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Final Report
November 2010

Table of Contents

• Executive Summary
  • Evaluation Purpose and Scope
  • Evaluation Methodology
  • Summary of Findings and Recommendations
• Introduction and Context
  • Overview of the CBSA Detentions and Removals Programs
  • Evaluation Purpose and Scope
  • Evaluation Methodology
• Key Findings - Relevance
• Key Findings – Performance
• Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy
• Key Conclusions, Recommendations and Management Response
• Appendices
  • Appendix A: Removals Process Flow Chart
  • Appendix B: Description of CBSA Immigration Holding Centres (IHCS)
  • Appendix C: Eligibility Criteria for the Toronto Bail Program
  • Appendix D: International References
  • Appendix E: Abbreviations and Acronyms

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Executive Summary

The mandate of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is to provide integrated border services by managing, controlling and securing Canada's borders in support of national security priorities. The Agency's responsibilities include enforcing legislation that governs the admissibility of people, goods, plants and animals into and out of Canada. 

With the creation of the CBSA,^[1] authority for Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)^[2] -related enforcement and intelligence activities was transferred to the CBSA from Citizenship and Immigration (CIC).  Under IRPA, foreign nationals and permanent residents can be detained if the officer is satisfied that any of the following situations exist: the individual poses a danger to the public; there is reason to believe they will not appear for immigration proceedings; their identity cannot be confirmed; or they are believed to be inadmissible for security reasons or because of human or international rights violations.^[3] 

The CBSA operates four Immigration Holding Centres (IHCs) in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia. All but the Kingston IHC (reserved for security certificate cases) are used for low-risk detainees. High-risk immigration detainees are typically held in provincial correctional facilities and include those who have criminal backgrounds and those considered a danger to the public. Provincial facilities also serve regions where IHCs do not exist.

Individuals who are removed from Canada are removed in priority if: they pose a threat to the security of Canada; they are involved in crime, organized crime or crimes against humanity; they are failed refugee claimants; or they are otherwise inadmissible (e.g., expired visas, misrepresentation of their identity, including marriages of convenience and fraudulent documents). 

The delivery of detentions and removals programs costs approximately $92 million annually,^[4] which includes $22 million in Public Safety Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) funding.

Evaluation Purpose and Scope

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of the CBSA's detentions and removals programs. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the continued relevance of these programs, their impact and success in achieving expected results, and their cost-effectiveness and efficiency. The evaluation was identified as a priority in the 2009-2012 CBSA Risk-Based Multi-Year Evaluation Plan. This evaluation meets a Treasury Board requirement to report on PSAT funding for detentions and removals activities. Additionally, this evaluation addresses questions raised by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts related to the CBSA's tracking of detainees' compliance with conditions of release. 

Evaluation Methodology

The CBSA's Program Evaluation Division in the Internal Audit and Program Evaluation Directorate carried out the evaluation research between January and June 2010. The main lines of evidence for this evaluation included document review, analysis of program-related and financial data, observations made during site visits, focus groups and in-depth interviews with key CBSA staff in the regions and at Headquarters (HQ), as well as with representatives from CIC, the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of Canada and non-governmental organizations.

Summary of Findings and Recommendations

Overall, the evaluation found that the detentions and removals programs are key elements in supporting Canada's immigration program and its border legislation, including IRPA. These programs are aligned with and support federal government policy directions and Agency outcomes of promoting a safe and secure Canada, by ensuring that those who pose a threat to the integrity of Canada's immigration laws and/or Canadian society are detained and/or removed as quickly as possible. In fiscal year 2008-2009, 14,362 individuals were detained by the CBSA for immigration reasons.^[5] In the same year, 13,249 individuals were removed from Canada. Of those, 1,855 were removed for criminality (14 percent),^[6] 9,672 were failed refugee claimants, and 1,722 were removed for other reasons.^[7] Although the recent changes to visa requirements^[8] have resulted in a decrease in the number of airport refugee claims, the number of inland and land border refugee claims increased between 2005 and 2009. It is clear that the need to detain and remove foreign nationals will continue. 

Generally speaking, the programs are achieving several of their expected outcomes. For example, low-risk persons who are ordered detained are placed in IHCs, where available.  Furthermore, in any given year, over 70 percent of the cases in the working inventory^[9] are removed from Canada. However, the evaluation identified several areas for improvement.

There are notable differences across the country in detention practices within the first 48-hour period, when it is left to the CBSA officer's discretion to detain or release an individual. For example, in the Atlantic, Prairie and Pacific regions the majority of foreign nationals are released on terms and conditions prior to their IRB admissibility hearing. In contrast, border services officers (BSOs) at Toronto's Lester B. Pearson International Airport generally detain individuals and defer decisions to the IRB on release and terms and conditions associated with the potential release to the Board. In addition, during this 48-hour period, it is at the CBSA officer's discretion whether to continue to detain or to release a person pending their first detention review in front of the IRB. The result is that foreign nationals receive different treatment, under similar conditions, depending on where they arrive at a Canadian port of entry (POE).

While the Enforcement Manual provides some guidance on the detention of vulnerable populations, CBSA staff and management in the regions indicated a desire for clearer direction in this area. The lack of a clear understanding of the various available options when dealing with vulnerable populations has resulted in inconsistency in detention practices across regions. For example, in fiscal year 2009-2010, 83.1 percent of the 330 minors detained were held in IHCs^[10] in the Quebec, and Greater Toronto Area (GTA) regions. ^[11] While 13.9 percent were held in the Pacific region, minors there are generally released with one parent while the other parent is held in detention, or they are transferred to the care of child and family services. In the Atlantic and Prairie regions, it is standard practice to release minors into the care of community services. Similarly, while individuals with mental health issues do get assistance, there is considerable variation in the time until services are received. The evaluation was unable to determine the scope or magnitude of this issue as detainees' health statistics are not tracked by the CBSA. CBSA regional management stated that there is a need for a CBSA framework or amplification of the Enforcement Manual on how to deal with such detainees.

While officers who perform detentions and removals functions indicated that they have the skills and knowledge to carry out their responsibilities, they noted several areas for improvement in training and performance support. For example, officers working in the areas of inland enforcement, border services and hearings all require strong interviewing and note-taking skills to support the evidentiary requirements of the hearings process. It was noted that gaps in the interview notes can decrease the strength of the CBSA case before the IRB. In addition, the quality of the materials provided by the BSOs and the IEOs to support the process could be improved by providing officers with a standard format for materials provided to the IRB, and hearings specific training on note-taking and interviewing techniques.

The current relationship between HQ and the regions is ad hoc, and the assistance sought by regional units is not provided in a timely way (e.g., updates on obtaining travel documents, suggestions on how to handle an unusual situation).  In addition, regional management saw value in HQ's active role in facilitating removals by liaising with Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) and airlines, and providing information such as changes to country policies, and case law related to immigration detentions and removals. Management in all regions commented on the need for a national working group to provide a forum to address ongoing and emerging issues, including detention practices, alternatives to detention, removals practices and emerging issues (e.g., changing immigration patterns), and to foster the exchange of best practices in detentions and removals approaches. 

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 1: The Programs Branch works in consultation with Operations Branch at strengthening the detentions and removals programs delivery by:

• solidifying the relationship, roles and responsibilities between HQ and the regions;
• clarifying and providing guidance on policy application related to the first 48 hours after a person has been detained, particularly in the handling of refugee claimants and vulnerable populations;
• leveraging a national forum, such as a national inland enforcement committee, to communicate such guidance and address ongoing and emerging needs; and
• identifying and addressing training and performance support gaps for inland enforcement officers (IEOs) and border services officers (BSOs).

The evaluation noted gaps in the available performance and financial information which presented a challenge in determining the programs' effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, while both program areas have improved their monitoring processes over the past 18 months, the evaluation found a number of limitations in the Field Operations Support System (FOSS) and the National Case Management System (NCMS) ^[12]  that hinder the day-to-day management of the cases in the field and limits their usefulness in managing the programs overall.

For example, it is impossible to determine the cost per individual removal as neither NCMS nor the CBSA financial system provides the data needed to track the itemized costs for each removal, the mode used for removal (e.g., charter flights, airfare), or whether the removal required an escort. In addition, NCMS lacks key fields such as the frequency and type of conditions imposed on a person prior to the 48-hour detention review, and compliance with conditions of release and removals by IRPA contravention (i.e., sections 32-42). While the evaluation was able to determine the percentage of removals over the past five years that were specifically for "in-Canada criminality", the data underestimated the true number. This occurred because the existing systems do not track those who were removed under another section of IRPA but who also had "in-Canada criminality" associated with their case.In addition, the evaluation could not determine how many people with "in-Canada criminality" had committed those crimes while awaiting removal since the information could not be linked across the systems containing this information. Obtaining this information would have involved reviewing each removal order on a case-by-case basis. 

Similarly, there is a cost recovery element for removals that is not tracked or monitored and may represent a significant "lost opportunity cost". For example, someone removed from Canada on a ticket paid for by the Crown, who later returns to Canada, is required to repay the cost of the ticket ($750 for removal to the United States and $1,500 for elsewhere). CIC is responsible for collecting such fees when an individual applies to return to Canada at an international office. However, should such an individual apply for entry directly at a Canadian POE, the CBSA currently has no way of identifying if such fees are to be or have been repaid to the Government of Canada.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 2: The Programs Branch enhances the collection of performance and financial information to manage and monitor the programs.

In fiscal year 2008-2009, detentions costs in the regions amounted to $45.7 million or an average of $3,185 per detained case. In addition, the use of non-CBSA facilities for immigration detention rose in each of the last three fiscal years, to over one-third of all detainees in the fiscal year 2009-2010. A snapshot of the detainee population taken on April 22, 2010 identified 510 persons in detention, 55 percent of whom were considered high risk.  However, at the same time, 32 percent of the detainees considered low risk were also held in non-CBSA detention facilities. Although there would be an expectation that regions without an IHC, such as the Prairies and the Atlantic, would use provincial facilities for detention, even the GTA had 38 low-risk detainees in provincial facilities.

The Toronto Bail Program (TBP) provides a cost-efficient and less restrictive alternative to detention and is the only supervised program of this nature in Canada. The TBP is run by a non-profit agency that works on a fee-for-service basis with the CBSA in the Greater Toronto Enforcement Centre (GTEC) within the GTA to provide community-based supervision of foreign nationals who would normally be held in detention. The TBP's strength lies in the relationship the staff develop with the individual through frequent contact and stringent reporting requirements. The daily cost of TBP monitoring is between $12-$16 per day versus $112 per day for the Toronto IHC or $175 for a provincial facility.  The TBP uses an algorithm to calculate the potential cost avoidance savings that result from using the program as an alternative to detention. Based on these figures, the TBP calculated the potential cost avoidance savings for GTEC at over $3.4 million for the fiscal year 2008-2009. ^[13]

Further, electronic monitoring is rarely used in immigration cases. The approximate cost to monitor one individual is $204,400 per year. However, it would cost substantially less for each additional individual released on electronic monitoring as the infrastructure and employees to support the monitoring are already in place.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 3: The Programs Branch, in consultation with Operations Branch, examines the feasibility of a national rollout of alternatives to detention programs.

Many HQ and regional management staff interviewed raised questions regarding the need for the CBSA to manage the day-to-day operations of the IHCs. Running a detention centre and managing detained populations requires training and skills that are outside the core CBSA officer training. While IRPA confers on the CBSA the responsibility to oversee the detention of foreign nationals while determining their admissibility (pending the results of immigration-related hearings), and/or while awaiting their removal from Canada, it does not specify that the CBSA must handle the daily activities of the IHCs. Currently, many aspects of the IHCs are already privatized as the CBSA leases IHC facilities and contracts with private companies to provide security, transportation of detainees, maintenance, meals and housekeeping services.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 4: The Programs Branch explores the merits of alternative service delivery arrangements for the daily operations of all IHCs.

