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Final Report
Program Evaluation Division
Strategy and Coordination Branch
July 2009

Table of Contents

• Executive Summary
• Introduction and Context
  • Purpose of the Evaluation
  • Overview of CBSA Admissibility Screening and Supporting Intelligence Activities
• Evaluation Methodology
  • Review and Analysis of Program Documents and Data
  • In-Depth Interviews
  • Survey of Migration Integrity Officers
  • Site Visit
  • Study Limitations
• Key Findings
  • Relevance of Admissibility Screening
  • Program Design and Delivery
  • Success/Progress
  • Program Efficiency
• Key Conclusions, Recommendations and Management Response
• List of Abbreviations

Executive Summary

More than 25 million persons who are not citizens or permanent residents of Canada arrived at Canadian Ports of Entry (POEs) in 2007-2008. With this high volume of travellers comes the risk that some individuals may pose a threat to Canada's security or may be inadmissible for other reasons. Within this context, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) defines the circumstances in which a person is deemed inadmissible and allows Canada to pursue the maximum benefits realized from immigration, offer safe haven to the displaced and persecuted and maintain the security of Canadian society.¹

When the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) was created on December 12, 2003, the responsibility for immigration enforcement, interdiction, intelligence and processing at POEs was transferred to the Agency from Citizenship and Immigration (CIC). The CBSA's mandate includes ensuring that persons who pose a threat or risk to Canada and Canadians are prevented from entering or remaining in the country while at the same time facilitating the flow of legitimate goods and people.

While Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) is responsible for administering and delivering Canada's immigration program, both CIC and the CBSA share responsibility for administering the IRPA. The CBSA supports CIC in the delivery of the immigration program by providing immigration services at the POE and enforcement and intelligence services to CIC. The Agency's activities include providing assistance to visa officers and immigration program officers in determining the admissibility of applicants. Admissibility screening is conducted on refugee claimants, applicants for permanent residence, visa applicants and permanent residents who apply for Canadian citizenship. The CBSA monitors the screening process for refugee claimants, and screens visa applicants and permanent resident applicants.

Purpose of the Evaluation

This report presents the evaluation findings of the admissibility² screening and supporting intelligence activities that the CBSA carries out in support of IRPA. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the continued relevance of the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities, their success in achieving expected results, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the design, delivery and management of the various activities under the admissibility screening umbrella.

This evaluation was identified as a priority in the 2007-2010 CBSA Risk-Based Multi-Year Evaluation Plan, approved by the CBSA Executive Evaluation Committee in November 2007. Some of the CBSA activities associated with admissibility screening received funding under the Government of Canada's Public Security and Anti-terrorism (PSAT) agenda, for which there are evaluation commitments to Treasury Board Secretariat.³

The Program Evaluation Division, Strategy and Coordination Branch planned and conducted this evaluation study. The evaluation research was carried out between July 2008 and May 2009. In preparation for this evaluation, the evaluation team, in consultation with key internal stakeholders, developed a logic model for admissibility screening. Based on the logic model, key evaluation issues were identified and an evaluation plan was developed.

Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation study used the following research methodologies to answer the evaluation research questions:

• Interviews;
• Review and analysis of documents and data;
• Site visits; and
• Survey of Migration Integrity Officers (MIOs).

Summary of Findings and Recommendations

Overall, the evaluation found that admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities, including the work of the MIOs abroad, are key elements in preventing inadmissible persons from entering Canada. The CBSA's admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities are essential to the CBSA fulfilling its responsibilities as identified in the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) Act, the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

Roles and responsibilities between partner organizations (CBSA, CIC and CSIS) are understood and consistent with the mandate of each partner. The evaluation concluded that within CBSA, the governance and management structure for these activities is generally satisfactory. However, CBSA's internal roles and processes for admissibility screening activities have not always been clear to partner organizations and recent efforts by CBSA to clearly identify the National Security Division (NSD) as the single window for admissibility screening activities has been a positive step towards facilitating more efficient communication between partners.

CBSA continues to make improvements to the capacity and effectiveness of its admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities. For example, additional MIO positions have been established in order to strengthen 1st level anti-fraud detection, a decision which resulted in the identification of close to 2,000 fraudulent documents in FY 2008-2009. As well, the Intelligence Risk Assessment and Analysis Division (IRAAD) within the Intelligence Directorate consults with HQ and front-line users within CBSA and at CIC to ensure that its products, such as the Weekly Intelligence Digest, Intelligence Bulletins and Irregular Migration Trend Report, continue to meet the needs of users. The vast majority of MIOs express satisfaction with these products.

The evaluation found opportunities for the Agency to strengthen performance measurement and reporting. While MIOs are now reporting on the number of visa applications refused as a direct result of their anti-fraud activities, there are no similar data on the extent to which NSD and Regional Intelligence Officer (RIO) screening activities contribute to the prevention of inadmissible persons entering Canada. Although some operational data are collected by NSD (for example the number of files monitored, the number of visa applications referred from CIC and average processing time), these data cannot be used to measure the contribution of NSD admissibility screening to the eventual outcome of the visa application process. The absence of a feedback mechanism with CIC, which would provide NSD with an indication of the relevance and utility of the information provided, makes it difficult to assess whether adjustments and improvements are required.

In light of these findings, the evaluation makes the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1: Enforcement Branch, in collaboration with Operations Branch, develops and implements a performance measurement strategy for admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities.

Recommendation 2: Enforcement Branch collaborates with CIC to implement a quality assurance process that gathers regular feedback on the utility of the admissibility screening information provided by CBSA and its contribution to the final disposition of cases for which it was provided.

The existing MOU with CIC stipulates that MIOs spend no less than 70% of normal working hours on the core migration integrity activities that support the CBSA mandate. The evaluation found that a significant number of MIOs find it difficult to meet this requirement. 26% of MIOs report that they do not have adequate time for reporting and intelligence gathering and 24% have inadequate time to carry out 2^nd Level Anti-Fraud activities. In addition, almost 20% of MIOs report spending 50% or more of their time on immigration processing.

The evaluation noted the contribution of MIO migration integrity duties to cost avoidance. MIO collaboration with local law enforcement agencies and the travel industry results in the interception of approximately 5,500 illegal migrants each year. It has been estimated that detention, court and removal costs for individuals denied refugee status can range from $4,768-$41,085⁴ per claimant. Assuming that the 5,500 illegal migrants intercepted as a result of MIO activities would have eventually entered a refugee claim, the theoretical cost avoidance attributable to MIO activities is in the range of $26-$225 million per year.

In light of these findings, the evaluation makes the following recommendation:

Recommendation 3: Enforcement Branch develops options for enhancing the focus of the MIO function on intelligence gathering and anti-fraud activities and adjusts the level of services around ongoing immigration processing activities accordingly.

The current manner of collecting the financial information makes it difficult to clearly identify funding dedicated to specific admissibility activities. While financial information is available at the Cost Centre level and for the overall Screening Abroad People Program⁵, a lack of internal orders numbers for specific activities make it impossible to accurately identify costs per activity and reach a determination as to whether the volume of work achieved is reasonable given the financial resources allocated. This determination is made even more challenging by the absence of performance measurement strategies for the specific programs under the umbrella of the Screening Abroad People Program.

In light of these findings, the evaluation makes the following recommendation:

Recommendation 4: Enforcement Branch works with Comptrollership to develop an activity-based accounting structure that would facilitate better tracking of costs associated with these activities.

The introduction of the Screening Referral Request (SRR) secure application to the processing of temporary visa applications has enabled NSD to provide more timely responses to missions abroad, despite an increase in the number of cases referred for screening. SRR runs an automated query against the existing cases database in STS/SRR and incorporates a risk algorithm with an identified threshold. Ongoing quality assurance activities ensure that the threshold is effective.

In the case of admissibility screening of refugee claimants, Field Operations Support System (FOSS) does not provide the tracking functionality required by the Front-End Screening Unit (FES) for the ongoing monitoring of cases. FES currently manages this process using an excel spreadsheet which is updated based on a case status report run by CIC (and funded by CBSA). The process is inefficient and requires additional data entry on the part of staff at FES.⁶ As well, current systems do not have the capacity to transmit additional information that may have an impact on the original recommendation. Therefore, the unit must rely on e-mails to inform the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of any changes. Overall, the current processes result in additional work on the part of the FES to monitor and track cases.

In light of these findings, the evaluation makes the following recommendation:

Recommendation 5:  Enforcement Branch engages Innovation, Science and Technology Branch to develop a case tracking system for use by the Front-End Screening Unit. System functionality should include regular automated updates based on relevant information drawn from legacy systems such as FOSS.

Introduction and Context

More than 25 million persons who are not citizens or permanent residents of Canada arrived at Canadian Ports of Entry (POEs) in 2007-2008. With this high volume of travellers comes the risk that some individuals may pose a threat to Canada's security or may be inadmissible for other reasons. Within this context, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) defines the circumstances in which a person is deemed inadmissible, and allows Canada to pursue the maximum benefits realized from immigration, offer safe haven to the displaced and persecuted and maintain the security of Canadian society.⁷

Exhibit 1: Persons Entering Canada by Category⁸

Persons Entering Canada by Category

Categories	2005/2006	2006/2007	2007/2008
Immigrant & Former Resident	311,321	280,013	271,936
Non-Resident US Visitors	31,125,355	28,022,471	25,123,489
Non-Resident (non-USA) (direct)	2,954,474	3,070,469	3,156,113
Non-Resident (non-USA) Entry via USA	1,551,820	1,487,077	1,542,771

 

When the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) was created on December 12, 2003, the responsibility for immigration enforcement, interdiction, intelligence and processing at POEs was transferred to the Agency from Citizenship and Immigration (CIC). The CBSA's mandate includes ensuring that persons who pose a threat or risk to Canada and Canadians are prevented from entering or remaining in the country, while at the same time facilitating the flow of legitimate goods and people.

Purpose of the Evaluation

This report presents the evaluation findings of the admissibility⁹ screening and supporting intelligence activities that CBSA carries out in support of IRPA. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the continued relevance of the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities, their success in achieving expected results, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the design, delivery and management of the various activities under the admissibility screening umbrella.

