[Translation]
by
the Honourable Stéphane Dion
President of the Privy Council and
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
This text appears in French in the work
ÊTRE GOUVERNÉ
Études en l'honneur de Jean Leca
Pierre Favre, Jack Hayward and Yves Schemeil, eds.
Presses de Sciences Po
Paris
June 2003
As my contribution to this work devoted to governance, I want to demonstrate that it would be impossible to govern in a political system in which secession were a right automatically granted on demand. Democratic governance, which is the only governance we want to have, calls for loyalty from all citizens toward one another. Democracy, in effect, calls on us to accept all our fellow citizens, without distinction of race, religion or regional belonging. Secession, for its part, is equivalent to choosing from among our fellow citizens those we accept and those we wish to transform into foreigners. So there is a contradiction between democracy and secession which makes these two notions hard to reconcile. Indeed, there has never been a well established democracy, which I define as having had at least ten consecutive years of universal suffrage, that has experienced secession.
At the same time, in the event that the tie of loyalty among fellow citizens is clearly broken and a territorially concentrated population unequivocally demands to separate from an existing state in order to form a new state, it would be difficult for a democracy to ignore that demand. In effect, even though the democratic principle and the principle of severing relations between fellow citizens are inconsistent, it would be difficult for a democracy to ignore an indisputable desire for break-up, as the other solution, which would consist in holding a population against its clearly expressed will, could prove to be even more contrary to democracy. The democratic state could instead choose to accept the irremediable fact that citizens’ loyalty toward one another clearly no longer existed. It would then need to set the terms and conditions for as fair a break-up as possible, after having determined that secession clearly appeared, in the circumstances, to be the least pernicious of foreseeable solutions.
On June 29, 2000, Canada became the first major democratic state to acknowledge its own divisibility through a legislative enactment. In the Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, more simply called the Clarity Act, the Canadian Parliament set out the circumstances in which the Government of Canada might undertake negotiations on the secession of a province from Canada. That Act, which I had the honour of sponsoring in the Canadian Parliament, has received broad support but has also been criticized both by the proponents of secession on demand and by those who, on the contrary, advocate the absolute indivisibility of the national territory.1
This debate took place in Canada, true, but it is reflected universally in the sense that the peaceful coexistence of populations of different languages, cultures or religions poses one of the greatest challenges faced by the international community at the start of this century. One question to which this challenge seeks an answer is under what circumstances, and by what means, could the delineation of new international borders between populations become a just and equitable solution. I will explain the normative principles here that guide my response.
In so doing, I will be addressing one of the greatest concerns of Jean Leca: loyalty among citizens in democracy. One who has long considered pluralism and respect for diversity has also written that "the democratic impetus tends to unify the ‘people’ beyond the diversity of ‘populations’ "and "transfers the indivisible unity of the sovereign to the people."2 [Translation] Can the pluralism of freely expressed wills in democracy be reconciled with the principles of citizens’ loyalty to one another, the indivisibility of the state, and the territorial integrity of sovereign nations? It seems to me that it is possible to answer this question in the affirmative.
After showing the extent to which state practice displays great reticence in recognizing secessions and after identifying the democratic principles that strike me as justifying that reticence, I will set out the circumstances which I believe can make the negotiation of a secession acceptable in democracy.
1. The aversion of states and the international community to secessions
Aversion to the phenomenon of secession is evident at three levels: in domestic state law, in international law, and in accordance with state practice on the international scene.
Among the most democratic states one can find many that affirm their indivisibility in their constitution, explicitly or implicitly. France is not the only democracy to do so. The United States, Spain, Italy, Australia: all these democracies and many others affirm that they form indissoluble entities.3
In international law, the right to self-determination of peoples cannot be the basis of a right to external self-determination, that is, a right to effect secession unilaterally, except in situations of colonization, military occupation or grave human rights violations. Apart from these extreme cases, the right to self-determination applies within the limits accorded to the territorial integrity of states.4
International state practice displays the same reticence to recognize unilateral secessions outside the colonial context. As noted by Professor James Crawford of the University of Cambridge in the Experts’ Report he submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada, "Since 1945 [outside the colonial context] no state which has been created by unilateral secession has been admitted to the United Nations against the declared wishes of the government of the predecessor state." He added that, "Where the government of the [predecessor] state in question has maintained its opposition to the secession, such attempts have gained virtually no international support or recognition, and this has been true even when other humanitarian aspects of the situations have triggered widespread concern and action."5
To be sure, states, at least democratic ones, condemn the violent repression of populations, but at the same time they hesitate to see a solution in support for secessionist initiatives. The international intervention in Kosovo, for example, was undertaken out of humanitarian concern, and not to help accede to independence a population which nevertheless desires it in the clearest possible manner.
