ARCHIVED - Audit of the Arming Initiative
Internal Audit Report

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October 2008

Table of Contents

• Executive Summary
• Introduction
  • Background
  • Risk Assessment
  • Audit Objective and Scope
  • Audit Approach and Methodology
  • Audit Criteria
  • Statement of Assurance
• Audit Opinion
• Findings, Recommendations and Management Action Plan
  • Arming Policies and Procedures
  • Roles and Responsibilities
  • Communications, Awareness and Training
  • Risk Management
  • Information Systems
  • Monitoring
  • Compliance
• Appendix A — List of CBSA Arming Policies and Procedures
• Appendix B — Lines of Enquiry and Audit Criteria
• Appendix C — List of Acronyms

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Executive Summary

Background

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has the mandate to provide integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities. In Budget 2006, the Government of Canada formally announced its intention to arm CBSA officers and to eliminate situations where officers work alone, and earmarked $101 million over two years to begin the process. In June 2006, it was agreed that the Arming Initiative was to be implemented over a 10-year period and by the end of the 2015–2016 fiscal year, 4,800 CBSA officers should be trained and equipped to carry duty firearms. During the period of July 2007 to June 2008, 496 CBSA officers were trained in use of duty firearms.

The Arming Initiative is a 10-year project that will affect all areas of the Agency. The responsibility for implementing the Arming Initiative rests with the Vice-President of the Operations Branch. The Arming Task Force (ATF), now the Arming Division, in the Operations Branch has been leading the development and overall monitoring of the program implementation, including the development of arming policies and procedures. A formal governance structure has been established to provide oversight in the management and implementation of the initiative.

In June 2006, the former Audit and Evaluation Committee approved the Audit of the Arming Initiative as part of the CBSA’s three-year risk-based internal audit plan.

Objective and Scope

The audit objective was to provide assurance to senior management that the Arming Initiative policies are consistent with federal authorities, including the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act, and that the Initiative is administered in compliance with CBSA policies and procedures.

The audit focused on (a) the adequacy of the management control framework associated with the arming operational policies and procedures for the implementation of the Initiative, and (b) the extent to which regional arming practices were compliant with the Agency’s arming operational policies and procedures effective since July 2007.

The audit was conducted between February and May 2008 at CBSA Headquarters (HQ) and in four regions: Windsor–St. Clair, Quebec, Niagara–Fort Erie and Pacific. The four regions selected for site visits accounted for three quarters of the CBSA officers across Canada that underwent the duty firearms training and were deployed from July 2007 to June 2008.

Statement of Assurance

This audit engagement was planned and conducted in accordance with the Internal Auditing Standards for the Government of Canada.

Audit Opinion

The Arming Initiative is governed by program policies and procedures that are consistent with Government of Canada regulations, legislation and firearms practices. The audit found that since the introduction of arming program policies in July 2007, reasonable progress had been made in establishing appropriate mechanisms to administer the Initiative in accordance with the arming policies.

Main Observations

The audit recognizes the ongoing development and implementation of policies, and possible modifications to them, as the Agency gains more experience with arming. The audit found that the management control framework governing the Agency’s arming activities is for the most part in place. Arming policies and procedures were developed based on policies and best practices of other law enforcement organizations, and have been integrated into existing policies; roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders were understood; and training and awareness sessions were provided to employees affected by the Arming Initiative. Communications were in place to ensure that issues were addressed on a timely basis.

Overall, the CBSA arming policies and procedures are being followed, and their application was consistent in the four regions visited. Instances of non-compliance are reported and are being addressed in a timely manner through the regional arming coordinator, regional management and HQ.

Opportunities for improvement are noted to strengthen areas of policy development, communications, information systems, monitoring and risk management.

Management Response

The Operations Branch welcomes the findings and the recommendations contained in this report.

The decision to arm CBSA officers has been a major undertaking for the Agency, to which the Agency has responded well within the time frames it was given.

The observations made by the auditors reflect the complexity of the working arrangements within the Agency and how this arming decision has touched all aspects of the Agency’s organization and operations. The recommendations, while valid, are made based on observations of an ever-changing environment.

Some of these observations/recommendations have already been addressed with products that were under development, but not finalized, when the audit was undertaken. Other observations/recommendations identify issues that remain to be resolved. The key branches — Operations, Comptrollership, Human Resources — in consultation with the other branches of the Agency and CBSA partners, will continue to work diligently to ensure that CBSA officers are properly trained and provided with the tools, equipment and other resources needed to make the implementation of the Arming Initiative successful.

Introduction

Background

Since December 2003, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has been an integral part of the Public Safety portfolio, which was created to protect Canadians and maintain a peaceful and safe society. The Agency has the mandate to provide integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the free flow of persons and goods, including animals and plants, that meet all requirements under the program legislation.