This evaluation was identified as a priority in the 2007-2010 CBSA Risk-Based Multi-Year Evaluation Plan, approved by the CBSA Executive Evaluation Committee in November 2007. Some of the CBSA activities associated with admissibility screening received funding under the Government of Canada's Public Security and Anti-terrorism (PSAT) agenda, for which there are evaluation commitments to Treasury Board Secretariat.¹⁰

The Program Evaluation Division, Strategy and Coordination Branch planned and conducted this evaluation study. The evaluation research was carried out between July 2008 and May 2009. In preparation for this evaluation, the evaluation team, in consultation with key internal stakeholders, developed a logic model for admissibility screening. Based on the logic model, the evaluation team identified key evaluation issues and developed an evaluation plan.

Although various government departments contribute to the admissibility screening function, the evaluation focused only on those activities delivered by the CBSA. Exhibit 2 illustrates the activities included in, and excluded from, the scope of activities of the evaluation.

Exhibit 2: Scope of the Evaluation

Included in the Evaluation	Excluded from the Evaluation
National Security Division (NSD) people admissibility screening processes, including: Visitor Vetting Unit Front-End Screening (FES) Unit	Pre-Arrival targeting and related systems/risk assessment tools, including support to NRAC/regions
	War Crimes Program
CBSA's contribution to those Migration Integrity Program activities that support admissibility screening, including the role of  the Migration Integrity Officers (MIOs)	Detentions, Removals and Investigations
	Intelligence Liaison Officers (ILOs)
Intelligence products and processes that support admissibility screening	Security Certificates
Information technology systems supporting intelligence products used in the admissibility screening processes	High-Risk Traveller Identification (HRTI)

Overview of CBSA Admissibility Screening and Supporting Intelligence Activities

A key element of the CBSA's approach to combat irregular migration is its "multiple borders strategy" (Exhibit 3). The strategy strives to "push the border out" so that people posing a risk to Canada's security and prosperity are identified as far away from the actual border as possible, ideally before a person departs their country of origin. Admissibility screening occurs prior to the arrival of an individual in Canada or after they have entered the country in order to ensure that those who are inadmissible do not enter or cannot remain in Canada.

Exhibit 3:  Multiple Border Strategy

The responsibility for ensuring the compliance with and enforcement of the inadmissibility sections of IRPA are shared by CIC and the CBSA. The Agency's activities include providing assistance to visa officers and immigration program officers in determining the admissibility of applicants. This function is delivered through three main components:

• Headquarters (HQ) Intelligence Directorate, including;
  • Front-End Screening Unit (FES)
  • Visitor Vetting Unit
  • Intelligence Risk Assessment & Analysis Division (IRAAD);
• Migration Integrity Officers (MIOs); and
• Regional Intelligence Officers (RIOs).

The HQ and MIO network components are part of the umbrella Screening Abroad People Programs. This program includes the MIO network, the National Security Division (NSD) units including Front-end Screening and Visitor Screening, the Transporter Obligation Program and the Document Integrity Program. Only the MIO network, the Front-End Screening and Visitor Vetting Units were examined within the scope of this evaluation study.

Admissibility screening is conducted on refugee claimants, applicants for permanent residence, temporary visa applicants and permanent residents who apply for Canadian citizenship. The CBSA monitors the screening process for refugee claimants, and screens visa applicants and permanent resident applicants. The Canada Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) conducts admissibility screening of citizenship applicants.

Temporary Visa Applicants

Approximately 1.2 million visitors, students and workers (Exhibit 4) entered Canada in 2008. The majority of these people either had their applications for a visa granted by a CIC visa officer or a work or study permit issued by a CBSA border service officer (BSO) at the POE without additional admissibility scrutiny.¹¹ Cases where a visa officer may have an admissibility concern are referred for further screening to the CBSA Visitor Vetting Unit or, for requests from citizens or residents of countries suspected of assisting terrorists, endorsing terrorist activities or serving as potential bases for terrorist operations, to the CSIS Visa Vetting unit. In some cases, RCMP assistance may also be sought.

A significant portion of the admissibility screening activities carried out by CBSA is in the area of Temporary Visa Requests (TVR). Of the 1,008,874 TVR applications received by CIC in 2008, 59,054 (5.8 %) were referred to NSD for further screening. The results of these screening activities, along with any results from the CSIS screening activities, are then conveyed to the appropriate CIC visa officer. It is the CIC visa officer who makes the final decision on whether or not a visa is issued.

Exhibit 4: Temporary Resident Applications Abroad¹²

Temporary Resident Applications Abroad

Applications	2005	2006	2007	2008
Temporary Resident (Visitor) VISA (TVR)	923,349	975,828	971,337	902,654
Temporary Work Permit	110,599	128,978	162,729	188,837
Temporary Study Permit	87,223	92,175	97,240	100,982
Total Temporary Resident VISA Applications (Abroad)	1,121,171	1,196,981	1,239,306	1,192,473

Refugee Claimants

Canada is one of the primary destinations for asylum seekers within the industrialized world. In 2008, Canada ranked second in the number of refugee claimants among the 44 industrialized countries reporting to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).¹³

Exhibit 5: Refugee Claimants at POEs and Inland¹⁴

Refugee Claimants at POEs and Inland

Claims	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total Claimants	19,771	22,956	28,533	36,912
Inland Claims	12,384	14,280	14,618	17,953
Land Border Claims	4,042	4,477	8,194	10,797
Airport Claims	3,345	4,199	5,721	8,162

In 2008, 49% of all refugee claims were entered inland. The number of refugee claims made at airports in 2008 increased by 43% from the previous year. For the past five years, Mexico has been the primary source country for refugee claimants, representing 9,467 refugee claims in 2008.  

Whether a refugee claim is entered at the POE or inland, the CBSA officer must establish the identity of the claimant and then determine whether the claimant is eligible to have his claim referred to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB).¹⁵ Should the individual be deemed ineligible to enter a refugee claim, a removal order is issued.¹⁶

CBSA's Front-End Screening Unit's mandate is to coordinate the refugee¹⁷ screening program with CSIS, the IRB and regional and local CIC/CBSA offices, ensuring to the fullest extent possible, admissibility screening is completed by CSIS prior to a claimant's hearing at the IRB.¹⁸ The unit liaises with regional and local staff to ensure that data on claims is entered accurately and promptly into FOSS for transmissions to CSIS for screening. CSIS conducts the screening to determine whether there is evidence to indicate that the claimant may be inadmissible to Canada for security reasons.¹⁹ The final decision on the claimant's admissibility is rendered at the local office or by the Immigration Division of the IRB.²⁰

Exhibit 6: Permanent Resident Visa Applications²¹

Permanent Resident Visa Applications

Applications	2005	2006	2007	2008
Applications (Abroad)	308,893	375,677	14,618	413,903
VISAs Issued Abroad	213,635	216,278	216,285	215,034
Permanent Residents Admittted	262,236	251,649	236,758	204,781

Permanent Residence Applicants

Every year, Canadian missions abroad receive hundreds of thousands of applications for permanent residence (Exhibit 6) under the various immigration programs.²²  Permanent Resident Application screening requests are sent individually by the visa officer to the CBSA, CSIS and the RCMP. CSIS and the RCMP forward any No Reportable Trace (NRT)²³ results directly to the appropriate CIC visa office abroad. CSIS forwards any negative results to CBSA in the form of a Security Brief. The NSD reviews each Security Brief and adds any additional material to reflect specific CBSA concerns before forwarding it to the appropriate mission. The decision to grant the permanent resident visa is made by the CIC visa officer. CBSA's role in the admissibility screening of permanent residents is not as central to the process as it is with Temporary Visa Requests (TVR) applications.

Migration Integrity Officers (MIOs)

CBSA and CIC partner in delivering the Migration Integrity Program. Integral to this program are the CBSA MIOs located at various Canadian missions abroad.²⁴ MIOs provide direct support to admissibility screening activities by reviewing applications at the mission and carrying out background checks to validate information provided on applications.

At the time the evaluation study was conducted there were 55 MIOs²⁵ located in 37 countries at 45 locations around the globe. Mandated to ensure the integrity of Canada's border through intelligence, interdiction and anti-fraud activities, MIOs are involved in a wide range of activities including:

• identifying fraud indicators for visa officers;
• training local airlines and authorities to identify fraudulent documents;
• monitoring of flight check-in and boarding processes alongside airline personnel;
• ensuring that transportation companies comply with terms stipulated in the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with international carriers;²⁶
• providing assistance to facilitate removals from Canada;  
• intelligence gathering and reporting; and
• representing Canada in bilateral and multilateral fora.

Evaluation Methodology

This section provides an overview of the research methodologies used to answer the following evaluation research questions:

Exhibit 7: Key Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Issue	Evaluation Questions
Relevance	Do the CBSA admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities continue to be aligned with government-wide and CBSA priorities?
	To what extent do admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities address an actual need?
Program design  and delivery	To what extent is the governance and management structure for the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities effective?
	How effective is the CBSA in collaborating and partnering with CIC?
	How effective are the communication channels for managing and delivering the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities?
	To what extent is the training given to personnel delivering the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence function adequate to support activities?
	Is there a strategy to measure performance of the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities?
Success/progress	To what extent do admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities and the Agency's partnerships with other Canadian Government departments (OGDs) and international partners contribute to the prevention of inadmissible persons being issued a Canadian Visa, permanent resident (PR) or refugee status?
	To what extent do the intelligence databases and systems contribute to the effectiveness of detecting inadmissible persons?
	To what extent has the CBSA increased its capacity/effectiveness to identify inadmissible persons? To what extent has the capacity improved over time?
	Have the current admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities resulted in unintended outcomes or impacts?
Program efficiency	Are there sufficient resources and infrastructure in place to deliver on the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities?
	To what extent do the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities make the best use of resources?
	Are there more efficient and effective methods for delivering admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities?

