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LETTER TO PREMIER LUCIEN BOUCHARD
CONCERNING THE MAJORITY REQUIRED FOR SECESSION
(TRANSLATION)
April 9, 1999
Dear Mr. Premier,
You have sought to turn the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Newfoundland's
entering Canada into an opportunity to reopen the debate on the clear majority required by
the Supreme Court to initiate the negotiation of a secession. The attempt to link these
two issues is unfortunate for our fellow citizens from Newfoundland, who deserved to be
celebrated for themselves, and regrettable as well for us, Quebecers, the great majority
of whom wish to hear nothing more of your plans for a third referendum.
Your point of view is well summed up in the following statement, which you made on
March 30 outside the National Assembly:
[Translation]
"In 1949 [sic], by that historic decision that would be
binding upon future generations, Newfoundlanders adopted the democratic rule of fifty per
cent plus one. And it was by a vote of fifty-two per cent, with a majority of 7,000
ballots, that the dual decision was made to break with Great Britain and join Canada [...].
It would be a historical injustice if, in an upcoming referendum, Quebecers were not
treated with the same democratic respect as their friends and neighbours in
Newfoundland."
It is precisely because Quebecers are entitled to the same democratic respect as
Newfoundlanders that the negotiation of their loss of Canada should never be undertaken
unless, as stated by the Supreme Court, a clear majority has made that choice by
responding positively to a clear question on secession. In fact, the comparison with
Newfoundland argues against a secession attempted on a 50% plus one basis for four
fundamental reasons:
1. The ties to break were much less steadfast
Newfoundland was neither a province nor a region of the United Kingdom. An
independent state at the time, Newfoundland had endured enormous economic hardship during
the Great Depression, with the result that it became politically and financially dependent
on the United Kingdom in 1934, a status that was intended to be provisional from the
outset. After the war, pressure to put an end to this provisional status grew, and London
encouraged this option.
You are asking Quebecers to split a real country, not to put an end to a provisional
arrangement. The ties that would have to be "broken", as you put it, would be
infinitely more solid and complex than those linking Newfoundland to the United Kingdom in
1948. Their rupture would require that many precautions be taken so as to ensure justice
for all. A host of problems would arise, including, possibly, the issue of borders.
As the Supreme Court reminds us,
"After 131 years of Confederation, there
exists, inevitably, a high level of integration in economic, political and social
institutions across Canada. [...] Of course, secession would give rise to many
issues of great complexity and difficulty. [...] Nobody seriously suggests that our
national existence, seamless in so many aspects, could be effortlessly separated along
what are now the provincial boundaries of Quebec."
2. The rupture was supported by a clear majority
One cannot confuse the 52% of Newfoundlanders who supported confederation with
Canada with the much larger majority who were in favour of rupturing the links of
provisional dependency they had with the United Kingdom. A first referendum held on
June 3, 1948, offered Newfoundlanders three options: 1) a five-year extension of this
status of dependency, [Commission of Government] 2) independence, without the financial
support of London [Responsible Government] or 3) entry into the Canadian federation
[Confederation with Canada]. Only 14% of voters supported the extension of the status of
dependency. In other words, 86% of voters supported rupturing the link with the United
Kingdom. The Government of the United Kingdom, responsible for organizing these public
consultations, expected such a clear majority and expected that the real debate would be
between the other two options in a subsequent referendum.
In fact, it is best not to hold a referendum on this type of rupture unless it is
merely to confirm officially the existence of an observable consensus in its favour. This
is what has occurred since 1945 in the 13 cases of accession to independence, outside the
colonial context, in which referenda were held: the majority obtained was on average 92%,
with the lowest having been 72%.
3. The wrenching choice was made between two radical changes and not between
continuity and a radical change
When a choice is made between the solution of continuity and a serious,
quasi-irreversible change that would profoundly affect the lives of citizens and future
generations, it is appropriate to require the proponents of that change to obtain the
support of a clear majority. In the case of Newfoundland, the second referendum, held on
July 22, 1948, forced voters to choose between two radical changes: independence without
British financial support or confederation with Canada. There was no solution of
continuity available. The Canadian government could have refused to negotiate
Newfoundland’s entry into Confederation by claiming that 52% support for Canada was
too lukewarm. But in doing so, Canada would have forced Newfoundland to fall back on the
less popular option of radical change: independence without external assistance.
Quebecers have a solution of continuity available to them: their country, Canada. You
are proposing a radical change: Quebec’s secession from Canada. Quebecers have the
right not to lose Canada unless they have clearly indicated their desire to do so. This
right has been confirmed for them by the Supreme Court.
4. Joining is not the same as leaving
On the basis of mutual agreement, after months of negotiations, Newfoundland
entered Canada; it did not break it up. As the Prime Minister of Canada and the Premier of
Newfoundland aptly responded to you, building a country is not the same as breaking up a
country.
And contrary to what you stated on March 31, nothing in the opinion of the
Supreme Court makes it possible to confuse the rules regarding the majority necessary for
entering and those for leaving a country.
It is customary in a democracy to require a higher majority for separating from a union
than for entering it, since the risks of injustice are higher when one is seeking to break
mutual ties, allegiances and obligations forged over time. This principle, which applies
for an association in private law, is all the more relevant where a country is involved.
Indeed, a number of highly democratic countries, such as France and the United States,
exclude any secession, regardless of the majority.
It is therefore the position of the Government of Canada that our governments would be
acting irresponsibly if they attempted to negotiate secession without the assurance that
this is what Quebecers clearly want. This is what emerges from the opinion of the Court,
with its emphasis on clarity, provided that one does not read it selectively.
A majority would be required that is sufficiently clear that it does not dwindle away
during the difficult negotiation period and that it could be legitimately binding on
future generations. You yourself, Mr. Premier, acknowledged on August 31, 1998, that
it would be "desirable" for the Yes side to obtain more than a simple majority.
Why then consider beginning a negotiation process as difficult as that for secession with
a majority that would not be "desirable"?
Even from your own point of view, that of an advocate of independence, you should
acknowledge that the attempt at secession would almost surely fail without that clear
support, not for lack of mutual good faith, but because the inevitable difficulties
associated with your project would create growing reluctance within Quebec itself. And
after imposing on Quebecers the ordeal of this failed negotiation, they would have no
desire to relive the experience a second time.
I have two suggestions for you. The first, which is by far the solution preferred by
the great majority of Quebecers, is to put away your plans for a third referendum, which
divides and weakens Quebec, and instead devote all your energies to working with the other
provinces and the Government of Canada to ensure prosperity and social progress for all
our fellow citizens and all our children.
The second, on the assumption that you would want to move ahead with your plans for a
third referendum, is to give serious thought to how the decision by the Supreme Court can
be fully respected, including, notably, its requirements for clarity with respect to the
majority and the question on secession.
Yours truly,
Original signed by
Stéphane Dion
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