CBSA HQ and regional management were divided on the best option to deal with the escalating costs and resource demands associated with escorted removals. CBSA officers are used as escorts in removal cases where the person being removed is considered high risk, the country of destination or the airline requires it, or for medical reasons. In 2008, the Agency carried out approximately 1,400 escorted removals at a cost of $6 million.^[14]

While the number of removals has only increased slightly in recent years, it is expected to increase significantly once the Balanced Refugee Reform Act is implemented. The changes in the refugee determination process will shorten the process for refugee claimants from all countries and eliminate access to some avenues of appeal for claimants from certain countries. While it is expected that the number of escorted removals will not increase significantly, the changes will require the CBSA to carry out removals in short order, prior to additional avenues of recourse becoming available.^[15] This will not only put pressures on the removals program to meet the increased demand, but also on the detentions program.  

The evaluation found that efficiencies could be realized by changing the way that escorted removals are currently conducted. In maintaining the status quo, the CBSA will continue to incur significant overtime, travel costs and the loss of expertise and capacity while the officer is on escort duty for extended periods of time. There are other options that may be considered, such as developing a corps of CBSA escort officers or providing the function through alternative service delivery. A corps of CBSA officers dedicated to escorting removals would ensure that the CBSA has direct day-to-day control of the process (i.e., travel arrangements), that there would be minimal impact on other core removal activities, and that these officers could accelerate the removals process as they would be dedicated to this work and not have other demands on their time. Alternative service delivery would have similar benefits to that of a corps of CBSA officers dedicated to escorting removals.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 5: The Programs Branch conducts an option analysis of different models for escorted removals, including an implementation plan for the preferred option, should the status quo not be the preferred option.

The CBSA Warrant Response Centre (WRC) is an important component in effecting some removal orders. The current process whereby an immigration-related warrant is added to the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) system is entirely paper-based. The documents associated with this process need to be signed by the issuing officer and mailed to the WRC. Should there be erroneous information on a warrant, the docket must be sent back to the officer for correction then returned to the WRC. While the warrant is active from the time it is issued, only the WRC has the authority to enter immigration warrants into CPIC. The time lag associated with the process results in delays in alerting police agencies which can provide valuable assistance in apprehending the individual. Electronic authentication is already accepted by the courts for other legal documents, and implementing such an approach for immigration warrants would not only reduce data entry errors and eliminate the cost of storing tens of thousands of paper files, but it would also speed up the process, thereby ensuring that the warrants are entered into CPIC in a timelier manner.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 6: The Programs Branch considers developing and implementing an electronic authentication and transmission process for immigration warrants.

Introduction and Context

Canada prides itself on in its multicultural identity, on attracting the best and brightest immigrants, and on providing protection for refugees in need. At the same time, Canada must remain vigilant that its immigration and refugee policies are not abused and that the integrity of its immigration program is upheld.

The mandate of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is to provide integrated border services through managing, controlling and securing Canada's borders in support of national security priorities. The Agency's responsibilities include enforcing legislation that governs the admissibility of people and goods, plants and animals into and out of Canada. 

With the creation of CBSA,^[1]  authority for Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)^[2]-related enforcement and intelligence activities were transferred to the CBSA from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC).^[3]  Under IRPA, the CBSA has the authority to investigate, detain, and remove foreign nationals found to be inadmissible to Canada or who may pose a threat to Canada – including persons involved in terrorism, organized crime, war crimes or crimes against humanity.

With a projected Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 3.0 percent in 2010,^[4] a comprehensive social safety net and a reputable refugee determination process, Canada is a preferred destination for many migrants. In 2009, Canada accepted over 252,000 permanent residents and nearly 23,000 refugees who were identified as refugees by CIC, in co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (see Exhibit 1, Number of Accepted Refugees and Permanent Residents in Canada, By Year).^[5] Refugee claims may also be made upon arrival at a Canadian land border, marine port or airport, or inland at either a CBSA or CIC office. Regardless of where the claim is initially made in Canada, if the individual is eligible to enter a refugee claim, the determination of the claim is made by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). In 2009, 15,079 refugees were recognized as Convention refugees through this process.

In 2008, Canada ranked second (behind the United States) in the number of claims for refugee status received among the 44 industrialized countries reporting to the UNHCR, receiving 10 percent of all refugee claims made globally.^[6] According to the IRB, the number of refugee determination hearings grew nearly 20 percent from 2007-2008 to 2008-2009 (from 30,524 to 36,628), but then declined by 17 percent the following fiscal year (to 29,947).^[7] Over 40 percent of the in-Canada refugee claims were accepted for each of those years.

Exhibit 1: Number of Accepted Refugees and Permanent Residents in Canada, By Year^[8]

Year	Refugees (abroad)	Refugees (in Canada)	Permanent Residents
2005	35,776	25,938	262,241
2006	32,499	24,097	251,642
2007	27,955	20,547	236,754
2008	21,860	14,526	247,246
2009	22,846	15,079	252,124

A small percentage of migrants enter Canada using falsified documents such as passports and visas. Individuals, employers or immigration consultants may help migrants gain entry by fraudulent means. According to the CBSA Intelligence Directorate, although the magnitude of the problem is not known, there are irregular migrants (e.g., improperly documented arrivals) who enter Canada surreptitiously, both at and between ports of entry to either enter refugee claims or to go underground. Such clandestine activities present serious challenges to the integrity of Canada's border legislation, the integrity of the immigration program, and to the safety and security of Canadians. 

Illegal migration requires that the CBSA remains vigilant in enforcing IRPA. In fiscal year 2009-2010, 9,420 individuals were detained by the CBSA for immigration reasons.^[9]  In fiscal year 2008-2009, 13,249 individuals were removed from Canada. Of those, 1,855 were removed for criminality (14 percent),^[10] 9,672 were failed refugee claimants, and 1,722 were for other reasons.^[11] The top five removals by nationality in 2009^[12] were Mexico (4,623), the United States (1,296), the Czech Republic (635), China (406) and Hungary (374). 

Overview of the CBSA Detentions and Removals Programs

The CBSA shares responsibility for carrying out the provisions of the IRPA with CIC, and the IRB (see Exhibit 2, Roles and Responsibilities of the CBSA, CIC and the IRB). For an overview of the removals process, see Appendix A, Removals Process Flow Chart. CIC develops immigration policy, issues visas, and conducts Pre-Removal Risk Assessments (PRRAs).^[13] CIC also decides on refugee protection claims made outside Canada at Canadian embassies, high commissions, and consulates, while the IRB renders decisions on refugee claims made by persons in Canada. The IRB also conducts admissibility hearings and detention reviews for persons detained under IRPA after the first 48 hours of arrival (the CBSA decides on detention or release options for the first 48 hours), and rules on immigration appeals such as removal orders.

Exhibit 2: Roles and Responsibilities of the CBSA, CIC and the IRB

Activity	CBSA	CIC	IRB
Determine the eligibility of people to claim refugee protection	Yes	Yes	No
Hold detention reviews	Yes	No	Yes
Arrest and detain people under the IRPA	Yes	No	No
Remove people from Canada	Yes	No	No
Issue security certificates[14]	Yes	Yes	No
Make refugee and immigration policy	No	Yes	No
Decide refugee claims made by people in Canada	No	No	Yes
Decide refugee claims made by people abroad	No	Yes	No
Hold admissibility hearings to determine if people may enter or remain in Canada	No	No	Yes
Select immigrants	No	Yes	No
Hear and decide appeals on immigration matters (removal orders, sponsorship appeals, residency obligations)	No	No	Yes
Issue visitor visas, student visas, travel documents, work permits or Minister's permits	Yes	Yes	No
Determine residency obligations	No	Yes	No
Do Pre-Removal Risk Assessments (PRRAs)	No	Yes	No
Decide applications to stay in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds	No	Yes	No
Grant Canadian citizenship	No	Yes	No

Source: IRB Web site. http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/brdcom/publications/oveape/Pages/index.aspx (accessed March 20, 2010) and updated in consultation with IED September 2010.

The Inland Enforcement Division (IED) of the Post-Border Programs Directorate (Programs Branch) oversees the regulatory enforcement of IRPA, and is the program lead and primary Headquarters' (HQ) resource for the development of national policies and statistics on the detentions and removals programs. The IED is comprised of the following units: Hearings and Detentions, Investigations and Removals, Monitoring of Conditions, and Policy and Program Development. 

The Border Operations Directorate (Operations Branch) is the HQ link to the regions. It provides operational guidance on detentions and removals issues, and collects regional statistics on detentions and removal activities^[15]. Regional Border Services Officers (BSOs) and Inland Enforcement Officers (IEOs) carry out detentions and removals activities. BSOs are sometimes the first step in the detentions and/or removals processes. An inadmissible person may be "allowed to leave" at the discretion of a BSO with a Minister's Delegate^[16] designation.  Alternatively, the BSO may transfer the individual to the regional inland enforcement office, detain the person on-site, or transfer them to the local Immigration Holding Centres (IHCs) or other correctional facility, as required and/or when available. IEOs, on the other hand, work in regional offices across Canada and handle investigations, detentions, hearings and/or removals cases that originate inland or are transferred there from the POE.

The CBSA operates four IHCs located in Vancouver, Laval, Toronto, and Kingston. With the exception of the Kingston IHC, these facilities are used for low-risk detainees (see Appendix B, Description of CBSA Immigration Holding Centres (IHCs). In addition, provincial and municipal correctional facilities are used in areas where IHCs do not exist or for high-risk detainees.^[17]

The Operations Branch's Warrant Response Centre (WRC,), within the Border Operations Centre and Major Events Directorate, enters and validates information on immigration warrants and previously deported persons and removes executed and cancelled immigration warrants in the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) database.  The WRC also responds to calls from law enforcement agencies regarding immigration warrants in CPIC. 

Evaluation Purpose and Scope

The evaluation of the detentions and removals programs was identified as a priority in the 2009-2012 CBSA Risk-Based Multi-Year Evaluation Plan. This evaluation meets a Treasury Board requirement to report on the use of $22 million Public Safety Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) funding for detentions and removals activities.^[18]  Additionally, this evaluation addresses questions raised by the Senate Standing Committee on Public Accounts related to the CBSA's tracking of detainees' compliance with conditions of release. The CBSA's Program Evaluation Division in the Internal Audit and Program Evaluation Directorate carried out the evaluation research between January and June 2010. Exhibit 3, "In and Out" of the Evaluation of the Detentions and Removals Programs, summarizes the CBSA activities included in and excluded from this evaluation.

Exhibit 3: "In and Out" of the Evaluation of the Detentions and
Removals Programs

Included in the Evaluation	Excluded from the Evaluation
CBSA detentions and removals activities	Criminal investigations program activities related to IRPA
Role of the Warrant Response Centre	Administration of the security certificate initiative
Follow-up to the Government Response to the Report on the Standing Committee on Public Accounts Examination of compliance with conditions of release	Intelligence activities, with the exception of processes, activities and products that directly support the detentions and removals programs
	Hearings program, with the exception of processes and activities that directly impact the detentions and removals programs
	Inland investigations program, with the exception of processes and activities that directly impact the detentions and removals programs
	Migration Integrity Officer network, with the exception of processes and activities that directly impact the detentions and removals programs.

In consultation with key internal stakeholders, the evaluation team developed a logic model for the detentions and removals programs. These discussions yielded the following immediate and intermediate program outcomes:

• enhanced knowledge, skills and abilities of CBSA staff involved in detentions and/or removals activities;
• strong, effective partnerships and information sharing;
• timely, fair and effective enforcement of detentions and removals orders;
• increased public confidence in the detentions and removals processes; and
• improved integrity of Canada's immigration program.