Review and Analysis of Program Documents and Data

The following documents and data were reviewed and analyzed:

• CBSA, CIC, CSIS and IRB public reports (i.e., DPR, RPP, public reports, annual reports, reports to Parliament, evaluation and audit reports);
• Program documents such as program guides, relevant correspondence, training materials, budget and expenditure reports;
• Relevant policy documents, including CIC-CBSA MOU: Migration Integrity Program Management Framework; Building New Bridges: A Collaborative Partnership on Intelligence between CIC and the CBSA, and 2008 Migration Integrity Review – Overview and Options Analysis to Guide Program Direction;
• Intelligence reports, including Weekly Intelligence Digests, 2008 Border Threat and Risk Assessment, Year Ahead 2008 and Year Ahead 2009: Canada and Irregular Migration;
• Internet sites of the CBSA, CIC, IRB, DFAIT and other government internet sites;
• CBSA national statistics and performance data from sources such as Consolidated Management Reporting System (CMRS), National Security Division (NSD), as well as regional data;
• CIC, IRB and CSIS statistics and performance data from the DPR, RPP and annual reports as well as website content;
• Budget and/or expenditure information from the Corporate Administrative System (CAS) and the different areas/units involved in admissibility screening activities.

In-Depth Interviews

The evaluation team conducted interviews at CBSA Headquarters (HQ) with representatives from Admissibility; Enforcement; Innovation, Science and Technology (IST); and Operations Branches. Interviews were also held with management at CIC, CSIS and the IRB. A breakdown of the interviews is shown in Exhibit 8.

Exhibit 8: Interviews Conducted

Interview Category	Number of Interviews
CBSA NHQ Management and Staff	9
CBSA Regional Management and Staff	15
CSIS NHQ Management	6
CIC NHQ Management	6
IRB Management	3
Total	39

Survey of Migration Integrity Officers

An electronic survey of the MIOs was conducted to capture details pertaining to the types of activities they carry out; the nature of their networks and workload; and their levels of satisfaction with the resources available to them, including intelligence information, communications, and systems.

The survey was conducted from March 2-13, 2009. Forty-five out of a total of 55 MIOs completed the survey, representing a completion rate of 82%.

Site Visit

The evaluation team conducted one site visit in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) Region. The site was selected based on volume of immigration-related traffic and inland enforcement and intelligence capacity. During the site visit, the team observed the processes for admission of travellers to Canada and conducted interviews with CBSA regional staff and management.  

Study Limitations

While CBSA is in many ways a data- and information-rich organization, there were limitations to what could be used for the purposes of the study. The lack of a measurement framework for admissibility screening performance with measurable outcomes, means that the data captured cannot be directly linked to outcomes. As a result, the evaluation was not able to measure the contribution of admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities to the prevention of inadmissible persons entering Canada, nor was it possible to measure changes in the effectiveness of these activities over time.

Key Findings

Relevance of Admissibility Screening

Do the CBSA admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities continue to be aligned with government-wide and CBSA priorities?

The work carried out by various organizations within CBSA in support of the immigration program and specifically the admissibility screening activity is firmly grounded in legislative authority. The role of CBSA in determining admissibility is confirmed in the Canada Border Services Agency Act which establishes the Minister's responsibility for "enforcement policies and determinations relating to inadmissibility of persons for reasons of:²⁷

• security
• organized criminality
• violation of human or international rights."

The screening duties performed by the border services officers (BSO) at the POEs at Primary Inspection Line (PIL) and immigration secondary is established in the Customs Act under Part 11 (11) governing presentation of persons on arrival in Canada which states that every person arriving in Canada must present themselves to an officer and truthfully answer any questions asked by the officer.

Section 4 (2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of Canada (IRPA) identifies the Minister²⁸ as being responsible for the administration of the IRPA as it relates to:

1. examinations at the ports of entry;
2. the enforcement of this Act, including arrest, detention and removal;
3. the establishment of policies respecting the enforcement of this Act and inadmissibility on the grounds of security, organized criminality or violating human or international rights; or
4. (determinations under any of the subsections 34(2), 35(2) and 37(2).

These activities support the Government of Canada's priorities related to national security and public safety while at the same time facilitating the flow of legitimate persons and goods. The current government's continued commitment to protecting the safety and security of Canada and Canadians was outlined in the 2007 Speech from The Throne and subsequent budget. Admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities are clearly a public safety issue and, therefore, rightfully belong under the umbrella of the Public Safety portfolio.

Admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities at the beginning of the visa process at the missions abroad supports the multiple border strategy by preventing those people who pose a risk to Canada's security and prosperity from entering Canada. In doing so, these activities directly support the border vision by having the screening of people done in or closer to their country of origin and they fit with the CBSA concept of "pushing out the borders."²⁹

Exhibits 9 and 10 show the number of temporary and permanent resident applications that were approved and refused by CIC for the last four calendar years. While not all those applications that were refused can be directly linked to input from CBSA, the Agency conducts admissibility screening on a percentage of permanent and temporary visa applications submitted abroad. As an example, in FY 2008-2009 the Agency conducted admissibility screening on 5.8% (59,054) of the Temporary Visitor Request Applications (Exhibit 9) ³⁰  and 0.44% (1,592) of the Permanent Resident Applications.³¹

Exhibit 9: Temporary Visitor Request - Cases

Year	2005		2006		2007		2008
Total	757,469	164,154	805,330	175,773	829,386	193,904	823,199	211,096
Class	Approved	Refused	Approved	Refused	Approved	Refused	Approved	Refused
Visitor	607,421	137,028	638,951	146,102	637,927	150,737	597,678	154,314
Temporary Worker	86,917	7,069	98,368	9,440	120,199	22,304	146,533	34,297
Study	63,131	20,057	68,011	20,231	71,260	20,863	78,988	22,485

Exhibit 10: Permanent Resident Applications - Cases

Year	2005		2006		2007		2008
Total	104,794	42,774	107,138	36,380	108,248	33,115	107,150	35,972
Class	Approved	Refused	Approved	Refused	Approved	Refused	Approved	Refused
Economic	52,497	33,160	56,157	26,134	56,027	21,929	55,834	25,456
Family	45,837	6,924	44,206	7,458	45,457	8,440	45,147	8,492
Refugees	6,460	2,690	6,775	2,788	6,764	2,746	6,169	2,024

Working closely with transportation companies and local law enforcement agencies, MIOs have contributed to the successful interception³² of people before they depart for Canada. On average, 5,500 interceptions per year³³ have been made since 2002. A direct consequence of this work is the reduction in the number of Improperly Documented Arrivals (IDA) at Canadian POEs. The prevention of these people from reaching Canada eliminates or reduces the downstream costs associated with their potential removal from Canada. (See Program Efficiency section for more details.)

Exhibit 11: Interceptions and Improperly Documented Arrivals (IDA)³⁴

Interceptions and Improperly Documented Arrivals (IDA)

	2005/2006	2006/2007	2007/2008
Interceptions	5,145	4,796	4,125
Improperly Documented Arrivals (IDA)	2,329	2,423	2,124

 

In addition, the MIOs at the various missions provide direct anti-fraud³⁵ support to the CIC visa officers through various activities such as document verification, background checks to validate information provided on applications and site visits. Exhibit 12 shows the number of permanent and temporary visa applications that were refused in FY 2008/2009 as a direct result of these activities.
  

Exhibit 12:  Applications Denied As a Result of MIO 1st Level Anti-Fraud Activities³⁶

Applications Denied As a Result of MIO 1st Level Anti-Fraud Activities

Denied Applications	Count	Percentage
Temporary Visitor	1,240	59.5%
Temporary Foreign Worker	544	26.1%
Study	185	8.9%
Immigrant (Permanent Resident)	115	5.5%

Under the IRPA neither CIC nor CSIS have the legislative mandate to carry out the detailed admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities delivered by CBSA. While CSIS has a mandate to perform security and criminality admissibility screening in support of the IRPA, it is narrow in scope³⁷ and does not cover the sections of the IRPA that are a CBSA responsibility, such as war crimes and organized crime.

The decision to approve a permanent or temporary resident application and grant the applicable visa rests with the CIC Visa Officer. In cases that are not clear cut, the CIC Visa Officer relies on the detailed admissibility screening and supporting intelligence provided by CBSA for informing that decision-making process. As a consequence of the transfer of Intelligence resources from CIC to CBSA, CIC no longer has the capacity to provide the supporting intelligence necessary to inform the decision making; accordingly "CIC remains the primary external immigration intelligence client for the CBSA".³⁸ The absence of these activities would likely result in one or more of the following outcomes: longer wait times for application approvals, denial of a visa to a person who is admissible, inadmissible persons receiving a visa, increased referrals from PIL to immigration secondary and longer processing times at immigration secondary.

To what extent do admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities address an actual need?

The vast majority of the 20-30 million travellers that enter Canada with no admissibility screening do so from countries requiring no entry visa. The Agency's admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities are focused where the risk is perceived to be the greatest, that is applicants and/or countries of origin that have visa requirements for entry into Canada.

The evaluation study examined the placement of the MIO positions in the four international regions as identified by CIC and CBSA, in relation to the volume of temporary and permanent resident applications received and processed in the applicable region (Exhibit 13). The overall placement of the MIO positions is roughly aligned with the relative volumes of applications (Exhibit 14).
 
Exhibit 13: MIO Positions 2008-2009

Exhibit 14: Placement of MIOs in Relation to Volume of Applications³⁹

	# Temporary Visitor Request (TVR) Applications for 2008			#  Permanent Resident Applications for 2008			MIO Positions
Total	1,064,086 (100%)	597,678 (100%)	154,314 (100%)	189,937 (100%)	107,748 (100%)	36,077 (100%)	56 (100%)
Location (Regions as per CIC)	Total Applications	Approved	Refused	Total Applications	Approved	Refused
Africa and the Middle East	138,636 (13.0%)	70,737 (11.8%)	31,345 (20.3%)	30,787 (16.2%)	14,682 (13.6%)	3,667 (10.2%)	9 positions (16.1%)
Asia and the Pacific	439,597 (41.3%)	223,800 (37.4%)	65,931 (42.7%)	64,208 (33.8%)	42,193 (39.2%)	17,294 (47.9%)	20 positions (35.7%)
Europe	156,795 (14.7%)	84,756 (14.1%)	16,393 (10.6%)	29,400 (15.5%)	21,180 (19.7%)	9,115 (25.3%)	12 positions (21.4%)
Western Hemisphere (Americas)	329,058 (30.9%)	218,385 (36.5%)	40,645 (26.3%)	65,542 (34.5%)	29,693 (27.6%)	6,001 (16.6%)	15 positions (26.8%)

The annual immigration targets set by CIC are expected to remain relatively high at 265,000. As previously indicated, the Agency conducted admissibility screening on 5.8% (59,054) of the Temporary Visitor Request Applications and 0.44% (1,592) of the Permanent Resident Applications in FY 2008-2009.