Historically, CBSA officers have been defined in law as “peace officers” pursuant to Section 2 of the Criminal Code for the purpose of performing their duty in administration of the Customs Act and the Excise Act. As the security and public safety roles and expectations at the border have grown progressively during recent years, the focus on enforcement for CBSA officers has increased.

In the last decade, the Government of Canada passed two bills that altered the status of CBSA officers. The passage of Bill C-18 in 1999 granted them with the “powers and responsibilities” of peace officers for the purpose of enforcing the Criminal Code. Bill C-26 led to the creation in 2003 of the CBSA as an organization with a multi-faceted mandate including national security and public safety.

As part of this progression and to assist them in carrying out their duties, officers, both at the border and those performing inland immigration enforcement, intelligence and criminal investigations functions, were provided with handcuffs, pepper spray, batons and protective vests, as well as use-of-force training.

In Budget 2006, the Government formally announced its intention to arm CBSA officers and to eliminate situations where officers work alone, and $101 million over two years was earmarked to begin the process. In June 2006, it was agreed that the Arming Initiative was to be implemented over a 10-year period and by the end of the 2015-2016 fiscal year, 4,800 CBSA officers should be trained and equipped to carry duty firearms. This figure includes the following:

• 3,600 officers who work at the land border and at marine facilities and who perform off-site verifications;
• 800 officers who perform inland immigration enforcement, intelligence and investigations functions; and
• 400 new officers who will be hired in order to eliminate work-alone situations.

The Arming Initiative is a 10-year project that will affect all areas of the Agency. The responsibility for implementing the Arming Initiative rests with the Vice-President of the Operations Branch. The Arming Task Force (ATF), now the Arming Division, of the Operations Branch has been leading the development and overall monitoring of the program implementation. A formal governance structure has also been established to guide strategic and key operational decisions for the Initiative and to ensure that the development and implementation of the Initiative reflect the needs and interests of stakeholders.

The Operations Branch developed a phased-in implementation strategy to ensure that CBSA officers are armed in a proper, safe and efficient manner without undue delay. The strategy is based on carefully defined operational criteria and reflects the Government of Canada’s commitment to arming CBSA officers at land and marine ports of entry, as well as the inland enforcement officers.

The plan for the 2007–2008 fiscal year consisted of providing training to 340 employees from the top 10 highest-volume land border ports of entry, from 14 small and medium-sized land border ports, and from 7 inland enforcement offices with the highest volume of business and general level of risk. The plan for the 2008–2009 fiscal year is to train 572 employees from the top 10 highest-volume land border ports, from 5 small and medium-sized land border ports and from 3 marine ports, as well as inland enforcement, intelligence and investigation officers from various areas across the country. During the period of July 2007 to June 2008, 496 CBSA officers were trained in the use of duty firearms.

In June 2006, the former Audit and Evaluation Committee approved the Audit of the Arming Initiative as part of the CBSA’s three-year risk-based internal audit plan. It was important to audit this Initiative early in its implementation to make appropriate course corrections as the Initiative matured.

Risk Assessment

The risk assessment of the Arming Initiative completed during the planning phase concluded that there may be a risk that procedures in support of the existing arming policies may not be fully in place, which could lead to non-compliance and inconsistent application of applicable Government of Canada authorities and CBSA policies. As well, there may be a risk that individual policies have not been assessed in terms of their effectiveness and compliance. This may become increasingly important given that a number of armed CBSA officers have been deployed. The above risks, therefore, formed the basis for the audit objective and scope.

Audit Objective and Scope

The audit objective was to provide assurance to senior management that the Arming Initiative policies are consistent with federal authorities, including the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act, and that the Initiative is administered in compliance with CBSA policies and procedures.

The audit focused on (a) the adequacy of the management control framework associated with the arming operational policies and procedures for the implementation of the Initiative, and (b) the extent to which regional arming practices were compliant with the Agency’s arming operational policies and procedures effective since July 2007. A list of the policies and procedures examined is provided in Appendix A.

The audit was conducted between February and May 2008 at CBSA Headquarters (HQ) and in four regions: Windsor–St. Clair, Quebec, Niagara–Fort Erie and Pacific. The four regions selected for site visits accounted for three quarters of the CBSA officers across Canada that underwent the duty firearms training and were deployed from July 2007 to June 2008.

Audit Approach and Methodology

The methodology used to conduct this audit included the following:

• A preliminary survey to test and finalize the audit program.
• A review of applicable legislation, regulations, policies and procedures.
• Interviews with key stakeholders at HQ and at the regional level responsible for implementing the Arming Initiative. This included senior management and managers and staff from the Operations, Comptrollership, Enforcement and Human Resources branches.
• Interviews with armed and unarmed CBSA officers and supervisors and managers to assess the adequacy of the Agency’s arming policies and procedures and the training and communication of these policies and procedures, and to confirm the existence of controls.
• Site visits to assess compliance with the arming operational policies and procedures. The on-site work included (a) visual observation of storage facilities, (b) interviews with on-site staff, and (c) a review of any additional documentation provided by staff.
• An analysis of controls and monitoring and reporting practices related to the Arming Initiative.