States’ caution is proportional to the seriousness of the issue. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of conflicts within states has far outstripped the number of conflicts between states. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict has identified over 200 ethnic or religious minorities that are calling for an improvement to their legal or political rights.6
Wariness of the secessionist phenomenon can be seen, paradoxically, in the case of the only democracy to have demonstrated ambiguity regarding the unity of another democracy. I am alluding of course to France’s attitude toward Canada since July 24, 1967, when General de Gaulle launched his famous "Vive le Québec libre" from the balcony of Montreal’s city hall.
France’s attitude toward Canadian unity is an utterly exceptional case unparalleled in French politics. To a journalist who asked whether France might maintain the same ambiguity toward the unity of Spain in the face of the Catalan autonomy movement, François Hollande, then-Deputy First Secretary of the French Socialist Party, replied: "The problem does not present itself, because the Catalans don’t speak French"!7 [Translation]
Ever since de Gaulle’s bombshell, senior French political leaders have occasionally used language that might be interpreted as opening the door to possible recognition by France of an independent Quebec against the will of the Canadian state. But the fact remains that French authorities have never clearly committed to supporting a unilateral secession, in spite of all of the influences that have been felt: deployment of a strong Quebec independence lobby in Paris8, the French Gaullist movement’s loyalty to de Gaulle’s legacy, French feelings of guilt about "abandoning" New France in 1763, Gallic solidarity toward a population of French origin, misunderstanding of the Canadian reality, perceived as a sort of "Anglo-Saxon hegemony."9 [Translation]
In recent years, however, French authorities have indicated more clearly that the direct relations they maintain with the Government of Quebec ought not to be interpreted as a challenge to Canada’s territorial integrity. For example, the French ambassador to Canada stated on August 30, 1999: "The national question, the problem of relations between Quebec and Ottawa, is an internal Canadian problem. It's not our problem, it's your problem."10
President Jacques Chirac, who had said on CNN on October 23, 1995, that in the case of a Yes majority in the Quebec referendum held that month, his position would be "I will recognize a fact," four years later qualified that rather laconic statement as not announcing recognition of a unilateral secession. "I did not say that France would recognize, the day after an election, a situation which by definition was not achieved because it opened a discussion between the State and Quebec."11 [Translation] "I made the mistake that day of speaking in English and [...] I used the word ‘recognize’ which I felt was appropriate [...]. I should probably have said ‘acknowledge’ or something like that."12 [Translation]
For his part, former prime minister Lionel Jospin specified on September 30, 1997, that "a free judgement of Canada"[Translation] would be a fact that France would need to consider.13
The French authorities’ refusal to commit to recognizing a possible unilateral secession by Quebec may perhaps partly lie in the fact that the natural French sympathy for Francophone Quebec society is not inconsistent with a fascination, no less French, for the totality of Canada. President Chirac himself has expressed this eloquently: "I would like to underline the exemplarity of Canada [...] an immense country, land of First Nations peoples, land of the Inuit, a land, at the same time Anglophone and Francophone, that is perfecting, in peace and tolerance, the art of living together."14 [Translation]
But there is a more general factor that explains France’s attitude: it would be difficult for it to have a policy toward Canada that was so at odds with its policy regarding the territorial integrity of other states. In accordance with international practice as described above, France does not recognize unilateral secessions. Like other states, it is loath to do so even in the most extreme cases of populations that are calling for independence almost unanimously and are victims of grave impositions by the states from which they want to separate. For example, in the case of Chechnya, France’s position is in line with that of other states: "Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation. Respect for the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity is one of the basic rules of international life."15 [Translation]
It is hard to see how this "basic rule of international life" could hold true for all states except Canada, a democratic state, ally of France, member of NATO and the G8. So the only exception to the rule that might be found is not really an exception at all. States, including France vis-à-vis Canada, are loath to recognize secessions effected contrary to the territorial integrity of states.
