Sept/Oct 2008: Mock Justice

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By Dave Oswald Mitchell
Briarpatch Magazine
September/October 2008

In our most recent reader survey, we asked readers how they first learned about Briarpatch. Whether it is a sign of the loyalty of our readership or the advanced age of the magazine I don’t know, but a whopping 26 per cent checked the box “It’s been so long I can’t remember.”

I’m young enough that I happen to be among the 74 per cent of Briarpatch readers who does remember his first encounter with the magazine. It was a softball tournament, of all places, circa 1985. I don’t remember anyone reading Briarpatch in the stands, but the magazine (and its need for cash) was the reason we’d all gathered that summer day; the tournament was organized as a fundraiser for Briarpatch. My dad’s workplace had entered a team – the Churchill Park Green Thumbs – and I’d tagged along to cheer them on.

I was seven years old – you could say I was thrown into the briarpatch at an early age. Growing up, the magazine was a familiar presence around the house. Five years its junior and admittedly not the most attentive reader for the first several years, I must say I’m poorly equipped to reflect on 35 years of Briarpatch Magazine in this, the 35th anniversary issue. But it’s a story that bears retelling, so I’ll try to do it justice in the limited space available, cautioning that many important details have been left out.

Briarpatch launched in 1973 as a newsletter of the Saskatchewan Coalition of Anti-Poverty Organizations (allegedly derived its name from a grudge with a social services director named Brierley). It was a grassroots effort, constantly on the verge of bankruptcy, and driven by a fierce commitment to popular empowerment. “In those early years, we were mostly concerned with helping people gain self-confidence and become articulate in print and to become conscious of organizing and supporting each other in challenging the status quo,” reminisced founding editor Maria Fischer in a 20th anniversary retrospective. “We would hold back an article written by us if it meant we would have no space for an article that a group needed to circulate on a particular struggle.” The newsletter was born from, and thrived on, the “commitment that the Briar Patch belongs to everyone who struggles against oppression,” said Fischer.

By the late 1970s, Briarpatch had evolved from a “stapled-in-the-corner anti-poverty newsletter” into the independent, subscription-based, insufferably cheeky magazine it is today. Here’s how former editor Marian Gilmour (1977-79) tells it: “We had a vision of an activist publication – one that provided critical, alternative, topical information in a friendly, accessible yet irreverent format.” Billing itself variously as “the voice of Saskatchewan people,” “Saskatchewan’s independent newsmagazine” and – my favourite – “a champagne magazine on a beer budget,” the raging little rag grew to play a vital (albeit marginal) role in Saskatchewan’s social fabric, producing investigative, muckraking, risk-taking journalism and analysis, both reporting on and participating in Saskatchewan’s social movements of the day.

The magazine hit its stride not a moment too soon. When Grant Devine’s Conservatives swept to power provincially in 1982 and launched into their programme of social spending cutbacks and privatization, Briarpatch was there as both a watchdog and a rallying cry, documenting the excesses and galvanizing a grassroots opposition to the assault.

Briarpatch was vital to the growing opposition, playing an important role in the larger movement. But don’t take my word for it. As conservative pundits Paul Jackson and Don Baron would have it, writing in their now-laughably inflammatory 1991 book Battleground: The Socialist Assault on Grant Devine’s Canadian Dream:

“Saskatchewan is home of Brierpatch [sic], one of Canada’s more curious publications, a monthly magazine published as a sort of heartbeat of the socialist cause. . . .

“Anyone who thinks Brierpatch [sic] is simply an aimless outpouring by a few dreamers doesn’t understand today’s world of ideas and the deadly earnest business of influencing the public agenda. This is a flag-ship paper. Its thrust is masterminded and orchestrated for greatest possible effect.”

From the sounds of it, mighty Briarpatch had the poor capitalists quaking in their proverbial loafers.

Whatever modicum of influence the magazine may have had while the “socialists” were in opposition, Briarpatch was soon cast adrift in a sea of compromise after Devine and his cronies were thrown overboard in 1991. When the third-way NDP of Roy Romanow returned to power and further slashed spending to deal with the deficit they’d inherited, the provincial Left quietly split into two camps – the work-with-the-NDP crowd and the work-outside-the-NDP’ers.

Without the unifying power of a common enemy from which to draw energy and purpose, Briarpatch increasingly began to extend its focus and its readership beyond Saskatchewan’s ruler-straight borders, joining other left-leaning magazines like This and Canadian Dimension in providing an alternative perspective on national and international issues to Canadians from coast to coast, while still endeavouring to speak for, and from, Canada’s wheat heart.

By 2004, the transition was complete: for the first time, there were more Briarpatch readers in B.C. and Ontario combined than in Saskatchewan, a shift that presented a new challenge for the magazine as it spoke increasingly to its national readership while still trying to serve the media needs of its long-time Saskatchewan supporters.

This challenge has grown more pressing since the right-wing Saskatchewan Party defeated the somewhat less right-wing NDP in last November’s provincial election and launched an all-out assault on the rights of workers. In some ways it feels like a return to the climate of the Devine years; Briarpatch‘s staff and board are presently exploring how best to harness the organization’s legacy and assets to fill the role it once filled while continuing to serve the magazine’s nationwide readership. Rumours abound that a sister publication to the magazine is in the works – a news tabloid focussed on Saskatchewan politics. In many ways, this would be a much-needed resurrection of Briarpatch‘s one-time role as “Saskatchewan’s independent newsmagazine.”

For now, suffice it to say that the next 35 years should prove at least as dynamic and interesting for Briarpatch as the last 35 have been. I hope you’ll stick around for the journey.

In closing, would you indulge me a moment and pour yourself a glass of champagne, beer or whatever you’ve got handy? (I’ll wait…. Okay, ready?) Readers, please raise your glasses to Briarpatch at 35. In the words of that traditional Scottish toast:

May the best you’ve ever seenBe the worst you’ll ever see;
May a mouse ne’er leave yer girnal
Wi’ a teardrop in his e’e.
May ye aye keep hale and hearty
Till ye’re auld enough tae dee,
May ye aye be just as happy
As I wish ye aye tae be.

Cheers,

-Dave Oswald Mitchell, editor
editor [at] briarpatchmagazine [dot] com

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Illustration by Robert Carter In this, our 35th anniversary issue, Briarpatch tackles stories ranging from an in-depth look at the outrages of the Omar Khadr case to the politics of immigration in France & Canada, from an assessment of the alternatives for Canada in Afghanistan to an exploration of the culture of youth gun violence in Canada’s capital.

To subscribe or order a copy of this issue, call 1-866-431-5777 or visit our secure online shop. Read the rest of this entry »

By John W. Warnock
Briarpatch Magazine
September/October 2008

No nation can donate liberation to another nation. Liberation should be achieved in a country by the people themselves.”

