

Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar

## Audience publique

## Public Hearing

L'Honorable juge /
Commissaire
The Honourable Justice
Commissioner Dennis R. O'Connor

Tenue à:
Salon Algonquin
Ancien hôtel de ville
111, Promenade Sussex
Ottawa (Ontario)
le mardi 14 juin 2005

Held at:
Algonquin Room
Old City Hall
111 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
Tuesday, June 14, 2005

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| Mr. Steven Shrybman | Canadian Labour Congress/Council of |
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| Mr. Emelio Binavince | Minority Advocacy and Rights |
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## APPEARANCES / COMPARUTIONS

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Ottawa, Ontario / Ottawa (Ontario)
--- Upon commencing on Tuesday, June 14, 2005 at 9:34 a.m. / L'audience reprend le mardi 14 juin 2005 à 9 h 34

THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Good
morning, Mr. Commissioner.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Good morning,

## Commissioner.

Today we are going to hear from Mr. Franco Pillarella. Mr. Pillarella will be testifying today and tomorrow.

I wonder if he might be sworn.
THE COMMISSIONER: He was sworn
before. Is it necessary to do it again?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is not
necessary to do it again, unless people who were not in attendance at the in camera proceedings would prefer that, and $I$ assume that there is no preference.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think it is fair enough. Mr. Pillarella has been sworn in.

Your evidence will be given
under oath.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
PREVIOUSLY SWORN: FRANCO PILLARELLA
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Commissioner, the
evidence of Mr. Pillarella will be broken down into five separate and distinct areas.

Initially I want to review with
him his education and professional background.
Second, I will review with him the
role of a Canadian Ambassador abroad, in
particular relationships with Canadian agencies.
Third, in light of
Mr. Pillarella's experience in Syria, we will be looking at the political landscape in Syria, including its human rights record.

Fourth, we will be dealing with
the role of the embassy in relation to other detained Canadians in Syria, in particular Mr. El Mati and Almalki,

Then, finally, the bulk of his
evidence will relate to the Arar time line, starting initially with the search for Mr. Arar in October of 2002 .

I am wondering if before you,

Mr. Commissioner, you would have Exhibit P-134, which is entitled Ambassador Franco Pillarella, newly redacted volumes, and Exhibit $P-137$, which was introduced yesterday. It is a loose-standing exhibit. I wonder if the witness may have that in front of him as well? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I do have a copy.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, it is another
document. Okay, we will have that.
As well as Exhibits 26, 27, 28
and 29.
EXAMINATION
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now,
Mr. Pillarella's curriculum vitae can be found behind Exhibit $P-85$, tab 125. There is no need to go to it as $I$ will summarize his education and professional background through questioning. Mr. Pillarella, I understand that in 1966 you graduated from the University of Ottawa Law School, the civil law program. Is that correct? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: After that time
you spent one year articling and then wrote the Quebec Bar exams?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: In 1967 you
started your career in the foreign service in the Legal Bureau Section?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I did. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.

Between 1988 and 1992 you were the Resident Head of the Canadian Military Mission, Consul General, in Berlin?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Between 1992 and
1997 you were the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Division.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That is the position that during the material time was held by Mr. Scott Heatherington.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Periodically
during that five-year period, I understand that you filled in as an Acting Director, in other words the ISB position, periodically during that time?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is correct.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Between 1997 and 2000 you had your first posting as Canadian Ambassador in Algiers?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: For our purposes the material time is between November 1, 2000 and September 13, 2003, you were posted as the Canadian Ambassador to Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: From the 29 th of September 2003 until the current time, you are now the Canadian Ambassador to Romania?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Accredited also to Bulgaria, Moldova and High Commissioner to Cyprus.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Initially, I would like to just talk generally about the period of time when you were in Damascus and, more particularly, between

October 2002 and the time at which you left in September 2003, and talk initially about the embassy in Damascus.

I understand that at that time there were approximately 100 employees?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: More or
less, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: These were both Canadian employees as well as local employees, or Syrian employees?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: There were
approximately 27 Canada-based people and the rest were local employees.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I
understand as well that not all of the employees assigned in the embassy in Damascus were members of the Department of Foreign Affairs

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
true. There were representatives of Immigration, for instance, representatives of the RCMP and CSIS.

All the programs -- various programs were represented at the embassy, programs related to other departments of the government.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I understand that about half of the employees were dedicated to immigration issues?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes,
because Damascus is a hub. Damascus was responsible for several countries in terms of immigration. For instance, we were responsible for Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Cyprus, and obviously for Syria.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
These employees, for example these immigration employees, would be members of CIC and not of DFAIT?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is correct.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. As far as the other half of the employees are concerned, we have heard a great deal about consular affairs, and I assume that there were other people dedicated from the DFAIT to issues other than consular affairs.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
Well, there were representatives of International Trade, for instance, and representatives from the
political side and public diplomacy and, of course, consular affairs.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Okay.
In respect of these employees
and other matters, $I$ would like to move on now to the role of the Canadian Ambassador abroad and focus as well on relationships with other Canadian agencies.

Initially, if you could refer the witness to Exhibit 11, which is the Book of Documents for Mr. Sigurdson.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Thank you.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you refer,
Mr. Pillarella, to tab 7, we will see the legislation which is governing your duties and responsibilities, and that is the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act.

As far as the duties and
responsibilities of an Ambassador are concerned, I would refer you to section 13(2). That particular provision -- and let me read it to you, and for those who do not have it -- provides that:
"Except as otherwise instructed by the Governor in Council, a head of
mission..."
That is defined as including an
Ambassador:
"...a head of mission shall have the management and direction of his mission and its activities and the supervision of the official activities of the various departments and agencies of the Government of Canada in the country or portion of the country or at the international organization to which he is appointed."

So it would appear that you have management and direction responsibilities related to the mission and its activities, and you have, if we can call it, supervisory responsibilities in respect of the official activities of the various departments and agencies.

As far as direction of these Heads of Mission, if you would refer to section 10 , which is the empowering provision relating to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This is
section 10(2).
Do you have that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Is this
the same tab?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, the
very same tab, section 10. It should be the previous page.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you go to subsection 2, it provides that the Minister, and obviously that is the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:
"In exercising his powers and carrying out his duties and functions under this Act ...
shall"
And I am going to refer to two
paragraphs. Shall 2(g):
"coordinate the direction
given by the Government of
Canada to the heads of
Canada's diplomatic and consular missions:
(h) have the management of

Canada's diplomatic and

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 consular missions".Now, in principle, although the Minister of Foreign Affairs is given powers of management, and so on, as specified in these two paragraphs, you are not appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in respect of your position.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is correct. The misconception usually about a Head of Mission, Ambassador or Consul General, is that he or she represents the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that is not correct.

A Head of Mission is appointed by Order in Council, that is by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the letters of credence are signed by the Governor General. In other words, the Head of Mission is the representative of the Canadian State abroad. He or she does not represent one single department.

The responsibilities of a Head of Mission are that of representing Canada with all the various departments and agencies that may be part of that government.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I think it is fair to say that anything that transpires between

Canada and the host government should be done with your knowledge and guidance, as being the Head of Mission?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, I
would like to get a little more specific in respect of your duties and responsibilities.

Our challenge there is made
somewhat easier if we refer to the evidence of Mr. Livermore. You can refer to Exhibit $P-134$ in the newly redacted documents, and we can find the overview statement of Mr. Livermore behind tab 26.

I am going to refer to certain aspects of Mr. Livermore's statement and ask you to comment if you want to add anything.

If we start at paragraph number 7 at the bottom of page 4, we see that, as you have stated, you are appointed to your position by the Order in Council, which means you are appointed by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and then it goes on.

In terms of that important distinction Mr. Livermore stated, at the top of page 5, that -- rather than Head of Mission, I'm going to refer to the Ambassador:

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"The (Ambassador) is ... responsible for the activities of the various departments and agencies of the Government of Canada in his area of accreditation, not simply those of Foreign Affairs Canada."

You would agree with that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: He is:
"...responsible for the conduct of bilateral relations."

Then, as you have stated:
"In principle, everything
that transpired between
Canada and the host
government should have been done with (your) knowledge and guidance."

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The Ambassador interprets the views of Canada to the foreign country and does the same interpreting

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that country to Canada. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It goes on
in paragraph 8 to say that:
"...the (Ambassador)
maintains coherence in the relationship and guides its development. He does this based on deep knowledge of the interests Canada may have in that relationship, an understanding of how that country and society work, the networks his embassy maintains with the influential people and decision-makers, and his skills of persuasion and leadership."

You would agree with that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes,
absolutely.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So since, as you
have described, you are the interpreter of Syria
to the Canadian government, it is very important that you have a good idea of the political and
economic conditions within Syria, as well as who are the key decision-makers in Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I would say that if the Ambassador doesn't do that, then he is not doing his job.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, it goes on and refers to Canadian staff, which we need not refer to, but it goes on in the second-last sentence and says:
"While the ambassador is his direct supervisor..."

That is Mr. Leo Martel, who is the consular official that we will be hearing from next Monday.
"...he receives day-to-day guidance..."

This is Mr. Martel would receive:
"...day-to-day guidance as
required from appropriate headquarters divisions within Foreign Affairs."

So that although you are responsible for the management of the activities, Mr. Martel's day-to-day supervision would come from headquarters?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then in the next paragraph it goes on to deal with Canada-based staff and non-residents, and so on.

Then it goes on, in the second sentence -- let me just read the whole thing: "It is worth noting that most missions have Canada-based staff members who are 'non-resident'. That means
that they do not reside in
the country in which the mission is located, but are accredited to it and travel back and forth from another
city to do their work. This
is a common arrangement with
liaison officers representing
CSIS, the RCMP or indeed the
Canadian Armed Forces..."
Then finally it states:
"They are expected, in
respect of their activities when visiting another post,

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to report to the head of mission and be guided by his instructions, while carrying out home agency responsibilities."

We cannot disclose the location of
the CSIS liaison officer, but $I$ understand that there is a CSIS liaison officer in the area that periodically comes to Damascus.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct. There is an officer from CSIS and, as well, an officer from the RCMP.

As for the Armed Forces, he was resident in Damascus.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The RCMP liaison
officer has the fortune to be located in Rome?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If it is
public knowledge, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is public
knowledge and it is in Mr. -- what, public
knowledge being a good place to be in Rome?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Both.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That is
public knowledge.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Both. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let us go on.

In paragraph 10 at page 6,
Mr. Pillarella, it states:
"For management purposes, the specific objectives of a head of mission are worked out by
a geographic branch at
Foreign Affairs, in
consultation with functional
branches..."
We have seen that there are --
for example, there is the Middle East and North African Bureau, there is the Middle East Division within that bureau, and there are other bureaus and divisions that may be called into play as a result of the nature of the problem that you were dealing with. For example, we will see something called foreign intelligence, security and intelligence, and they certainly were particular players, and we will come back to that in a second.

Then it goes on, halfway through paragraph 10, and states:
"The (Ambassador) is expected

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to exercise latitude and initiative in carrying out responsibilities in his country or region, and in doing so, he and the staff deal with a wide variety of other actors both public and private. A head of mission or an ambassador knows the main players in his country of accreditation, and he knows how the country works. In the case of Syria, the (Ambassador) would know which departments of the Syrian government were effective interlocutors with Canada. Indeed, a key objective of a new head of mission, upon arriving in the host country, is to get to know, quickly and effectively, the individuals who are the true decision-makers in that country."

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Then, finally:
"The (Ambassador) is also
considered a major
'interpreter' of that country
in Canada, to governments and others. In the case of Syria, the Canadian had of mission would be expected to analyze and explain to the Government of Canada Syria's influence in the Middle East peace process, Syria's attitude towards its neighbours, and Syria's foreign policy objectives more generally."

Then, finally, it states that: "The influence and leadership that the head of mission can exercise both in the country of residence and in Canada is a major factor in the success of his mission."

I would like to now turn,
Mr. Pillarella, to a number of questions relating

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to your relationship with other aspects of Foreign Affairs as well as other Canadian agencies.

Initially I would like to deal with Foreign Affairs, and that is ask you whether there is any policy, practice or protocol with respect to your communications with ISD, or security intelligence, and foreign intelligence, in other words the Security Intelligence Branch, in respect of when they have duties relating to Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't
know if I understand your question well, but it seems to me that the communication from the embassy to headquarters is directed to the division or the bureau or the branch that is most directly concerned with the issue at hand. So if, for instance, there is something that, as you suggest, concerns security, then obviously the message would be addressed to that particular division or bureau, but it could also be copied to other divisions that might have an interest as well.

So in this particular case it could be addressed to ISI or ISD. If it were a political issue, it would be addressed to the
political division. Depending upon the content of that particular message, one might decide as well to copy other divisions and even, for instance, the Security and Intelligence Bureau.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just let me
understand. Is that a practice or is it a written protocol or policy relating to what you have just described?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't believe that there is any written protocol that exists. It is the common practice.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I think the communication, $I$ believe that in some places it was described as being horizontal and vertical and this is one example, where the information may be distributed horizontally as well as vertically.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So if we take a concrete example like Mr. Arar's situation, which may have a consular aspect, may have a security aspect, may have a political aspect as well, in respect of reporting back to headquarters you would use your own discretion as to which particular divisions may be notified in respect of your reporting responsibilities?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
And depending on the subject matter the addressees or the action addressees might be multiple, might be, for instance, in this particular case, the Consular Bureau as well as the Security and Intelligence Bureau.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right, okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Or even, for that matter, the political bureau.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Within
Consular you may be sending something to Mr. Pardy and at the same time sending it to the Middle East desk, and so on and so forth?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: There may be
multiple addressees.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I must
make one distinction, is that it is never addressed outside of the department. In other words, it stays within the confines of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let us move on to agencies outside of Foreign Affairs and ask whether there is any policy, practice or protocol with respect to
communications with Canadian law enforcement and security intelligence agencies.

I just want to focus on relating to Canadians who are detained abroad. Let's not worry about other aspects. We are going to focus on Canadians detained abroad, and in particular I'm looking at the law enforcement agency being the RCMP and the security intelligence agency being CSIS, and that is whether there is a practice, protocol or policy in respect of your reporting, if any, to these two Canadian agencies? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Again, $I$ would say that there are memoranda of understanding that exists between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the other agencies that exist. However, when it comes to the reporting from the mission, as $I$ have indicated a moment ago, the reporting is done through the Department of Foreign Affairs, and then it is for the department and the various bureaus and divisions to decide what to do with that information, whether it is going to be disseminated elsewhere or not. But it is not the mission that does that. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I'm wondering, then, if you might help us in terms of
describing your relationship as the Head of Mission, or the Ambassador, in respect of what has been referred to in the Livermore document as the RCMP and the CSIS liaison officers?

Taking initially the RCMP, the liaison officer from Rome, who may periodically come to Damascus, what is your relationship with him or her?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, the relationship is the same as with any other head of program. The only difference is that he or she may be sitting elsewhere, not in Damascus.

So when the head of the program travels to Damascus in order to discharge his business, then it is obvious that he or she will report to the Ambassador and usually inform the Ambassador what the purpose of the visit may be. They may have cases to discuss with their counterparts and normally they can deal directly with these counterparts.

Sometimes they require the assistance of the Ambassador, and because it is the responsibility of the Head of Mission to assist them, then obviously the Ambassador will try to facilitate their work. But the Ambassador
does not substitute himself to the head of the program. It is for the head of program to do his or her job.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Well, let me just get a little more specific as far as one of these agencies, and let's just take the RCMP.

Assume that $I$ am the liaison
officer in Rome and $I$ come to Damascus, I report to the Ambassador at the embassy, and I say, "I have this ongoing investigation in relation to a Canadian who is detained in Syria. What can you do for me?"

In that situation, what could you
do in terms of assisting the RCMP officer in respect of the investigation that he or she is conducting?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, it depends on what the actual case might be. You are sort of speaking in general. There is no concrete example. For instance --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let me give you a concrete example. Let me be as specific as I possibly can at this point in time.

I come to you as the LO from Rome, RCMP, and I say, "I have this Canadian who is
detained at the Palestine Branch, which is under the supervision or jurisdiction of the Syrian Military Intelligence. I would like to question, or $I$ would like to do whatever, talk to the Syrian Military Intelligence in respect of what information they have on this individual." What could you do in those circumstances?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I think I will not retain your example because $I$ would have to correct it because $I$ don't think it applies like that.

But let me say this: What I could do for him or her is simply to open doors, to facilitate the access to whoever may be responsible for this particular case, and then try to facilitate the contact.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But I would not go beyond that. In other words, I would not act for the liaison officer. I will try to open doors.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I assume that the same thing would be true if $I$ used the example of a CSIS liaison officer? It would be the same
thing, that you could open doors, but after that it was up to them to pursue their --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- their own duties and responsibilities.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just a question
relating to that, and that is, assuming once again -- and we are going to get very specific with Mr. Arar's case, but assuming that this individual that is being detained in the Palestine Branch under the supervision of the Syrian Military Intelligence wants to get back to Canada, and as a result of that consular officials within your jurisdiction or supervision, like Mr. Martel, is trying to get his release from Syrian detention, pursuing the instructions, for example, of Mr . Pardy, as we will see in this case.

The question that $I$ have is: Is there not a conflict that you see when, on the one hand, you are supervising Mr. Martel to get this Canadian released from Syrian detention back to Canada and, on the other hand, you are opening the door for either CSIS or the RCMP to get

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information from the Syrian authorities in respect of that same Canadian detainee?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, again $I$ think the example that you are providing is a little bit misleading.

First of all, you are talking
about a Canadian being detained by the -- now, is this a Canadian with dual nationality or is this a Canadian with just the --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is a Canadian with dual nationality.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, a Canadian with dual nationality means that the country in question is not obliged by any international treaty or international law to recognize the second citizenship, which means that if the country, in this particular case that you are quoting, refuses to recognize the Canadian citizenship of that individual, there is very little that we can do.

We can certainly press the country
to say, "We believe and we consider that this individual is a Canadian citizen and, as such, is entitled to the assistance of the Canadian government." Of course we can say that, and we
normally do that. The point is that the country is not obliged to listen to us. So that is one thing.

To your question regarding the conflict between -- I think that -- no, I don't see any conflict at all, because these are two separate things.

The fact is that even if the individual is detained for whatever reason, that the country considers that -- for instance, they consider that he has broken some law, I don't know, he is still entitled to consular assistance.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Therefore,
the fact that a Canadian agency -- in this case you mentioned the RCMP -- wants to have access to this individual to pursue their investigation, that is fine.

But, on the other hand, that person, that Canadian citizen, is still entitled to the assistance of the Canadian government, and therefore the consular section of the embassy will do all it can to see -- because please keep in mind that consular access does not mean that the person will be released. Consular access means
that we have to verify that the person is well-treated, that the laws of the country are applied to this particular individual, as in any other case.

In other words, consular access doesn't necessarily mean that a person is going to be released.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Oh, absolutely. Certainly if we look at the case of Mr. Arar, the initial objective of Mr. Pardy in terms of the instructions given to consular officials was, "We want Mr. Arar released from Syria." That doesn't mean, of course, that they will release him, but that seems to be the objective.

The point $I$ guess I'm raising is, if you go to the Syrians on Monday saying, we want Mr. -- let's use a hypothetical, "We want Jim Jones released. He is being detained here. By the way, Tuesday I'm going to introduce you to the RCMP. They want to come over and question Mr. Jones." Don't you see that there may be a conflict here?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But, you
see, you are giving me one example which is a general one, and then you are giving me the
example of Mr. Arar. I would say let's take the general example.

The general example is, if you have a Canadian citizen who has broken some law into that particular country, that means that he or she will have to be submitted to the process in that particular country, and consular access does not mean that he is going to be freed.

Because in any other country -for instance, if you are in the United States and you break some law in the United States and you are arrested, of course you will be subject to the American law. You can still have access by a consular officer, but you are still submitted to the law of the country. If you have broken the law and if you are sentenced, then the consular access -- well, it will assist you, but it will not -- if due process is followed and the person is sentenced, there isn't much that one can do. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, let me then get very specific in terms of the policies which are applicable.

If you go once again to
Exhibit $P-11$, which is the Book of Documents of Mr. Sigurdson, at tab 22 we have something called

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 the "Manual of Consular Instructions"Do you see that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If you go
to page 13 of 75 you see the title under
paragraph 2.4.10 that talks about "Police Liaison Programs. The initial part talks about the RCMP, and we have discussed that.

About halfway down, it says "these programs" -- and they are talking about police programs and consular.
"These programs should not conflict, any more than, for example, law enforcement and legal aid programs on Canada, and missions should ensure that conflict is avoided both in reality and appearance.

Potential conflicts of interest, including perceived precedence of responsibility in police liaison and consular matters, should be adjudicated by the Head of Mission, who must weigh the

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merits of any case in the context of relations with the country concerned and of the rights and interests of the Canadian citizen involved, in consultation as appropriate with Headquarters..."

That would seem to suggest that there is a possibility -- there is a possibility, of conflict in respect of the execution of both programs, the police program and the consular program, and if such a conflict arises then the conflict should be resolved to the best of the ability of the Head of Mission, if perhaps in consultation with headquarters?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If there should be some conflict, yes, of course it would be resolved with the assistance of headquarters.

But you, as I said, gave a very general example where there is no such conflict. I mean, if the person is coming to inquire, as it is indicated here, it is prohibited from pursuing an investigation in the host country. So the liaison officer is not coming for that.

So, yes, if there should be a
conflict, yes, the conflict will be resolved. This is where the responsibility of the Head of Mission comes into play, because I can make a recommendation.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If the
liaison officer tells me something with which I do not agree, for whatever reason, I can try to convince him, to say, "We should act in this way and not in the way that you are proposing." If he says, "No, I disagree," then, yes, of course, we go back to headquarters, and this is what --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That is the example $I$ would like to focus on at this time.

Assuming that the RCMP liaison officer comes and says, "I want to question the Canadian detained" or "I want to have the Syrians ask questions for me", and you say, "I don't think that is a good idea at this particular point in time because of other things we are doing in respect of that Canadian detainee."

So what you seem to be saying is, you don't have the authority to make the decision. You can make recommendations.

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Is that right? Or can you say,
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"No, it is not happening"?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Let me put
it this way. I can tell the liaison officer, "No, it is not going to happen." The liaison officer then will turn back and say, "Well, fine, I will accept your decision, but $I$ will go back to my headquarters." Then his headquarters will get in touch with Foreign Affairs. This is where the issue will be discussed.

Then, if $I$ receive instructions, written instructions from headquarters saying you do it, if the Minister says that, well then it is very difficult. I have done what I should do, but then if I'm overruled, well, I'm overruled.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: As we saw in
section $10(2)(9)$, the Minister basically can give direction as he has management of the diplomatic missions abroad?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA:
Absolutely.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
I would like to move on to the political landscape in Syria. Let's start, since you are the key interpreter of Syria.

I am going to refer now,

Mr. Pillarella, to a number of exhibits that you should have in front of you, starting with Exhibit $P-26$, which is U.S. Department of State Background Note For Syria. What I'm going to do here to save some time, I am going to focus on certain aspects of this report and ask you whether you agree or not with it and ask you to supplement or add any comments you want relating to the particular issue.

But initially I would like to deal with the key players in Syria at the material point in time.

The President at the time was who? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: When I
arrived it was Bashar Assad, the son of Hafiz Assad.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. He continued to be the President? In fact he is the President today?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes. He is still President today. Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall who the Prime Minister was?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To tell
you the truth, no.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. We will
come to his name in this document.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs
was, we have heard, is Mr. Al-Shara'?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Shara'a,
yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will see from
the evidence that you really dealt with two Deputy
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Who are they?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If $I$ can
answer that -- I think the names --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The names
are public.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: One was
Vice-Minister Mouallem, the other one was Vice-Minister Haddad.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I understand
that during that point in time that Mr. Haddad left that position and became chair of the parliamentary committee relating to Foreign

Affairs?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Without telling
tales out of school, who would be the more
influential of those two gentlemen?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I would
say that Mr. Haddad was.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. The head of Syrian Military Intelligence we understand was General Khalil?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Finally, we will
see the name of a senior Syrian Military
Intelligence official whose name is Colonel Saleh?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: He was
Mr. Martel's contact?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Your contact
would be General Khalil?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: The Syrian

Ambassador to Canada at that point in time was Mr. Arnous?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'm wondering whether you had any relationship or knowledge at all of the Syrian Ambassador to the United States at the time?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Not at all.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
We are going to have a very quick Syria 101 and rely to a great extent on the Department of State documents which are fairly reliable. As $I$ say, $I$ will read portions to you and ask you to comment on them, starting initially with Exhibit $\mathrm{P}-26$.