Now let us try to identify the reasons for such a strong reluctance. The first reason naturally pertains to states’ concern that their own territorial integrity not be challenged. The golden rule of "do unto others as you would have others do unto you" has a powerful dissuasive effect. It is difficult for a state to demand that its own territorial integrity be respected if it does not respect that of others. It will be more difficult for it to prevent separatist movements at home if it encourages them in other states.
International stability is also a constant concern. Separatist movements are potential factors of disorder. If the international community is so clearly opposed to recognizing unilateral secession as an automatic right outside the colonial context, it is no doubt because a.) it would be very difficult to determine to whom that right should be granted, b.) because such an automatic right to secession would have dramatic consequences for the international community – with over 5,000 human groups each claiming a collective identity for itself in the world16 – and c.) because the creation of each new state would risk mobilizing, within that same state, minorities which would in turn stake their own claim for independence.
As former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has stated: "Yet if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve."17
But in addition to these considerations of state and international stability, another factor argues against recognizing an automatic right to secession. Because it fundamentally affects democracies, I want to focus on it in particular. This is the factor I noted initially in introducing my topic and it has to do with the true meaning of citizenship in democracy.
2. Inconsistency between secession and democracy
Let us first consider democracy from an essential, albeit strictly procedural, aspect: the vote. The people, that is, the citizenry as a whole, exercise their sovereignty either by electing their representatives or directly by referendum, in accordance with either a simple or a qualified majority. A crucial question is raised with a vote on secession: which would be the appropriate majority in this case? Given that the scission of a national territory would have consequences for all citizens, the majority should thus be that of all citizens who are eligible to vote. But what should be done if a clear majority is expressed against secession at the national level, but an equally clear majority emerges in favour of secession in the region from which the secessionist demand emanates? And what should then be done if, within that same region, sub-regions pronounce themselves equally clearly against secession? And if the country’s majority opts for secession but the affected population rejects it, is expulsion an acceptable solution?
Reconciling secession and democracy becomes even more complex if one considers as one should, not only the democratic process, but also the values that justify it. Those values, in the name of which sovereignty passes from the hands of the monarch to the people, were defined during the French Revolution as liberty, equality and fraternity. In more modern terms, fraternity may be conceived as the solidarity or loyalty that binds citizens in a democracy.
The citizens of a democracy are linked by a principle of mutual loyalty. They all owe one another assistance regardless of considerations of race, religion or regional belonging. For this reason, all citizens are owners of the country in its entirety, with its potential for wealth and human solidarity. No group of citizens can take it upon itself to monopolize citizenship over one part of the national territory, or to withdraw from its fellow citizens, against their will, their right to full belonging to the country in its entirety. Every citizen should be able to pass that right of belonging on to his or her children. Ideally, such a right should never be challenged in democracy. It is thus completely legitimate for a democracy to consider itself to be indivisible.
This principle of mutual loyalty among citizens is just as valid in a federation as it is in a unitary system. In international law, territorial integrity is recognized in both instances.18 Federalism itself induces a loyalty among constituent entities, a principle which some federations, such as Germany, have formalized in law: "The constitutional principle of federalism applying in the federal state therefore places a legal obligation on the Federation and all of its constituent states to be ‘pro-federal’ in their behavior, that is to say, all members of the constitutional ‘alliance’ are required to cooperate with one another in a manner compatible with the nature of that alliance and to contribute to its consolidation and to the protection of its interests and the well-considered interests of its members."19 [Translation]
Because loyalty unites all citizens over and above their differences, no group of citizens within a democratic state can assume the right to secession under the pretext that its specific attributes – language, culture or religion – qualifies it as a nation or a distinct people within the state. As the Supreme Court of Canada has written in relation to Quebec: "whatever be the correct application of the definition of people(s) in this context, their right of self-determination cannot in the present circumstances [those of a democratic state] be said to ground a right to unilateral secession."20
We are surely touching here on the fundamental reason why international law and state practice alike recognize a right to secession only in situations of colonization or flagrant human rights violations. In extreme circumstances where a state refuses to treat a group of citizens as citizens, where it rides roughshod over their right to citizenship, those citizens in turn have the right to consider it no longer to be their state. They have that right not by virtue of distinctive traits pertaining to race, language or religion, but because, like other human beings, they have a universal right to citizenship.21
Thus, the normative foundation of the indivisibility of states in democracy is the loyalty of citizens, a principle which guarantees to each citizen full belonging to his or her country. It should be added that this normative foundation is far from being of merely theoretical importance: on the contrary, it must be considered as essential to the proper functioning of democracies. Indeed, a philosophy of democracy based on the logic of secession would be unworkable. It would incite groups to separate from one another rather than trying to unite or reach agreement. Automatic secession would prevent democracy from absorbing the tensions inherent in differences.