Malalai Joya, Member, Afghan House of the People

The U.S. imperial project in Afghanistan has faltered. The government created by the United States lacks credibility and legitimacy. The vast majority of the people remain poor. The drug economy is dominant. Despite an increase in NATO military forces, the armed resistance led by the Taliban is increasing in strength. So what should Canada’s response be?

The public debate on Afghanistan has had a very narrow focus in this country. The primary concern has been the role of the Canadian Forces in the counter-insurgency war: How many more Canadians will be killed? How long will our forces remain in Kandahar province? What will the United States think if Canada withdraws from the southern conflict zone? If Canada pulls its forces out of Afghanistan, will there be chaos? Meanwhile, the occupation grinds on and the hopes for peace in Afghanistan recede into the distance.

It is time for Canadians to ask what the Afghan people want. At the top of the list would certainly be an end to the death, destruction and despair of the current occupation (the real “three Ds” that Afghans have inherited from Canada’s “development, diplomacy and defence” state-building strategy). The polls all show that a large majority of Afghans want a negotiated settlement and an end to the war. The majority do not want to see the return of the Taliban to government. The fact that the Afghan public supports negotiation with the Taliban insurgents is an indication of how far they are willing to go to end the violence. The current U.S.-NATO policy, supported by the Canadian government, however, only perpetuates the war.

The Afghan people also want their sovereignty, their right to self-determination and their democratic rights. Since October 2001 the United States, its allies and United Nations agencies have directed political, military and economic policy in the country. Afghanistan has been treated like a 19th-century colony.

Beginning with the Bonn conference in 2001, the U.S. government has imposed a political structure of its own making on Afghanistan. They installed Hamid Karzai, their key agent from the 1979-92 anti-Soviet proxy war, as president. They dictated the basic structure of the new constitution. The Afghan people had wanted to restore the democratically instated 1964 constitution after the removal of the Taliban government. Instead, the U.S. government and its allies, including Canada, manipulated the process to impose an Islamist constitution on them. This Islamist constitution, demanded by the jihadist allies of the U.S. government, has proven to be a major barrier to the development of democratic parties and movements in Afghanistan. Many parties and political groups did not want a highly centralized government with enormous powers given to the president, but rather a federal system with a balance of powers and election by proportional representation. Given the democratic freedom of choice, the Afghan people would most likely choose a political system different from the one imposed upon them.

All surveys of Afghan public opinion indicate that a strong majority wants warlords, commanders and criminals banned from the government and legislature. This demand was blocked by the U.S. government and its allies, including Canada.

Public opinion polls also show a large majority wants to see war criminals brought before war crimes tribunals. But the U.S. government and its allies have systematically blocked this process. Most of these war criminals were supported by the U.S. government at one time or another over the past three decades; some hold prominent positions in the Karzai government and many are in the legislature.

A very narrow, neo-liberal economic development policy has been imposed on the Afghan people by the U.S. government, their allies who are providing economic assistance and international aid agencies like the World Bank, the UN Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank. The Afghan people and even their government have had no say in this matter. The neo-liberal model represents a repudiation of the policy direction developed by Afghan governments throughout the 20th century. There is no indication that this model has the support of the Afghan population.

Indeed, the imposition of neo-liberalism is only exacerbating the problems that average Afghans face. Almost every analysis of the situation in Afghanistan today reports the persistence of poverty: there are food shortages, unemployment, a lack of housing, electricity, heating and medical care, and a weak educational system. A major part of the problem is the fact that international assistance is largely outside the control of the Afghan government, provided by international lending institutions, foreign governments and a myriad of non-governmental organizations. Even the Karzai government has asked that international aid be funnelled through the Afghan government.

The present government, widely denounced by the Afghan people for its corruption and ineffectiveness, is weak because it has no legitimacy. Defenders of U.S. policy often state that Afghans today are better off than they were under the Taliban. That is a vast misconception. The large majority of Afghans are far worse off today than they were in the 1970s.

Beyond the Manley report: Real alternatives for Canada

The Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, headed by John Manley, released its report in January 2008. This report summarized the position of the Canadian political and military establishment and the economic ruling classes. There is no alternative, the panel argued, to supporting the U.S. position in Afghanistan. There is no alternative to participation in a long counter-insurgency war.

At the same time there were two major studies released in the United States that contrast strikingly with the Manley report. The Atlantic Council of the United States, chaired by retired General James L. Jones, former commander of NATO, concluded, “Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.” The January 2008 report by the Afghanistan Study Group reached a similar conclusion and stressed the “growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country.” Both identified the “stark poverty” faced by most Afghans and the steady increase in violence.

Meanwhile, the panel headed by John Manley recommended the assignment of more NATO forces to Kandahar province and more equipment for the Canadian Forces. But this is no solution. Extending the war into Pakistan, as proposed by some U.S. and Canadian politicians, and hinted at in the Manley report, will only make the situation worse.

Looking at possible alternatives, the Manley panel argued that if the Canadian Forces were to move to another province to reduce exposure to conflict and loss of life it “would inevitably waste a large part of Canada’s human and financial investment in Kandahar.” They also argued that “Canadian interests and values, and Canadian lives, are now invested in Afghanistan.” Echoing the “support our troops” faction in the Canadian public, the panel stated that “[t]he sacrifices made there, by Canadians and their families, must be respected.” This suggests that in order to honour those who have lost their lives, Canada must keep fighting and lose even more lives. This is a ridiculous argument. All wars eventually come to an end, usually by a negotiated agreement. What the Manley panel seems to be saying is that not enough people have yet been killed to warrant an end to this war.

One clear option for the Canadian government would be to withdraw our military forces from Afghanistan, propose a ceasefire and make a strong commitment to finding a peaceful solution. Contrary to the view of the Manley panel, Canada’s world reputation and influence is not a product of fighting counter-insurgency wars in support of U.S. policy but of our historical role in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Canada could take on a leadership position, constructed with those countries in the United Nations which are not committed to the U.S. war policy. This would necessitate bypassing the Security Council, where the U.S. and the U.K. have the veto, and going directly to the UN General Assembly. Of course, this would require Canada to pursue a foreign policy initiative independent of the U.S. government.

What is needed is a broad regional peace settlement that includes Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries. Such an approach has been formally proposed to NATO by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but was flatly rejected by the United States. The other NATO governments have remained silent. An SCO-brokered settlement would be based on the revival of the Six-Plus-Two negotiations on Afghanistan (1997-2001) which were hosted by the United Nations and which consisted of the six countries that border on Afghanistan, plus the United States and Russia. The SCO has recommended that NATO be formally added to this group. Afghanistan is already an official observer to the SCO and has sought full membership.

