ARCHIVED - CBSA Commercial Examination Processes and Detection Technology

This page has been archived.

Final Report
May 2009

Table of Contents

• Executive Summary
• Introduction and Context
  • Pupose of the Evaluation
  • Description of Commercial Examination Processes
  • Organization of Commercial Examination Activities
  • Evaluation Methodology
• Key Findings
  • Relevance
  • Design and Delivery
  • Results
  • Efficiency
• Conclusions, Recommendations and Management Response

Executive Summary

The Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) mandate is twofold: facilitate the movement of legitimate travellers and goods and intercept those travellers and goods that pose a threat to Canada. To ensure that incoming goods are admissible and not illegal or dangerous, commercial shipments arriving by land, air or sea may be referred for examination before they are released.

In 2007–2008, the CBSA conducted more than 200,000 commercial examinations. These CBSA examination activities led to 10,884 drug seizures, 5,700 weapon seizures and 3,939 tobacco seizures. The CBSA also intercepted 7,357 items of child pornography, obscene material and hate propaganda, as well as 91,973 food, plant and animal products. During the same period, the CBSA seized $39.6 million in undeclared currency.

Examinations of commercial goods typically occur at the port of entry and vary in length of time and intensity depending on the risk level. During the examination of commercial shipments, border services officers employ a variety of tools and technologies to quickly and safely identify contraband and dangerous goods. Currently, officers in ports across the country have access to more than 16 different types of detection technology. For example, X-ray imaging (fixed units, mobile units and vans), gamma-ray imaging (mobile and pallet VACIS [Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System] units) and radiation detection.

Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the relevance of commercial examination activities, the use and roles of detection tools in these processes, and the effectiveness of program design, delivery, management and results. The evaluation was conducted by the CBSA's Evaluation Division, and the research was carried out between February and October 2008. The following research methods were used:

• a review and analysis of internal and public CBSA documents and data;
• a literature review of open source documents on the design and delivery of commercial examinations in other countries;
• interviews with internal and external stakeholders; and
• site visits to land, air and marine ports in eight regions.

This evaluation was identified as a priority for 2007–2008/2008–2009 in the CBSA Risk-Based Multi-Year Evaluation Plan 2007–2010 and was approved by the CBSA's Executive Evaluation Committee in November 2007. There were several Treasury Board evaluation commitments associated with funding for specific detection tools; however, given that detection tools and technology do not comprise a program in and of themselves and they are used by border services officers in their duties, the scope of the evaluation was expanded to include not only tools but also the CBSA's examination processes for incoming commercial goods in the air, marine, rail and highway modes.

Key Findings and Recommendations

The evaluation found that examinations are relevant and address an actual need. The CBSA's mandate is to provide integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the flow of legitimate persons and goods. The CBSA's legal authority to conduct examinations is provided by the Customs Act (sections 99, 101, 111, 112 and 163.5) and the Canada Border Services Agency Act generally.

Overall, the evaluation found that the CBSA is devoting considerable attention and resources to examinations. Through its examination activities, the CBSA detects, interdicts and prevents contraband and other threats from harming Canadian society and commerce. Examination processes may involve using non-intrusive technology or may require more invasive methods of determining the legitimacy of a commercial shipment. Examinations are key to the Agency realizing its strategic outcome of efficient and effective border management that contributes to the security and prosperity of Canada.

All branches at CBSA Headquarters (HQ) and all CBSA regions are involved in various aspects of examination activity. Despite the large number of stakeholders, governance is generally functioning well. A majority of HQ interviewees were aware of multiple functional authorities because responsibilities for examination activities are generally divided along examination type (e.g. contraband versus non-contraband). For example, the Admissibility Branch is viewed as the leading authority on non-contraband examinations and the Enforcement Branch on contraband examinations.

It can take considerable time to fully train an officer to conduct commercial examinations. For example, after officers complete phases one and two of the Port of Entry Recruit Training, additional time is needed to train them for specific modes. Securing required and specific training for recruits and officers is problematic due to the infrequency of course offerings, the limited number of seats available and the constant intake of recruits. Border services officers may receive the training only after they have worked in the commercial stream for a period of time, or not at all. Access and availability of courses in French was reported as even more limited.

The use of train-the-trainer sessions could be an effective approach to deal with increased regional pressures to deliver training and address the backlog. However, the infrequency of the train-the-trainer sessions and the high turnover of border services officers in this role have caused a sharp decline in the number of available trainers. As such, in its current form, the train-the-trainer approach has not been successful in meeting regional training needs.

The Agency relies heavily on job shadowing as a means to train border services officers; however, this learning strategy is only as good as the person being shadowed. Presently there are no national standards for what should be delivered or taught during job shadowing. Under the current approach, in the absence of standards, there are ample chances to pass on bad habits and erroneous information to officers new to the task.

Specialized training is only available for the marine mode (Marine Centre of Expertise). Overall, there is inadequate training capacity and support structures to meet Agency needs.

Since 2003–2004, more than 1 million commercial examinations have been completed. As a result, approximately 220,835 enforcement actions were taken. Monetary penalties collected by the CBSA for commercial infractions are considerable and have risen from about $6.6 million in 2003–2004 to over $11 million in 2007–2008. As well, since the introduction of radiation detection portals, more than 1 million scans have been conducted.

In 2007–2008, 14% of all referrals for secondary examination were overridden. It is not possible to ascertain the level of risk associated with overrides as no data is collected on the types of referrals that were not acted on, on the rationale for overrides or on the number of incidences by mode. However, it appears that system-generated random examinations are the most commonly overridden referrals.

Notwithstanding the level of resources dedicated to examination activities, the Agency's capacity to analyze examination information for the purpose of measuring results is inhibited by the fact that data is not always collected and measured in a consistent manner. Multiple data sources, systems and definitions are used to record examination information. For example, marine containers have several measures (20-foot equivalent units [TEUs], individual containers, releases, shipments) depending on the process for which the information is used. As a result of multiple metrics, data cannot be easily linked. At this time there is no tracking of the contributions of specific detection technologies toward the achievement of examination outcomes (e.g. resultant examinations as well as non-resultant examinations). In addition, there are inconsistencies in the closing of files and the logging of results, which means that data cannot be relied on to provide the necessary information for continual improvement of detection and interdiction activities.

Some of the CBSA's facilities do not meet Agency needs. In particular, the custodial facilities for the highway mode are insufficient to support examinations. At some ports of entry that process commercial traffic, site security is inadequate. At some ports, facilities are not large enough to permit examinations to be conducted on site. The evaluation also noted instances where the size and height of bay doors are not adequate to accommodate the dimensions of some truck trailers.

In general, the legislated facilities in the marine mode are adequate although some are reaching maximum capacity and will not address forecasted future volumes for the regions.

The CBSA is provided with space to examine air cargo and the examinations are typically conducted within the airside carriers' warehouses. In these warehouses, space for inspections varies with the size of the facility. Site visits found the designated areas for CBSA examination activities were often not clearly delineated or the designated areas were used for non-CBSA storage.

In the rail mode, if shipments are deemed high risk, officers can inspect on site. However, shipments that are identified for examination are typically transported to other facilities for a full offload.

The CBSA has a risk-based process in place to select and deploy new and existing detection tools to the regions. As part of this process, the Detection Technology Section (DTS) in the Enforcement Branch consults with subject matter experts at HQ for information on new or perceived threats and with the Laboratory and Scientific Services Directorate (LSSD) in the Innovation, Science and Technology Branch for science-based expertise on functions and use of technology. Regions are consulted annually to determine their specific detection tool needs. Tools and technologies are deployed based on port and border risk assessments and on some input from the Operations Branch.

The DTS and the LSSD communicate regularly on ongoing detection technology projects and the regions reported having sufficient operational support from these areas. However, the roles and responsibilities of the DTS and the LSSD could be clarified to maximize the strategic use of each area's expertise (e.g. joint work on vulnerabilities, limitations and countermeasures; development of joint strategies based on regional feedback to address emerging needs). Better articulated and communicated roles might have improved the selection and deployment of the Itemizer3 and would likely enhance the LSSD's ability to plan research activities in a manner that best reflects program direction and priorities.

Introduction and Context

The Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) mandate is twofold: facilitate the movement of legitimate travellers and goods and intercept those travellers and goods that pose a threat to Canada. The CBSA fulfills this mandate by providing integrated border services that support national security, public safety and economic prosperity priorities.

In the 2007–2008 fiscal year, the CBSA processed more than 13.1 million commercial releases. This amounts to approximately 35,890 commercial releases per day. Facilitating the movement of these commercial goods into Canada is essential to the country's economy. Imports for 2007 exceeded $415 billion (65% arrived from the United States and 10.2% from the European Union). In 2007–2008, the CBSA collected approximately $64.1 million in taxes and duty per day. [ 1 ]

As it is part of the CBSA's mandate to ensure that incoming goods are admissible and not illegal or dangerous, commercial shipments arriving by land, air and sea may be referred to secondary inspection for examination before they are released. In 2007–2008, the CBSA conducted more than 200,000 commercial examinations. [ 2 ]

Examinations of commercial goods typically occur at the port of entry. The examinations vary in length of time and intensity depending on the risk level (e.g. contraband or non-contraband [ 3 ]). During the examination of commercial shipments, border services officers employ a variety of tools and technologies to quickly and safely identify contraband and dangerous goods. Currently, officers in ports across the country have access to more than 3,250 tools for conducting examinations, representing more than 16 different types of detection technology.

Since September 11, 2001, the CBSA has increased its ability to detect and prevent weapons, contraband, explosives and other dangerous goods from entering the country. Over the last few years, the CBSA has invested more than $70 million in contraband detection equipment. [ 4 ] More recently, further investments have been made in the acquisition of radiation detection equipment for the screening of commercial cargo in the marine mode.

Purpose of the Evaluation

The evaluation was conducted by the CBSA's Evaluation Division, and the evaluation research was carried out between February and December 2008. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the relevance of commercial examination activities, the use and roles of detection tools in these processes, and the effectiveness of program design, delivery and management and results.

This evaluation was identified as a priority for 2007–2008/2008–2009 in the CBSA Risk-Based Multi-Year Evaluation Plan 2007–2010 and was approved by the CBSA's Executive Evaluation Committee in November 2007. There were several Treasury Board evaluation commitments associated with funding for specific detection tools; however, given that detection tools and technology do not comprise a program in and of themselves and they are used by border services officers in their duties, the scope of the evaluation was expanded to include not only tools but also the CBSA's examination processes for incoming commercial goods in the air, marine, rail and highway modes.

