"From the Referendum of 1980 to the Canada of 2020"

Notes for an address by the
President of the Privy Council and
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
the Honourable Stéphane Dion

before the
Association for Canadian Studies

Montreal, Quebec

May 19, 2000

Check against delivery

"A real fraud!" [Translation] We often heard this accurate denunciation of the convoluted question that was put to voters during the 1995 referendum. But I’ve actually just quoted what the leader of the No side in the 1980 referendum, Mr. Claude Ryan, had to say about the referendum question that was asked in that campaign (quoted in Maurice Lamontagne, La réponse au Livre blanc du PQ, 1980, p. 86). "Misleading and dishonest "[Translation]; "a camouflage, designed to inflate support for the Yes side," [Translation] he added (Le Devoir, March 5, 1980, pp. 1 and 10). Editorialists were not to be outdone, either: "a sidestep" [Translation] is how Michel Roy described it (Maurice Lamontagne, ibid). And listen to this: "a bag of tricks," [Translation] wrote the late journalist Marcel Pépin (Maurice Lamontagne, ibid).

Tricks in 1980, tricks in 1995. Well you know, ladies and gentlemen, you can’t lose a country by trickery. That would be contrary to the law, and contrary to justice.

In May 1980 a poll indicated that only 46% of voters understood that a sovereign Quebec would no longer be part of Canada. In October 1995 a poll revealed that the same proportion of voters, only 46%, understood that the question meant that Quebec would become independent even if the negotiations on the political and economic partnership were to fail (Maurice Pinard, "Confusion and Misunderstanding Surrounding the Sovereignist Option," brief submitted to the parliamentary committee on Bill C-20, February 2000).

The separatist leaders claim that the high voter turnout in the 1995 referendum is proof that the voters understood what was at stake. That claim is, of course, erroneous. It is obvious that many voters went to the polls believing in good faith that sovereignty was linked to a successful agreement on political and economic partnership.

Any proper referendum process requires a clear question. That is true everywhere, in Quebec as elsewhere. In 1980 and again in 1995, the question was not clear. Indeed, that was the opinion of the voters themselves. According to sociologist Maurice Pinard, "Just before the 1995 referendum, only 46% [once again, 46%!] of the voters asked said that the referendum question, which had just been read to them, was ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ clear; in fact, 53% said on the contrary that it was ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ ambiguous."

You cannot lose a country through trickery. That is why both in 1980 and in 1995, the Prime Minister of Canada refused to negotiate secession in the event of a Yes vote. That is why Mr. Ryan said in 1980, two days before the referendum: "If Quebecers were to vote ‘yes’ by 52% on Tuesday night, we would not know what that meant because there would be no negotiations and we would be plunged into a second referendum within six months or a year." [Translation] (La Presse, May 20, 1980, p. A9)

And that is why Prime Minister Jean Chrétien wanted the clarity bill drafted in the wake of the Supreme Court’s opinion of August 20, 1998. The bill merely states the obvious: if you want to effect independence, ask a question on independence. Ask Quebecers if they want to cease to be part of Canada and make Quebec an independent country. And they will give you their answer.

It is only if, in response to such a clear question, there were a clear majority in favour of secession, and not a circumstantial majority, that we could undertake the difficult task of negotiating secession, in accordance with the law and with a sincere desire for justice for all.

The truth must be told: no democratic country in the world would agree to negotiate its own dismemberment on the basis of the unclear questions asked in 1980 and 1995. No more in Canada than in any other democracy.

"We need to flesh out the partnership bare bones," [Translation] Lucien Bouchard said on June 19, 1997. Not only should he have warned the Quebec people in the 1995 referendum that he was proposing sovereignty with an offer of "bare bones," but it must be noted that those partnership bones are even barer than ever today. They vary between the usual arrangements that are made between neighbouring countries and something as demanding and elaborate as the European Union.

Europe? As if Europe could function with just two partners. As if it could be expected that Canada would agree to have its major policies subject to a veto by an independent Quebec one third its size. As if the mention of such an improbable parity arrangement, if by some miracle it were ever to be negotiated and could nevertheless be cancelled at the request of either country, had its place in a referendum question alongside an issue as irreversible as secession, which would commit not only ourselves but our children, our grandchildren and future generations.

"We must not dream and ask for the moon. It would be asking for the moon to imagine that when Quebec sovereignty is proclaimed, we’ll be able to negotiate a host of economic and political changes with Canada [...] And that English Canada, which would already be none too pleased with Quebec’s becoming sovereign, would agree to such an upheaval in its political life simply because it liked the cut of our jib, simply because it wanted to please us, in some vague imitation of what some people think is happening in Western Europe," [Translation] Mr. Parizeau said in December 1993 (La Presse, December 3, 1993, p. B3), well before he went along with Mr. Bouchard’s tactical about-face.

So this raises the question: why is the PQ leadership continuing to dangle the moon in front of Quebecers? Why this obstinate desire to let Quebecers believe that they can somehow keep Canada by the back door? Why is the PQ plunging ever deeper into confusion with an association/partnership project that it has never been able to define in 35 years? Why "dress it up with partnership," [Translation] in the words of a young PQ supporter frustrated with his party’s leadership’s lack of candour? (RDI, 5:00 p.m. news, March 6, 2000)

You know the answer. Everyone does, including Mr. Bouchard himself, who acknowledged on October 19, 1999, that "partnership represents 7% to 8% more public support," [Translation] an estimate that’s quite conservative, incidentally.

The answer is that the vast majority of Quebecers have this strange idea: they are attached to Canada. We want to stay Canadian. We would rather be Quebecers and Canadians than Quebecers without Canada.