Following such an international settlement, the United Nations could create a real peacekeeping operation. It would have to be completely separate from the United States, NATO and the “coalition of the willing.” The largest contributors to UN peacekeeping forces today are Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Jordan, Nepal and the Organization of African Unity.

Investing in Afghan-centred development

The Senlis Council (an NGO with many years experience operating in Afghanistan) and many others have criticized the Canadian government for allocating 90 per cent of its budget for Afghanistan to military forces and only 10 per cent to humanitarian assistance. They have called for a radical change that would put the bulk of our resources into economic and social development. This is an obvious policy alternative, in line with the Canadian public’s strong support for humanitarian assistance.

Canada could make a significant impact if it would concentrate its funding on health, housing, food and agriculture. As the Senlis Council has repeatedly stressed, there is a real need for emergency food assistance. The Canadian government could choose to bypass the international aid organizations like the World Bank and direct its spending to the most needy areas. This would have to be done with the support of the Afghan government.

The United States and international aid organizations have determined that the health system in Afghanistan shall be run on free-market principles. Canada could demonstrate that a public-health approach is better. Our government could begin by financing community health clinics open to all.

The Canadian government would also win a great deal of support in Afghanistan if it directly provided major funding to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and other human rights organizations. The legal system is hardly functioning in Afghanistan. Canada could provide significant help in this area, especially in the development of a legal aid program. The educational system is still in need of schools and teachers. Official Canadian aid could be funnelled to the Afghan government for this purpose.

What can we do in the area of food and agriculture? No poor, underdeveloped country can make progress towards social justice unless it can feed its people. Food security requires a rejection of the free-trade and free-market model of agricultural development.

The Afghan economy depends on food and agriculture; these account for over 50 per cent of the gross domestic product. Added to this is the poppy economy, which is estimated to be 35 per cent of the total GDP. Afghan agriculture is characterized by many small- and medium-sized farms with very few large operators. In this context Canada has a great deal to offer from our own history. Canadian farmers have expertise in the development of farm organizations, farmer-controlled co-operatives, credit unions and marketing agencies. Afghan farmers need help in developing transportation and marketing. As in many European countries, farmer co-operatives can expand into food processing, wholesaling and retailing.

Canada could readily provide assistance in this area. But it would mean rejecting the neo-liberal model imposed on Afghanistan that promotes the free market and foreign corporate agribusiness. The “Food First” model of self-reliance and egalitarian development as promoted by the Institute for Food and Development Policy, supported by many Canadian non-governmental and ethical organizations, is the obvious alternative.

Afghanistan has relied on two state-owned banks, but they are now being privatized. Through political mobilization Canadian farmers were able to establish the Farm Credit Corporation to provide long-term, low-interest mortgages. The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan government of 1978-1992 was establishing similar credit programs. The Canadian model would be welcomed by Afghan farmers who are now victims of local money lenders and drug lords.

Afghanistan has very little industrial development; this is one of the main reasons why it is one of the poorest countries in the world. It has natural resources and good potential for mining, oil and natural gas. The current model for development, set by the United States with the support of the Canadian government, places emphasis on attracting investment from foreign-controlled transnational corporations. The previous state-owned enterprises are being abolished or privatized.

It is most important for Afghanistan to establish state ownership and control over natural resources, including the creation of state-owned enterprises. This is the only way that a less-developed country can capture high economic rents from natural resource extraction. In the Middle East all of the Muslim states maintain state-owned corporations for the development of the oil and gas industry. These states could provide the technical assistance to create this model. Assistance could also come from the central Asian countries who are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They are all developing oil, natural gas and other resource extraction through their own state-owned corporations, working in partnership with transnational corporations.

Of course, such a pronounced change in policy will be difficult for any Canadian government to realize. Since the 1980s our major political parties and federal and provincial governments have developed a commitment to the free market and foreign-ownership model of resource development. Prior to 2001, however, the Afghan government was developing its resource and energy sectors using state-owned enterprises. Canadian governments must recognize the right to self-determination and democracy. If the people of Afghanistan want to pursue a different road, we must accept that and provide assistance.

There are many policy options that are different from those being pursued by the U.S. and Canadian governments. If the alternative policy approaches outlined above were presented to the Canadian public there is a very good chance that they would receive majority support.

From counter-insurgency to peacemaking

The immediate goal of any Canadian movement for a new policy direction in Afghanistan must be to pressure the political parties in Parliament to respect the sovereignty and democratic rights of the people of Afghanistan. This would include an end to the Canadian government’s commitment to a large-scale deployment of military forces in Afghanistan in support of the U.S. counter-insurgency war. Instead, Canada should take on the role of peacemaker.

The second goal would be to convince the Canadian government there should be a major budget shift from the military role in Afghanistan to economic and social development. If the people of Afghanistan were given the right to self-determination and democracy, it is doubtful they would choose the neo-liberal agenda that is being imposed upon them.

Recent public-opinion polls indicate that around 50 per cent of the Canadian public want to see the government withdraw from the counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan. Over 60 per cent took the position that Canada should not continue a counter-insurgency military role beyond February 2009. Polls regularly show that 70 per cent choose UN peacekeeping over a combat role. Several polls report that a large majority, around 80 per cent, is pleased that Canada is not officially involved in the war in Iraq.

So what can those of us wanting to act on these sentiments do to directly aid Afghanistan? In the 1970s and 1980s Canadians formed local organizations across Canada to help the people of Guatemala and El Salvador resist and survive the horrors of their right-wing dictatorships, backed by the U.S. government. People mobilized in support of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, under attack from the Contras who were backed by the Reagan administration and the CIA’s narco-empire. Canadians can do that again.

There are quite a few parties of the left in Afghanistan, constantly undergoing change. There is also a group of younger parties, referred to as “new democrats,” which have a strong commitment to human rights, secularism and broad-based democracy. In her visit to Canada in November 2007, Malalai Joya, the embattled and determined advocate from the Afghan parliament, urged Canadians to give direct support to the “freedom-loving democratic parties” that need so much support. She also urged organizations in Canada to give assistance to the established non-governmental organizations doing good work in her country that cannot complete their projects because of lack of funds. There is a great need for the formation of Canadian solidarity organizations to go to Afghanistan to build alliances with political and non-governmental groups. There is a need for Canada’s alternate media organizations to do the same thing.

In the past Canadians have undertaken international solidarity activities that were in direct opposition to the policy positions taken by their government. They were willing to stand up and defy the policies of the U.S. government. Because our government shares responsibility for the tragic situation that now exists in Afghanistan, it is even more important for Canadians to take action today.

