only are we saying from the Government of Canada's point of view, but actually the, if you like, the security authorities themselves have no objection whatsoever to Mr. Arar's return from Canada.

I mean, I think -- obviously the contents of these letters would have been worked out by Mr. Pardy, by CSIS, the RCMP, you know, and the government through the $P C O$, to coordinate, to make sure that we were saying something that was appropriate for the Government of Canada to say. And so I would not personally have been involved in, if you like, this articulation, but you will see that later on -- either later on contemporary with this -- I had my meeting with Ms Mazigh and wanted more -- stronger language. MR. CAVALLUZZO: We'll come to that --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: We came to a conclusion, and it's clear Mr. Pardy's advice to us was, this will not do the trick. But he was not getting any success in having different language adopted.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let's go to that
meeting at tab 443. This is the meeting that you had with Dr. Mazigh on July 12 --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- of 2003. And
you'll see in the first paragraph, it states:
"The meeting began with a request by Dr. Monia Mazigh to the Minister for a coherent and clear statement by the Canadian Government, stating that the Government of Canada has no evidence linking her husband, Maher Arar, to any terrorist activities and that the Government of Canada wants Maher Arar to be sent back to Canada immediately."

And then in the next paragraph it refers to the lack of consensus on the issue with the security agencies.

And then, in the next paragraph -or the paragraph second from the bottom it talks about Mr. Cellucci's statements that we need not get into.

And then, at the bottom paragraph, it says:
"Minister Graham stated that
the issue of who said what to
the US is very murky and that
no one can get to the bottom
of it, although colin Powell
and Amb. Cellucci have both
been confronted on this issue
and they will not budge on
their standard lines on the
matter."
I think the other point that I
paragraphs from the bottom
"The point was also made by Dr. Mazigh, excusing herself for saying this, but that a message from the Security agencies in Canada may have more clout than a letter from Foreign Affairs, as it would mean more to the Syrian security officials who may override anything that the

Syrian Foreign Ministry says about the case. The Minister did not disagree."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So that here we have two clear messages: one, as we've said before, is that, because you're dealing with the security agencies in Syria, that a letter from our security forces would have more clout; and secondly, that Dr. Mazigh is suggesting that we need a letter which says that there is no evidence that Mr. Arar could be tied in to terrorist activities.

Now, as a result of that, I
understand that your office attempted to initiate that kind of letter, a no-evidence letter, and I'm going to show you an exhibit now, a new exhibit -THE COMMISSIONER: What was the number, Gilles?

THE SECRETARY: 110.
THE COMMISSIONER: P-110.
EXHIBIT NO. P-110:
E-mail from Pierre
Guimond sent Tuesday June 17, 2003 to EXTOTT JPD C4

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, this is an e-mail dated June 17, from Pierre Guimond, from MINA's office? Now who is he?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Who is MINA?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No. I know what MINA is. MINA is the Minister's office.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Pierre Guimond was the contact person between the department and my office on my floor. So that we had a --

He was a departmental official, not a ministerial appointment. But he was part of our office set up so that we would have constant, seamless contact with the department.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It says -it's to Gar Pardy, obviously. It says:
"Gar, ministers' advisors have reviewed your memo and draft letter from Minister Graham to Shara'a..." (As read)

Which is tab 439.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO:
"... and would like to see the following changes made,
below in italics, made to the body of the letter. Could you seek as early as possible to seek from SOLGEN, RCMP and CSIS if at all possible on the next report? (As read)

And the new wording suggested is: "I assure you that there is no evidence he is involved in terrorist activity nor is there any Canadian Government impediment to Mr. Arar's return to Canada." (As read)

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And that message
went to -- to SOLGEN from the Minister's office. Is that correct?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. This is what we were trying to do to strengthen the letter so that it would be -- so that it would make it clear.

We had -- you can imagine we had a lot of discussion about what is the appropriate language.

You'll see that Mr. Pardy says, in
his memo, there's no evidence -- to the effect: we have no evidence in Canada or from foreign services that Mr. Arar is or was a member of al-Qaeda.

And this is the whole point about the fact that Mr. Arar may have been a person of interest, but that doesn't mean that he's guilty of a terrorist offence.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: So we were
trying to find language which would accommodate the fact that he may have been a person of interest, which anyone could be, but at the same time saying, whatever that interest is, it has not led to an appropriate conclusion that he is guilty of a terrorist offence in Canada.

So that was the -- that was the
intent of what we were trying to achieve at our level and seeing whether or not CSIS and RCMP could agree with that language, to sort of take you at least that far to get as much as we possibly could.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And what was the response of CSIS and the RCMP?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, I believe
there's an exhibit in here, but basically it was that they were not -- that that language was not acceptable to them.

Now, I don't know the reason for that, clearly, but they will no doubt explain to the Commission why they were of the view they could not accede to that language, but they were of the view they could not accede to that language.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And with the
language that was brought back by RCMP and CSIS, would that have assisted Mr. Arar's release from Syria?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Could you show me that? I think it's...
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, there's one letter from Mr. Loeppky dated June 24 th of 2003 , that we will try and find for you.

In fact, I have found it for you. It's in the Garvie report, which is Exhibit P-19 at page 41.

THE COMMISSIONER: The clerk will get it for you.

Page 41?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, 41.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You will see at
the bottom there, Minister, it says:
"D/Comm. Loeppky advised
Mr. Michel D'Avignon..."
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: "... major
concerns about the text of
the letter proposed by DFAIT.
The concerns were:
'with the misleading statement made in paragraph two of the attached letter "I assure you the Government of Canada has no evidence Mr. Arar was involved in terrorist activities..."

And then it goes on.
"'These have been expressed on a number of occasions to DFAIT officials by RCMP ... and the Solicitor General. Mr. Arar is currently subject

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of a national security investigation in Canada ... he remains of great interest ... given this situation, we do not believe it would be advisable for Mr. Graham to send this letter to his Syrian counterpart.'"

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So do you recall
seeing language --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, we
certainly were told that -- we were certainly told that the language we proposed, as I say, was not acceptable. But there was at one point, I think there was some language provided to us that, in my view, made the matter worse rather than better. So I still think it goes back to this difficult judgment we are trying to do, make sure we get the best consular assistance we can, the best way we can get Mr. Arar's case, and yet obviously we can't do something which will be contrary to what the advice of the officials is.

But if $I$ was wearing my own
lawyer's hat, $I$ was trying to make a distinction

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between what you might be in terms of a person of interest and actually guilty of an offence. These are two different things. You could be a person of interest for all sorts of reasons.

However, we were not able to
accommodate that in the discussions between the departments.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And, of course, we do have a Charter of Rights that says everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Absolutely.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The next exhibit I would ask you to look at is Exhibit P-108, which are the relevant PCEP documents, relevant documents filed today.

The clerk will get it for you.
THE COMMISSIONER: Do you want to
move some of those books away? Would it be easier?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I will just
leave that open. Thanks, Commissioner.
Sorry, what number?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 2. There is some handwriting on this note which says:
"Joanne:

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"Please speak to me. I don't think Minister Graham should walk out on a limb and say we have no evidence. We may
have something or have something in a few months." And then it's signed.

