"Democratic governance and
the principle
of territorial integrity"
[Translation]
by
the Honourable Stéphane Dion
President of the Privy Council and
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
This text appears in French in the work
ÊTRE GOUVERNÉ
Études en l'honneur de Jean Leca
Pierre Favre, Jack Hayward and Yves Schemeil, eds.
Presses de Sciences Po
Paris
June 2003
As my contribution to this work devoted to
governance, I want to demonstrate that it would be impossible to govern in a
political system in which secession were a right automatically granted on
demand. Democratic governance, which is the only governance we want to have,
calls for loyalty from all citizens toward one another. Democracy, in effect,
calls on us to accept all our fellow citizens, without distinction of race,
religion or regional belonging. Secession, for its part, is equivalent to
choosing from among our fellow citizens those we accept and those we wish to
transform into foreigners. So there is a contradiction between democracy and
secession which makes these two notions hard to reconcile. Indeed, there has
never been a well established democracy, which I define as having had at least
ten consecutive years of universal suffrage, that has experienced secession.
At the same time, in the event that the tie of
loyalty among fellow citizens is clearly broken and a territorially concentrated
population unequivocally demands to separate from an existing state in order to
form a new state, it would be difficult for a democracy to ignore that demand.
In effect, even though the democratic principle and the principle of severing
relations between fellow citizens are inconsistent, it would be difficult for a
democracy to ignore an indisputable desire for break-up, as the other solution,
which would consist in holding a population against its clearly expressed will,
could prove to be even more contrary to democracy. The democratic state could
instead choose to accept the irremediable fact that citizens’ loyalty toward
one another clearly no longer existed. It would then need to set the terms and
conditions for as fair a break-up as possible, after having determined that
secession clearly appeared, in the circumstances, to be the least pernicious of
foreseeable solutions.
On June 29, 2000, Canada became the first major
democratic state to acknowledge its own divisibility through a legislative
enactment. In the Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set
out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession
Reference, more simply called the Clarity Act, the Canadian
Parliament set out the circumstances in which the Government of Canada might
undertake negotiations on the secession of a province from Canada. That Act,
which I had the honour of sponsoring in the Canadian Parliament, has received
broad support but has also been criticized both by the proponents of secession
on demand and by those who, on the contrary, advocate the absolute
indivisibility of the national territory.1
This debate took place in Canada, true, but it is
reflected universally in the sense that the peaceful coexistence of populations
of different languages, cultures or religions poses one of the greatest
challenges faced by the international community at the start of this century.
One question to which this challenge seeks an answer is under what
circumstances, and by what means, could the delineation of new international
borders between populations become a just and equitable solution. I will explain
the normative principles here that guide my response.
In so doing, I will be addressing one of the
greatest concerns of Jean Leca: loyalty among citizens in democracy. One who has
long considered pluralism and respect for diversity has also written that "the
democratic impetus tends to unify the ‘people’ beyond the diversity of ‘populations’
"and "transfers the indivisible unity of the sovereign to the
people."2 [Translation] Can the
pluralism of freely expressed wills in democracy be reconciled with the
principles of citizens’ loyalty to one another, the indivisibility of the
state, and the territorial integrity of sovereign nations? It seems to me that
it is possible to answer this question in the affirmative.
After showing the extent to which state practice
displays great reticence in recognizing secessions and after identifying the
democratic principles that strike me as justifying that reticence, I will set
out the circumstances which I believe can make the negotiation of a secession
acceptable in democracy.
1. The aversion of states and the international
community to secessions
Aversion to the phenomenon of secession is
evident at three levels: in domestic state law, in international law, and in
accordance with state practice on the international scene.