The number of temporary visa applications being referred for further screening by CIC to CBSA/NSD has steadily increased over the last three years as illustrated in Exhibit 15.While the total number of temporary visa applications received at missions abroad has not changed significantly, the number of cases referred, as a percentage of total cases, has increased.

The number of Permanent Resident (PR) visa applications referred for further screening has increased between 2006/2007 and 2008/2009 (Exhibit 15), in part due to the updating of the indicators used by CIC visa officers to assist in admissibility determination.

Exhibit 15: Permanent Resident Visa Application Referred for Screening to CBSA

FY	War Crimes	Organized Crime	Terrorism	Other NSD Screening	Total
2006-2007	218	89	417	644	1,368
2007-2008	309	102	437	848	1,696
2008-2009	339	91	366	796	1,592

Furthermore, Canada has recorded successive increases in the number of refugee claimants over the last four years (Exhibit 4). It is anticipated that numbers will remain high into 2009 as enhanced control and enforcement initiatives in the US and the European Union are expected to produce secondary refugee movements⁴⁰ to Canada.⁴¹

Program Design and Delivery

To what extent is the governance and management structure for the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities effective?

With respect to division of roles and responsibilities between partner organizations, the majority of those interviewed indicated that the overall roles and responsibilities of the main partner organizations of CBSA, CIC and CSIS pertaining to admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities are understood. The general consensus was that the division of the roles and responsibilities was appropriate and in line with the mandates of the various partners.

The evaluation noted that the MIO network and the International Networks Support Unit⁴² management structure has been identified as potentially needing to be overhauled in order to deliver on its activities in support of the CBSA mandate. The 2008 Migration Integrity Review highlighted a number of issues with the current management structure of the MIO network requiring attention. For example, while the CIC-CBSA MOU specifies a shared management approach for the MIO network, CIC provides local supervision and performance appraisals as well as budget and other logistical management at the mission level. However, this shared management approach does not apply to the new MIO positions created as a result of the Canadian Experience Class (CEC) funding, as these resources are not covered under the terms of the current MOU. As a result, responsibility for the provision of management support activities for these positions is unclear. While CIC has agreed to provide support on an interim basis, a more permanent solution needs to be identified and agreed to by CBSA and CIC.

The recently completed CBSA International Program Review puts forth several recommendations on the Agency's international footprint moving forward, including the creation of an International Directorate to provide administrative and financial support to Agency resources abroad. The review also recommends the creation of an international Frontière-Border (FB)stream that would include both the MIO and Border Integrity Officer (BIO) functions⁴³ which, if implemented, would facilitate greater efficiency and better linkages between traveller and commercial intelligence activities abroad.

How effective is the CBSA in collaborating and partnering with CIC?

The CIC-CBSA MOU signed in March, 2006 recognizes the responsibilities of both CIC and CBSA for the overall achievement of the objectives ofIRPA.⁴⁴ A review of the CIC-CBSA MOU in 2007 found that improvements were needed in the area of resources, communication and information sharing; however, no changes to the MOU were identified at that time. Recent activities, including the addition of 12 new MIO positions under the CEC program, the 2008 review of the CBSA Migration Integrity program and the just completed CBSA International Program review have raised questions as to the appropriateness of the MIOs role in support of the immigration program, as well as the management structure supporting the MIO network. These questions were echoed in a number of the interviews conducted within CBSA. Given the evidence, the evaluation team believes that a review of the MOU is warranted to determine whether it allows for the degree of control over international resources the Agency needs to ensure that the activities of these resources fully support the CBSA mandate.

How effective are the communication channels for managing and delivering the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities?

Interviewees reported that, in the early years of the Agency, the roles and responsibilities for admissibility screening activities within CBSA were not always clear to partner organizations. This made the day-to-day management of the function and associated communications somewhat difficult, in that tracking files or addressing issues were time consuming. Even the identification of the person/unit responsible for a specific case file was at times difficult. Interviewees saw recent efforts within CBSA to clearly identify the National Security Division as the single window for admissibility screening activities as a positive step and making day-to-day management more efficient by facilitating easier communication between partners.

Survey responses from the MIOs indicated a general overall level of satisfaction with the communications with internal and external organizations. MIOs reported high levels of satisfaction with communications with both the Immigration Program Manager (IPM) at the mission and MI Support at CBSA HQ (88.9% reported they were satisfied or very satisfied with communications with the IPM and 80% indicated they were satisfied or very satisfied with communications with MI Support).

Interview and survey data indicates that the direct sharing of intelligence-related information between MIOs and RIOs occurs on a regular basis and contributes to the timeliness of CBSA's input to the process for admissibility screening determination. MIOs often rely on RIOs to validate information on immigration applications such as details pertaining to where applicant will be living, working, and/or going to school. For example, one such background check carried out on several applications from Ukrainian nationals to attend a conference found that the address provided on the applications was in actual fact a nail care salon.

To what extent is the training given to personnel delivering the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence function adequate to support activities?

In the survey, MIOs were asked to indicate how the training they received throughout their career prepared them to perform the key activities. In all areas at least 60% of the MIOs indicated that as a result of their training they were prepared or very prepared to perform the key activities (Exhibit 16).

Exhibit 16: MIO-Reported Training Received

The training I have received throughout my career has prepared me to perform…	Very prepared	Prepared	Neutral	Unprepared	Very unprepared	Never received training	No response
Interdiction - Airline Liaison	48.9%	35.6%	8.9%	0.0%	0.0%	4.4%	2.2%
Interdiction - Document Examination & Seizure	33.3%	60.0%	4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%
Interdiction - Training	33.3%	48.9%	8.9%	4.4%	0.0%	2.2%	2.2%
Reporting and Intelligence Gathering	40.0%	35.6%	8.9%	6.7%	2.2%	2.2%	4.4%
1st Level Anti-fraud	35.6%	31.1%	17.8%	8.9%	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%
2nd Level Anti-fraud	24.4%	42.2%	15.6%	6.7%	4.4%	6.7%	0.0%
Removals	22.2%	37.8%	24.4%	6.7%	0.0%	6.7%	2.2%
International Liaison and Cooperation	31.1%	51.1%	6.7%	2.2%	2.2%	6.7%	0.0%
Immigration Processing	40%	37.8%	11.1%	4.4%	0.0%	2.2%	4.4%

The International Networks Support unit, formerly Migration Integrity Support, conducted a Post Mortem and Evaluation of the 2008 MIO course that they deliver to new MIOs prior to their posting abroad or MIOs who are being cross-posted to a different mission. Based on this information, modifications were made to the course such as more specific examples to amplify module topics, addition of Support System for Intelligence (SSI) lab time and a more comprehensive anti-fraud module. Response of MIOs to the proposed changes was not available at the time of the evaluation as the first course incorporating these changes was just underway.

There is no learning framework to support admissibility screening which makes it more difficult to identify potential gaps in existing training; however some areas were identified during the evaluation.

The Training and Learning Directorate offers a number of courses that are well suited to meet the job requirements of those who deliver on the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities. One such course is the Information Gathering and Reporting Course (IGR). Many of those interviewed in the regions indicated that this course provides the BSOs, particularly in immigration secondary, with a good basic foundation in law, policy, and best practices in collecting and disseminating information within CBSA. However, without a learning framework  and associated learning paths or streams that supports the delivery of this horizontal function, it is not clear to either the BSOs themselves or to their immediate supervisors or Superintendents that a course such as this should be an integral component to the professional development of a BSO. While a Port of Entry community has been specifically identified on the Training and Learning portal it does not list the IGR as a course that would be applicable to members of that community. As a result, it may be overlooked as a potential solution to an identified, individual learning need.

During the regional site visit and in the interviews, potential training gaps were identified in level of skill related to interviewing techniques. Currently two basic courses are available in this area: Interview Techniques, and Interview Skills and Behavioural Analysis. Neither one address the potential gap in interviewing skills specific to the work carried out in immigration secondary. Interview Techniques is focused on techniques that would be applicable in interviewing the general public; and Interview Skills and Behavioural Analysis is focused on the interviewing of "suspects" during an investigation or similar type of activity.

For people arriving in Canada who request either work or study permits at the POE or for claimants entering a Refugee claim, it is the BSO in immigration secondary who grants the permit or determines if the person is eligible to enter a refugee claim. The Agency employs job shadowing to develop knowledge and expertise of the BSOs working in immigration secondary; however, there are no accompanying national standards for that experience.

As a result of the lack of standards, there is no detailed information provided to the regions responsible for conducting this portion of the training as to the specific objectives that need to be achieved, to what level or standard these objectives need to be achieved, or what measures should be used to determine whether or not the BSO has achieved the objectives. When the function was delivered under CIC, there were standards detailed for the job-shadowing experience and these standards were used across regions and modes; however, when the function was moved to CBSA the evaluation study could find no evidence that those standards were transferred or modified for use within CBSA. A concern voiced during the interviews was that the lack of national standards for the job-shadowing experience lends itself to inconsistency and regional variations.

Is there a strategy to measure performance of the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities?

The evaluation found that there are opportunities for the Agency to strengthen the performance measurement and reporting around the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities. There is no overall performance measurement framework for the function nor do the individual activities such as security screening, which would include the Front-end Screening (FES) and the Visa Vetting Unit, and the MIO Network, have individual frameworks linking activities to outcomes.  

Data are collected; for example the FES unit counts the number of files that are tracked and monitored in a given year, and the Visitor Vetting Unit tracks the number of temporary visitor visa request applications referred from CIC, as well as the average turn around time for processing a No Reportable Trace (NRT) return back to the missions abroad. Limited data exists that can be used to attribute the work to the final outcome of the visa application process and the admissibility determination.

The International Networks Support unit has made modifications to the reporting criteria for the MIO activities to include identifying the number of permanent and temporary resident applications that have been refused as a consequence of MIO anti-fraud activity (Exhibit 11). Additional modifications to the MIO reporting have been made for FY 2009-2010 to further quantify the direct contribution of MIO activities to the admissibility determination decision.