Do you recognize this particular
note?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, I don't -I'm sorry, I don't know who Joanne is. I certainly don't know that signature at the bottom, what that squiggle at the bottom is, and $I$ don't recognize the writing.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, let me just
ask you then, and that is whether you were hearing admonitions around this point in time. When you are trying to get Mr. Arar back from Syria, whether you are hearing people going, remember what happened to the Prime Minister four or five years ago when he got somebody else back from Pakistan.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Oh, that was -yes, the reference to the case when the Prime Minister made representations in Pakistan were
certainly raised by people. I mean, this is a natural thing. You learn by your experience.

But I didn't -- well, that's
legitimate in terms of caution. I believe in this case what we were anxious is to go as far as we possibly could in saying, you know, this person is -- there's nothing wrong with him being brought to Canada.

But I mean at one point I said to my Syrian counterpart, "Look, if there is a criminal offence being committed by Mr. Arar, the Canadian officials are perfectly capable of prosecuting him themselves. So return him to Canada."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And that's the whole point, isn't it?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: So, I think this is what we were trying to achieve. Obviously CSIS and RCMP will speak for themselves, but I don't think they were deliberately frustrating that. I believe that they were trying to make sure that we didn't say anything that would inhibit an inquiry which they were then carrying on. And that is of course a matter for them to speak to.

But from my perspective as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I had to be very careful not to stray in that territory either.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, under
section 10 of the Department of Foreign Affairs Act, it says that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is the final spokesperson for Canada with foreign nations.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: What $I$ would ask you is at this point in time, surely shouldn't you have said to CSIS and the RCMP through the Solicitor General, "Enough is enough. Canada is going to speak with one voice, and that voice is: We want Mr. Arar back"?

Couldn't you have done that?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, we
certainly said that, that we wanted Mr. Arar back.
I do not believe -- I would have to see section 10. I have not looked at it for -I'm not sure $I$ ever looked at it. But there's no question but that section 10 , if that's what it says, says that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is the spokesperson for Canada officially in international affairs. That's right.

That doesn't mean the Minister of Foreign Affairs can write any damn thing he likes to any foreign country about anything. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has to conduct himself as an officer of the government, governed by the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister's Office, relationships with other government departments.

If $I$ decided $I$ wanted to write a letter that we are declaring war on the United States, that doesn't make war on the United States.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is not -- while he may be the final spokesperson for the Government of Canada, is the spokesperson for the Government of Canada. But the spokesperson, not somebody who is acting on his own behalf.

So I wouldn't accept any
suggestion on your part that $I$ had an unfettered and unlimited ability to write whatever I wanted to to any foreign government. Anything I would write to any foreign government would be informed by the best interests of the Government of Canada as a whole, which would include of course the security interests of Canada and Canadians when I was doing that.

So that would certainly be why $I$ was approaching this the way $I$ was. I didn't believe I was entitled to just, you know, write this -- although we were working hard to get this, I didn't believe $I$ was entitled to unilaterally say, "Well, to heck with it. If you don't want to come along, I'm going to do it without you." MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess that raises once again the question $I$ said at the outset after the break, and that is that really all we needed, it would seem to me, from CSIS is a simple letter, not operational, not anything else, "Syrians, you have misunderstood us. We, like every other agency of Canada, want Mr. Arar back." And I guess that's the problem I'm having, seeing how that was so difficult to achieve. It doesn't seem to be rocket science to most Canadians, I would have thought. It just seems to be such a struggle to get that out. That's the problem I'm having.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. Well, you would have to ask them that because they have their reasons and $I$ would be speculating, like you, if I were to get into that.

You did point out that although,
as far as we were concerned, given what we were being told about the influence of the Americans and everything else in Syria -- I mean, this was the problem. We felt we were making yards, but it was very difficult making yards in Syria for all sorts of other reasons. It didn't seem to matter what we did. There were all sorts of other factors that were playing in.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I would ask you now to refer to tab 451.

This is another draft memo. This is within your department. It was to be signed by two Assistant Deputy Ministers. It is dated June 24, and once again it deals with these conflicting responsibilities.

It opens by saying:
"It is very clear that there
has not yet been, on an
institutional level, a
meeting of minds between
DFAIT on the one hand and
CSIS and the RCMP on the
other with regard to the case
of Maher Arar. Recent
exchanges have been almost

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testy and there is a fear that the working relationship between DFAIT and CSIS, in particular, might be poisoned if agreement is not reached on a government-wide approach to this case."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then it goes
on in the bottom, under paragraph 2 under the
first redaction, and it talks about.
"Mrs. Arar, Dr. Monia Mazigh, has been very active and able in her public advocacy campaign in support of her husband. She generated a great deal of publicity and sympathy for her husband and has presented his case to Members of Parliament, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs (June 12, 2003)."

And then it goes on on a very

It says:
". . officials ...
From whatever the agency.
"... do not seem to
understand that, guilty or innocent, Maher Arar has the right to consular assistance from the Department and that in the circumstances in which he presently finds himself, the best outcome might be his return to Canada. Even though there is a risk that Arar might later be found to have been involved in extremist activities of one sort or another, his right to consular assistance must be honoured."

I think you would agree with that

HON. BILL GRAHAM: That was what
was motivating, basically, our approach --
MS McISAAC: Mr. Commissioner, I
hate to interrupt, but $I$ think it's only fair to
point out to the witness that the evidence has been that this memorandum never found its way off Mr. Gould's computer. I think Mr. Livermore testified to the fact that no one in ISI had ever seen it, or approved it, or dealt with it in any way.

It was there, but just so that background is there.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: As I said, it was a draft, and $I$ think it captured the sentiments that the witness was sharing with us and he has just agreed 100 per cent.

Then finally it says that:
"It is important that the Minister and his staff be made aware of the evidence that can be marshalled against Arar and a way must be found for the Department to respond to allegations that there is no evidence suggesting that Arar has a connection to the activities of Muslim extremists."

I assume you would agree with
that: that the more information you had, the better?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I'm not quite sure $I$ understand what that means.
"It is important that the Minister and his staff ..." MR. CAVALLUZZO: In other words, I think what he is saying there is you have met with Mr. Cellucci or Mr. Powell who are saying, "Listen, we've got a lot of stuff on this guy." HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you had more information, you could better deal with that relationship. I think that is what that is saying. You would agree with that: the more information the better?

And then, finally: "The Minister should seek a briefing from his colleague, the Solicitor General, about the evidence facing Mr. Arar."

And so on and so forth. And you told us that that briefing was never given at this point in time?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. This is
June still?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, June 24 th.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I don't believe
this -- the Solicitor General at the time would have been Mr. Easter.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Easter, that's
correct.
We have talked about what CSIS didn't do, and I am going to ask you another question. Were you ever made aware of representations made by CSIS or somebody in CSIS about whether or not you should be sending a letter yourself to Syria?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, let us move to July.