Audit Criteria

Criteria for this audit were developed based on (a) recognized management control frameworks, including the core management control framework developed by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat; and (b) federal authorities and CBSA arming policies effective July 2007. Detailed audit criteria are provided in Appendix B.

Statement of Assurance

This audit engagement was planned and conducted in accordance with the Internal Auditing Standards for the Government of Canada.

Audit Opinon

The Arming Initiative is governed by program policies and procedures that are consistent with Government of Canada regulations, legislation and firearms practices. The audit found that since the introduction of arming program policies in July 2007, reasonable progress has been made in establishing appropriate mechanisms to administer the Initiative in accordance with the arming policies. Overall, the CBSA arming policies and procedures are being followed, and their application was consistent in the four regions visited. Instances of non-compliance are reported and are being addressed in a timely manner through the regional arming coordinator, regional management and HQ.

Findings, Recommendations, and Management Action Plan

The audit recognizes the ongoing development and implementation of policies, and possible modifications to them, as the Agency gains more experience with arming. The audit found that the management control framework governing the Agency’s arming activities is for the most part in place. Arming policies and procedures were developed based on policies and best practices of other law enforcement organizations, and have been integrated into existing policies; roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders were understood; and training and awareness sessions were provided to employees affected by the Arming Initiative. Communications were in place to ensure that issues were addressed on a timely basis. Overall, the audit found that the four regions visited administer their offices in accordance with the arming policies and procedures.

Opportunities for improvement are noted to strengthen areas of policy development, communications, information systems, monitoring and risk management.

Arming Policies and Procedures

The expectation is that arming policies and procedures are consistent with Government of Canada regulations, legislation and firearms practices, and provide the necessary guidance to employees affected by the arming requirement to execute their duties in the appropriate manner.

The Agency has arming policies and procedures in place, which were developed through consultations and research and analyses of policies and practices of other law enforcement organizations. The arming program policies were approved through the governance structure, which includes both HQ and regional representation. An online Arming Initiative Reference Manual provides a single point of reference for all policies and procedures that have been developed to date.

The process for reviewing policies and procedures was developed and documented by the ATF in the Process for Creating and Modifying Arming Policies and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) document. This process was approved through the governance structure and stipulates that arming policies will be updated as the need arises (e.g. a policy gap is identified, there are changes in the work environment related to legislative or policies changes). A schedule for updating the policies has not been determined.

A review of the CBSA arming policies and procedures concluded that they are compliant and consistent with authorities and provided overall guidance to affected employees. As one would expect with a new initiative, some areas in the policies and procedures require further clarification and guidance. For example:

• The CBSA’s use-of-force procedures did not provide sufficient guidance on actions or activities that employees are permitted to do, expected to do or prohibited from doing in situations that involve general use of force, e.g. when to use oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray and batons. Management advised that detailed guidance on administering general use of force would be provided in training packages that are being developed.
• The guidelines regarding individuals on extended leave did not sufficiently address the issue of retention of firearms for these individuals.
• Insufficient guidance was given in areas such as (i) managing a critical incident involving use of force/discharge of a firearm, (ii) transporting firearms by aircraft, and (iii) wearing of protective and defensive equipment for intelligence, investigation and inland enforcement officers.

Regional guidelines have been developed to address some of these areas and have been reviewed by the ATF to ensure consistency. Development of further guidance by regions may be necessary in consideration of the operating environment. In some cases, regional practices are developed and used across the regions and this is a practice that the Agency would want to continue. However, it should be done within an acceptable level of flexibility to minimize the risk of developing non-compliant practices or inconsistencies in the application of policies across regions.

The audit noted that the definition of “on duty” was inconsistent in two CBSA policies. In the Policy on the Wearing of Protective and Defensive Equipment Including Duty Firearms, “on duty” was defined as “the hours of scheduled work and overtime.” The policy mandated that “when leaving a port of entry or other CBSA office for personal business (e.g. for meal or rest breaks)…officers shall store their defensive equipment on site….” In the Uniform Policy and Standards of Appearance, “on duty” was defined as “the hours of work scheduled and includes meal breaks for which employees may not receive payment.” Thus, according to this policy, employees had to wear their protective and defensive equipment when they left for meal or rest breaks.

In August 2008, the definition of “on duty” was changed in the Uniform Policy and Standards of Appearance to align with the wording of the Policy on the Wearing of Protective and Defensive Equipment Including Duty Firearms.