The evaluation addressed the key questions provided in Exhibit 4, Evaluation Questions.

Exhibit 4: Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Issue	Evaluation Questions
Relevance	Is there a demonstrable and continued need for the detentions and removals programs?
	Are the detentions and removals programs aligned with government priorities, and federal roles and responsibilities? How do they contribute to the CBSA's strategic outcomes?
Performance	How effective are the governance structures within the CBSA for the detentions and removals programs?
	How successful are the detentions and removals programs in developing and maintaining the partnerships needed to support and sustain the programs?
	Do CBSA employees have the skills and knowledge to effectively carry out detentions and/or removals activities?
	Does the CBSA have the systems and information needed to manage the programs?
	Are CBSA detentions processes and practices timely, fair and effective?
	Are CBSA removals processes and practices timely, fair and effective?
	Does the public have confidence in the detentions and removals programs?
Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy	Are detentions and removals activities sufficiently resourced and is the allocation of resources aligned with high-risk areas?
	Are there more efficient and effective methods for delivering detentions and removals activities?
	Were there any unexpected or unintended results of the detentions and removals programs?

Evaluation Methodology

Document and Data Review and Analysis

Key CBSA documentation reviewed included Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) and CBSA enforcement manuals, CBSA training bulletins, outreach and communications materials and ministerial correspondence. The May 2008 Office of the Auditor General Report, Chapter 7 (Detention and Removal of Individuals – CBSA), relevant Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)^[19] with key partners, as well as materials from the Web sites of CIC and the IRB were reviewed and analyzed.  The UNHCR Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers (February 1999), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment were used as resources to assess the CBSA's adherence to detention guidelines. The Comptrollership Branch, regions and IED provided financial data on detentions and removals activities.

Literature Review

The evaluation included a review of relevant domestic and international documents and Web site information from other organizations such as the Canadian Red Cross, Amnesty International, the Canadian Council for Refugees, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

In-depth Interviews with Key Stakeholders

One-on-one and group interviews were conducted with 89 individuals (see Exhibit 5, Interviews Conducted for the Evaluation). The majority were CBSA employees. Evaluators also interviewed staff at CIC, the IRB and non-governmental organizations, including the Canadian Red Cross, the Canadian Council for Refugees, Action Refugee Montreal, the Toronto Refugee Affairs Council, the Legal Aid Ontario Refugee Law Office and the UNHCR.  

Exhibit 5: Interviews Conducted for the Evaluation

Interview Category	Number of Interviewees
CBSA HQ management and staff	17
CBSA regional management and staff	61
Non-governmental organizations and other government departments	11
Total	89

 

Site Visits

Montréal, Toronto and Vancouver account for nearly 95 percent of all refugee claims and are the stated preferred destination for 78 percent of permanent residents.^[20] The Quebec, Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and Pacific regions were therefore selected for evaluation site visits. Field research included tours of each IHC facility, temporary holding areas, and in-depth interviews with regional CBSA management and staff. To capture the perspectives of regions not visited, evaluators interviewed key management and staff from the Prairie, Northern Ontario, and Atlantic regions by telephone.

Evaluation Research Limitations

The evaluation used detention and removal financial information provided by the Comptrollership Branch. However, these figures did not match those provided by IED, and there are no details related to exactly how the $22 million in PSAT funding was spent, with the exception of monies ($1.55 million) allocated to the National Case Management System (NCMS) to track detentions, removals, hearings and investigations activities. Furthermore, financial information pertaining to the detentions and removals activities of Operations Branch at HQ was not available.  Moreover, each fiscal year the financial data by region was missing for some regions. As well, regional data were not all available by lines of business such as detentions, removals, investigations and hearings, and various regions included different items in their totals. For instance, Quebec rolls all detention expenses into a single code, including expenses related to its IHC, whereas the GTA and Pacific regions separate out funding for their IHCs. As such, accurate cost comparisons of the IHCs were not possible. Finally, the cost incurred at the POE to determine inadmissibility and consequent removals activities was not available. Due to weaknesses in the financial information, this evaluation could not determine the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of either program.

One of the primary systems used in the delivery of detentions and removals activities is the NCMS.^[21]  The NCMS lacks key fields such as the frequency and type of conditions imposed prior to the 48-hour detention review, compliance with conditions of release, removals by IRPA contravention (i.e., sections 32-42), and details and costs of removals. In addition, there is currently no tracking of the number of times CBSA's recommendation for or against detention is upheld by the IRB. As such, this evaluation could not fully assess the expected outcome of "timely, fair and effective enforcement of detentions and removals orders". Finally, not all fiscal year 2009-2010 data were available when this report was written. The most recent data available have been used.

Key Findings - Relevance

Is there a demonstrable and continued need for the detentions and removals programs?

Although the December 2004 Safe Third Country Agreement^[22] initially reduced the number of land border refugee claimants, such claims more than doubled between 2005 and 2008 (from 4,042 to 10,801) – essentially increasing the number of refugee claimants to pre-Safe Third Country Agreement levels.^[23] In addition, the number of inland claims has grown from 13,178 in 2004 to 17,546 in 2009.^[24] The CBSA Intelligence Directorate suggests that the rise in inland claims is due in part to irregular migrants entering Canada between POEs to file refugee claims at inland CBSA and/or CIC offices, to avoid being turned back at the border based on the Safe Third Country Agreement.^[25] These include persons identified by U.S. authorities as having criminal records or outstanding charges against them, and persons refused refugee status in the U.S.^[26]  In addition, with the world's longest coastline and 300 ports and harbours, Canada is vulnerable to the arrival of illegal migrant vessels.

Under IRPA, the CBSA has the authority to detain persons who pose a danger to the public; are considered to be a flight risk for immigration proceedings; cannot confirm their identity; or there are reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is inadmissible for security reasons or human or international rights violations.^[27]  Between fiscal year 2004-2005 and fiscal year 2008-2009, the number of people detained increased by one-third from 10,774 to 14,362, but there was a sharp decline to 9,240 immigration holds in fiscal year 2009-2010, in part due to changes in visa requirements for Mexican and Czech travellers^[28] (see Exhibit 6, CBSA Detentions and Removals 2004-2005 to 2008-2009). In fiscal year 2009-2010, 44 percent of all immigration holds were refugee claimants. A total of 3,843 persons (41 percent) were detained prior to removal as they were considered a flight risk.^[29]

The CBSA prioritizes the removal of high-risk persons who pose a threat to national security, are involved in organized crime, crimes against humanity or other serious criminality, followed by failed refugee claimants, and other inadmissible persons.^[31]  Of the 13,249 persons removed in fiscal year 2008-2009, 14 percent were removed for criminality.^[32]  Between fiscal years 2004-2005 and 2008-2009, the total number of removals increased by over 10 percent. 

Exhibit 6: CBSA Detentions and Removals by
Fiscal Year (2004-2005 to 2008-2009)^[33]

Year	Detentions	Removals
2004-2005	10,774	12,006
2005-2006	11,663	11,362
2006-2007	12,714	12,636
2007-2008	13,987	12,315
2008-2009	14,362	13,249

Source: IED "Detentions at a Glance Fiscal Years 04-05 to 08-09" and "Removals at a Glance Fiscal Year 2008-2009".

Under the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, an expedited refugee determination process, including removal of failed refugee claimants, will be implemented.^[34] In addition, it will introduce an assisted voluntary return provision,^[35] and establish a one-year time frame for removals. As the new Act eliminates automatic stay of removal for people from a designated country of origin while a judicial review is pending and for manifestly unfounded claims, detention will remain a key tool for ensuring that failed refugee claimants do not evade removal from Canada, particularly when the risk of the individual going underground is high.
 

Are the detentions and removals programs aligned with government priorities, and federal roles and responsibilities? How do they contribute to CBSA's strategic outcomes?

The Government of Canada is a signatory to immigration-related international agreements and treaties, such as the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNHCR's Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. As such, the federal government has a responsibility to ensure its detentions and removals activities adhere to these standards and principles.

The 2008 Speech from the Throne states: "Security ultimately depends upon a respect for freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Where these values are imperilled, the safety and prosperity of all nations are imperilled." The detentions and removals programs directly support the federal government's priority of a safe and secure Canada by ensuring that inadmissible persons are detained, when required, and removed from the country as expeditiously as possible. 

These programs also support the CBSA's strategic outcome of "integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitates the free flow of persons and goods" and the CBSA's performance outcome to keep "Canada…safe and secure from border-related risks". IRPAgives the CBSA clear authority to detain individuals to ascertain their identity or whether they are admissible to Canada, when grounds exist. The Act also authorizes the CBSA to remove individuals who do not meet the admissibility requirements laid out in sections 33 through 42. The determination is done through a process detailed under 44(1) and (2) of the Act. 

By focusing on high-risk persons, the detentions and removals programs are key elements in the mitigation of the risk associated with managing border program integrity (identified in the 2009-2010 CBSA Enterprise Risk Profile as a Tier 1 risk). 

Key Findings - Performance

How effective are the governance structures within the CBSA for the detentions and removals programs?

Until the internal restructuring of the CBSA in April 2010, Enforcement, Operations and Admissibility branches at HQ all supported aspects of detentions and removals activities. However, the lines of responsibility were unclear. Responsible for the development of national policies, IED also often provided advice on day-to-day problems to the regions such as obtaining travel document for removals such as passports and visas. The Admissibility Branch at HQ provided direction and information to officers and supervisors at POEs, as required. However, Operations Branch was intended to be the de facto lead on regional issues, including detentions and removals. Regional staff indicated that they were not sure who to contact at HQ on difficult cases or to obtain travel documents for certain countries. In addition, when they did send in a request, they indicated that they were not kept up-to-date on the progress of their files.

Regional staff identified a number of areas where they require HQ assistance to streamline case preparation for removals. These included:

• improving the time it takes to obtain travel documents from claimants' countries of origin;
• working with DFAIT to have countries accept their returning nationals;
• working with the airlines to obtain better airfares, more convenient schedules and clearer policies on transporting removals, such as number of escorts required and how much notice the airlines need;
• working internationally to open up more airport locations through which removals may transit; and
• conducting research and disseminating information on changes to country policies, federal or international jurisprudence and case law related to immigration, detentions and removals.

Regions also indicated they would like to be informed of upcoming situations in their areas that could lead to increased refugee claims or immigration issues such as fraudulent documents. 

There was near unanimous consensus among regional CBSA management that the NIEC should be reinstated as a regular forum for regional and HQ colleagues to discuss detentions and removals issues and best practices. Examples raised that would merit discussion were variation in detentions practices, use of alternatives to detention, removals practices, and emerging issues such as processing migrant vessels. CBSA interviewees suggested that in addition to Post-Border Programs Directorate, other stakeholders such as the WRC, Intelligence and Targeting Operations Directorate, and Border Operations Directorate should participate.

How successful are the detentions and removals programs in developing and maintaining the partnerships needed to support and sustain the program?

There are a number of challenges faced by the program related to the use of provincial correctional facilities, including the fact that the facilities can change the number of detainees they take, move immigration detainees from one location to another, reduce operational hours, and restrict advocacy groups' access to the facility to monitor the well-being of the detainees.^[37]

This has several consequences. First, detainees may be held for hours or days at CBSA offices or in short-term holding cells at airports that are not equipped according to CBSA detention standards^[38] (e.g., lacking showers, not suitable for families). Second, the lack of CBSA input as to where people will be held means that detainees may have to travel far and frequently to attend IRB hearings or other appointments, which increases the cost to the CBSA, and is inconvenient for both the Agency and the detainees. Third, advocacy groups, such as the Canadian Red Cross and the Canadian Council for Refugees, are concerned for obvious safety reasons when immigration detainees, who may or may not have a criminal history, co-mingle with an incarcerated population.

