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"From the Referendum of 1980 to the Canada of 2020"
Notes for an address by the
President of the Privy Council and
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
the Honourable Stéphane Dion
before the
Association for Canadian Studies
Montreal, Quebec
May 19, 2000
Check against delivery
"A real fraud!" [Translation] We often heard this accurate
denunciation of the convoluted question that was put to voters during the 1995
referendum. But I’ve actually just quoted what the leader of the No side in
the 1980 referendum, Mr. Claude Ryan, had to say about the referendum
question that was asked in that campaign (quoted in Maurice Lamontagne, La réponse
au Livre blanc du PQ, 1980, p. 86). "Misleading and dishonest
"[Translation]; "a camouflage, designed to inflate support for
the Yes side," [Translation] he added (Le Devoir,
March 5, 1980, pp. 1 and 10). Editorialists were not to be outdone,
either: "a sidestep" [Translation] is how Michel Roy described
it (Maurice Lamontagne, ibid). And listen to this: "a bag of tricks,"
[Translation] wrote the late journalist Marcel Pépin (Maurice Lamontagne,
ibid).
Tricks in 1980, tricks in 1995. Well you know, ladies and gentlemen, you can’t
lose a country by trickery. That would be contrary to the law, and contrary to
justice.
In May 1980 a poll indicated that only 46% of voters understood that a
sovereign Quebec would no longer be part of Canada. In October 1995 a poll
revealed that the same proportion of voters, only 46%, understood that the
question meant that Quebec would become independent even if the negotiations on
the political and economic partnership were to fail (Maurice Pinard,
"Confusion and Misunderstanding Surrounding the Sovereignist Option,"
brief submitted to the parliamentary committee on Bill C-20, February 2000).
The separatist leaders claim that the high voter turnout in the 1995
referendum is proof that the voters understood what was at stake. That claim is,
of course, erroneous. It is obvious that many voters went to the polls believing
in good faith that sovereignty was linked to a successful agreement on political
and economic partnership.
Any proper referendum process requires a clear question. That is true
everywhere, in Quebec as elsewhere. In 1980 and again in 1995, the question was
not clear. Indeed, that was the opinion of the voters themselves. According to
sociologist Maurice Pinard, "Just before the 1995 referendum, only
46% [once again, 46%!] of the voters asked said that the referendum
question, which had just been read to them, was ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’
clear; in fact, 53% said on the contrary that it was ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’
ambiguous."
You cannot lose a country through trickery. That is why both in 1980 and in
1995, the Prime Minister of Canada refused to negotiate secession in the
event of a Yes vote. That is why Mr. Ryan said in 1980, two days before the
referendum: "If Quebecers were to vote ‘yes’ by 52% on Tuesday
night, we would not know what that meant because there would be no negotiations
and we would be plunged into a second referendum within six months or a
year." [Translation] (La Presse, May 20, 1980, p. A9)
And that is why Prime Minister Jean Chrétien wanted the clarity bill
drafted in the wake of the Supreme Court’s opinion of
August 20, 1998. The bill merely states the obvious: if you want to
effect independence, ask a question on independence. Ask Quebecers if they want
to cease to be part of Canada and make Quebec an independent country. And they
will give you their answer.
It is only if, in response to such a clear question, there were a clear
majority in favour of secession, and not a circumstantial majority, that we
could undertake the difficult task of negotiating secession, in accordance with
the law and with a sincere desire for justice for all.
The truth must be told: no democratic country in the world would agree to
negotiate its own dismemberment on the basis of the unclear questions asked in
1980 and 1995. No more in Canada than in any other democracy.
"We need to flesh out the partnership bare bones,"
[Translation] Lucien Bouchard said on June 19, 1997. Not only should
he have warned the Quebec people in the 1995 referendum that he was proposing
sovereignty with an offer of "bare bones," but it must be noted that
those partnership bones are even barer than ever today. They vary between the
usual arrangements that are made between neighbouring countries and something as
demanding and elaborate as the European Union.