The audit also noted that the requirements of the CBSA preventative maintenance program and the associated costs are not clearly stated in the memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the service provider. Management indicated that analysis is currently taking place to establish the specific maintenance cycle and to determine the preventative maintenance requirements. Given the number of duty firearms in the Agency’s possession, and in the absence of the preventative maintenance service being clearly documented in the MOU, there is a risk that this service may not be adequately provided.

Recommendation:

1. The Vice-President of the Operations Branch, in collaboration with other branches, should develop a timetable to review and update its arming policies and procedures. The subsequent review should consider regional practices to ensure appropriate balance.

Management Action Plan	Completion Date
Major policy changes are approved through the governance structure, which includes representatives from all branches and regions. Information on regional practices is also obtained from the regional arming coordinators. The Process for Creating and Modifying Arming Policies and SOPs document has been approved by the Arming Director General Committee.	June 3, 2008
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) will review and update the arming policies and procedures as often as the environment requires. The Process for Creating and Modifying Arming Policies and SOPs document is to be presented to the Executive Management Committee (EMC) Policy Committee as a best practice for the CBSA when creating and modifying policies and standard operating procedures. This document will be amended to include a regular review process that may then make regular reviews a CBSA standard.	December 31, 2008
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) will undertake a policy review process (to look at clarity and consistency) in consultation with affected stakeholders.	March 31, 2009

Roles and Responsibilities

The accountability structure for the Arming Initiative should be established and roles and responsibilities should be defined, documented, assigned, understood and commensurate with the prescribed authorities.

The roles and responsibilities were primarily defined in the arming policies for all stakeholders and there was clear division of responsibilities between the Operations, Comptrollership and Human Resources branches and the regions. During the audit examination, the responsibilities that reside with the Enforcement Branch were performed on an interim basis by the Operations Branch. Examples included the following:

• The responsibility for creating, maintaining and updating policies and procedures related to the Policy on the Use of Force and the Policy on the Possession, Transportation and Storage of Agency Firearms, Ammunition and Controlled Items; and
• The responsibility for reporting annually on the use of force by CBSA officers.

The transfer of responsibilities has not been formally documented and referenced in the policies because the policies reflect the end state perspective when the program is fully operational. As well, there is no transition plan to outline the process of transferring responsibilities to other branches from the Operations Branch or when this would happen. Without a transition plan or a formal acknowledgement and acceptance of accountabilities, responsibilities may be inappropriately performed.

Recommendation:

2. The vice-presidents of the Operations Branch and other affected branches should develop a transition plan that would outline the activities and time frames to transfer future Arming Initiative responsibilities.

Management Action Plan	Completion Date
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) in consultation with other affected branches will develop a process for the transition of tasks to functional program areas. This process will include the initiation, implementation and monitoring of the transition of tasks.	March 2009
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) will test this process when the psychological testing (MMPI-2 and 16PF tests) is transitioned to the Human Resources Branch.	September 2009

Communications, Awareness and Training

Employees need to have consistent and sufficient communications and training to inform them of policies and procedures, specific requirements of their jobs and associated issues and implications, as well as to help them competently exercise their roles and responsibilities.

The ATF has developed a communications strategy to ensure that employees are informed on a regular basis about policies, supporting procedures and specific requirements of their jobs, and about the impact of those policies, procedures and requirements.

Bi-weekly conference calls provide an opportunity to discuss working-level issues affecting the implementation of the Arming Initiative. Participants include regional arming coordinators and representatives from the ATF and other branches. Regional arming coordinators are involved in the overall coordination and implementation of the Initiative and liaise with HQ on a regular basis to identify issues and operational requirements.

The arming policies and procedures are part of the curriculum for the duty firearm training and awareness sessions for managers. Most managers have attended awareness sessions that provide them with information on how employees are trained to handle firearms and on their roles and responsibilities in managing an armed workforce. Superintendents and chiefs, who work in armed locations, will be trained in the use of duty firearms over the implementation period of the Arming Initiative. In February 2008, the decision was made to also provide the duty firearm training to first-line managers of inland enforcement, intelligence and investigation officers.

Interviews revealed that, overall, the Arming Initiative was well communicated and key individuals involved in the program were informed on the status of the program through conference calls and e-mails. CBSA officers and their managers indicated that the management team in some cases should directly communicate pertinent arming updates and changes to their staff. The following examples of pertinent updates to the Policy on Wearing of Protective and Defensive Equipment Including Duty Firearms were noted:

• Leaving a port of entry or other CBSA office for personal business, such as meal or rest breaks (effective date December 24, 2007); and
• Wearing of defensive equipment at alternative inspection service enrolment centres located in the United States (effective date March 10, 2008).

It should be noted that the operational environment is not always conducive to holding face-to-face discussions through team meetings and some communication mediums are not always appropriate depending on the message. As a result, staff may not always be aware or understand why certain decisions are made, which may lead to a lack of their acceptance. However, management was aware of this concern and will be adapting their communications strategy where appropriate.