In preparation for this evaluation, the evaluation team, in consultation with key stakeholders, developed a logic model for examination processes around which the evaluation plan was developed. The following immediate and intermediate outcomes were identified:

• improved skills and knowledge to perform examinations;
• improved tools and processes to conduct examinations;
• enhanced relationships with stakeholders;
• improved placement of tools to align with contraband risk areas and needs;
• effective detection and interdiction of contraband and other threats to Canada; and
• enhanced deterrence of terrorism and border criminality.

Exhibit 1: Scope of the evaluation

Included in the evaluation	Excluded from the evaluation
Examination processes for commercial shipments in the air, marine, rail and highway modes	Targeting including pre-arrival, real-time and post-release targeting
Effectiveness of processes for the selection and placement of detection technology and equipment	Scientific validity of detection technology equipment
Gamma-ray imaging – mobile and pallet VACIS (Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System) units	Storage and destruction of seized goods
X-ray machines (fixed units, mobile units and vans)	Compliance verification
Radiation detection equipment	Remote operating vehicles, vessel rummaging and confined space entry
Ion mobility spectrometry (Ionscan, Sabre 2000, Sabre 4000 and Itemizer3)	Detector Dog Service
Contraband Outfitted Mobile Examination Truck (air and marine modes)	Courier and postal modes
Miscellaneous detection tools and technology	Quality of the referrals for secondary inspection
Logging of examination results

Description of Commercial Examination Processes

The CBSA verifies that incoming goods are compliant with import laws and regulations. The CBSA examines commercial goods that have been referred in a number of ways:

• by targeting units (marine, air and rail modes);
• by border services officers at the primary inspection line;
• by intelligence officers and lookouts;
• through system-generated random selection; and
• by other government departments (OGDs).

From the point of referral, examinations vary considerably by mode. Examinations can be conducted at land border ports of entry, in examination facilities, on the tarmac, on the pier or in warehouses. Examinations can progress from non-intrusive (e.g. VACIS, X-ray) to intrusive (full offload/de-stuff of containers), based on the type of threat and officer discretion.

The CBSA has made investments in detection technology to enhance the capacity and efficiency of officer inspections with the ultimate goal of preventing contraband and dangerous and/or restricted goods from entering Canada. The CBSA's detection technologies include the following:

• X-ray systems (fixed units, mobile units and vans): These imaging tools detect contraband and dangerous goods in baggage and cargo containers for all modes. Since 2001, the inventory of X-ray technology has drastically increased to meet operational needs and evolving technology standards.
• Gamma-ray systems (mobile and pallet VACIS units): The mobile VACIS unit is a truck-mounted gamma-ray imaging tool that is used on containers, rail cars, passenger vehicles and trucks. The pallet VACIS unit is a stationary unit through which pallets or pallet-sized cargo are passed. Both display images of the density of the contents.
• Radiation detection portals: These portals are used to detect the presence of illicit radiation or nuclear materials in marine containers. If threshold levels of radiation are exceeded, the portals transmit an alarm to the National Risk Assessment Centre (NRAC) and the Laboratory and Scientific Services Directorate (LSSD). In general, NRAC is responsible for risk assessing and identifying suspect containers. If NRAC cannot negate a risk, officers will contact the LSSD for scientific advice and request/refer to a carborne unit at the port. The LSSD is then responsible for analyzing carborne readings and next steps (e.g. release, referral for examination, notification of port authority, initiation of emergency response plan).
• Carborne units: These radiation-monitoring systems are affixed to the roofs of vehicles. These units measure radiation emissions and transmit the information to the LSSD for further analysis (e.g. to identify the type of isotope present).
• Electronic personal dosimeters: These devices detect dangerous levels of radiation to ensure the safety of border services officers. Handheld survey meters detect the source of radiation. These tools are used in conjunction with the radiation detection portals and the carborne units.
• Handheld/portable ion mobility spectrometry devices (Ionscan, Sabre 2000, Sabre 4000): These devices are used to detect a wide variety of trace organics such as narcotics and explosives. The CBSA recently deployed a new device, the Itemizer3, that can detect traces of both narcotics and explosives simultaneously.
• Contraband Outfitted Mobile Examination Truck: These trucks are outfitted for marine operations and this includes equipment for deep rummaging and dockside activities. The units used in air operations are outfitted with the necessary tools to examine air cargo and baggage.

Border services officers also use a wide variety of other detection tools such as mirror kits for inspecting under the carriage of containers, probes for inspecting bulk loads of goods, laser range finders to measure the length of containers, density gauges and long- and short-pole reach cameras to view hard-to-reach places.

Examination activities specific to each mode are outlined below.

Air
In the air mode, a contraband examination can be done by examining the aircraft itself while it is stationed on the tarmac. Also, air cargo that is sent to the warehouse can be opened for a visual inspection, portable narcotic identification kits can be used to detect the presence of narcotics and a Detector Dog Service team can be brought in to detect contraband. For non-contraband exams, the examining officer will inspect the goods to ensure that the description, country of origin and marking match the manifest.

Marine
Containers entering Canada via the marine mode are scanned by a radiation detection portal. When the silent alarm is triggered, the images taken by the portal are sent to NRAC using the Radiation Alert Viewer (RAV) system. The LSSD is also notified. All other photos (i.e. those of containers that do not generate an alarm) are stored on the individual radiation portals and then discarded after a set period.

NRAC uses the RAV system to view images of the container and to pull the container number. Together, NRAC and the LSSD decide whether NRAC will refer the container for further examination. Examination information is forwarded to the LSSD for scientific analysis, assessment and appropriate action (e.g. release, notification of first responders).

In the marine mode, containers may be examined on the pier itself. Since the implementation of the new fumigation policy, [ 5 ] border services officers conducting examinations on the pier must don a breathing apparatus before opening a container. At container examination facilities (CEFs), officers are required to test for fumigants and ventilate the area before opening the containers if the presence of some chemical agents exceeds the determined threshold. Containers are typically fully de-stuffed and a wide variety of tools are employed to check for contraband. Small items may be run through an X-ray system. Large or paletted items may be screened by a pallet VACIS unit. When available, a Detector Dog Service team may be used to verify that there is no hidden contraband in the shipment or the container itself.

For non-contraband examinations, border services officers will open boxes and/or pallets to ensure that goods match the description on the manifest, and, in the case of OGD targets, that the shipments meet OGD requirements (e.g. for Health Canada, officers verify that goods have the proper labelling in French and English and that the goods are approved for sale in Canada). If items are found to be inadmissible, officers may issue a penalty under the Administrative Monetary Penalty System (AMPS) or contact the appropriate OGD to send a representative for further review. These examinations may be conducted in sufferance warehouses or CEFs.

Highway
In the highway mode, commercial trucks referred to secondary inspection can undergo a series of examinations. If the port has a VACIS truck, the conveyance may be scanned to detect any irregularities in the load.

An examination of commercial goods inside a truck can involve a full offload of the goods to check for the presence of contraband and to ensure that the goods are compliant and match the manifest. Again, a variety of tools such as the Ionscan or portable narcotic identification kits may be used.

Rail
All high-risk shipments are sent to a facility for 100% offload and examination. Any containers referred for contraband examinations are fully de-stuffed. For non-contraband examinations, the container may be fully or partially offloaded. For non-contraband examinations, the process is similar to that of the marine mode.

Organization of Commercial Examination Activities

There is no single area at the CBSA that is responsible for overseeing the many types of examination activities.

The Enforcement Branch, specifically the Borders Enforcement Division, provides the policy (e.g. standard operating procedures [SOPs]), program direction and functional guidance in support of border enforcement actions by directing the research, development, analysis, field testing and review of detection technology, with assistance from the LSSD where required. Once funding is committed, this Division works directly with Public Works and Government Services Canada to facilitate the procurement of the respective detection technology. The Enforcement Branch is also responsible for producing the Border Management Plan (BMP) and port risk assessments. The latter are important inputs into allocation of various resources, including the deployment of detection tools.

The Operations Branch is the CBSA Headquarters (HQ) link to the regions. It is responsible for the effective, efficient and consistent delivery of programs related to the processing of commercial goods both entering and exiting Canada. This Branch also collects and verifies corporate statistics and coordinates the development of the Compliance Management Plan (CMP [ 6 ]) that will build on the BMP [ 7 ] developed by the Enforcement Branch. NRAC — a 24/7 risk assessment centre — plays a role in examination activities when a radiation detection portal detects radiation that is above the threshold in a marine container.

The Admissibility Branch is responsible for developing and maintaining national policies and SOPs for functional guidance of non-contraband examination activities (e.g. food, plant and animal [FPA] products), including AMPS. The Admissibility Branch is the primary Agency contact for the trade community. It is also responsible for some policies pertaining to examinations, including the offload policy in the highway mode.

The Innovation, Science and Technology Branch manages and maintains corporate information technology systems such as the Accelerated Commercial Release Operations Support System (ACROSS). The LSSD is part of this branch and it analyzes samples of questionable imported goods and conducts research on technology for detecting contraband and illicit radiological material. The LSSD also supports NRAC with identification and action on alerts transmitted by the radiation detection portals.

The Comptrollership Branch manages and maintains custodial and legislated facilities, including the facilities where examinations are conducted. It is also responsible for monitoring the state of facilities and procuring detection tools.

The Human Resources Branch houses the Enforcement Training Division (formerly part of the Enforcement Branch). This Division develops, coordinates, maintains and delivers national enforcement-specific training products.

The CBSA is responsible for enforcing regulations of OGDs, such as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Health Canada, Transport Canada, Environment Canada and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, and may examine shipments based on OGD referrals or lookouts. Depending on the result of an examination, these organizations may be called in to the port of entry to further investigate an intercepted good.

Private sector stakeholders also play an important role in the CBSA's examination activities. For example, in the air mode, border services officers often conduct examinations in facilities belonging to private sector stakeholders (e.g. the Air Canada cargo facility at Toronto Pearson International Airport). In the marine mode, CEFs and off-load services are provided by industry as part of its obligations to the CBSA under section 6 of the Customs Act. In the highway mode, bridge authorities provide examination space to the CBSA and private sector companies provide off-load services, which may include transporting, unpacking and repacking cargo containers under the CBSA's supervision when containers are referred for examination.