Success/Progress

To what extent do admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities, and the Agency's partnerships with Canadian OGDs and international partners contribute to the prevention of inadmissible persons being issued a Canadian Visa, permanent resident or refugee status? 

While the MIOs are now reporting on the number of visa applications refused as a direct result of their anti-fraud activities, there are no standard data available on the extent to which the screening results provided by the units within NSD at CBSA directly influence a decision on whether or not an individual is admissible to Canada. Interview data would suggest that should the Agency provide CIC with adverse information on a visa application, the likely end result is a decision to deny the applicant a visa. However, there is no formal, regular feedback mechanism in place in which CBSA is provided with an indication of the quality, relevance or completeness of the information that is provided to CIC. Such information, including an indication of the contribution that the information made to the final admissibility determination, would indicate to NSD the relevance and utility of the information provided, enabling it to assess whether adjustments and improvements are required.

To what extent are the intelligence databases and systems contributing to the effectiveness of detecting inadmissible persons?

The introduction of the SRR to the processing of temporary visa applications has enabled the Visitor Vetting Unit within NSD to provide a more timely response back to the missions abroad. SRR runs an automated query against the existing cases database in the Secure Tracking System (STS)/SRR and incorporates an associated risk algorithm with an identified threshold. If the risk scoring of the application is below the threshold, a No Reportable Trace (NRT) result is returned to the mission. Regular quality assurance activities, such as random selection and review of applications returned with NRT, are undertaken to ensure that the set threshold in the SRR risk algorithm continues to be effective.  

The current agreed upon service standard with CIC for the return of cases with NRT is 10 days. Prior to the introduction of SRR, the NSD unit required the full timeframe to provide the NRT results of the admissibility screening. According to the program area, approximately 80% of the screening requests are now returned with a NRT back to the missions within 6 days. At the same time, the total number of cases referred to NSD has increased, going from 43,380 in 2007 to 59,054 in 2008, indicating that overall performance in delivery of this activity is enhanced. Today only 23 missions have access to SRR; however, plans are in place to roll out SRR to the remaining missions as funding becomes available. Furthermore, the intent is to introduce SRR for the processing of referral requests for permanent resident visa applications sometime in the future.⁴⁵

The Front-end Screening unit (FES) is the section within NSD responsible for tracking and monitoring the CSIS security screening process for refugees and informing the IRB on whether screening has been completed or not. The FES manages this process often using ad-hoc "work arounds" in FOSS and updates by electronic mail. The tracking functionality that is necessary for this unit to effectively carry out its responsibility is not available in FOSS, where the case information is entered originally at POEs or inland. As a result, CBSA provides funding to CIC Information Management and Technologies Branch (IMTB) to run case status reports. This is due to the lack of any upgrading to the FOSS refugee module since 2001. A proposal for changes to the module is currently with ISTB and CIC's IMTB for review and provision of costing information.

Additionally, should new information come to light on a case following the initial CSIS assessment, the FOSS/Synchronous Technology and Application Release (STAR) interface between CIC and the IRB is not configured to send/receive a second security decision. Consequently, the unit must send an e-mail to the Refugee Protection Division of the IRB to inform them of any changes to the initial security decision when the initial No Reportable Trace (NRT) notification has been revoked by CSIS. Once a second NRT decision is rendered, a cumulative report is forwarded to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) upon their request. The processes in place as "work arounds" result in additional work on the part of the FES to monitor cases and track the progress of the security decision results.

To what extent has the CBSA increased its capacity/effectiveness to identify inadmissible persons? To what extent has the capacity improved over time?

In the past MIOs' anti-fraud activity was focused primarily at 2nd level anti-fraud. With the introduction of the Canadian Experience Class (CEC) by CIC there were concerns that 1st level⁴⁶ anti-fraud would increase and, as a result, CBSA received funding for an additional 12 MIO positions. For the most part, these positions have been set up in missions that already have established MIO positions, thereby allowing the MIOs in the newly created positions to focus their activities on 1st level anti-fraud. This has served to strengthen CBSA's capacity to support the immigration program. The CEC is a new program. Consequently, at the time of the evaluation study there was no evidence to indicate that there had been increased fraud activities directly related to this program. Therefore, no determination was made as to the effectiveness of these additional MIO resources in providing support to an admissibility determination in applications submitted under the CEC program. However, in FY 2008-2009, MIOs' 1st level anti-fraud activities resulted in the identification of close to 2,000 fraudulent documents (Exhibit 17).

Exhibit 17: MIO Network 1st Level Anti-Fraud Document Examination FY 2008-2009

MIO Network 1st Level Anti-Fraud Document Examination FY 2008-2009

Continent	Fraudulent Documents Identified	Documents Found Genuine
Total	1,913	11,633
Americas	528	5,148
Europe	221	1,184
Africa & M.E.	483	1,736
Asia	681	3,565

The Intelligence Risk Assessment and Analysis Division (IRAAD) within the Intelligence Directorate provides current intelligence products such as the Weekly Intelligence Digest and Intelligence Bulletins. These products provide MIOs and BSOs in immigration secondary with valuable information to assist in identifying irregular migrants and inadmissible persons. When asked about their satisfaction level with the relevance of various IRAAD outputs, 84.4% of MIOs indicated the relevance of the weekly intelligence reports as satisfactory to very satisfactory. The same level of satisfaction was noted with respect to the relevance of the Irregular Migration Trend Reports. In addition, IRAAD produces the various strategic risk assessments on irregular migration and fraud associated with the immigration program. As a result of a recent survey that IRAAD conducted and consultations with HQ and front-line users within CBSA and at CIC, IRAAD is reviewing its current product offerings with the aim of providing products better linked to the needs identified by the various client groups.

Have the current admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities resulted in unintended outcomes or impacts?

The SRR secure system is designed to enhance the delivery of the admissibility screening of temporary resident applications. While available data would suggest that the introduction of SRR has resulted in the reduction of the wait times for screening results to be transmitted to the appropriate mission abroad, it also appears that its introduction has resulted in increased workload at the missions. The increased workload results from the requirement to enter virtually the same information in both SRR and the Computer Assisted Immigration Processing System (CAIPS). National Case Management System features to be introduced in 2010 will eliminate this problem.

Program Efficiency

Are there sufficient resources and infrastructure in place to deliver on the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities?

The evaluation study found no conclusive evidence to indicate that the overall resources necessary to support admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities were not sufficient. The Visitor Vetting Unit at NSD has been able, with the introduction of SRR, to reduce its response time for approximately 80% of the referral requests received on TVR applications from 10 to six days. The sections in NSD that conduct the detailed screening on referred permanent resident applications have identified service standards for providing a response back to the applicable mission. For example, applications under the Urgent Protection Program (UPP)⁴⁷ require a response within 48 hours. For those applications where the individual has been deemed Vulnerable⁴⁸ by CIC the required response time is three months, and for all other cases the acceptable response time is 12 months. The lack of available data around the Agency's ability to meet these standard times makes it difficult to determine if the Agency's capacity has improved or diminished over time.

To what extent does the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities make the best use of resources?

While financial information is available at the Cost Centre level and for the overall Screening Abroad People Program, the lack of internal orders for specific activities and units such as FES, and the Visitor Vetting Unit, makes it impossible to measure the costs per activity and reach a determination on the reasonableness of the volume of work achieved compared to the financial resources allocated. This determination is made more challenging by the lack of performance measurement strategies for the specific programs under the umbrella of the Screening Abroad People Program.

The evaluation study was able to obtain certain financial information to provide a sense of the resources that contribute to the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities of the Agency. The Intelligence Directorate and its various divisions deliver on the majority of the admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities within the Agency. Exhibit 18 presents the overall salary and Operating & Maintenance (O&M) expenditures for the various Cost Centres associated with this function.⁴⁹

Exhibit 18: Planned and Actual Expenditures – CBSA's Screening Abroad People Programs 

Planned and Actual Expenditures	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010
Total	41,352,000	45,881,000	35,531,000	34,401,000
O&M	6,694,000	7,684,000	5,180,000	4,203,000
Salary	34,659,000	38,197,000	30,350,000	30,198,000

For the calendar year 2008 this funding, in whole or in part, enabled the Agency to provide admissibility screening for 5.8% (59,054) of the Temporary Visa Applications (Exhibit 20) and 0.44% (1,592) of the Permanent Resident applications for FY 2008-2009.⁵⁰

The expenditures identified above include a majority of the funding that has been given for activities related to admissibility screening and supporting activities under the Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) initiative as identified in Exhibit 19. The funding, with the exception of Canadian Experience Class (CEC), was originally provided to CIC and then transferred to the Agency after its creation.

Exhibit 19: PSAT Funding

Activity	Funding (Operating Costs)	Type of Funding
Screening & Anti-Fraud (00371)51	$9,404,200	Ongoing since Dec 2001
Case Intervention (00308)52	$1,342,200	Ongoing  since Dec 2001
Intelligence Officers Abroad (00299)53	$4,031,100	Ongoing since Sep 2003
Intelligence Branch (00300)	$3,119,400	Ongoing since May 2002
Total Ongoing Funding	$17,896,900
Canadian Experience Class(00559) 54	$6,913,100	One-time funding FY 07/08
Total Funding for FY 07/08	$24,810,000

The current CIC-CBSA MOU stipulates that MIOs spend not less than 70% of normal working hours on core Migration Integrity activities that directly support the CBSA mandate.⁵⁵ While the MOU does not clearly identify what those activities are, the MOU does state that MIOs "will not be assigned to regular processing duties that would prevent them from delivering their core activities."⁵⁶ "Regular processing duties" can be interpreted to mean immigration processing as reported on the MIOs Network Statistics Report.

This interpretation for immigration processing was used in the MIO survey conducted as part of this evaluation study. The MIO survey found that the majority of the MIOs restricted their activities in immigration processing to less than 30%. However, 18% of the MIOs indicated that in the FY 2007/2008 they spent 50% or more of their time on immigration processing (Exhibit 20). This is clearly not in keeping with the conditions detailed under the roles and responsibilities and dedication of resources sections of the MOU.