Now, I understand that Syria is a republic under a particular political party, and that party is the...?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The Ba'ath Party.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. That regime, $I$ understand, has been in existence since March of 1963?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The Ba'ath Party,
is it related to the Ba'ath Party that we have heard under the Saddam's regime in Iraq?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Also if we could just ask you, is there a particular minority that controls the Ba'ath Party that we should be aware of?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, yes.
The Alawites clan, which represents approximately 11 per cent of the Syrian population, clan of President Bashar al-Assad. That clan controls basically all the levers of power. The rest, particularly the trade side, has been left to the Sunnis, but the Alawites do control the apparatus of the State basically. They are a minority, as I said. The Sunnis represent approximately 70 per cent, whereas the Alawites represent approximately 11 per cent.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: As we will see
from this document, about 10 per cent, 10 or 11 per cent are Christian in Syria? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we can just pick up in terms of the political history respecting Syria at page 3 this document, we see
in the second paragraph from the bottom -- this is once again when the regime started, it says:
"Various coups culminating on March 8, 1963 in the installation by leftist Syrian Army officers of the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), a group of military and civilian officials who assumed control of all executive and legislative authority."

Just cutting across a number of coups which occur between --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: There were several of them.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: There were
several of them. I don't want to go through each one, although it is very interesting reading.

Let's come to when Mr. Assad's
father became President. If we go to the next page, at page 4 , in the last sentence at the paragraph at the top, we see:
"On November 13, 1970,

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Minister of Defence, Hafiz al-Asad affected a bloodless military coup, ousting the civilian party leadership and assuming the role of prime minister."

We see, as you have stated earlier, that he maintained the leadership of the country until his death in 2000?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: In 2000,
yes. The loth of June I believe.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'm sorry?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The 10th
of June I believe.
MR. CAVALLuZZO: Okay. If we
go on, there is an important political event that happens in the 1970 s and 1980 s that $I$ would refer to in the middle paragraph on page 4.

It states that:
"The authoritarian regime was not without its critics, though most were quickly dealt with. A serious challenge arose in the late 1970s, however, from
fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, who reject the basic values of the secular Ba'ath program and object to rule by the Alawis whom they consider heretical. From 1976 until its suppression in 1982, the arch conservative Muslim Brotherhood led an armed insurgency against the regime. In response to an attempted uprising by the brotherhood in February 1982, the government crushed the fundamentalist opposition centered in the city of Hama, levelling parts of the city with artillery fire and causing many thousands of dead and wounded. Since then, public manifestations of anti-regime activity have been very limited."

I focus on that, of course, because initially the Syrians alleged that

Mr. Arar was a member of the Moslem Brotherhood, you will recall, and we will come to that.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLuZZO: Okay?
We see that Mr. Al-Assad, in the second paragraph from the bottom, as you stated, died on June 10, 2000, after 30 years in power.

Then we see:
Immediately following
Al-Asad's death, the
Parliament amended the constitution, reducing the mandatory minimum age of the President from 40 to 34 years old, which allowed his son, Bashar Al-Asad legally to be eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba'ath party. On July 10, 2000, Bashar Al-Asad was elected President by referendum in which he ran unopposed, garnering 97.29\% of the vote, according to Syrian government statistics."

As you have stated, he continues to be in power, and certainly was in power by the time you left in September of 2003?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Are there any
comments, additional comments you would like to make in respect of that description?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Perhaps
the only thing $I$ can say is that when Hafiz al-Assad died and his son was elected President a month later, there was a certain hope that the regime might open up, because his father had kept a very tight control of the country.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: So the hope in the population was that perhaps with a younger President, a President who had also been educated in the west, he was studying ophthalmology in England at the time when he was called back.

Because you should know that it was not Bashar al-Assad who was supposed to succeed to his father but his older brother. His older brother unfortunately killed himself in a car accident on the road to Beruit.

So therefore, when that happened Bashar al-Assad was called back to Syria to receive the training. Unfortunately, his father died much too quickly for the training to be completed so when Bashar al-Assad became President perhaps he did not have all the knowledge and the know-how that his father had.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: However, as $I$ have said, the hope was that he might open up the regime. This happened at the very beginning, but the President had to fight, and perhaps he is still fighting, a certain entrenched clan which was resistant to the change.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, just a brief description of the political conditions. If you would refer now to page 6 of the Department of State report. As $I$ have said earlier, officially Syria is a republic. In reality, however, it is an authoritarian regime that exhibits only forms of a democratic system.

Then if you go down a few lines, it says:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "The President and his senior } \\
& \text { aides, particularly those in }
\end{aligned}
$$

the military and security services, ultimately make most basic decisions in political and economic life, with a very limited degree of public accountability.

Political opposition to the President is not tolerated. Syria has been under a state of emergency since 1963."

That is a long emergency.
"Syrian governments have justified marshal law by the state of war, which continues to exist with Israel and by continuing threats posed by terrorist groups."

Then finally, if you go to the middle of the next paragraph, it states: "The President's continuing strength is due also to the army's continued loyalty and the effectiveness of Syria's large internal security apparatus, both comprised

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largely of members of Asad's own Alawi sect. The several main branches of the security services operate independently of each other and outside of the legal system. Each continues to be responsible for human rights violations."

We will come back to that, but can you give us a general idea of, to your knowledge, how many separate security services there may be in Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Let me just say that there are several.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But I will add just one thing: Yes, this report states that it is an authoritarian regime. What I would like to add is that, as $I$ started saying a moment ago, when President Bashar al-Assad took over there was a movement to open up the system and perhaps this did not go as far as people had wanted it to go.

However, whereas before there
was very little criticism of the regime during
my time, $I$ think that Syrians in general from all walks of life were speaking quite openly and freely, something which would not have been possible some years before, and now this was happening.

So it was a measure of openness, and this is still the case today.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. A few comments about the economy. There is a Canadian aspect to this and this is why $I$ want to ask you about this. This picks up at page 7 of the report.

Obviously Syria is a developing country and I understand that it has a budding petroleum industry which accounts for a lot of its export income with the States, and indeed the government has successfully begun to work with international energy companies attempting to encourage foreign investment in Syria.

I'm just wondering during that time whether you have any knowledge of a couple of Canadian companies, such as Petro-Canada and Tanganyika, wanting to make oil deals in terms of investing in Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
true.
However, I must say that the trade between Canada and Syria was almost non-existent, and the same with investments. Certainly, we had been trying to do more and, in fact, during my tenure I tried to convince some Syrian businesspeople to come to Canada and see what was possible. In fact, I did accompany a Syrian trade delegation to Canada, but not much came of this. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Certainly
in terms of any kind of leverage that Canada may have in regard to that bilateral relationship, $I$ think it is pretty clear that the Syrians wanted investment from Canada, as well as, obviously, other countries, and that gave us some kind of leverage.

Isn't that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct. But I think that the Syrians also appreciated Canada's positions with regard to the Middle East and, therefore, they thought that we could be an extremely valuable interlocutor, and therefore they were very much interested in keeping close political relations with Canada. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Another aspect of
the bilateral relationship which I think is important during this material time, of course, on March 17, 2003 the coalition forces invaded Iraq. Obviously Canada didn't join the coalition and I would think that the Syrians would be very happy with that turn of events.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is absolutely correct, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Now, I would like to move because the bilateral relationship between Syria and the United States may be relevant to the facts that we will be coming to assess relating to Mr. Arar. Once again if you would come back to this report at page 4 of 13 .

> If you refer to the bottom
portion of that page for the years 2000 to 2004 , it states:
"In the aftermath of 9/11, the Syrian government began limited cooperation with the United States in the global war against terrorism. However, Syria opposed the Iraq war in March 2003, and

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bilateral relations with the
U.S. swiftly deteriorated.

In December 2003 President Bush signed into law the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty

Restoration Act of 2003, which provided for the imposition of sanctions."

We have heard evidence about this and you will see in May of 2004 that sanctions were indeed imposed.

So it would appear that at least for a certain period of time during the relevant period that the Syrians were attempting to accommodate the Americans in respect of the global war against terrorism, but it reached a point in time where the relationship deteriorated as a result of the war in Iraq?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
true.
CAVALLUZZO: I'm just wondering in
respect of the role of one of the security services that we will hear some evidence on, and that is the Syrian Military Intelligence. We have
heard -- there are media reports that the Americans were collaborating with Syrian intelligence during the period of time prior, of course, to the war in Iraq, and $I$ wonder whether you can comment on that, whether you knew in particular the Syrian Military Intelligence were collaborating with the Americans in respect of the global war against terrorism?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: All $I$ can
say is that, yes, there was cooperation between the United States and Syria with regard to combatting terrorism. Now, at what level that cooperation was taking place, that $I$ don't know; therefore, $I$ think that it would be very difficult for me to tell you whether it was with the military intelligence or with any other security apparatus, but, yes, there was cooperation.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: One other
question related to that, Mr. Pillarella, and that is that in particular if we focus in in September of 2002 , when Mr. Arar was deported from the United States -- I'm sorry?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Perhaps if I can add just one thing? MR. CAVALLUZZO: Sure.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If one wonders why suddenly the Syrians were cooperating with the Americans, for instance, in terms of combatting terrorism, $I$ think that the answer is fairly simple, is that by helping the Americans they were helping themselves, because they were in an area where they were still traumatized, if $I$ can use that expression, by what had happened with the Moslem Brotherhood, and therefore, it was in their interests to combat terrorism, combat al-Qaeda and any other organization.

So it was not surprising in the aftermath of $9 / 11$ that the Syrians decided that it was in their interests to cooperate with the Americans.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. That went
back some years. Of course back in 1991 they participated with the American coalition in respect of the first Gulf War?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Coming back to
the last question in this area relating to September of 2002 , and that is whether you were aware at that time, in September-October of 2002, which they refer to in these proceedings as the

American practice or policy of extraordinary rendition, whereby the Americans may send somebody, whether it be from their own country or from another country, to a preferred country for particular questioning, which, for whatever reason, is done in a particular country like Syria, Egypt and Jordan, for example, and wonder whether you were aware of this policy of rendition at this point in time?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, I was not.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. The final
contextual area that $I$ would like to deal with, Mr. Pillarella, relates to the human rights record of Syria. If we can start with Exhibit $P-28$.

Excuse me. Why don't we start with P -27. This is one of the loose documents that you have in front of you.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Exhibit $P-27$ is, once again, another Department of State document. It is "The Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Syria for the Year 2002," and it was released, as you can see, March 31, 2003, so it would have been applicable during
a portion of the material period.
I will just highlight certain
aspects of this report.
I assume you are familiar with
this publication, the Human Rights Reports that are compiled by the American Department of State?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Starting
on page 1 , just in the first paragraph -- we have covered much of this, but just the last sentence which provides that:
"The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but security courts are subject to political influence. The regular courts generally display independence, although political connections and bribery may influence verdicts."

So I assume you were aware of the security courts within Syria? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm aware of what is written here, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will be a
little bit more specific later on.
It goes on in the next paragraph
to state that:

> "The powerful role of the security services in government, which extends beyond strictly security matters, stems in part from the state of emergency that
> has been in place almost continuously since $1963 . "$

Then the government justifies the marshal law and the state of war with Israel and past threats from terrorist groups.

Then it goes on to deal with what we are concerned about. It says:
"Syrian Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence are military agencies, while General Security, State Security, and Political Security come under the purview of the Ministry of Interior."

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The question $I$ would have is whether you were aware of that, that the Syrian Military Intelligence was a military agency? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, the title says it. I mean, it is the Military Security Intelligence.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then it goes on:
"The branches of the security services operated independently of each other and outside the legal system."

Then it states:
"The security forces were under effective government control. Their members committed serious human rights abuses."

I would ask whether you are aware of this, that certainly the general knowledge at that point in time was these serious human rights abuses occurred within Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I can only
say what I see here. Perhaps, Commissioner, you
will remember that in camera $I$ have provided some testimony on this for which $I$ cannot comment publicly. So I think that you have heard my comments on these issues.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, we heard an anecdote that you related, and obviously we are not going to share that publicly.

But the question that $I$ have is just generally speaking you agree with me that certainly the general knowledge, if we can put it at that, is that there were serious human rights abuses in Syria committed by the services at this point in time?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: All I can
say is that $I$ have read the report and that is all. I have provided my own comments in camera and $I$ don't believe that $I$ can repeat these comments.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's fine, you
have read the report. I'm not concerned about whether you have read the report. What I'm concerned about is what you thought at this particular -- just let me finish the question -at this particular point in time.

Whether you saw a serious human
rights abuse is neither here nor there. The question that $I$ have for you is at that point in time in 2002 and 2003, when you were the Ambassador, whether you were aware that serious human rights abuses were being committed in Syria? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, I was not. I did not have any indication that there were serious human rights abuses committed that I could verify.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Whether you could verify them or not, are you saying that since you couldn't verify them your position was they weren't occurring? MR. BAXTER: Mr. Commissioner, if I can remind Mr. Cavalluzzo what Mr. Livermore said when this type of question was referred to him. It is a very delicate position he is putting the Ambassador in and he is displayed some reluctance at this point to go beyond this in the public setting. There is certainly some international relations interests here that $I$ think my friend is asking Mr. Pillarella to comment on and perhaps compromise. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Can I
reply --

THE COMMISSIONER: Just wait a minute. I will hear from Mr. Cavalluzzo next. MR. CAVALLUZZO: You will get your chance, Mr. Pillarella. Just in response, Mr. Commissioner, I am dealing with a very public record at the present point in time, which is very clear as to its assertions on human rights abuses. All I'm asking the witness at this point in time is when he was the Head of Mission for this country in Syria whether he was aware that human rights abuses were occurring or whether he is saying that because he didn't see them they weren't occurring. That is all I'm -THE COMMISSIONER: I suppose in the end another question that comes from that which has been asked of several witnesses in public: Was he aware that there was a reputation that Syria had for these types of human rights abuses?

MR. BAXTER: I think the
answer is --
THE COMMISSIONER: We will hear from the witness.

MR. BAXTER: No, not as to his
answer but in terms of Canadian officials commenting on the human rights records of other countries. That was the nuance that $I$ was attempting to draw to Mr. Cavalluzzo's and your attention, sir. Mr. Livermore explained the logic behind the reluctance to do so.

THE COMMISSIONER: But am $I$ wrong that other witnesses have not been asked and have answered about Syria's reputation?

MR. BAXTER: About the reputation
that is true, sir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, then let me put the question that way.

Were you aware in 2002 and 2003
that Syria had this reputation as being referred to here of serious human rights abuses?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, the
reputation, yes, $I$ may have heard about it. I certainly have heard about it, but $I$ was going to say that it is not in our habit to comment on the human rights records of another country. But I have admitted that $I$ have read this document, I know what the document says --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- but if
you ask me did you have any --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let me ask you
this, from that statement: Are you saying that if you reasonably believed that Syria was engaging in torture in respect of a detained Canadian, that you wouldn't comment on that to the Syrians, or indeed publicly?

Is that what you are saying?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, I'm not saying any such thing.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. So that
you would. If there was a reasonable belief that torture was occurring in respect of a detained Canadian, you could --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I would have to have evidence of that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. But you could comment on it to the Syrians, and indeed, if necessary, you could comment on it publicly.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm not saying whether $I$ would comment publicly or not. All I'm saying is that $I$ would need to have evidence and then how that evidence would be brought to the attention of the Syrians, that is
another matter.
I don't believe that it would be useful for me to comment publicly on what would be done, because we are getting into a very delicate area. If you are talking about the way that we conduct business, that is something that is to be reserved, because if you want to conduct business and get concrete results you cannot put it on the public place.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. But let
me just understand this. Once again, if you reasonably suspected that a Canadian was being subjected to torture at the hands of the Syrians, are you saying that you would, because of your concern with the relationship with the Syrians, that you would be hesitant --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- in discussing this publicly?

I just want to be clear on this. So, if necessary, you would state publicly -listen to the question, please.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You would state publicly that there was a reasonable suspicion
that this Canadian was being subjected to torture by the Syrians, even if that offended the Syrians?

You agree with that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It is not
a question of offending anybody, the Syrians or anybody else, it is a question of being effective, that's all.

If something like that were taking
place and you want to be effective, and for the alleged torture to cease, well, there are many ways to do that. Going public is perhaps one way, but it is not always the best way.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: All right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But to
say, or to suggest as I thought you were suggesting, that $I$ would remain silent, the answer is no. All I'm saying is that I'm not commenting on what kind of action $I$ might take, but certainly I would not remain silent.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's fine. I
just wanted to make that clear.
Let us go on in respect of Syria's reputation as captured by the Department of State in the second paragraph, the bottom paragraph. It states:
"The government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit serious..."

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Excuse me.
Where are you now?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'm still on the
first page, in the bottom paragraph where it states:
"The government's human rights record..."

Okay?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It says:
"...remained poor, and it continued to commit serious abuses."

Then, if you skip a sentence
there, it states:
"Continuing serious abuses
included the use of torture
in detention; poor prison
conditions; arbitrary arrest
and detention; prolonged
detention without trial;

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fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts; an inefficient judiciary that suffered from corruption and, at times, political influence; and infringement on privacy rights."

So in 2002 and 2003, were you
aware of Syria's reputation in this regard?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I have
indicated before that, yes, the reputation, but that is all.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then if
you go on to page 2 we see that there is a section specifically dealing with torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. It states in the opening sentence:
"Despite the existence of
constitutional provisions and
several Penal Code penalties
for abusers, there was
credible evidence that
security forces continued to
use torture, although to a
lesser extent than in

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previous years."
Were you aware of that reputation?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Again I
can only repeat what $I$ have said. I have read
this report, so $I$ know what the report states.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It
goes on:
"Former prisoners, detainees, and the London-based Syrian

Human Rights Organization
reported that torture methods included administering electrical shocks..."

I need not go through that, but I
want to refer to the last sentence, and it states:
"Although it occurs in
prisons, torture was most
likely to occur while detainees were being held at one of the many detention centers run by the various security services throughout the country, especially while the authorities were attempting to extract a

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confession or information."
You had obviously read that
in 2002 .
A couple of other portions. It
goes on:
"The government has denied that it uses torture and claims that it would prosecute anyone believed guilty of using excessive force or physical abuse."

Now, as far as prison conditions are concerned, if you go to the second paragraph from the bottom, it states:
"Prison conditions generally were poor and did not meet international standards for health and sanitation.

However, there were separate facilities for men, women and children."

Then it goes on:
"Pre-trial detainees, particularly those held for political or security

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reasons, were usually held separately from convicted prisoners. Facilities for political or national security prisoners generally were worse than those for common criminals."

In terms of arbitrary arrest and detention, at the next page, page 3 , it says, just generally, the opening statement:
"Arbitrary arrest and detention were significant problems."

Then it goes on, five lines down: "Nonetheless, in cases involving political or national security offenses, arrests were often carried out in secret. Suspects may be detained incommunicado for prolonged periods without charge or trial and are denied the right to a judicial determination regarding the pretrial

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detention."
You are aware of that as well from
reading this.
Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Again, $I$ have read this document, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Finally, as I said before, we would get specific in terms of the security courts. If you go to page 5 of Exhibit $P-27$ we will see that there is reference to the two security courts, three paragraphs from the bottom, the Supreme State Security Court, which tries political and national security cases; and the Economic Security Court which tried cases involving financial crimes.

Then in terms of the process meted out by these courts, in the next sentence it says:
"Charges against defendants
in the (Supreme State
Security Court) were vague.
Many defendants appeared to
be tried for exercising
normal political rights..."
in the bottom paragraph it
talks about:
"...defendants are not present during the preliminary or investigative phase of the trial, during which the prosecutor presents evidence. Trials usually were closed to the public. Lawyers were not ensured access to their clients..."

Et cetera, et cetera.
Once again, this is the reputation of the security court of which you are aware because you had read this in 2002 and 2003 .

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes. Once again $I$ repeat, $I$ did read the document.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, if we go to tab 28 , it is the very same human rights report. I won't take you through that --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Tab 28 of...

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, Exhibit P-28, I'm sorry. It is a loose document. It is the Human Rights Report for 2003 . I won't take you to
that. I just leave that for counsel to read because it is very similar to the 2002 report.

Now, just out of interest, I understand although it is a classified document we have heard there is a Human Rights Report prepared for each country under the jurisdiction of DFAIT.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And there was a human rights report created for Syria under your supervision while you were there?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. The final
exhibit $I$ would refer to is Exhibit P-29. This is the Amnesty International report for 2002.

I will ask you whether, at the material time, you had read this document? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I may have. I can't really recall. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let me just refer to a couple of portions.

In the very first paragraph, referring to political prisoners, if $I$ could just pick it up at the second or third sentence, it says:
"Hundreds of political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience, continue to be held, most following unfair trials before the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC) and Field Military Courts." It goes on: "Torture and ill-treatment continue to be used against political prisoners, especially during incommunicado detention. There were reports that the health of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners was deteriorating as a result of a lack of medical care."

Specifically $I$ would refer to page 2 of the Amnesty report for 2002 under the title, "Torture and Ill-treatment" on the right hand portion, and it states that:
"Torture and ill-treatment

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> continue to be inflicted routinely on political prisoners, especially during incommunicado detention at the Palestine Branch and Military Interrogation Branch detention centres."
> I wonder and ask whether in 2002
you were aware of the Palestine Branch?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You were not
aware of it?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So that you did
not know its reputation?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: There are other portions of this which I leave to counsel to read.

Mr. Pillarella, with that context
in mind $I$ would like to move on now to another area, and that is the question of other Canadians who were detained in Syria in 2001 and 2002, prior to Mr. Arar's arrival in Syria, and first dealing with Mr. El Maati.

You recall that there was a

Canadian by the name of El Maati who was detained in Syrian detention during your --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall
when you first became aware that Mr. El Mati was detained in Syrian detention?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: When the name was mentioned to me by the RCMP liaison officer.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Do
you recall in terms of timing when that would have been.

Just let me give you the contextual facts that we have. We understand that Mr. El Maati was arrested sometime in November 2001 and sometime in the early part of 2002 was transferred to Egypt, of which he was a national. With that context in mind, can you be of assistance in terms of when you may have learned of Mr. El Mati's detention from the RCMP? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If my memory serves me well, I believe that it was much, much later when the RCMP liaison officer mentioned it, but $I$ do not believe that the embassy was aware of his presence in Syria. I -- no, I don't
recall that.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you not
recall attempting to obtain consular access for Mr. El Maati while he was in Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If this were the case, then there would be a document indicating that, in other words a note verbale.

Do you have such a document?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I can't answer that question.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: We are going back to almost four years ago. You are asking me to remember what happened four years ago. If you have a document that you can show me, then that will refresh my memory, otherwise I can't answer.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, we can speak to government counsel about that.

Just let me ask you a few other general questions. Do you recall the purpose for which the RCMP notified you about Mr. El Maati? Were they attempting to seek anything?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I believe that they were conducting an investigation and I believe that they wanted information and that was
the purpose of their visit.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: As you said
earlier in your evidence, did you open the doors for them in this regard?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, I
did.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You introduced
them to somebody?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is correct.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Who was that? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: On the basis of NSC, Commissioner, can I answer that. I'm not sure.