Evaluation Methodology

This section provides a brief overview of the qualitative and quantitative research methodologies that were used in this evaluation to answer the following research questions (Exhibit 2):

Exhibit 2: Evaluation questions and issues

Relevance	To what extent are examination activities consistent with CBSA and government-wide priorities? To what extent is there an actual need for the CBSA's examination activities?
Design and delivery	How effective is the governance structure for managing and conducting examination activities? To what extent are tools strategically deployed to align with risk management principles? To what extent do relationships and/or communications with stakeholders support the CBSA's examination processes? Does the CBSA have channels of communication in place for ongoing consultation with external stakeholders? Are stakeholders satisfied with the communication and consultation processes? Is performance measurement data collected, analyzed and reported on for the continual improvement of examination processes? How effective is training for examination activities?
Results	Is the CBSA meeting its examination performance targets? How effective are examinations in detecting and interdicting threats? What contributions are the tools making to the examination processes? Is the logging of examination results sufficient for improving CBSA programs and processes? Is there evidence that examinations and detection tools and technologies have deterred terrorism and border criminality? Have there been any unexpected results from the examination processes?
Efficiency	To what extent are sufficient resources available for the examination activities? To what extent is the CBSA making efficient use of detection technologies? Are there areas for improvement? Are there alternative approaches that could improve efficiency and results?

CBSA Document and Data Review

The following types of documents were reviewed:

• Internal and public CBSA documents such as CBSA strategic priorities and planning and management reports; acts, regulations and D-memoranda related to the legal/regulatory framework of cargo examinations; SOPs and manuals for different types of examinations; risk assessments; and training materials.

The data review was based on the following sources:

• CBSA national statistics and performance data from sources such as the BMP, the G11 unit, the Consolidated Management Reporting Service (CMRS), the Integrated Customs Enforcement System (ICES), the Detection Technology Section (DTS) and regional data; and
• Budget and/or expenditure information from the Corporate Administrative System and the different branches involved in examination activities.

Literature Review

The evaluation team reviewed open source documents on the design, delivery and performance of examinations of commercial cargo in other countries (e.g. United States, Australia) to help identify issues related to examination processes and detection technologies.

Key Interviews

Formal interviews were held with CBSA managers, directors and directors general at HQ, as well as with management and staff in the regions. Industry representatives were also interviewed. Exhibit 3 provides a breakdown and the number of interviewees by group.

Exhibit 3: Number of interviews conducted by group

Group	Number
TOTAL	49
CBSA HQ management and staff	12
Examination processes for commercial shipments in the aiCBSA regional management and staffr, marine, rail and highway modes	26
Private sector stakeholders	11

In addition to these formal interviews, another 23 stakeholders at HQ and 10 in the regions were contacted for informal interviews and discussions.

Site Visits

The evaluation team conducted site visits to land, air and marine ports in all CBSA eight regions.

• Land border ports: Prescott, Queenston–Lewiston Bridge, Sarnia Blue Water Bridge, Pacific Highway, Aldergrove and Coutts.
• Airports: Toronto Pearson International Airport, Montréal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, Halifax Robert L. Stanfield International Airport and Vancouver International Airport.
• Marine ports: Halifax, Prince Rupert and Delta (Vancouver)

The team also visited CEFs in the marine, rail and land modes in the Quebec, Greater Toronto Area, Atlantic and Pacific Regions.

Research Limitations

Although the CBSA has considerable information on different aspects of examination activities, there were limitations on what could be used for the evaluation. Some data on examination activities is captured in ACROSS and TITAN and in various logs at the port of entry and district level. Some district and regional data is rolled up at a national level for BMP purposes and other data is used for G11 reporting. However, data is not always collected in a consistent manner, making comparisons and integration of information contained in the various systems difficult and sometimes impossible. Some of the issues include varying definitions, level of detail and reporting periods. This limited the ability of the evaluation team to develop a comprehensive picture of the CBSA's examination activities.

Key Findings

Relevance

To what extent are examination activities consistent with CBSA and government-wide priorities?

Examinations are consistent with CBSA priorities and essential to the CBSA fulfilling its mandate and achieving its strategic objectives. Examination activities support the Government of Canada's priorities of facilitating efficient legitimate trade while at the same time preventing threats from entering Canada.

The CBSA's mandate is to provide integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the flow of legitimate persons and goods. The CBSA's legal authority to conduct examinations is provided by the Customs Act (sections 99, 101, 111, 112 and 163.5) and the Canada Border Services Agency Act generally. The public's obligations to assist the CBSA are provided in sections 13, 21 and 27 generally of the Customs Act.

Through its examination activities, the CBSA detects and interdicts contraband and other threats from harming Canadian society and commerce. Examination processes may involve using non-intrusive technology or may require more invasive methods of determining the legitimacy of a commercial shipment. These activities are key to the Agency realizing its strategic outcome of efficient and effective border management that contributes to the security and prosperity of Canada.

The November 2008 Speech from the Throne included references to expanding gateways to trade and investments for better oversight of food, drug and consumer products to ensure the safety of Canadians. As well, the Government of Canada's priority of combating border criminality was highlighted in the February 2008 budget that allocated $174 million for border security. Examination of incoming goods is fully aligned with and supports these priorities.

Through its examination activities, the CBSA fulfills its responsibilities to enforce legislation on behalf of OGDs to prevent the unlawful entry of goods. Key legislation that supports CBSA examination processes include the Food and Drugs Act, the Plant Protection Act, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and the Firearms Act.

To what extent is there an actual need for the CBSA's examination activities?

CBSA examinations are crucial for the detection and seizure of unlawful goods entering Canada.

In 2007–2008, CBSA examination activities led to 10,884 drug seizures, 5,700 weapon seizures and 3,939 tobacco seizures. The CBSA also intercepted 7,357 items of child pornography, obscene material and hate propaganda, as well as 91,973 FPA products. During the same period, the CBSA seized $39.6 million in undeclared currency. In the absence of examination activities, these goods would have entered Canada. As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the CBSA has focused additional attention and resources on the detection of radiological and nuclear threats in the marine mode. Modern technology and equipment acquired for the examination of imports plays an important role in detecting illicit and potentially dangerous goods.

Threats are real and significant. Numerous independent sources have identified actual and potential threats associated with inbound commercial goods.

The Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2007 identified the expanding role of criminal organizations in drug trafficking in Canada and the United States. An estimated 1 to 2 tons of heroin and approximately 15 to 25 tons of cocaine enter Canada each year. [ 8 ] In its 2008 report on organized crime, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada noted that organized crime groups in Canada are active along the Canada–U.S. border and that Canada is a transit point and/or destination for illicit drugs, illegal migrants and firearms.

The CBSA's examination activities are essential in order for Canada to meet its international obligations to secure the global trade chain.

As a member of the World Customs Organization (WCO), the CBSA represents Canada and has committed to implement the WCO's SAFE Framework of Standards. The purpose of the Framework is to secure and facilitate trade by setting a minimum threshold of what must be done to facilitate a safe and secure international trade chain without creating duplication or over-burdening the system. CBSA examinations support the goal of the SAFE Framework and demonstrate the Agency's commitment to securing the trade chain as shipments transiting through Canada are among those that may be targeted and subject to examination.

Design and Delivery

How effective is the governance structure for managing and conducting examination activities?

In general, the governance structure for examinations seems to be functioning well. However, because responsibilities are shared across several branches, there is sometimes a lack of clarity.

As outlined in section 1.3 of this report, there are many areas at HQ that provide direction and services to the regions with regard to examinations. A majority of HQ interviewees were aware of these multiple functional authorities because responsibilities for examination activities are generally divided along examination type (e.g. contraband versus non-contraband). However, there are areas at HQ that do not seem as well organized. For example, while the Admissibility Branch is viewed as the leading authority on non-contraband examination activities, the offload contract in the highway mode is maintained by the Operations Branch. Furthermore, SOPs for examination activities are housed in different branches (e.g. SOPs for FPA products are developed and updated by the Admissibility Branch; the Customs Enforcement Manual is maintained by the Enforcement Branch).

To what extent are tools strategically deployed to align with risk management principles?

The CBSA has a process in place to select and deploy new and existing detection tools to the regions that takes risk into consideration.

The Enforcement Branch, specifically the DTS, is responsible for determining which new detection tools are required. Regions are consulted annually to determine their specific detection tool needs. The Operations Branch reviews regional requests by assessing the existing technology present at each port in conjunction with traffic volumes to determine needs by port. The DTS also consults with subject matter experts in several areas:

• the Enforcement Branch provides information on new or perceived threats;
• the Intelligence Directorate provides monthly bulletins and other products that report on new smuggling-related modus operandi and ports at risk; and
• the LSSD provides science-based expertise and advice on the functions and use of detection tools and technology.

The Enforcement Branch allocates various resources, including the deployment of detection tools, based on this information.

Generally, interviews with stakeholders in the regions and at HQ indicated that the processes have worked fairly well. Representatives from the DTS and the LSSD reported that they work closely together on a weekly if not daily basis on ongoing detection technology projects. In addition, regional staff indicated that they receive sufficient operational support from the DTS and the LSSD. At the same time, the evaluation found that the roles and responsibilities of the DTS and the LSSD could be clarified to maximize the strategic use of each area's expertise (e.g. joint work on vulnerabilities, limitations and countermeasures; development of joint strategies based on regional feedback to address emerging needs).

One case where better articulated and communicated roles might have improved outcomes was the selection and deployment of the Itemizer3. In this case, the decision process allowed only limited time for testing of the technology before the equipment was purchased and deployed. Had the LSSD been involved earlier in the process, it may have been able to identify problems that surfaced after the equipment had been deployed. The DTS and the LSSD have subsequently worked to resolve these issues.

The evaluation found that the lack of clarity regarding roles hampers the LSSD's ability to plan research activities in a manner that best reflects program direction and priorities. For example, while there was excellent cooperation and communication between the Enforcement Branch and the LSSD when Radiation Network Initiative (RADNet) portals were installed in marine container ports, there has been limited subsequent consultation about further deployment of RADNet portals or the need to assess alternative spectroscopic technology. Closer consultation with respect to program direction and priorities in this area would allow the LSSD to be more proactive in planning its activities.

There are SOPs for most types of examination activities and they are frequently updated.

The Customs Enforcement Manual remains the principle SOP for border services officers and the primary policy document regarding examinations. Topics such as the use of detection technology and policies and procedures on examining commercial shipments, containers and aircraft are included. The manual also provides crucial information on the CBSA's authority to examine conveyances and goods under the Customs Act, on health and safety measures, and on the proper procedures to follow when conducting commercial examinations.

Since December 2007, the CBSA has developed numerous SOPs for identifying FPA threats during examinations of live animals and when inspecting wood packaging, and for controlling, monitoring and disposing of international waste arriving via marine vessels and aircraft.

While still in draft form, there are SOPs for dealing with radiation detection portal alarms at NRAC and SOPs for the LSSD to follow when an alarm cannot be negated by NRAC. The Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Unit has developed a national field guide on the use of carborne radiation detectors. Ports have received draft versions of these SOPs; the SOPs will be finalized when remaining portals have been installed.