Removals officers indicated that in 2009 they spent between five to 20 percent of their time liaising with embassies and consulates to arrange for the return of foreign nationals to their home countries. The majority of CBSA interviewees believed that DFAIT is in a better position than the CBSA to ensure that these countries supply the required travel documents and/or admit the deportees once they arrive. In addition, the CBSA and DFAIT working together might be able to open up more transit points, as currently many countries impose travel restrictions^[39]. Restrictions impede the timeliness of removals, increase the cost to the CBSA in airfare and overtime, and have a significant impact on the number of removals that can be carried out.

Do CBSA employees have the skills and knowledge to effectively carry out detentions and/or removal activities?

Officers repeatedly cited how complex and sensitive immigration files are, and that a solid knowledge of the Act and relevant front-line experience were crucial to the success of the detentions and removals programs. Although officers felt confident that they had the skills and knowledge to carry out their work, there was near-unanimous agreement that CBSA's approach to prepare IEOs could be improved. 

Although many inland recruits come from the BSO ranks and have been through the Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT), others come to inland from external organizations or other areas of the CBSA. As a result, many new IEOs do not have a great deal of training or experience in immigration.^[40] One issue raised is that the CBSA's cross-training model and shift schedules work against BSOs acquiring solid immigration-related experience at POEs as they may only work an immigration-specific role once every eight days or so. The vast majority of officers interviewed wanted more advanced training.

Detentions staff noted that they require better training on how to deal with persons with mental illness. In addition, nearly all IEOs requested better training and reference materials for National Case Management System (NCMS) and Field Operations Support System (FOSS).^[41] Such training is often not available, is not in the officer's preferred language, or becomes available after an officer has already been on the job for a number of months. Due to the legal nature of the hearings and removals officers' work, specific training on the court systems, the Act, writing legal briefs and interviewing were seen as necessary, but not always available.

In an effort to address the lack and limitations of training at the national level, regions have developed in-house training on specific topics relevant to inland enforcement activities (e.g., how to write reports and recommendations for IRB hearings, orientation on IHC-specific procedures and protocols, how to manage a removal). However, there is no national standard to ensure that the content and delivery are consistent across regions.

Hearings officers indicated that gaps in interview notes decrease the strength of the CBSA case when arguing for/against detention, removal or a person's admissibility to Canada in front of the IRB. Although the CBSA does not keep statistics on how often their recommendations are supported by the IRB at immigration hearings, hearings officers observed that well-presented and well-documented CBSA cases were more likely to be supported by the IRB.

The quality of the materials provided to hearings officers by BSOs and IEOs could be improved by providing officers with a standard format to follow and hearings-specific training on note-taking and interviewing techniques. This would ensure that BSOs and IEOs increase their understanding of protocol and procedural requirements, thereby improving the quality of case information and avoiding mistakes such as including personal opinions in their notes.

Does the CBSA have the systems and information needed to manage the programs?

After delays in developing an overarching, interdepartmental, immigration IT system (the Global Case Management System), in 2008 the CBSA opted to concentrate on augmenting the then-interim NCMS to meet its specific and immediate immigration-related needs. Although there have been ongoing improvements to NCMS, in the absence of additional funding, further changes are on hold at this time.

Although many fields are directly uploaded from FOSS to NCMS, other information requires CBSA staff to manually enter data. For example, NCMS includes fields such as criminal charges and convictions, but FOSS does not. In addition, there are a number of fields missing entirely in one or both systems.

For the detentions program, these include:

• the frequency and type of conditions imposed by either a BSO or IEO prior to the 48-hour detention review;
• whether or not detention recommendations are upheld by the IRB;
• compliance with conditions of release; and
• whether there is a correlation between types of conditions or amount of bond imposed, the risk profile of the person, and their compliance.

For the removals program, data not available in NCMS include:

• detailed costs for each removal (e.g., flight ticket, visa);
• mode of removals (e.g., charter flight);
• method of removals; and
• processing time for each removal stage (e.g., to obtain travel documents, average length of stays, number of stays per case).

Regional staff indicated that NCMS did not meet their case management needs. As a result, "work-arounds" have been implemented to collect and manage the data needed. The three regions where on-site visits occurred to gather information for this report use white boards to track the detainees' movement to hearings, medical appointments, or removal. The Quebec Region continues to use an obsolete stand-alone database^[42] to monitor IHC activities and expenses. Many IEOs import their active cases from NCMS into spreadsheets to sort their files based on key information, including removal date, IRB hearing, or characteristics (e.g., criminality, name, or country). Managers and analysts also use spreadsheets to report on regional detentions and removals issues and trends. 

For the most part, NCMS access is limited to inland enforcement officers in the regions and to staff at HQ. Although 25 to 30 percent of all refugee claims^[43] are entered at airports, Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto is the only POE with access to NCMS. Without NCMS access, a paper file must be transferred to an IEO to enter, resulting in delays of hours to weeks before the case is in the system. 

Although IEOs are responsible for immigration removals, there are other activities carried out by BSOs that serve a similar purpose. For instance, BSOs may let an inadmissible person voluntarily return to their country of origin under an "allowed to leave" FOSS code. However, often the BSO does not enter details or key information from their immigration interview in the text field that could be of use to inland enforcement officers. 

Are CBSA detentions processes and practices timely, fair and effective?

Regional staff indicated that while the various manuals provide high-level guidance on detention, more detailed guidance is needed in some areas. There are notable differences across the country in detention practices within this first 48-hour period.  For example, in the Atlantic, Prairie and Pacific regions, the majority of foreign nationals are released on terms and conditions prior to their IRB admissibility hearing. In contrast, BSOs at Lester B. Pearson International Airport generally detain individuals and will defer decisions on release and terms and conditions associated with the potential release to the IRB. In addition, during this 48-hour period, it is up to the CBSA officer's discretion to continue to detain or release an individual pending their first detention review in front of the IRB. The result is that foreign nationals receive different treatment under similar conditions, depending on which Canadian POE or CIC/CBSA office they arrive at. All regions indicated that anyone with a serious criminal history, or who is a flight risk, or who raises security concerns is detained.

While the Enforcement Manual provides guidance on the detention of vulnerable populations, CBSA staff and management in the regions indicated a desire for clearer direction in this area. The lack of a clear understanding of the various options available when dealing with vulnerable populations has resulted in inconsistency in detention practices across regions. In fiscal year 2009-2010, for example, 83.1 percent of the 330 minors detained were held in IHCs^[44] in the Quebec, and GTA regions. ^[45] While 13.9 percent were held in the Pacific Region, minors there are generally released with one parent while the other parent is held in detention, or they are transferred to the care of child and family services. CBSA staff in the Atlantic and Prairie regions indicated they were extremely unlikely to detain minors or persons with mental health issues or other special needs, drawing instead on community agencies and resources where possible to take care of them during immigration processes and hearings. CBSA regional staff interviewed indicated that part of the reason for this variation is that the Enforcement Manual is not specific or detailed enough.

As shown in the snapshot of detainees (see Exhibit 7, Detention Snapshot by Risk, April 22, 2010), there were 510 persons in detention, 55 percent of whom were considered high risk (281). Of these, 94 percent (263) were held in non-CBSA facilities such as provincial or federal correctional centres. At the same time, 32 percent of the detainees considered low risk were also held in non-CBSA detention facilities. Although it was expected that regions like the Prairies and Atlantic would use provincial facilities as they do not have IHCs, even the GTA had 38 low-risk detainees in provincial facilities on April 22, 2010.^[46]

Exhibit 7: Detention Snapshot by Risk, April 22, 2010

Detainee Risk Profile	Facility Type						Total
	IHC			Non-CBSA Facility
	# of IHC detainees	% of IHC population	% of total risk type	# of Non-CBSA Facility detainees	% of Non-CBSA Facility population	% of total risk type	# of detainees by risk type	% by risk type	% of total risk type
High-Risk (Criminality and Danger to the Public)	18	10%	6%	263	78%	94%	281	55%	100%
Low-Risk (Non-Criminal)	156	90%	68%	73	22%	32%	229	45%	100%
All Detainees	174	100%		336	100%		510	100%
% of All Detainees	34%			66%			100%

Source: IED data from NCMS detentions cube, April 22, 2010.

Local administrative standards also influenced whether a person is detained or released. In the GTA, officers indicated that when there were budget shortfalls or when the IHC ran close to capacity, senior management directed them to opt for release, where possible, to reduce the strain on detentions resources. 

The use of other conditions remained essentially the same, with the exception of 2008 where there was a marked increase in conditional releases. IEOs saw the use of high-threshold bonds as good incentives for persons on release to comply with their other conditions, and tended to increase compliance for appearing at interviews and hearings.^[47] Data on the use of bonds could not be broken out to determine the number of individuals who were released without either bonds or other conditions of release and compliance with those conditions. 

The IRB may order a foreign national held for longer periods if they actively resist their removal by not providing key information, including their birth date, name, or country of origin, or by failure to take the necessary steps to obtain their travel documents, such as attending meetings with their country's embassy or signing their removal documents. On the other hand, indefinite detention risks legal challenges to the CBSA and the IRB as it may contravene the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Individuals who pose a danger to the public, but who cannot be removed to their country of origin, may also be held for longer periods. For instance, Canada may not deport someone to a country where a temporary suspension of removals has been imposed, or where country officials refuse to repatriate their citizen. 

Are CBSA removals processes and practices timely, fair and effective?

Regional staff and management pointed to a number of factors impacting the timeliness of removals, including a lack of co-operation by individuals and receiving countries, and backlogs in other immigration processes such as IRB refugee determination hearings and CIC PRRAs (see Exhibit 8, Top Factors Influencing the Timeliness of Removals). Of the five main factors influencing the timeliness of removals, only the last two are within the CBSA's sphere of control, in whole or in part.

Exhibit 8:  Top Factors Influencing the Timeliness of Removals

On average, it takes more than 18 months for the IRB to process a refugee claim, and more than six and one-half months for CIC to process a PRRA. The acceptance rate for both processes remains low – 42% for the refugee determination process (11,197 out of 26,864 finalized claims in 2009), and a mere 2.1 percent for PRRA (174 cases out of 8,376 decisions) – with the failed claimants eventually being removed from Canada.

In 2009^[50], conducting a removal involved an average of 695 days (roughly 22 months), starting from the time the order was issued. By comparison, in 2007 the same process involved 809 days (or over 26 months) (see Exhibit 9, Timeliness of Removals and Numbers of Removals by Year). Spikes in 2006 and 2007 were in part due to a shortage of IRB adjudicators to oversee immigration hearings.

Exhibit 9: Timeliness of Removals and Number of Removals Cases By Year^[51]

Year	Cases	Average # Elapsed Days
2005	11,272	722
2006	12,596	799
2007	12,480	809
2008	12,779	730
2009	14,760	695

Source: CMRS removals cube data, as of June 23, 2010, produced by IED.

The total number of persons removed from Canada per year has increased, from 11,268 in 2005 to 14,626 in 2009.^[52] As of July 2010, there were 115,579 removal orders on the books. However, fewer than 17 percent (or 19,346) were enforceable. The remaining removal orders are stayed or "not into force" pending the conclusion of IRB, CIC or other immigration proceedings. Of the 19,346 people awaiting removal in the working inventory, about 15 percent of these had impediments preventing their removal such as awaiting travel documents (60 percent), unable to obtain travel documents (11 percent), and unconfirmed identity or citizenship (4 percent). 