MR. BAXTER: I'm not sure that is in the public record, Mr. Commissioner. I think you have heard evidence in camera that will allow you to tell Mr. Cavalluzzo that you are satisfied that you know the answer to the question.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I did provide that answer, Commissioner, in the in-camera hearing.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: What I'm seeking here is an individual whose name is quite public.

I don't know what interest there is in attempting to assert NSC.

THE COMMISSIONER: What would the interest at this stage be? I think I know the answer.

MR. BAXTER: This is another case, as I understand it.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
MR. BAXTER: I'm not aware of any public document relating to the incidents in question.

THE COMMISSIONER: But that is not the sole test for whether something is subject to an NSC, is it?

MR. BAXTER: I agree, there are
other tests, Mr. Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm inclined to direct that the question be answered.

I think the process should be if you wish to object to it given my ruling, then you should be given an opportunity to do so.

MR. BAXTER: May I take
instructions, Mr. Commissioner?
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR. BAXTER: I'm sorry to do this.

I just need to respect the process here and I would like to get instructions.

THE COMMISSIONER: So for the time being the question will remain unanswered. Mr. Baxter will seek instructions.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In any event, you testified that you opened the door and we will come back to who was on the other side of the door.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I opened
the door, but it was the liaison officer that conducted the business, not me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But I'm more interested in who was on the other side of the green door for now and we will come back to that. Okay?

Now, in respect of Mr. El Maati,
there is a very strong public record that in August 2002, while he was detained in Egypt, Mr. El Maati alleged that he was tortured while he was in detention in Syria between, as I said before, November 2001 and sometime in the early part of 2002 when he was transferred to Egypt.

I'm wondering whether you
were aware of Mr. El Maati's allegations that he
was tortured while in Syrian detention at that point in time?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Not at that time. This information came to me much, much later.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: By "much, much
later", would it be fair to say after you left your post in Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No. I
can't recall exactly when it came to my attention, but it was still probably while $I$ was in Syria, but $I$ can't give you a date or a timeframe.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You would agree with me that that would be a very important piece of information which you should have had as the Syrian Ambassador, or Canada's Ambassador to Syria, in respect of knowing what is going on in that country.

You would agree with that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you know who should have notified you of Mr. El Mati's allegations that he was tortured while in detention in Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To tell
you the truth, I don't know. I mean, if there was a report that was prepared, that report should have been copied to me at some point.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I can't
say who in particular should have provided that information.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you know if
the RCMP liaison officer gave you that information subsequently, that that is how you found out? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, I
cannot tell that because $I$ don't recall how it came to my attention.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. The other
questions relating to other detained Canadians at that point in time would be Mr. Almalki, Mr. Abdullah Almalki.

Were you aware that he was
detained in Syria at that time?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: How did you
become aware of Mr. Almalki's detention?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If I
remember well, I think that we were notified by Ottawa that there was a Canadian by the name of

Almalki who might be detained in Syria, and immediately we sent a note verbale to the Foreign Ministry asking for access -- first of all, to confirm that --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: He was there.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- we understood that Mr. Almalki was being detained and, therefore, as a Canadian citizen, we were asking for access, consular access.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you ever get consular access in respect of Mr. Almalki while you were the Syrian Ambassador?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The Canadian Ambassador you mean.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The Canadian
Ambassador.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: In fact, perhaps I should underline the fact that we started by saying, "Please give us access."

If I remember well, the note
verbale was sent sometime in August or September -- there is a document on that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes. That
is 2002 .
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: We never received a reply until about a year later, or something like that. Of course for us this was a consular case.

However, in the meantime the family of Mr. Almalki had indicated to us that we should not continue to deal with the case, for their own reasons, and we respected their wishes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In the course of
your role as Ambassador, did you assist the RCMP in attempting to get access to Mr. Almalki?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No,
because they -- I don't think that they ever asked, but $I$ certainly did not assist.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So you are
not aware of whether they asked or whether you attempted to assist?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, in respect
of further -- you don't recall any further activities on behalf of Mr. Almalki; that is whether Mr. Martel ever got access to him?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If that
happened it must have happened after I had left

Damascus.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Mr. Commissioner, I am going to
now move on to the Arar chronology. It is now five after 11:00. It may be an appropriate time to take the morning break.

THE COMMISSIONER: We will take
15 minutes.
THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Upon recessing at 11:05 a.m. /
Suspension à 11 h 05
--- Upon resuming at 11:22 a.m. /
Reprise à 11 h 22
THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I wonder,
Mr. Pillarella, if you could have Exhibit P-134 in front of you as well volume 1 of the DFAIT documents. We are now going to move into the situation respecting Mr. Arar. Okay?

If we refer initially to the Exhibit $P-134$, which is the smaller Book of Documents, to the newly redacted tab 1 , which is tab 61 of volume 1.

> I'm going to be referring,

Commissioner, throughout to the newly redacted documents, obviously, and maybe pointing out which has been newly redacted.

Mr. Pillarella, this is an e-mail which is dated October 10, 2002 and it is sent to Damascus C4R. We understand that that is you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is from
Mr. Daniel Livermore, who was Director General of Security and Intelligence Bureau.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: What this e-mail
notes is that we are wondering at this point in time where Mr. Arar is. I assume at this point in time, until you get this e-mail, you had never heard of this Mr. Maher Arar?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Never.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. This
e-mail points out a couple of things which are important. First of all, it says:
"This message is to advise you of the removal of a dual Canadian/Syrian citizen from the United States to Syria."

So that is the first indication that we are dealing with a dual national that you referred to earlier.

It goes on in the next paragraph
to say that:
"Maher Arar ... is known to
the RCMP, and is one of the
subjects of their 'o Canada'
investigations...."

Then it describes some personal aspects of Mr. Arar's employment history, where he lives, and then in the next paragraph describes what happened to him while he was in the United States, and of course was deported sometime in the morning of October 8th.

Then it goes on in the next paragraph and it says:
"At the direction of JPD.." Who is, of course, Mr. Pardy:
". . .JPE/Harris..."
That is Helen Harris:
"...has contacted Leo Martel
and asked that he make official inquiries about Arar..."

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Then it goes on. He is asked to
locate him.
Then there is this line which has been newly unredacted, or the redaction has been removed, and Mr. Livermore states:
"There are concerns that Arar may be aggressively questioned by Syrian security services."

Then finally it just says:
"Grateful you make requests
using your own resources to determine the location, status and condition of Arar."

I guess the question that $I$ have is: These concerns that were expressed by Mr. Livermore that "Arar may be aggressively questioned by Syrian" authorities, I ask you what your interpretation of that particular admonition was at the time?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, what does the word "aggressively" mean? It can mean anything. Rough handling. I don't know.
"Aggressively" means aggressively, that you are
forceful in asking whatever questions you may ask. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did that lead you to suspect that: You know what, this guy may be tortured. They are going to aggressively question this guy Arar. It is quite possible they may torture him.

Did that come to mind?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: First of
all, this is the first $I$ hear of a Canadian citizen being detained. Yes, there is an indication that he -- there are concerns that he might be aggressively questioned. Why should I jump to conclusions at that moment to say, "Oh, that means torture"? Why should I?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, I'm not
going to answer that question, but $I$ would put it to you that if you are not going to jump to that conclusion at least it would have raised your antennae as to how Mr. Arar might be treated by the Syrians.

You agree with that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But it did. It did. When I saw that, yes, that raised concerns in me.

What I'm saying is that, yes,
this is a concern, but $I$ don't make a jump and conclude to something else, because I know absolutely nothing at this point when $I$ received that message.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. The other question that $I$ would have, we read a lot in the public record about what goes on while the Syrians are holding detainees incommunicado, and we have this period of time when we don't know where Mr. Arar is. We suspect that he is in Syria.

At this point in time, did that come to mind, this knowledge you had that there could be trouble while detainees are held incommunicado while they attempt to extract statements?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Many
things go through one's mind. The thing is that between the time that $I$ received this message and the time that $I$ could meet with anybody to ask the question, there was no certainty that he was in Syria. I mean, it was implied that he might be detained in Syria, but we certainly had no certainty that this was the case.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, but the
question is a very clear one, and that is: At
this point in time were you concerned that he may be held incommunicado and we know what happens when detainees are held incommunicado in Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't
know that, because, as $I$ have said, we had no idea that he was even in Syria at the time.

If, for instance, I had been
certain that he was there, I might have -something might have come to my mind, but at this point $I$ just can't --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, let's come
then to --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- I can't
agree with your conclusion.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let us come then
to your response at tab 106?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Tab 106?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, tab 106 is a
CAMANT note.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is a letter
from Mr. Pardy to Dr. Mazigh, but it captures apparently what you did.

If you look at the second
paragraph, it says:
"The Canadian Ambassador to Syria first raised the matter with Syrian authorities on Friday, October 11
immediately after we were informed by the American authorities that Mr. Arar had been deported to Syria."

Do you see that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall on
October 11 th who you raised the matter with in respect of Syrian authorities?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Let me
just read this paragraph.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Please do.
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall who
you raised it with on October 11th?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, it
must have been with the Vice-Minister of the Foreign Ministry.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Which one is
that, Haddad or Mouallem?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It must
have been Vice-Minister Haddad.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just before we go
to tab 73, what would you have said to
Mr. Mouallem, "There is this Canadian --"
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Sorry,
Mr. Haddad.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Haddad. "We have this Canadian who we have been told by the Americans has been deported to Syria. Could you locate him for us?" Something to that effect, or how would you have broached it?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I asked him whether he was in Syria or not.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Haddad said that he would check and get back to you on that? Obviously he wouldn't have known presumably off the top?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. At tab 73, this once again is a CAMANT note from Mr. Pardy dated October 14 th where he says:
"Spoke earlier today to
Ambassador in Damascus and
Consular Officer in Amman.

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Neither mission has had any response from their respective authorities on their requires for information. Damascus has submitted a Note Verbale but Ambassador does not believe that anything will be forthcoming until his contact on these matters return on Wednesday."

Do you recall sending a note verbale in respect of Mr. Arar?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If there is a note verbale, the note verbale should be on record somewhere in the --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall who
the contact was, your contact was, who would be returning on Wednesday?

You have a calendar --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It was the Vice-Minister.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Vice-Minister
Haddad. Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: This is
incorrect when it says -- no, it is in the other one that it said "another official." It is the same official.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is the same.
It is Mr. Haddad.
If you go then to tab 81, I assume
this is the diplomatic note that --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is dated
October $15 t h$ and obviously is asking about --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: October
14 th.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Or 14th.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And is asking
about, I guess, the whereabouts of Mr. Arar.
These diplomatic notes like this,
would this have been prepared by you or Mr. Martel, or do you recall?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, this
would have been prepared by Mr. Martel.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We won't take you
through all of them, but there are several diplomatic notes that are exchanged during this period of time.

The diplomatic note, of course, would go to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct. That is the normal procedure.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Now, if you go to tab 96 on October the 17th? As I said, I'm not going to take you through the diplomatic notes in respect of Mr. Arar.

While you were there, once again, in Damascus, did you ever get a response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to any of your diplomatic notes?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To the best of my recollection, until the day I left the Syrians never acknowledged having Mr. Arar in their country. They never responded to any -even though we were meeting with Mr. Arar, Mr. Martel was meeting with Mr. Arar, I don't believe that officially from the Foreign Ministry we had an acknowledgment that Mr. Arar was in the country.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
At tab 96 we see a couple of
e-mails between you and Mr. Pardy.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm. MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is dated October 17th, which is a Thursday. It is to Pardy from you and it says:
"I have a meeting scheduled for next Sunday to discuss subject."

That, of course, the subject is
Mr. Arar.
Mr. Pardy's response is:
"Franco, a slight reed no matter how distant is most helpful. MJM..."

Do you know who that is, MJM?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That was
the ADM at the time, John McNee.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
"(Mr. McNee) will also raise
the matter with the Syrian ambassador here later today.

Gar."
Was this once again Mr. Haddad -AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Haddad. MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- that you would be meeting with on the Sunday?

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { If you go to tab } 106 \text { now. I } \\
& \text { guess this is just referencing that there will } \\
& \text { be a meeting on -- there is reference to } \\
& \text { October 17th. Just picking up that same paragraph } \\
& \text { it says: }
\end{aligned}
$$

"The Canadian Ambassador ... raised the matter ... on Friday, October 11
immediately after we were
informed by the American authorities that Mr. Arar had been deported to Syria. He
has again raised the matter
with them including most
recently on October 17."
Then it goes on:
"So far the Syrians have not
responded to his
representations. It appears
that the Syrians are fully
aware of the matter. There
appears to be a
misunderstanding of Maher's
citizenship on the part of
the Syrians with one official

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suggesting that he has American citizenship."

That reference there that the Syrians seem to be fully aware of the matter and are confusing his citizenship, do you know where Mr. Pardy was getting that information? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I really don't know, for the very simple reason that $I$ have learned all this during my meeting on the 20 th. So I don't know where he is getting that information from.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. At the previous tab, tab 105, just to keep in chronology, this is a message dated October 19th from Mr. Pardy to you in Damascus, and it says:
"Sub: Syria: Detained Canadians."

And it states:
"Further to our conversation
this morning this is to
confirm your discussion on
Sunday morning you raise the
following cases."
Certainly the first case that you are to raise is Mr. Maher Arar, et cetera.
"Mr. Arar entered Canada on September 1, 1987 and became a citizen of Canada in 1991. It is our understanding that Mr. Arar was deported from the United States on October 8 and was escorted to Syria by American officials. He has Canadian passport ... does not have American citizenship."

Then it says:
"Mr. Arar is not a subject of a police investigation in Canada and can return to

Canada at any time."
So that would seem to be the
initial indication that we seem to see from Mr. Pardy, is that he wants the return of Mr. Arar as soon as possible --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- is the
direction we are getting. Okay.
Now, let's come to your meeting on October the 20th. If we can go back to the

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smaller book there is a newly redacted document. This is at tab 2.

This is a message from Damascus to Ottawa, Mr. Pardy and ISI and ISD, and it is stated that:

> "Ambassador Pillarella and the Third Secretary..."
> That is a Canadian official, the

Third Secretary?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
"...met with the (somebody)
to request confirmation
concerning the whereabouts of
Mr. Arar, a Syrian-Canadian
allegedly deported to Syria
by US authorities."
It says "As you know" and then it
is blacked out.
Then it says:
"He therefore remains the
essential conduit to the
security services."
I assume that is the person
that you were talking to is the conduit with
security services.
Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In the next
paragraph we see that you briefed this individual, emphasizing that he wasn't the subject of a police inquiry. Then you talked about the American citizenship, and so on, and tried to clarify that.

In the next paragraph you
acknowledged that there was this dual citizenship problem and the Syrians may not regard him as a Canadian citizen. However, it seems that you:
"...emphasized, however, that
it was in Syria's interests, given our good bilateral relations, to co-operate on this case."

It goes on:
"The issue of Arar's whereabouts was coming under increasing scrutiny by the media and the Canadian public and we did not want this issue to mar our good

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relations."
So that what you seem to be doing here, and correct me if I'm wrong, you seem to be trying to apply a bit of pressure on the Syrians, saying, "This is becoming a notorious situation in Canada and let's cooperate and resolve this problem so that it doesn't mar our relationship"?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is correct.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then in the fourth paragraph it states that whoever this person is:
"...stated emphatically that
Arar was not in Syria."
It goes on.
"He suggested that we request more detail from the US
including an itinerary and
flight numbers. The ...
stated more than once that he
had not heard from the
Americans regarding this case and did not understand why
the Americans would have
deported Arar to Syria when

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he..."
Held a Canadian passport."
Then he said:
"...he was $99 \%$ certain' that
Arar was not in Syria..."
Just an administrative matter,
Mr. Commissioner.
In this newly redacted document you will see that there is a white box and it says "Not relevant and/or is personal information." This is the position of the government. We haven't had the opportunity to go carefully through these documents to assess whether or not, in our view, they are relevant. So that when that notation is there it is the government's position.

This meeting was held,
Mr. Pillarella, on -- is it October? I guess October 19th.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Twentieth.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Twentieth,
Because it says, if you look a
third of the way down, it says:
"REFTEL - 19 OCT 02"
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That's
right, but this message is dated from Damascus October 20th.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Okay, so
that is the --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The report
would have been drafted immediately after the meeting and sent back to Ottawa.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. That is
the Sunday meeting that we referred to earlier?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If we go back to volume 1, the bigger book in front of you, we see that we get confirmation that Mr. Arar is in Syria at tab 119.

This is once again a CAMANT note
and is dated October 21 , and it states that:
"JPD/Pardy just had a call
from DMCUS/Pillarella
advising that his contact in
the Syrian [Ministry of
Foreign Affairs] (Deputy
Minister, MFA)..."
Is that Mr. Haddad?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. "...informed him that subj. has just arrived in Syria from Jordan. HOM Pillarella
has requested Consular access to subj., so we are awaiting response to this request."

Then it goes on that Mr. Pardy discussed this with Mr. Arar's relatives.

A couple of questions. First of all, when you received this notification was it a telephone call from Mr. Haddad?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes. It was late in the evening, I was at the residence. I don't recall exactly the time, but it was between 9 and 10 o'clock in the evening that I received the telephone call from the Vice-Minister informing me of the presence of Mr. Arar in Syria.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we go back to tab 2 in terms of the meeting with this gentleman on the previous day where he says he was 99 per cent certain that Arar was not in Syria, did this advice receive -- or were you concerned about this, that you were clearly getting a different message from Haddad and then the next day he
phones to say, "Oh, by the way, the guy is here. He just got here from" --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Look, there was nothing that $I$ had any idea whether he was there or whether he was not there. He had told me that he was certain 99 per cent that he was not in Syria, but that doesn't necessarily mean that he was lying to me because the next day he came back and says "Yes, he is here." It might simply have meant that the information had not been passed on to him. When he made inquiries he was told, "Yes, he is here."

So there is nothing that
should have -- yes?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You had made
inquiries of him on the 17th. You talked to him before on the 11 th, the 17 th , the $20 t h$, he said 99 per cent sure he is not here. He phones you on the 21 st and says, "By the way, he is here."

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Please, please, don't forget that he was out of town. So I may have spoken with him but then he left town so I could not speak with him. And he probably had other business to attend to.

So the fact that some time
elapsed between the first time and the second time I spoke with him doesn't necessarily mean anything specific.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. The
question that $I$ would have is?: When you got this information on the 21 st from Haddad that he was in Syria, did that raise any concerns with you? "You know what, this guy may have been held incommunicado between October 8th, 9th and the 21st?"

Did that come to mind?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Why should
I have thought of something like that when, at the same time, Ottawa was saying that maybe he was in Jordan?

So I had no basis on which to say, "Oh, maybe he is been detained or eight, nine, 10 days before they tell me that he is here."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So at this point in time going through your head as well there was a possibility that he could be in Jordan and therefore that --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: At this point in time there was only one concern for me: Determine where he was. Suddenly we had
determined that he was in Syria, and that was the important thing.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just one question, once again in respect of tab 2 of the smaller book.

I notice now that ISI and ISD are being copied on the e-mails relating to Mr. Arar. Could you tell us how the interest of ISD and ISI was engaged as a result of Mr. Arar's situation? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't know why you seem to be surprised when the first message that $I$ received about Mr. Arar was from ISD, because there was -- there seemed to be a security aspect of it. So it is only normal that suddenly I do locate where Mr. Arar is and I copy both the ISD, ISI and the Consular Bureau.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, okay. Could you go to the last tab, tab 125. You will see that this is October 21 , it is an e-mail from Pardy. It states that the information you received -- it says:
"I have just received a call from the Canadian Ambassador in Damascus. He was just contacted by the person with

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whom he spoke yesterday and was informed that Mr. Arar arrived in Syria earlier today from Jordan."

So the information that you
received at this point in time was that on October 21st -- that Arar had arrived earlier that day on October the 21 st from Jordan?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I would like to move now in terms of time to another newly redacted document. This is Exhibit $\mathrm{P}-137$.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Thank you.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you go to
page 7 of 15 , this is a note to you from
Mr. Pardy.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: He, in effect as
the Head of Consular affairs, is giving certain
guidance or directions to you. I just want to read those to you starting in paragraph number 2.

It says:
"In your representations to
the Syrians the following

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points should be registered: - Mr. Arar is a citizen of Canada and has lived continuously in Canada since 1987. He has extensive family ties here...

- For reasons that are not known to us, the American authorities decided to deport him on October 8 to Syria via Jordan..."

And so on. It goes on.
Then third:
"The Government of Canada would appreciate the cooperation of the Syrian authorities in arranging a consular visit at the earliest possible time so that we can convey to Mr. Arar family proof of his well being."

Then, finally:
"Equally, the government of Canada would appreciate if

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the government of Syria could permit the return of Mr. Arar to Canada, a country that he can return to at any time."

So it would appear that Mr. Pardy
once again is giving an indication that Arar can return at any time with the cooperation of the Syrian authorities?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. We see, if you go to the very first page of Exhibit $P-137$, that there is a meeting, a 45-minute meeting between yourself and General Khalil, the head of Syrian Military Intelligence.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This meeting was
held on October $22 n d ?$
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Which would have
been Tuesday of the following week?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Could you tell us how this meeting came about, that you were meeting Mr. Khalil?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, first of all perhaps $I$ should give you a wider context how this happened.

You must understand that, first of all, when it comes to dual nationals the Syrians do not recognize the second nationality of someone who is a Syrian citizen as well. Therefore, to obtain a meeting with someone like General Khalil even to discuss the case was rather exceptional. In particular, it was exceptional also because someone who is detained by military intelligence, they don't allow outsiders to come in and to discuss these cases.

So the fact that I had been able to obtain this meeting showed already a certain favourable disposition to try to be cooperative with us.

At that point $I$ still did not
know to what extent this cooperation would go but, in any event, $I$ think it is important to understand that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. The question was, though, how did the meeting happen? Did General Khalil phone you up and say, "Come on over Franco"?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, that morning I received a telephone call from my contact at the Foreign Ministry and said, "Ambassador, General Khalil will see you in half an hour." That is how the meeting happened.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Within half an hour $I$ was at the office of the General. Now, I must say that $I$ didn't know how to get there. My driver was instructed to go to a certain place. At that place somebody got into the car and directed the driver to go to this location where General Khalil was, and we were shown in and $I$ met with General Khalil.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you know the location at which you met General Khalil? Was it, first of all, in Damascus?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It was in Damascus. It was a sort of a compound, but I had no idea what that compound was. It was obviously a security compound, but $I$ did not know the name or anything.

> MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you
subsequently come to find out that that is what is called the Palestine Branch?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you ever inquire as to whether it was the Palestine Branch? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you know of the existence of the Palestine Branch? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I have heard about it afterwards, but my answer is still the same, I had no idea what this place was called nor that it was the Palestine Branch. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Was this the first occasion upon which you met General Khalil?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, it was not.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: When had you met Khalil before?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA:
Commissioner, once again, I believe that I have given indication of this in camera and under NSC I don't know if $I$ can answer that question.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, you can
answer this question then: How many times had you met General Khalil prior to October 22nd?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Once only.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. This
particular meeting with General Khalil, was it in his office, or was it in a boardroom, was it located somewhere in a --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I was
taken into some kind of living room, there was even a dining table. I don't know if he uses that for entertaining purposes, but in any event, I was taken into that room and then General Khalil came in.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The prior
occasion upon which you met General Khalil, was it the same location? Was it his office, in other words, if that was his office?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It was in the same location, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. We will
come now to the first page of 137 because it describes the meeting itself. I just have a number of questions relating to the meeting.