To what extent do relationships and/or communications with stakeholders support the CBSA's examination processes?

The effectiveness of communications varies across the Agency. Generally speaking, communications are working well at the field and regional levels, but are at times problematic between the regions and HQ.

Communications seems to be working well between port of entry managers, district directors and regional directors general. However, there are sometimes problems with communications between the regions and HQ on operational issues. For example, it is not always clear who at HQ should be contacted for functional guidance. This may be linked to staff turnover and, as such, some interview respondents suggested that the implementation of a single window in the Operations Branch to field general questions and direct calls would be beneficial.

One area showed consistently effective communications: the communications between the regions and the LSSD. Site visits and interviews found that regional representatives were highly satisfied with the LSSD's responsiveness to calls concerning test results on seized and detained goods and the interpretation of radiation technology readings.

It should also be noted that the DTS established a national help desk in 2005 to facilitate the timely and consistent resolution of equipment failures and other related issues. And, more recently, the DTS appointed regional detection technology coordinators [ 9 ] to serve as a single point of contact between border services officers and the DTS.

Does the CBSA have channels of communication in place for ongoing consultation with external stakeholders?

The CBSA has created channels to engage private sector stakeholders in constant and open communications.

Private sector stakeholders use local contacts to address day-to-day issues and HQ contacts or steering/consultative committee meetings for higher-level or policy-based questions. For commercial processes, the CBSA has two forums to engage industry: the Canada Border Services Advisory Committee and the Border Commercial Consultation Committee.

The Canada Border Services Advisory Committee is composed of heads of private sector stakeholder associations, academia and non-governmental organizations. Members provide high-level advice on major determinants that affect Canadian border activity or that may affect the priorities, business and operations of the Agency. Through the Border Commercial Consultation Committee, the CBSA consults with Canadian commercial stakeholders on Agency strategies, policies, operational programs and administrative procedures that govern and affect Canada's border operations and overall commercial trade. This committee serves as a forum for sharing information and views on matters relevant to the processing of commercial goods across Canada's border.

Examination-related topics addressed by the two committees have included radiation detection technology, import costs, wait times, staff and stakeholder training, compliance management plans and communications.

Are stakeholders satisfied with the communication and consultation processes?

Shippers, carriers and shipping and trucking federation representatives report that communications with the CBSA are generally satisfactory with some exceptions.

While most stakeholders interviewed indicated that communications are good, stakeholders in the marine mode were generally the least satisfied. This can be attributed to delays and confusion associated with the implementation of the container fumigation policy in the 2007–2008 fiscal year. Specific issues noted during interviews included the timeliness of the CBSA's response to questions on the status of containers referred for examination and/or the methods of communication employed by the CBSA (e.g. using faxes instead of e-mail to send hold notifications). To address these issues, some stakeholders suggested that the CBSA should create a Web portal to help carriers track the status of containers online.

A review of correspondence sent to the Minister of Public Safety over the last two fiscal years showed that costs and time delays related to examinations and damage to goods are of high concern to private sector stakeholders (see Exhibit 4). Site visits also revealed that border services officers handle goods roughly at times, leading to damage or destruction. Other commonly cited issues include frequency of exams and the recent release at first point of arrival policy that delays less than truck load (LTL) shipments [ 10 ] referred for examination.

Exhibit 4: Correspondence sent to the Minister of Public Safety by mode and issue

2006–2007	Damages [ 11 ]	Costs [ 12 ]	Time delays	Client service [ 13 ]	Other [ 14 ]
TOTAL	18	27	19	7	25
Marine	4	7	4	0	2
Highway	0	4	4	1	6
Air	2	1	1	0	3
Subtotal	6	12	9	1	11
2007–2008	Damages	Costs	Time delays	Client service	Other
Marine	8	12	8	1	6
Highway	2	3	2	3	7
Air	2	0	0	2	1
Subtotal	12	15	10	6	14

Is performance measurement data collected, analyzed and reported on for the continual improvement of examination processes?

The CBSA has established some performance targets for examinations and collects some operational information on the detection technology. However, data collected with respect to specific types of examinations is insufficient to measure performance.

The BMP is the CBSA's tool for setting and monitoring examination targets by mode and type of inspection on a national and regional basis. Since 2000–2001, the former Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, and now the CBSA, has made use of the BMP to help manage risk at ports of entry.

The DTS has implemented data collection methods on the use of the CBSA's detection technologies. For example, as Exhibit 5 shows, information on mobile VACIS images is collected to track the number of 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs) examined using this technology. In 2007–2008, a total of 48,087 images were taken by the mobile VACIS units, which translates into an estimated 67,828 TEUs. It is anticipated that, once reporting becomes more timely and data quality is standardized, this information will present an accurate depiction of the operation of these technologies (e.g. unit operating hours, mileage, number of scans and samples). Although this type of information is valuable for monitoring and tracking the achievement of examination targets and the operating status of the detection technology, no cross comparisons can be made because the data cannot be linked. At the time of this evaluation, the data was not sufficient to determine the effective and efficient use of the tools.

Exhibit 5: Imaging and scans by gamma-ray, X-ray and ion mobility spectrometry technology in 2007–2008

Imaging and scans by gamma-ray

gamma-ray technology	40 foot	20 foot	Other [ 15 ]	Total scans	Average (month)
Mobile VACIS images	19,741	6,045	22,301	48,087	4,007.3
Pallet VACIS images [ 16 ]	n/a	n/a	n/a	97,035	8,086.3

Imaging and scans by X-ray

X-ray technology	Total samples [ 17 ]	Average (month)
X-ray imaging technology [ 18 ]	10,818,546	901,545.5
Scan trailers	134,115	11,176.3
TOTAL	10,952,661	912,721.8

Imaging and scans by Ion mobility spectrometry technology

Ion mobility spectrometry technology	Total samples [ 19 ]	Average (month)
Ionscan	8,684,642	723,720.2
Sabre	134,999	11,249.9
Itemizer3	18,455	1,537.9
TOTAL	8,838,096	736,508.0

Additional CBSA systems and sources that collect and manage information associated with examination activities and detection technology include ACROSS [ 20 ], TITAN [ 21 ] and ICES. [ 22 ] Each captures various aspects of the commercial process (e.g. referrals, examinations, examination outcomes, release processes, enforcement actions), but the information on examination activities (e.g. indicators, methods, technologies used) is not standardized and is prone to data entry errors and issues.

Information is also being collected at the port of entry level. The evaluation found this local information is often rich in detail and is analyzed and used for operational decisions (e.g. scheduling, requests for offloaders). However, it is not standardized nationally therefore making broader analysis difficult (e.g. variation in types of information captured, names, definitions, labels).

Although the CBSA currently collects some information on risk assessment activities associated with the radiation detection portals, this information is insufficient to measure performance.

Although the algorithm software was provided by the supplier of the detection technology, the LSSD developed key components of the RADNet system including the software that monitors the health of the portals and their environment, the RAV and the alarm statistics Web page. Together, these systems and tools produce information for risk assessment and tracking the status of radiation detection portal alarms.

The evaluation found that prior to implementation, strategic goals and performance measures were not developed to support the assessment of the success of the radiation detection portal program. Interviewees reported that when the project was in the design and development stages, emphasis was placed on getting the portals up and running quickly.

Since implementation, steps have been taken to address this issue. For example, the CBRN Unit in the Enforcement Branch is currently working with the Results-Based Management Unit in the Strategy and Coordination Branch to develop strategic goals and performance measures (including a results-based management and accountability framework and logic model) for the radiation detection portals. In addition, the LSSD has completed some research to determine the limitations of the portal sensors and has developed plans to enhance functionality. There are also plans to revise the existing algorithm used to estimate the total TEUs scanned and to review options of pushing data collected by each portal to a central database at the LSSD.

How effective is training for examination activities?

As of 2006–2007, training specific for the commercial stream is no longer delivered to border services officer recruits at the Learning Centre in Rigaud, Quebec. Commercial training is now the responsibility of the regions to where the recruits are deployed after they complete the first two components of the Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT).

Although responsibility for the 10-day training that is specific to the commercial mode has been transferred to the regions, regional staff interviewed did not believe that additional resources to deliver this course had been provided. Interviews indicated that resourcing poses a considerable challenge — especially considering the investment required to fully train a border services officer — and the added responsibility of the 10-day course increases the burden considerably. Respondents reported that it was often difficult to locate enough funding from their budgets to pay for training delivered locally.

Exhibit 6 shows that the time and cost to fully train border services officers on how to examine marine containers may be more substantial. Staff at one CEF reported that fully trained border services officers enhanced the capacity of the facility and management's flexibility and ability to address staffing issues (e.g. sick leave, holiday leave).

Exhibit 6: CEF training plan

Training component/course	Number of training days
In-class training	10 days
Job shadowing	10 days
Counter training	20 days
Pallet VACIS unit training	5 days
Container examination training	10 days
In-class post-training	5 days
Training on other detection tools (e.g. handheld tools, Sabre 2000, Sabre 4000, X-ray machines)	Varies
TOTAL	60+ days

Training also presents operational challenges. As noted in Exhibit 6, it can take more than 60 days for a newly hired border services officer to be able to perform all activities in a CEF. [ 23 ] Compounding the challenge is the backlog for some training courses. During site visits, it was consistently reported that securing required and specific training [ 24 ] for recruits and officers was problematic due to the infrequency of course offerings, the limited number of seats available and the constant intake of recruits. [ 25 ] This is supported by research conducted by the Enforcement Training and Learning Directorate in 2008, which showed access to and availability of training to be one of the primary challenges for the regions. [ 26 ] Participants reported receiving training only after they had worked in the commercial stream for a long period of time, or not at all. [ 27 ] Access and availability of courses in French was reported as even more limited.

To offer some courses in a cost-effective manner, it means bringing together a group of 6 to 10 border services officers. This puts a strain on ports due to the costs associated with travel (officers travelling to training locations) and overtime (to back fill positions). Secondly, the specialized skills required for examinations limits flexibility in assigning officers to specific tasks and it can be difficult to find trained officers to cover for those on training. According to one interviewee, "Training is not as good as it could be. We do the best we can with limited budget and staffing, and our operational requirements."

Regional management reported that the train-the-trainer approach was one way to deal with increased regional pressures to deliver training and to address the training backlog. However, all but one region reported having high turnover rates of trainers trained under this approach. Interviewees at HQ reported that the train-the-trainer course for the 10-day commercial mode specific training has only been delivered once since responsibility for delivering this training was transferred to the regions. As a result, trainers available to deliver this training are on the decline and the train-the-trainer approach has likely not delivered results as anticipated.