John W. Warnock is the author of The Politics of Hunger: The Global Food System; Free Trade and the New Right Agenda; The Other Mexico: The North American Triangle Completed and most recently Creating a Failed State: The U.S. and Canada in Afghanistan (Fernwood Publishing), from which this article is excerpted.

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By Dave Oswald Mitchell & Brent Erickson
Briarpatch Magazine
September/October 2008

The shaming of one Canadian has shamed all Canadians.”

-Liberal MP Paul Szabo, apologizing in the House of Commons for the RCMP’s treatment of lobbyist and arms dealer Karlheinz Schreiber. (Schreiber’s pants had fallen down while RCMP officers led him, in handcuffs, to a waiting cruiser after his testimony before the Commons Ethics Committee.)

You’re 15 years old, in the company of hardened militants who are associates of your father. A foreign army has invaded the country and unleashed a massive bombing campaign. Soldiers come knocking one morning and demand entry. The men around you refuse and a firefight ensues, culminating in the occupying air force bombarding the compound you’re in, killing everyone but you and one other person.

What happens next is disputed. As the soldiers enter the bombed-out compound a grenade is thrown and explodes near one of them. He later dies of his wounds. Based on witness reports, the thrower could have been one of three people: you, the man lying beside you, or a U.S. soldier outside the compound wall.

The man beside you is shot by an advancing soldier as he reaches for an AK-47 lying beside him. Cowering in the corner, you, in turn, are shot twice in the back. As shock sets in, you plead with the soldiers to kill you, to finish the job.

You are Omar Khadr. Your ordeal has barely begun.

~

It was a temporary but extremely telling setback. On June 4, 2007, U.S. military judges presiding over the Bush Administration’s hastily convened military tribunals threw out all war crimes charges against the only two Guantanamo prisoners facing trial at the time. One of the two prisoners was Omar Khadr, who had been charged with “murder in violation of the law of war, attempted murder in violation of the law of war, conspiracy, providing material support for terrorism and spying.” Khadr was 15 years old at the time of his capture.

The judge presiding over Khadr’s case determined he had no jurisdiction over detainees who had been designated “enemy combatants” (as Khadr and many other detainees were labelled in their Combatant Status Review Tribunals in 2004) rather than “alien unlawful enemy combatants,” the more precise term Congress had used in the legislation authorizing the tribunals. The Bush Administration argued that the difference between an “enemy combatant” and an “unlawful enemy combatant” is purely semantic. But is it?

Merely being an “enemy combatant” is not illegal, even according to the laws the U.S. introduced to retroactively prosecute those captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere. What the dismissal of charges introduced into the process was the suggestion that, even if Khadr had thrown a grenade and even if the fact that he was a child soldier who was tortured into confessing was somehow overlooked, the act of resisting an attack by an occupying army alone might not be cause for prosecuting him for war crimes.

As Dave Lindorff, writing for Pacific Free Press, has pointed out, “a fighter killing another fighter during warfare is not the act of a ‘terrorist.’ It may be brutal and it may be tragic, but it is the act of a soldier. That soldier, if captured, is not a criminal, but a POW. Moreover, if he is a child, the Geneva Conventions . . . require that he be treated not as a POW but as a victim of war.”

Khadr’s case, remember, was one of the first the Bush Administration chose to prosecute – a supposed “slam-dunk” designed to pave the way for future victories in the war on terror. The temporary dismissal of charges against Khadr, however, exposed the tribunal for what it was: a politically driven show trial devoid of legal or moral legitimacy.

Khadr’s victory was, of course, short-lived. On September 24, 2007, a hastily convened three-member panel of the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review overruled the decision to throw out the charges, reinstating terrorism charges against Khadr and Salim Hamdan, the other Guantanamo prisoner to have had his charges thrown out. In its ruling the appeals court parroted the Bush Administration line that the distinction between “enemy combatant” and “unlawful enemy combatant” was purely semantic, and that the military still had the authority to try those it had designated “enemy combatants.” The decision meant that prosecutors could move forward with their case against Khadr and other prisoners without having to convene new status tribunals.

Khadr now faces life in prison if convicted. And if acquitted? The U.S. maintains it would still have the right to detain him indefinitely, until such time as America’s war on terror is deemed to have ended.

So what, exactly, is the Pentagon’s case against Omar Khadr? In all the ink that has been spilled covering Khadr’s story, the Kafkaesque absurdity of the entire situation is easily lost in the accumulation of disputed details. With the approach of Khadr’s October trial date, timed to be rushed to completion before President George W. Bush leaves office early next year, Canadians would do well to review the sordid details of Khadr’s story – particularly in light of our own government’s shameful role in perpetuating the torture and abuse of Guantanamo’s youngest detainee.

The firefight in Ab Khail

It happened one morning in July 2002, when U.S. intelligence picked up activity on a satellite phone belonging to an al Qaeda field commander. Before long, U.S. and Afghan forces had traced the call to a small compound in the mountain town of Ab Khail, near the border with Pakistan. When those inside refused to submit to a search, the U.S. patrol began exchanging fire with four or five men armed with grenades and assault rifles.

After air strikes were called in and multiple bombing raids had all but levelled the mud-brick huts, a small assault force entered the compound on foot to sweep out the remaining fighters. Someone in the compound began firing at the soldiers, who quickly took cover. What happened next only became clear in February of this year, after a 2004 Criminal Investigation Task Force witness report was accidentally released to the media.

The witness interviewed in the report, the soldier who shot Khadr, is identified only as OC-1. His description of the throwing of the grenade that would precipitate Khadr’s murder charge reads as follows:

“As the fire continued, [OC-1] saw a hand grenade ‘lobbed’ over the corner wall that lead [sic] into the alley. He estimated the wall was about eight feet tall. The grenade went over his head in an arching pattern. The grenade traveled approximately 30 to 80 feet with the distance depending on how deep from in the alley the grenade was thrown. The grenade landed and [sic] estimated 30 to 50 feet from the opening of the alley.”

Though OC-1 did not hear the grenade explode, it is alleged that this was the weapon that fatally wounded Sgt. Christopher J. Speer. And Omar Khadr stands accused of wielding it.

It was initially alleged that Khadr was seen to have thrown the grenade, but no eyewitness reports have yet surfaced to corroborate this claim. Indeed, the operation’s military commander, identified only as “Col. W,” initially reported that the man suspected of throwing the grenade had been killed in the fighting. Early this year, however, Khadr’s lawyers revealed that Col. W’s report had been altered months later to read that the suspect had merely been “engaged” rather than “killed,” provoking an accusation that the U.S. military was “manufactur[ing] evidence to make it look like Omar is guilty.”