Among the most democratic states one can find
many that affirm their indivisibility in their constitution, explicitly or
implicitly. France is not the only democracy to do so. The United States, Spain,
Italy, Australia: all these democracies and many others affirm that they form
indissoluble entities.3
In international law, the right to
self-determination of peoples cannot be the basis of a right to external
self-determination, that is, a right to effect secession unilaterally, except in
situations of colonization, military occupation or grave human rights
violations. Apart from these extreme cases, the right to self-determination
applies within the limits accorded to the territorial integrity of states.4
International state practice displays the same
reticence to recognize unilateral secessions outside the colonial context. As
noted by Professor James Crawford of the University of Cambridge in the Experts’
Report he submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada, "Since 1945 [outside
the colonial context] no state which has been created by unilateral secession
has been admitted to the United Nations against the declared wishes of the
government of the predecessor state." He added that, "Where the
government of the [predecessor] state in question has maintained its
opposition to the secession, such attempts have gained virtually no
international support or recognition, and this has been true even when other
humanitarian aspects of the situations have triggered widespread concern and
action."5
To be sure, states, at least democratic ones,
condemn the violent repression of populations, but at the same time they
hesitate to see a solution in support for secessionist initiatives. The
international intervention in Kosovo, for example, was undertaken out of
humanitarian concern, and not to help accede to independence a population which
nevertheless desires it in the clearest possible manner.
States’ caution is proportional to the
seriousness of the issue. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of conflicts
within states has far outstripped the number of conflicts between states. The
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict has identified over
200 ethnic or religious minorities that are calling for an improvement to
their legal or political rights.6
Wariness of the secessionist phenomenon can be
seen, paradoxically, in the case of the only democracy to have demonstrated
ambiguity regarding the unity of another democracy. I am alluding of course to
France’s attitude toward Canada since July 24, 1967, when General de Gaulle
launched his famous "Vive le Québec libre" from the balcony of
Montreal’s city hall.
France’s attitude toward Canadian unity is an
utterly exceptional case unparalleled in French politics. To a journalist who
asked whether France might maintain the same ambiguity toward the unity of Spain
in the face of the Catalan autonomy movement, François Hollande, then-Deputy
First Secretary of the French Socialist Party, replied: "The problem
does not present itself, because the Catalans don’t speak French"!7
[Translation]
Ever since de Gaulle’s bombshell, senior French
political leaders have occasionally used language that might be interpreted as
opening the door to possible recognition by France of an independent Quebec against
the will of the Canadian state. But the fact remains that French authorities
have never clearly committed to supporting a unilateral secession, in spite of
all of the influences that have been felt: deployment of a strong Quebec
independence lobby in Paris8, the French
Gaullist movement’s loyalty to de Gaulle’s legacy, French feelings of guilt
about "abandoning" New France in 1763, Gallic solidarity toward a
population of French origin, misunderstanding of the Canadian reality, perceived
as a sort of "Anglo-Saxon hegemony."9
[Translation]
In recent years, however, French authorities have
indicated more clearly that the direct relations they maintain with the
Government of Quebec ought not to be interpreted as a challenge to Canada’s
territorial integrity. For example, the French ambassador to Canada stated on
August 30, 1999: "The national question, the problem of relations
between Quebec and Ottawa, is an internal Canadian problem. It's not our
problem, it's your problem."10
President Jacques Chirac, who had said on CNN on
October 23, 1995, that in the case of a Yes majority in the Quebec referendum
held that month, his position would be "I will recognize a fact,"
four years later qualified that rather laconic statement as not announcing
recognition of a unilateral secession. "I did not say that France would
recognize, the day after an election, a situation which by definition was not
achieved because it opened a discussion between the State and Quebec."11
[Translation] "I made the mistake that day of speaking in English and [...]
I used the word ‘recognize’ which I felt was appropriate [...].
I should probably have said ‘acknowledge’ or something like that."12
[Translation]
For his part, former prime minister Lionel Jospin
specified on September 30, 1997, that "a free judgement of Canada"[Translation]
would be a fact that France would need to consider.13
The French authorities’ refusal to commit to
recognizing a possible unilateral secession by Quebec may perhaps partly lie in
the fact that the natural French sympathy for Francophone Quebec society is not
inconsistent with a fascination, no less French, for the totality of Canada.