There is more specialized training available in the marine mode than in other modes.

The Agency has developed a range of training products and tools to meet training and learning needs for working on the front line. However, interview respondents both at HQ and in the regions reported that the availability and quality of specialized training was greatest in the marine mode. Regional interviewees stated that the courses offered by the Marine Centre of Expertise were extremely useful and that border services officers returning from training there were well versed in examination processes and in health and safety matters.

Although the CBSA has developed general training for examinations in the highway mode, site visits and interviews indicated that specialized training does not appear to be available in Canada. As a result, some regions have sent border services officers to specialized training in the United States.

There is also a serious training gap on health and safety procedures. It was reported that border services officers have refused to conduct examinations in the past due to a lack of such training.

The Agency relies heavily on job shadowing as a means to train border services officers. This is an efficient and effective approach provided the person being shadowed is knowledgeable and can offer the required learning opportunities.

Presently, there are no national standards for what should be delivered or taught during job shadowing. Under the current approach, there are ample chances to pass on bad habits and erroneous information to officers new to the task.

The evaluation found that while border services officers valued job shadowing, a combination of formal training, job shadowing and mentoring and/or guidance from other officers was most effective in preparing an officer to work in commercial operations. [ 28 ]

Since training on commercial activities was transferred to the regions, no process has been implemented to ensure quality of training or to determine whether training needs are met.

While some initial measures have been put in place to review the current state of commercial training (e.g. the 2008 CBSA Commercial Training Redesign Focus Group), tracking and reporting of both training needs and the quality of training delivered is not being done. For example, the evaluation research found that the regional training needs assessments and the record of training delivered regionally (two useful tracking tools created by the Enforcement Branch training group in the Training and Learning Directorate) have not been maintained since 2005–2006. Monitoring the development of border services officers new to the commercial stream is primarily informal.

Results

Is the CBSA meeting its examination performance targets?

Since 2004–2005, the CBSA has exceeded its overall examination targets in the air and highway modes.

The CBSA has been consistently unable to meet full offload targets of marine containers. An apparent significant improvement in 2007–2008 for the marine mode may be attributed to a reduction in target levels.

In the rail and highway modes, partial offload targets are not being met while full offload targets are being exceeded. CBSA staff in the regions noted that once officers reach the partial offload threshold of 75% of a shipment, they often elect to complete a full offload rather than stop the inspection. This may account for some of the discrepancies between targets and actual examinations.

How effective are examinations in detecting and interdicting threats?

It is estimated that since 2003–2004, the CBSA has completed more than 1 million commercial examinations. As a result, approximately 220,835 enforcement actions have been taken.

Examination levels fluctuated significantly from 2003–2004 to 2007–2008. Over this period, the CBSA examined 87% of shipments referred for secondary examination.

Exhibit 7: Examination activities (all modes) from 2003–2004 to 2007–2008

2003–2004

Activity	Count	% of referals
Commercial examination referrals	317,879	100%
Overrides	61,966	19.5%
Commercial examinations	255,913	80.5%
Commercial enforcement actions (hit rate)	41,246	[13.0%]

2004–2005

Activity	Count	% of referals
Commercial examination referrals	236,777	100%
Overrides	21,956	9.3%
Commercial examinations	214,821	90.7%
Commercial enforcement actions (hit rate)	51,105	[21.6%]

2005–2006

Activity	Count	% of referals
Commercial examination referrals	263,819	100%
Overrides	22,841	8.7%
Commercial examinations	240,978	91.3%
Commercial enforcement actions (hit rate)	40,252	[15.3%]

2006–2007

Activity	Count	% of referals
Commercial examination referrals	336,670	100%
Overrides	44,657	13.3%
Commercial examinations	292,013	86.7%
Commercial enforcement actions (hit rate)	50,006	[14.9%]

2007–2008

Activity	Count	% of referals
Commercial examination referrals	297,448	100%
Overrides	42,219	14.2%
Commercial examinations	255,229	85.8%
Commercial enforcement actions (hit rate)	38,226	[12.9%]

Overrides are recorded when referrals for secondary examination were not actioned. Between 2003–2004 and 2007–2008, the proportion of examination referrals overridden declined by 32% (from 61,966 to 42,219). It is not possible to ascertain the level of risk associated with overrides because no data is collected on the types of referrals that were not acted on, on the rationale for overrides or on the incidence by mode. However, based on site visit interviews/discussions with front-line staff, system-generated random examinations are the most common referrals overridden by officers. Reasons cited were capacity issues at the port and lack of understanding as to the importance of random examinations for baseline data collection. This is in spite of the BMP, which specifically notes that the importance of doing random examinations must be communicated and stressed to both superintendents and inspectors, and that they must be accountable for completing those examinations.

Exhibit 8 shows the proportion of examinations by type from 2003–2004 to 2006–2007. More than half of all examinations conducted were referred for commercial, non-contraband purposes.

Exhibit 8: Examinations (all modes) by type of referral from 2003–2004 to 2006–2007 [ 30 ]

Exhibit 8: Examinations (all modes) by type of referral from
2003–2004 to 2006–2007

	2003–2004	2004–2005	2005–2006	2006–2007
Non-terminal office	9.2%	12.6%	10.9%	11.0%
Contraband	22.3%	22.5%	20.8%	21.6%
Commercial – non-contraband	60.7%	55.8%	61.2%	61.5%
Commercial – OGDs	7.8%	9.1%	7.2%	6.0%

The percentage of referrals for OGDs registered a slight overall decline during this period. This may be due to a decline in the number of referrals or to a greater focus on other threats or capacity issues. Several stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation suggested that the CBSA should enhance its focus on incoming FPA threats to better fulfill its obligations.

As shown in Exhibit 9, the majority of enforcement actions are associated with commercial or trade contraventions. More than 75% of the enforcement actions taken over the 2003–2004 to 2007–2008 period were either notice of penalty assessment (NPA) contraventions (AMPS) (56.7%) or forced payments (20.3%). By comparison, only 8% were associated with drug seizures (6.0%) and prohibited goods (2.4%).

Despite the relatively small proportion of drug seizures compared to the total enforcement actions, the number of drug seizures resulting from examinations is significant. Information from ICES shows that the CBSA made 658 seizures in 2007–2008 of which 48.3% (320) were drug seizures. These drugs had an estimated street value of $60 million. In 2006–2007, drugs seized by the CBSA had an estimated street value of $84.5 million.

Exhibit 9: Number of enforcement actions [ 32 ] (all modes) by fiscal year

Exhibit 9: Number of enforcement actions (all modes) by fiscal year

	2003–2004	2004–2005	2005–2006	2006–2007	2007–2008
NPA Contraventions (AMPS)	20,552	30,222	23,353	32,173	18,979
Forced Payments	10,164	10,891	7,763	7,727	8,394
K19s Issued	4,788	5,046	5,028	5,344	6,834
Drug Seizures	2,795	2,557	2,321	2,934	2,519
Prohibited Goods	1,224	1,352	863	1,064	801
Shipments detained on K27s	1,723	1,017	924	764	699

Penalties collected by the CBSA for NPA contraventions (AMPS) are considerable and have risen from about $6.6 million in 2003–2004 to over $11 million in 2007–2008 (Exhibit 10).

Exhibit 10: Total value of net NPA contraventions (AMPS) by fiscal year (all modes)

Exhibit 10: Total value of net NPA contraventions (AMPS) by fiscal year (all modes)

	2003–2004	2004–2005	2005–2006	2006–2007	2007–2008
NPA Contraventions	$6,575,190	$8,258,273	$11,205,363	$12,791,190	$11,224,153

What contributions are the tools making to the examination processes?

Using detection technologies enhances the timeliness of examination activities, supports the decision-making process for border services officers and makes the best use of resources.

Although there are some practices that could be enhanced (see Section 2.4), in general, the site visits indicated that the use of detection technology facilitates an approach that proceeds from non-intrusive to intrusive examination methods based on indicators and the judgment of officers. For example, images produced by mobile VACIS scans of trailer loads (particularly non-LTL shipments) provide officers with visual information; officers use this information when deciding to refer shipments to secondary inspection or to release shipments without an offload. In the CEFs visited, pallet VACIS units were used to scan palletized shipments (e.g. antique furniture, engines, bulk fabric rolls) for indicators as an initial step rather than inspecting items in a piecemeal manner. When indicators or suspicions were confirmed, officers escalated examinations by dismantling shipments for more in-depth inspection.

Similar use of the X-ray imaging technology provides officers with images of boxed goods without them having to physically open or dismantle entire shipments to look for indicators. This technology was efficient for full offload inspections in the CEFs and for examinations typically conducted at air carriers' warehouses with scan trailer units.

Examination activities rely heavily on officers' judgment, particularly the interpretation of indicators. Scans and sample results support officers because they provide information to verify indicators. During one site visit, X-ray scans confirmed that several boxes with different markings in a trailer load of imported dried goods were not recorded on the manifest. By escalating the examination to a full offload, officers found unreported pallets of olive oil and bottled sauces at the rear of the trailer.

Detection technologies also facilitate a multi-layered approach to examinations. For example, during examinations at one CEF, officers used swabs, in addition to reviewing results of X-ray scans and visual inspections, to draw selective samples from the goods and the walls of the container during a full offload. Samples analyzed by the Ionscan verified that there were no traces of narcotics in the shipment or container.

Detection technologies can maximize use of resources. A typical mobile VACIS unit TEU examination requires approximately 60 minutes of a border services officer's time. [ 34 ] This is significantly less time than the estimated BMP time standards [ 35 ] for a full (745.8 minutes) or partial offload (89 minutes) in the rail and highway modes or for a full TEU offload (337.8 minutes) in the marine mode. The use of VACIS examinations helps the CBSA to maximize the number of examinations completed and minimize shipping delays.

Since the introduction of radiation detection portals, more than 1 million scans have been conducted. Although portals send a silent alarm on a regular basis, to date all potential threats have been successfully assessed and negated.

The CBSA has implemented radiation detection equipment in most major marine ports in Canada. To date, 25 of the 31 portals purchased have been installed and are operational. [ 36 ] Radiation detection portals scan marine containers as they are moved from vessels to the terminal stacks. If the base radiation threshold is exceeded, the portal sends a silent alarm to NRAC via the RAV system. NRAC officers will either negate the risk or refer the container for secondary examination at the port. In this process, the LSSD is also notified and consulted.

Exhibit 11 shows the estimated number of TEUs scanned by the radiation detection portals since the portals were implemented in 2005–2006. Note that radiation detection portals were not operational in the Quebec and Pacific regions until 2007–2008.

