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Some Reflections on the Concept of Nation
The new Premier of Quebec, Mr. Bernard Landry, asserts that the crux of the
Canada-Quebec question lies in the fact that Quebecers form a nation, that
nations aspire to govern themselves, and that Quebec therefore must become
independent.
Let's run through that. Do Quebecers form a nation? In sociological terms,
in the French sense of the word, admittedly, but in legal terms,
in the English sense, it is Canada that constitutes a nation, that is, an
independent state with its own seat at the United Nations.
But in sociological terms, I would say that a nation exists as soon as human
beings consider that they form one. They feel that they share common
historical, cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious traits and on this
basis see themselves as a nation. It is undeniable that a large number of
Quebecers consider themselves to be a nation and are one from that moment
on.
When Mr. Landry maintains that Quebec, since it is a "nation,"
must be the political equivalent of "nations" such as Canada, the
United States or France, he is playing on words: he is sliding
from the "French sociological" meaning (a community aware of its
identity) to the "English legal" meaning (an independent state).
In fact, the vast majority of nations in the sociological sense have a
political status that is much narrower in scope than that enjoyed by
our Canadian provinces. That includes the Catalans and the Scots,
nations that our Quebec separatist leaders nevertheless point to as models.
When we talk of a nation in the sociological sense, it is often difficult
precisely to delineate its contours because the national sentiment stems
from a process of self-identification which is ultimately rather subjective.
Moreover, it would be intolerable if that self-identification were to
degenerate into an attempt at annexation or appropriation of others. It is
Fernand Dumont, the well-known sociologist with pro-independence
allegiances, who has written that one cannot encompass into the Quebec
nation, "with some sort of magic vocabulary," [translation]
Quebec residents who do not recognize themselves in this nation (Raisons
communes, 1995, p. 63). Now, while there are not many Quebec residents
who do not recognize themselves as Quebecers, there are very many who do not
want to be part of the Quebec nation if that means that they are not
Canadian.
Because that is what Mr. Landry is claiming: if we are part of the Quebec
nation, we cannot be part of the Canadian nation. It is impossible to belong
to two or more nations at the same time, he alleges. He is even saying that
the Aboriginal peoples of Quebec are not part of the Quebec nation because
they form their own nations.
This ignores the world in which we live, where plural identities constitute
a strength more than ever before, where these identities must
be accumulated, never subtracted. For the majority of human beings,
national attachments are intermingled.
Compounding this false idea of Mr. Landry's that people can belong to only
one nation is another, even more serious error, which is that each
nation must form a country. This would make the planet explode. There are
over three thousand human groups that define themselves as nations in
the world, whereas there are fewer than two hundred states in the United
Nations. The vast majority of countries are made up of several nations. In
France, do the Alsatians or the Bretons form nations? In Canada, do the
Acadians form a nation? Why not? Even within Quebec, just how many nations
are there? Should they not form just as many independent countries,
according to Mr. Landry's own logic?
Very well then, the separatist spokespersons respond, if you do not deny the
existence of the Quebec nation, why not recognize it in the Canadian
Constitution? There would then have to be agreement on the number of
nations to recognize in the Constitution. With the very special
exception of Aboriginal peoples, the Constitution only establishes the
rights of citizens and the powers of the public authorities, and otherwise
lets all citizens define themselves as they see fit without
imposing anything on anyone. It does not even recognize the Canadian nation.
You are trivializing the Quebec identity, the separatist leaders accuse. To
which I respond that we are not trivializing anything whatsoever. We
are simply refusing to commit the error of believing that everything
that is important has to be put into the Constitution.
Many important things are not in the Constitution. The most important
of values, love, is not constitutionally recognized, to take the
example used by Jean-Pierre Derriennic (Nationalisme et démocratie,
1995, p. 134). It is not because our Constitution is mute on this point that
love does not exist! Everyone will agree that it would not exist to any
greater extent if it were mentioned in the Constitution. Even legal
texts on marriage do not talk about love. That does not prevent anyone from
seeing marriage as the union of two beings who love each other. I know that
this argument will cause some smiles, but I nevertheless believe it is
fundamental: we put into a constitution not everything that is important,
but everything to which we want to attach legal consequences.
So, the question, from the viewpoint of constitutional law, is not whether
Quebecers have their own identity, to which they are attached in
addition to their Canadian identity. Of course the Quebec identity is alive
and well, and its existence, no more than the existence of love, does not
depend on constitutional recognition. No, the question is which rights would
need to be attached to an eventual constitutional recognition of that
Quebec identity.
Incidentally, I much prefer the expression "society" to that of
"nation." If the objective is really to be as inclusive as
possible, the word "society" is more appropriate. The etymology
of the word "nation" refers to "birth," and thus
retains a connotation linked to origins, even to race. The nation can be
civic, but that is not guaranteed. The number of Quebecers who feel included
is expanded when Quebec is defined as a society rather than a nation.
But the question remains: what legal consequences are to be attached to a
constitutional recognition of this unique or distinct Quebec society?
It cannot be a question of giving Quebecers more rights than other
Canadians. Democratic states usually do not go very far into the
hierarchisation of the rights of their citizens according to whether some
belong to "nations" or "societies."
Nor can it be a question of decreeing in advance that Quebec's specificity
necessitates the transfer of additional powers to the Government of
Quebec, or new arrangements, such as that on which our civil law is based,
without specifying which powers or which arrangements those are. Even with
the constitutional recognition of Quebec's specificity, it would be
necessary to continue, as we do today, to assess each proposal for
change on its own merits, in light of the interests of citizens.
But if the objective is to make that constitutional recognition an
interpretive clause, as provided for in the Meech and Charlottetown
accords, it must be borne in mind that this is what judges generally do in
any event. The late Chief Justice Dickson, former Chief Justice Lamer and
the current Chief Justice, the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, have all
said that the Supreme Court of Canada takes Quebec's specificity into
account when interpreting the Constitution on issues that affect
Quebec. To recognize this explicitly in the Constitution would be desirable,
but not absolutely necessary.
In short, with or without constitutional change, Quebecers can live very
well with their national attachments. Above all, they can do so without
having to choose between Quebec and Canada. It is terribly false to believe
that one can belong to only one nation at a time and that each nation must
be independent. Mr. Landry's over-enthusiasm for the concept of nation is
misplaced. What he says about it in no way changes the fact that it is
better to be both Quebecer and Canadian than to be a Quebecer without
Canada.
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