First of all, in paragraph 2
it says:

> "Gen. Khalil said that Arar appeared at the Jordan/Syrian border yesterday without
warning, escorted by
Jordanian officials who handed him over. When I asked the General whether the

Americans had not forewarned
him of Arar's arrival..."
We don't know the answer to that.
In any event, it goes on in
paragraph 3. It states:
"According to Gen. Khalil,
Arar has apparently already
admitted that he has
connections with terrorist
organizations, (the General
alluded to Pakistani groups)
and they would continue to
interrogate him."
At that point in time where
the General advises that Arar arrived the day before at the Syrian border and that he has already admitted to terrorist connections, did you think that that was a pretty quick admission by Mr. Arar? Did that raise any questions in your mind?
know if this was a quick admission by Mr. Arar, and $I$ really do not know what happened. But if you ask me how this is possible, one can imagine that Mr . Arar had been picked up in New York, had been detained by the Americans for two weeks, I believe --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- had been interrogated by the Americans, despite the fact that there was consular access. Then, suddenly, in the middle of the night he is removed from New York, he is put on a plane, he is taken he doesn't know where, he arrives in a foreign country and then he is removed to another foreign country. He must have been very afraid --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- not
knowing what was happening to him. So one can speculate that in order to avoid any further -- I don't know how to call it -- pressure put on him, that he decided that he would indicate to them whatever they wanted to hear. I don't know.

I mean, if you are asking me why in this short time this could be an explanation, but I really don't know.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, I'm not asking you that. I'm asking you whether when you are given this information in terms of a context where there is a period of time between October 8th and October 21 st where we don't know where Mr. Arar is, and then the Syrians through Khalil tells you that he appeared the day before, he has is already admitted to terrorist connections, I'm wondering whether you suspected that Mr. Arar may have been tortured and as a result gave an admission?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I have no basis on which to say, yes, he has been detained for eight days, ten days, $I$ don't know. All I know is what I'm told. I have to be sceptical, but $I$ have no way of saying, yes, he was there for 10 days. No.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. But we are going to come to a document wherein you are advised that he was there for 10 days.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: But before coming
to that document $I$ am putting it to you that in light of the public record of the human rights abuses that we talked about, particularly with
these kinds of forces, that I'm putting it to you that when one of these people, one of these security forces people, tells you that they got an admission within --

## AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA:

## Apparently --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Can $I$ finish the question, please?

Got an admission within 24 hours, I'm putting it to you that in light of a public record, there could have been a reasonable suspicion that that admission was the product of torture?
know that because, again, first of all, the text says "apparently." So that is not even -- that is not a certainty.

Second, I really don't know what happened. I have absolutely no basis on which to say, "Yes, he has been detained for eight, 10 days," and what happened in these 10 days, I have absolutely no knowledge of that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But are you
saying that if you were aware that he was there for eight or 10 days then that would have given
rise to suspicions of torture?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: You see -MR. CAVALLUZZO: Can you answer the question first and then you can expand on it. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: All I can say is this: The Syrians are not obligated in anything because they consider that he is a Syrian citizen, he is not a Canadian citizen. They accept, first, through the Vice-Minister to arrange a meeting, and therefore they are willing to discuss this with me. The fact is that after this discussion the Syrians agree to have a Canadian official to meet with him, so why should I at this point, not knowing what has happened, immediately jump to your conclusion, torture?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, I guess one of the bases might be a knowledge of the public record that this was a real possibility?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But in that case the Syrians would have simply ignored my request for a meeting, if that --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'm not
suggesting that you should have said, "Khalil, you tortured Mr. Arar." All I'm asking is whether your antennae were raised, saying, "You know what,
there is a real possibility here that they are abusing Mr. Arar. That he has come up with an admission within a short period of time."

That is the only question. Did
you suspect that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I
gave you an explanation of why, for instance, an admission might have been made in 24 hours.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But --
but, in order to be able to verify that Mr. Arar was in good shape or that he was safe, was precisely to get access. That was the most important thing for me to get from the General to be able to verify directly to meet with Mr. Arar --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I understand that totally and that is a very reasonable method of operation.

The only question I'm asking is: Before you get access, are you suspicious that perhaps Mr. Arar has been tortured or abused in any way?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: All I can
say is that we wanted to have access to him as
quickly as possible in order to verify that he was safe, and the only way to do that was to obtain permission to meet with him.

Now, anything can go through one's
mind and say, "Yes, maybe he is been handled
roughly, I don't know. Maybe his detention
conditions are bad." All this I will admit to you, all these things go through one's mind --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But I'm asking,
did it go through your mind?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Of course
it did go through my mind.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That is all I
was asking.
You are saying that on October 22 nd when Khalil is giving you this information, going through your mind was the possibility that he was tortured?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I didn't say that he was tortured, that he might have been roughly handled, because $I$ had no basis at that time to say torture.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I have nothing to go by and that is what we wanted to
verify.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'm going to
leave this area very shortly, but this is what you had at that point in time:

You had the public record, which we have reviewed with you. Right?

You had the letter from Livermore, the very first indication saying that Mr. Arar may be "aggressively" questioned. You had that.

Unfortunately, at this time you didn't have the knowledge that another Canadian had alleged that he was tortured a month or two before that time? You didn't know of El Maati's allegations?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So that what you
had at that point in time you had Livermore saying aggressively questioned; you had the public record; and on top of that, of course, you have a situation where the General says he arrived yesterday, he is apparently admitted already.

So those are the objective facts
that you had.
The final question, once again
is -- and I assume the answer is "yes" -- is you
suspected there was a possibility of mishandling in terms of extracting this admission?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I will
answer: You quoted Mr. Livermore and I will quote him back to you. I believe that Mr. Livermore said, "You cannot go from the generic to the particular." He testified to the effect that he had known cases when he was in South America where Canadians were detained in a country with the worst record of human rights and yet those individuals were not submitted to torture. MR. CAVALLUZZO: But why, because they were Canadians?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, because -- you cannot -- yes, you can have a general statement, allegations, but it doesn't necessarily mean that because you have those general allegations that in each particular case everyone is going to fit into that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Oh, absolutely.
Go on.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: My answer to what you said before, you say you had this, you had that. Indeed. But $I$ can also say that we had suddenly the Syrians showing cooperation with us,
so why, with this willingness to cooperate with us, should I jump to the conclusion of torture? MR. CAVALLUZZO: You are misunderstanding the question. The question isn't saying to the Syrians, "You have tortured this guy." The only question I'm saying is that there was a reasonable suspicion -- in all of the circumstances that $I$ mentioned there could have been a reasonable suspicion that they extracted this confession through mishandling or torture? That's all I'm saying. And I think you said that, yes, you thought --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I said because we could imagine that maybe something had happened it was important that we could get and see Mr. Arar immediately, and that happened.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm. In light of the fact that Khalil goes on to say they would continue to interrogate him?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did that raise causes for concern? In other words, if you are saying if there is a possibility that they have extracted a confession through torture or mishandling and then they are saying on top of
that, "We are going to continue to interrogate him", did that raise any concerns? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The word "interrogate" has been used as I could have used any other word. In other words, what it means is that the Syrians believe that Mr. Arar has ties with terrorist organizations, and therefore -again $I$ come back to the word "apparently" which means that there is no certainty -- they will continue to investigate, call it interrogate, "interroger", whatever word you want to use, but they will continue to try and find out whether Mr. Arar is indeed connected to terrorist organizations and whether this represents a threat to their country.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you told us before in terms of the contextual evidence regarding the human rights situation in Syria, the political conditions, that they treat terrorism very, very seriously, and indeed that is one of the justifications upon which they have had emergency rule and marshal law for over 40 years.

Isn't that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm,
yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. So if they have a guy that they suspect is a terrorist, they have extracted a confession within 24 hours and then they say to you, "By the way, we are going to continue to interrogate him because we suspect he is a terrorist," did that not raise questions in your mind as to how they were going to treat Mr. Arar?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I can only
repeat what $I$ have said before. We had no evidence at that point of anything and we want to ensure that we could have access to Mr. Arar precisely to determine in what condition he was.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: By "we didn't have any evidence," the only evidence you could have had would be an admission by the Syrians that they tortured him, and presumably they wouldn't do that?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Perhaps I did not express myself correctly. What I wanted to say is that $I$ did not know what had happened. In order for us to find out what had happened, we needed to have access to Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: And this
is what $I$ obtained from General Khalil.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So if we go,
then, to the next paragraph, Mr. Pillarella, paragraph 4, we see that Khalil's ready to cooperate. He would allow consular officer to visit with Mr. Arar. This is an exceptional measure, stated in this note, and it says:
"...the consular officer could continue to visit Arar at intervals of 4-5 days..."

Then the concluding comment you
say that:
"In the Syrian context this apparent openness and readiness to cooperate by the security service is unheard of. Yet, I believe that Gen. Khalil will deliver on his promises."

You are talking about the promises of cooperation and consular access there.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Consular
access, yes, because that was our main concern. That was my main concern at the time.

You see, once again, when $I$ hear the head of Syrian Military Intelligence accepting, on an exceptional basis, unheard of -this is what has to be kept in mind. This is unheard of in Syria, that they would allow a foreign diplomat to meet with someone who is considered to be a Syrian citizen, that (a) they accept that we meet with him, and (b) that those visits can continue to take place almost on a weekly basis.

I put it to you this simply never happened before. Never.

And therefore when you say to me, "Didn't this go through your mind that he might be roughly handled and tortured?" Yes, indeed, because of the reputation of -- but at the same time I have to ask myself what would be the interest of the Syrians to do that when they are accepting that a Canadian consular officer will be able to meet with Mr. Arar and will be able to meet with him on a weekly basis.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, you provide the answer in paragraph 5. You state in paragraph 5:
"Syrians must be aware of the

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interest this case has generated in Canada, something I emphasized several times..."

So that is one reason why Khalil
may have given you access.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Indeed,
but --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It goes on. It
goes on and talks about our bilateral
relationship. It says:
"...during our conversation, and in the context of the present regional unrest, Syria is becoming more conscious of the image it projects abroad."

Of course what is going down at this time is there is the prospect of a war in

Iraq and Syrians wanted Canadian cooperation.
Isn't that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But all
this was in our favour.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Absolutely.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: This was
in favour of Mr. Arar, so it is irrelevant. For whatever reason the important thing was that we were getting what we wanted, access to Mr. Arar. MR. CAVALLUZZO: But you were asking me the question, why were they giving us such exceptional access, and I'm just giving you your response in paragraph 5, is that we had some leverage with Syria, in other words, at that point in time.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It was
little leverage, but some leverage.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Some leverage, okay.

Then the final sentence in that paragraph is very telling:
"They may also believe that they will gain more credit in letting a Canadian consular officer visit Arar, when they could legitimately claim that when in Syria he is only a Syrian citizen."

So it would seem, at least at that point in time, that what you are saying is, you know what, we have some leverage here.

Let me just finish the question. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Sorry. MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'm repeating
what you said. This is becoming a notorious dispute in Canada. They are concerned about their image in Canada. On top of that we have a very, very difficult situation in the Middle East where there may be a war in Iraq and, as a result of that, they may want to have a good relationship with Canada. As a result of that, that may be why they are being cooperative at this point in time. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I was using the very few things that $I$ had in hand to obtain that access.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Finally, if you go to the next page of your note, Mr. Pillarella, it says, in the last sentence:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "Finally, General Khalil has } \\
& \text { promised to pass on to me any } \\
& \text { information they may gather } \\
& \text { on Arar's implication in } \\
& \text { terrorist activities." } \\
& \text { I want to ask you first of all, }
\end{aligned}
$$

did you ask for that?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't know how this came about. I mean, I can't say the exact -- but it was important for me to know exactly what it was that the Syrians had or suspected that Mr. Arar might be involved in. Therefore, any information $I$ could send back to Ottawa and say, "Look, this is what the Syrians claim" and this could be checked whether it was true or not, this would play -- or would be in favour of Mr. Arar.

So the information that he promised to provide was that this would be something welcome because we would know everything that we needed to know if we wanted to defend Mr. Arar's interests.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You say this
would be in the interests of Mr. Arar.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess it
wouldn't be if in their interrogations they are torturing him. Right? If they are going to continue their interrogation and they are engaging torture methods, then it wouldn't be in the interests of Mr. Arar for them to, at the end of the process, give you the information they have
extracted through these kinds of methods?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But again, you are jumping to conclusions, and at that time, at that particular point in time, during my first meeting with General Khalil, I could not jump to that conclusion for the reasons that $I$ gave you before. That is the reason why, I repeat once more, we needed to have access to Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just out of
interest, did you say to the General, "Listen, this is a very highly visible case in Canada and $I$ would ask you not to continue your interrogation of Mr. Arar until such time as we get to see him"?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: We saw him the very next day, and he said that we would see him immediately so --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: A lot can
happen in 24 hours though, as we have seen from the first statement.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But again
I say to you, if you are severely torturing
somebody how can you produce that somebody less than 24 hours later to a foreign diplomat?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Well,
let's see what happens 24 hours later.

If you go back to the little book? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Which one? MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is the Exhibit $P-134$, the little book of documents that are newly redacted. This is tab 3.

Just before we come to the first consular visit, which is that of Mr. Martel -- and we will have the opportunity to ask him questions next week.

Just prior to doing that, in terms of the General's suggestion or offer that he would give you the results of the interrogation, did it come to mind that that may have left the General with a mixed signal in the sense that, you know, on the one hand you are saying, "Release this guy immediately" and on the other hand "Thanks for the information on this guy after the interrogation", did that come to mind?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let us come to the consular visit, which I understand you did not attend. This was Mr. Martel?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is tab 130,
the newly redacted documents tab 3 of the new Book of Documents.

In terms of headquarters directions in terms of what to look for regarding this consular visit, if you go to tab 131 of the big book, which is Book 2 or volume 2 ?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Tab 131?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's correct, of volume 2. If you have volume 2 .

This is a message from Mr. Pardy which is dated October 22 , and it is to yourself, Head of Mission, as well as Mr. Martel.

The directions from Pardy would be as follows:

> "Realize that the circumstances in which you will see Mr. Arar may preclude your ability to do much more than observe his situation or ask most transparent of questions.
> But in the event that circumstances may allow something more, would suggest the following:

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(a) we are in daily contact with his wife and brother and they express their deep and abiding concern for his welfare. His wife and children remain in Tunis and will stay there until such time as they obtain information on his welfare and well being. You can say that he is constantly in their prayers and thoughts. (b) his situation and what has happened has been a matter of great public concern in Canada. The government of Canada will not rest until he is back home and reunited with his family.

The foreign minister Mr. Graham has protested to the American authorities the actions that they have taken and will continue to make high level representations

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about what has happened."
The fourth point is that there
will be more information as:
"we have not been able to obtain accurate details as to what happened to him since early October when Ms Girvan from the consulate in New York visited him on October 3 and his lawyer saw him on the morning of Oct 5. It is our understanding that he was removed from the United States on the early morning of Oct 8, the day after there was an Immigration hearing in New York. It is our further understanding that he was flown to Jordan and remained there until October 21 when he was taken by Jordanian officials to the Syrian border and was turned over to Syrian officials."

The fourth point is that:

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"the Syrian authorities have assured us that we can visit every three or four days and we will continue to do so..."

Then the fifth point is:
"our objective is to try and make arrangements for his return to Canada but this may take some time and in the meantime we will do everything to ensure that he is provided with the appropriate amenities. If there is anything that is needed please let us know." So that those would be the directions that you and Mr. Martel were given in respect of the first visit.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just one question
that $I$ would have is: At that point in time, did the Ministry, through the Syrian Embassy of Canada, have any instructions as to what to look for if you may suspect that a Canadian has been tortured or mishandled by foreign authorities?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm sorry. The beginning of your question was...?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: The question is whether the Department of Foreign Affairs or whether the Embassy in Damascus had any instructions, training, or whatever, guidance to be given to consular official to look for signs of torture if there is a suspicion that a Canadian may be subjected or had been subjected to torture?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't
know that there is any document which says that, but $I$ think that every consular officer that receives training is provided with clues on what to look for when meeting with a detainee and make observations.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, Mr. Graham testified publicly that in his view after the Arar situation he was of the view that more could be done in order to train, advise, or whatever, guide consular officials in looking for incidents of torture in the future?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I agree
with that. I think that one can always improve.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Were
there any -- was there any training given to
consular officials in respect to how to detect torture?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't
know if there was anything specific, but I can tell you one thing is that $I$ had a very, very, very experienced officer in Mr. Martel. I don't think that you can find anyone better than him in the department who has been dealing with consular affairs throughout his career, and if anyone had an indication of what to look for, Mr. Martel would have had it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Would it surprise you if Mr. Martel will tell us that he received no training?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, he may not have received any training, but do you know the expression, "apprendre sur la tas"?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No. You
better --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That means that you learned as you go by, and Mr. Martel has had ample time to learn as he went by throughout his career.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So that is
training on the job, so to speak?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, sometimes it is the best training that you can get.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But was there anybody in the embassy, for example, that was an expert in torture or mishanding of detainees by Syrian authorities?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Frankly, I
don't know how to answer that question. You say "an expert in torture". Where do you find an expert in torture? Obviously --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You should have been here last week, we had three experts who testified about torture.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Do they
work in embassies?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Pardon me?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Do they
work in embassies?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, they
don't have to work in embassies but presumably an expert could have been called on at any point in time.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Oh, you
believe that if being in Damascus we could have
called on some expert to come and visit Mr. Arar? MR. CAVALLUZZO: I assume the
answer is no.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Obviously
not.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then
let's see what took place at the meeting, going back to tab 3.

Even though you didn't attend it would appear you approved this particular report. If you go to the second page it says approved by Mr. Pillarella?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I approved
most of the reports. And that is simply a way of working. I mean, if it is anything that is routine, I may not need to approve it, but anything of importance $I$ want to be aware. So approval means simply knowledge of what goes out. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. In any event, in the first paragraph, it says we were granted access on October $23 r d$.

Then it says:
"Arar is being detained by
the anti-terrorist unit, a
branch of the Syrian security

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services."
So that emphasizes once again it is a terrorism-related activity that he is being suspected of. Then it goes on to say:
"Col Majid Salah, who was
present at the meeting between Gen. Khalil and Amb, was the contact point and Martel was taken to the site in an unmarked vehicle after being met at a rendez-vous point in the City."

So that Saleh was his contact person and Khalil was yours.

Paragraph 2, it says:
"Arrived on site at 1000
hours and was greeted by an officer who declined to give his identity."

Now, just that line there. That would have raised your antennae saying, what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with an officer who refuses to give his identity.

Did that raise any questions?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I will let
you finish and $I$ will respond to --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, that is the question. Did that raise any suspicions, when you see that there is an officer there who greets him and the guy refused to give his identity?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA:
Mr. Cavalluzzo, please keep in mind what I said earlier.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: This is
terra incognita for the Syrians. They have never done anything like this. We were certainly anxious to meet with Mr. Arar, but I can assure you that they were extremely nervous about that meeting because to them this was something that they were not accustomed to.

So General Khalil authorized the meeting, but this gentleman, in the Syrian context, it is quite understandable that he doesn't know what to do. This is something totally unheard of for him. He declines to give his name. I don't see anything ominous in that. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It goes on in that paragraph and says:
"Importance that Canadian
authorities attach to this high profile consular case was emphasized..."

So that Martel is passing on the same message that you did before.

Then it says:
"Officials took minutes during this entire initial period."

Then 10:30 arrives and the: "...meeting with Martel lasted approximately one-half hour. It was not possible to see where exactly Arar was being detained."

Now, is that a problematic situation? In other words, you don't know what the conditions of detention are, and...

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I would submit that even in other countries, or even in Canada, if a detainee is met by a consular officer he is not met inside of where he is being detained. I believe that Mr. Arar, when he was met by Ms Girvan in New York, she did not meet Mr. Arar in the cell where he was being detained.

So I don't -- yes, it would have been much better to be able to see where he was being detained. I agree with you.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: What I'm
referring to, of course, is once again the public record on prison conditions, particularly in these detention centres in Syria, we know that they are very problematic --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I agree
with you, it would have been ideal if Mr. Martel could have seen Mr. Arar where he was being detained, but --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It goes on:
"Questioning starting along
the lines of your
instructions..."
This is obviously to Mr. Pardy:
"...but it was obvious subj
was not free to answer all of
the questions. Conversation
took place in English and was
translated into Arabic
immediately. Notes were
taken at all times by the
Syrians."

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Did this concern you, that
Arar was not free to answer all of the questions and that notes were taken of everything that was said by the Syrians, since the conversation was in Arabic?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It goes on in the same paragraph to say that Arar was shown a seat at some distance.

Did that concern you?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Why would that
concern you, that he was given a seat at some distance?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It could mean anything, that they didn't want -- again, $I$ don't know. I wasn't there and I don't know what "a distance" means. You would have to ask Mr. Martel that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you ask
Mr. Martel that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To tell
you the truth, $I$ don't remember.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Four:
"Subj appeared to be healthy

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but this is difficult to assess. He looked resigned and submissive. Numerous eye signals seemed to indicate that he was not free to speak out. At least that is the impression we had."

So once again it would appear that for whatever reason that Mr. Arar clearly does not feel free to speak out.

I guess a question that some
intervenors would have related to this is, at any time, particularly in light of the circumstances in which we see in the first report, at any time did anyone from the Canadian Embassy say to the Syrians, "We would like a private meeting with Mr. Arar, not in front of four Syrians officials. We would like a private meeting"? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA:

Mr. Cavalluzzo --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- in an
ideal world everything would be possible. I hope that you will allow me this expression. In this particular case, we were beggars, not choosers.

We were on their territory, not on ours.
We had to act according to the circumstances on the ground. Therefore, we had to make those assessments right on the spot. To make the suggestions that you are making, that would have been the perfect question in an ideal world, but we are not dealing in an ideal world and we had to consider ourselves very fortunate that we were having a meeting, that we were able to see Mr. Arar, that Mr. Arar was alive.

I will concede to you that this report does have some negative aspects, that he was not free to express himself, that the meeting was taking place in front of Syrian Intelifgence, that perhaps he was sending signals with his eyes that -- there are many negative aspects.

But there are also some very positive aspects to it, and those very positive aspects are that Mr . Arar came into the room by himself. In other words, he did seem to be in fairly good shape. He shook hands with Mr. Martel and his handshake was a firm handshake. I seem to recall that -- you know, there was indication that there were bruises and so on. When Mr. Martel shook hands with Mr. Arar he did not feel any
bruises, and certainly Mr. Arar did not withdraw his hand in pain or something. These were positive points.

I admit that the document, this document, does raise questions. But you have to make a balance. This document is complete. It says: "We are happy, we have seen him and he seems to be in fairly good health, even if it is difficult to assess."

But at the same time we are indicating in our report that there are some issues that preoccupy us and, because of that, we insist for another meeting, precisely to see if there is any evolution between the first and the second one.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I assume you
didn't ask for a private meeting?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Sorry?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You didn't ask
for a private meeting?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No. But I explained to you why this would have been impossible to obtain.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You said that in this situation, we were beggars?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Canadians would
say to you, you are selling us short on that.
Here we have a country -- here we have a country that wants better relationships with Canada, wants foreign investment, is in a very precarious position because the relationship with the Americans is going quickly into the toilet. At the same time, they want our cooperation respecting the prospective war in Iraq. It seems to me that we had a lot to bring to the table and that we were not beggars in those circumstances, Mr. Pillarella.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: When I say
"beggars" I mean that we did not have the type of leverage that could have changed or induced the Syrians to act differently. In fact, the little leverage that we had, we used it and we obtained what we wanted, access to Mr. Arar. That was the foremost preoccupation we had.

So we had to do with what we had.
We could not invent things.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It goes on
in the next paragraph -- this is paragraph 5 now, it talks about, five lines down:
"When prompted further for answers, the Syrians told him in Arabic he was not to answer those questions."

Once again signalling whether he
was free to speak.
It goes on.
"He said he only stayed in Jordan for a couple of hours before being taken to the Syrian border. He would therefore have been detained in Syria for the past two weeks, contrary to what we were led to believe."

There you are advised by Mr. Arar that he has been there for two weeks. Not 24 hours, two weeks.

When you got that information did
you say, "These guys have been holding Mr. Arar incommunicado for two weeks, and $I$ know what happens, why they keep people incommunicado, because they extract information they want through aggressive techniques"?

Did that come to mind?