We can adapt the celebrated conceptual trilogy by Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, to our present topic.22 For loyalty among citizens to be strengthened, secession (exit) must not appear as a normal, easy solution when disagreements (voice) arise. As Allen Buchanan has written, "democratic institutions are most likely to flourish when exit is not so easy as a majoritarian right to secede would make it."23
The fact of knowing they will stay together encourages citizens to strive toward sincere and active cooperation, and to see that cooperation as lasting from one generation to the next: "[...] citizens can generally proceed on the assumption that they and their children and perhaps their children’s children will be subject to laws that are made through the same processes to which they are now subject – and whose quality they can influence by the character of their participation."24
Conversely, recognition of the right to secession on demand would invite break-up as soon as difficulties were experienced along fault lines which are very likely to develop around collective attributes such as religion, language or ethnicity.25 Moreover, such a right would make the mere threat of break-up a permanent political strategy within a state. In effect, it would give groups a strong incentive to threaten to secede in order to get what they wanted. This secessionist blackmail as a bargaining tool consists of saying: "Do what I say, or I’m leaving." A more indirect form goes as follows: "Do what I say, or else those who want to leave will have more and more convincing arguments to do so." The state gives in to this blackmail by responding: "Let’s give the separatists some of what they’re asking for in order to avoid separation." But in so doing, the state penalizes citizens who do not use this blackmail as leverage to advance their concerns in the order of government priorities.
This creates a perverse effect whereby, although the expression "separatist blackmail" is pejorative, the vast majority of those who practise this blackmail or who give into it do so in good faith. It is a habit that catches on quickly: as soon as one group adopts the threat to secede as a pressure tactic, others become inclined to do so as well. And so its negative effects get overlooked.
With separatist blackmail, the quality of public policy is no longer a concern; it disappears as an issue, giving way entirely to the sole concern of calming separatism. It is hoped that giving separatists some of what they are asking for might at least win over the less radical among them. And if they are not satisfied, then we have not given them enough concessions. More are in order, so the reasoning goes.
At the same time as it trivializes the extreme perspective that secession represents, separatist blackmail overdramatizes the quite normal disagreements that arise in democracy. For example, in Canada in recent years, political figures in different provinces have brandished the threat of secession to make their case in connection with such current issues as a budget deficit, a budget surplus, a scholarship program, health care funding, dwindling salmon stocks, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and so on. This outbidding, where everyone attributes an existential importance to the changes they are advocating, makes people lose their sense of perspective. In the long run, this exacerbation of tensions tarnishes the country’s image in the eyes of its own citizens. They come to perceive their country as a perpetual dispute. Some end up by seeing separation as the way to achieve peace, whereas in fact it is the ease with which separation is contemplated that saps the very foundations of loyalty among fellow citizens.
3. In what circumstances should a negotiation on secession be undertaken in democracy?
The principle of loyalty is thus essential to democracy. The assurance they will stay together helps citizens to maintain dialogue, to keep a sense of perspective in the event of disagreements, and together to find avenues for the common good. This principle of loyalty cannot, however, be seen as an absolute, despite all its advantages. It cannot prevent the negotiation of secession from appearing to be the least harmful solution possible in the event that one part of the population clearly demonstrates its will no longer to be part of the country. The fact is there are some means a democratic state could not even consider in order to hold against its clearly expressed will a population concentrated in one part of its territory. In other words, secession is not a right in democracy, its logic and democracy are incompatible, but it remains a possibility in case of necessity.