In the same year there were 80,729 unenforceable removal orders nationally (representing 70 percent of the total removal inventory). Nearly 70 percent of these cases are "not into force" pending the conclusion of their refugee determination processes and a further 26 percent are awaiting confirmation of permanent resident status through other CIC immigration processes. ^[53] In addition, there were 15,504 stays of removal (13 percent of the total removal inventory), which include persons who are involved in criminal proceedings, or are in prison or in hospital. ^[54] Sixty percent of the removals inventory is the responsibility of the CBSA units within Ontario (see Exhibit 10, Snapshot of Removals Inventory by Status of Removal Order, by Region (on July 29, 2010). ^[55]

Exhibit 10: Snapshot of Removals Inventory by Status of Removal Order, by Region (on July 29, 2010)^[56]

Source: NCMS removals cube data, snapshot provided on July 29, 2010. 

Region	Unenforceable	Working Inventory	Stay
Atlantic	105	68	41
Quebec	24,496	2,927	5,639
Ontario	48,772	12,356	8,080
Prairies	3,001	2,176	996
British Columbia	4,363	1,807	741

In 2009, 851 people were removed for "in-Canada criminality", up from 706 in 2005 (a total of 3,798 persons removed over the past five years). ^[58] The data did not show whether those in-Canada crimes were committed while awaiting removal, or were the reason for the removal order in the first place. Moreover, data do not reveal if these convictions are for violent or non-violent crimes.

A "criminality" indicator flag is entered into FOSS for IRPA infractions under sections 36(2) (a), 36(2)(d), or 36(1)(a) (for both "in-Canada criminality" and convictions elsewhere), but only when the "confirmation of departure" is completed. However, these data underestimate the true number of persons involved in crime as they do not track those who were charged but not convicted (often because the cases were stayed so that the person could be deported), those who were removed under another section of the Act, or those for whom the CBSA was never notified of their criminal court cases (court cases are not automatically cross-referenced against immigration warrants).

There are three types of removal orders,^[59] which generally correspond to the seriousness of the reasons for removal. ^[60] For example, all persons found inadmissible for criminality, both in and outside of Canada, are removed on a deportation order and are not permitted to return. Over half of all removals in 2009 were by deportation orders, clearly demonstrating that higher-risk cases are prioritized as per CBSA policy (see Exhibit 11, Number and Percentage of Removals Carried Out as Compared to Working Inventory, by Removal Order Type). There has been a continuous decline in the number of deportation orders enforced in the last five years, from a high of 8,962 deportations in 2006 (71 percent of all removals), to a low of 8,011 deportations in 2009 (54 percent of all removals). It is important to note that failed refugee claimants who do not depart Canada within 30 days of their order coming into force are also removed on a deportation order.

Exhibit 11: Number and Percentage of Removals Carried Out as Compared to Working Inventory, by Removal Order Type^[61]

FY 2009	Type of Removal Order
	Departure Order	Exclusion Order	Deportation Order
Working Inventory	11,870 (62%)	1,157 (6%)	6,039 (32%)
Completed Removals	3,606 (24%)	3,166 (21%)	8,011 (54%)

Source: Data produced by the Operational Monitoring and Reporting Section (Operations Branch).

In fiscal year 2009-2010, the WRC processed up to 425 immigration warrants per month.^[62]  Immigration warrants include removal warrants, notifications for previously deported persons, and warrants for persons who failed to appear for an immigration examination or hearing.

The process to add an immigration-related warrant to the CPIC system is cumbersome and leads to significant delays in warrants being transferred to CPIC.  A CBSA officer must complete a paper form and send it by courier with all supporting documentation to the centralized WRC. Once received at the WRC, staff will verify the content and clarity of the warrant and contact the issuing officer (i.e., BSO, IEO) if there are any questions. If revisions are required, all the material needs to be mailed to the issuing office, where the officer amends and returns it to the WRC before the information is entered into CPIC (only the WRC has the authority to enter immigration warrants into CPIC). The concern is that the time lag associated with the process results in delays in electronically alerting police agencies which can provide valuable assistance in apprehending the individual. The CBSA relies greatly on other police services to be its "eyes and ears" and a CPIC flag is the only way police officers would know that someone is wanted for an immigration violation without contacting the on-duty IEO or the WRC directly.

The rationale for the current paper-based system is that warrants are legally binding documents that require the signature of the issuing officer to be on file. However, senior staff with the WRC pointed out that electronic authentication of other types of documents is permitted by the courts. If legally permissible, electronic authentication would speed up the process, reduce data entry errors, and eliminate the cost of storing tens of thousands of paper files.

From fiscal year 2004-2005 to fiscal year 2009-2010, the WRC received 168,562 calls from within the CBSA, from local, national, and international police services as well as from other government departments and public security agencies (see Exhibit 12, Calls to the Warrant Response Centre, by Agency Type, Fiscal Years 2004-2005 to 2009-2010). The calls were primarily to confirm whether a person in police custody had an immigration flag on CPIC, and whether the immigration warrant was still valid.

Exhibit 12: Calls to the Warrant Response Centre, by Agency Type, Fiscal Years 2004-2005 to 2009-2010^[63]

Agency type	% of Calls
Canadian Police Services	68.4
CBSA	14.4
Other Canadian Agencies	6.2
U.S. Agencies	1.1
Interpol	10

Source: WRC call logs provided May 2010.

As of August 8, 2010, the WRC had 42,608 active warrants in its files. ^[64]The warrant inventory contains many warrants that may no longer be valid. While people who depart Canada on their own are requested to report to the nearest CBSA office prior to leaving, IEOs and BSOs indicated that most people do not. Without exit controls, such persons inaccurately remain in the removal inventory.

Beginning in November 2009, the CBSA initiated a verification of the warrants inventory. This verification was conducted in the regions and included closing removal warrants for persons who had died, were known to have left Canada, or where the warrant was no longer valid.^[65] The Pacific Region^[66] found that before the implementation of the dedicated warrant project teams approach, the warrant inventory decreased only five times over the previous three years. In contrast, in the first four months of the blitz (between December 2009 and March 2010), these dedicated teams closed 396 outstanding warrants.^[67] The GTA had similar success; GTEC has conducted yearly warrant reviews since December 2005.^[68] In 2006, the warrant review resulted in a 53 percent reduction in inventory. While GTEC has maintained the size of the criminality inventory (priority 1 and 2 cases), the non-criminal inventory, including overstays and misrepresentations, has increased by almost 50 percent. Annually, the number of warrants issued far outweighs the number of warrants executed (approximately three percent of the inventory). GTEC estimates that by March 2011, the region's warrant inventory will exceed 24,000 files and, without warrant reviews each year, the inventory will reach over 70,000 warrants by 2016. Based on previous results, GTA staff estimate conducting yearly reviews could cut this number by 23 percent.

Does the public have confidence in the detentions and removals programs?

From January 2007 to March 2010, there were 709 letters to the Ministers of Public Safety and/or CIC regarding detentions and removals issues by individuals, organizations and politicians. Of these, 611 (86 percent) were related to specific removal cases, 9 percent were for broad-based causes (e.g., faster removals of people involved in organized crime, cease removing people persecuted for their involvement in certain religi^[69]ous groups), and the remaining 5 percent were on other topics (e.g., requests for information on removal policies, the deportation process, and border security generally). The content of these letters revealed that the public does not fully understand the removals processes, and the CBSA's interdependence on the processes of other agencies (such as CIC, IRB and DFAIT). Overall, these letters revealed public disapproval with Canada's removals processes. At one end of the spectrum were letters denouncing the removals process as too lenient, especially in cases where convicted criminals remained in Canada for years prior to their deportation. At the other end of the spectrum were letters objecting to cases where law-abiding, long-standing residents of Canada were removed after having overstayed their visas.

Removals cases consistently capture the media's attention. Between April 2008 and March 2009, there were 571 Canadian print media articles and 368 media inquiries to the CBSA regarding removals,^[70] representing 15 percent of all CBSA-related coverage. While the tone of the reports was neutral (i.e., presented without overt bias for or against the CBSA), most topics focused on high-profile cases where the CBSA is portrayed negatively (e.g., where the CBSA was or was not deporting a specific person). In contrast with the heavy media focus on deportation-related cases, detentions were not mentioned in the media unless related to high-profile individuals or serious incidents such as a death while the individual was in detention.

Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

Are detention and removal activities resourced sufficiently, and is the allocation of resources aligned with high risk areas?

Officers and supervisors indicated that limited resources influence how they carry out their responsibilities, such as reducing overtime by carrying out removals in simpler or less costly cases first. GTEC staff and management stated they have increased the use of casual employees who can be hired on a temporary basis to match the changing workload (i.e., administration, filing and data entry), but that this has created turnover issues and less in-house immigration expertise.

This evaluation could not determine the efficiency of these two programs due to conflicting overall budget and expenditure information for activities, as tracked by the programs, the regions and Comptrollership Branch. No information was available on budgets or expenditures for the Operations Branch at HQ related to its detentions and removals activities. Costs incurred at POEs to determine inadmissibility and consequent removals activities were also not available.

In addition, the Comptrollership data used for this report did not itemize what costs regions included in each of the following categories: detentions, removals and IHCs for such items as IHC lease/mortgage, transportation of detainees, and housekeeping. Additional information provided by Comptrollership on IED detentions and removals activities included salary but not O&M costs for fiscal years 2006-2007 through to the present. Some regions allocate budget by area or activity while others use a global inland enforcement budget that includes hearings, investigations, detentions, removals and other activities. In addition, each region tracks its expenses in a different way, therefore the figures cited provide an incomplete picture of expenditures associated with these programs. 

According to Comptrollership data, the regions spent $68.8 million of the $85.0 million budget allocated for detentions and removals activities in fiscal year 2008-2009 (see Exhibit 13, Total Budgets, Expenditures, Lapses/Deficits for Regional Detentions, Removals and IHCs, by Fiscal Year). While Comptrollership was not able to provide a breakdown of funding by O&M and salary, information provided showed salary costs at IED HQ for the detentions and removals programs rose from $0.66 million in fiscal year 2006-2007 to $1.038 million in fiscal year 2009-2010, an increase of 57%.^[72] 

Exhibit 13: Total Budgets, Expenditures, Lapses/Deficits for Regional Detentions, Removals and IHCs, by Fiscal Year

	Fiscal Year
	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009
Total Regional D&R Budgets	$58,417,997	$63,922,419	$63,273,798	$85,056,608
Expenditures	$57,844,150	$60,094,739	$64,531,534	$68,817,114
Lapse/Deficit	$573,847	$3,827,680	$(1,257,736)	$16,239,494

Source: Comptrollership Branch, CBSA.

PSAT funding totalling $20.4 million is allotted annually for detentions and removals activities, of which these programs spent $20.3 million in fiscal year 2008-2009.  The bulk of the spending was for operating expenses ($17.9 million or 88 percent), most of which was directed toward the IHCs and removals activities in the regions. Separate PSAT funding of $1.55 million annually was allocated for the NCMS system.^[73]

In fiscal year 2008-2009, $8.0 million in Quebec, $29.1 million in the GTA and $4.2 million in Pacific were spent on detentions activities (see Exhibit 14, Detentions Expenditures, by Region, Percentage of Detainees and Cost per Detainee, Fiscal Year 2008-2009).^[74] Based on the information provided, it appears that detentions expenses align with the proportion of detainees managed within each region, with two notable exceptions. Ontario's regions spent $32.2 million or 70.7 percent of regional expenditures on detentions, while they held 61.9 percent of all immigration detainees.^[75] On the other hand, the Pacific Region held 18.3% of immigration detainees in fiscal year 2008-2009, but was responsible for only 9.3% of the overall expenditures on detentions. 