In terms of your efforts to get Mr. Arar home, you became aware that Mr. De Bane was going to be an envoy to the Middle East?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. This is when we still had not resolved the issue of the letter.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct. HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And as a result of that, you decided that Mr. De Bane could be used to the advantage of Mr. Arar.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, since he was going.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So why don't you recount what happened there?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, my
recollection is that Mr. De Bane, who I believe is Lebanese descent but very familiar with the Middle East, was going. I believe he was also going to Saudi Arabia. We felt that he could go to Syria. And therefore it was then decided that if he would be going to Syria, it would be more effective if he took a letter from the Prime Minister than myself, given the fact $I$ had already sent letters to the Foreign Minister, and this had obviously -we were now trying to move it up yet another level, to see whether we could get some results. MR. CAVALLUZZO: I don't know if you need to refer to it, Mr. Commissioner, but that letter can be found at Exhibit $P-48$ at tab 20, which is a letter from Prime Minister Chretien, dated July 11th, 2003, to President Assad.

Is that the letter that Senator De Bane carried with him?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I believe so, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The language that
the Prime Minister used, as you can see, is:
"I can assure you that there
is no Canadian government
impediment to his return."
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, as we are
moving through --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: But I would assume that the statement by the Prime Minister, "there is no Canadian government impediment", covers all the Canadian government.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. On August the 1st of 2003, we see that there is a change in the public position of Ambassador Cellucci.

Do you recall that change?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: In August?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: August 1st of 2003.

You may recall that on or about July $30 t h$, there was a reported statement of

Solicitor General Easter about possible rogue elements in the RCMP, and shortly thereafter there was a public statement by Mr. Cellucci which was somewhat different.

I am showing you P-44. This is Friday, August 1st, The Ottawa Citizen, and the title of the article is: "RCMP didn't turn in Arar, U.S. Embassy statement conflicts with claims by Powell and Cellucci".

And it opens up:
"The U.S. Embassy says the RCMP had no direct role in the arrest and deportation to Syria of an Arab Canadian on suspicion of being linked to al-Qaeda. The denial yesterday comes after the RCMP faced allegations of helping the U.S. to deport a Canadian citizen to a country known for torture and calls for a parliamentary inquiry from Amnesty International and the American Islamic

Relations Council."

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And then it goes on.
If you see in terms of the comment
of the report, about halfway down it says:
"The official denial of any
Canadian participation in Mr. Arar's deportation was made under pressure from the RCMP, sources say, and conflicts with statements made by U.S. Ambassador Cellucci and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell."

So do you recall certainly the public position of Mr . Cellucci changes at that point in time?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. Well, certainly it changed. Exactly the date, I don't recall.

But I certainly remember
Mr. Cellucci recognizing clearly at some point that, contrary to his prior statements, that in fact there was no one in Canada that was involved in the decision that the Americans made. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. You received a letter from Dr. Mazigh on July $23 r d$ of
2003. It's Exhibit P-48, tab 21.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Twenty-one?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, 21. And
this is a letter to the Prime Minister, dated July 23rd, 2003, a copy of which is sent to you.

The reference here is there is a
statement about the allegations of torture, and in
the fourth paragraph down it is stated:
"This is particularly
alarming because $I$ have just received news from the London-based Syrian Human Rights Committee that they have confirmed that my husband has been subjected to severe torture and intense interrogation."

We have certainly heard evidence, if you go back to Volume 5 of the DFAIT volumes, at tab 496 .

We see that a press conference is held. This is 496.

If you go to page 5 of 8 , you will see, at the bottom there, starting with Mr. Neve, it talks about:
"The following is a rough transcript based on closed captioning of a press conference concerning Maher Arar..."

And this is where there are allegations of torture from the Syrian Human Rights Committee.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And there are certain suggestions that are made.

For example, you are called upon to withdraw the Canadian ambassador to Syria, and I want you to comment on that: why, at this point in time, you felt it wasn't appropriate to withdraw the ambassador to Damascus at this time?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, there is
a series of diplomatic and other responses to every disagreement between states, of which this had now become that, of which calling in their ambassador, withdrawing your ambassador, engaged in embargoes and there are a host of actions which one can take, short of going to war, which seek to enforce your point of view.

So the question we would ask, and

I have to say that in this context, I was guided very much by the experts in the department, Mr. Pardy and others, by a series of considerations based on some experience we had had in other cases as well.

And calling back your ambassador has the advantage of being an extreme indication of displeasure on behalf of the state and therefore, you know, a way of registering your displeasure. We have done that on occasion, as we did in the tragic case of Madame Kazemi, when we called back our ambassador.

But the downside of that is it
leaves you in the country without an ambassador to be effective, if you believe you need an ambassador at that particular time. So that consideration has to be looked at from the point of view of the individual case involved. Will it be effective or not?

We called back our ambassador in the case of Madame Kazemi. Madame Kazemi, tragically, was dead. Mr. Arar was still alive, he was in jail, and there were two other Canadians in jail as well. It was our judgment that our ambassador was absolutely necessary in Damascus at
that time if we were going to give effective representation to protect their interests.

In addition to that, you have to take into account the global interests of Canada as a whole. Syria was, as you pointed out earlier, in a key geographic position in an extreme tinderbox where we were engaged in the Middle East peace process and a lot of other issues. If we were going to call back our ambassador, that might have as well impeded our ability to have effective representation for Canada in that respect.

So overall, basically, we weighed all the advantages, all the pros, all the cons, and decided in this circumstance it would have been unadvisable to call back the ambassador.

And I still believe that was -- I strongly believe that was the right decision in this case. I do not think it would have furthered the case of Mr. Arar, and in fact it might have made it worse.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In terms of what
in fact happened, if you go now to tab 521 in Volume 6, at page 13 of the backgrounder, in "Advice to the Minister" in paragraph 2 we see
that:
of 16?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thirteen of 16,
yes. In paragraph 2 --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Paragraph 1?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Paragraph 2 is
what $I$ am going to ask you about.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It says:
"At 16.30 August 7, MJM..."
That is Assistant Deputy Minister
John McNee? Do you recall that?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, that would be Mr. McNee.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I was going to
say I hope I haven't reached the point where I know these initials better than the Minister.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, let's put
it this way. You have spent a lot more time on this case in the last recent period of time than $I$ have.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I sure have. HON. BILL GRAHAM: I hope you are
more familiar.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That person:
". . . convoked Ambassador Ahmad Arnous of Syria to convey concerns of Canadian government on the Arar case. MJM referred to media attention aroused by the allegations of torture made by the Syrian Human Rights Committee. He noted that MINA. . ."

Or the Minister.
"... would likely comment publicly and that he had asked the MJM to underscore the problem in person to the Ambassador."

So you sent an envoy to the Syrian ambassador expressing those concerns concerning these allegations of torture.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You also held a press scrum on August 14th.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And just to give context to this, as we know, August 14 th of 2003 was the final consular visit that Mr. Martel had with Mr. Arar, and shortly after that visit you held a press scrum which can be found behind tab 505.