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AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Maybe. But we will never know the answer because we really don't know what happened.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just a minute. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes? MR. CAVALLUZZO: What do you mean, "We really don't know what happened"? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, you say that Mr. Arar was being controlled and, of course, we said that he was not free to speak, and at the same time he is allowed to say something which is contrary to what they have been saying. I mean, I have a --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No. Do you
accept -- do you accept what Mr. Arar, a Canadian, has told your consular official, that he was only in Jordan for a few hours and that he had been in Syria for two weeks?

Do you accept that today?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
what he said.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: I didn't ask you
if he said that. We all know he said that.
I said, do you accept that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't
know what happened.
Again, the point is you say that Mr. Arar is being controlled, and at the same time the Syrians would allow him to say something which is contrary to what they have been saying. It is because of that that $I$ really don't know what to think.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: What you are telling me today, in 2005, you are telling me today you don't know who to believe as to how long he was in Syria, Mr. Arar or General Khalil?

Is that what you are telling me?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, I'm not telling you that.

The only thing I'm saying is
that -- I would like to know the exact answer. The point is that Mr. Arar you say is not free to talk, except that on this particular point the Syrians allow him to say that. I don't know what to think.

## MR. CAVALLUZZO: But

Mr. Pillarella -- Mr. Pillarella, this is a crucial point, because if you don't accept what Mr. Arar told your consular official on October $22 n d$, then this whole idea of being held
incommunicado is irrelevant, and therefore all of the public record we have -- just let me finish the question.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I didn't say anything.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: All the
public record we have on what the Syrians do when someone is held incommunicado didn't come to bear in respect of any decision you took relating to Mr. Arar.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But,
Mr. Cavalluzzo, I don't know that Mr. Arar was held incommunicado, as you say. I don't know. MR. CAVALLUZZO: But he has told you. We have a Canadian citizen who has told you that he has been there for two weeks, and you have General Khalil saying, "No, it was one day." I'm asking you: Why wouldn't you believe the word of a Canadian? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I believe facts. When Mr. Martel met with Mr. Arar there was no evidence -- no evidence that Mr. Arar had been physically tortured. There was no such evidence.

Because $I$ can tell you one thing,
if that evidence had been there, that evidence would have been reported to Ottawa.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But, you see, Mr. Pillarella, the problem with that response is that is why someone is held incommunicado, so that they stop torturing somebody at a certain point in time when there will be objective observers coming to see him. So, in other words, if they had tortured Mr. -- just listen to the question -- if they had tortured Mr. Arar in the first week in a particular way -- and I assume they may be experts at it to do it in such a way that it won't show after a particular point in time -- so that it seems to me that whether he was there for two weeks or one day was terribly relevant in terms of how you should have responded in terms of representing Mr. Arar.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, in fact, I have read somewhere that Mr. Arar had been hit with electrical wires on the palm of his hands and that bruises and redness lasted for something like three weeks, and $I$ accept that this might have happened.

The point is that when Mr. Martel met with him for the first time and shook hands
with him, Mr. Martel did not feel any bruises in his hands and Mr. Arar did not withdraw his hand because of pain or something.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: So this is
a fact. And I repeat, if Mr. Martel had noticed anything untoward, that would have been reported. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. We
will have the opportunity to speak to Mr. Martel next week.

Paragraph 7, it goes on to say:
"When asked if he wished the Embassy to provide him with anything he might need he answered that his needs were all taken care of by his Syrian hosts..."

Then it says in brackets:
"... (his answer was dictated to him in Arabic by the Syrians)."

That obviously is a concern. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is another negative point. These are the negative points $I$ was mentioning earlier.

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MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let's go to another negative point at the top of page 2. It says:
"He also repeated in English after his hosts, speaking

Arabic, prompted him to do so..."

This is what Mr. Arar
apparently stated:
"`I am Syrian and I obey the
laws of Syria. I am proud of
my country of origin and $I$ am
also proud of Canada, my
country of adoption. I have
been respected by my Syrian
brothers and I am happy to
have come back to Syria. The
authorities have not
exercised any pressure on me.
You can see I feel well.
Anything I ask for $I$
receive'."
Now, needless to say, you would have thought that that was just a pile of baloney?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.

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 MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It goes on in paragraph 8:"Syrian authorities have indicated they would detain Arar in this location until interrogation is completed."

Okay. Now, let me put it to you: If you had known that this was the Palestine Branch, and if you were aware of the public record as demonstrated in the Amnesty report of 2002 that I read to you, this statement, that he is going to remain there until his interrogation is completed, would have concerned you immensely?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, it certainly concerned us, and because of that we asked for another immediate meeting to see, as I have said earlier, what evolution there might be.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then it
goes on -- because, you know, the point about the Palestine Branch, I don't want to repeat it to you, is that they are apparently experts in extracting information that they want through methods that we certainly wouldn't condone. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: As I have said, $I$ didn't know whether this was the

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Palestinian Branch or not.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then,
finally, it says:
"Col. Salah Majid said Arar
had confessed to knowing members of a terrorist group."

Then, finally, in terms of the comment in paragraph 10, Martel says:
"What is rather puzzling
however, is Arar's statement
that he had been in Jordan
for only a few hours (and
therefore would have been in
Syria for the past two
weeks), whereas both ... and
General Khalil maintained
that Arar had arrived in
Syria only a few days ago."
So what Martel seems to be saying
is this is a troublesome area, and that is the point that we discussed with you.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But, as I
have admitted earlier, this message contains positive and negative points.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: And
perhaps the negative points are longer than the positive points, and because of that, and because this was the very first meeting, we wanted to make sure that we could verify as quickly as possible, within a few days, whether there was going to be an evolution in his appearance and to be able to verify his well-being.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This idea of you are getting these visits and we will see whether in fact he is tortured and Martel shook his hand, have you ever heard of mental torture?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: What?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mental torture?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So you understand
that the definition of torture, both in international conventions and Canadian law, includes mental torture --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- not just
physical beatings?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA:
Absolutely.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right? Would you agree with me that if someone was subject to mental torture, quite apart from physical torture, that it may be difficult to discern that in the context of this kind of meeting? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is a possibility. However, $I$ was referring to something that was reported publicly by Mr. Arar himself. So I'm not making things up. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mr. Arar didn't
report it --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, no. MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- until a year after the fact. What $I$ am concerned about is what you were thinking about at this particular point in time, in 2002.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But even mental torture will show effects that perhaps one can detect not as easily as physical torture -MR. CAVALLUZZO: How do you
know that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Hmm?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: How do you
know that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Because, I
mean -- I am no expert in the matter, but $I$ can only imagine that if you have been subjected to mental torture that you will show some outward sign of not being with it, if $I$ can say -- if $I$ can use that expression.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So I think you would agree with me that Mr. Graham's statement that there should be more training in this area of consular officials is a good suggestion?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I have already agreed to that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Let us move on, then, to the second visit, which was a few days later, on October the 28 th. This is at tab 4.

Do you have that in front of you?
Once again, this is Mr. Martel,
approved by you. Once again, Mr. Martel will testify to this so $I$ won't spend a lot of time on it

In terms of the important portions for $u$ s today, it states in paragraph 4 that:
"Syrians have briefly indicated their investigation was progressing but were not

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prepared nor authorized to provide details. Only General Khalil was in authority to do so and the latter has assured the (Head of Mission) he would do so once the investigation is completed."

So what this seems to suggest
is the interrogation is continuing, it would continue for some time, according to Mr. Khalil, and that information would be given to Canadians once the investigation was completed? We heard that earlier.

The question $I$ have is: If there is a reasonable suspicion that the interrogation is being conducted in a way which would violate international norms, such as the Convention Against Torture, or hard or mishandling or whatever one wants to call it, and Canada is saying, "When you have completed your interrogation can you give us the fruits of the interrogation process?" does that not indicate that Canada may be complicit -AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- in getting information which may be the product of torture? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No. I completely disagree with your assessment. First of all, we are not asking. I never asked the Syrians to continue to interrogate him so that we can get information. No.

My point was: What is it that you have against him, because we in Canada have nothing against him? We consider that he is not sought for any offence, crime or anything, and therefore, we want him back in Canada. That was the mantra from day one to the very last day when Mr. Arar was released.

In other words, for us Mr. Arar was an innocent person and we want him back. Now, you Syrians are holding on him. Well, let us know what it is that you have against him, because if you do have something against him then put him on trial. But what we want is his return in Canada." So when you suggest --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But -- I'm sorry. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- that we are complicit in the interrogation, I'm sorry, but

I do strongly disagree with such an affirmation. MR. CAVALLUZZO: But you would agree with me that if the information you obtained from the Syrians was the product of torture and you took it back to Canada --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I never said -- I said that we never had any indication or evidence that Mr. Arar was being tortured. Had we had that indication, we would have reported to Ottawa. So whatever information he has provided, from what we know and from all the visits and, in fact, you will notice that from Visit 1 to Visit 9, there is a marked evolution. In fact, that evolution you can already see in Visit No. 2, that Mr. Arar was not subject to physical torture. So you are reaching that conclusion --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just a minute.
Where does it say that he is not subject to physical torture in the second visit?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, it says he was -- I mean, I would have to reread this message --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It certainly
doesn't say that --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- I
haven't seen it in a long time.
But all $I$ know is that the message is quite different from the very first one. The tenseness of the first meeting is gone from this second meeting. Mr. Arar is more relaxed. He doesn't appear confused or anything like that.

So already, if $I$ had to follow your line of reasoning, that should not be, because, according to your conclusion, he would have been tortured during this week in the --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, I'm not. I'm not suggesting that.

What I'm suggesting to you is that there is a real possibility, I'm putting it to you, that Mr. Arar may have been tortured in that period when he was held incommunicado, I'm putting it to you, the first two weeks. That is what I'm suggesting. He may have been physically tortured. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: My answer is, I have no indication that he was being held incommunicado and, two, there was no evidence that Mr. Martel could verify that assumption of yours.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did it ever occur
to you that if Mr. Arar, a Canadian, was telling the truth, that he -- just wait for the
question -- that he was only in Jordan for a few hours and that he was in Syria for two weeks, and the Syrians are saying, "He just got here," dud you ever suspect as to why the Syrians would have been lying about that?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Everything
is possible, but --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Can you give
us one good reason as to why the Syrians may have been lying about that, if Mr. Arar was telling the truth?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But I
don't know that. I can't --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: But can you think
about it? Can you think about it and say, "If Mr. Arar was telling the truth and I believe him, then why did the Syrians lie to me about this?"

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: You are asking me to make a choice on something that I have no knowledge of, and that that is extremely difficult.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, I'm
asking you to make a choice to believe a Canadian over General Khalil. That is what I'm asking you to do.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Why should
you ask me to make such a choice? I mean, I need facts, and I don't have the facts to make the choice.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Final question regarding the second visit is the second last paragraph. This is number 6. It says:
"The question of where things are with the Syrians is being investigated by the (Head of Mission). Visits by RCMP or CSIS officials could not be discussed at this level."

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That question or
that statement relates back to a question that you received from Mr. Pardy, does it not?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To tell
you the truth, I can't recall.
Do you have this document --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Let me
show it to you. Let me show it to you. It is Exhibit P-98.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm
sorry --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Exhibit P-98.
The clerk will get this for you.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Oh, okay.
Thank you.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is a note
from Mr. Pardy to Damascus and Head of Mission and Martel. The last paragraph, Mr. Pardy says:
"Would appreciate if you could report if you obtain any information on possible visits by RCMP and CSIS officials, either to meet with Maher..."

Then there is some redaction.
"...or Syrian officials.
Many thanks, Gar." (As read)
Do you recall receiving that
message from Gar Pardy --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- asking about reporting about any information concerning visits by the RCMP?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you have any
idea what Mr. Pardy's concern was respecting possible visits to Mr. Arar by CSIS or the RCMP? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't
know.
I assume that you have asked that
question of Mr. Pardy.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, did it
not raise a question in your mind when you received this?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well,
there was a security aspect in all this. I mean,
there was a consular case but there was also a security aspect to it, so $I$ can only assume. But the best answer can be provided to you by Mr. Pardy himself --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So you don't
recall any discussions you may have had with Mr. Pardy as to his concern about possible RCMP or CSIS officials' visits to see Mr. Arar?

You don't recall any conversations
to that effect?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To tell
you the truth, I don't remember. This may have been discussed, but $I$-- per se, I do not remember, no.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just one final
question before we break for lunch.
In these circumstances, presumably
when the consular head or director is saying, "Watch out" or "Can you tell me about any visits by the RCMP or CSIS", then presumably he would have the controlling voice in terms of if they did show up. You would report back to him and say -AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Of course I would have. Yes. Absolutely. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Commissioner, it is one o'clock. This may be an appropriate time. THE COMMISSIONER: Is 2:15 okay? MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's fine. THE COMMISSIONER: We will break until 2:15.

THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Upon recessing at 1:00 p.m. /
Suspension à 13 h 00
--- Upon resuming at 2:16 p.m. /
Reprise à 14 h 16
THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated. Veuillez vous asseoir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Go ahead.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Thank you,

Commissioner.
Mr. Pillarella, at the break, we reviewed the second visit of Mr. Arar, and in that it said that the question of the RCMP and CSIS couldn't be reviewed at that level, and I'm wondering if, in respect of Mr. Pardy's memo, which is $\mathrm{P}-98$, wherein he said:
"If you could report/obtain any information on possible visits by RCMP and CSIS officials to meet Mr. Arar." (As read)

Whether you did your own investigation to see whether that had happened or was going to happen, or did you just leave it and just wait to see what happened?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't remember that there was anything done about that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
I'm wondering if you could, once again, go back to 134 , which is the small booklet, and let's pick up at tab 5. We're now at October $30 t h$ of 2002 , and this is the former ...

The same date, but just before that, I'm wondering if -- there was a newly
redacted document, P-97. If you might give that to the witness?

THE COMMISSIONER: P-97.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Now, P-98, which I showed you
before the break, is dated October 28 from Pardy, where he's asking about reporting on information of possible CSIS visits or RCMP visits.

P-97 is two days later,
October 30, from Pardy to yourself and Martel, and it states in paragraph 2:

> "With respect to paragraph 6 of referenced message, I would appreciate if ambassador could report if there has been any contact with RCMP and CSIS liaison officials indicating interest in visiting Syria or contact with Syrian officials with respect to the case. There have been indications of this from RCMP and letters being prepared by ISI, suggesting that this not happen in the

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current circumstances."
(As read)
And once again, upon receiving this, did you investigate this or did you just wait to see if anything happened in respect to the RCMP and CSIS?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To my recollection, there was no indication on the part of the RCMP and CSIS liaison officers indicating an interest in visiting, so -- because the way $I$ read it is, if they had approached me for a visit, and $I$ don't recall any such approach.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then once again, now, if you go back to 134 , tab 5, on the same date, there is a report or a message which is dated August -- or, excuse me, October 31, 2002. It's from Damascus to headquarters, including Pardy, Harris, ISI, and others. And it says -drafted by Mr. Shaw. Now, Mr. Shaw is the political officer in Damascus?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: He was the political counsellor at the time, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And approved by the ambassador.

Then it says:
"During GXD's meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem on October 30 ..." Now, GXD, if you could help us,
what is that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: GXD was
the special coordinator for the Middle East peace process. He was an official from Foreign Affairs. He was dealing strictly with the Middle East peace process.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
And so that he was in Damascus at the time and met with Mouallem?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, he came to visit in that particular context. Not in the context of Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. As far as you're concerned, in the second paragraph, it says:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "The ambassador thanked the } \\
& \text { Deputy Minister for his } \\
& \text { cooperation in the Arar case. } \\
& \text { He noted that Canada } \\
& \text { understood that according to } \\
& \text { Syrian law, Arar was a Syrian }
\end{aligned}
$$

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national, and appreciated
that Syria had on an exceptional basis accorded consular access. This access
had helped to assuage some concerns raised by the Canadian press. Nonetheless,
the case was continuing to generate considerable interest in Canada."

And then it goes on:
"Members of Parliament are asking the Canadian Government when Arar will be able to return to Canada. As the Ambassador was travelling to Canada on November 4, he fully expected to be queried on this case. For this reason, the Ambassador had once again asked to see General Khalil, Head of Military Intelligence ...
before November 4 to receive the latest information on the

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Arar case."
Then it goes on, finally:
"The Deputy Minister committed to calling General Khalil to facilitate this meeting ..."

Now, in respect of your travel to Canada, you were going to be travelling back to Ottawa on November the 4 th of 2002 , or thereabouts?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, that is correct.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And in effect what you were saying at this meeting with the Deputy Minister is that you would like a meeting with Khalil because he had promised to give you information, the fruits of the interrogation, prior to your return to Canada. Is that correct?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No? Why don't you give us the context --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The reason
I asked for that particular meeting is because (a), as you indicated, I was returning to Canada and because of the interest generated in Canada, I
knew that $I$ was going to be asked how things were evolving, and the only person who could tell me how things were evolving was General Khalil, and therefore I said, could I get a meeting with General Khalil so that he can tell me how things are going, because we need to know. I mean, the pressure is on us to get Mr. Arar back to Canada, but we need to have all the facts, and that is the reason why $I$ asked for the meeting. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And did the
meeting take place? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It did. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And the meeting took place on November 3? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I believe so.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you go to
volume 2, tab 164.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Which tab, sorry?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: 164 .
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: 164.
You're probably right. It was November 3, but I can't ...

Yes, it was November 3, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And how did that
meeting come about?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm sorry,
what do you mean?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: How did that meeting -- did General Khalil call you and say --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, no,
no. No. I can't remember who called me, but I did receive a call saying General Khalil will see you at such and such a time, and the same procedure was followed, you know --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Same location?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Same
location.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: They brought your
car to a location, somebody jumped in the car?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And brought you
to -- okay.
Now, tab 164 is a report dated November 3, 2002. It's for Ottawa. And you mention in the opening paragraph that:
"An hour long meeting, with ..."

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Well, it's blacked out. But I
assume it's the same meeting we're talking about.
" ... to review the Arar case
proved to be extremely
positive and confirmed the continued cooperation ..."

Of the Syrians. And then it goes
on:
"When I asked ... whether I could get a resume of information obtained so far from Arar that $I$ could take to Canada with me, he agreed
to do so. He promised I
would receive it before my departure, unfortunately only in Arabic."

So here it is you that are asking
the General for the resume or the information?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: And I can
explain that.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Go ahead. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: He kept -the General kept saying, that, you know, Mr. Arar had affiliation with terrorists and things like
that, and I must say that I pushed the envelope at this point and I said, "Well, if this is the case, can we have any proof that -- of what you're saying?"

But I must admit, that when I said that, $I$ was not believing that the General would comply. In fact, I asked, because it was in our interests to know exactly what it was that the Syrians had against Mr. Arar --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But I never believed, in spite of the fact he said he would provide this information to me before $I$ left.

And as $I$ was leaving in the middle of the night, this was the 3rd of November, and planes normally for Europe leave around two o'clock or three o'clock in the morning, I thought to myself, yes, he has promised, but he is not going to deliver.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: And to my
surprise, around seven or eight o'clock in the evening, somebody showed up at the residence, somebody from General Khalil, with an envelope,

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and he refused to give the envelope to the staff at the residence. I had to come down and get it myself. And that is how it happened.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And if you go
back to the smaller Book of Documents, at tab 6 -AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Sorry, which tab?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 6?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Six?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We see that it's
stated, and this has been newly redacted, but in
any event it states, and this is the former tab 165:
"On November 3, 2002, the Canadian Ambassador to Syria received a document (written in Arabic) from Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI). The Ambassador brought the document to Canada personally and gave it to ISI on November 6. ISI sent it to CSIS for translation. The document, an undated three-paragraph bout de

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papier, was translated on November 7. The document alleges that Arar spent time in Afghanistan in Mujaheddin camps, and that he knew ... The document was sent to CSIS for translation by the CSIS Liaison Officer in ISI. The translated document was returned to ISI and the information was shared with JPD, the RCMP and CSIS."

Now, just a number of questions relating to that document, and $I$ guess the first would be, and I come back to what I had asked before: Did you suspect that this document may have been the product of torture, and as a result, of limited reliability?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: With regard to reliability, we had to take that with a certain scepticism. As to know whether this was the result of physical torture, my answer is, as this morning, it might have happened, but $I$ really don't know, and from the visits by Leo Martel with Mr. Arar, there was no such evidence.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So I assume that at this point in time then, you concluded, since there was no evidence of torture, that this particular document, which you brought back from Syria, was not a product of torture, and therefore reliable?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I said a moment ago, I really don't know. I can't -- it might have happened. I really don't know.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But, you see, we're going to come to -- let us then just ask you, before we come to this meeting: This document was obviously sent to CSIS for translation, and then it would appear that the document was shared with the RCMP and CSIS, and I'd like to know who made the decision that the RCMP and CSIS would have access to this document?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If you
look at all the documents that go from Damascus, there is not a single document that goes to the RCMP or CSIS, which means that all my communications were with the Department of Foreign Affairs. The information was distributed to those divisions or bureaus, and then, if there is a decision made to share that information with an
outside agency, that decision was taken in Ottawa, not by me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, do you
know -- do you have any idea of who made the decision that this information would be shared with CSIS and the RCMP?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't
know.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, you did
attend an interagency meeting on November 6 . Isn't that correct?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is
correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And this was a
meeting at DFAIT headquarters?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And at the
meeting there were in attendance DFAIT people, including ISI?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To my recollection, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: There were people
from the RCMP?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And people from

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, if you go to
tab -- staying in the small booklet, 134, at
tab 9. This is a message, or a comment, or
memorandum from Jonathan Solomon, who we
understand -- actually, it's from Scott
Heatherington to a number of people, and it starts with reference to JPD -- that's Mr. Pardy, in particular:
"... a memo providing a chronology of the Maher Arar case, I think it would be useful to provide you with a translated copy of the summary of Arar's confession, provided to DFAIT by Syrian intelligence."

Now, do you know who decided that this particular document has now turned into a confession? Were you referring to the document as a confession, or is this just --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, I
never referred to the document as a confession. This is -- well, $I$ see the word "confession"
written down here, but it was certainly not my expression.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. The
message or memorandum goes on. It says:
"The summary was provided to
Ambassador Pillarella in
Damascus ..."
And then there's some redaction.
Then it goes on:
"... and immediately before
the Ambassador's return to
Ottawa for meetings. The document was discussed in a meeting with ISI, the

Ambassador, CSIS, and the
RCMP on 6 November."
And then it says:
"... CSIS made no comments about the credibility of the document, but said that even if true, it was not necessarily damning evidence against him."

Okay? So CSIS would appear -- do
you know who was there for -- I guess we can't ask

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you that. But certainly the representative of CSIS' view was, not expressing any opinion on the reliability of the document; however, even if it's true, it's not, in their words, damning evidence against Mr. Arar.

Now, the question that $I$ would have for you: At this meeting, was there any discussion, any discussion at all, about the reliability of this alleged confession because of all of the concerns we discussed with you this morning, that is, the possibility of torture, the possibility of mishandling, any kind of possibility where there was any kind of coercion involved?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: As far as I can recall, yes, everyone took the contents of that particular message with a certain scepticism because we had no way of knowing whether this was true or not. In fact, one of the reasons for getting information from the Syrians on what they had against Mr. Arar was precisely to be able to verify that by our own means and see whether this was correct or not.

MR. CAVALLuZZO: But was -- go on. I'm sorry.

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AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: And, again, you're asking me to remember what happened over three years ago. As $I$ seem to recall, yes, there was general discussion, but -- yes. No one came to any conclusion. In fact, you have the conclusion there, when CSIS says, well -- they made no comment on the credibility of the document.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, but what I'm asking you, since you're the expert, you're the interpreter of Syria to Canadian officials, did you yourself, as being the interpreter of Syria, say, "This document should be viewed with a great deal of scepticism because it may be the product of torture"? Did you say that?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I did
it -- I don't know if $I$ said that in those terms, but $I$ certainly did it, as others around the table, that we were taking this document with a certain scepticism, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And why the
scepticism? Why was everybody taking this with -leaving apart the CSIS conclusion, even if it's true, it doesn't help us. But just in terms of the process of getting the confession, as it's
called, why was there scepticism expressed?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Because we had no way of knowing whether, for instance, if Mr. Arar, finding himself in the situation where he was, thought it might be better to cooperate and let the Syrians hear what they wanted to hear so that, you know, he would be safe.