The majority of interviewed staff and instructors (i.e. armed officers, unarmed officers, operations management) stated the need for better understanding of the interaction between armed and unarmed personnel in circumstances that may require use of lethal force. It was indicated that unarmed personnel may not be adequately prepared to respond in these circumstances. During the audit, an online learning product was being developed for armed and unarmed officers to address this issue and changes were made to the firearm training course syllabus.

3. The Vice-President of the Human Resources Branch, in conjunction with the Operations Branch, should review the current control and defensive tactics training to include scenarios involving the interaction of armed and unarmed officers in circumstances that may require use of force.

Management Action Plan	Completion Date
An online learning product entitled “Introduction to the Arming Initiative” was made available to employees. This product, posted on Atlas, includes scenarios involving armed and unarmed officers interacting in situations requiring duty firearms.	September 9, 2008
Scenarios related to co-located offices are under development for inclusion in the Duty Firearm Course.	September 30, 2008

Risk Management

Strategic and operational risks need to be identified, assessed and managed. Appropriate mechanisms need to be in place at HQ and regional levels to ensure risks are identified, assessed, managed and documented, and tolerable levels of risk exposure have to be approved and communicated.

Key high-level risks and mitigation strategies for the Arming Initiative were identified in the arming project charter. Risks pertaining to the implementation of the policies were being routinely identified, assessed and managed by the regions and HQ through bi-weekly conference calls and ongoing communications.

A formal risk assessment process was initiated in November 2007 that identified preliminary risks and mitigation strategies. It has not yet been finalized. In the absence of a completed risk assessment, key risks may not be fully identified, residual risks may not be in line with the Agency’s risk tolerance level and risk responses may not be integrated with operational plans to achieve operational effectiveness and good governance.

Recommendation:

4. The Vice-President of the Operations Branch should establish a timetable to complete the Arming Initiative risk profile.

Management Action Plan	Completion Date
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) will complete the risk analysis portion of the Results-based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF).	December 31, 2008
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) will complete the development of RMAF performance measures.	March 31, 2009
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) will complete a draft RMAF.	April 1, 2009

Information Systems

The Agency is expected to have a national information system that provides access to timely, complete, accurate and comprehensive arming data in order to meet the information needs of management and reporting requirements.

Information system requirements to support the arming project were defined and CAS was enhanced for tracking arming data such as training and inventory. The training module includes data on prerequisites, training results, practices and re-certification. The functionality to track ammunition was being developed and was partially operational during the audit examination. Management has advised that this functionality was released after the audit was conducted.

The responsibility for data input into CAS is shared between HQ and the regions. HQ is responsible for inputting the inventory data, whereas the regions are responsible for inputting the training and re-certification data. For the initial transition period, HQ was entering training data because the regional arming coordinator positions had not yet been staffed due to delays in the classification of this position.

The audit found that information in CAS was not current and in the case of spare firearms, the site location was inaccurate. It also noted that regions had developed and maintained their own databases to have access to reliable data. This was due to a lack of CAS training and a lack of CAS user friendliness.

In the absence of a sufficiently timely input of arming data into CAS, the regions may continue to develop multiple regional systems that will result in duplication of effort with regard to data entry and maintenance. It may also lead to difficulties in generating complete and accurate reports for the Agency.

Recommendation:

5. The Vice-President of the Operations Branch, in collaboration with the Human Resources, Comptrollership and Innovation, Science and Technology branches, should develop a transition plan to fully utilize the Corporate Administrative System as the national information system for the Arming Initiative to provide complete, accurate and timely information for decision making and reporting.

Management Action Plan	Completion Date
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) will continue to coordinate the full and complete implementation of business processes that are supported through the Corporate Administrative System (CAS), take measures to ensure that the information in CAS is up-to-date and take steps to rectify identified data discrepancies.	March 31, 2009
The armoury and the Northern Ontario Region warehouse will be fully operational and supported with existing CAS components.	March 31, 2009
The Operations Branch (Arming Division), in consultation with the Comptrollership and Human Resources branches, will complete a review of CAS implementation activities and determine what corrections/enhancements, if any, are required.	Fall 2009

Monitoring

A monitoring process should be in place to ensure that the arming policies and procedures are working as intended, the program controls are appropriate and issues are addressed.

The audit noted that efforts were being made to put in place a national compliance-monitoring framework. The controlled assets monitoring framework for the Arming Initiative was drafted by the Comptrollership Branch and should be finalized by fall 2008. This document describes the monitoring, security audit and reporting responsibilities, and suggests the frequency for monitoring activities and proposed methods to assess regional security specialists.

The Niagara–Fort Erie Region had developed and implemented a monitoring framework to verify inventory, assignments and the safe storage and use of firearms and controlled items. As well, CBSA regional security officials in this region had developed their annual audit plan, as per policy requirement.