If you go 12 lines up from the
bottom it says -- and this is you speaking.
The date, by the way, says 13
August 2003. We have checked that. That is the incorrect date. It is August 14 th.

This is tab 505?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Obviously my book
is out of whack here, if someone could find the press scrum of August; Bowden's?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Counsel, maybe
this isn't appropriate for me to do this, but in that 505, whatever it is, if you turn to page 4, you will see there that Amnesty International states that:

> "Mr. Arar must be released immediately if he is not charged with a recognizably

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criminal offence.

And they go on to suggest that these charges must be laid and there must be a trial in respect of that.

So that is no different from the position that $I$ took in respect of either release him or prosecute him.

So, so far, Ms Mazigh and Amnesty
International both agree that saying to the Syrians "charge him and give him a chance to defend himself" was not an unreasonable position to take.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And that's helpful, thank you.

Actually, it is tab 405. I have 505 and everyone else has 405, and it's in Volume 4.

It should, at the top, say
"Bowden's Media Monitoring Ltd."?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: As I say, the date at the top is incorrect. It should be August 14 th.

But if you go 12 lines from the bottom it states:
"I'd like also to address another case $I$ know you're all interested in: the case of Mr. Arar who is in jail in Syria. I've just been speaking to my officials in Ottawa, who have been on the phone to Damascus this morning. Mr. Arar has been visited by our consular officials in jail. Our consular officials have assured us that he's in good physical condition. He personally, totally rejects all allegations of torture. He was interviewed independently by our consular officials and he has stated that his condition is better than it was before we started to intervene on his behalf."

In terms of this particular scrum, just taking one thing at a time, first of all, the statement "he was interviewed independently by our
consular officials"?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: All of the
evidence that we -- and it is uncontradicted
evidence. In the eight or nine consular visits that Mr. Arar had, not on one occasion, not for ten seconds, was the consular official Mr. Martel alone with Mr. Arar.

So this statement that he was interviewed independently, which seems to suggest that, is clearly contrary to the evidence we have before this inquiry.

I am wondering if you have any
comments on that?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, the only explanation would be that I've misunderstood the briefing I was given, which is -- you will appreciate the circumstance of this was, as you can see from this press conference, I was speaking to the case of William Sampson. As I went down to give the press conference on Wellington Street about Mr. Sampson, $I$ was told going down the escalator, we've got breaking news on Mr. Arar: that you will recall there were the allegations of torture.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: The ambassador
then spoke to the General and we got consular access to Mr. Arar.

My information was we have had
access to Mr. Arar. He has confirmed, in circumstances which are beyond any doubt -obviously I've said independently -- but in circumstances beyond any doubt that he was not being tortured at that time.

Now, that is the information $I$
got. That was the information $I$ was seeking to convey.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: And just
reviewing the notes of what took place subsequently -- and I wouldn't have known because I wasn't there, obviously -- I see that in fact clearly people, officials were in the room, translators and others, but that $I$ think there was some suggestion that the General who normally stuck around the whole time walked in and out.

All $I$ can say was $I$ had the impression that this was a conversation with Mr. Arar that was in much freer circumstances than
before.
So I might have gone too far in saying independently, but $I$ certainly was trying to say -- you know, we felt we were getting -- I felt that at least $I$ was being told this is a chance where Mr. Arar is freely expressing himself as to what took place and he is not under any inhibitions. That's what $I$ would have been told. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Not under any inhibitions other than the fact that there are a number of --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: People around. MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- Syrian
detainers in the same room.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The information
that Mr. Arar "totally rejects all allegations of torture", is this as well the information that you received on that day?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, I believe
that's what $I$ was told.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. So that
your information to this point in time, in light of your earlier evidence as to whether he was tortured early in the piece, that is the first two
weeks, your information as of August 14 th, then, is that Mr. Arar has never been tortured?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: That is basically -- now, whether or not this is the allegations of torture that were suggested in the -- I mean, this is all in context of the meeting that took place in London, the allegations in London.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Whether they
went back right to the earliest days, or whether they were about the time of his then incarceration, I don't know.

But my understanding is that we were informed and $I$ was informed that there were -- that he rejected having been tortured, from the information $I$ was given.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. But you told us earlier this morning that no official told you that he had been tortured in the first few weeks of his --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- if he was
there for two weeks prior to them disclosing his whereabouts and certainly up to August the 14 th,
your information is he was never tortured?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. Yes, sir.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. As time
goes on -- and you referred to this earlier -- you had a meeting with the Syrian Foreign Minister on September the 25th at the United Nations.

If you go to tab 580, the last tab
in Volume 6 --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry, what
number?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: 580. It's the
very last tab in this volume.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: When we met
earlier last week, you told me that these were like speaking notes that you would carry and look at prior to meeting the Minister.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And obviously you were talking about Mr. Arar's situation, and there are a couple of aspects to it which I think are important.

On the first page, for example,
you are saying there is no impediment to his
return to Canada.
On the second page you talk about investment in Canada, that we are looking forward to receiving Syrian business in petroleum missions next year, and so on and so forth, obviously bringing to bear the Syrian interest in improving bilateral relations with Canada.

When it comes on to Maher Arar it says:

> "We are grateful for Syria's continuing cooperation in providing our Embassy consular access to Mr. Arar, including the exchange of information ..."
> Then there's an extensive background, and in effect you are making your pitch to Mr. Shara'a, and in the previous tab as well, to get Mr. Arar released, if possible, to Canada.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, these are the department's notes that are to kind of jog my memory, an aide-memoire, that they would have given me to carry around.

The way it works in New York, when

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you go to the General Assembly, is you will have perhaps five or six meetings with foreign ministers every day you are there, because you are there and everybody is in town at the same time so you can get everybody.

So it is a very intense time, and
you probably have, as $I$ say, five, sometimes six or seven meetings, bilateral meetings with foreign ministers.

We were able to arrange a meeting
with Mr. Shara'a, so I would have got this book about him, like $I$ would have got for other people. But I understand there's actually a briefing note on what we actually said. This is what they told me to say. I mean, I don't necessarily say what they tell me to say. I sometimes have my own way of putting it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: So I would be
happier looking at what $I$ actually said rather than what the department suggested I said, as being a more accurate reflection of what took place at that meeting. MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is in here somewhere. My colleague will no doubt find it.

But who attended this particular
meeting? Is this the meeting at which the security official attended with Mr. Shara'a?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. This
would have been the Foreign Minister, probably an official from his United Nations delegation, and a security official. And as well, on my side, I believe Rob Fry was there with me --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Maybe if you look
at --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: There would
have been somebody from the embassy as well who would have been there. There would have been a note taker there.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Look at 533.
This may jog your memory a bit.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: 533?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Correct. It's
entitled: "Meeting with Mr. Farouk Al-Shara'a, Minister of Foreign Affairs".