President Chirac himself has expressed this eloquently: "I would like to
underline the exemplarity of Canada [...] an immense country, land of
First Nations peoples, land of the Inuit, a land, at the same time Anglophone
and Francophone, that is perfecting, in peace and tolerance, the art of living
together."14 [Translation]
But there is a more general factor that explains
France’s attitude: it would be difficult for it to have a policy toward Canada
that was so at odds with its policy regarding the territorial integrity of other
states. In accordance with international practice as described above, France
does not recognize unilateral secessions. Like other states, it is loath to do
so even in the most extreme cases of populations that are calling for
independence almost unanimously and are victims of grave impositions by the
states from which they want to separate. For example, in the case of Chechnya,
France’s position is in line with that of other states: "Chechnya is
part of the Russian Federation. Respect for the principle of sovereignty and
territorial integrity is one of the basic rules of international life."15
[Translation]
It is hard to see how this "basic rule of
international life" could hold true for all states except Canada, a
democratic state, ally of France, member of NATO and the G8. So the only
exception to the rule that might be found is not really an exception at all.
States, including France vis-à-vis Canada, are loath to recognize secessions
effected contrary to the territorial integrity of states.
Now let us try to identify the reasons for such a
strong reluctance. The first reason naturally pertains to states’ concern that
their own territorial integrity not be challenged. The golden rule of "do
unto others as you would have others do unto you" has a powerful dissuasive
effect. It is difficult for a state to demand that its own territorial integrity
be respected if it does not respect that of others. It will be more difficult
for it to prevent separatist movements at home if it encourages them in other
states.
International stability is also a constant
concern. Separatist movements are potential factors of disorder. If the
international community is so clearly opposed to recognizing unilateral
secession as an automatic right outside the colonial context, it is no doubt
because a.) it would be very difficult to determine to whom that right should be
granted, b.) because such an automatic right to secession would have dramatic
consequences for the international community – with over 5,000 human groups
each claiming a collective identity for itself in the world16
– and c.) because the creation of each new state would risk mobilizing, within
that same state, minorities which would in turn stake their own claim for
independence.
As former United Nations Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali has stated: "Yet if every ethnic, religious
or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation,
and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more
difficult to achieve."17
But in addition to these considerations of state
and international stability, another factor argues against recognizing an
automatic right to secession. Because it fundamentally affects democracies, I
want to focus on it in particular. This is the factor I noted initially in
introducing my topic and it has to do with the true meaning of citizenship in
democracy.
2. Inconsistency between secession and democracy
Let us first consider democracy from an
essential, albeit strictly procedural, aspect: the vote. The people, that is,
the citizenry as a whole, exercise their sovereignty either by electing their
representatives or directly by referendum, in accordance with either a simple or
a qualified majority. A crucial question is raised with a vote on secession:
which would be the appropriate majority in this case? Given that the scission of
a national territory would have consequences for all citizens, the majority
should thus be that of all citizens who are eligible to vote. But what should be
done if a clear majority is expressed against secession at the national level,
but an equally clear majority emerges in favour of secession in the region from
which the secessionist demand emanates? And what should then be done if, within
that same region, sub-regions pronounce themselves equally clearly against
secession? And if the country’s majority opts for secession but the affected
population rejects it, is expulsion an acceptable solution?
Reconciling secession and democracy becomes even
more complex if one considers as one should, not only the democratic process,
but also the values that justify it. Those values, in the name of which
sovereignty passes from the hands of the monarch to the people, were defined
during the French Revolution as liberty, equality and fraternity. In more modern
terms, fraternity may be conceived as the solidarity or loyalty that binds
citizens in a democracy.
The citizens of a democracy are linked by a
principle of mutual loyalty. They all owe one another assistance regardless of
considerations of race, religion or regional belonging. For this reason, all
citizens are owners of the country in its entirety, with its potential for
wealth and human solidarity. No group of citizens can take it upon itself to
monopolize citizenship over one part of the national territory, or to withdraw
from its fellow citizens, against their will, their right to full belonging to
the country in its entirety. Every citizen should be able to pass that right of
belonging on to his or her children. Ideally, such a right should never be
challenged in democracy. It is thus completely legitimate for a democracy to
consider itself to be indivisible.