Exhibit 14: Detentions Expenditures, by Region, Percentage of Detainees and Cost per Detainee, Fiscal Year 2008-2009^[76]

Region	Expenditures ($ Millions)	% of total detentions expenditures	# and % of detainees	Cost per detainee
Atlantic	$148,634	0.3%	57 (0.4%)	$2,608
Quebec	$8,096,310	17.7%	2,431 (16.9%)	$3,330
NORO	$2,379,164	70.5%	8,890 (61.9%)	$3,626
GTA	$29,182,891
NFE	$361,288
WSC	$312,000
Prairie	$1,032,023	2.3%	363 (2.5%)	$2,843
Pacific	$4,229,740	9.2%	2,621 (18.3%)	$1,614
Total	$45,742,050	100%	14,362 (100%)	$3,185 (average)

Source: Financial information from Comptrollership Branch, 'Summary 2008-2009". Detainee data from IED, 'Detentions at a Glance – English – Fiscal Year 04-05 to Fiscal Year 08-09".

In fiscal year 2008-2009, the IHCs cost over $8.0 million,^[77] $5.1 million and $2.0 million for the Quebec, GTA and Pacific regions, respectively. Per diem costs for the IHCs were estimated at $148 per person at the Laval IHC, $112 for the Toronto IHC and $232 for the Richmond IHC.^[78] In comparison, the average per diem cost for provincial correctional facilities was $166, ranging from a low of $120 per person per day in New Brunswick, to a high of $207 in Prince Edward Island.^[79]

Approximately 55 percent of removals expenditures were for Ontario, which covers about 50 percent of all removals annually. ^[81] IED estimates that an escorted removal requiring two officers costs approximately $15,000, but can rise to over $300,000 if a chartered aircraft is required. The number of removals carried out using a chartered aircraft each year, and the related costs, is not known as this information is not tracked in NCMS or a CBSA financial system. In 2008, the Agency carried out approximately 1,400 escorted removals (of which 725 were international air removals) at a cost of $6 million.^[82] The cost estimate for an unescorted removal is about $1,500.^[83] The Agency will launch a pilot project to track the costs of individual removals in fiscal year 2010–2011. 

Are there more efficient and effective methods for delivering detentions and removals activities?

This evaluation found that the reasons for inconsistent delivery in detentions activities are largely outside of the control of the CBSA. IRB practices and procedures principally dictate how hearings are conducted, as well as when and why a person is detained or released. For instance, in Quebec, the IRB conducts all admissibility hearings and detention reviews face-to-face rather than by videoconference, which means that all detainees must be transported from the IHC (45 minutes away) or a provincial correctional facility hours away from the downtown Montreal location. However, this same regional IRB office conducts videoconference hearings with immigration detainees held in the NORO and the Atlantic regions. In contrast, the IRB in the Prairies and Pacific regions routinely uses videoconferencing.^[84] The IRB in the GTA is co-located with the IHC, and conducts hearings for IHC detainees and those released into the community in person. For persons detained in provincial facilities, IRB members will use either videoconferencing or visit the location in person. Videoconferencing of IRB hearings improves the security of the process, reduces administrative and transportation costs, and is more respectful and less disruptive for the detainees as they do not need to be handcuffed and transported many times.

The Toronto Bail Program (TBP) is run by a non-profit agency that works on a fee-for-service basis with the CBSA in the Greater Toronto Enforcement Centre (GTEC) within the GTA to provide community-based supervision of foreign nationals who would normally be held in detention. The TBP is the only supervision program of this nature in Canada. The program was originally contracted to supervise 50 cases, but with the program's success the funding has been increased to allow for an intake of up to 230 cases. During fiscal year 2008-2009, the TBP supervised 338 immigration cases. The lost client ratio was 3.65 percent overall, well below the 10% established threshold. 

The individual's CBSA file is thoroughly reviewed to ensure their eligibility (see Appendix C, Eligibility Criteria for the Toronto Bail Program). If the person is accepted into the program, an agreement of supervision document is provided to the IRB at the detention review hearing. From this point, the TBP provides dedicated community supervision similar to that of federal parole supervision. A plan of supervision is developed for each person prior to release. 

The TBP found that by addressing the person's specific needs, such as addictions treatment and mental health counselling, reduced the risk of non-compliance with conditions. If a person demonstrates wilful non-compliance, supervision is withdrawn, an immigration warrant is issued and, once located, the person is detained again. The daily cost of TBP monitoring is $12-16 per day versus $112 for the Toronto IHC or $175 for a provincial facility. The TBP uses an algorithm to calculate the potential cost avoidance savings that result from using the program as an alternative to detention. Based on these figures, the TBP calculated the potential cost avoidance savings for GTEC at over $3.4 million for fiscal year 2008-2009. ^[85]

The TBP's strength lies in the relationship the staff develop with the individual through frequent contact and stringent reporting requirements which, in turn, help the person get  psychologically ready for removal. This may be a good model for other regions with relatively high numbers of persons requiring monitoring and/or detention, pending the completion of their immigration processes, to consider.

The IRB has ordered electronic monitoring as a condition of release in the Pacific and GTA regions. At the time this report was written, IED had only two non-security certificate immigration cases being electronically monitored. The current electronic monitoring contract with a private company covers equipment and 24-hour, 7-day-a-week monitoring, as well as training of officers, replacement and repairs, and technical support. Alerts are sent directly to the blackberry, cell phone, stand-alone computer and/or laptop of the IEO on duty.   

The estimated cost of $204,400 per year includes salaries for three IEOs at the FB-03 level and 24/7 electronic monitoring services at $17.50 per unit, per day. However, officers would be able to carry out other duties and monitor more than one individual at a time, should monitoring be used with greater frequency. Consequently, IED estimates it would cost substantially less for each additional individual released on electronic monitoring.

There are mixed reactions to the use of electronic monitoring. The UNHCR and the IRB are increasingly interested in this option as an alternative to the long-term detention of persons. Critics, however, point out that the initial cost and infrastructure required is high and that electronic monitoring will not prevent someone from committing illegal acts. A 2000 study^[86] concluded electronic monitoring widens the corrections net by providing a more intrusive and expensive alternative to regular probation and other community sanctions.

The CBSA is the only federal organization with the legislative authority to detain individuals under theAct. However, there are no legislative requirements for the CBSA to manage the day-to-day operations of the IHCs. The management of detained populations requires training ands skills that are outside the core CBSA officer training. Another entity, such as Correctional Services Canada,^[87] provincial correctional services or a private corrections company (as is used to some extent in the United States and in the United Kingdom) could be used to construct and/or manage current and future IHCs – possibly at a lower cost.^[88] Furthermore, detention for immigration purposes in Canada is already mostly privatized, as the CBSA leases IHC facilities and contracts out security, meals, housekeeping, and other services. Moreover, the CBSA already relies heavily on other external solutions to provide detention facilities and services, including provincial correctional facilities and community resources.

In 2008, the Agency carried out approximately 1,400 escorted removals (of which 725 were international air removals) at a cost of $6 million.^[89] Efficiencies may be gained by changing the model used. Three options proposed by interviewees were: maintain the status quo, develop a corps of CBSA escort officers, or outsource the escort function to a private company.

With the status quo, the CBSA will continue to incur significant overtime, travel costs and the loss of expertise while removals officers are on the road rather than working on incoming removal cases. A corps of CBSA officers dedicated to escorting removals would ensure that the CBSA has direct day-to-day control of the process, and may speed up the removals process as these officers would not have competing demands on their time. When an officer is not required to carry out a removal, that officer would be available for other work related to removals such as obtaining travel documentation from recipient countries. A high level review by the IED estimated that the private sector model favoured by the United Kingdom would cost the CBSA about $6.9 million annually. However, this review was not exhaustive and did not take into account ancillary positive effects such as having more removals officers available to work cases as they would not be travelling. Exhibit 15, Comparison of Escorted Removal Options summarizes the current known advantages and disadvantages of the three options. 

Exhibit 15: Comparison of Escorted Removal Options

Escort Option	Advantages	Disadvantages
CBSA inland enforcement officer (FB-03) (status quo)	CBSA controls the entire removals process. Officers have in-depth knowledge of the cases. CBSA is recognized and respected internationally and is able to deal on diplomatic front overseas. This presents a development opportunity for officers.	When IEOs are on escort duty, their other core activities are unattended. IEO expertise is not needed in accompanying deportees. Overtime and travel costs are significant. The desire for overtime and travel is a distraction.
CBSA escort officer	CBSA controls the entire removals process. Officers receive specific training and develop expertise in escorting removals. CBSA is recognized and respected internationally and is able to deal on a diplomatic front overseas. This presents a development opportunity for officers. The shift schedule could reduce travel and overtime costs.	Escort officers do not have the level of expertise of FB-03s or their experience. This option would require creating a new position within the CBSA and providing specific training. Cost savings will take time as front-end costs associated with hiring and training officers for new positions.
Private company escorts	CBSA officers would concentrate on core activities. Some cost savings would exist due to lower wages, travel and overtime costs in the private sector. Private security contractors are already used for interprovincial escorts.	CBSA would be liable for the actions of non- CBSA staff. Private contractors would not have the same diplomatic recognition or expertise. Low wages may result in high turnover and escorts of variable quality.

 

Under IRPA, if an airline transports an inadmissible person to Canada, they must pay the costs to return that person to the point of departure.^[90] The carrier may be charged a fee of $3,200 where the person's arrival results in substantial costs to the Government of Canada (i.e., investigation, admissibility hearing, immigration proceedings, and detention).  No fee is imposed if the foreign national is admitted, withdraws their refugee claim, or if no link can be made to the liable transporter (i.e., 'no link cases").^[91] One difficulty with this administrative fee is that it is dependent upon regional officers reporting airline liability cases to the CBSA's Transportation Unit. While the Office of the Auditor General in a 2008 report considered this reporting rate 'questionably low",^[92] the Transportation Unit reported a 49 percent reduction in 'no link cases" since fiscal year 2006-2007. This reduction was attributed to an increased use of the API/PNR data, and checks at the time of arrival by disembarkation and roving teams. The CBSA recovered $824,800 in airlines fees in fiscal year 2009-2010.^[93]

A cost-recovery mechanism outlined in section 243 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations states that any 'foreign national who is removed from Canada at Her Majesty's expense shall not return to Canada if the foreign national has not paid to Her Majesty the removal costs of (a) $750 for removal to the United States or St. Pierre and Miquelon; and (b) $1,500 for removal to any other country". This applies to persons who were removed at public expense on a departure, exclusion or deportation order, and where the relevant costs have not been recovered from a transportation company.   CIC is responsible for collecting such fees when an individual applies to return to Canada at an international Canadian office. However,  should such an individual arrive at a Canadian POE or at a CBSA or CIC inland office, the CBSA currently has no consistent way of identifying if such fees have been paid or are to be repaid to the Government of Canada.

These countries detain foreign nationals if the person poses a security or flight risk, authorities are unable to establish the person's identity, and if the person is awaiting removal from the country. Foreign nationals are detained in correctional facilities, police cells, hospitals and a range of immigration holding centres. In the United States and France, foreign nationals considered lower risk may be immediately paroled or be placed under administrative detention rather than held in a secure facility. The maximum length of immigration detention also differs. American legislation requires that foreign nationals may not be held indefinitely, French legislation explicitly limits detention to a maximum of 32 days, while there is no statutory limit in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand (see Exhibit 16, International Comparisons of Detentions Programs). According to a 2006 U.S. study,^[94] Canada is viewed as the least detention-oriented country when compared with the United States (moderate) and Australia (high). The authors suggest the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is an important factor in limiting Canada's use of immigration detention.

Exhibit 16: International Comparisons of Detentions Programs

Country	Detention over one year	Detain Minors	Detain Refugee Seekers	Alternatives To Detention	Average Length in Detention
Canada	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, regional variations	24 days
United States	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	30 days
United Kingdom	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	7 days
France	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	9 days
Australia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, small scale	42 days
New Zealand	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	42 days

Source: See Appendix D, International References, for details. CBSA data is from IED.