HON. BILL GRAHAM: 533?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: 532, yes.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. Well,
again, this is just a larger version of what you just showed me. I mean, they prepared --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's all we have.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, in
reviewing this case, $I$ was shown a compte rendu of the actual meeting that took place between myself and the Foreign Minister, and it was a very extensive discussion about what $I$ discussed. I have read at it and we looked at it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You have read it,
but $I$ think it's completely redacted.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Oh, okay.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You have an
advantage.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: There you are.
So you can ask me questions about who said what to whom about what. You can decide to what extent you want to redact me as we go along.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If I am going to redact you, $I$ am going to throw this at you, and that means don't say anything.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: At that point $I$ will duck and get under the table, and we can all go home.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you can, first
of all, tell us what Mr. Shara'a said he would do, if anything, on your behalf relating to Mr. Arar? By the way, there were other things you discussed. You discussed Iraq, and so on.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: There's a lot
of stuff, including -- you will have seen the references to trade and things like that.

Where that figures is, if I'm having a meeting like this with Mr. Shara'a, with any foreign minister of a country where we have these types of problems, my approach always was to say, "Look, you want to have better relationships between Canada your country. You want more trade relations. You've got Syrian nationals in Canada. We've got Canadians in Syria. However, if we are going to strengthen our ties, we have to have some sense that human rights are being observed in your country."

Now, I've made this pitch not only in the occasion of Syria but many other countries where we've had similar discussions.

And my view is that $I$ tell the foreign minister opposite me, "Look, you are not going to get better relations if Canadians don't
believe they are going to get a fair shake in your jurisdiction, in your country. Who is going to go and invest money in your country if in fact they are likely to get into jail, be treated arbitrarily, and abused, and have no recourse?" So with that as background, I say, "Look, I'm willing to work with you on better relations, but the case of Mr. Arar and the other two cases we've spoken to are direct impediments to our ability to do that, because the Canadian public and anybody who wants to go to Syria is of the view that the regime is not one which is going to treat people fairly." So from there we moved to Mr. Arar, and the Foreign Minister assured me that he would do his best to bring this to a positive conclusion, and, again, $I$ reiterated the fact that we wanted Mr. Arar released to Canada and that was what we wanted, and it was at this point that the intelligence official who was present there, and I don't know whether I'm entitled to say this, because it seems to -- but you can stop me if -MR. CAVALLUZZO: You already have said it.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, well, the
intelligence official -- okay, so I'm -- the intelligence official who was there said that -my recollection is he said, well, Mrs. Arar has made so much fuss about this case in Canada and there's so much bad publicity of Syria in Canada around this case, we, the intelligence people, have no intention of releasing Mr. Arar whatsoever.

So he virtually contradicted the Foreign Minister and, you know, I said, well, I'm dealing with the Foreign Minister, and I think if you want good relations with Canada, we have to proceed on the footing we're going to work on.

So there was clearly -- clearly there was a disagreement between the intelligence official there and the Foreign Minister about how to approach this case. There's no doubt about it.

The Foreign Minister was cordial and willing to talk about how we could try and get to a positive conclusion, with a much more negative attitude of the intelligence person.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just out of interest, did the Foreign Minister admonish the security official for talking out of line?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, he didn't,
no -- well, $I$ can't remember that. You can ask Mr. Fry. I mean, he'll be giving evidence. I believe he was there, so... He might have a better recollection of that.

I don't believe he did that. But
he did have a different approach. He really did say, no, I'll work with you, Bill, to try and resolve this. So there certainly was two distinct messages we were getting in the room.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: There's a note in
Exhibit P-42 that $I$ would ask you to comment on, at tab 122?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: P...
MR. CAVALLUZZO: P-42.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Forty-two?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, P-42.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: At what number?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: 122. It's way
out of order. It's in volume 1, that
unfortunately is a year out of order.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: 122.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: 122. These are handwritten notes.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Can you tell us
whose handwritten notes these are? I understand they're Aileen Carroll's.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, I've been advised that they're notes made by my then Parliamentary Secretary, Minister Carroll. But apart from that $I$ don't know under what circumstances she made them, or...

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. At page 2 , that $I$ would ask you about, it says:
"Can. For. Min. met his
Syrian Counterpart in N.Y. yesterday. He pressed for
the return of Mr . Arar to
Canada. Failing his return, he insisted that there would
be a fair and open trial
ASAP.
He was given assurances by
the Syrian For. Min. of
continued consular access and
that all of our demands will
be conveyed to Syrian
Judicial Authorities."
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did Ms Carroll

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attend at this meeting, or is this just a report back?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: No, I don't
think so. I think you'd have to ask her. But I think probably she made this note as a result of a conversation.

I'm not sure she was in New York with me. She might have been. But I don't believe she was at that meeting.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: And I don't
know why she would have made that note.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: There's another,
I guess, reference that $I$ would make. At 581, you're maybe asked a question about this, but you got a certain newspaper report with headlines -this is dated September 25 as well -- saying that Arar can get a fair trial in Syria, and then it says "Graham".

And we've already asked you certain questions about seeking -- how one can get a fair trial in Syria, and you've answered those questions.

But just to put this in total context, at this point in time your officials are
attempting to assist or facilitate Mr. Arar and his family in getting counsel that -- you're appointing Mr. Lockyer as an independent observer who would attend the trial, if a trial takes place. And at this point in time there's a suggestion that it's not a military court, but is a civilian court. Is that correct?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: That was certainly capital for me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Then I'd like to move now to your
notes for September. We're getting to the end now, September 29. This is your diary. Monday, September 29.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: P-107?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes.
--- Pause
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And if you could
read those notes to us, just to clarify it?
HON. BILL GRAHAM:
"...still not clear who said what to who. Did the CIC..."

This was speculation we had.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The CIC being

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the?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Canadian
Immigration.
There was -- in the office when we're sitting around talking about this, we're saying, if somebody talked to the Americans -- I mean, who could it possibly be? RCMP? CSIS? Well, maybe an immigration officer spoke to another immigration officer. This was pure speculation on our part.

We're just trying to find out.
It's still alleged by -- although I -- this may have been post to when Mr. Cellucci denied the American involvement. But Mr. Powell was still saying to me that somebody told somebody. So we're still --

The Mounties and CSIS swear, no, it's not them, that have told anybody. Now I don't know what the rest of the line says, but then that's just a philosophical reflection on my part. What is justice in this Kafka-esque situation? It was basically a frustrating reflection on my part about what chance did Mr. Arar have to have justice?

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You can't -- rumours are spreading
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around about him. There's allegations all over the place. No trial, no chance to defend yourself, and it just seemed to me that it was entirely Kafka-esque.

That's why we were trying as hard
as we were to get him out, at least to get to Canada where, as I say, if there was a problem he could clear his name, and in a proper process.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, on October
1, you met the Secretary-General of the Arab League in Ottawa?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Who is he?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Amir Moussa.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Go on. If you
could just tell us the --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well,
Mr. Moussa is a former Foreign Minister of Egypt and an extremely prominent person in the Middle East, and, as Secretary of the Arab League, an extremely powerful person.