This principle of mutual loyalty among citizens
is just as valid in a federation as it is in a unitary system. In international
law, territorial integrity is recognized in both instances.18
Federalism itself induces a loyalty among constituent entities, a principle
which some federations, such as Germany, have formalized in law: "The
constitutional principle of federalism applying in the federal state therefore
places a legal obligation on the Federation and all of its constituent states to
be ‘pro-federal’ in their behavior, that is to say, all members of the
constitutional ‘alliance’ are required to cooperate with one another in a
manner compatible with the nature of that alliance and to contribute to its
consolidation and to the protection of its interests and the well-considered
interests of its members."19
[Translation]
Because loyalty unites all citizens over and
above their differences, no group of citizens within a democratic state can
assume the right to secession under the pretext that its specific attributes –
language, culture or religion – qualifies it as a nation or a distinct people
within the state. As the Supreme Court of Canada has written in relation to
Quebec: "whatever be the correct application of the definition of
people(s) in this context, their right of self-determination cannot in the
present circumstances [those of a democratic state] be said to ground a
right to unilateral secession."20
We are surely touching here on the fundamental
reason why international law and state practice alike recognize a right to
secession only in situations of colonization or flagrant human rights
violations. In extreme circumstances where a state refuses to treat a group of
citizens as citizens, where it rides roughshod over their right to citizenship,
those citizens in turn have the right to consider it no longer to be their
state. They have that right not by virtue of distinctive traits pertaining to
race, language or religion, but because, like other human beings, they have a
universal right to citizenship.21
Thus, the normative foundation of the
indivisibility of states in democracy is the loyalty of citizens, a principle
which guarantees to each citizen full belonging to his or her country. It should
be added that this normative foundation is far from being of merely theoretical
importance: on the contrary, it must be considered as essential to the proper
functioning of democracies. Indeed, a philosophy of democracy based on the logic
of secession would be unworkable. It would incite groups to separate from one
another rather than trying to unite or reach agreement. Automatic secession
would prevent democracy from absorbing the tensions inherent in differences.
We can adapt the celebrated conceptual trilogy by
Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, to our present topic.22
For loyalty among citizens to be strengthened, secession (exit)
must not appear as a normal, easy solution when disagreements (voice)
arise. As Allen Buchanan has written, "democratic institutions are most
likely to flourish when exit is not so easy as a majoritarian right to secede
would make it."23
The fact of knowing they will stay together
encourages citizens to strive toward sincere and active cooperation, and to see
that cooperation as lasting from one generation to the next: "[...] citizens
can generally proceed on the assumption that they and their children and perhaps
their children’s children will be subject to laws that are made through the
same processes to which they are now subject – and whose quality they can
influence by the character of their participation."24
Conversely, recognition of the right to secession
on demand would invite break-up as soon as difficulties were experienced along
fault lines which are very likely to develop around collective attributes such
as religion, language or ethnicity.25 Moreover,
such a right would make the mere threat of break-up a permanent political
strategy within a state. In effect, it would give groups a strong incentive to
threaten to secede in order to get what they wanted. This secessionist blackmail
as a bargaining tool consists of saying: "Do what I say, or I’m
leaving." A more indirect form goes as follows: "Do what I say, or
else those who want to leave will have more and more convincing arguments to do
so." The state gives in to this blackmail by responding: "Let’s give
the separatists some of what they’re asking for in order to avoid
separation." But in so doing, the state penalizes citizens who do not use
this blackmail as leverage to advance their concerns in the order of government
priorities.
This creates a perverse effect whereby, although
the expression "separatist blackmail" is pejorative, the vast majority
of those who practise this blackmail or who give into it do so in good faith. It
is a habit that catches on quickly: as soon as one group adopts the threat to
secede as a pressure tactic, others become inclined to do so as well. And so its
negative effects get overlooked.