Management in other regions indicated that they monitored compliance with the arming policies and procedures; however, the results were not documented by regional security and operations management. In one region, regional security had not performed the compliance checks because regional security specialists were not provided with the firearms safety training to fulfill these responsibilities.

An operational policies review framework has been established by the ATF and, in May 2008, regional operational reviews were initiated. Regional site visits were completed in July and a report on the findings is due in September 2008. The Operations Branch plans to incorporate elements of the ATF operational policies review framework into the Operations Branch process monitoring framework.

As part of the commitment to the Treasury Board, the Evaluation Division developed two components of the RMAF — a logic model and an evaluation strategy for the Arming Initiative. The Operations Branch, with the assistance of the Evaluation Division, is in the process of completing the performance measurement component of the RMAF by fall 2008. It should provide a framework that ties resources and activities to expected results, and outline monitoring and reporting requirements. The evaluation plan for the Initiative is scheduled to be developed by fall 2008 with the evaluation taking place in early 2009.

Without an established monitoring framework, inconsistencies in administering the Arming Initiative may not be identified and deficiencies may not be addressed.

Recommendation:

6. The Vice-President of the Operations Branch, in collaboration with the Comptrollership Branch, should implement the compliance-monitoring framework and proceed with the plan to incorporate arming templates into the process monitoring framework.

Management Action Plan	Completion Date
The Comptrollership Branch (Corporate Security and Internal Affairs Division) will implement the controlled assets monitoring framework for the Arming Initiative. The first summary report will be available to management in summer 2009.	Fall 2008
The Operations Branch (Operational Performance and Readiness Division) will review the controlled assets monitoring framework and the operational policies review framework and update the process monitoring framework to incorporate activities that monitor arming-related processes.	Spring 2009
The Operations Branch (Arming Division, Operational Performance and Readiness Division) will work to identify and address any remaining compliance monitoring gaps.	Spring 2009

Compliance

Use of force and use-of-force reporting

The expectation is that CBSA officers use force in the execution of their duties provided such force is necessary, appropriate to the circumstances and in accordance with the Incident Management Intervention Model (IMIM). Incidents involving the use of force by CBSA officers are reported and reviewed on a continual basis to recognize exemplary behaviour, maintain program integrity and identify areas of concern, the need for retraining or the need for further investigation.

The audit reviewed 23 incidents reported during the period of July 2007 to April 2008 (10 closed incidents involving duty firearms and 13 randomly selected reports involving general use of force). All 23 incidents were compliant with the IMIM.

The audit examined the CBSA duty firearm incident review process for the 10 closed duty firearm incidents. Six files contained all the necessary documentation. The other four files had missing or incomplete documentation on file for incidents reported (e.g. Incident Review Committee reports were not always on file, reports and narratives were not always signed or initialled by the individuals engaged in the incident).

Based on the trend analysis of use-of-force incidents reported, one region had not been sending the general use-of-force reports to the ATF since the new policy came into effect in July 2007.

The region was not aware of this requirement. The Policy on Use-of-Force Incident Reporting and Investigation and supporting procedures did not clearly state that all use-of-force regional reports should be submitted for review by HQ. In addition, the audit found that the Enforcement Manual 7, Section 24, “Procedure: Enforcement incident reporting requirements” (a legacy document from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and now used by the CBSA) is outdated and reflects the CIC Operational Manuals that were effective in April 2006, including hyperlinks to the old forms. The Enforcement Branch plans to review and update the manual by fall 2008.

During the audit, the 2007 CBSA annual use-of-force report was being developed and the expected completion date had not been set. This is due, in part, to a date not being stipulated by the ATF in the Policy on Use-of-Force Incident Reporting and Investigation and/or supporting procedures.

The audit noted that the reporting process is relatively new and the review and quality assurance for use-of-force reporting have not been fully implemented. This may result in information on incidents not being reviewed, incomplete data on the use of force and no follow-up or investigation taken to address serious concerns. Therefore, the Agency may not analyze breaches of policy and ensure corrective action is taken when systemic problems become evident.

Recommendation:

7. The Vice-President of the Operations Branch should implement a quality assurance program to ensure compliance with the reporting and review requirements of the Policy on Use-of-Force Incident Reporting and Investigation.

Management Action Plan	Completion Date
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) has implemented a checklist to ensure that all required information is present when completing reviews of duty firearm incidents.	September 2008
The Operations Branch (Arming Division in collaboration with the Operational Performance and Readiness Division) will develop a quality assurance program to bring increased rigour to the use-of-force incident review process.	December 31, 2008
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) will institute an annual management report on use-of-force incidents.	December 31, 2008
The Operations Branch (Arming Division), in combination with the Enforcement Branch, is working on enhancements to the Integrated Customs Enforcement System to track use-of-force reports. This is an interim measure until an incident management and reporting system (IMRS) is implemented.	March 31, 2009
The IMRS will be developed and deployed to all CBSA locations to capture and report on CBSA use-of-force incidents.	Summer 2010

Storage and transportation

Armed officers should carry only CBSA firearms and controlled items [1] that are authorized by the Agency and they should be transported and/or stored in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. According to arming policies, a controlled item also includes batons that are issued to CBSA officers. Proper storage facilities should be available to safely store and handle firearms and controlled items.