This is the position the Government of Canada has defended in the face of the Quebec independence movement. The Government of Canada does not recognize that the Government of Quebec has any right to effect secession unilaterally. It maintains that the Government of Quebec does not have the right to take it upon itself to remove from Quebecers their full belonging to Canada. The Government of Canada affirms that it could not abdicate its constitutional responsibilities toward Quebecers without having the assurance that this is what they clearly want. Indeed, no democratic state could abolish its responsibilities toward one part of its population in the absence of clear support for secession.
The Government of Canada would not agree to undertake a negotiation on secession except in the event that the population of a province clearly demonstrated its will no longer to be part of Canada. This clear will to secede should be expressed by a clear majority in support of a question clearly pertaining to secession, rather than on some vague proposal for political partnership.
Negotiation on secession would be undertaken within the Canadian constitutional framework and should be guided by a genuine quest for justice for all. For example, in the event that territorially concentrated populations within Quebec clearly asked to stay attached to Canada, the divisibility of Quebec’s territory would have to be contemplated with the same spirit of openness which led to accepting the divisibility of Canada’s territory.
The Government of Canada has expressed this position on a number of occasions, including through the Attorney General of Canada, who explained to the House of Commons the reasons why he was asking the Supreme Court of Canada whether or not the Government of Quebec has the right to effect secession unilaterally: "The leading political figures of all the provinces and indeed the Canadian public have long agreed that this country will not be held together against the will of Quebecers clearly expressed."26
The Supreme Court of Canada rendered its opinion on August 20, 1998. It confirms that the Government of Quebec does not have the right to effect secession unilaterally, neither under Canadian law nor under international law. To be legal, a secession would necessitate an amendment to Canada’s Constitution. Such an amendment would entail the negotiation of "many issues of great complexity and difficulty," possibly including that of territorial boundaries.27 The obligation to undertake such a negotiation on secession exists only in the presence of clear support for secession, expressed through a clear majority and a clear question. Only such clear support would give the secessionist demand sufficient democratic legitimacy to justify the obligation of a negotiation on secession.
In the wake of that opinion, the Government of Canada had the Canadian Parliament pass the Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference. The Clarity Act prohibits the Government of Canada from undertaking negotiations on the secession of a province unless the House of Commons determines that the referendum question clearly pertained to secession and that a clear majority has been expressed in favour of secession.
The Clarity Act also specifies the elements that must be included in the agenda for the negotiations: "No Minister of the Crown shall propose a constitutional amendment to effect the secession of a province from Canada unless the Government of Canada has addressed, in its negotiations, the terms of secession that are relevant in the circumstances, including the division of assets and liabilities, any changes to the borders of the province, the rights, interests and territorial claims of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the protection of minority rights."28
In short, because accepting secession as an automatic right is contrary to democracy, and given that an absolute prohibition on secession can prove to be impracticable in democracy, I feel the Canadian approach I have just described is a realistic one. It consists of first focussing on the need continuously to improve a country of which all citizens can be proud, a democratic and prosperous country whose highly diversified populations develop and flourish with their own cultures and their own institutions, while working together toward common objectives. If, in spite of this type of understanding that a federation such as Canada affords, a population should clearly express its desire to separate, then a negotiation on secession should be undertaken within a legal framework and with a concern for justice for all, no matter how numerous the difficulties inherent in such a negotiation.
That is the Canadian approach. In Canada’s case, it has had a beneficial effect on national unity. That is because this approach introduces the notion of clarity. And indeed, if there is one thing that clearly stands out, poll after poll, it is that with a clear question, Quebecers choose a united Canada.29 The vast majority of Quebecers want to remain Canadian and do not want to break the ties of loyalty that attach them to their fellow citizens in other parts of Canada. They do not want to be forced to choose between their Quebec identity and their Canadian identity. They reject the exclusive definitions of the word "people" and want to belong to both the Quebec people and the Canadian people, in this global world where concurrent identities will more than ever be an asset for opening oneself to others.
Despite its obviously beneficial impact on Canadian unity, I do not doubt that the approach I have just described as realistic may appear very daring and liberal in the face of the internationally abhorred phenomenon of secession. The Canadian approach rejects the use of force, of any form of violence. It emphasizes clarity, legality and justice for all. While it may appear idealistic to many nations, it is precisely because it seeks to address in an ideal manner situations of break-up which are always complex and delicate.