With separatist blackmail, the quality of public
policy is no longer a concern; it disappears as an issue, giving way entirely to
the sole concern of calming separatism. It is hoped that giving separatists some
of what they are asking for might at least win over the less radical among them.
And if they are not satisfied, then we have not given them enough concessions.
More are in order, so the reasoning goes.
At the same time as it trivializes the extreme
perspective that secession represents, separatist blackmail overdramatizes the
quite normal disagreements that arise in democracy. For example, in Canada in
recent years, political figures in different provinces have brandished the
threat of secession to make their case in connection with such current issues as
a budget deficit, a budget surplus, a scholarship program, health care funding,
dwindling salmon stocks, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and so on. This
outbidding, where everyone attributes an existential importance to the changes
they are advocating, makes people lose their sense of perspective. In the long
run, this exacerbation of tensions tarnishes the country’s image in the eyes
of its own citizens. They come to perceive their country as a perpetual dispute.
Some end up by seeing separation as the way to achieve peace, whereas in fact it
is the ease with which separation is contemplated that saps the very foundations
of loyalty among fellow citizens.
3. In what circumstances should a negotiation on
secession be undertaken in democracy?
The principle of loyalty is thus essential to
democracy. The assurance they will stay together helps citizens to maintain
dialogue, to keep a sense of perspective in the event of disagreements, and
together to find avenues for the common good. This principle of loyalty cannot,
however, be seen as an absolute, despite all its advantages. It cannot prevent
the negotiation of secession from appearing to be the least harmful solution
possible in the event that one part of the population clearly demonstrates its
will no longer to be part of the country. The fact is there are some means a
democratic state could not even consider in order to hold against its clearly
expressed will a population concentrated in one part of its territory. In other
words, secession is not a right in democracy, its logic and democracy are
incompatible, but it remains a possibility in case of necessity.
This is the position the Government of Canada has
defended in the face of the Quebec independence movement. The Government of
Canada does not recognize that the Government of Quebec has any right to effect
secession unilaterally. It maintains that the Government of Quebec does not have
the right to take it upon itself to remove from Quebecers their full belonging
to Canada. The Government of Canada affirms that it could not abdicate its
constitutional responsibilities toward Quebecers without having the assurance
that this is what they clearly want. Indeed, no democratic state could abolish
its responsibilities toward one part of its population in the absence of clear
support for secession.
The Government of Canada would not agree to
undertake a negotiation on secession except in the event that the population of
a province clearly demonstrated its will no longer to be part of Canada. This
clear will to secede should be expressed by a clear majority in support of a
question clearly pertaining to secession, rather than on some vague proposal for
political partnership.
Negotiation on secession would be undertaken
within the Canadian constitutional framework and should be guided by a genuine
quest for justice for all. For example, in the event that territorially
concentrated populations within Quebec clearly asked to stay attached to Canada,
the divisibility of Quebec’s territory would have to be contemplated with the
same spirit of openness which led to accepting the divisibility of Canada’s
territory.
The Government of Canada has expressed this
position on a number of occasions, including through the Attorney General of
Canada, who explained to the House of Commons the reasons why he was asking the
Supreme Court of Canada whether or not the Government of Quebec has the right to
effect secession unilaterally: "The leading political figures of all the
provinces and indeed the Canadian public have long agreed that this country will
not be held together against the will of Quebecers clearly expressed."26
The Supreme Court of Canada rendered its opinion
on August 20, 1998. It confirms that the Government of Quebec does not have the
right to effect secession unilaterally, neither under Canadian law nor under
international law. To be legal, a secession would necessitate an amendment to
Canada’s Constitution. Such an amendment would entail the negotiation of
"many issues of great complexity and difficulty,"
possibly including that of territorial boundaries.27
The obligation to undertake such a negotiation on secession exists only in the
presence of clear support for secession, expressed through a clear majority and
a clear question. Only such clear support would give the secessionist demand
sufficient democratic legitimacy to justify the obligation of a negotiation on
secession.