During the inspection of arming ready rooms, the audit tested compliance with the storage requirements and found the following:

• Officers possess only CBSA-authorized firearms and controlled items and use only approved carrying equipment (e.g. holsters, containers).
• Officers have three magazines and sufficient ammunition in their possession.
• There is 100% compliance with regard to storage of firearms.
• There is 64% compliance with regard to the storage of controlled items (e.g. the OC spray is located with the firearm in the arming locker).

Through interviews and documentation review, the audit found the following:

• Regional practices varied in providing authority to officers to transport and store firearms at a place other than a CBSA office (e.g. at home). In one of the regions, no employees were authorized to transport and store firearms at a place other than a CBSA office, while in another region, all armed officers were issued blanket authority that they kept with them at all times to transport the firearms.
• A written Authorization to Transport and Store Firearms at a Place Other Than a Canada Border Services Agency Office (Form BSF 390) was not always obtained by shipping clerks who transport firearms in accordance with the transporting firearms procedures as this requirement was not communicated to them or their managers.
• In the early implementation of the Arming Initiative, shipping clerks were not always advised of forthcoming shipments of firearms and ammunition. The process has been streamlined and this is no longer an issue.

In the early implementation of the Arming Initiative, managers and employees were learning the requirements of the policies and their application. Improvements in compliance and in the administration of the Arming Initiative will continue to be made as the Agency gains more experience. Non-compliance with the requirements of the Policy on the Possession, Transportation and Storage of Agency Firearms, Ammunition and Controlled Items may lead to firearms and controlled items being stolen or damaged, or to safety issues (injury or death due to an accidental discharge).

With regard to physical security of facilities, regional security is responsible for ensuring that the storage facility and the storage equipment housing the arming assets meet the guidelines of the CBSA Corporate Security Bulletin No. 2007-002. Three of the four regions selected for audit provided documentation, which indicated that regional security and the ATF inspected regional facilities used for storage and warehousing of firearms, ammunition and controlled items. Of these three regions, only the Niagara–Fort Erie regional security provided an attestation that the facilities met the recommended security requirements. The process for inspecting facilities used for storage and warehousing of firearms, ammunition and controlled items did not include a mechanism for sign-off on the implementation of recommended security standards. In the absence of an attestation by regional security, there is no confirmation that regional facilities met the guidelines of the Corporate Security Bulletin.

As well, the Corporate Security Bulletin makes a reference to other authorities that outline standards for access control; however, it does not explicitly discuss the subject. In one of the 17 arming facilities visited, the audit found that access control was not limited to only those whose duties require such access, as required by the RCMP Physical Security Guide G1-024 – Control of Access (August 2004). Management decided to grant access to others based on health and safety considerations, such as in the event of a medical emergency inside the room, when no armed staff would be available to assist. The lack of a clear guideline related to access or non-compliance with the recommended security requirements of the Corporate Security Bulletin and other authorities may result in the ineffective control of arming assets or safety issues.

Recommendation:

8. The Vice-President of the Comptrollership Branch should establish an appropriate process to verify compliance with recommended security requirements that address the current gaps (e.g. attestation that recommended security standards are met) and the Vice-President of the Operations Branch should ensure that recommended security requirements are met.

Management Action Plan	Completion Date
The Comptrollership Branch (Corporate Security and Internal Affairs Division) will consult with the Operations Branch and undertake a review of the CBSA security policies related to physical security to ensure a requirement is documented in the policy for security officials to complete a site inspection whenever security requirements are identified in the design. The site inspection will be conducted at required phases during a renovation project or new construction and after the completion of the project to ensure that all physical security requirements have been met.	Fall 2008
A security bulletin will be developed detailing the responsibilities of regional security officials in following through on new requirements. This bulletin will be distributed to regional security managers and will form an amendment to the CBSA security policies.	September 2009
The Operations Branch (Arming Division) will ensure that recommended security requirements are met and will continue to communicate to the Comptrollership Branch any changes in standards related to arming that may affect security processes or infrastructure/facility requirements.	Ongoing

Wearing protective and defensive equipment

When leaving a port of entry, CBSA officers engaged in the enforcement of program legislation administered by the CBSA are expected to wear protective and defensive equipment when dealing with members of the public or when they are likely to encounter members of the public.