Exhibit 11: Total estimated [ 37 ] TEU scans by fiscal year

Region	2005–2006	2006–2007	2007–2008
Atlantic	7,920	11,400	31,950
Quebec	n/a	n/a	647,400
Pacific	n/a	n/a	614,100
TOTAL	7,920	11,400	1,293,450

Total alarms in 2005–2006 (66) and 2006–2007 (95) were relatively low as units were operational in only one region. During this period, 72% of the alarms were negated by NRAC, while approximately 25% were negated after being referred to the port for further examination. Once the portals in the Quebec and Pacific regions went operational, the total number of alarms increased to 8,623. Of these alarms, 97% were negated by NRAC and only 3% were referred for further inspection.

In general, examination tools and processes have improved over time.

The CBSA's tools and examination processes have improved over time. Detection equipment is employed in all modes to detect trace amounts of drugs or explosives, X-ray machines and VACIS units are in place to detect unusual loads or shipments, and radiation detection portals and carborne units have been strategically deployed to match the highest risk areas: marine ports.

Regional interviewees also noted that examination processes have been adjusted to match current threats. For example, in the highway mode, discoveries of drugs in transport trucks have led to the development of new methods by the CBSA.

The majority of interviewees in the regions and at HQ believe that tools have been keeping up with known threats.

Is the logging of examination results sufficient for improving CBSA programs and processes?

Examination results are not logged in a timely, detailed or standard fashion.

Site visits indicated that ports of entry have implemented different protocols for the monitoring of logging of examination results. In some ports, there are multiple stages of review (border services officers close examination files by the end of their shift, superintendents review the files for completeness, targeters review the files for quality and report any problematic entries to the chief). In other ports, commercial analysts will compare across entries to paper logs at the port, resolve issues and report to the chief. The evaluation team's review of some of the data found the latter process was not effective in ensuring quality of data. Several examination files shown to the team had not been closed from the previous week.

The CBSA has developed mechanisms in ICES to capture the use of detection technologies. However, interviews and data indicate that officers are not using this feature regularly. As a result, the information cannot be used to measure how effective the tools are or how the tools contribute to the detection of unlawful goods.

Is there evidence that examinations and detection tools and technologies have deterred terrorism and border criminality?

There are indications that there have been changes to border criminality behaviours.

The CBSA is one of many organizations working to deter criminality and terrorism. As such, it is not possible to categorically state the extent to which the Agency's examination activities deter criminal activity. However, there is evidence to suggest that criminal behaviour has been influenced by the CBSA's efforts. For example, smuggling techniques appear to have changed in response to the CBSA's successful seizures of illegal goods. Officers reported that concealment has become more sophisticated since increasing the Agency's presence on marine port docks. Since 2001, the air mode has witnessed a downward trend in the number and scale of high-value drug seizures. The CBSA National Drug Assessment 2006 report attributes this trend to the increased and enhanced airline security measures implemented post-9/11.

Have there been any unexpected results from the examination processes?

The implementation of the new policy on testing for fumigants and ventilating marine containers has had significant unanticipated impacts on workload and flow and on the number of commercial examinations completed overall.

In July 2007, testing and ventilation (if necessary) of all marine containers were introduced as mandatory steps to be taken prior to containers being examined by border services officers. At CEFs, the required testing required the realignment of resources. For example, at one CEF, a minimum of two officers were scheduled each day to container fumigation (e.g. to draw and test samples, to send containers for ventilation). These were resources originally scheduled to conduct examinations.

As per the policy, border services officers are required to retest ventilated containers to ensure levels of fumigants are safe before an examination can be started. If levels continue to be unsafe, containers must be ventilated for 24 hours and retested until levels are found to be safe. In some cases, containers were held up for several weeks.

These factors contributed to an overall decline in the number of examinations of marine containers during the research period.

A potentially significant unanticipated impact of the fumigation policy and resulting delays in examinations may be changes to shipping patterns. Some shippers that normally transit goods through Canada to the United States have indicated that the delays due to fumigation may lead them to ship directly to U.S. ports, where there is no testing for fumigants.

Some expectations associated with the utility and outcomes of using the mobile VACIS units have not been met.

Site visits and interviews with regional staff indicated that some expectations of the mobile VACIS units have not been met. For example, several interviewees reported that when this technology was deployed, it was believed that it would be useful in all modes and at all facilities. However, it was found that the mobile VACIS units were not suitable for some conditions and some ports of entry.

Alternatively, interviews with some regional and HQ staff indicated that they expected that the use of mobile VACIS units would yield higher rates of seizures in the highway mode. For example, regional staff in one region reported that during an operation across several ports of entry, numerous scans by the VACIS teams resulted in few seizures.

Efficiency

To what extent are sufficient resources available for the examination activities?

Overall, the Agency has allocated adequate resources for detection technologies.

As shown in Exhibit 12, it is estimated that more than $70 million has been allocated for detection technology since 2006–2007. [ 38 ] Overall, this level of funding has been sufficient to meet examination targets as outlined in the BMP.

Exhibit 12: Estimated funding allocated for detection technology

Tresury Board submission funding for technology	2006–2007	2007–2008	2008–2009
TOTAL	$23,627,918.00	$23,727,918.00	$23,820,000.00
VACIS imaging technology and full-time equivalents	$4,707,918.00	$4,707,918.00	$4,800,000.00
Radiation detection equipment	$1,000,000.00	$1,100,000.00	$1,100,000.00
X-ray machines, X-ray vans, ion scanners, container examination equipment	$13,600,000.00	$13,600,000.00	$13,600,000.00
Strengthening carborne units and radiation detection portals	$4,320,000.00	$4,320,000.00	$4,320,000.00

Conservative estimates regarding expenditures for examinations and support activities are shown in Exhibit 13. Overall, figures are likely lower than actual expenditures because all support activities provided by staff in the Admissibility Branch (e.g. trade-related activities, FPA-related activities) and the Innovation, Science and Technology Branch (e.g. systems support) are not easily identified using existing activity codes.

Exhibit 13: Estimated expenditures for examinations and support activities

TOTAL	$23,939,684.44	$25,162,988.23	$38,644,158.45
Salary by activity	2006–2007	2007–2008	2008–2009 [ 39 ]
Commercial secondary examination	$10,494,196.80	$11,269,550.40	$12,231,675.00
Container examination	$6,181,328.40	$7,398,540.00	$8,932,154.40
Scientific research and scientific analyst	$1,864,159.24	$3,085,185.42	$2,579,950.87
Branches at HQ	2006–2007	2007–2008	2008–2009
DTS, Enforcement Branch	$2,300,000.00	$1,183,114.00	$12,100,000.00
CBRN Unit, Enforcement Branch	$3,100,000.00	$2,226,598.41	$2,800,378.18

An estimated 367 full-time equivalents were dedicated to examination activities in 2008–2009. Resources dedicated to examinations have been increasing steadily since 2006–2007. In 2008–2009, the DTS and the Comptrollership Branch implemented three new activity codes to specifically track activities in the regions and at HQ. However, to date, these codes have not been used on a national basis.

Exhibit 14: Number of full-time equivalents by examination activity

Salary by activity	2006–2007 (FTEs)	2007–2008 (FTEs)	2008–2009 (FTEs) [ 40 ]
Commercial secondary examination	164.84	175.13	192.78
Container examination	99.61	118.55	143.90
Scientific research and scientific analyst	22.45	35.28	30.55
TOTAL	286.90	328.96	367.23

To what extent is the CBSA making efficient use of detection technologies? Are there areas for improvement?

In general, the CBSA has an adequate inventory of detection tools to conduct examination activities. However, the intensity with which the tools are used varies and could be improved.

Regional and HQ staff interviewed reported that, in general, officers in the field have the detection tools and technology they require for their examination activities. However, it was also reported that the consistency of use could be improved. For example, several superintendents indicated that, at times, officers do not use handheld tools such as cameras (pole cameras, probe cameras) and density meters as much as they could. It was reported that, from time to time, superintendents had to encourage officers to make the best use of these types of tools in their work.

The deployment of the Itemizer3 was intended to provide officers with a technology that was capable of scanning samples for traces of narcotics and explosives at the same time. Staff in the DTS and the LSSD indicated that there were some technical issues early on during the deployment of this tool; however, their understanding was that the Itemizer3 units are now functioning as required. Outreach and/or communications could be enhanced to identify any issues with the technology and to outline the functionality of the units to ensure the best use of the tool.

Site visits indicated that the intensity of use of the mobile VACIS units also varied across ports in the highway mode. At some ports, referrals for VACIS examinations were frequent and there was a regular workflow. However, in other ports the VACIS teams were not used effectively. For example, during one visit, the VACIS team received only one to two referrals over a seven-hour period.

The state of examination facilities varies widely by mode and from port to port. In general, the facilities available for examinations of commercial shipments are inadequate to meet the needs of the Agency.

Facilities play a central role in the CBSA's examination activities. Currently, the CBSA is accommodated in four categories of facilities: custodial facility, legislative facility, international postal terminal (Canada Post Corporation space) and general office and special purpose lease space provided by Public Works and Government Services Canada. The evaluation found that the most imperative issues are in the custodial [ 41 ] and legislative [ 42 ] categories.

All land border ports of entry are custodial installations. In total, the custodial installations include 119 ports of entry (six sites are jointly owned by Canada and the United States), 58 residences and 16 wharves. The CBSA recognizes that the facilities are insufficient and have not kept pace with the demands of the increased volume of international trade in all modes and the increased border security environment post-9/11. [ 43 ] According to the Comptrollership Branch, this portfolio has been historically underfunded resulting in an inventory that is, on average, more than 35 years old.

In 2001, the capital budget was increased from $10 million to $23 million per year. However, the renewal and recapitalization of the inventory has been delayed by several factors including the following:

• costs associated with maintaining inventory (approximately $5 million annually);
• the need to operate more complex replacement facilities;
• unplanned replacements;
• increasing resource requirements for property management of large port facilities; and
• inflation. [ 44 ]

The age of the facilities has a direct impact on the examination activities. For example, in many of the facilities, the dimensions of the bay doors did not align well with the dimensions of current trailer doors. At several sites, offloaders had difficulty lifting palletized goods because trailers currently in use are generally lower than the bay doors and/or the bay doors were narrower than the doors of the trailer. At some sites, border services officers have to ask drivers to back their trailers onto railroad ties so that the trailers align with the elevation of the bay doors.

In addition, the structural integrity of the warehouse floors was sometimes an issue. In other sites, warehouse floors have had to be reinforced with steel plating to bear weight loads of new detection technology and offloaded shipments. Furthermore, during one site visit, there were indications that the warehouse floor was cracked and there had been some water damage.