In the wake of that opinion, the Government of
Canada had the Canadian Parliament pass the Act to give effect to the
requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada
in the Quebec Secession Reference. The Clarity Act prohibits the
Government of Canada from undertaking negotiations on the secession of a
province unless the House of Commons determines that the referendum question
clearly pertained to secession and that a clear majority has been expressed in
favour of secession.
The Clarity Act also specifies the
elements that must be included in the agenda for the negotiations: "No
Minister of the Crown shall propose a constitutional amendment to effect the
secession of a province from Canada unless the Government of Canada has
addressed, in its negotiations, the terms of secession that are relevant in the
circumstances, including the division of assets and liabilities, any changes to
the borders of the province, the rights, interests and territorial claims of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the protection of minority rights."28
In short, because accepting secession as an
automatic right is contrary to democracy, and given that an absolute prohibition
on secession can prove to be impracticable in democracy, I feel the Canadian
approach I have just described is a realistic one. It consists of first
focussing on the need continuously to improve a country of which all citizens
can be proud, a democratic and prosperous country whose highly diversified
populations develop and flourish with their own cultures and their own
institutions, while working together toward common objectives. If, in spite of
this type of understanding that a federation such as Canada affords, a
population should clearly express its desire to separate, then a negotiation on
secession should be undertaken within a legal framework and with a concern for
justice for all, no matter how numerous the difficulties inherent in such a
negotiation.
That is the Canadian approach. In Canada’s
case, it has had a beneficial effect on national unity. That is because this
approach introduces the notion of clarity. And indeed, if there is one thing
that clearly stands out, poll after poll, it is that with a clear question,
Quebecers choose a united Canada.29 The vast
majority of Quebecers want to remain Canadian and do not want to break the ties
of loyalty that attach them to their fellow citizens in other parts of Canada.
They do not want to be forced to choose between their Quebec identity and their
Canadian identity. They reject the exclusive definitions of the word
"people" and want to belong to both the Quebec people and the Canadian
people, in this global world where concurrent identities will more than ever be
an asset for opening oneself to others.
Despite its obviously beneficial impact on
Canadian unity, I do not doubt that the approach I have just described as
realistic may appear very daring and liberal in the face of the internationally
abhorred phenomenon of secession. The Canadian approach rejects the use of
force, of any form of violence. It emphasizes clarity, legality and justice for
all. While it may appear idealistic to many nations, it is precisely because it
seeks to address in an ideal manner situations of break-up which are always
complex and delicate.
I believe the approach I have described could
contribute to peace and enlightened state practice. I feel its basic premise,
that secession, while not impossible, should be negotiated only in the face of a
clear will to break-up, is ultimately not so far removed from how other
democracies consider this issue. The case of France is a good example.
France is not a decentralized, bilingual
federation like Canada; it is, as everyone knows, a Republic, which is one
and indivisible. The indivisibility of the French state is a principle on
which its leaders lay great stress. For example, President Chirac stated on
February 9, 1998, in Ajaccio: "France is one and indivisible. To be
sure, it is made up of regions, provinces, different from one another, each with
its own inhabitants, customs, history and sometimes language. This is especially
true of Corsica, whose identify and specificity are recognized by all. France is
diverse, and is all the richer for it. But there is only one France. There is
only one national territory, subject, everywhere, to the same law and the same
right."30 [Translation]
And yet the indivisible Republic has been divided
several times in recent decades, in particular with the withdrawal in 1962 of
the 15 "départements" of Algeria and the Sahara, but also with
the departure of Djibouti, Comoros (with the exception of Mayotte) and the
pending case of New Caledonia. All those departures, however, were effected in
accordance with a procedure determined by the French state: they were not
unilateral secessions. Moreover, they were similar to colonial situations for
which both international and state practice are disposed to recognize a right to
secession. The question is: what about metropolitan France? There is no answer
to that hypothetical question, and it is to be hoped for the French that nothing
ever breaks the loyalty that unites them to one another.