In poll after poll, three quarters of Quebecers say they are attached to Canada. Between one fifth and one quarter don’t acknowledge any sense of Canadian identity. That is much too high, but it is much lower than 49.4%.

Of course we Quebecers have different ideas about how Canada can be improved, and about Quebec’s place within Canada. But we want to improve this Canada from the inside, because we feel strongly that it belongs to us in its entirety, just as much as it belongs to other Canadians.

And why wouldn’t we be attached to Canada? Why wouldn’t we want to keep it? We can see clearly that the country we have built in a spirit of caring and sharing with other Canadians is an extraordinary human achievement. We know that there are hundreds of millions, if not billions of human beings who would dream of becoming Canadian. So it’s pretty hard to convince us to give it up.

But just because the separatist leadership finds it difficult to win in clarity, that does not give them the right to try to win in confusion. The burden of proof is on them. It is up to them to demonstrate that we would be better off if we ceased to be Canadian. That is a tall order, to be sure, but that’s not Canada’s fault.

Rather, it is that it must be very difficult indeed to renounce Canada, this "country celebrated for the generosity of its spirit [...] in which all citizens and all groups can assert and express themselves and realize their aspirations," as Mr. Bouchard said on July 1, 1988. I won’t insult him by imagining that those kind words about Canada, which ring so true, were inspired by any lack of confidence in Quebec on his part. And yet that’s how he interpreted his referendum defeat in 1995: apparently, the explanation for the Yes side’s defeat was a lack of confidence in Quebec’s economy. Now that the Quebec government has eliminated its budgetary deficit, support for the PQ’s option should be on the rise, Mr. Bouchard predicts.

Why is it so hard to admit that Quebecers’ pride in being Canadian, which Mr. Bouchard expressed so well in that statement in 1988, is inspired not by some presumed lack of confidence in themselves, but rather by a sincere attachment to Canada?

Of course separation would be costly. The PQ itself has just unwittingly demonstrated that. In a recent document, it predicted that the budget balance of an independent Quebec would amount to a $41 million surplus. But to arrive at that figure, it assumed that Quebec’s share of federal debt servicing would be only 17.7%. If we take the Parti québécois’ own calculation, but we use a more proper allocation, based on Quebec’s demographic weight (24.1%), it would give Quebec a $3.1 billion deficit. And that’s assuming a problem-free secession without any economic slowdown, interest rate hikes, capital flight or labour drain.

But it’s not the fear of that drop in our economic standard of living that makes Canada so appealing to us. I am convinced that we Quebecers cherish the principle of caring that is Canada’s strength and Canada’s true greatness. That when we have strengthened our economy to the point that we can help the other provinces in the same way that the wealthier provinces help us today, we shall do so with the same generosity. Because this spirit of caring, this country of solidarity, is ours as well.

All of the arguments put forward to get us to renounce Canada have proven to be erroneous. During the 1980 referendum campaign, Claude Charron predicted that a win by the No side would be the equivalent of "fading away" [Translation] for Quebec (Journal de Montréal, 4/5/80). Today, 20 years later, the Quebec culture and the Quebec identity are thriving, and according to the Conseil de la langue française, 87% of Quebecers speak mainly French in their public activities.

Also in 1980, another Claude, Claude Morin, said that "the real meaning of a No win in the referendum [would be] the complete loss of Quebec’s powers in favour of the federal government" [Translation] (Le Soleil, 1/5/80, p. B4). But in fact, Canada has instead become more decentralized since 1980. For example, direct federal spending in proportion to GDP has fallen (from 12.0% in 1980 to 10.9% in 1998, the latest available statistics), while direct provincial spending has increased (from 14.5% to 15.2%).

For 35 years now, the separatist leaders, these doomsayers, have been announcing a dangerous centralization of Canada. As far back as 1967, Jacques Parizeau predicted that Canada would become more centralized, in accordance with the economic planning models then in vogue: "A country should not be allowed to balkanize decision-making to the extent that exists now," he said in his famous speech in Banff on October 17, 1967. Has that centralization materialized as announced? Indeed it has not, as the same Mr. Parizeau acknowledged in Quebec City on February 28, 1999: "Canadian federalism is about the most decentralized in the world, along with Switzerland." [Translation]

But no matter: centralization is still just around the corner, Mr. Parizeau repeatedly warns, with what I must admit is an admirable consistency. At this conference in Quebec City on February 28, 1999, he said: "It is imperative that it [the federal government] centralize what is an extraordinarily decentralized federation." [Translation] The pressures of globalization impel it to do so, the incorrigible centralist assures us.

The separatist leadership will always find some trendy concept to attempt to convince us to renounce Canada: yesterday it was economic planning, today it’s globalization. But I say again, why is it so difficult to admit that the constantly fluid balance between the decentralized nature of our federation and its capacity for concerted action, this combination of diversity and unity, is not a problem at all, but rather a fundamental strength which has helped us so much in the past and will help us even more in the future?

What will Canada be like in 20 years? Well, that will depend on us. But our country gives us remarkable leverage. Few countries are better positioned than ours to succeed in the face of globalization, with our provinces and territories with complementary strengths, with two official languages that are international languages, with our civil law and common law which enable us to speak the legal language of the vast majority of countries, our immense land mass which gives us access to Europe, the Americas and Asia, and a multicultural population that opens up opportunities in every corner of the world.

Faced with our powerful American neighbour, who is increasingly our main trading partner, we will need to rely on a united Canada. With international agreements affecting our lives more and more, we need to rely on our country’s prestige and influence. In light of the realities of the new economy, the solidarity of all Canadians will be an essential strength.

It is not referendum fatigue that is the real explanation for Quebecers’ growing disinterest in the separatist option. It is rather the feeling that, together with our fellow Canadians, we have made our diversity into a strength which we will need more than ever in the future.