Exhibit 20: MIO Reported Time Spent in FY 2007-2008 on Immigration Processing

MIO Reported Time Spent in FY 2007-2008 on Immigration Processing

Time Spent	Count	Percentage
More than 75%	2	4%
Between 50-74%	6	13%
Between 25-49%	7	16%
Between 10-24%	6	13%
Less than 10%	8	18%
Not applicable	12	27%
No Response	4	9%

The MIOs Network Statistics Report for FY 2007/2008 indicates that, in FY 2007/2008, MIOs processed over 24,000 immigration applications (Exhibit 21).⁵⁷ While it is necessary that MIOs develop a basic fundamental understanding of the immigration program to better understand where the challenges to the program may arise, such understanding can be derived through other more time-limited means. A formal mission orientation program for first-time MIOs, for example, would be more cost-effective than taking up to 30% of their working hours for immigration processing on an ongoing basis.

Exhibit 21: Number of Immigration Applications Processed by MIOs FY 2007-2008

	Americas	Europe	Africa & Middle East	Asia	Total
Total	6,832	4,819	8,868	4,308	24,827
Temporary Resident Applications	6,021	2,191	8,867	2,667	19,446
Permanent Resident Applications	811	2,628	301	1,641	5,381

The number of temporary visa applications being referred for further screening by CIC to CBSA/NSD has steadily increased over the last three years as illustrated in Exhibit 22.

Exhibit 22: Number of Temporary Visa Applications Referred to NSD

	Total Number of TVR applications received by CIC	Temporary Visa Applications Reviewed by CBSA	Percentage of Total
2006	1,001,592	15,000	1.4%
2007	1,041,754	43,380	4.1%
2008	1,008,874	59,054	5.8%

While the total number of temporary visa applications received at missions abroad has not changed significantly, the number of cases referred, as a percentage of total cases, has increased. Given the risk environment in which the admissibility screening function is delivered, it is reasonable and realistic to anticipate that the current levels will remain the same or increase. Even a modest increase in the number of cases referred, as a percentage of total cases, would represent a significant increase in workload for CBSA/NSD.

The Temporary Resident Biometrics Project will introduce fingerprint and facial biometrics to the TVR process. As a consequence, all persons submitting a TVR application abroad and all persons from visa exempt countries who request a study or work permit at POEs will have fingerprints and a photograph taken as part of the process. Currently only a limited number of TVR applications undergo admissibility screening. With the introduction of biometrics all TVR applications will undergo an initial level of screening.

The Temporary Resident Biometrics Project⁵⁸ estimates that as a result of biometric validation that will be required at POEs, there could be 50,000 additional referrals annually to immigration secondary as it is estimated that approximately 5% of applicants arriving in Canada will have potential identity issues at Primary Inspection Line (PIL). In addition, it is estimated that when the project is fully implemented, CBSA will be processing approximately 100,000 study and work permit applicants annually from visa-exempt countries at POEs.⁵⁹ Implementation will not commence until year four of the project (FY 2011-2012) and will be phased in over a three-year period. By FY 2013-2014 all temporary visa applicants will have their biometric data captured during the application process. Both CIC and the RCMP have identified funding requirements for deployment and post-implementation review; however, no CBSA deployment funding for recruitment and training of additional CBSA personnel or other such deployment activities has been identified in the current project plan.⁶⁰

Evidence indicates that MIOs are experiencing pressures to deliver on their key activities. In the MIO survey, respondents were asked a series of questions related to their key activities.⁶¹  Specifically, they were asked to give a measure of time they have to carry out these activities, the priority they themselves assign to these activities within their working context and finally an indication of the extent to which these activities are effective in maintaining program integrity. Three key activities, Reporting and Intelligence Gathering, International Liaison and Cooperation and Interdiction – Airline Liaison were identified by at least 75% of the MIOS to be effective or very effective in maintaining program integrity (Exhibit 23).

Exhibit 23: MIO Effectiveness to Maintaining Program Integrity

Effectiveness to maintaining program integrity	Reporting and Intelligence Gathering	International Liaison and Cooperation	Interdiction –  Airline Liaison
Very effective	24.4%	31.1%	37.8%
Effective	66.7%	51.1%	37.8%
Neutral	2.2%	11.1%	4.4%
Ineffective	2.2%	0.0%	0.0%
Very ineffective	2.2%	0.0%	0.0%
Not applicable	2.2%	0.0%	17.8%
No response	2.2%	6.7%	2.2%

Of these key activities, Reporting and Intelligence Gathering was reported as one of the top three priorities of work by 73% of the MIOs (Exhibit 24); however, when asked to rate the adequacy of time available to carry out this activity, 26% rated the time as inadequate to very inadequate (Exhibit 25). Another activity that is experiencing some pressure is 2nd Level Anti-Fraud. While 53% indicated that the time available to carry out this activity was adequate to very adequate, 24% indicated that the time available was inadequate to very inadequate and another 26% were neutral.

Exhibit 24: MIO Priority Given to Key Activities

Priority given to	First priority	Second priority	Third priority	Last priority	Not applicable	No response
Reporting and Intelligence Gathering	17.8%	26.7%	28.9%	6.7%	0.0%	20%
International Liaison and Cooperation	13.3%	17.8%	11.1%	20%	0.0%	37.8%
Interdiction – Airline Liaison	42.2%	15.6%	6.7%	8.9%	17.8%	8.9%

Exhibit 25: MIO Time to Carry Out Key Activities

Time to carry out	Reporting and Intelligence Gathering	International Liaison and Cooperation	Interdiction –  Airline Liaison	2nd level Anti-Fraud
Very adequate	4.4%	2.2%	11.1%	4.4%
Adequate	44.4%	55.6%	42.2%	26.7%
Neutral	20.0%	17.8%	8.9%	26.7%
Inadequate	20.0%	15.6%	15.6%	22.2%
Very inadequate	6.7%	4.4%	2.2%	2.2%
Not applicable	0.0%	2.2%	17.8%	13.3%
No response	4.4%	2.2%	2.2%	4.4%

Finally, MIOs were asked to give an indication of how they see their workload in the key activities in FY 2008-2009 relative to the last FY (2007-2008). In those areas identified as priority activities, having the greatest impact on program integrity and/or where there appears to be pressures to devote time to these activities, MIOs expected workloads to increase in FY 2008-2009 (Exhibit 26).

Exhibit 26: MIO Anticipated Workload Relative to Previous Fiscal Year

Relative to last FY I anticipate my workload to	Reporting and Intelligence Gathering	International Liaison and Cooperation	Interdiction –  Airline Liaison	2nd level Anti-Fraud
Significantly increase	6.7%	6.7%	2.2%	0.0%
Increase	40.0%	40.0%	28.9%	28.9%
Remain the same	46.7%	48.9%	44.4%	51.1%
Decrease	2.2%	0.0%	4.4%	2.2%
Significantly decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Don't know	2.2%	2.2%	17.8%	11.1%
No response	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	6.7%

Every year MIOs working with local enforcement agencies abroad and the travel industry intercept approximately 5,500 illegal migrants. The costs associated with a person arriving at a POE, filing a refugee claim and being removed from Canada, range from $4,768-$41,085.⁶² The lowest cost would be associated with a case in which the claimant does not contest the Refugee Protection Division⁶³ decision and waives rights to a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment. The high-end costs would be associated with a case in which the claimant seeks judicial review to the Federal Court, a full PRRA is performed and the individual is detained in a CBSA detention facility prior to removal.

The evaluation study could find no exact data on the percentage of IDAs who are successful in reaching a Canadian POE and subsequently enter a refugee claim. Assuming that 100% enter a refugee claim, interception activities result in a potential cost avoidance ranging from $26- $225 million  per year. When compared to the cost of supporting the MIO network per year (Exhibit 27), interdiction at a point closest to country of origin is a cost-effective component in the Agency's multi-border strategy.

Exhibit 27: Salary and O&M for MIO/ILO Network and Support for FY 2009/2010

Activity	FY 2009/2010
Salary – MIO/ILO Network	$4,900,000
Salary – International Networks Support Unit (INS)64	$705,000
O&M	$1,034,000
Fenced resources at CIC for O&M – MIOs/ILOs	$828,000
Total	$7,467,000

Are there more efficient and effective methods for delivering admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities?

The establishment of identity is a significant challenge in the Agency's efforts to maintain the integrity of the immigration program. Nearly one-third of the IDA travellers destined for Canada in 2008 were identified as an "impostor"⁶⁵, that is a traveller posing as another individual, often with genuine documents. It is recognized that the current admissibility screening tools that rely on biographic information are less and less effective in establishing and managing identity. The introduction of biometrics, in particular the capture of fingerprints, would have a significant and positive impact on the ability to establish and manage identity within the immigration program by fixing the applicant's identity at the time of application and allowing for verification of that identity at the POE.

The Temporary Resident Biometric Project will have significant implications for CBSA human resource management both in the area of capacity to meet increased workload at the POEs and in the development of the required expertise to effectively use the new technology. As mentioned previously in the report, no CBSA deployment funding has been identified to offset the cost associated with training of POE personnel or the requirement for additional FTEs in the current plan.

Key Conclusions, Recommendations and Management Response

Overall, the evaluation found that admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities, including the work of the MIOs abroad, are key elements in preventing inadmissible persons from entering Canada. The CBSA's admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities are essential to the CBSA fulfilling its responsibilities as identified in the Canada Border Services Agency Act, the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

Roles and responsibilities between partner organizations (CBSA, CIC and CSIS) are understood and consistent with the mandate of each partner. The evaluation concluded that within CBSA, the governance and management structure for these activities is generally satisfactory. However, CBSA's internal roles and processes for admissibility screening activities have not always been clear to partner organizations and recent efforts by CBSA to clearly identify the National Security Division as the single window for admissibility screening activities has been seen as a positive step towards facilitating more efficient communication between partners.

CBSA continues to make improvements to the capacity and effectiveness of its admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities. For example, additional MIO positions have been established in order to strengthen 1^st level anti-fraud detection, a decision which resulted in the identification of close to 2,000 fraudulent documents in FY 2008-2009. As well, the Intelligence Risk Assessment and Analysis Division (IRAAD) within the Intelligence Directorate consults with HQ and front-line users within CBSA and at CIC to ensure that its products, such as the Weekly Intelligence Digest, Intelligence Bulletins and Irregular Migration Trend Report, continue to meet the needs of users. The vast majority of MIOs express satisfaction with these products.