I had had the opportunity to make his acquaintance in New York. He came to Canada. We were discussing matters such as the then Israeli fence or wall (which was a matter of great
controversy at the time in the Middle East) and generally Middle East prospects for peace in the Middle East.

And I took the opportunity to raise with him what I've said before, that I said to him that it seemed to me that one of the problems bedeviling us in our relationships with middle eastern countries were these consular cases. I was thinking specifically of Mr. Sampson and Mr. Arar frankly.

And I said one of the problems we have is the Canadian public had had a very bad opinion of how conditions are in the Middle East, and particularly conditions of human rights and normal liberties that we as Canadians take for granted.

I said, Amir, if you can help us with these cases, it would be extremely helpful if you would do it.

So he undertook to do that, and we then went outside and did a press scrum together where we talked about all the issues. And then, at the end of the press scrum, where he was asked by the press about various items, he then said to me on the way out, he said, $I$ see what you mean.

The press are really exercised about these.
I said, yes, these are very, very
important issues. I would appreciate if you phoned the Foreign Minister of Syria or anybody else and see if you could get some support for us. So we left it at that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And
shortly thereafter, on October 3 or 4, you received a call while you were in Rome?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And could you
tell us about that?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, I guess, Rome, I think was a NATO summit, and I believe Minister Shara'a phoned obviously Ottawa and they patched the call through there -- it was an early morning call -- and he said that Mr. Arar was being released because of the Prime Minister's request to President Assad.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you
notified -- who did you notify as a result of that call?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, my recall is we phoned immediately -- obviously Ms Mazigh would have been the first person and most
important person to inform.
Obviously we were elated by the
news, but my recollection is that we were nervous about getting out ahead about announcing it because my recollection of what took place was Mr. Arar was released to Mr. Martel, and then Mr. Martel accompanied him back.

But we did not want to make any public comment about it until we could get Mr. Arar safely in either another country or in Canada, and therefore, any calls I would have made would have been strictly to say, look, it looks like we've got this going. Let's make sure he gets home before we make any public announcements about it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Now, upon Mr. Arar's return to
Canada, originally you were going to meet him in early October; however, that was postponed to October 29.

And if you go to tab 625, we see a briefing note for you concerning the meeting you are going to have with Mr. Arar.

And at 634, if you would look at 634, we have a summary of that meeting.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry. 634?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, 634. We can skip 625, which are the minutes or talking points or briefing notes for you, and 634 is dated Friday, October 31, and is a summary of the meeting.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Where you met for -- Mr. Graham, yourself, and Mr. Fry met for 30 minutes, and then with Dr. Mazigh and Maher Arar, and then subsequent to that time, a number of officials came in as well as Mr. Lockyer and Ms Pither and Mr. Neve from Amnesty International?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you had a thorough discussion on what happened.

However, what I want to ask you about is about the torture allegation that is referred to in paragraph 3.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You will see that it says:

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"Torture allegation is
inconsistent with statements
made by Arar to Martel during
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the meeting on August 14 in Damascus... and on October 6 while en route back to Canada."

And then it says:
"Please confirm info in ref messages..."

And so on and so forth.
And we'll look at responses to
that in terms of the inconsistencies --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: So this would
be from Mr. Chesson to Damascus saying to them that in the meeting that Mr. Arar had with me, he then told us about the torture and how he had been treated, and it was inconsistent with what we had been advised from Damascus up to that time, basically, is what this is saying.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. And he's
asking Damascus --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: So this was
from a note taker that was in the meeting then sending to Damascus, "What's going on here? There's a total inconsistency."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
And he's asking Damascus for
clarification.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Okay.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And then a
few days later, on November 4, Mr. Arar -- if you go to tab 648, Mr. Arar has a press conference and there's a press scrum that you have on that day?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. I had
an earlier scrum where, as I recall, I said I wasn't going to talk about it until he talked about it, basically. So this would have been after he actually spoke.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And as far as the questions that you were asked, for example, the question at the top of page 1 : "...allegations are so horrifying. Why not a public inquiry to get to the bottom of it?"

And then you say:
"Well, certainly Mr. Arar's allegations are terrible. Unfortunately, $I$ was in cabinet this morning, so I wasn't able to watch what he said publicly, but $I$ met with
him last week as you know, and he shared with me some of his experiences which are horrifying for us as

Canadians to understand that a justice system could operate in that way."

And then it goes on:
"And I will be calling in the Syrian ambassador immediately after lunch where I'm going with --"

Who is that? Mr. Mbeki?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: The President
of South Africa. It wasn't to suggest that he was going to express our concerns together. There was a lunch with the President of South Africa, and I would immediately be dealing with the Syrian Foreign Minister, the Syrian Minister. I imagine the lunch was probably at the Governor General's with Mr. Mbeki, if my memory is -- that can only be what it would be.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In any event, you had the ambassador called in where you expressed concerns about the allegations of torture?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And do you
recall --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Do you
recall whether Mr. Arar's press statement -- was that consistent with the kind of allegations he shared with you on October 29?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Mr. Arar's?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. Yes. I
mean, I absolutely believe --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: -- that he -he then went specifically public with what he told us in private, and there was no inconsistencies.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. At 649 we have something called Arar talking points, which relate to --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: 649.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: 649. And I assume this is the kind of document that would be prepared for the Minister in dealing with these allegations of torture? Or do you recall this document at all? I understand that Mr. Fry
prepared these notes?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Could be, or
they might have been prepared by my Communications Director, but Mr. Fry could speak to that. I think they may well have been.

These would be talking points that
I could use if $I$ were in a press scrum or were asked questions about it. They're an aide-memoire of the events so that $I$ would, you know, get it -keep things straight.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Okay.
Now, on November 5, if you go to the next tab, 550 --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: 650?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: 650. Excuse me.
Correct. That you're going to be getting in touch with Mr. Powell again. The summary is:
"On November 5, Minister
Graham placed a telephone
call to Secretary Powell on
the issue of Maher Arar,
conveying to Powell the
pressure the Canadian
government was coming under
to conduct a public inquiry

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into the case, and his concern over the negative impact this could have on the bilateral relationship. In response to the Minister's request for assistance in determining who in the Canadian government might have conveyed information to American authorities concerning Mr. Arar, Secretary Powell undertook to look into the matter immediately."

So this was a phone call that you
made to Mr. Powell?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And I understand
it followed a statement in the House by the Prime Minister about if the Americans have a name, then they should give it to us, sort of message. Is that correct?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes. It may
have been even almost contemporary with it, because I noticed Mr. Chrétien, when he answered
his question in the House -- I had a look at his answer -- and I think he said something like "my Foreign Minister tells me he's phoned Mr. Powell." So it might have been -- I might have phoned Mr. Powell in the morning, and Mr. Chrétien gave his answer in the House, or it might have been reverse. I wouldn't remember that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Certainly the minutes or the summary of this phone call is you shared with Mr. Powell the background of your discussions with him concerning this problem.

In paragraph 3 you informed him of what had happened the day before. There was the press conference, where there were detailed and credible account of Mr. Arar's experience in Syria. He had described his torture in Syria in great detail and had given details concerning his arrest in New York, et cetera, et cetera.