Europe? As if Europe could function with just two partners. As if it could be
expected that Canada would agree to have its major policies subject to a veto by
an independent Quebec one third its size. As if the mention of such an
improbable parity arrangement, if by some miracle it were ever to be negotiated
and could nevertheless be cancelled at the request of either country, had its
place in a referendum question alongside an issue as irreversible as secession,
which would commit not only ourselves but our children, our grandchildren and
future generations.
"We must not dream and ask for the moon. It would be asking for the
moon to imagine that when Quebec sovereignty is proclaimed, we’ll be able to
negotiate a host of economic and political changes with Canada [...] And
that English Canada, which would already be none too pleased with Quebec’s
becoming sovereign, would agree to such an upheaval in its political life simply
because it liked the cut of our jib, simply because it wanted to please us, in
some vague imitation of what some people think is happening in Western Europe,"
[Translation] Mr. Parizeau said in December 1993 (La Presse,
December 3, 1993, p. B3), well before he went along with
Mr. Bouchard’s tactical about-face.
So this raises the question: why is the PQ leadership continuing to dangle
the moon in front of Quebecers? Why this obstinate desire to let Quebecers
believe that they can somehow keep Canada by the back door? Why is the PQ
plunging ever deeper into confusion with an association/partnership project that
it has never been able to define in 35 years? Why "dress it up with
partnership," [Translation] in the words of a young PQ supporter
frustrated with his party’s leadership’s lack of candour? (RDI, 5:00
p.m. news, March 6, 2000)
You know the answer. Everyone does, including Mr. Bouchard himself, who
acknowledged on October 19, 1999, that "partnership represents
7% to 8% more public support," [Translation] an estimate that’s
quite conservative, incidentally.
The answer is that the vast majority of Quebecers have this strange idea:
they are attached to Canada. We want to stay Canadian. We would rather be
Quebecers and Canadians than Quebecers without Canada.
In poll after poll, three quarters of Quebecers say they are attached to
Canada. Between one fifth and one quarter don’t acknowledge any sense of
Canadian identity. That is much too high, but it is much lower than 49.4%.
Of course we Quebecers have different ideas about how Canada can be improved,
and about Quebec’s place within Canada. But we want to improve this Canada
from the inside, because we feel strongly that it belongs to us in its entirety,
just as much as it belongs to other Canadians.
And why wouldn’t we be attached to Canada? Why wouldn’t we want to keep
it? We can see clearly that the country we have built in a spirit of caring and
sharing with other Canadians is an extraordinary human achievement. We know that
there are hundreds of millions, if not billions of human beings who would dream
of becoming Canadian. So it’s pretty hard to convince us to give it up.
But just because the separatist leadership finds it difficult to win in
clarity, that does not give them the right to try to win in confusion. The
burden of proof is on them. It is up to them to demonstrate that we would be
better off if we ceased to be Canadian. That is a tall order, to be sure, but
that’s not Canada’s fault.
Rather, it is that it must be very difficult indeed to renounce Canada, this
"country celebrated for the generosity of its spirit [...] in
which all citizens and all groups can assert and express themselves and realize
their aspirations," as Mr. Bouchard said on July 1, 1988. I
won’t insult him by imagining that those kind words about Canada, which ring
so true, were inspired by any lack of confidence in Quebec on his part. And yet
that’s how he interpreted his referendum defeat in 1995: apparently, the
explanation for the Yes side’s defeat was a lack of confidence in Quebec’s
economy. Now that the Quebec government has eliminated its budgetary deficit,
support for the PQ’s option should be on the rise, Mr. Bouchard predicts.
Why is it so hard to admit that Quebecers’ pride in being Canadian, which
Mr. Bouchard expressed so well in that statement in 1988, is inspired not
by some presumed lack of confidence in themselves, but rather by a sincere
attachment to Canada?