In the United States, an expedited removal process allows officers at POEs to remove unsuccessful refugee claimants^[95] without further hearing or review if they attempt to enter by fraud or misrepresentation, or arrive without proper documents. In the United Kingdom, a person on a removal order leaving voluntarily may sign a disclaimer and buy their own ticket, but those who entered by deception may be removed at the carrier's or public's expense. The United Kingdom also has an assisted removals program which includes a reintegration allowance of up to $2,500 in cash and training, and assistance to the country of origin.^[96] In Australia, immigration officers oversee all voluntary removals and deportation orders requiring escorts, and may prohibit the person from ever returning to Australia.^[97] France recently coupled the 'obligation to leave France", with a 'prohibition on returning to any European country" for a maximum of five years.^[98]

Were there any unexpected or unintended results that came to light during the evaluation of the detentions and removals programs?

IEOs may execute warrants for a foreign national's arrest at the individual's residence, and may or may not wear uniforms or carry side arms. IEOs in one region carry a police radio, in part so they can alert local police that an immigration arrest warrant is being carried out. Notifying local police improves the chances that CBSA officers will not be brought in for questioning by local police following up on the concerns of local citizens. In other regions, officers do not carry a police radio.

While there is merit related to health and safety issues for officers not to wear uniforms when carrying out certain enforcement actions, there are also job-related duties when they need to be identified as CBSA officers – both from a health and safety perspective and from the public's perspective. With more and more IEOs being equipped with side arms, the issue of whether to wear a uniform or not is becoming increasingly important.

Key Conclusions, Recommendations and Management Response

Overall, the evaluation found that the detentions and removals programs are key elements in supporting Canada's immigration program and its border legislation, including IRPA. These programs are aligned with and support federal government policy directions and Agency outcomes of promoting a safe and secure Canada, by ensuring that those who pose a threat to the integrity of Canada's immigration laws are detained and/or removed as quickly as possible. In fiscal year 2008-2009, 14,362 individuals were detained by the CBSA for immigration reasons.^[99] In the same year, 13,249 individuals were removed from Canada. Of those, 1,855 were removed for criminality (14 percent),^[100] 9,672 were failed refugee claimants, and 1,722 were removed for other reasons.^[101] Although the recent changes to visa requirements^[102] have resulted in a decrease in the number of airport refugee claims, the number of inland and land border refugee claims increased between the years 2005 and 2009. It is clear that the need to detain and remove foreign nationals will continue. 

Generally speaking, the programs are achieving several of their expected outcomes. For example, low-risk persons who are ordered detained are placed in IHCs, where available.  Furthermore, in any given year, over 70 percent of the cases in the working inventory^[103] are removed from Canada. However, the evaluation identified several areas for improvement.

There are notable differences across the country in detention practices within the first 48-hour period, when it is up to the CBSA officer's discretion to detain or release an individual. For example, in the Atlantic, Prairie and Pacific regions, the majority of foreign nationals are released on terms and conditions prior to their IRB admissibility hearing. In contrast, BSOs at Lester B. Pearson International Airport generally detain individuals and defer decisions to the IRB on release and terms and conditions associated with the potential release. In addition, during this 48-hour period, it is up to the CBSA officer's discretion to continue to detain or release a person pending their first detention review in front of the IRB. The result is that foreign nationals receive different treatment, under similar conditions, depending on where they initially arrive at a Canadian POE or inland office.

While the Enforcement Manual provides some guidance on the detention of vulnerable populations, CBSA staff and management in the regions indicated a desire for clearer direction in this area. The lack of a clear understanding of various options available when dealing with vulnerable populations has resulted in inconsistency in detention practices across regions. For example, in fiscal year 2009-2010, 83.1 percent of the 330 minors detained were held in IHCs^[104] in the Quebec, and GTA regions. ^[105] While 13.9 percent were held in the Pacific region, minors there are generally released with one parent while the other parent is held in detention, or they are transferred to the care of child and family services. In the Atlantic and Prairie regions, it is standard practice to release minors into the care of community services. Similarly, while individuals with mental health issues do get assistance, there is considerable variation in the time until services are received. The evaluation was unable to determine the scope or magnitude of this issue as detainees' health statistics are not tracked by the CBSA. CBSA regional management stated that there is a need for a CBSA framework or amplification of the Enforcement Manual on how to deal with detainees from vulnerable populations.

While both detentions and removals officers indicated that they have the skills and knowledge to carry out their responsibilities, several areas for improvement in training and performance support were noted. For example, IEOs, BSOs and hearings officers  require strong interviewing and note-taking skills to support the evidentiary requirements of the hearings processes. It was noted that gaps in the interview notes decrease the strength of the CBSA case before the IRB. In addition, the quality of materials provided by IEOs and BSOs to support the process could be improved by ensuring that officers have standard formats for materials, which are provided to the IRB. Hearings-specific training on note-taking and interviewing techniques were cited as being valuable skills.

The current relationship between HQ and the regions is ad hoc, and the assistance sought by regional units is not provided in a timely way (e.g., updates on obtaining travel documents, suggestions on how to handle an unusual situation). In addition, regional management saw value in HQ's active role in facilitating removals by liaising with DFAIT and airlines, and by providing information such as changes to country policies, and case law related to immigration detentions and removals. Management in all regions commented on the need for a national working group to provide a forum for addressing ongoing and emerging issues, including detention practices, alternatives to detention, removals practices and emerging issues (e.g., changing immigration patterns), and to foster the exchange of best practices in detentions and removals approaches. 

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 1: The Programs Branch works in consultation with Operations Branch at strengthening the detentions and removals programs delivery by:

• solidifying the relationship, roles and responsibilities between HQ and the regions;
• clarifying and providing guidance on policy application related to the first 48 hours after a person has been detained, particularly in the handling of refugee claimants and vulnerable populations;
• leveraging a national forum such as a national inland enforcement committee, to communicate such guidance and address ongoing and emerging needs; and
• identifying and addressing training and performance support gaps for IEOs and BSOs.

Management Response
The CBSA concurs with the recommendation. Since both Programs Branch and Operations Branch play an integral role in the detentions and removals programs, it would benefit both areas to work together to identify ways to further strengthen its delivery. The relationship between HQ and the regions can always be improved and the Programs Branch agrees with the proposal for the revitalization of the existing National Inland Enforcement Committee (NIEC). In addition, the Programs Branch is of the opinion that a sub-committee on detention would need to be reactivated with the inclusion of managers from both IHC and non-IHC regions. The NIEC was reactivated in July 2010. A review of the terms of reference for both the NIEC and the sub-committee on detention will be reviewed and updated by January 2011. A date for the initial meeting of the sub-committee will be determined at the next NIEC forum.

On the issue of detention, there is an entire chapter (ENF-20) on detention policy that offers guidance to officers in exercising their powers of detention under IRPA. The Programs Branch will review this chapter and utilize the NIEC to identify any areas that require amplification, particularly in relation to vulnerable populations and policy surrounding the first 48 hours after a refugee claim has been made.

Programs Branch, in consultation with Operations Branch, will work with Human Resources Branch to identify and address training needs and other on-the-job support for all officers delivering the detentions and removals programs.

Key milestones	Expected completion date/Status
Reactivate National Inland Enforcement Committee.	July 2010 (completed)
Inland Enforcement and Operations Branch to participate in the Curriculum Advisory Board to examine the training needs of IEOs and BSOs.	October 2010 and ongoing
Develop supporting documentation (i.e., terms of reference).	November 2010 (completed)
Create a detention sub-committee.	February 2011
Develop supporting documentation for detention sub-committee (i.e., terms of reference).	February 2011
Review existing procedures on initial 48-hour detention and detention of vulnerable persons and issue policy statement, if required.	February 2011
Create a roles and responsibilities document for inland enforcement-related units in the Programs and Operations branches.	March 2011
Liaise with Operations and Human Resources branches on training/performance issues.	April 2011
Review applicable manuals and update/modify, as required.	June 2011

The evaluation noted gaps in the performance and financial information available which presented a challenge in making a determination of the effectiveness and efficiency of the programs. Furthermore, while both program areas have improved their monitoring processes over the past 18 months, the evaluation found a number of limitations in FOSS and NCMS ^[106]  that hinder the day-to-day management of cases in the field and limit their usefulness in managing the programs overall.

For example, it is impossible to determine the cost per individual removal as neither NCMS nor the CBSA financial system provides the data needed to track the itemized costs for each removal, the mode used for removal (e.g., charter flights, airfare), or whether the removal required an escort. In addition, NCMS lacks key fields such the frequency and type of conditions imposed on a person prior to the 48-hour detention review, and compliance with conditions of release and removals by IRPA contravention (i.e., sections 32-42). The evaluation did determine the percentage of removals over the past five years specifically for 'in-Canada criminality". However, the data underestimated the true number since the existing systems do not track those also removed for 'in-Canada criminality" associated with their cases, but who were categorized under another section of IRPA.In addition, the evaluation could not find out how many people with 'in-Canada criminality" had committed those crimes while awaiting removal since the information cannot be linked across the systems containing this information. Obtaining this information would have involved reviewing each removal order on a case-by-case basis. 

Similarly, there are several cost recovery elements for removals that are not tracked or monitored and may represent a significant opportunity to recover costs. For example, an individual removed from Canada on a ticket paid for by the Crown, who later returns to Canada, is required to repay the cost of the ticket ($750 for removal to the United States and $1,500 to elsewhere). CIC is responsible for collecting the return of such fees when an individual applies to return to Canada at a Canadian international office. However, should such an individual arrive at a Canadian POE or CBSA or CIC inland office, the CBSA currently has no way of identifying if such fees are to be or have been repaid to the Government of Canada.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 2: The Programs Branch enhances the collection of performance and financial information to manage and monitor the programs.

Management Response
The CBSA concurs with the recommendation. The Programs Branch agrees that several long standing issues still exist regarding the collection of performance and financial information to manage and monitor the detentions and removals programs. Some progress has been made with the introduction of the CUBE system, which is software that extracts detention data, however this data system relies on both FOSS and NCMS for its core data.

Funding to build enhanced capacity for NCMS, as it relates to refugee claimants, is also being pursued within the refugee reform initiative.

Programs Branch will work with Operations Branch to enhance the ability to monitor program data. Additionally, other work is underway to improve financial data across the Agency primarily through the functional model/functional tables.

Key milestones	Expected completion date/Status
Secure funding for systems enhancements under refugee reform.	November 2010 (completed)
Develop enhanced reporting capacity for enforcement activities.	June 2011
Implement a pilot project to track the individual costs of removals.	March 2011
Implement revised financial tracking for enforcement activities.	April 2011

In fiscal year 2008-2009, detentions costs in the regions amounted to $45.7 million or an average of $3,185 per detainee. In addition, the use of non-CBSA facilities for immigration detention rose in each of the last three fiscal years, to over one-third of all detainees in fiscal year 2009-2010. A snapshot of the detainee population taken on April 22, 2010 identified 510 persons in detention, 55 percent of whom were considered high risk. However, at the same time, 32 percent of detainees considered low risk were also held in non-CBSA detention facilities. Although it would be expected that regions without an IHC, such as the Prairies and the Atlantic, would use provincial facilities for detention, even the GTA had 38 low-risk detainees in provincial facilities.