And then finally in paragraph 4 it states:

> "The Minister told Powell
> that the Government was coming under tremendous pressure to conduct a public

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inquiry into this case, including calls for Syrian and American officials to be summoned to testify. Of course, US officials could not be compelled to testify, but such an inquiry would nevertheless not be beneficial for Canadian-US relations. The Minister indicated that after Powell told him that information had been provided by Canadian authorities, he had talked to various agencies concerned but that the investigation had revealed nothing."

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. So this was still -- this is after the Prime Minister in the House, as I believe, said, you know, we're asking the American authorities to tell us because Mr. Arar had said he understood that Canadians had been implicit complicit in his removal.

So the Prime Minister ratcheted it up. The Prime Minister's level, that, as you can
imagine, got the attention of the ambassador and everybody else.

So I then had this call with
Mr. Powell to say, "Look..." -- I obviously didn't remind him in this conversation that, in fact, his ambassador had already contradicted that. But in any event, he was still of the position that somebody in Canada was involved.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: And it was only
then subsequent to that that he made his inquiries and came back to me and said, "Well I agree with you, there wasn't."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We have to be very careful here, but $I$ understand that the ambassador to the U.S. in Washington, Mr. Kergin, tried to get information as well concerning --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, there was some confusion in Washington around this issue, which extended into the National Security Council, and so the ambassador was engaged to that time. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just for counsel's benefit, at tab 711 in Volume 8, we see a very redacted e-mail from Mr. Kergin sent to the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Harder at that time,
the subject being "Arar."
And all it says is:
"At NACO reception last night, I approached ... to
have his take on this
intelligence imbroglio."
It is signed by Kergin. And then
there's a post script to it:
"PS Not surprisingly, I have not heard back following my
request of ... for more
information concerning
Canadian interlocutors
leading up to Arar's
deportation."
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, at tab 740,
this is a memo to you dated November 21 , which attempts to explain the inconsistencies we talked about between the statements of August 14 th and Mr. Arar's allegations in the press conference.

Do you see that?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: This goes back
to the meeting in August that $I$ then talked about in my press conference.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: The meeting
that provoked the press conference statement that he had had independent --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We looked at that
e-mail or we had that e-mail to Damascus saying there is an inconsistency and, Damascus, explain. HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this is just a summary of that.

You will see in paragraph 4 it talks about -- this is Mr. Martel. We will start at paragraph 3:
"The Canadian Consul, Mr. Leo Martel, reported on that meeting in a confidential message to the Department on August 14, 2003, the main excerpts of which follow."

And then paragraph 4:
"An interpreter and two aides were present. Mr. Arar was pleased to see the Consul and

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thanked all concerned, including the Syrian authorities, for making this visit possible. The Consul questioned Mr. Arar on the conditions of his detention and asked whether he needed anything. Mr. Arar made no special request, but was pleased that reading material was brought for him. He expressed himself freely at times, indicating that:

- prison conditions had been more difficult in the past than now;
- he did not want adverse media publicity in Canada as this would only harm his case, and he added that 'the press will know the truth when $I$ return home';
- he had not been beaten,
tortured or paralysed (asked to explain the latter term,


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he could not find another word);

- his long detention had destroyed him mentally; and
- as far as he knew, he was
not being treated worse than
other prisoners worse than
other prisoners."
And then it goes on:
"The Syrian official said
that Mr. Arar was due to
appear before a civilian
court within a week."
And it talks about:
"... the account circulated
in a chronology prepared by Mr. Arar and distributed at his press conference ... indicates that he told the Canadian Consul in English in front of the Syrian officials about his cell and the conditions that he was living in. In his account, he states the Consul asked if he


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had been tortured and Arar replied, 'Yes of course, at the beginning.' Arar's account is contrary to the Embassy's report of the August 14 visit on this point, and thus appears to be inaccurate."

And that is a memo which was signed by both John McNee, the Assistant Deputy Minister we have referred to earlier, and Mr. Harder, who at that point in time is the --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: New Deputy
Minister, right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
I would like to go now to a couple of final documents at Volume 9 .

Let us look at tab 749. This is
another less redacted document which was introduced this morning, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right. What
was the "P" number this morning?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I am just looking for it.

MS McISAAC: 105.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. So we might as well work off 105?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes. It coincides with 749 .

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, it would
appear that Mr . Powell returned your call on December the 1st, if we look at $\mathrm{P}-105$ ?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: I am just
looking at it.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: I see. This is
the same one but ...
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, just less
redacted.
It says in the summary portion:
"In a phone call on December
1, Secretary of State Colin
Powell provided a number of responses to Minister Graham on the Arar case. Namely,

Powell confirmed that the decision to deport Arar to Syria was taken by the U.S. alone without consulting

Canada."
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: "He denied Arar was inoculated with any substance while in US."

Then it goes on: "Minister Graham took advantage of the opportunity to raise with Powell the idea of the US and Canada negotiating a protocol ..."

Which we will come to. And then
there is a number of references to the four
questions, starting in paragraph 4:
"First, concerning who had provided the US Government with information it used in making the decision to deport Arar."

Then it's blacked out. Then there is the second, and so on and so forth, and $I$ just leave that to the parties to read.

But if we go to $P-106$, we have a fuller account in the chronology of this phone conversation, the phone conversation at the top of
page 2 of $P-106$, for December 1, 2003.
Do you have that at the top of the second page?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, I do. I
mean -- it's a chronology of events. It says "Secret - Canadian Eyes Only", but who is it prepared by and for whom?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, I wonder if government counsel would assist us, but I assume it is prepared by DFAIT concerning a chronology, and it would be prepared by officials in your office, presumably.

MS McISAAC: Well, that is
correct. After Mr. Arar returned to Canada, at the request of $P C O$ the departments involved, including Foreign Affairs, were asked to prepare a chronology of their involvement with respect to the matter, and this is a portion of that chronology.

This particular paragraph summarizes the information in the e-mail you were just looking at.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right. The document as a whole would not have been exclusively DFAIT prepared. It would have been a
whole-of-government prepped document.
MS McISAAC: Each of the departments prepared their own chronologies. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Let us just refer then to this chronology. It states: "MINA and US Secretary of State Powell speak on the telephone."

Once again, this is December 1st, 2003. "Powell informs that (1) the Arar affair was triggered by enquiries by Canadian sources and that Arar would not have been on the US radar screen had he not been the subject of attention by Canadian agencies; (2) contrary to what he had alleged, Arar had not been inoculated with any substance while in US custody; (3) US law enforcement officials had informed the RCMP about

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Arar's detention and the RCMP had informed the Consulate General in New York; and (4) no Canadian officials were consulted prior to the US decision to deport Arar. MINA refers to a meeting the previous week of Solicitor General Easter and Attorney General Ashcroft when Easter raised the possibility of a bilateral protocol to deal with such cases in the future."