After the grenade sailed over his head, OC-1 heard moaning coming from the back of the compound and saw a man lying on the ground within reach of an AK-47. Seeing that the man was moving, OC-1 shot him once in the head, stirring up a cloud of dust. Once the dust had settled, OC-1 “saw a second man sitting up facing away from him leaning against brush. This man, later identified as KHADR, was moving.” Khadr had by then been wounded in the head, eye, and leg by shrapnel, presumably from the earlier aerial bombardment or perhaps from a U.S. grenade. The 15-year-old was wounded and unarmed, and was facing away from the approaching soldier. According to his report, OC-1 shot Khadr twice in the back.

OC-1 stated that he had been the only American to fire his weapon since entering the compound, although he admitted that at least one American grenade had been thrown into the compound from outside the walls after the team had entered. Khadr’s lawyer, Bill Kuebler, has argued that this raises the possibility that the grenade that killed Speer had been thrown by a U.S. soldier, rather than by anyone inside the compound. Kuebler has indicated that he will present forensic evidence at Khadr’s trial to corroborate this claim.

Approaching the wounded Khadr, OC-1 reported that he “tapped” the motionless boy’s wounded eye to confirm that he was alive. Khadr was then given on-site medical attention, during which time he repeatedly asked the medics and soldiers to kill him. He was then loaded aboard a military helicopter and flown to the detention centre at Bagram Airbase. When he regained consciousness several days later, Khadr claims that the first thing he was told was that he “had killed an American with a hand grenade.”

“Several times, he forced me to [redacted], which caused me [redacted] due to my [redacted].”

Six years of torture and abuse

Some basic facts of Omar Khadr’s story are not disputed. His father was an Egyptian-Canadian aid worker who had ties to numerous militant leaders including Osama bin Laden. He was a suspected member of al Qaeda, and was killed in a raid by Pakistani troops in October 2003. On the day the U.S. army came knocking, Omar Khadr, who speaks English, Pashto, and Arabic, had been loaned out by his father to act as an interpreter for Abu Laith al-Libi, an al-Qaeda leader. (The young Khadr had been living with his mother at the time and had been forced to hide behind a burka, disguised as a girl, to escape scrutiny. Upset by having to disguise himself as a girl in order to be safe, Khadr had asked to live with men in the village instead.) Video footage found at the compound shows Omar Khadr playing with a detonator cord while other men assemble explosives. But none of these facts make him a terrorist, nor do they justify the treatment he has endured since his capture.

As Human Rights Watch points out in their 2007 report “The Omar Khadr Case: A Teenager Imprisoned at Guantanamo,” “Both US and international law requires governments to provide children (persons under the age of 18) with special safeguards and care, including legal protections appropriate to their age.”

“While children should be held accountable for their crimes,” the report continues, “international law requires that they be treated in a manner that takes into account their particular vulnerability and relative culpability as children, and focuses primarily on rehabilitation and reintegration.” Surveying the litany of abuses Omar Khadr has endured in the six years since his capture, it is hard to imagine a treatment regimen better designed to destroy utterly an adolescent’s chances for “rehabilitation and reintegration.”

One might think that Khadr’s youth would have served as a mitigating factor that would have limited the extent of his mistreatment, but two factors conspired to ensure Khadr would be shown no mercy. First, he was considered an “intelligence treasure trove” because of his family’s high-ranking contacts in al Qaeda (Khadr spent part of his childhood living alongside Osama bin Laden himself, and playing with the bin Laden children). In an extra-judicial detention system obsessed with “ticking-time-bomb” scenarios and “actionable intelligence,” this made him an irresistible candidate for torture. Secondly, Khadr was accused of killing a U.S. soldier, which immediately earned him the animosity of almost every other U.S. soldier he encountered. Together, these factors virtually guaranteed that he would receive the sort of “gloves-off” treatment from his captors and interrogators that Bush and then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had directly called for.

At the Bagram Theater Internment Facility, where Omar Khadr spent the first two months of his detention, his interrogators barely waited until he had regained consciousness before they went to work. He was often carried into the interrogation room on a stretcher and was regularly denied pain medication prior to and during his interrogations. He was subjected to barking dogs, threatened with rape, denied bathroom privileges, singled out for all-night cleaning duty long before his wounds had healed, and hung up by his wrists in doorways for hours at a time.

Further abuses detailed by Khadr in a sworn affidavit have been blacked out by military censors. For instance, Khadr’s censored description of his first interrogation reads as follows:

“During this first interrogation, the young blond man would often [redacted] if I did not give him the answers he wanted. Several times, he forced me to [redacted], which caused me [redacted] due to my [redacted]. He did this several times to get me to answer his questions and give him the answers he wanted. It was clear that he was making me [redacted] because he knew that [redacted] and he wanted me to answer questions. I cried several times during the interrogation as a result of this treatment and pain.”

Whatever the specifics, such treatment quickly had its desired effect. Khadr, who was once described by a teacher as “very smart, very eager and very polite,” realized almost immediately that “the more I answered the questions and the more I gave him the answers he wanted, the less [redacted] on me. I figured out right away that I would simply tell them whatever I thought they wanted to hear in order to keep them from causing me [redacted].” A U.S. official quoted in an Amnesty International report cites Khadr as an example of a prisoner “singing like a bird” out of fear of abuse by U.S. interrogators.

Khadr estimates that he was interrogated 42 times over a 90-day period while at Bagram. He was then transferred to Guantanamo, where many of the torture techniques he had already encountered were soon to be enshrined as official U.S. policy, authorized by President Bush himself. At Guantanamo, Khadr was beaten; drugged; ridiculed; subjected to sleep deprivation; subjected to solitary confinement and sensory deprivation; choked repeatedly to the point of passing out; force-fed and beaten after he participated in a detainee hunger strike; and, in one oft-cited incident, denied the use of a bathroom until he lost control of his bladder and was used as a “human mop” to clean up the puddle of urine, then refused a change of clothes for two days. He was also threatened with extradition to Israel, Egypt, Jordan or Syria where he would, he was led to believe, be raped and tortured.

This is, again, only a partial list, as the U.S. military has refused to release details of many of the “enhanced interrogation techniques” used on Guantanamo detainees, and has censored detainee communications that give details of this treatment, citing concerns that terrorists might use the information to prepare themselves to better resist U.S. interrogation methods.

The psychological effects of such a harsh regimen of torture and abuse on someone of Khadr’s age were entirely predictable. “Soon after Omar arrived at Guantanamo,” writes Jeff Tietz in his Rolling Stone exposé, “The Unending Torture of Omar Khadr,”

“he began exhibiting the kinds of dissociative [sic] symptoms most adolescent psychiatrists would have expected. He was startled to the point of disorientation by small changes in his surroundings. He had fainting spells. He cried frequently. [ . . . ] His appetite diminished; he took on the appearance of the permanently malnourished. He entered what clinicians call a state of hypervigilance: He started thinking he might be attacked at any time – without reason, his heart rate would jump, and he would sweat and hyperventilate. He began hearing sounds – screams, bombs, things he could not identify – when the cellblock was silent. Every week or so, a self-generated rage possessed him – an experience wholly foreign to his character. For long periods he felt no emotion at all. He started blaming himself for the things that had happened to him; he became deeply ashamed of what he had suffered. He developed a pronounced twitch on the left side of his face, of which he remained unaware.”