And yet, one may risk an answer at the strictly
legal level. Without in any way claiming to be a specialist in the matter, I
note that French jurists make a distinction between the sovereignty of the
state, which for its part is indivisible, and the territory, which may be
divided under certain conditions. For example, according to Félicien Lemaire,
while unilateral secession is prohibited, "a procedure for secession
organized and consented to by the State"31
[Translation] is legally possible: "In effect, secession as a unilateral
act of separation of a territorial community from the state of origin has at all
times been rejected, and it is not surprising that this is still the case today,
as no constitution has ever had the purpose of advocating territorial
dismemberment. In contrast, territorial transfers – and consequently
secessions – effected with the consent of the State cannot be considered to be
contrary to the principle of indivisibility. It is the difference that can be
established between the right to secession, which is rejected, and the right of
secession, which is accepted under certain conditions."32
[Translation]
As with the principle of indivisibility,
territorial integrity does not exclude the possibility of a secession legally
consented to by the state: "Territorial integrity constitutes a
preventive measure against separatism, but it is not incompatible with a
procedure for secession organized by the State or determined by the ‘competent
authorities,’ to use the terminology of the Constitutional Council."33
[Translation]
Conclusion
My position consists first and foremost of the
following basic proposition: a country gives itself the best chances of
improving if all its citizens adhere to the principle of loyalty. That principle
may be expressed as follows: "Come what may, we shall choose to stay
together."
This assurance gives rise to greater mutual
trust, a stronger and more sincere desire genuinely to help one another, a
better aptitude for frank discussion and the discovery of solutions when
disagreements arise. For it is normal for disagreements to occur in a pluralist
democracy. But the search for new solutions which results from this clash of
ideas will be much more productive if it is based on unfailing loyalty rather
than on calling into question the very unity of the country.
An automatic right to secession would unleash a
series of perverse effects that I have sought to describe. It would create a
dynamic of concessions that would cause citizens’ interests to be obscured. It
would trivialize secession and the rupture it represents. It would sow jealousy,
confusion and disengagement.
The unitary and indivisible French Republic and
the decentralized Canadian federation ultimately pose the question of
territorial integrity in quite a similar way. Both admit secession as a
possibility, but only under certain conditions, through a procedure in
accordance with the constitutional framework. In spite of very different legal
traditions and political contexts, both states reject unilateral secession. If
two democratic systems as different as France and Canada reach this conclusion,
it is because, over and above the classic motives of order and stability,
unilateral secession and democracy are profoundly incompatible.
Democracy unites all citizens through a principle
of loyalty that confers on each a right to his or her country. Such a right
should never be called into question, except in cases where the will to secede
is clearly expressed.
Such clear support for secession has never
occurred in a well-established democracy. If it is unlikely to happen, it is
mainly because a regime founded on the loyalty of citizens creates very strong
human ties that would be difficult to break. It is not the vocation of citizens
in a democracy to transform themselves into foreigners.
- For a presentation of this debate adapted to the French
public, see in Le Figaro the denunciation of the federal legislative
initiative signed by Quebec’s Minister of International Relations, Ms
Louise Beaudoin: "Le Canada veut fixer les règles du prochain
référendum sur la souveraineté. Non à la mise sous tutelle de la
démocratie québécoise,"Le Figaro, March 21, 2000, p. 12, as
well as my response in the same paper: Stéphane Dion, "La réponse du
gouvernement canadien aux indépendantistes : les citoyens ne veulent
pas la sécession," Le Figaro, April 1, 2000, p. 14.
- Jean Leca, "La démocratie à l’épreuve des
pluralismes," Revue française de science politique, 46, 2
(April 1996): 226.
- Patrick J. Monahan et al., Coming to Terms with Plan B:
Ten Principles Governing Secession (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute
Commentary 83, June 1996).
- Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal
Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also:
Opinion by the Supreme Court of Canada on the Reference Re Secession of
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at par.113 to 139.
- James Crawford, State Practice And International Law in
Relation to Unilateral Secession, Experts’ Report submitted to the
Supreme Court of Canada, February 19, 1997, pp. 26 and 66.
- Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing
Deadly Conflict, Final Report (New York: Carnegie Corporation of
New York, December 1997).
- Louis-Bernard Robitaille, "‘La France accompagnera
le Québec’... depuis 1977," La Presse, October 5, 1997, p.
A9.
- Frédéric Bastien, Relations particulières. La France
face au Québec après de Gaulle (Montreal: Boréal, 1999).
- Jacques Julliard, "Pour que le Québec... reste libre!,"
Le Nouvel Observateur, March 2, 2000, p. 27.
- Statement by Mr. Denis Bauchard, French Ambassador to
Canada, reported in the Ottawa Citizen on August 31, 1999, p. A3.
- Press conference in Ottawa, September 1, 1999.
- Press conference in Quebec City, September 2, 1999.
- Press conference in Paris, September 30, 1997.
- Speech by President Jacques Chirac, Iqaluit, Nunavut,
September 6, 1999.
- Conversation with French Foreign Affairs Minister Alain
Juppé, Libération, January 9, 1995, pp. 6 and 7.
- Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1983), p. 44.
- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New
York: United Nations, 1992), p. 17. He reiterated the same position as
Secretary General of the Francophonie: "The territorial integrity of
a UN member country is not negotiable. It is the only guarantee of peace and
unity," [Translation] in an article by E. H. Mbaye, "L’intégrité
du Sénégal n’est pas négociable," Le Soleil (Senegal),
January 16, 1998, p. 3.
- Luzius
Wildhaber, expert’s letter dated January 15, 1998, reproduced on the
website of the Department of Justice of Canada: See also: Allen Buchanan,
"Theories of Secession," Philosophy & Public Affairs,
26, 1 (winter 1997): p. 43.
- BVerfGE 1, 299 (315). A 1954 decision of the German Federal
Constitutional Court.
- Opinion by the Supreme Court of Canada on the Reference
Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at par. 125.
- Jean-Pierre Derriennic, Nationalisme et démocratie :
Réflexion sur les illusions des indépendantistes québécois
(Montreal: Boréal, 1995), pp. 45-46.
- Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
- Allen Buchanan, "Democracy and Secession," in
Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 21.
- Allen Buchanan, "Theories of Secession ," Philosophy
& Public Affairs, 26, 1, (Winter 1997): pp. 47-48.
- Donald L. Horowitz, " Self-Determination: Politics,
Philosophy, and Law," in Ian Shapiro et al., Ethnicity and Group
Rights (Nomos no 39) ( New York: New York University Press,
1997), pp. 421-463.
- Statement by the Honourable Allan Rock, Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of Canada, in the House of Commons, September 26, 1996,
Hansard, p. 4707.
- Opinion by the Supreme Court of Canada on the Reference
Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at par. 96.
- Clarity Act, An Act to give effect to the
requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, assented to June 29, 2000,
Ch. 26, s. 3(2).
- Maurice Pinard, Confusion and Misunderstanding
Surrounding the Sovereignist Option, brief submitted to the legislative
committee studying Bill C-20, February 24, 2000.
- Address by Mr. Jacques Chirac, President of the French
Republic, at a memorial ceremony for Claude Érignac, Prefect of the Region
of Corsica and the County of South Corsica, Le Magazine de l’actualité
présidentielle, Internet edition, February 9, 1998.
- Félicien Lemaire, "Les évolutions du principe d’indivisibilité
de la République," Revue de la recherche juridique – Droit
prospectif, 26 (88), 2001-2002, p. 741.
- Lemaire, p. 739. See also: Roland Debbasch, Le principe
révolutionnaire d’unité et d’indivisibilité de la République
(Paris: Economica – Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 1988), pp.
424-425.
- Lemaire, p. 745.
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