And does that capture the
telephone conversation you had --
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Probably a
series of telephone conversations, as you suggest. I mean, there was the one when $I$ was in Maastricht. There was the one before that. But I would say that's an accurate summation.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And as far as
your responsibilities as Minister of Foreign Affairs are concerned, is that the last statement of the position of at least the Secretary of State
as to what happened in respect of Mr. Arar that you are aware of?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, I believe so. I might have discussed -- I don't believe I would have discussed this matter then any further, once we had achieved the Memorandum of Understanding. So this would be the last time that Mr. Powell would have raised this issue with me, yes. I believe that to be the case.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Just two
other matters.
One would be -- okay. Really, the final document then is tab 791, once again in the last volume.

THE COMMISSIONER: 799?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: 791. And this is
what has been referred to as the Monterey
Protocol, which is an understanding reached between Canada and the United States concerning the removal of nationals to third countries. We have a letter to Mr. Powell
from Mr. Graham, which is dated January 13th, 2004, and a counterpart letter from Mr. Powell to Mr. Graham, dated January 13th, 2004 .

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Wherein what the understanding is, is that in a situation in the future, that prior to removing somebody from the United States that the United States government or the Canadian government indeed would at least consult with officials in the other government so that there could be a discussion prior to the removal of that person.

Do you see that?
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And I guess the only question that $I$ would have for you in respect of this protocol is: Is it worth anything?

We have an American government which seems to be acting unilaterally, doing what it wants in its own interests, and what meaning is there to have them have an obligation to consult with the Canadian government prior to removing a Canadian citizen to another country where that person might be tortured? What good is it?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, it clearly is not as effective as an outright undertaking not to deport anybody under these circumstances, which would have been a preferred option of the Canadian government.

But as you said, the security position taken by the United States at this particular time meant that they were not -- we explored all possible avenues and were told the best arrangement we could get would be an agreement to consult.

Therefore, we entered into this agreement. We will have to see how it is applied in the future.

I would not be as cynical as your question suggested to me, largely because my experience, in terms of the practice between states is, once these things get consulted on, you have an opportunity to bring other people into the picture. I mean, clearly this envisages that the Director General of the Consular Affairs Bureau in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade will be advised by the appropriate official in Washington before anything like this would happen again.

Once that is done, alarm bells are going to go off all over the place, and if necessary, we can ratchet it up, call in the Prime Minister and the President. But you can be sure that the Prime Minister's Office could phone Andy

Card in the White House.
There would be a whole host of immediate responses that we could get to that would move this to an action level that $I$ believe would make it virtually most unlikely that they would go ahead in the light of a Canadian government objection, just because you are going to have such a high level of action on the file.

So I can't put it any higher than that, sir, but $I$ really do believe that this is a very effective protection against this happening in the future, because of the nature of what consequences would flow from consultation and the opportunity that it would give us to take that to the highest levels for reflection from the United States.

If, as you say, they were
determined absolutely they were going to do it, there is nothing we could do to stop them from doing it. But that's exactly why they wouldn't sign any such agreement. They are not going to bind themselves because they can't foresee unusual or unforeseen circumstances in the future where they would fetter their discretion.

But I believe this is a very
effective protection for Canadians, given the nature of how things work in international practice.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you will just
give me a second, Mr. Commissioner?
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That leaves just one final question, and it relates to -- maybe you could go to 756. This once again is something from ISI --

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Sorry, 756?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, 756, the
same volume.
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And it relates
to, if you go to page 2, at the top of the page it talks about:
"The delivery of consular
services has changed since
9/11; the new threats have
led to a more security
conscious world, making
travel in some cases more
risky. The delivery of
traditional consular services

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is now often greatly complicated by the security preoccupations of other countries. This has led
human rights advocates to become increasingly vocal in criticizing what they say is a disregard for customary international law.

Therefore, the Deputy has called for a review to be conducted by DFAIT's internal auditors to evaluate current consular policies, practices and procedures. This is being undertaken as an in-house matter."

Once again, this is dated December
4th, 2003.
on:
HON. BILL GRAHAM: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then it goes

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"DFAIT has a legislative
requirement to 'conduct all
... consular relations on
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behalf of Canada'. This we have done and are doing, but it often means that we (DFAIT consular officials) find ourselves in a state of confrontation with Canadian security authorities (CSIS and the RCMP). This is unlikely to change, but there must be more transparency and openness between the Departments and agencies to avoid the sort of 'nasty surprise' and 'failure to understand' each other's motives that have marked some cases."

Now, this, it seems to me, is a
refresher of the Pardy memo back in February or March of 2003, which may not have reached you.

Do you recall whether a
department-wide audit was done in respect of undertaking these consular services in the future? I am wondering whether you are aware of that. HON. BILL GRAHAM: Yes.

Mr. Harder, the then Deputy Minister, wanted to examine how we could be more effective in rendering consular services. And in addition to these matters, which would be ensuring that there was better coordination amongst internal government sources, one of the objectives of the departmental memorandum and the inquiry was to make sure that our consular officials in countries such as Syria or other countries where Canadians could not be guaranteed a similar level of legal or other protections, that the consular services would be sensitized to, for example, the possibility of torture or look for signs and make sure that nobody is being misled by anyone.

I believe that memorandum was
done. I believe that, like all experiences in life, the department has learned a great deal from this terrible experience and hopefully will be perfecting its performance of what it does for Canadians in the future based on the experience that they learned.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you. Commissioner, I will be speaking to government counsel. We are having discussions as to the document, and so on and so forth.

But other than that, Mr. Graham, thank you very much. That would complete the direct examination.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Thank you, sir.
THE COMMISSIONER: We will take
the afternoon break.
Ms Edwardh, do you know how long you will be?

MS EDWARDH: I had not intended to so quickly misspeak myself, Mr. Commissioner, but my friend has in fact gone longer than he thought he would, and Ms McIsaac and I were just caucusing as between the two of us whether we have created a real problem, since it's already --

THE COMMISSIONER: 4:15. So we would resume at 4:30.

MS EDWARDH: We will talk. I
guess the question is whether we can possibly complete the Minister today. That is really the issue.

THE COMMISSIONER: Maybe you can let me know after the recess if that's possible. Let's see if we can.

I think that is your preference, isn't it, Minister, to finish?

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Well, it
depends what you mean by "today",
Mr. Commissioner.
--- Laughter / Rires
HON. BILL GRAHAM: If you mean
11 o'clock tonight, $I$ am a little less happy.
I know Ms Edwardh is a very
thorough lawyer, so I am getting more and more nervous.

THE COMMISSIONER: Discussions
will take place during the break that will give us some guidelines. We will take 15 minutes.

HON. BILL GRAHAM: Thank you, sir.
THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Upon recessing at 4:20 p.m. /
Suspension à 16 h 20
--- Off Record Discussion / Discussion officieuse
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4:42,
to resume on Tuesday, May 31, 2005,
at 9:00 a.m. / L'audience est ajournée
à 16 h 42 , pour reprendre le mardi
31 mai 2005 à 9 h 00

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 Lynda Johansson, C.S.R., R.P.R.

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