Meanwhile, Khadr’s ordeal dragged on with no end in sight. It wasn’t until three years after reaching Guantanamo that Khadr was even charged with a crime. He was not provided access to legal counsel until late 2004, more than two years after his transfer. In over six years of detention, he has been allowed to speak to his family by telephone only once and his family has never been permitted to visit him.

The London-based Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has been closely following the case of Omar Khadr, the world’s highest profile child soldier. According to Lucia Withers of the Coalition, Khadr “should have been treated primarily as a child and a victim of adult illegality. His treatment should have focused on maximizing his potential for successful reintegration. His treatment, including indefinite military detention, lack of access to family and lawyers, lack of judicial review and allegations that he has been ill-treated, have been manifestly contrary to these principles.” The Coalition is calling for Khadr’s age to be taken into account before judgment is passed in his case, and for his punishment, if he is found guilty, to be consistent with international principles on juvenile justice.

Khadr’s disclosure of torture to Canadian officials cost him dearly.

“They had no sympathy”

One of the ugliest questions to emerge from the released documentation of Canada’s interviews with Khadr is the question of why Khadr was “softened up” with three weeks of sleep deprivation, with the full knowledge of Canadian officials, before their meeting with him. Was it because Canadian officials were actively participating in his interrogation in hopes of bolstering the U.S. case against him, rather than visiting “to ascertain Khadr’s well-being,” as the government claimed at the time, and as Khadr’s rights as a Canadian citizen should have warranted? Assisting with the U.S. prosecution, indeed, appears to have been the primary objective of these meetings.

The Canadian government has repeatedly claimed that it “sought and received assurances” that Khadr was being humanely treated in Guantanamo. The classified documents released in July of this year under court order, however, expose this claim as deceptive: whatever “assurances” they may have received, Canadian officials knew very well that Khadr was being subjected to harsh and inhumane interrogation methods, and didn’t particularly seem to care. They neither protested his treatment nor sought his extradition to Canada. Indeed, as is now clear, they actively participated in his interrogation.

The reports of these interrogation sessions reveal that Canadian officials had full knowledge that Khadr had been subjected to what is known as the “frequent flyer program,” a sleep deprivation method, “in an effort to make him more amenable and willing to talk” prior to a visit with now-retired Canadian foreign service officer Jim Gould in 2004.

“For the three weeks before Mr. Gould’s visit,” reports R. Scott Heatherington, Director of the Canadian Foreign Intelligence Division, “Umar [sic] has not been permitted more than three hours in any one location. At three hour intervals he is moved to another cell block, thus denying him an uninterrupted sleep and a continued change of neighbours. He will soon be placed in isolation for up to three weeks and then he will be interviewed again.”

The Foreign Affairs documents go on to state that on several occasions, Khadr cried uncontrollably, and that he removed his shirt to show interviewers bullet wounds he had suffered to his back and shoulder during the firefight in Afghanistan, some of the wounds still leaking blood. According to a sworn affidavit from Khadr,

“I showed them my injuries and told them that what I had told the Americans was not right and not true. I said that I told the Americans whatever they wanted me to say because they would torture me. The Canadians called me a liar and I began to sob. They screamed at me and told me that they could not do anything for me. I tried to cooperate so that they would take me back to Canada. I told them that I was scared and that I had been tortured.

“They came back three more days but I did not sob because they had no sympathy.”

Heatherington’s report notes coldly, “Mr. Khadr’s allegations and protestations . . . did not ring true.”

Damningly, however, Gould’s very own observations actually lent weight to Khadr’s allegation of torture: in one report Gould expressed frustration with the “inexperience and lack of a goal” of Khadr’s primary interrogator, who “seemed to be trying to intimidate Umar or force Umar to talk rather than trying to cajole him into cooperation.” There is no indication that Gould investigated these suspicions further or lodged any complaint with the Americans about what he observed.

Khadr, it must be remembered, took a major risk in disclosing his mistreatment while still in the custody of his torturers, and his disclosure, so quickly dismissed by Canadian officials, cost him dearly: “After the Canadians left and I told the Americans that my previous statements were untrue, life got much worse for me.” Khadr’s description of the “much worse” punishment he suffered for disclosing his torture is almost entirely redacted.

Canada has consistently refused to call for Khadr’s release. Indeed, as Sean Fine pointed out in the Globe and Mail in March 2008, Canada “is the only Western nation to give the United States carte blanche with one of its nationals at Guantanamo. Britain, Australia, Sweden and Germany fought to repatriate their nationals – adults, all of them. And Canada let a juvenile languish.” Indeed, all other western countries not only tried, but succeeded, in getting their nationals released from Guantanamo. How hard would it have been for Canada to do the same?

Meanwhile, Khadr has not been visited by Canadian officials since 2004, after his attorneys sought and won a Federal Court injunction to prevent the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs from interrogating their client again.

“Legal anarchy”

“What is new about President Bush’s order [‘Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,' November 13, 2001] is that it radically erases any legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally unnamable and unclassifiable being. Not only do the Taliban captured in Afghanistan not enjoy the status of POWs as defined by the Geneva Convention, they do not even have the status of persons charged with a crime according to American laws. Neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply ‘detainees,’ they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight.”

Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception

While his lawyers are working to establish a rehabilitative program that would see Khadr returned to Canada under a program of extensive rehabilitation, monitoring and limited family contact, neither the U.S. nor the Canadian government has publicly expressed any support for such a plan. Prime Minister Stephen Harper insists that there is no other option for Khadr than to continue with the controversial U.S. military tribunals. “Frankly, we do not have a real alternative to that process now to get to the truth about those accusations, and we believe that this process should continue,” the PM told reporters at the G8 summit in Japan in July.

Such faith that anything resembling justice can yet emerge from Guantanamo puts Harper among a very small number of neo-conservative Pollyannas who maintain that the Guantanamo “process” should be allowed to work. As early as June 2007, the editorial in the Toronto Star condemned the “legal anarchy” of a process in which “Washington appears determined to rewrite the rules until it manages to secure a conviction.” The Globe and Mail, meanwhile, pointed out in its editorial of July 10, 2008, “The issue is not, as Mr. Harper implies, that Canada’s justice system lacks the legal tools to deal with Mr. Khadr. It is that, by Canadian notions of fair process, the U.S. case against Mr. Khadr would unravel.”