I believe the approach I have described could contribute to peace and enlightened state practice. I feel its basic premise, that secession, while not impossible, should be negotiated only in the face of a clear will to break-up, is ultimately not so far removed from how other democracies consider this issue. The case of France is a good example.
France is not a decentralized, bilingual federation like Canada; it is, as everyone knows, a Republic, which is one and indivisible. The indivisibility of the French state is a principle on which its leaders lay great stress. For example, President Chirac stated on February 9, 1998, in Ajaccio: "France is one and indivisible. To be sure, it is made up of regions, provinces, different from one another, each with its own inhabitants, customs, history and sometimes language. This is especially true of Corsica, whose identify and specificity are recognized by all. France is diverse, and is all the richer for it. But there is only one France. There is only one national territory, subject, everywhere, to the same law and the same right."30 [Translation]
And yet the indivisible Republic has been divided several times in recent decades, in particular with the withdrawal in 1962 of the 15 "départements" of Algeria and the Sahara, but also with the departure of Djibouti, Comoros (with the exception of Mayotte) and the pending case of New Caledonia. All those departures, however, were effected in accordance with a procedure determined by the French state: they were not unilateral secessions. Moreover, they were similar to colonial situations for which both international and state practice are disposed to recognize a right to secession. The question is: what about metropolitan France? There is no answer to that hypothetical question, and it is to be hoped for the French that nothing ever breaks the loyalty that unites them to one another.
And yet, one may risk an answer at the strictly legal level. Without in any way claiming to be a specialist in the matter, I note that French jurists make a distinction between the sovereignty of the state, which for its part is indivisible, and the territory, which may be divided under certain conditions. For example, according to Félicien Lemaire, while unilateral secession is prohibited, "a procedure for secession organized and consented to by the State"31 [Translation] is legally possible: "In effect, secession as a unilateral act of separation of a territorial community from the state of origin has at all times been rejected, and it is not surprising that this is still the case today, as no constitution has ever had the purpose of advocating territorial dismemberment. In contrast, territorial transfers – and consequently secessions – effected with the consent of the State cannot be considered to be contrary to the principle of indivisibility. It is the difference that can be established between the right to secession, which is rejected, and the right of secession, which is accepted under certain conditions."32 [Translation]
As with the principle of indivisibility, territorial integrity does not exclude the possibility of a secession legally consented to by the state: "Territorial integrity constitutes a preventive measure against separatism, but it is not incompatible with a procedure for secession organized by the State or determined by the ‘competent authorities,’ to use the terminology of the Constitutional Council."33 [Translation]
Conclusion
My position consists first and foremost of the following basic proposition: a country gives itself the best chances of improving if all its citizens adhere to the principle of loyalty. That principle may be expressed as follows: "Come what may, we shall choose to stay together."
This assurance gives rise to greater mutual trust, a stronger and more sincere desire genuinely to help one another, a better aptitude for frank discussion and the discovery of solutions when disagreements arise. For it is normal for disagreements to occur in a pluralist democracy. But the search for new solutions which results from this clash of ideas will be much more productive if it is based on unfailing loyalty rather than on calling into question the very unity of the country.
An automatic right to secession would unleash a series of perverse effects that I have sought to describe. It would create a dynamic of concessions that would cause citizens’ interests to be obscured. It would trivialize secession and the rupture it represents. It would sow jealousy, confusion and disengagement.
The unitary and indivisible French Republic and the decentralized Canadian federation ultimately pose the question of territorial integrity in quite a similar way. Both admit secession as a possibility, but only under certain conditions, through a procedure in accordance with the constitutional framework. In spite of very different legal traditions and political contexts, both states reject unilateral secession. If two democratic systems as different as France and Canada reach this conclusion, it is because, over and above the classic motives of order and stability, unilateral secession and democracy are profoundly incompatible.
Democracy unites all citizens through a principle of loyalty that confers on each a right to his or her country. Such a right should never be called into question, except in cases where the will to secede is clearly expressed.
Such clear support for secession has never occurred in a well-established democracy. If it is unlikely to happen, it is mainly because a regime founded on the loyalty of citizens creates very strong human ties that would be difficult to break. It is not the vocation of citizens in a democracy to transform themselves into foreigners.