The evaluation found opportunities for the Agency to strengthen performance measurement and reporting. While MIOs are now reporting on the number of visa applications refused as a direct result of their anti-fraud activities, there are no similar data on the extent to which screening activities carried out by NSD and Regional Intelligence Officers (RIO) contribute to the prevention of inadmissible persons entering Canada. Although some operational data are collected by NSD (for example the number of files monitored, the number of visa applications referred from CIC and average processing time), these data cannot be used to measure the contribution of NSD admissibility screening to the eventual outcome of the visa application process. The absence of a feedback mechanism with CIC, which would provide NSD with an indication of the relevance and utility of the information provided, makes it difficult to assess whether adjustments and improvements are required.

In light of these findings, the evaluation makes the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1: Enforcement Branch, in collaboration with Operations Branch, develops and implements a performance measurement strategy for admissibility screening and supporting intelligence activities.

Recommendation 2: Enforcement Branch collaborates with CIC to implement a quality assurance process that gathers regular feedback on the utility of the admissibility screening information that CBSA provides and its contribution to the final disposition of cases for which it was provided.

Management response:

Enforcement Branch concurs with these recommendations.

Enforcement Branch will engage Operations Branch to identify admissibility screening and requirements for supporting intelligence performance measurement. Enforcement Branch will also identify the quality assurance information required to facilitate regular feedback on the utility of CBSA's admissibility screening information. This work will be completed by March 2010.

The existing MOU with CIC stipulates that MIOs spend no less than 70% of normal working hours on the core migration integrity activities that support the CBSA mandate. The evaluation found that a significant number of MIOs find it difficult to meet this requirement. 26% of MIOs report that they do not have adequate time for reporting and intelligence gathering and 24% have inadequate time to carry out 2nd Level Anti-Fraud activities. In addition, almost 20% of MIOs report spending 50% or more of their time on immigration processing.

The evaluation noted the contribution to cost avoidance of MIO duties related to migration integrity. MIO collaboration with local law enforcement agencies and the travel industry results in the interception of approximately 5,500 illegal migrants each year. It has been estimated that detention, court and removal costs for individuals denied refugee status can range from $4,768-$41,085⁶⁶ per claimant. Assuming that the 5,500 illegal migrants intercepted as a result of MIO activities would have eventually entered a refugee claim, the theoretical cost avoidance attributable to MIO activities is in the range of $26-$225 million per year.

In light of these findings, the evaluation makes the following recommendation:

Recommendation 3: Enforcement Branch develops options for enhancing the focus of the MIO function on intelligence gathering and anti-fraud activities and adjusts the level of services around ongoing immigration processing activities accordingly.

Management response:

Enforcement Branch concurs with this recommendation.

Through careful monitoring of activities over the past year, the Enforcement Branch has identified the locations where too much time has been spent on immigration processing and has taken steps to realign activities in accordance with the MOU. Moving forward on the concept of an integrated overseas CBSA network in which officers conduct both customs and immigration-related duties, it will be necessary to clearly define those MIO activities that are currently focussed primarily on serving CBSA requirements, as well as additional activities that may need to be included. This task will be competed by September 2009 and the information will be used as a basis for discussions with CIC concerning the MIO function.

Ultimately, reducing or otherwise adjusting MIO responsibilities for ongoing immigration processing activities will require reopening of the MOU. Enforcement Branch will present options to the Executive Management Committee in July, 2009. A first meeting with CIC will be scheduled for no later than October 2009 with the goal of drafting an amendment to the MOU by March 31, 2010.

The current manner for collecting financial information makes it difficult to clearly identify funding dedicated to specific admissibility activities. While financial information is available at the Cost Centre level and for the overall Screening Abroad People Program⁶⁷, a lack of internal orders numbers for specific activities makes it impossible to accurately identify costs per activity and reach a determination on the reasonableness of  the volume of work achieved compared to the financial resources allocated. This determination is made even more challenging by the absence of performance measurement strategies for the specific programs under the umbrella of the Screening Abroad People Program.

In light of these findings, the evaluation makes the following recommendation:

Recommendation 4: Enforcement Branch works with Comptrollership to develop an activity-based accounting structure that would facilitate better tracking of costs associated with these activities.

Management response:

Enforcement Branch concurs with this recommendation.

Intelligence Directorate will meet with Operations Branch to identify the key activities that require better tracking of costs. Existing codes will be reviewed and areas where new activity codes are needed will be identified. Comptrollership Branch will be engaged to establish the required coding. This exercise will be completed by November 2009. The new activity-based accounting structure will be implemented in April 2010.

The introduction of the Screening Referral Request (SRR) secure application to the processing of temporary visa applications has enabled NSD to provide more timely responses to missions abroad, despite an increase in the number of cases referred for screening. SRR runs an automated query against the existing cases database in STS/SRR and incorporates a risk algorithm with an identified threshold. Ongoing quality assurance activities ensure that the threshold is effective.  

In the case of admissibility screening of refugee claimants, FOSS does not provide the tracking functionality required by the Front-End Screening unit for the ongoing monitoring of cases. FES currently manages this process using an excel spreadsheet which is updated based on a case status report run by CIC (and funded by CBSA). The process is inefficient and requires additional data entry on the part of staff at FES.⁶⁸ As well, current systems do not have the capacity to transmit additional information that may have an impact on the original recommendation; therefore, the unit must rely on e-mails to inform the Refugee Protection Division of the IRB of any changes. Overall, the current processes result in additional work for the FES to monitor and track cases.

In light of these findings, the evaluation makes the following recommendation:

Recommendation 5:  Enforcement Branch engages Innovation, Science and Technology Branch to develop a case tracking system for use by the Front-End Screening Unit. System functionality should include regular automated updates based on relevant information drawn from legacy systems such as FOSS.

Management response:

Enforcement Branch agrees that there is a need for a case tracking system. However, the feasibility of developing and implementing a solution will depend on complexity and cost which are not known at this time.

As a first step, Enforcement Branch will conduct a scoping exercise to identify system functionality requirements. This work will be completed by fall 2009 and will include consultation with Innovation, Science and Technology Branch (ISTB), Operations Branch and the program and IT areas within CIC, CSIS and the IRB.

List of Abbreviations

Acronym	Description
CAIPS	Computer Assisted Immigration Processing System
CAS	Corporate Administrative System
CEC	Canadian Experience Class
FES	Front-End Screening Unit
FOSS	Field Operations Support System
IDA	Improperly Documented Arrival
IPM	Immigration Program Manager
IRAAD	Intelligence Risk Assessment and Analysis Division
IRPA	Immigration and Refuge Protection Act
MIO	Migration Integrity Officer
NRT	No Reportable Trace
NSD	National Security Division
PIL	Primary Inspection Line
POE	Ports of Entry
POERT	Port of Entry Recruit Training
PRRA	Pre-Removal Risk Assessment
PSAT	Public Security and Anti-terrorism
RPD	Refugee Protection Division
SRR	Screening Referral Request
SSI	Support System for Intelligence
TVR	Temporary Visa Requests

 