Of course separation would be costly. The PQ itself has just unwittingly
demonstrated that. In a recent document, it predicted that the budget balance of
an independent Quebec would amount to a $41 million surplus. But to arrive
at that figure, it assumed that Quebec’s share of federal debt servicing would
be only 17.7%. If we take the Parti québécois’ own calculation, but we use a
more proper allocation, based on Quebec’s demographic weight (24.1%), it would
give Quebec a $3.1 billion deficit. And that’s assuming a problem-free
secession without any economic slowdown, interest rate hikes, capital flight or
labour drain.
But it’s not the fear of that drop in our economic standard of living that
makes Canada so appealing to us. I am convinced that we Quebecers cherish the
principle of caring that is Canada’s strength and Canada’s true greatness.
That when we have strengthened our economy to the point that we can help the
other provinces in the same way that the wealthier provinces help us today, we
shall do so with the same generosity. Because this spirit of caring, this
country of solidarity, is ours as well.
All of the arguments put forward to get us to renounce Canada have proven to
be erroneous. During the 1980 referendum campaign, Claude Charron predicted
that a win by the No side would be the equivalent of "fading away"
[Translation] for Quebec (Journal de Montréal, 4/5/80). Today,
20 years later, the Quebec culture and the Quebec identity are thriving,
and according to the Conseil de la langue française, 87% of Quebecers speak
mainly French in their public activities.
Also in 1980, another Claude, Claude Morin, said that "the real
meaning of a No win in the referendum [would be] the complete loss of Quebec’s
powers in favour of the federal government" [Translation] (Le Soleil,
1/5/80, p. B4). But in fact, Canada has instead become more decentralized since
1980. For example, direct federal spending in proportion to GDP has fallen (from
12.0% in 1980 to 10.9% in 1998, the latest available statistics), while direct
provincial spending has increased (from 14.5% to 15.2%).
For 35 years now, the separatist leaders, these doomsayers, have been
announcing a dangerous centralization of Canada. As far back as 1967,
Jacques Parizeau predicted that Canada would become more centralized, in
accordance with the economic planning models then in vogue: "A country
should not be allowed to balkanize decision-making to the extent that exists now,"
he said in his famous speech in Banff on October 17, 1967. Has that
centralization materialized as announced? Indeed it has not, as the same
Mr. Parizeau acknowledged in Quebec City on February 28, 1999:
"Canadian federalism is about the most decentralized in the world, along
with Switzerland." [Translation]
But no matter: centralization is still just around the corner,
Mr. Parizeau repeatedly warns, with what I must admit is an admirable
consistency. At this conference in Quebec City on February 28, 1999,
he said: "It is imperative that it [the federal government] centralize
what is an extraordinarily decentralized federation." [Translation] The
pressures of globalization impel it to do so, the incorrigible centralist
assures us.
The separatist leadership will always find some trendy concept to attempt to
convince us to renounce Canada: yesterday it was economic planning, today it’s
globalization. But I say again, why is it so difficult to admit that the
constantly fluid balance between the decentralized nature of our federation and
its capacity for concerted action, this combination of diversity and unity, is
not a problem at all, but rather a fundamental strength which has helped us so
much in the past and will help us even more in the future?
What will Canada be like in 20 years? Well, that will depend on us. But
our country gives us remarkable leverage. Few countries are better positioned
than ours to succeed in the face of globalization, with our provinces and
territories with complementary strengths, with two official languages that are
international languages, with our civil law and common law which enable us to
speak the legal language of the vast majority of countries, our immense land
mass which gives us access to Europe, the Americas and Asia, and a multicultural
population that opens up opportunities in every corner of the world.
Faced with our powerful American neighbour, who is increasingly our main
trading partner, we will need to rely on a united Canada. With international
agreements affecting our lives more and more, we need to rely on our country’s
prestige and influence. In light of the realities of the new economy, the
solidarity of all Canadians will be an essential strength.
It is not referendum fatigue that is the real explanation for Quebecers’
growing disinterest in the separatist option. It is rather the feeling that,
together with our fellow Canadians, we have made our diversity into a strength
which we will need more than ever in the future.
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