According to Comptrollership Branch staff, most medium and large ports have recently undergone some redevelopment. [ 45 ] A key challenge is the redevelopment of approximately 90 small ports while maintaining the state of those recently completed. At the current resource levels, an additional investment of $180 million in land border ports will be required over 10 to 15 years to redevelop these 90 ports. [ 46 ]

Over the next five years, the CBSA will be focusing on the following custodial infrastructure projects:

• Aldergrove, British Columbia (full port replacement, estimated cost $15 million);
• Lacolle, Quebec (bus processing and commercial examination facilities, estimated cost $10 million);
• St. Stephen, New Brunswick (port-of-entry facilities, $15 million announced from the Border Infrastructure Fund); and
• Douglas, British Columbia (port redevelopment, estimated cost $44 million).

In addition, the CBSA has identified a number of ports that will require significant investment and/or total port replacement over this period. [ 47 ] It should be noted that Budget 2009 allocated $80 million to modernize and expand border service facilities at Prescott (Ontario) and at Huntingdon, Kingsgate and Pacific Highway (all in British Columbia).

Custodial facilities for the LSSD are insufficient. The current installation is beyond capacity and requires immediate replacement. Site visits indicated that the state of the building does not support LSSD activities or accommodate current staffing levels. Recently, the CBSA has had to address leaks in the facility's roof and heating issues that affected the LSSD's server.

The CBSA is provided with a total of 106 legislated installations in the land (11), rail (3), air (68) and marine (24) modes. These are typically located at or near the major international bridge crossings, marine ports and airports. Comptrollership Branch staff reported that, in general, the CBSA has a good relationship with owners and operators. Most of the major ports have provided the Agency with adequate facilities but there are some challenges. For example, the Comptrollership Branch has reported that it can be difficult to get small owners/operators to invest in facilities necessary to meet the legislative obligations under section 6 of the Customs Act.

In general, the legislated facilities in the marine mode are adequate although some are reaching maximum capacity. Facilities have been provided for major ports in the Atlantic, Quebec and Pacific regions. Private stakeholders have established a new installation in Prince Rupert to meet the requirements of the Asia-Pacific Gateway.

In the air mode, the CBSA has been provided with operational facilities; however, there have been issues associated with these installations. For example, the CBSA has had to negotiate with airport authorities for temporary facilities during major developments and expansions. In one instance, air commercial operations had to be moved to temporary accommodations to facilitate onsite expansion. Given the space limitation in these facilities, examinations are typically conducted within the airside carriers' warehouses. In the warehouses, space for inspections varies with the size of the facility. Site visits found the designated areas for CBSA examination activities were non-existent or infringed by debris (e.g. file storage). Officers had to conduct examinations in high-traffic areas where forklifts transported loads. A key impact of this arrangement is that officers do not have secure areas to conduct examinations in and have to meet and escort high-risk shipments to warehouses to ensure the security of shipments.

In the rail mode, if shipments are deemed high risk, officers can inspect onsite. However, shipments for examination are typically transported to other facilities for a full offload.

Are there alternative approaches that could improve efficiency and results?

Staff at one CEF have developed an electronic reference tool for examination officers. Wider application of this or a similar tool would assist border services officers.

Examination officers at one CEF have access to a single point reference tool on their workstations. Key information for examinations, including legislation, policies, procedures and hyperlinks to useful Web sites (e.g. OGDs, search engines), are embedded for quick reference so that officers have all the information they require readily available and from a single source.

Conclusions, Recommendations and Management Response

The evaluation found that examinations are relevant and address an actual need. The CBSA's mandate is to provide integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the flow of legitimate persons and goods. The CBSA's legal authority to conduct examinations is provided by the Customs Act (sections 99, 101, 111, 112 and 163.5) and the Canada Border Services Agency Act generally.

Overall, the evaluation found that the CBSA is devoting considerable attention and resources to examinations. Through its examination activities, the CBSA detects, interdicts and prevents contraband and other threats from harming Canadian society and commerce. Examination processes may involve using non-intrusive technology or may require more invasive methods of determining the legitimacy of a commercial shipment. Examinations are key to the Agency realizing its strategic outcome of efficient and effective border management that contributes to the security and prosperity of Canada.

All branches at HQ and all CBSA regions are involved in various aspects of examination activity. Despite the large number of stakeholders, governance is generally functioning well. A majority of HQ interviewees were aware of multiple functional authorities because responsibilities for examination activities are generally divided along examination type (e.g. contraband versus non-contraband). For example, the Admissibility Branch is viewed as the leading authority on non-contraband examinations and the Enforcement Branch on contraband examinations.

It can take considerable time to fully train an officer to conduct commercial examinations. For example, after officers complete phases one and two of POERT, additional time is needed to train them for specific modes. Securing required and specific training for recruits and officers is problematic due to the infrequency of course offerings, the limited number of seats available and by the constant intake of recruits. Border services officers may receive the training only after they have worked in the commercial stream for a period of time, or not at all. Access and availability of courses in French was reported as even more limited.

The use of train-the-trainer sessions could be an effective approach to deal with increased regional pressures to deliver training and address the backlog. However, the infrequency of the train-the-trainer sessions and the high turnover of border services officers in this role have caused a sharp decline in the number of available trainers. As such, in its current form, the train-the-trainer approach has not been successful in meeting regional training needs.

The Agency relies heavily on job shadowing as a means to train border services officers; however, this learning strategy is only as good as the person being shadowed. Presently there are no national standards for what should be delivered or taught during job shadowing. Under the current approach, in the absence of standards, there are ample chances to pass on bad habits and erroneous information to officers new to the task.

Specialized training is only available for the marine mode (Marine Centre of Expertise). Overall, there is inadequate training capacity and support structures to meet Agency needs.

Management Response:

The CBSA concurs with this recommendation. The current POERT offered at the Learning Centre in Rigaud, Quebec, focuses on the processing of travellers while commercial training, which is more complex and technical, is provided when officers are deployed to a port of entry. It is recognized that the Agency needs to strike a balance between the two approaches to ensure that key elements of commercial examination training are included as part of the POERT curriculum.

In February 2008, the Human Resources Branch conducted focus testing on a commercial training redesign to identify training needs and to design commercial, mode-specific training. The resulting report recommended that the CBSA implement a five-phase strategy that addresses all issues recommended by this evaluation. The Operations Branch is currently working with the Admissibility, Enforcement and Human Resources branches to develop a business case for commercial training in all modes (including resources for completing the phases of the strategy). The business case will include a plan for implementation of a national mentorship/coaching training program that includes standards for job shadowing. The business case is expected to be ready for approval in December 2009. Implementation will be contingent on approval of funding.

The Human Resources Branch developed a framework and governance structure based on consultations with all regions and branches that was approved in principle by the Human Resources Committee in April 2009. The framework recommends creating a national institute of learning (with five learning centres across the country) and assessing the need for establishing centres of expertise, such as the Marine Centre of Excellence, for other modes. The framework and governance structure proposal calls for the designation of permanent national trainers attached to a national institute of learning. As an interim incentive to retain trainers, in 2008–2009, the Training and Learning Directorate lent 72 technical trainer (FB-04) positions to the regions. Implementation of the framework and governance structure will be contingent on approval of funding.

---

Since 2003–2004, more than 1 million commercial examinations have been completed. As a result, approximately 220,835 enforcement actions were taken. Monetary penalties collected by the CBSA for commercial infractions are considerable and have risen from about $6.6 million in 2003–2004 to over $11 million in 2007–2008. As well, since the introduction of radiation detection portals, more than 1 million scans have been conducted.

In 2007–2008, 14% of all referrals for secondary examination were overridden. It is not possible to ascertain the level of risk associated with overrides as no data is collected on the types of referrals that were not acted on, on the rationale for overrides or on the number of incidences by mode. However, it appears that system-generated random examinations are the most commonly overridden referrals.

Notwithstanding the level of resources dedicated to examination activities, the Agency's capacity to analyze examination information for the purpose of measuring results is inhibited by the fact that data is not always collected and measured in a consistent manner. Multiple data sources, systems and definitions are used to record examination information. For example, marine containers have several measures (TEUs, individual containers, releases, shipments) depending on the process for which the information is used. As a result of multiple metrics, data cannot be easily linked. At this time there is no tracking of the contributions of specific detection technologies toward the achievement of examination outcomes (e.g. resultant examinations as well as non-resultant examinations). In addition, there are inconsistencies in the closing of files and the logging of results, which means that data cannot be relied on to provide the necessary information for continual improvement of detection and interdiction activities.

Management Response:

The CBSA concurs with this recommendation. The Enforcement Branch will work with the Operations, Admissibility and Innovation, Science and Technology branches to develop standard measurable units (e.g. TEUs) for all commercial examinations by October 1, 2009. This standard unit of measurement would be used for all Agency applications to ensure that CBSA reports produced throughout the commercial examination process are consistent, thereby facilitating improved program monitoring, evaluation and performance. In addition, the Enforcement Branch will ensure the timely collection of data on regional use of detection technology and develop and implement a performance measurement strategy for the radiation detection portals by October 1, 2009.

The Operations Branch will work with the Enforcement, Admissibility and Innovation, Science and Technology branches to address the systems issues noted in the first and second bullets, and determine how the systems can better serve border services officers by June 2009.

With respect to the third and fourth bullets, the regions provided information on how they are "closing the loop" at their ports. With this information, the Operations Branch will work through the summer to prepare an enhanced monitoring process to address the issues raised by this recommendation. The implementation plan will be finalized by October 31, 2009.

---

Some of the CBSA's facilities do not meet Agency needs. In particular, the custodial facilities for the highway mode are insufficient to support examinations. At some ports of entry that process commercial traffic, site security is inadequate. At some ports, facilities are not large enough to permit examinations to be conducted on site. The evaluation also noted instances where the size and height of bay doors are not adequate to accommodate the dimensions of some truck trailers.

In general, the legislated facilities in the marine mode are adequate although some are reaching maximum capacity and will not address forecasted future volumes for the regions.

The CBSA is provided with space to examine air cargo and the examinations are typically conducted within the airside carriers' warehouses. In these warehouses, space for inspections varies with the size of the facility. Site visits found the designated areas for CBSA examination activities were often not clearly delineated or the designated areas were used for non-CBSA storage.

In the rail mode, if shipments are deemed high risk, officers can inspect onsite. However, shipments that are identified for examination are typically transported to other facilities for a full offload.

Management Response:

The CBSA concurs with this recommendation. The Comptrollership Branch has a planning process for real property investments that identifies the demand for fixed infrastructure and major repair and recapitalization initiatives and that balances long-term interests and available resources. Over the next three fiscal years, the CBSA will modernize, expand or replace commercial examination facilities at five ports of entry.