Particularly since the release of the Canadian interrogation footage, Canadian public opinion has increasingly shifted to favour bringing Khadr into the Canadian justice system. As of press time, it remains to be seen whether public pressure can force the Canadian government to abandon its hard-line stance, or whether this quasi-judicial prosecution of a Canadian child soldier based on a confession extracted under torture will be allowed to proceed.

Meanwhile, whatever crimes Khadr may have committed, the list of crimes committed against the youth by those who have held him in legal limbo for the past six years is surely much longer. Justice for Omar Khadr requires not just a free and fair legal process in which the now-21-year-old can defend himself against the serious charges he faces. Justice also requires that those who have manipulated and abused him for their own political ends also be held to account. If prosecuting war crimes is our intention, then let’s not limit ourselves to the war crimes of children and foot soldiers.

Perhaps fearing precisely such an outbreak of judicial zeal, the Bush Administration saw to it that the same Military Commissions Act of 2006 that stripped Guantanamo detainees of their habeas corpus rights and ruled coerced testimony to be admissible against them also gutted the War Crimes Act of 1996 in order to protect U.S. policy-makers (from Bush and Cheney on down) from prosecution for war crimes.

In June of this year, Khadr responded to questions sent to him by CBC News in a handwritten letter, saying “I’m a peaceful person,” and asking the Canadian people to “give me a chance in life and don’t believe what you’ve heard, and believe what you see with your own eyes.”

Dave Oswald Mitchell is the editor of Briarpatch Magazine. Brent Erickson is an artist, activist and independent journalist based in Winnipeg.

Further reading

OC-1′s witness report

Affidavit of Omar Khadr

The Canadian interrogation files

60 Minutes segment: “Omar Kadr: The Youngest Terrorist?”
(November 18, 2007)

Andy Worthington, “Guantanamo’s Child Soldier: The Trials of Omar Khadr”
Counterpunch, November 15, 2007

Trial Watch’s profile on Omar Khadr

Petition Stephen Harper to bring Omar Khadr home

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By Aaron Lakoff
Briarpatch Magazine
September/October 2008

It’s a Tuesday evening in Paris, and in the predominantly immigrant neighbourhood of Belleville, people from all corners of the world are crowding into the metro station. Tension is high tonight; for many, this ride home could be their last in France.

Outside the turnstiles of the metro, a small group of people have gathered to call out warnings to those entering the station. “Attention sans-papiers! There are police in the metro!” Down on the platform, a unit of French police officers are doing a random check of people’s immigration documents. Those who are in the country illegally can be swept up right away, put in detention, and then eventually deported. These immigration sweeps in public places have become a common occurrence in France over the last year, and for many undocumented migrants in French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s republic, the country is no longer seen as the terre d’accueil, or “land of welcome” it has so long promoted itself to be.

Meanwhile, here in Canada, migrants may not be undergoing such horrific experiences on as large of a scale, but the threat of being snatched up by police in the subway, a hardware store, or even at home is still an everyday reality for many. Particularly in light of the Conservative government’s recent changes to the Canadian Immigration Act, an examination of the politics of immigration in France has real bearing on the future of immigration in this country as well.

Nicolas Sarkozy rose to power in May 2007 on a platform of tightening immigration controls. Migration has been a hot button issue in France for the last few years, especially since the riots in the working class, immigrant suburbs of Paris in late 2005. For weeks, youth in these suburbs burnt cars and engaged in running battles with riot police following the deaths of two youth of colour during a police chase. For some, the riots were an indication of the failures of youth from immigrant families to integrate into French society, while for others they represented a very clear reaction to the ongoing poverty, unemployment, discrimination and police brutality that their communities face. In France, the unemployment level amongst immigrant families is three times the national average.

Sarkozy’s rise to power reflects a troubling triumph of divisive, xenophobic politics in France. During the riots of 2005, Sarkozy, who was minister of the interior at the time, famously declared that the youth rioters were “scum” (racaille), and that they should be cleaned off the streets with a kärcher, a high-powered cleaning machine. And in December 2006, while still minister of the interior, Sarkozy announced a target to deport 25,000 undocumented people per year from the country. So when he was voted in as president of the republic six months later and maintained this objective, many were saying that Sarkozy had already declared war on France’s sans-papiers (undocumented migrants).

Sarkozy has described what he sees as the two trends of immigration happening in France: “suffered immigration,” in which France can’t choose its migrants (referring to those who cross the country’s borders illegally), and “chosen immigration,” when France decides who to let in and who to reject. He wants to move away from the former while using the latter to boost the French economy. France’s recently introduced regularization program, for instance, favours highly skilled (and mostly white) immigrants from the newest member-states of the European Union (mainly Romanians, Poles, and Bulgarians) over non-white immigrants from French-speaking countries in northern or western Africa.

The flip side to this kind of regularization program is that those who are already living in the country without papers and who fall outside the criteria for being regularized are faced with little chance of ever gaining legal status, leaving them dangerously open to economic exploitation, human trafficking and worse. In effect, the gates to the country are being slammed in their faces – when they’re already halfway in.

Sarkozy’s rise to power reflects a troubling triumph of divisive, xenophobic politics in France.

Surplus humanity

Brice Hortefeux, the French minister responsible for immigration, told the magazine Jeune Afrique that the French government is enforcing Sarkozy’s quota of 25,000 deportations to “indicate to other countries that to come to France, you need a proper visa.”

The quota of 25,000 deportations per year has translated into massive police actions in many big cities in France. In recent years, large police roundups targeting undocumented migrants have occurred in metro stations, train stations, apartment buildings, and even city streets. During such an event, the police tactic is to seal off an area in question, demand to inspect everyone’s identification and immigration papers, and then immediately arrest and detain those who are in the country illegally.

In some cases, these police raids on migrants have even become deadly. In one case last year, a Chinese woman died after falling out of a window while trying to escape a police raid in Paris. And on February 12, John Maïna, a young Kenyan immigrant living in the city of Meudon, committed suicide before his impending deportation.

Many migrant groups have begun using the French term rafle (roundup, raid) to describe these police operations. The term has powerful historic connotations, referring to the mass roundups of French Jews during the Vichy regime of World War II. While the end result may be different, many argue that the police tactics have not changed.

Pierre Cordolier – a member of the Tlemcen Committee, a group devoted to popular education about the Vichy regime in Paris – says that little has changed in how the French government views illegal immigrants since the Second World War. Cordolier explains the similarities in the language used to justify deportations then and now.

“There was an official motive which was outlined [under the Vichy regime] – ‘In surplus in the national economy,’” Cordolier explains. “‘Surplus in the national economy’ means we don’t need you, you’re worth nothing to us, and we don’t want you anymore. Today, people don’t say ‘surplus in the national economy’; however, they think it. They say ‘suffered immigration,’ which is a totally different term, but completely identical in meaning.”