I don't know. Again, we wanted the information to be able to verify whether there was any veracity to this information provided by the Syrians. It is better to check than not. And that is the reason why we wanted to do it.

Because if, for instance, we could have checked that that information was false or did not correspond to reality, we could have gone back to the Syrians and said, "Look, this is what you're telling us, but we have evidence which says otherwise, and therefore, please let Mr. Arar go."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, was there any discussion at this interagency meeting on November 6 of the possibility that Mr. Arar had been in Syria for those two crucial weeks at the beginning, and that the Syrians were lying about his arrival in Syria and so that there would have been a period of time where he was incommunicado?

Was there any discussion along those lines. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Not that I recall.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you talk to
Mr. Pardy about the possibility of whether Mr. Arar was tortured in the first two weeks that I've been referring to as being incommunicado? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Never. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Would it surprise you to know that Mr. Pardy's evidence was that he believed that Mr. Arar, that he had been in Syria for the first two weeks, that he was incommunicado, and that it's quite reasonable to assume that there may have been torture which produced the document which was discussed on November 6. Would that surprise you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, let me -- let me say this: I have known Mr. Pardy for a very long time. He was a former colleague, a friend, and $I$ know that there is no one in the Department that has taken more interest in consular affairs, and he has done tremendous things to try to get Canadians freed from imprisonment and to have consular access to these Canadians detained abroad. I think that he has
dedicated, with passion, his last years in the Department to consular affairs; and therefore, I have the greater respect for him.

But I must say that if this is what he has said in his testimony, I'm afraid that I have to say that this was never discussed between us --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, he did not -he did not say -- he did not say that he discussed it with you.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: What I'm saying he said, is that based with the facts that he had --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- which were
similar to the facts that you had, that he believed that Mr. Arar was in Syria for the first two weeks, was held incommunicado, and any statements may have resulted from torture. That was his --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If that is what he thought, he never shared these thoughts with me. Never.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, I guess he
may have assumed that since you were the interpreter of Syria to Canadian officials, that you would have been operating on the same assumption as him.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well,
then, he should have read the reports coming out of Damascus, which were not indicating -- they were not saying "Yes" or "No", they were saying, based on the evidence that we have, there is no such indication; and therefore, $I$ don't know how he could assume, because if -- I said it this morning -- if, for instance, we had had any inkling that there might have been physical torture, this would have been reported. But we could not do that, Mr. Martel could not do that, because there was no such evidence.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: How he could
assume that, Mr. Pillarella, is that he believed Mr. Arar. He believed Mr. Arar when Mr. Arar said, "I was only in Jordan for a few hours and I've been in Syria for a few weeks, and those Syrians were lying about that." That's what he believed and as a result of that made certain assumptions based on the public record.
presume what Mr. Pardy was thinking. I can only say what we could verify on site.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And we've been through that and there's no reason to revisit those discussions.

Let us then move to the third consular visit at tab 192 in volume 2. This is November 12.

But before doing that, what was the result of that interagency meeting? What was going to happen as a result of the three -- DFAIT, ISI, CSIS and RCMP -- meeting about this alleged confession of Mr. Arar? Who was going to do what?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Look, this was left in the hands of the headquarters. I was there for a very short period of time. I was not in Canada --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- for the purpose of Mr . Arar, $I$ was here for other reasons, and therefore, you know, I presented what I had but then I left it to headquarters to --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, was it your working assumption, when you left that meeting, and after seeing the CSIS response, that the
alleged confession was of no assistance because even if it was true, it didn't move the ball down the court in any sense?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm not
sure that $I$ know what -- what I should answer to that. What is it that you're asking? MR. CAVALLUZZO: What I'm asking you is, was the conclusion, was the consensus at the meeting that this statement was useless? That even if it was true, it didn't assist in advancing whatever you were doing in respect of Mr. Arar?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I don't know about that, but one thing is certain, is that on my return to Damascus, I kept going back to the Syrian authorities, repeating the same message.

So, in other words, we did not
leave things hanging. I kept doing what $I$ was supposed to do in trying to persuade the Syrians to let Mr. Arar go.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And did you say
to them that, "This statement, that this alleged confession you have, General Khalil, is useless? It doesn't advance the ball at all? That my intelligence agency says that it's not worth --"

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But what I could say, and what they believed -- I mean, that was -- what was important for themselves was what they believed, not what $I$ might say.