In terms of legislated facilities, the CBSA is currently working with bridge owners at four crossings on the construction of new, expanded port inspection facilities. With respect to the examination of commercial rail shipments, any consultations with industry on requirements for the provision of examination installations would take place subsequent to the development of an Agency offload policy.

Over the next 18–24 months, the CBSA will develop the amendments required to harmonize legislation relating to the provision of examination space at legislated facilities. It is envisioned that once completed, the new legislation will help eliminate "ambiguities" that currently exist and clearly articulate the legislated obligations for the provision of examination space.

In response to the second bullet, CBSA corporate security representatives at both the regional and national level review and approve individual site and building plans for all CBSA port redevelopment projects (custodial and legislated facilities). Corporate security representatives will review plans for the nine sites undergoing development over the next three years.

---

The CBSA has a risk-based process in place to select and deploy new and existing detection tools to the regions. As part of this process, the DTS in the Enforcement Branch consults with subject matter experts at HQ for information on new or perceived threats and with the LSSD in the Innovation, Science and Technology Branch for science-based expertise on functions and use of technology. Regions are consulted annually to determine their specific detection tool needs. Tools and technologies are deployed based on port and border risk assessments and on some input from the Operations Branch.

The DTS and the LSSD communicate regularly on ongoing detection technology projects and the regions reported having sufficient operational support from these areas. However, the roles and responsibilities of the DTS and the LSSD could be clarified to maximize the strategic use of each area's expertise (e.g. joint work on vulnerabilities, limitations and countermeasures; development of joint strategies based on regional feedback to address emerging needs). Better articulated and communicated roles might have improved the selection and deployment of the Itemizer3 and would likely enhance the LSSD's ability to plan research activities in a manner that best reflects program direction and priorities.

Management Response:

The CBSA concurs with this recommendation. The Enforcement and Innovation, Science and Technology branches will formulate and agree upon more clearly defined roles and responsibilities by September 1, 2009. These roles and responsibilities will ensure that the Agency's enforcement and scientific areas of expertise are used in a manner that maximizes their joint effectiveness.

---

• 1. CBSA Departmental Performance Report, 2007–2008, p. 15. [Return to text]
• 2. Operational Monitoring and Reporting Unit, Operations Branch. [Return to text]
• 3.For the purpose of this evaluation, the term "contraband" refers to prohibited and controlled goods as defined in the Customs Enforcement Manual. The term "non-contraband" refers to non-compliant goods as per import laws and regulations. [Return to text]
• 4. CBSA intranet. [Return to text]
• 5. As of July 2007, all marine containers arriving in Canada are to be tested for the presence of seven chemical fumigants before the containers are opened for examination. [Return to text]
• 6. The CMP is in the developmental phase. The Operations Branch was assigned responsibility for developing a new CMP to integrate the requirements of the customs, immigration and food, plant and animal programs in 2006. It is anticipated that the plan will build on the work of three previous plans — the BMP, the Post-Release Compliance Verification Plan and the Client Services Plan — and incorporate this information into one plan. In November 2008, the CMP regional workbook was forwarded to regional directors general. Based on much of the work in the BMP, the regional workbook identifies the CBSA's national priorities and provides regions with a tool to help them focus on activities to address the priorities. In addition, working groups have been formed to move the development of the CMP forward. [Return to text]
• 7. The BMP assists in the management of risk at ports of entry and is used to identify goals for enforcement actions and compliance examinations. The BMP establishes the level of examination by type required for each port in Canada based on several factors (e.g. level of risk, intelligence information, current volumetric data, compliance characteristics, previous enforcement actions). Level estimates also consider local factors (e.g. level of resources, types of examination tools present). Once set, the number estimates are reviewed and adjusted by the regions. After finalization, these targets are communicated to all ports. [Return to text]
• 8. Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2007, paragraphs 394 and 398. [Return to text]
• 9. Roles and responsibilities of these coordinators include coordinating annual regional business case submissions; coordinating DTS and LSSD site visits; gathering requested information and statistics from field operations; disseminating policy, procedures and other information from the DTS to the field; collecting and analyzing regional statistics; and providing advice and recommendations to regional senior management on equipment needs, deployment and the program in general. [Return to text]
• 10. Unlike a full truck load, which is one trailer/container containing a single shipment, LTL shipments comprise numerous shipments that are consolidated for transport to a hub terminal where the freight is then further sorted, consolidated or unloaded for local delivery. [Return to text]
• 11. This category includes references to damages to goods and conveyances. [Return to text]
• 12. This category includes references to costs of offloading services and costs related to housing containers pending examination. [Return to text]
• 13. This category includes references to perceived mistreatment by border services officers. [Return to text]
• 14. This category includes a diverse list of topics such as frequency of exams, use of a third-party offload service provider, requirement to examine at the first point of arrival instead of at offsite inspection facilities, concerns over the thoroughness of examinations, and importer concerns over rising security requirements. [Return to text]
• 15. "Other" is the count of the number of non-container scans performed. [Return to text]
• 16. This is the total number of pallets put through the imaging system. [Return to text]
• 17. This refers to the number of X-ray scans. [Return to text]
• 18. Included in this category are X-ray imaging systems that are not mobile and are therefore not used during offsite examinations. [Return to text]
• 19. This refers to the count of the number of tests performed. [Return to text]
• 20. ACROSS allows importers, brokers, carriers, freight forwarders, exporters and warehouse operators to exchange information electronically with the CBSA. [Return to text]
• 21. Border services officers enter examination results into the TITAN system on shipments that are referred in the marine and air modes. [Return to text]
• 22. ICES is the repository for all enforcement-related information such as records of seizures and other enforcement actions, lookouts, intelligence and investigations cases, and information from external sources relating to enforcement. [Return to text]
• 23. It should be noted that the Human Resources Branch recently (December 2008) released a POERT curriculum that outlines the requirement for each of the three phases of training. For in-service training, the curriculum identifies a requirement of up to 32 days for the commercial mode. [Return to text]
• 24. Tasks that require specific training include the operation of VACIS units, aircraft examinations and commercial motor vehicle examinations. [Return to text]
• 25. Regional interviewees reported that the number of seats offered to them for national training courses are frequently lower than the number of border services officers requiring training at their port. [Return to text]
• 26. Commercial Training Redesign Focus Group Report, version 0.1. [Return to text]
• 27. Commercial Training Redesign Focus Group Report shows that one third of focus group participants (6 of 18) reported that they never received the 10-day commercial training previously included in POERT for recruits. [Return to text]
• 28. Commercial Training Redesign Focus Group Report, version 0.1. [Return to text]
• 29. Based on information in the CBSA's Book of Facts and Figures, Fiscal Year Facts and Figures, 2003/2004 to 2006/2007, and on information from a special request to the Operational Monitoring and Reporting Unit. [Return to text]
• 30. Comparable information for 2007–2008 was not available due to new policies regarding development/provision of corporate statistics adopted by the Operations Branch. [Return to text]
• 31. Prepared by the Operational Monitoring and Reporting Unit, Operations Branch. [Return to text]
• 32. A K19 is a customs seizure receipt and a K27 is a notice of detention/determination. [Return to text]
• 33. Prepared by the Operational Monitoring and Reporting Unit, Operations Branch. [Return to text]
• 34. Estimate based on observations of VACIS operations conducted as part of this evaluation. Assumes each examination requires four border services officers and takes 15 minutes. [Return to text]
• 35. According to the 2006–2007 BMP (page 15), these time standards were developed through the use of historical standards, onsite measurements and composite standards or time standards from a similar activity. [Return to text]
• 36. The first radiation detection portals installed were up and running in Saint John, New Brunswick, in December 2005. In 2007–2008, portals went live in Montréal (May), Vancouver (September), Prince Rupert (October) and Halifax (December). [Return to text]
• 37. These calculations are based on a formula (developed by the LSSD) that reflects figures drawn from field trials. As such, they should be considered rough approximations. [Return to text]
• 38. The Treasury Board submission funding refers to allocations. Salary by activity covers the actual dollars spent. Depreciation and replacement values are not included in the table, nor are resources for facilities used for examination, the laboratory equipment and facilities used to support examination activities or the vehicles used by border services officers for examination activities. [Return to text]
• 39. Totals for entire fiscal year are estimates based on information current to December 8, 2008. [Return to text]
• 40. Totals for entire fiscal year are estimates based on information current to December 8, 2008. [Return to text]
• 41. Custodial facilities are federal real property under the administration of the Minister of Public Safety and for which the CBSA has lifecycle responsibilities. (Source: The CBSA's Fixed Infrastructure, August 2008, Infrastructure and Environmental Operations Directorate, Comptrollership Branch). [Return to text]
• 42. Legislated facilities are installations that are provided at no charge pursuant to legislation and regulations (Customs Act, the Plant Protection Act, the Health of Animals Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations). As per the legislation and regulations, owners or operators of installations that charge a fee for the service or toll for receiving international conveyances at the facility must provide the CBSA with port of entry examination facilities at no charge. While the Agency is not responsible for capital costs associated with construction and maintenance, it is responsible for costs such as furniture, computers, cameras, information technology infrastructure and salary. [Return to text]
• 43. Internal documents, Comptrollership Branch. [Return to text]
• 44. According to the Comptrollership Branch, in order to protect and optimize its capital investment, the CBSA will have to identify funding to ensure that regions have sufficient resources to provide full life-cycle costs of managing its fixed inventory of custodial assets (Source: draft CBSA Investment Plan 2008/09 to 2009/10, August 2008). [Return to text]
• 45. Projects recently completed include Andover, New Brunswick (2007); Cascade, British Columbia (2007); Lacolle, Quebec (commercial primary inspection lines) (2007); Stanstead, Quebec (2005); Armstrong, Quebec (2004); and Coutts, Alberta (2004). [Return to text]
• 46. The CBSA's Fixed Infrastructure, August 2008, Infrastructure and Environmental Operations Directorate, Comptrollership Branch. [Return to text]
• 47. Ports identified include Woburn, Quebec (port replacement); Winkler, Manitoba (port replacement); Aldergrove, British Columbia (traffic building only); Wildhorse, Alberta (port replacement); West Poplar, Saskatchewan (port replacement); Carway, Alberta (port replacement); Oungre, Saskatchewan (port replacement); Sprague, Manitoba (port replacement); Forest City, New Brunswick (port replacement); Lacolle, Quebec (commercial improvements); and Pacific Highway, British Columbia (commercial improvements). (Source: draft CBSA Investment Plan 2008/09 to 2009/10, August 2008). [Return to text]