In the face of this growing repression, strong displays of popular resistance have emerged across the country. Migrant justice groups, rallying around the simple idea that human rights transcend one’s citizenship, that France’s motto of “liberty, equality, fraternity” applies to all, not just to holders of French citizenship, have taken to the streets in protest. Some groups, such as the 9ème Collectif des Sans-Papiers in Paris, have even organized a hotline to alert people about where and when the raids are happening.

“People today are living in fear and in agony,” says Bahija Benkouba of the 9ème Collectif. “At their homes they are afraid the police will come find them. [The situation is the same] at their workplaces, because it’s also a target of the government to go into their workplaces, to arrest and round up people. In homes, in metros, anywhere.”

Every second Tuesday for more than a year, hundreds of people have been gathering to protest the mass roundups, and on April 5, 2008, tens of thousands of people marched in cities across France to demand a regularization for all undocumented people in the country. While many undocumented migrants are reluctant to protest their treatment for fear of deportation, others feel that being public and vocal about the desperation of their situation is their only hope.

Mourad, a sans-papiers migrant from Algeria, is a tireless organizer for the rights of others in his situation, and can frequently be seen with a megaphone in hand at demonstrations in Paris. He has been living in the French capital for seven years, “When French people see us in the streets,” he says, “it shows that we are here. We demonstrate to have rights like everyone, to live in dignity like other French people. To demand these rights, we demonstrate. They have to hear our message.”

Another manifestation of that resistance has been the Réseau Éducation Sans Frontières, a national network formed in 2004 that brings together parents, teachers, school administrators, and other activists who provide advocacy for sans-papiers children who are facing deportation with their families. This dynamic and vocal network brings together people from various political affiliations, including many who might not have previously considered themselves activists, but who have been shocked into action by the recent wave of deportations in France. As a result, on several occasions they have been successful in quickly mobilizing thousands of people to prevent the deportation of migrant families.

“People to wash dishes and make sandwiches”

In Canada, this logic and language of “chosen immigration” is beginning to take a foothold as well. On June 9, the federal Conservatives passed an amendment to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act entitled Bill C-50. The amendment was actually tacked onto the Conservatives’ budget implementation bill, a tactic that opposition groups have denounced as a sneaky way of making such sweeping changes to Canada’s immigration system. The minority Conservative government was able to pass the bill because it was put forth as a matter of confidence, meaning the opposition parties would have triggered an election if they had voted down the bill. With Liberal leader Stephane Dion’s undesirably low popularity levels, this was not a risk the Grits were willing to face. The bill passed by a vote of 121-95.

Among other changes, Bill C-50 gives discretionary power to the minister of citizenship and immigration to arbitrarily reject immigration applicants, even though those same applicants might have otherwise been admitted under Canada’s point-system criteria. Moreover, it effectively allows the immigration minister to set quotas on the category of persons who can enter Canada, including quotas based on one’s country of origin.

Recently, grassroots groups opposed to the bill held a pan-Canadian week of action against C-50 from May 31 to June 7. The week included popular education events and protests at Immigration Minister Diane Finley’s speaking events in Vancouver and Montreal.

“Even if you fit into all the criteria – let’s say that you can come to study or visit in Canada, you fit all the regulations, rules, and laws – the visa office could still deny you without really having to tell you why. And no, you cannot appeal it, and that is grossly unfair,” says Olivia Chow, the NDP’s immigration critic and MP for the Trinity-Spadina riding in Toronto.

An additional power given to the minister under the proposed changes is that of deciding the order in which new applications are processed, regardless of when they were made. This means prioritizing immigration applicants based on one’s ability to fulfill the needs of the Canadian job market, “whether it’s people to wash dishes and make sandwiches,” Finley recently explained, “or whether it’s the highly skilled engineers.”

In a statement released on May 1 by Solidarity Across Borders, a Montreal network of migrant justice groups, the group points out, “this unprecedented modification of [the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act] would risk putting in place covert equivalents of the explicitly racist immigration policy that characterized much of Canadian history, including the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923, the Order in Council of 1911 prohibiting the landing of ‘any immigrant belonging to the Negro race,’ that of 1923 excluding ‘any immigrant of any Asiatic race,’ or the ‘none is too many’ rule applied to Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi-occupied Europe during the Second World War.”

Restrictive measures on immigration policies, whether they be in France or Canada, tend to ignore the realities of worldwide migration, particularly the human rights of refugees and the real potential for exploitation and abuse of people made vulnerable by being denied legal status. Such measures treat migrants not as people, but as economic units-people who are coming here simply to make a quick buck. While jobs might be one of the “pull” factors for migrants to come to Canada or France, the “push” factors that cause these people to leave their homes can be far more powerful. These can include natural or man-made disasters, wars, occupations, indigenous land expropriation or natural resource extraction. So when Sarkozy speaks of “chosen immigration,” or when the Conservatives introduce immigration measures such as Bill C-50, they offer a very one-sided and cynical view of immigration trends. If we removed the idea of “choice” from the equation, we would see a situation in which migrants are forced to flee their countries of origin, only to come up against closed borders and denial of status in the Global North.

If we add to that the fact that many of the “push” factors that create migration are at least partially the fault of the wealthier destination countries (for example, French colonization in Algeria, or Canadian mining projects in Latin America), then the idea of countries like Canada or France talking about “choosing” who and who not to let in seems irresponsible at best. This is perhaps why more and more people in the migrant justice movements in North America have taken up the slogan, “We didn’t cross your borders. Your borders crossed us.”

The mass roundups in France have demonstrated that the outcome of quotas and “chosen immigration” is a violent one that results in the decimation of families, livelihoods, and communities. And while borders may be tightened and policies tweaked, migration to Europe or North America – be it “legal” or “illegal” – will not stop, and criminalizing the problem will only make things worse.

One basic yet foundational demand that many migrant communities in France and in Canada are making is “papers for all,” meaning a regularization program for all non-status people already living within those countries. In tangible, practical terms, that would mean that these migrants, many of whom have lived among us for years and contribute in innumerable ways to our society, would be able to access health services, go to work, ride the metro, or go to school without living in constant fear of being picked up by the police and deported. It would mean living in dignity. But until that demand of “status for all” is met, and countries like Canada and France start addressing the root causes of why people have to flee their home countries in the first place, that ride home on the metro will continue to fill people with fear.

Aaron Lakoff is an independent journalist from Montreal. He travelled to France in February 2008 to document the struggles of sans-papiers people in the country. A one-hour radio documentary in French on this subject can be downloaded from Lakoff’s blog.

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