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• 1. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of Canada, 3(1) (2) [Return to text]
• 2. The term "admissibility screening" is used broadly to include the screening of refugees, immigrants, visitors and citizenship applicants and the determination of inadmissibility of those applicants under IRPA. [Return to text]
• 3. Components of the CBSA immigration function have been audited by the OAG  (Chapter 5:  Citizenship and Immigration Canada – Control and Enforcement in 2003 April Report OAG (2003); Chapter 5:  Keeping the Border Open and Secure - Canada Border Services Agency in Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Ottawa (2007); Chapter 7:  Detention and Removal of Individuals - Canada Border Services Agency in Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Ottawa. (2008). However, intelligence and admissibility screening activities abroad have only been reviewed in a CIC examination in 2001 and in a CIC 2003 Public Security and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) evaluation report. [Return to text]
• 4. The Summative Evaluation of the War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Program provides some costing information on various activities for dealing with allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity that prove useful in assessing potential cost avoidance as a result of interception activities. [Return to text]
• 5. The Screening Abroad People Programs is an umbrella for activities and programs which directly and indirectly contribute to the Agency's overall admissibility screening and include the MIO network, the NSD units including Front-End Screening and Visitor Screening, the Transporter Obligation Program and the Document Integrity Program. Only the MIO network, the Front-End Screening and Visitor Screening Units were examined within the scope of this evaluation study. [Return to text]
• 6. The method was employed at the time the research was conducted; however, as of March 29, 2009 tracking is carried out using an Access database. The database itself has limitations as a case management tool and linkages with FOSS would enable the Unit to more efficiently track and monitor claimants and prepare reports with greater accuracy. [Return to text]
• 7. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of Canada, 3(1) (2) [Return to text]
• 8. Source: CMRS- 27 January 2009 [Return to text]
• 9.The term "admissibility screening" is used broadly to include the screening of refugees, immigrants, visitors and citizenship applicants and the determination of inadmissibility of those applicants under IRPA.   [Return to text]
• 10. Components of the CBSA immigration function have been audited by the OAG  (Chapter 5:  Citizenship and Immigration Canada – Control and Enforcement in 2003 April Report OAG (2003); Chapter 5:  Keeping the Border Open and Secure –  Canada Border Services Agency in Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Ottawa (2007); Chapter 7:  Detention and Removal of Individuals – Canada Border Services Agency in Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Ottawa. (2008). However, intelligence and admissibility screening activities abroad have only been reviewed in a CIC examination in 2001 and in a CIC 2003 Public Security and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) evaluation report. [Return to text]
• 11. A number of resources are available to aid the CIC visa officer including the Immigration Control Manual which contains indicators developed by CBSA, indicators provided by CSIS, as well as input from the MIO. [Return to text]
• 12. Source: CIC Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2006, 2007, 2008 [Return to text]
• 13. Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries First Half of 2008: Statistical Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in 38 European and  6 Non-European Countries [Return to text]
• 14. Source: Year Ahead 2009 [Return to text]
• 15. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 101(1): A claim is ineligible to be referred if: (a) refugee protection has already been conferred on claimant under the Act; (b) a previous claim by the claimant has been rejected by the Board; (3) the claimant has been recognized as a Convention refugee by another country and can be sent or returned to that country; (e) a claimant came to Canada, directly or indirectly, from a third country designated by the regulations; (f) the claimant has been determined inadmissible on grounds covered under Division 4, Inadmissibility of the Act. [Return to text]
• 16. The Removal Order in this case may be either an Exclusion Order or a Deportation Order, depending on the nature of the claimant's ineligibility. [Return to text]
• 17. Refugees who are identified as such outside of Canada follow the Permanent Resident stream. The Refugee Determination process as described herein only applies to those claimants who enter a refugee claim at the POE or at an inland office. [Return to text]
• 18. When the IRB receives the refugee claimant information via FOSS it immediately sets a hearing date for one year from the date the case is received at the IRB. The IRB may proceed with the hearing at that time even if CSIS has been unable to complete the screening. [Return to text]
• 19. CSIS advice related to admissibility screening can take one of four forms: (1) Notices of Assessments where there is no adverse information on the applicant/claimant; (2) Incidental letters  where the applicant/claimant has been involved in activities that are not security related; (3) Information briefs where CSIS has information on the claimant/applicant that does not necessarily warrant inadmissibility; and (4) Inadmissibility briefs when an applicant/claimant is deemed inadmissible under security provisions of the IRPA. Consequently, the results forwarded to the IRB indicate only that the screening has been completed and not the details of the screening efforts. [Return to text]
• 20. The IRB makes a determination as to whether or not the claimant is a Convention Refugee or a Person In Need Of Protection as defined under IRPA. It has no authority or responsibility concerning the claimant's admissibility to Canada. Consequently, the results forwarded to the IRB indicate only that the screening has been completed and not the details of the screening efforts. [Return to text]
• 21. Source: CIC Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2006, 2007, 2008 [Return to text]
• 22. The overall annual immigration target set by the Government of Canada is approximately 250,000 people. [Return to text]
• 23. "No Reportable Trace" (NRT) is the term attached to a file that has been screened through the applicable databases and has no match based on the algorithm and/or query used in the database. [Return to text]
• 24. The MI Network was originally established under the authority of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Under DFAIT, the control and enforcement liaison officers (CELO) were charged with liaising with airlines and working with local authorities to ensure effective pre-screening of passengers travelling to Canada prior to departure. With the program move to CIC, the role of immigration control officers (ICO), as CELOs were now called, expanded to include the gathering and reporting of information for immigration intelligence purposes. The MI Network was renamed the Migration Integrity Program to better reflect the broadened mandate. The migration integrity officers, the former ICOs, added new activities including immigration control, anti-fraud and investigation. [Return to text]
• 25. The Migration Integrity Program received funding this FY through the Canadian Experience Program for 12 additional MIO positions, 11 of which are in the process of being filled. The remaining position in Bogota will be filled in FY 09/10. [Return to text]
• 26. Airlines signatory to MOU with CBSA effective April 1,2008 to March 31, 2010. [Return to text]
• 27. Canada Border Services Agency Act.S.2 [Return to text]
• 28. IRPAS.4(2) defines the Minister as the minister defined in section 2 of the Canada Border Services Agency Act. [Return to text]
• 29. Border Vision: A Vision for Border Management in 2018. [Return to text]
• 30. CIC data is typically reported on for calendar year whereas CBSA typically reports on a FY basis. [Return to text]
• 31. Total number of Permanent Resident visa Applications (persons) for FY 2008-2009 was 359,369 and CBSA screened 1,592. [Return to text]
• 32. Interception is defined as the act of preventing somebody or something from entering the country illegally. All interceptions must be entered into Secure System for Intelligence (SSI) which sets out three criteria for identifying and entering the interception. The inadmissible passenger (1) must be in possession of Canadian documentation; (2) has a Canadian destination; or, (3) the interception was made by a Canadian agent. [Return to text]
• 33. Calculated using rates from 2002-2007. [Return to text]
• 34. Source: CBSA Departmental Performance Report 2007-2008 [Return to text]
• 35. MIOs provide 1st and 2nd level anti-fraud support. 1st level anti-fraud activities are focused on case specific information and documentation whereas 2nd level anti-fraud activities include those strategic investigative activities focused on organized or widespread threats to the immigration program. [Return to text]
• 36. MIO Network Statistics FY 2008 provided by International Networks Support, Intelligence Development and Field Support Division, Intelligence Directorate, CBSA [Return to text]
• 37. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act section 14(b) states that CSIS may provide any minister of the Crown with information relating to security matters or criminal activities, that is relevant to the exercise of the power or the performance of any duty or function by that minister under the Citizenship Act or the IRPA. [Return to text]
• 38. CIC-CBSA MOU: Shared Services Annex.[Return to text]
• 39. The number of applications approved and refused in a calendar year do not necessarily equal the total number of applications received for that calendar as applications may be received, approved or refused in a calendar year other that the one in which it was received. [Return to text]
• 40. Secondary movements result from the tightening of controls and enforcement activities that make the primary destination less favourable thereby shifting the migration pattern for refugee claimants from the US and EU to Canada. [Return to text]
• 41. Year Ahead 2009: Canada and Irregular Migration, 4 March 2009, Strategic Intelligence Analysis Division, Intelligence Directorate, Canada Border Services Agency. 2008 Border Threat and Risk Assessment – Intelligence Forecasting, Strategic Intelligence Analysis Division, Intelligence Directorate, Canada Border Services Agency. [Return to text]
• 42. Formerly the Migration Integrity (MI) Support unit [Return to text]
• 43. Border integrity officers are responsible for the delivery of the Container Security Initiative. [Return to text]
• 44. CIC-CBSA MOU. March 21, 2006. [Return to text]
• 45. The finding reflects information provided at the time the research was conducted. As of June 2009 SRR will not be rolled out to any other missions, nor will it be used for the Permanent Resident (PR) processing. [Return to text]
• 46. 1st level anti-fraud activities are focused on case-specific information and documentation whereas 2nd level anti-fraud activities include those strategic investigative activities focused on organized or widespread threats to the immigration program. [Return to text]
• 47. UPP are refugee abroad cases in need of urgent protection where the life, liberty or physical well-being of a refugee is under immediate threat. Urgent protection cases, by definition, need to be resettled on an expedited basis required by their particular circumstances. Consequently, these cases are to be assigned the highest processing priority. [Return to text]
• 48. "Vulnerable" with respect to a Convention refugee or a person in similar circumstances means that the person has a greater need of protection than other applicants abroad because of the heightened risk to the person's physical safety. Vulnerable cases are eligible for expedited processing. Expedited cases are not urgent and it is acceptable to have refugees in these cases en route to Canada within one to four months. [Return to text]
• 49. The data include activities that directly and indirectly support the admissibility screening function. Some activities that indirectly support the admissibility screening function and are included in this data include the Document Integrity Program and the Transporter Obligation Program. [Return to text]
• 50. Total number of Permanent Resident Visa Applications (persons) for FY 2008-2009 was 359,369 and CBSA screened 1,592. [Return to text]
• 51. Activities supported by this funding include development of SRR and the establishment of NSD. [Return to text]
• 52. Activities supported by this funding include the activities of the Front-End Screening Unit within NSD. [Return to text]
• 53.Activities supported by this funding included the establishment of four new MIO positions and the creation of three new ILO positions. [Return to text]
• 54. Activities supported by this funding include the establishment of 12 new MIO positions whose primary focus is anti-fraud activities related to the CIC Immigration Program. [Return to text]
• 55. CIC-CBSA MOU Shared Service Annex Appendix A: MIO Management Framework. The key activities taken from documentation and confirmed by International Networks Support are: Interdiction – Airline Liaison; Interdiction – Document Examination and Seizure; Interdiction – Training; Reporting and Intelligence Gathering; 1st Level Anti-Fraud; 2nd Level Anti-Fraud; International Liaison and Cooperation; and Immigration Processing. [Return to text]
• 56. CIC-CBSA MOU Shared Service Annex Appendix A: MIO Management Framework. [Return to text]
• 57. Reported on the Migration Integrity Officer's (MIOs) Network Statistics for April 2008-March 2009. [Return to text]
• 58. The business objectives of the Temporary Resident Biometrics Project are to: strengthen identity management; enhance security; improve program integrity and facilitate processing of legitimate clients. [Return to text]
• 59. Temporary Resident Biometrics Project – Project Brief, February 9, 2009. [Return to text]
• 60. Temporary Resident Biometrics Project – Project Brief, February 9, 2009. [Return to text]
• 61. The key activities taken from the MIO documentation and confirmed with MIS are: Interdiction – Airline Liaison; Interdiction – Document Examination and Seizure; Interdiction – Training; Reporting and Intelligence Gathering; 1st Level Anti-Fraud; 2nd Level Anti-fraud; International Liaison and Cooperation; and, Immigration Processing. [Return to text]
• 62. The Summative Evaluation of the War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Program provides some costing information for dealing with allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity that prove useful in assessing potential cost avoidance as a result of interception activities. Interception activities include costs such as interview and report writing, CBSA Hearings Officer and Intelligence Analyst contribution, Department of Justice (DOJ) involvement, CIC Pre-Removal and Risk Assessment (PRRA), and detention. The formula used does not include downstream costs borne by OGDs not heretofore mentioned. [Return to text]
• 63. The Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) [Return to text]
• 64. Formerly the Migration Integrity Support Unit. With the reorganization of the Intelligence Directorate renamed the International Networks Support unit to better reflect its responsibilities. [Return to text]
• 65. Year Ahead 2009: Canada and Irregular Migration, 4 March 2009, Strategic Intelligence Analysis Division, Intelligence Directorate, Canada Border Services Agency. [Return to text]
• 66. The Summative Evaluation of the War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Program provides some costing information on various processes for dealing with allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity that prove useful in assessing potential cost avoidance as a result of interception activities. [Return to text]
• 67. The Screening Abroad People Programs is an umbrella for activities and programs that directly and indirectly contribute to the Agency's overall admissibility screening, and include the MIO network, the NSD units including Front-End Screening (FES) and Visitor Screening, the Transporter Obligation Program and the Document Integrity Program. Only the MIO network, the FES and Visitor Screening units were examined within the scope of this evaluation study. [Return to text]
• 68. The method was employed at the time the research was conducted; however, as of  March 29, 2009, tracking is carried out using an Access database. The database itself has limitations as a case management tool and linkages with FOSS would enable the Unit to more efficiently track and monitor claimants and prepare reports with greater accuracy. [Return to text]