Of course, $I$ can say: "To us,
this doesn't prove anything," and in fact we kept saying, "Please let him go." But the Syrians were convinced otherwise --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you didn't
say to them, "The conclusion of our security intelligence agency is that even if this document is a true statement Mr. Arar's, it doesn't prove anything. It doesn't prove that he's a terrorist or he has terrorist connections"?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I had no basis to say that. We had only one short comment from CSIS saying well -- first of all, they made no comment, so they did not verify it. They just said -- where is the --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It's tab 9. It looks to me like they made a comment. It looks like a conclusion. They made no comment about the credibility of the document. But read on.

```
"... but said that even if
    true, it was not necessarily
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damning evidence against him."

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That's as far as we're concerned in our system. But as I've said, for the Syrians, it was different. I mean -- and there I had no influence. I kept telling the Syrians, "Mr. Arar is not sought for any offence in Canada, and therefore, we want him returned. Please let him go."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But
Mr. Pillarella, we keep hearing from DFAIT witnesses, the reason why we got CSIS involved, the reason why we got the RCMP involved, was to help Mr. Arar, right? And here you have a conclusion from one of these agencies, CSIS, saying that, even if it's true, it's not necessarily damning evidence against him. Why wouldn't you bring that back to the Syrians and say, "Our security intelligence agency says it doesn't prove anything"? If CSIS was in the game to help Mr. Arar?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But if it doesn't prove anything for us does not mean that it doesn't prove anything for them.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, but the
expert opinion of your security intelligence agency may have gone a long way with the Syrian Military Intelligence who like to, we understand, like to deal with security intelligence agencies. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, then
perhaps you should put the question to CSIS because --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And we will.
In other words -- I just want to
be sure -- you didn't put that position forward with Khalil?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Let's move
then to the third consular visit. This is November 12.

Now, this says, "Drafted by Leo
Martel" and this one doesn't say it's approved -AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Which tab? MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'm sorry, it's 192 of volume 2.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: This doesn't appear to be approved by you, perhaps because you were in Canada at the time?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That's
probably the case, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And what
this does, it's just the third consular meeting, and this is in the third paragraph:
"Was able to discuss for approximately 15 minutes with

Arar who was appreciative of the visit."

However, it would appear in the preceding paragraph that Mr. Martel spoke with officials for approximately 30 minutes. Martel brought some reading material.

In paragraph 4, this is "He", Arar :
"... asked the following be
sent to his wife and asked
that she continued dating her
letters. He spoke Arabic (as
requested by the Syrians) and
Col. Majed acted as
interpreter."
And then in the second last
paragraph, 5:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "Martel tried to obtain some } \\
& \text { information on the }
\end{aligned}
$$

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progression of the investigation but the Syrians remained silent. They said the HOM had been provided with a full report. They gave no indication that Maher Arar would be release any time soon."

Now, here they're telling you --
here they're telling you that you've been
provided -- that's you, the Head of Mission -- was provided with a full report. And what you know at this point in time is that your security intelligence agency is saying there's nothing there, and I'm wondering, when you read that, whether you went back to them and said, "CSIS says there's nothing there"?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't
know that the statement says that there is nothing there. The statement says they did not comment on the credibility and they said even if it were true that this probably would not amount to much.

I don't know --this was a comment
made by an officer present -- whether he had had the time to consult experts on whether this had
any value or not. I don't know that.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you ask him? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't
know that.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: But you didn't
ask him?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Ask who ?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Ask the CSIS
person what they were relying upon when they reached that conclusion?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I
indicated to you that $I$ left the meeting and $I$ left it in the hands of the headquarters to decide what they were going to do about it. It was for them to do so, not for me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm. Right.
But this is a document coming from ISI, which is in DFAIT. Presumably they would have sent this to you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you recall
reading it before? I assume they would have sent this to you. You would have been the person -- if anyone should know this information, it would have been you.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: In fact, this memo was not even copied to me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So that you
didn't even receive a copy of this memo?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I
don't see -- $I$ don't see my name on it.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you find that
astounding? Do you find that astounding that your Department, your ISI, is not sending you such crucial information about this alleged confession about Mr. Arar?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, you
are saying that this is crucial information. I don't know. The point is, it can happen that this was an internal document and, yes, they should have sent it to me. I recognize that. For some reason, it wasn't copied to me.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But you're
carrying the spear for Mr. Arar. You're Mr. Arar's representative, trying to get him out, and here we have a conclusion reached by the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency that they don't seem to share with you. I find that astounding.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't

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know if it is astounding, but $I$ admit that this should have been communicated to me. The fact that it was not, it might have been an oversight. I don't know. I can't -- perhaps you should ask those who sent the memo why $I$ wasn't copied on it. I really don't know. I can't answer that. MR. CAVALLUZZO: So you don't know this conclusion. At this time are you aware of the El Maati allegations, that he was tortured while he was in Syrian custody? These are the allegations $I$ talked about before, that were made in August of 2002?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, even if at that particular time $I$ had been made aware of the allegations of Mr. El Maati, I don't know what this would prove, because from the start, when we met with Mr. Arar, that Mr. Martel met with Mr. Arar, at this point in time, I think we're already at the third visit, and there was no indication -- I know that I'm repeating myself -but there was no evidence of any physical torture. So even the fact that Mr. El Maati might have said that he had been tortured, I don't see how this would apply to this particular case because each case should be viewed separately.

Maybe Mr. El Maati had been tortured. In this particular case, we did not have evidence that Mr. Arar was being tortured.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But don't you
think it might have helped you to know that another Canadian, another Canadian that was detained in a Syrian facility, was tortured in the same facility?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But even if this is the case, I've said this morning that each case is different, and because Mr. El Maati might have been tortured, it doesn't necessarily follow that Mr. Arar will have been tortured. If we had had any evidence of it, an inkling of evidence, maybe, but we did not have it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But doesn't it suggest -- it suggests to me, and I'm putting it to you that it suggests to you that if you have evidence within a matter of months that the Syrians were prepared to torture a Canadian with a Canadian passport, who happened to be a dual national, and Mr. Arar comes on to the scene shortly thereafter, a Canadian with a Canadian passport, a dual national, that it might have assisted you in your representation of Mr. Arar in
terms of suspecting whether Mr. Arar had been tortured?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I've said,
and $I$ repeat, even if we had some suspicions that this might have happened, the meetings we had, that Mr. Martel had with Mr. Arar, seemed to show otherwise; and therefore, the fact that Mr. El Mati allegedly said that he had been tortured did not necessarily apply to Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But -- and this
is the last go at this, and once again, I will repeat, $I$ will repeat, $I \mathrm{I}^{\prime}$ not talking about whether he's being physically tortured in November and in December, in January. What I'm talking about are those two crucial weeks in the beginning. That's what I'm talking about.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: And I've said this morning that $I$ don't know about these two crucial weeks.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I simply
don't.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let us move on now to the CSIS visit to Syria in November of 2002, and if you go to Exhibit 7 of
the new book. This is the former tab 208. And it's dated November 18th of 2002 . And the sender is Jonathan Solomon, who, as we know, is in ISI.

And the recipient is Head of
Mission in Damascus, and it says:
"For your personal information, following a meeting with DMA --"

Do you know what DMA stands for?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That was
the Associate Deputy Minister.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you know if that person is the person -- was that Jonathan Fried?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, no,
no. Who was DMA at the time? I can't recall.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, we'll get
that information. That's fine if you can't recall it because $I$ can't recall it.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I can't recall either.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. So in any event...
"... following the meeting with DMA of the 18 November,

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senior DFAIT representatives officials asked to delay their visit to Syria. While CSIS indicated they would not attempt to visit Maher Arar, they still intended to continue with their planned visit to ..."

And that's redacted. And then it goes on:
"... PCO chose not to
intervene on this debate, so unless the Minister attempts to block this visit, CSIS will arrive in Damascus on schedule. Updates to follow."

So it would appear -- did you receive a copy of this message from Mr. Solomon?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you
facilitate the meeting between CSIS and whoever they were going to meet in Syria?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. So that

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CSIS had made contact on their own without your intervention?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And if we go on to tab 8, the new tab 8 of the new Book of Documents, this, once again, is from Solomon. It's the next day, November 19, and it is sent to you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And we can pick
up halfway in the first paragraph, it states:
"You will remember that at an
interdepartmental meeting held on Wednesday, November 6, it was agreed that it would be useful if CSIS were to travel to Syria to speak to Syrian authorities on international terrorism."

Now, do you recall that discussion took place on November 6, that there was consensus that CSIS would visit Syria to discuss global terrorism -- or international terrorism?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Now that I
read it, yes, I --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You recall that? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then it goes on: "In light of recent media reporting on Arar, we had doubts about the timeliness of the CSIS visit, although not about its substance. This issue went before the Minister on November 18. He did not wish to defer the visit; however, he indicated that he wished to have a full report on the visit and the discussions with the Syrians before he communicated with the Syrian Foreign Minister. He also requested an assessment of Arar's possible involvement in terrorist activities. Any further information beyond your report of November 3 would be extremely useful in this respect."

So it would appear, at least in DFAIT, that despite what CSIS said about that report of November the 3 rd, that at least DFAIT are going to be using that report because it says:
"Any further information beyond your report of November 3 report would be extremely useful..."

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well...
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That is what it says and that is what it --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I mean, it is normal that $I$ should continue to see if there was anything new, because once again we wanted to use whatever we could get to assist Mr. Arar.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, do you recall this issue? It says: "This issue went before the Minister on November 18."

Were you party to those discussions as to the Minister's decision as to whether or not to intervene and defer the CSIS visit?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No. I
took this at face value. I received that message and $I$ had no reason to question it. As I said, I took it at face value.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you look at
the next paragraph, paragraph 2 , it says:
"We have consulted with CSIS.
... We have been informed
that the..."
Then there is a redaction. It says:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "The purpose of the visit is } \\
& \text { to consult with Syrian } \\
& \text { intelligence and take } \\
& \text { advantage of their knowledge } \\
& \text { on Al-Qaeia and terrorist } \\
& \text { threats. CSIS is not } \\
& \text { visiting Maher Arar, but } \\
& \text { given the high profile of } \\
& \text { this issue in Canada, we } \\
& \text { suggest below the press lines } \\
& \text { in the unlikely event that } \\
& \text { there will be press coverage } \\
& \text { of the visit". } \\
& \text { Unfortunately, you should know the }
\end{aligned}
$$ unlikely event occurred last week when there was a

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leak of that visit in The Toronto Star. In any event, we dealt with that yesterday.

But the press lines are:
"We do not comment on
security matters the visit in question was planned some time ago to discuss terrorism-related issues the purpose of the visit is not to deal with the Arar case; he will not be visited by these officers."

Okay. Those are the press lines in the unlikely event that this is released. Just to give some context to this, were you aware that around this time there was to be a scheduled phone call between Minister Graham and Foreign Minister Shara'a?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Were you aware that the phone call between Shara'a and Graham was postponed or was put off?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you know why
the phone call between Shara'a and Graham was put off? Was it because of the CSIS visit?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No. I
don't know for a fact, but $I$ think that it is simply that the times couldn't coincide between the two Ministers, and that was the only reason why the --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That occurred in
December, because there was going to be another phone call in December, and schedules. We will come to a document.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm talking about this telephone call in December. I didn't know that there was another telephone call in November. I don't recall.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Well, let me bring you to the documents that will refresh your memory.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Because the embassy was involved in trying to arrange these telephone calls, but $I$ seem to recall that it was in December. But $I$ can't...

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Go to tab 12 of the same document book.

Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is a
memorandum or message from you --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- to Michael
Chesson. He is the GMR -- who is the GMR.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, the Middle East Division.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. He says:
"Further to your message, I would like to make."

Or you say:
"Further to your message, I would like to make the following two points. My first point relates to the cancelled phone call between the (Minister and Foreign Minister) MINA and FM

Shara'a. You will recall
that when the Syrians were informed that the call would not take place, they were somewhat puzzled and despite our explanation that the call was not being cancelled but

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simply postponed, they remained unconvinced." AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay? I'm putting it to you that that phone call, the initial phone call, was to take place in November 2002 .

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: As I have said, I don't recall when this telephone call was supposed to take place, but you asked me whether this was related to the CSIS visit and my answer is I don't believe so. I have no knowledge of that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm. Okay. I may come back to that.

In any event, so you didn't facilitate the CSIS visit --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- in your role as Ambassador?

Did you know if the CSIS visit
took place?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm sorry?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you know if the CSIS visit took place?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, of course.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Did anyone from CSIS come to visit you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You can't tell us who, but so that before the visit to the authorities they were going to deal with they came to visit you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, I
believe it was a Thursday they came to the embassy and we sat down and we spoke in general of the situation in Syria and they said that they had come to visit their counterparts to discuss terrorist issues.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Were the CSIS visitors to come back to speak to you after their visit with the Syrian counterparts?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did they come
back to you?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Were you
surprised?
was very upset, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Well, let's look at tab 11, as to that issue, and this is a message from you dated -- this is tab 10, I'm sorry. Tab 10 of the new booklet. It is dated November the 25 th.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm. MR. CAVALLUZZO: It is to ISI and several others, including ISD, GMD, and so on. The subject matter is the CSIS visit. You say: "Following my meeting with ... it was agreed that they would come back to the Embassy ... for a debrief on their meetings with Syrian counterparts which would be held..."

And that is redacted.
"Parallel to this, I informed them that $I$ was trying to arrange a meeting with General Khalil for ....

However, I could not guarantee that the meeting would take place given the

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last minute request. In the end, meeting with General

Khalil could not be arranged and $I$ never saw ... again, as they did not come back to the Embassy on ... as previously agreed. Several messages left at their hotel on Sunday to call me went unanswered and I found out ... that they had checked out of the hotel and presumably had left Damascus."

You go on. "Maybe there is a good explanation for this bizarre behaviour but $I$ confess that I cannot think of one at the moment. All $I$ can say is that in terms of co-operation, this is less than satisfactory to say the least. Not having been able to meet with General Khalil I have no further info on what
we can expect with regard to Arar. I would hope that you will be able to obtain a full debrief from CSIS on this curious visit and find out whether they discussed the Arar case."

Was there a discussion that they
were going to discuss the Arar case when you met with the CSIS representatives when they were at your embassy prior to the visit?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, no.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then it goes on:
"I am quite prepared to ask for another meeting with General Khalil on this issue, but I need clear instructions from you, once you have decided on how you wish to proceed."

So that you describe this as bizarre behaviour, them not reporting back to you? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, as I have said, I was very upset because I thought that we had reached an agreement that they would

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debrief me after their meetings. I didn't know who they were meeting with. I had no idea, because they did not indicate with whom they were going to meet. Therefore, $I$ thought it was, yes, rather bizarre, because in terms of cooperation, that is not what $I$ call cooperation. So the message is very clear.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I guess one of the concerns that $I$ would express is $f$ CSIS is going to be involved we get them involved on November the 6th because they are going to help Mr. Arar. It would seem quite peculiar that they left Damascus without talking to you, the person who is on the front lines trying to get Mr. Arar out of Syria back to Canada. Very odd behaviour, one would think.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That is the reason why $I$ say that this was very bizarre behaviour. And I don't even know whether Mr. Arar was discussed with somebody in Syria. I simply don't know. In fact, I have never known why they acted in this matter or what was discussed, so I cannot make any comments.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To this
day, I'm still in the dark.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, we will try
to find out for you.
One very troubling thing with this
document, which is at tab 10. This is the message that goes to you. This isn't your document itself, but it shows you the problems when we are dealing with these kinds of allegations.

Because if you look in the top
right corner, you will see it says "File 9690-04/BIN LADEN" and then "(Arar)".

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't know where this is coming from. This is certainly not my doing.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You have absolutely not a scintilla of evidence to suggest, to your knowledge, that Mr. Arar is in any way -in any way -- associated with Mr. bin Laden?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But I'm
seeing this for the first time -- or when $I$ saw it -- you would have to ask those who filed it why they filed it in this manner. I don't know. This is the first time that $I$ see "BIN LADEN (ARAR). I don't know.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: So coming back to
the CSIS visit, you never did get a satisfactory response in respect of why they --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- left without
talking to you?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: If you go to
tab 12, this once again comes to the phone call between Shara'a and Graham which will demonstrate, it would seem to me, that there was a call in November.
--- Pause
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It's like lifting weights.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Sorry.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: It's like lifting
weights.
If you stay in volume 2, at
tab 212?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Just get tab 212.
You will see that there is an e-mail at the bottom, November 17, 2002. At the bottom it says:
"Minister Graham has decided over the week end to call by
telephone his Syrian counterpart sometime Tuesday morning prior to Cabinet... Can you arrange for this phone call to take place?"

If you refer to volume 3, tab 215,
you will see that there was a briefing note prepared for the Minister on November 18, 2002 for the phone call with Mr. Shara'a.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you see that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Does that refresh
your memory now as to whether there was a phone call to take place --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, so it was the same telephone call. I mean, it was -yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I'm asking you whether you recall the reason as to why the phone call was postponed? I'm putting it to you it was because of the CSIS visit that was postponed?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To my
knowledge, the telephone call did not take place because the times could not be arranged between
the two Ministers. That is my recollection.
To tie it to the visit of
CSIS, I have no knowledge of that and I don't believe that this was the reason why the call was postponed.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Let us look at tab 12, because you do refer to it in your message at tab 12 , this phone call.

This is dated December 12 th?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is
once again to Michael Chesson at the Middle Eastern desk:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "Further to your message, I } \\
& \text { would like to make the } \\
& \text { following two points. My } \\
& \text { first point relates to the } \\
& \text { cancelled phone call between } \\
& \text { MINA and FM Shara'a. You } \\
& \text { will recall that when the } \\
& \text { Syrians were informed that } \\
& \text { the call would not take } \\
& \text { place, they were somewhat } \\
& \text { puzzled and despite your } \\
& \text { explanation that the call was }
\end{aligned}
$$

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not being cancelled but simply postponed, they remained unconvinced."

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Does that
refresh your memory, that obviously the phone call was cancelled, as we see, but you don't seem to recall as to why.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Again I
repeat, $I$ believe that the call did not take place because we could not arrange a suitable time for the two Ministers to talk.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, who was involved in the scheduling? Were you involved in the scheduling of the phone call that was to take place in November --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, no.
As you see in this message, it says, we want it at such and such time. You must understand that, for instance, when $I$ was trying to get a time for Minister Shara'a, it was no easy task, believe me. Even trying to reach somebody in the Minister's office was already some undertaking, and therefore it was extremely difficult to pin down the Minister and set a certain time.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, on November 26 th, if you go to tab 229 , we come to the fourth consular visit. This is now in volume 3, tab 229, on November 26 th.

Do you see that?
You once again appear not to have been in Damascus, as it was drafted and approved by Mr. Martel?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I don't know where I was. I might have been in Cyprus on that occasion. I don't know. I don't remember.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Well, even if you weren't in Damascus at the material time, would you likely have reviewed this consular report?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Oh, I would have certainly read it on my return, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. As far as Mr. Arar's condition is concerned, if we refer to the seventh paragraph, it states that:
"Maher appeared to..."
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Which
paragraph?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Seven.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Seven.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It states: "Maher appeared to be in good physical and mental health. Officials made him stand up to show that he was well being taken care of. No change could be seen in his state of health from that of the last visit. Upon being questioned on his current health compared to the day he was first visited he indicated that he had been afraid at the beginning as the investigation was more intensive. He seemed more relaxed and he said his only moment of joy was when he received our visit. He continued to say he was being treated well and when prompted by the officials he said `my brothers are treating me very well'. He indicated he was feeling as
well as anyone would feel
when being imprisoned."
Now, this prompting that is still
going on and his response, "My brothers are treating me well," once again is a concern to you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I
concede to you that being detained in Syria is far from being a picnic, and $I$ concede to you as well that the conditions of detentions may not be what we would like them to be. Therefore, yes, there is a concern.

On the other hand, however, this is now the fourth visit, and from the first to the fourth we can see that the atmosphere is much more relaxed, that Mr. Arar appears to be in good health, and, yes, there may still be some prompting on the part of the Syrians but $I$ think on the overall what Mr. Martel could verify was extremely positive, having conceded that being in a Syrian jail must be a very painful experience. MR. CAVALLUZZO: He is still in the same jail?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I assume so because he is being met always at the same place.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Was there
any discussion with Mr. Martel that, "Well, maybe now is the time that we should ask to see his prison conditions," or would that be an unreasonable request?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I would use your own words, that this would have been an unreasonable request. Because $I$ can say, knowing the conditions in Syria, knowing what the Syrians were prepared to do for us, that this would have gone beyond the -- and, you see, we had to be careful of one thing, and $I$ believe that this is important to remember. What we want to do is not to lose the possibility of meeting with Mr. Arar on a regular basis and, therefore, we had to tread very carefully in what we might ask the Syrians to do.

So if one keeps that in mind, then perhaps you have the answer to your own question.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. Of course, the General had already reneged on his original commitment. Remember originally he said that Mr. Arar could be visited every three or four days?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I
would not say that he had reneged. Yes, he might have said that, but then you have to understand that in the Middle East when you say " 10 minutes" it may stretch into an hour, or when you say three days, it may stretch into one week or two weeks. So I wouldn't make too much of that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Or when you say
24 hours, it might be two weeks?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I said
before, $I$ don't know.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. We Are in
December now. If we go to tab 11. This is in terms of the status of their investigation, and this is December 4th. We estimate this document is December 4, 2002, and it would appear that the Syrians are alleging that Mr. Arar is a member of the Moslem Brotherhood.

I guess Mr. Pardy is asking for -in the fourth paragraph:
"Would also appreciate any
information you could provide
on the importance of the
Moslem Brotherhood in Syria.
It was our understanding that
it was a decimated force and

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one of little or no
consequence to the Syrian authorities. Gar."

So at least at that point in time they seemed to be thinking that he is a member of the Moslem Brotherhood?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Did that allegation surprise you at all, since we saw on the record that, as Pardy says, that they were decimated at the town of Hama in 1982? Now they are saying this guy is a member of the Moslem Brotherhood?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, the answer to that is that, yes, they were decimated in Syria, but the Moslem Brotherhood existed elsewhere in the world, not just in Syria. I'm not talking about Mr. Arar now, but anybody could be a sympathizer of the Moslem Brotherhood, maybe in Egypt, in Syria, or elsewhere in the world.

So personally I don't find anything surprising there.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You did respond to Mr. Pardy in terms of describing what the Brotherhood is? If you go to tab 247.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Tab 247?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: We will go to
tab 240 first?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: There
isn't much in tab 247.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. That is
why we will try to get it another way.
You will see at tab 240 there is
a message from Pardy to you on December 5th, and it says:

> "Many thanks for the update and we look forward to your report. Assume consular visit is taking place this week."

Then it says:
"Ref. paragraph 4 of my Dec 4 message. Would appreciate your assessment of the subject organization. As such would appreciate that at your earliest opportunity."

That subject organization I
understand is the Moslem Brotherhood. It is totally redacted, but in any event you have
responded to his inquiry?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: The fifth
consular visit occurs on December loth. If you would go to tab 248.

As I say, this is the fifth, and
if you read the fifth line down:
"Arar appeared to be in good
physical condition and no change was been noticed since last visit. I talked at length with him about everything and anything. He asked to be told again about the PM's press attache's story."

And so on and so forth.
Nothing unusual about that
particular visit?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Now, at tab 251, at the bottom
there we have an e-mail from Jonathan -- excuse me, an e-mail -- that is the, I guess from Martel to Pardy. This concerns the consular visit.

It says:
"Access to subject was once again granted today..."

This is December 10th:
"... to consular officer and
a separate CAMANT note is
being filed."
That is what we looked at in the
previous tab.
It goes on:
"During conversation with
contact consular officer
enquired about (Head of
Mission's) desire for a
further meeting with high
level official. Response provided was that high level
official close to the case had been quite ill recently and a meeting with HOM had therefore not been possible. The matter is being pursued and you will be kept informed of developments."

So that if there is a problem in
terms of contact, somebody in Syria and Damascus is ill and you are having trouble meeting with him at that time?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, if
you go to tab 250, you will see on 11 December -this is from Mr. Chesson, once again the GMR, or the Middle East desk, to you, and it says:
"As you are aware, MINA had considered placing a call to ... some weeks ago to discuss the Arar case."

That is the November call we
referred to earlier?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: That shouldn't be
redacted, but in any event it is.
"Some members of the government caucus have suggested to him the idea of sending a special envoy..."

This would be a special envoy
to Syria.
"We would appreciate your
assessment of ... continuing

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interest in Arar and whether (somebody) would be receptive to a call from MINA on the subject. (Your) views would be of interest, if he is available. If MINA so decided and ... call would be made on Monday, December 16, prior to MINA's departure for Christmas leave."

This is what $I$ have been referring to as the December phone call.

If you go to tab 12, this is the newly redacted message of the next day. This is where you are talking about the postponed call, message it left with the Syrians, wondering what is going on, and so on and so forth, and we have reviewed that with you.

In terms of this issue of the Moslem Brotherhood, you do refer to that in the second paragraph --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- of this
message about halfway down:
"Following his interrogation,

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Arar is considered to be a case of internal security linked it seems to the Muslim Brotherhood, not to Al-Qaeda (see my reftel on Muslim Brotherhood) and therefore the Syrians will act with extreme prudence having in mind their national interest as the foremost priority. Should they consider that by releasing Arar and returning him to Canada he could still represent a potential menace for Syria, they will likely refuse to release him."

Now, in terms of coming
back to this particular question of a special envoy, whether it would have been a good idea at that point in time to send a special envoy, what were your views as to that idea, if we can call it that?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If I
recall at the time, my view was, on the basis of what we had, that the special envoy might not have
helped much.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: What do you mean by that, on the basis of --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, on
the basis of the fact --
MR. BAXTER: Could I refer the witness to paragraph 3 of the same document that Mr. Cavalluzzo is in.

THE COMMISSIONER: Sure.
MR. BAXTER: I think that might
perhaps refresh his memory.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I was
going to say that it was because of the internal security issues, and that was -- as indicated in paragraph $3:$

> "Given that Arar is being detained for internal security reasons, it is doubtful that a special envoy could do much to obtain his release."
> In other words, their national interests had priority. It is for that reason that I thought that a special envoy might not help much, not that $I$ was opposed to a special envoy
coming to Damascus.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, I
understand that.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But they
were asking me what $I$ thought about it, and $I$
said, well, $I$ don't think it will help much.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: As you know,
subsequently in July of next year a special
envoy went on behalf of the Prime Minister, and I'm wondering if you thought that that had any effect in the sense of his subsequent release two months later?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I think that in retrospect, yes, one can say that it did have some effect. But at this point in time, that we are talking of a special envoy in December, it did not seem that it would help much.

The other thing is that one tries
every avenue --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- and at one point in July we tried this other avenue with the letter from the Prime Minister.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Just
moving in terms of time, if you go now to tab 260 ,
we have another Solomon, ISI, message to Damascus, and Head of Mission. It says "Ambassador" -- it is a very short one:

> "In preparation for your conversation with Scott Heatherington, please find below a bootleg copy of a draft MINA briefing for his conversation with Syrian FM Sharaa. It is still undergoing modifications, and its final version will not contain language urging the early release of Arar, probably a softer line also mentioning the level of press coverage the issue is receiving in Canada."

Do you have any idea of why -since $I$ thought all along what we were trying to do was to get the earlier release of Arar -- ISI, in the final version, would not contain that language but go for a softer approach? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: To tell you the truth, I don't know, because I was not

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involved in this discussion, so I really don't know what prompted that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let us move into 2003 .

At tab 274 we have a message dated January 5th from yourself to Mr. Pardy, and it says:
"Gar, I can assure you that he..."

This would be Mr. Arar.
"...is constantly present in our thoughts. Unfortunately, there are no news for the moment. Léo will again ask for another meeting this week and we shall see what kind of reply we will get. For myself, I have had no luck in meeting with my usual contact; I have therefore tried a different tack and I was supposed to have met vice-minister this morning at 11h. Yesterday I received a telephone call at the OR

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saying that the meeting would have to be rescheduled..."

Et cetera, et cetera
So at this point you seem to be having trouble dealing with your usual contact? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, and I believe that it was related to the fact that the individual in question was severely ill.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Was this also a difficult period in terms of the relationship with Syria in terms of extraneous political factors at this point in time?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, we are in January. There are rumours of war. Obviously Syria, being right next to Iraq, you can well imagine that the concern of the Syrians was that particular event. In fact, gradually that issue took over everything else, and, you know, anything that was not related to that was simply of no interest to the Syrians basically.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Tab 276 is the sixth visit, sixth consular visit, which took place on January 7, 2003.

Do you see that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In terms of Mr. Arar, in the second paragraph it states that: "Arar looked in good health and no noticeable change was observed since last visit. He was warmly dressed and was, of course, very pleased to be visited. He expressed his gratitude to us as well as to the Syrian authorities."

In the seventh paragraph:
"We also raised the question of what the next steps might be for Arar's case. While contact was unable or not willing to elaborate he indicated it was too early to
tell. He said in all
likelihood Arar would be detained for a long time and also would be likely prosecuted. When asked if the authorities were going to keep subj forever the answer

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was, ‘we do not think so but at the moment it is a question of national security for Syria'."

This information would seem to be pretty serious now. It looks like the Syrians are now saying that Mr. Arar is going to be there for a long time and that this is a national security case for Syria.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Was there any
suggestion at this point in time, because of this new information, that maybe Canada's strategy should change because we should ratchet it up? This is looking very, very serious for Mr. Arar. Was there any suggestion about changing its approach?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The point is that there wasn't much more that we could do. I mean, we kept trying.

You have to understand that, yes, the principal actor in all this was the military intelligence. They had the key. But every time I had the occasion of raising this issue with other senior officials at the Syrian government, I would
do so. I mean, this was a constant. It was not something that was left there in abeyance and waiting. It was a constant repetition of our message at all levels.

In fact, $I$ can say that in all the time that $I$ was in Damascus, I have never, never spent so much time than on the case of Mr. Arar. I mean, this had become -- I think I have used this expression before -- this had become an obsession.

So when you say a change of
strategy, it is easily said but it is not easily done, because for that you need leverage. And, yes, we had some leverage, as indicated this morning, but our leverage was not of the heavy-duty type.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Let me just put it to you as a lay observer. I would have thought with the Iraq war on the horizon, and Canada's participation in the war being a huge question, it would seem to me, for the Syrians, that that would have given Canada a great deal of leverage at this point in time.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: My answer
to this is that $I$ was told in no uncertain terms
that when these events were occurring in the region all we wanted to talk about was Mr. Arar. The Syrians, believe me -- and I'm not talking about military intelligence now, I'm talking about the other side of the house -- they couldn't understand that, that basically we just wanted to talk about Mr. Arar, which we were doing.

But I'm trying to explain to
you that with the events that were about to take place in the region to the Syrians this was unbelievable.

So I don't see when you say that we should have used that as a leverage, I don't know how we could have done it because, I repeat, they did not understand that we wanted to talk only about Mr . Arar and not to talk about the geopolitical conditions in the region.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, let me throw out one suggestion. You sit down with General Khalil, which you did on January 9th, two days later, and you say, "You know, General, Mr. Arar's case is highly visible in Canada, and the Canadian government is getting a lot of pressure from Canadians saying, `What is going on with this guy, Arar, in Syria?' If we are getting
pressure like that, General, and if we are going to cooperate in other areas, like not joining the coalition and going into Iraq, you have to give something here, General"?

An idea like that? Something
like that?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, if
you believe that I did not put all these points to the General, then $I$ would say that you're mistaken. The only thing that $I$ will admit is that it was not for me to say, "If you release Mr. Arar, we're not going to join the coalition." I mean, let's be realistic.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You wouldn't put it that way, would you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Sorry?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: You wouldn't put
it that way, would you?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well,
probably not. But, I mean, the point was made not once, not twice --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- it was made many times.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, the meeting
with the General, which did take place on January 9, as I said, can be found behind tab 13 of the new Book of Documents. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And it's
redacted, but the portions that we can read, it says:
"I met with General Khalil, Head of Military Intelligence." And then down to paragraph 5:
"Once more the discussion digressed and then, something rather unexpected happened. For the umpteenth time $I$ was trying to explain to the General that Canada was not defending a terrorist; however, because for us Arar was considered to be a Canadian citizen, we had a consular responsibility towards him and his family, even accepting the fact that he was in Syria and was
considered to be a Syrian
citizen. Again, I reiterated to General Khalil that it was in the interests of Syria and its image abroad to be seen to be co-operating with us, as they had done thus far by allowing consular visits."

And then it goes on:
"I explained to the General that if we were to seriously consider a visit to Damascus by Arar's wife for a meeting with her husband, this would certainly show Canada was doing all it could to safeguard the interests of its citizen, but more importantly, this would do wonders for the image of Syria."

Now, there's a lot of -- there
appears to be a lot of discussion that we can't get into there, but were there other things that were affecting the relationship between Canada and

Syria other than the pending Iraq war?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, I
think the -- our relations, there was nothing that was an impediment to our relations except that $I$ was very, very irritated on this issue because I couldn't -- I didn't seem to get anywhere with the -- in the case of Mr. Arar.

But this message proves to you, if
there is any need for that, that, you know, my message to the General was the same message from the start and repeated continuously.

Here, the idea of having Mrs. Arar
come and visit, you know, was another indication of how far we were willing to push the General. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Were you getting any indications from Khalil, or anybody else, any of your other Syrian contacts, saying, "Pillarella, what are you talking about? I'm getting messages from another agency that they don't want him back in Canada"?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: This was mentioned once, almost en passant, and then my answer to that was, "I don't know what others may be telling you. What $I$ can tell you is that I am the Ambassador representing Canada; and therefore,