Based on interviews, officers remove their equipment when leaving a port of entry or a CBSA office for personal business (e.g. for meal or rest breaks). However, through observations, the audit noted varying practices related to meal/break periods. For example, one port of entry visited allowed armed officers extra time to remove their equipment when leaving the site for meal or rest breaks. The inconsistent application of this policy requirement may be perceived by officers as arbitrary and lead to a lack of acceptance.

Training

The expectation is that officers who are issued duty firearms have successfully completed the control and defensive tactics training and have qualified in the use and maintenance of duty firearms. All employees who are required to handle firearms should have received firearms safety training and employees who have not received this training do not handle firearms.

A review of documentation was completed and noted the following:

• Only officers who possess all the required prerequisites for the duty firearms training were authorized to proceed with the training.
• Only officers who successfully completed the training were provided with duty firearms.
• Firearms and ammunition forms were properly completed and kept on file.
• Clerical staff who handle firearms in the course of their duties have received firearms safety training. Valid certificates were on file for the clerical staff in the locations selected for a visit.

Re-certification and practice session

Officers should be scheduled for their first firearms practice approximately four months following their last certification and approximately eight months later following their re-certification.

Armed officers were provided with the opportunity to attend two mandatory live-fire practice sessions per year as required by the Policy on the Use of Force. The Agency has yet to establish long-term arrangements to secure facilities for re-certification and practice sessions in the regions.

The Operations Branch is conducting research with other government organizations to determine what they have in place and their future plans. Based on the results, an overall plan is to be developed by the ATF. A lack of available facilities may affect timely re-certification and required mandatory practice sessions. As well, additional cost and time could be incurred for travel to attend practice and re-certification sessions.

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Appendix A — List Of CBSA Arming Policies And Procedures

(effective July 2007)

Arming Policies

• Policy on the Use of Force
• Policy on the Acquisition and Reporting of Agency Firearms
• Policy on the Handling of Agency and Protected Firearms
• Policy on the Possession, Transportation and Storage of Agency Firearms, Ammunition and Controlled Items
• Policy on Use-of-Force Incident Reporting and Investigation
• Policy on the Wearing of Protective and Defensive Equipment Including Duty Firearms

Arming Procedures

• Mandatory Firearms Practice
• Shipping Duty Firearms
• Storing Duty Firearms
• Temporary Replacement of Duty Firearm
• Transporting Firearms
• Use of Force
• Use-of-Force Incident Reporting and Investigation
• Wearing Protective and Defensive Equipment

Appendix B — Lines of Enquiry and Audit Criteria

Lines of Enquiry	Audit Criteria
1. Adequacy and effectiveness of the control framework	1.1 The Canada Border Services Agency’s (CBSA) arming policies and procedures are consistent with applicable Government of Canada policies, regulations and legislation and provide the necessary guidance to employees affected by the arming requirement to execute their duties. 1.2 Roles and responsibilities for arming activities are clearly and adequately defined, assigned, documented and exercised and are commensurate with prescribed authorities and responsibilities. 1.3 Internal communications, awareness and training within the CBSA are consistent and sufficient to ensure that all parties involved are fully aware of their roles and responsibilities. 1.4 Monitoring of compliance with the arming operational policies and procedures is reliable and sufficient for management to adequately identify, assess, manage and appropriately respond to arising issues. 1.5 Information systems are used to the fullest extent possible to meet management information needs and policy requirements. Reporting to management is comprehensive, consistent and timely. 1.6 Risks pertaining to the implementation of the policies are identified, assessed, and managed, and plans are in place to measure the effectiveness of the policies.
2. Compliance with authorities	2.1 Armed CBSA officers use force in the execution of their duties provided such force is necessary, appropriate to the circumstances and in accordance with the Incident Management Intervention Model (IMIM). 2.2 All CBSA employees who are required to handle firearms are trained in the use of firearms. Employees who have not received the training do not handle firearms. 2.3 Armed CBSA officers carry only firearms and controlled items that are authorized by the CBSA. Firearms and controlled items are transported and stored in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. 2.4 CBSA officers engaged in the enforcement of program legislation administered by the CBSA wear protective and defensive equipment when dealing with members of the public or when they are likely to encounter members of the public. 2.5 Proper facilities and equipment are available to safely handle firearms and controlled items. 2.6 Incidents involving the use of force by CBSA officers are reported and reviewed on a continual basis to recognize exemplary behaviour, maintain program integrity and identify areas of concern, the need for retraining or the need for further investigation.

Appendix C — List of Acronyms

ATF	Arming Task Force
CBSA	Canada Border Services Agency
CAS	Corporate Administrative System
HQ	Headquarters
IMIM	Incident Management Intervention Model
MOU	memorandum of understanding
OC	oleoresin capsicum
RMAF	Results-based Management Accountability Framework

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Notes

1. A controlled item is a prohibited device, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon or prohibited ammunition as defined in Section 1 of the Public Agents Firearms Regulations.[ Return to text ]