The Toronto Bail Program provides a cost-effective and less restrictive alternative to detention and is the only supervised program of this nature in Canada. The TBP is run by a non-profit agency that works on a fee-for-service basis with the CBSA in the Greater Toronto Enforcement Centre within the GTA to provide community-based supervision of foreign nationals who would normally be held in detention. The program's strength lies in the relationship the staff develop with the individual through frequent contact and stringent reporting requirements. The daily cost of such monitoring is between $12-16 per day versus $112 daily for the Toronto IHC or $175 for a provincial facility. The program uses an algorithm to calculate the potential cost avoidance savings that result from using the program as an alternative to detention. Based on these figures, the TBP calculated the potential cost avoidance savings for GTEC at over $3.4 million for fiscal year 2008-2009. ^[107]

Further, electronic monitoring is rarely used in immigration cases. The approximate cost to monitor one individual is $204,400 per year. However, it would cost substantially less for each additional individual released on electronic monitoring as the infrastructure and employees to support the monitoring are already in place.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 3: The Programs Branch in consultation with Operations Branch examines the feasibility of a national roll out of alternatives to detention programs.

Management Response
The CBSA concurs with the recommendation. The CBSA recognizes that to deny individuals their liberty is a decision that requires a sensitive and balanced approach. The judgement skills involved in detention decisions relate to assessments of both the individual detained and the potential impact of release on Canadian society.

Programs Branch is currently developing a national detentions strategy to address immediate detention needs and to set out the future direction for CBSA detention facility requirements. Programs Branch will undertake to include, within the development of its broader detentions strategy, consideration of the greater use of alternatives to detentions programs. Programs Branch will examine the feasibility of a national roll out of alternatives to detention programs, such as the Toronto Bail Program. This exercise is contingent on the availability of organizations necessary to support such a program in other areas of the country. The exercise is also contingent on identifying qualified resources internally to conduct a feasibility examination for a national roll out of alternatives to detention programs.

Key milestones	Expected completion date/Status
Identify qualified resources to complete a feasibility examination (internal and external resourcing options can be considered).	March 2011
Commission and define examination plan.	June 2011
Complete the study.	September 2011

Many HQ and regional management staff interviewed raised questions regarding the need for the CBSA to manage the day-to-day operations of the IHCs since running a detention centre and managing detained populations requires training and skills that are outside the core CBSA officer training. IRPA confers on the CBSA the responsibility for overseeing the detention of foreign nationals while determining their admissibility, pending the results of immigration-related hearings, and/or while awaiting their removal from Canada. It does not, however, specify that the CBSA must handle the daily activities of the IHCs. Currently, many aspects of the IHCs are already privatized as the CBSA leases IHC facilities and contracts with private companies to provide security, transportation of detainees, maintenance, meals and housekeeping services.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 4: The Programs Branch explores the merits of alternative service delivery arrangements for the daily operations of all IHCs.

Management Response
The CBSA concurs with the recommendation. It also recognizes that the CBSA is the only federal organization with the ultimate legislative authority to detain individuals under IRPA. The CBSA will continue to require the ability and expertise to set and monitor all detainee conditions.

Programs Branch is currently developing a national detentions strategy to address immediate detention needs and set out the future direction for CBSA detention facility requirements. Immediate pressures are to identify a sub-strategy to address the pending closure of the Laval IHC. Current projections are that infrastructure costs for a replacement building would be significant.

The Programs Branch will undertake to include within the development of its broader detentions strategy an examination of the merits of alternative service delivery arrangements for the daily operations of the IHCs that would retain the necessary CBSA oversight. The undertaking of this examination is contingent on identifying qualified resources internally.

Key milestones	Expected completion date/Status
Identify qualified resources to complete a feasibility examination (internal and external resourcing options can be considered).	March 2011
Commission and define examination plan.	June 2011
Complete examination.	September 2011

CBSA HQ and regional management were divided on the best option to deal with the escalating costs and resource demands associated with escorted removals. CBSA officers are used as escorts in removal cases where the person being removed is considered high-risk, the country of destination or the airline requires it, or for medical reasons. In 2008, the Agency carried out approximately 1,400 escorted removals at a cost of $6 million.^[108]

While the number of removals has only increased slightly over the last years, it is expected to increase significantly once the Balanced Refugee Reform Act is implemented. The changes in the refugee determination process will shorten the process for refugee claimants from all countries and eliminate access to certain avenues of appeal to claimants from certain countries. While it is expected that the number of escorted removals will not increase significantly, the changes will require the CBSA to carry out removals in short order, as there will no longer be automatic stays of removal for people from a designated country of origin while a judicial review is pending and for manifestly unfounded claims.^[109]  This will not only put pressure on the removals program to meet the increased demand, but also on the detentions program.  

The evaluation found that efficiencies could be realized by changing the way escorted removals are currently conducted. In maintaining the status quo, the CBSA will continue to incur significant overtime, travel costs and the loss of expertise and capacity while the officer is on escort duty for extended periods of time. There are other options that may be considered, such as developing a corps of CBSA escort officers or by providing the function through an alternative service delivery model. A corps of CBSA officers dedicated to escorting removals would ensure that the CBSA has direct day-to-day control of the process (i.e., travel arrangements), would have minimal impact on other core removal activities, and may speed up the removals process as these officers would not have other competing demands on their time. Alternative service delivery would have similar benefits to that of a corps of CBSA officers dedicated to escorting removals.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 5: The Programs Branch conducts an option analysis of different models for escorted removals, including an implementation plan for the preferred option, should the status quo not be the preferred option.

Management Response
The CBSA concurs with the recommendation. The Programs Branch will carry out an examination of the CBSA removals escort function, taking into consideration the option to use third party escorts. The undertaking of this examination is contingent on identifying qualified resources internally.

Key milestones	Expected completion date/Status
Confirm resource availability to complete the study.	January 2011
Complete interim examination.	July 2011
Complete final examination.	September 2011

The CBSA Warrant Response Centre is an important component in carrying out some removal orders. The current process whereby an immigration-related warrant is added to the CPIC system is entirely paper-based. The documents associated with this process need to be signed by the issuing officer and mailed to the WRC. Should there be erroneous information on the warrant, the docket has to be sent back to the officer for correction and then returned to the WRC. While the warrant is active from the time it is issued, only the WRC has the authority to enter immigration warrants into CPIC. The time lag associated with the process results in delays in alerting police agencies, which can provide valuable assistance in apprehending the individual. Electronic authentication is already accepted by the courts for other legal documents. Implementing such an approach for immigration warrants would not only reduce data entry errors and eliminate the cost of storing tens of thousands of paper files, but also speed up the process by ensuring that warrants are entered into CPIC in a timelier manner.

In light of these findings, the evaluation recommends that:

Recommendation 6: The Programs Branch considers developing and implementing an electronic authentication and transmission process for immigration warrants.

Management Response
The CBSA concurs with the recommendation.

Key milestones	Expected completion date/Status
Seek legal opinion on feasibility	February 2011
Consider the viability of the change.	March 2011
Identify a funding source.	April 2011
Secure approval for a process and develop an implementation plan.	June 2011

Appendices

Appendix A: Removals Process Flow Chart

Appendix B: Description of CBSA Immigration Holding Centres (IHCS)

The Canada Border Services Agency operates four immigration detention facilities located in: Laval, Toronto, Richmond, and Kingston. All of the facilities, excluding the Kingston Immigration Holding Centre (KIHC), are used for low-risk detainees.

Laval Immigration Holding Centre (LIHC)

The IHC in Laval, Quebec is located on Correctional Service of Canada premises and is composed of three buildings (administration building, men's dormitories, and women and children's dormitories) which have been converted to house up to 150 low-risk detainees. There are two outdoor recreational areas (separate for men and women), and an area for children (located within the women's area). The LIHC is approximately 40 minutes from downtown Montreal and 30 minutes from the Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport. CSC provides various logistical support services such as meal preparation, cleaning and building maintenance.

Toronto Immigration Holding Centre (TIHC)

The TIHC is a refurbished hotel adapted to serve as an immigration holding centre, located approximately eight kilometres from Lester B. Pearson International Airport. The TIHC accommodates up to 125 low-risk detainees, in hotel-style rooms with private bathrooms. The facility has three floors; the top floor is dedicated to men only, the second floor houses men and women in two separate wings, and the first floor is a residence for mothers and their children. A large outdoor recreational area exists, with a dedicated children's play area. The CBSA contracts a private company to provide all security, meal preparation, cleaning and building maintenance.

B.C. Immigration Holding Centre (BCIHC)

The BCIHC in Richmond, located in the basement of the Vancouver International Airport, is a low-risk, short-term detention facility with 24 beds used to house detainees for up to 72 hours. Men and women are housed separately. Children stay with their mothers, while unaccompanied minors are housed separately. The rooms have limited washroom facilities, with each common area having complete washroom/shower and television access. In addition, the BCIHC has a family room consisting of a four-bedroom unit with a full washroom and television. Two rooms, equipped with two beds each and limited washroom facilities, are available for overflow or can be used to temporarily house detainees who require transfer to a more secure area.

Appendix C: Eligibility Criteria for the Toronto Bail Program

The following are the general eligibility criteria for the Toronto Bail Program, an alternative to immigration detention offered in the GTA region. The Person concerned must:

1. be co-operative on issues related to their detention and removal
2. be under a removal order
3. not be the subject of an imminent removal order
4. be a case facing a real prospect of removal
5. not be an extradition case (supervision is not offered)
6. not be a fugitive case (generally supervision is not offered)
7. not be a member of a criminal organization (generally supervision is not offered)
8. not have the resources to meet traditional forms of release (i.e., no family/community support or family/community support insufficient, either financially and/or in their ability to exert control over person concerned)
9. generally live in the GTA (TPB interviews are held at the Immigration Holding Centre (IHC), TWDC, Maplehurst, Don Jail, TEDC, Penetang (CNCC), Lindsay (CECC)
10. be able to physically report to the TBP office downtown Toronto
11. be able to demonstrate that he/she can reliably support themselves in the community
12. have a history of compliance with both the criminal justice system (bail conditions and probation)
13. be willing and able to comply with a release plan
14. have credibility
15. not be a foreign national with outstanding charges (TPB-ID will only consider once Crown has made a decision about staying charges)
16. not be an identity project case

Appendix D: International References

The following references were used to develop an understanding of Canada's and other countries' detentions and removals activities and obligations.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
(accessed June 24, 2010)

Canadian Red Cross (CRC)
(accessed June 24, 2010)

Amnesty International
(accessed June 24, 2010)

Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR)
(accessed June 24, 2010)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
(accessed June 24, 2010)

'Immigration detention and human rights", Australian Human Rights Commission Web site.
(accessed June 1, 2010)

International Organization for Migration (U.K.), '6 Month Enhanced Reintegration Package: IOM Briefing and FAQs,"
(accessed June 1, 2010)

« Éloignement des étrangers », Official French civil service Web site.
(accessed June 1, 2010)

'Enforcement Instructions and Guidance", Home Office Web site.
(accessed June 1, 2010)

'Alternatives to Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees", Ophelia Field (UNHCR Web site).
(accessed June 1, 2010)

Appendix E: Abbreviations and Acronyms

Abbreviation/Acronym	Definition and Description
BSO	Border Services Officer
CCR	Canadian Council for Refugees
CIC	Citizenship and Immigration Canada
CPIC	Canadian Police Information Centre
CRC	UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
DFAIT	Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
EEC	Executive Evaluation Committee
FOSS	Field Operations Support System
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
GCMS	Global Case Management System
GTA	Greater Toronto Area (CBSA region)
IAD	Immigration Appeal Division (IRB)
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ID	Immigration Division (IRB)
IED	Inland Enforcement Division
IHC	Immigration Holding Centre
IRB	Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
IRPA	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
MIO	Migration Integrity Officer
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCMS	National Case Management System
HQ	National Headquarters
NORO	Northern Ontario Region (CBSA)
OAG	Office of the Auditor General of Canada
POE	Port of Entry
POERT	Port of Entry Recruit Training
PRRA	Pre-removal risk assessments
PSAT	Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism (funding)
RPD	IRB Refugee Protection Division
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TBP	Toronto Bail Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
WRC	Warrant Response Centre