when $I$ say, in the name of Canada, that Mr. Arar is not wanted in Canada for any offence, crime, or anything, and that if you release him, we will take him back to Canada, this is the message from Canada, regardless of who might have said something different --" MR. CAVALLUZZO: Who mentioned this en passant?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If I
remember well, I believe that it was General Khalil at one point, but --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did anyone else
mention that besides General Khalil?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, but this was a repetition of what had been said before. It was not as if, you know, another message had been supposedly passed on to the Syrians. I mean, it was always the same. MR. CAVALLUZZO: But who? Who? I want to know who. Khalil is saying this. Who else?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I
believe -- I believe that it was one of the Vice-Ministers, but -- but that's it. MR. CAVALLUZZO: And one of the

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Vice-Ministers. Was it Haddad or Mouallem?
    AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Can I
mention that? I'm not sure.
    MR. BAXTER: Can you show him at
    tab 285, Mr. Cavalluzzo?
    MR. CAVALLUZZO: Go to tab 14.
    AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Which is
    that?
    MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 14, newly
    redacted 285. There's no need to go to 285.
    Tab 14. The second page in. January 15. It's a
    message from you.
    AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: We're
    talking about the message January 15? Is that it?
    MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, yes. It
    says:
    "I met this morning with ..."
    Okay. You met with somebody...
        "... to discuss the possible
        visit of Mrs. Arar to
        Damascus."
    AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
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    MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It says: "In reviewing the case with ... I took the opportunity to thank the Syrian authorities through him for the outstanding cooperation they had demonstrated thus far."

Do you think that was going over
the top, the "outstanding cooperation" that the Syrian had given so far?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The fact that they were accepting that Mrs. Arar could visit?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes. Yes. Your view at this point in time, at least in the middle of January 2003, is that you felt that you were getting "outstanding cooperation" from the Syrians?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It goes
on:

> "I added that if they were to agree to a visit by Mrs. Arar this would certainly be extremely positive for the

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image of Syria abroad ...
3. During the
conversation ... made two points which I thought were rather curious. The first was that according to his information ... Arar did not wish to return to Canada." Now, what did you think of that

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statement?
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AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I thought
this was bizarre, and I said that $I$ never heard that.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. It goes
on:
"The second, again according
to his information, was that
CSIS would have indicated to
.. that they have no wish to
see Arar return to Canada and
that they were quite content
with the way things were. If
true, this would be a rather
surprising situation. As to
the statement that Arar does

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not wish to return to Canada, Léo Martel indicated in Arar's letters to his wife, he expressed the exact opposite."

Okay? So that you're getting this message with whoever you are meeting with on January 15.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But this
gentleman is repeating what $I$ had been told before, so it's not as if there were several messages to that effect --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. But you're getting it from different people in the Syrian --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Two people, that's all.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's all.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Not a series of people.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And how far up in the hierarchy were these two different people?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: These people, these two people, were often in contact. So it's understandable that --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Could you answer
the question, please?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes. MR. CAVALLUZZO: How high up in the hierarchy were these two people that were giving you this message?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, they were very high up, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did that concern you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Of course
it concerned me, and $I$ kept saying, and what $I$ said a moment ago, I said, "I don't know what people have been telling you. What I am teling you, as the Ambassador of Canada and representing Canada and speaking for Canada, this is what you have to accept as being the wish of Canada: The return of Mr. Arar."

And that message was always the same at every level and every time I raised the issue of Mr. Arar. So there was no doubt in the minds of the Syrians at no point, despite what they were saying --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Despite what they were saying.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- there was no doubt that the wish of Canada was to see Mr. Arar returned to Canada because he was not sought for any offence, crime, or anything else.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Was Martel
getting the same message from the Syrians, that CSIS didn't want him back?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: You should ask the question of Mr. Martel. But the point is --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you discuss it with Mr. Martel? Did he tell you that he got the same message ?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I do not remember. I do not remember. That is the reason why I'm saying perhaps you can ask the question of Mr. Martel.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, that led to Mr. Graham's phone call to Shara'a the next day, on January 16? If you go to tab -- the new tab 15?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is a
briefing point for MINA, or for the Minister, which is dated January 15?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: "Phone call to
... Shara'a"?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And if you go
into the second page, you'll see one of the talking points, or bullet points, is at the bottom:
"I understand from recent reports --"

That's plural, "recent reports".
"-- that the Syrian
authorities may have the
impression that Canada has no
wish to see Mr. Arar return
to Canada. I would like to
make it very clear that the
Canadian government would
like Mr. Arar to be returned
to Canada."
And then if you go to the next page, under "BACKGROUND," it states in the bottom paragraph:

> "CSIS has had discussions with the Syrian authorities

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concerning Arar. The ... informed the Ambassador that, according to his information, CSIS had indicated to Syrian military intelligence that they have no wish to see Mr. Arar return to Canada and are quite content with the way things are. CSIS has informed the Department that this is not the case, that they only told the Syrians that Arar was not an active target or a priority for them."

Now, what it says here, that somebody informed the Ambassador that, according to his information, CSIS had indicated to the Syrian Military Intelligence that they had no wish to see Mr. Arar returned to Canada, I'm going to ask you: Were you told that this communication from CSIS to the Syrian Military Intelligence was made during CSIS's visit to Syria on November 20, or 21, of 2002?
is no.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: When was the
communication from CSIS made to the Syrians?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I have no
idea.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did you not ask?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I was told
in one of my meetings that this is what had been mentioned to them. I don't -- I didn't see any need to ask at what time or at what date this was done.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You might have asked who, who in CSIS gave you this impression? Did you ask that question?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Why not?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It's easy
to ask that question now. When one is engaged in a discussion and you're in the heat of the discussion, perhaps that question doesn't come to mind, to ask who in particular.

It was sufficient to know that CSIS apparently had said that, and I don't see what the name of the person might have added at this particular point.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, you might have found out who was leaving the impression with the Syrians -- we have a Canadian that's sitting in detention. You would agree with me, very poor conditions of detention. And Canada is trying to get his return. And a Canadian agency would appear to be undermining that effort. And I would have thought that the name of the individual concerned may have been very useful.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I think that if one wanted to have the name, it could have easily been found by simply checking who had been travelling to Syria at the time and then you would have had names.

I mean, $I$ don't see -- I don't see what -- the important point is, the information was passed on to me. Whether it was correct or not, I passed it back to Ottawa, and that information was passed to the Minister.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: See, there's a very similar situation which occurred on November 5, 2003.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: What was that?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And that is the

Americans were saying that somebody in Canada, somebody in Canada gave the Americans the impression that -- I can finish first -- that they didn't want Mr. Arar returned to Canada, and both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs said, "Give us a name. Because if you give us a name, then we will know." And that's the only question -- I still find it odd that you wouldn't have asked for a name.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: May I
answer?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: You say
somebody in Canada. Here it's different. It's not somebody in Canada. Here it says CSIS. Which is quite different than somebody.

In other words, it would have been
easy to check who had travelled to Syria from CSIS and then you would have found the name. That's the way $I$ see it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And did you check in to see who had travelled to Syria from CSIS?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I passed the information to headquarters. If
headquarters -- I don't know if they verified or not, but it was certainly not for me to verify that information.

The information was that
apparently CSIS had provided that information, and I said to the Syrians, "I don't care who has said what to you. What counts is what I am telling you."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm. Did you
ever hear that the Syrian Military Intelligence liked to deal with the Canadian security intelligence, their counterparts?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So that you knew
that there was that relationship?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, the intelligence organizations like to deal with other intelligence organizations.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And I guess the only other question relating to that is whether you're aware of whether anybody in DFAIT contacted CSIS at this point in time and said, "You guys, there may be a misunderstanding here, but you guys better straighten it out"?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: This might
have happened. I don't know. I was sitting in Damascus.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
Commissioner, it's five to four. THE COMMISSIONER: Why don't we
take a fifteen-minute break? Okay.
THE REGISTRAR: Please stand.
--- Upon recessing at 3:54 p.m. /
Suspension à 15 h 54
--- Upon resuming at 4:13 p.m. /
Reprise à 16 h 13
THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated.
Veuillez vous asseoir.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Commissioner, I
plan to proceed until five o'clock, at which time I'll break.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's fine.
Thank you.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now,
Mr. Pillarella, before we move on, as we are in the middle of January of 2003 , and we've now dealt with the Minister-to-Minister phone call on January 16, and you mentioned that you were advised at this particular meeting on January 15 that CSIS indicated to whoever you were meeting
that they had no wish to see Arar returned to Canada, and you told us that prior to that time you had been given the same message from -- is it General Khalil?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, but, as I've said, I don't think that there was much time in between, so --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. That's
what I wanted to try and tie down. Could you tell us how much time before the meeting on January 15 you would have been given that information?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, I can't. I can't recall, really.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: But you do think it was shortly before?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I can't say, I'm sorry.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then let us move on. Staying in Exhibit 134. This is an e-mail message dated January 17, from --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: P-134?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes, 134, tab 16.
Small booklet.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Oh, tab
16. Okay.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: This is, I guess, just a summary of a meeting between GMR, who you told us before was the --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Middle
Eastern desk.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- Middle Eastern
desk. It says in the second bottom paragraph:
"GMR informed Syrian
Ambassador Arnous --"
This, of course, is the Syrian
Ambassador to Canada.
"-- of the phone call --"
And that is the one we have just
covered. And it says:
"... Ambassador Arnous was well aware of the discussions regarding the possible visit by Mrs. Arar, including a request for a note verbale, which we informed him had already been sent."

And then it goes on:
"Ambassador Arnous also was pleased to hear that Minister Graham had informed his

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Minister that it was the position of the Canadian Government that the preferred option is the return of Arar to Canada. Arnous
volunteered that he had also been informed that the Syrian security services had been told by their Canadian counterparts that Canada did not wish to see Arar return to Canada."

Now, were you aware of this particular e-mail message?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I was
aware of it, when it came to me, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. So it
would appear that we have the Syrian Ambassador to Canada, we have General Khalil, and we have somebody else who is high up in the Syrian hierarchy, all of the same view that they've received a message somehow that CSIS did not want the return of Arar to Canada?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes,
apparently, yes.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you would agree with me that in respect of your efforts to get Mr. Arar's return to Canada, that this would make your job far more challenging, difficult, and perhaps impossible, if it was true that our security intelligence agency was telling their counterparts that they didn't want Arar returned to Canada?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, in the end it was not an impossible job because we did manage to get Mr. Arar back to Canada, but, as I've said, CSIS has denied having said -- provided this information. I don't know. I can't really comment on it. The only thing $I$ know is that the three people that you have mentioned are all referring to the same -- to the one time that this allegedly has been --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: How do you know that?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm sorry? MR. CAVALLUZZO: How do you know that?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Because it was never repeated again. I mean, this was always more or less in the same -- at the same time.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: How do you know
that Mr. Arnous -- did you ever speak to Mr. Arnous about this?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I did not speak to Mr. Arnous about this, but Mr. Arnous seems to be repeating what $I$ had been told, and because Mr. Arnous was very much involved -- he was, after all, the Syrian ambassador in Canada, therefore he had to be involved in what was going on.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, you said
that your job didn't become impossible because Mr. Arar returned to Canada.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, you
said that, "it made your job impossible," and I said, "in the end, no, because Mr. Arar was returned to Canada." But --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Nine months
later.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I will say
that in the Syrian context, and in a case like this, I know that for Mr. Arar one additional day was one day too many.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But in the
context of what we're dealing with, nine months was an extremely quick time to resolve the problem. I mean, we may not accept that -- I mean --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: It wasn't nine months, it was 12 months.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, it's a few months when you're being --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: We're not going to say nine months. You said nine months so I repeated nine months --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Nine months
later, after these events are occurring.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: The point remains that we may not like it, in the Canadian context. I am putting it to you that in the Syrian context, and with what was going on in the region at the time, and with what the Syrians were saying about the involvement of Mr. Arar in terrorist activities which had national security implications, $I$ say that the period of time that it took for Mr. Arar to return to Canada was extremely rapid.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Did it seem odd
to you that -- you know, once again we saw that CSIS report in or about November 8, 2003, that said that even if Arar's alleged confession was true or was credible, that there was nothing there, did it seem odd to you that the same agency that had reached that conclusion may have been, and we'll have to make findings of fact in this regard, may have been undermining your efforts or DFAIT's efforts to get Mr. Arar returned to Canada?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I was of one-track mind. I couldn't care less what others were allegedly saying. What $I$ was saying to the Syrians was always the same message, which I will not repeat, because you know what the message was, and that was my only concern: Get Mr. Arar back to Canada by any means one can.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: What I just find
interesting is after the contextual evidence in terms of your duties and responsibilities as Ambassador, that you are in control of all activities that occur in Syria -AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA:

Theoretically.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Theoretically.

Well, let's make it practical then. I just find it odd that if you found out that this had happened, that this message somehow had drifted to the Syrians, that you wouldn't have ensured that CSIS would have met General Khalil and said, "It's not true. We want him back."

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: This was something that headquarters had to decide.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If
headquarters had asked me to arrange a meeting for CSIS, let's say, in Damascus, I would have gladly done so, but $I$ was not asked, and $I$ know that at headquarters there were discussions taking place all the time between the various agencies and departments.

> MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Let's go to the seventh consular visit, which can be found behind tab 17 of P-134. This is on February 18, 2003.
> AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes?
> MR. CAVALLUZZO: And in the second paragraph, it says:

> "Arar said he was (and appeared) to be in good

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health and we have not
noticed any changes since last visit."

And then in the bottom of the CAMANT note it talks about possible charges. For example, in paragraph 4 --

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I'm sorry,
are you talking about a CAMANT note?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Or the message?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: It's the
same message.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right, same
message. In paragraph 4(b), it says:
"As previously indicated we had no indication that charges had been laid against Arar and security services confirm the fact. They also indicated that if/when charges will be laid, consular access might cease. This is probably because in the Syrian system, when someone is charged for offences relating to National

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security, the trial takes place in front of a military tribunal with no access to any outsider."
-- And so on.
"A lawyer for the defendant is generally designated by the State."
-- And it goes on. Then in
paragraph (c) it states:

> "Investigation is ongoing and there is no indication as to when it will be completed.
> Arar continues to be interrogated and is still apparently providing valuable information to the authorities."
> Now, this reference, and this is one of the consular reports which was approved by you, this reference, "that he is still being interrogated and still providing valuable information...", did you ever receive any of that new valuable information that $M r$. Arar was giving to the Syrians?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Then if you go to
the second page, at paragraph 6, it states:
"With regard to MINA's statement to Min Shara'a that the preferred option of the Canadian government would be that Arar be returned to Canada, this concept does not seem to find an echo with the Syrian authorities, at least for the moment. As long as they consider that their investigation is ongoing, the Syrians will not release

Arar. We suspect that the only possibility of a return to Canada could happen only at the end of an investigation that could not justify the laying of charges against Arar. For the moment, this remains an open question."

So that what seems to be the

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situation as of this date, in February, is that the investigation is ongoing, they are continuing to get valuable information from Mr. Arar, and that if he is charged, then consular access will come to an end. Correct?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now as we move into March, we are going to deal with a new area, and that is that we understand that MPs Catterall and Assadourian wanted to visit Syria on behalf of Mr. Arar?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: And this
is --
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, for
example, if you go to tab 338 in volume 4.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Did you
say 338?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yes. And this is a message, once again, from Harold Hickman of the Middle Eastern desk, and it concerns the possible visit of parliamentarians in March?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And just leading to their visit, you are attempting to get them to be able to visit the President, or the

Vice Minister, and so on and so forth. So you are involved in trying to arrange their meeting.

Is that correct?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And then if you
go to 343 , we see that -- this is a message from you to Pardy -- that you were not able to get a final answer from the Syrians on the Members of Parliament visit. This is, I guess, about five days before the invasion of Iraq by the Americans, so presumably the Syrians may have their minds on other issues than the visit of two parliamentarians?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then if
you go back to the smaller volume, at tab 18 -or, excuse me, it's another exhibit. Exhibit P-117, tab 18. It's Mr. Easter's.
--- Pause
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Which tab
is this one?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Tab 18.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Tab 18.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And really, this, once again, is dated March 12th, and it's a
message relating to their visit. In particular, if you go to the second page, which is another message, we'll see that the -- I guess the parliamentarians' visit has been put off somewhat. They eventually visit in April?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Mm-hmm.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, I want to show you now -- we're in March. We're coming to the end of March. And in particular, on March 21st. I'd like to show you Exhibit P-99. This is a confidential note which is dated March 24 th, and it concerns a telephone call between Ms Catterall and Myra Pastyr-Lupul, and we see in this exhibit that it states that: "Marlene Catterall and Sarkis Assadourian --" (As read) Who of course are the two parliamentarians that are about to come to Syria. "Met with the Syrian ambassador last Wednesday, March 21. They discussed the case of Maher Arar and made a humanitarian pitch to ask for the release of Mr. Arar and asked what it takes for the

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Syrian to make this happen." (As read)

Then it goes on:
"They learned that initially during this case CSIS officials told the Syrians that they have no interest in Arar. The Syrians took this to mean that CSIS has no interest in having Arar back. They may have meant that they have no security reasons to investigate Arar in Canada. Due to the miscommunication the Syrians believe that the Canadians did not want Arar back in Canada and therefore decided to detain or keep him in Syria." (As read)

Then there are certain suggestions as to what should happen regarding this miscommunication or misinformation.

Were you aware of this
conversation that Mr. Arnous, who talked to you -or you had seen an e-mail -- summary of an e-mail
relating to him two months before, but were you aware that in the end of March, Mr. Arnous was still under the impression that CSIS did not want Mr. Arar back?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So you've never
seen this --
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: -- note before?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: No, no.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: No one advised
you that Arnous still had this view on March 21st? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I
learned about it later, but you asked me whether I had seen this, and my answer is no.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: No, but what I
want to know at this point in time, did someone notify you, advise you, tell you, that here we are in late March and the Syrian ambassador to Canada is still saying that CSIS does not want Mr. Arar's return?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: As I said, this may have come to my attention later on, but at this particular point in time, $I$ didn't know what Mrs. Catterall and Mr. Assadourian had spoken
with the Syrian Ambassador, so $I$ was not privy to the content of their conversation, so I did not know about it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. But I
just want to know whether anybody in DFAIT told you, "Franco, you should be aware that we're now at late March, and we're still getting the same message, that CSIS doesn't want Arar back"? No one told you that?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I can't
recall anything to that effect.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Then if we move on in time to March 24 th, tab 18 of the smaller book. This is an e-mail from Damascus, sent to headquarters, and really the essence of it is that:
"Military Intelligence, Col
Saleh Majed returned Martel's
phone call today and
indicated there was a change
of procedure. Embassy would,
in future, have to obtain
MFA's concurrence for
consular access to Arar."
is there any -- are you aware

Now, is there any -- are you aware

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of any reason as to why this particular change of procedure?

> AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, if
you read paragraph 2 , it says there:
"... We do not believe the change is a result of the current Iraqi events but may be linked to recent pressure Syrians have come under when pressed to accept the MP's visit. We had indicated in our earlier correspondence that putting additional pressure on Syrians could result in loss of consular access. It appears that this may have now happened."

The point is that, what I said earlier, that in the events leading up to the war, we kept talking about Mr. Arar only and we did not seem interested in talking about what was happening in the region, and then, right in the middle of it, we go to the Syrians and say, "You have to receive two Members of Parliament to discuss about Mr. Arar." Well, once more, I

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repeat, for us, this was extremely important. For us, this was a priority. For us, this was an undertaking that was ongoing, and we were not letting up the pressure on the Syrians. On the other side, the Syrians were concerned about bombs that might fall on the country, that a country right next door was being attacked by the Americans. You have to understand that Mr. Arar, despite all I said a moment ago, was perhaps not a priority, and they had shown, I repeat, incredible cooperation with us, they had tried to accommodate us as much as possible, even though that kept Mr. Arar still in jail, but the fact is that they had made an effort when they could have not made that particular effort.

And yet, in the midst of the war we're saying, "You have to accept the visit of these two MPs." I can only say that they were irritated by this and this may have prompted -that's why we say here, this might have been the reason why a change of procedure.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you think they may also have been irritated at Canada because of the listing of a particular terrorist organization as part of the Criminal Code?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: They might have. I --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: You're not aware whether they were perturbed about the listing of Hezbollah?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Of course, of course, they were affected, and that might have played a role as well. But $I$ think that it's not one single factor --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: -- but
several.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, let's come
to the visit of the MPs, and that can be found behind tab 392 in volume 4.
--- Pause
Okay. Now, this meeting took place on April the $22 n d$. Is that correct?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And you
facilitated the meeting, you organized the meeting?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And it
would appear from the document on page 1 that the
parliamentarians met with deputy foreign minister Mouallem. Is that correct?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That's
correct.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And who else
participated in the initial meeting?
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, Mrs.
Catterall, obviously, and Mr. Assadourian, and Mr. Shaw, who was the political counsellor. The reason why it was Mr. Shaw that accompanied me and not Mr. Martel is because the two MPs were going to discuss about political issues, and therefore, the political counsellor came along.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. If we look in the summary, eight lines down, it says -- this is the first paragraph:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "Intelligence officers told } \\
& \text { Mrs. Catterall and } \\
& \text { Mr. Assadourian that they had } \\
& \text { completed their investigation } \\
& \text { of Mr. Arar and that he would } \\
& \text { soon be charged with } \\
& \text { belonging to al-Qaida and } \\
& \text { having received military } \\
& \text { training in al-Qaida camps in }
\end{aligned}
$$

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## Afghanistan."

Now, when did they move from the Muslim Brotherhood to al-Qaeda? They seem to have flip-flopped a couple of times there.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: You're absolutely right in pointing that out, but $I$ don't think that one should see too much in this in the sense that for the Syrians, Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, basically what they're looking at is extremists, and they had information that there were contacts between the Muslim Brotherhood -perhaps not those in Syria because they had been decimated, as we discussed earlier, because, as I have said, Muslim Brotherhood existed elsewhere. So they go from one to the other. But basically it was extremists that they were concerned with.

So the fact that at this point they talk about al-Qaeda instead of the Muslim Brotherhood, it really is not, you know, that important. For them, it's national security for Syria and anyone that can threaten that national security.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Do you have any idea of what the possible penalties might be for someone who would be convicted as being a member
of al-Qaeda in Syria? Do they still have capital punishment?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I believe
so, yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: So it's possible
that Mr. Arar, if the charges against him were that he was a member of al-Qaeda, it's possible that he could be subject to capital punishment? AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I would assume that that might have been a possibility. MR. CAVALLUZZO: So this is a very serious situation at this point in time, obviously, regardless of what the Syrians think.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: In terms of the investigation, if you go to the second page at paragraph 6 -- well, before that, just above that paragraph 6, it says in paragraph 5:
"The result of this
questioning was that Syrian Security Services still had concerns that Arar could be connected to al-Qaida. Then in the presence of the MPs, the Deputy Foreign Minister

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phoned Khalil, the head of Syrian Military Intelligence, to arrange for an immediate visit with Mr. Arar."

So this meeting with the Deputy
Vice-Minister opens up into a meeting with Mr. Arar, which would be the one and only time you met Mr. Arar?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Correct. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, in the next paragraph, it states that -- still with the SMI:
"The Colonel explained that they had finished their investigation of Mr. Arar and would shortly be sending him to stand trial on charges of belonging to al-Qaida and having received military training in al-Qaida camps in

Afghanistan. Mrs. Catterall again explained that the Solicitor General had indicated that Mr. Arar was not wanted in Canada for

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criminal activities and that
his young family was
suffering tremendously
because of this detention.
She conceded that for the Syrian Government, Mr. Arar was a Syrian citizen. The Colonel said that the case would now be the responsibility of the Syrian courts."

And then at the bottom there, it says:
"... the Colonel also said that once Mr. Arar was handed over to the court authorities, he would be moved to another detention centre and that the Embassy would need to go through the MFA..."
-- et cetera, et cetera.
Now that they have completed their investigation and it appears that he is going to be charged with being a member of al-Qaeda, did
you ask -- did you ask for the information they had as a result of their investigation?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: If I asked whether they could provide to me that information? No.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Yeah. Why not? Since you had on the earlier occasion.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Why not --
asking for the information?
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Mm-hmm.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, at
this point, they had completed their
investigation. They said that they were going to put Mr. Arar on trial. The only thing that we could do at this point was to assist Mr. Arar for his trial, and obviously, in assisting for the trial, the charges will have to come out.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, did it concern you at this point in time -- he's going to be charged with a national security offence, that is, being a member of al-Qaeda.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: Penalty could be capital punishment, and we know how the security courts in Syria operate.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: At this
particular point in time, we did not know in front of which court he was going to go.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, if you're a
member of al-Qaeda, I assume you're not going before the Economic Security Court.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well,
somewhere else, in all these messages, there is an indication that Mr. Arar was going to be presented to a civilian court --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: That's in late August.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: That's right.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: We're talking
April now.
AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yeah. But
I said at this point we had no idea where he was going to be prosecuted. They said that he was going to be prosecuted, but we had no idea where. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, it might be a safe assumption that it was the State Security Court, and I'm wondering if this raised alarm bells. Here's a guy -- a Canadian, right? And they're flip-flopping. Initially, "You're a
member of al-Qaeda -- no, no, no, you're a member of the Muslim Brotherhood -- no, no, you're a member of al-Qaeda." Okay?

We have the State Security Court.
We know what their due process rights there are. Your lawyer is lucky to see you before the trial. He may be subject to capital punishment as a result of a conviction, and it would seem to me that that should have or would have raised huge alarm bells for the Canadian government.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: But of
course it raised alarm bells. But then, my question is: What could we do? After all, he was being detained by the Syrians. He was considered to be a Syrian citizen. He was under Syrian law. We were doing all we could to try and extract him from there. But we couldn't do that by force. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Well, one thing I guess that could have been done, you could have ensured that there were no mixed signals that continued to be given.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: There were no mixed signals.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: There were no mixed signals.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: As far as I'm concerned, there was only one signal, and I repeated constantly to General Khalil and to everybody else $I$ was speaking to about Mr. Arar, that there was only one voice that was speaking for Canada, and that was myself.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, in light of
the fact that we are in a very, very serious situation here, where we are talking national security offence, we are talking likely the State Security Court, we are talking possible capital punishment, $I$ assume at that point in time that you wanted to ensure that all of the Canadian government got together in an attempt to get Mr. Arar back to Canada?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: All these
messages were meant for headquarters so that everyone would know what the situation was. It was not my role as Ambassador, sitting in Damascus, to convene meetings in Ottawa to do precisely what you are suggesting. I can only say these are -- "This is the situation in Damascus." MR. CAVALLUZZO: Right. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: "And these are our concerns. Now it's up to you."

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Now, would it surprise you to know that in the next month, in May and June, that Mr. Pardy, on behalf of the Government of Canada, in particular DFAIT, tried to get a consensus amongst the Canadian agencies to send a letter, jointly signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Solicitor General, and that that effort failed because CSIS and the RCMP balked? Does that surprise you?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes, this may be the case, indeed. But my question to you is: What could I do about it? I mean, this was -- but, yes, I was aware of the -- of what was going on, but there wasn't much that $I$ could do about it.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. In any
event, Mr. Arar comes in to the meeting at paragraph 7.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Yes.
MR. CAVALLUZZO: And he was
introduced to the MPs and the embassy staff.
"He appeared tired and disoriented but generally in good health. Mr. Arar was instructed by Colonel George

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to speak only in Arabic (so that the Syrian staff could understand what he was saying)."

Here we are, this is very late in
the day, and it looks like he is still being dictated to by the Syrians as to how he will conduct himself in this kind of meeting.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, I think that you have the answer there. Not everyone, aside from the Colonel, who spoke English -- the others had no knowledge of English, and therefore, if everyone was to understand what was being said, that is the reason why he was asked to speak in Arabic.

But you will also note in the report that this restriction was relaxed several times and Mr. Arar was able to express himself in English without any problems.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: If we pick that
up in paragraph 7:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "During the interview, this } \\
& \text { restriction was relaxed } \\
& \text { several times, especially } \\
& \text { when it came for Mr. Arar to }
\end{aligned}
$$

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dictate a letter to his wife. The Colonel also told Mr. Arar to refrain from commenting on security aspects of his case and to speak about his health, prison conditions, and family matters."

And how long, to your recollection, how long did the meeting with Mr. Arar last?

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: I can't recall for sure, but $I$ think that it must have been at least 20 minutes, but I --

MR. CAVALLUZZO: In any event, after this meeting, as you go to paragraph 9 now, it says:
"In a debriefing with the Ambassador..."

And this is Catterall and
Mr. Assadourian.
"...expressed disappointment
that all of the security
aspects of the Arar case, as seen by the Syrians, had not

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been explained to them earlier. Mrs. Catterall even suggested that perhaps Minister Graham had been kept in the dark concerning some of this information, a view that was not shared by Mr. Assadourian. Both MPs indicated that had they been more fully briefed in Ottawa, they would have reconsidered undertaking their mission to Damascus."

Now, Ms Catterall has reviewed this document and denies that particular aspect. AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: Well, what I can say is this: There were three people present during that debrief: Myself, Mr. Martel, and Mr. Shaw. I don't know what Mrs. Catterall might have meant to say, but what Mrs. Catterall did say is what is in this report, and the report was written immediately after the debrief. There were three people who read the report before it was dispatched, and the three people agreed that this reflected precisely what had been said.

So all I can say is that perhaps Mrs. Catterall meant to say something else, but what the three of us heard was what is reported in here.

We're not in the habit of making things up. We report things as we hear them. MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. I would
like to move now to the final and ultimate paragraph and the comment on page 3 of 3 . The comment is stated:

> "Syrian officials once again demonstrated a remarkable level of cooperation in the Arar case."
> Now, if I'm Mr. Arar and $I$ know that I'm about to be charged with being a member of al-Qaeda, I know that I'm subject to capital punishment, and $I$ know that $I ' m$ going to be tried before some court which has very little due process, to say the least, and my Ambassador is saying that the Syrians are demonstrating "a remarkable level of cooperation," I would wonder what my Ambassador was talking about. Do you want to comment on that?
comment is that we are in the field, we are in a certain situation, we are in a foreign country. That foreign country is not obligated to us in any way when it comes to what they consider to be a Syrian citizen.

Yes, what you are saying is very serious and, yes, this is very little comfort to Mr. Arar if he has to face a trial in these conditions. I concede all that. But the fact remains that what the Syrians did, starting in October until the day that they met with the MPs, I know that I'm repeating myself, but this was unheard of. This was totally and completely unheard of.

There is one indication in one of the documents where even our lawyer, who was a Syrian, who said to us that we were extremely privileged; and how this had happened, he could not explain, that we had had all this access and that we had been able, almost without any impediment, to have access to Military Intelligence, to have access to Mr. Arar, and to do all that we were doing.

So I put it to you: Yes, it is perhaps not sufficient, seen from our perspective
and from the perspective of Mr. Arar, but we had -- we were given a hand and we dealt with that in a way -- the best we could.

And I say that it was
unexceptional and unheard-of cooperation. But I'm not -- and I'm not -- by saying this, I am simply indicating what has happened to us, because there were other cases of other countries where their nationals were being detained and they did not have the same type of access that we had been able to get.

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. And I
guess -- I've already asked you about the months subsequent, when Mr. Pardy attempted to -obviously, because of the seriousness of the situation, attempted to get the government ad idem or a consensus, and that unfortunately failed from Mr. Arar's perspective.

Now, if you go to the small Book of Documents at tab 19. I just want you to look at a document to ensure that -- this is a document that we have received in our document demand, but it's dated May 13, 2003, and it says:
"On Wednesday, May 15th,
Canada's Ambassador to Syria,

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Franco Pillarella, handed over to DFAIT/ISI a document received earlier that month from ... The document, an undated..."

And so on and so forth and was
sent to CSIS.
This obviously, I believe, refers
to the document that we looked at earlier of November the 3 rd or 4 th, yet we have this document now, dated May $15 t h$, and $I$ 'm wondering if you can help explain what this means and just to ensure that it must be a mistake.

AMBASSADOR PILLARELLA: On here it says that -- it is a mistake because there is no other document. I received only one single document from the Syrians, and that was November the 3 rd .

MR. CAVALLUZZO: Okay. Now, I'd like to just ask you a few final questions before we come to the envoy.

In fact, we're coming to the visit of the Deputy Minister Lavertu in May of 2003, and Mr. Commissioner, I suggest that we perhaps adjourn at this point in time.

In terms of my examination, $I$ will
likely be another hour -- one hour, maximum.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Just for
our scheduling tomorrow, do you have any idea at this point, Mr. Waldman?

MR. WALDMAN: I would expect a few hours. Mr. Cavalluzzo has been very thorough.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I think that's a fair comment.

Mr. Baxter?
MR. BAXTER: I would -- I, first
of all, should advise you, I won't be here. It will be Ms McIsaac tomorrow with Mr. Flaim.

I would assume it will be in the range of, from what we've heard to date, approximately 45 minutes at the outside, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Ten o'clock then, do you think, on that basis?

MR. CAVALLUZZO: I think ten o'clock would be more than sufficient. I need a bit of sleep and --

THE COMMISSIONER: Yeah, I think that will -- okay. We'll start at ten o'clock tomorrow. THE REGISTRAR: Please stand. --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4:56 p.m., to resume on Wednesday, June 15, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. / L'audience est ajournèe à 16 h 56, pour reprendre le mercredi 15 juin 2005 à 10 h 00


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