Foreign
Influences on Japanese and Chinese
higher
education: A comparative analysis
Qiang Zha
hep.oise.utoronto.ca,
volume 1, issue 1, 2004, pp.1-15.
Abstract
Two forces shaped Japanese and Chinese systems of higher education.
These include the impact of foreign influences on the basic academic model; and
the indigenization of the universities as part of the national development
processes that took place in each country. Japan and China share significant
similarities in the patterns and process of their adoption of foreign
influences. This essay, however, discusses through comparison the underlying
differences behind the perceived similarities between the two countries in
borrowing and adopting foreign forms of higher education. The author argues
that Japan followed a bifocal approach to the appropriation of foreign ideas in
relation to the development of its higher education system. China, in contrast,
adopted a ‘go it alone’ policy, as it was unwilling or unable to abandon some
of its deeply held traditional beliefs. The author therefore concludes that
Japanese higher education succeeded in drawing a distinction between imported
innovations and original ethos, while Chinese higher education failed to adapt
innovative foreign models to its traditional patterns.
Résumé
Deux forces principales ont
contribué à la formation des systèmes d’enseignement supérieurs de la Chine et
du Japon. Elles comprennent l’impact
des influences étrangères sur le modèle académique de base, et l’indigénisation
des universités à l’intérieur du processus de développement national de chaque
pays. La Chine et le Japon partagent
des similarités importantes dans leurs tendances et processus d’adaptation des influences
étrangères. Cette rédaction discute à
l’aide d’une comparaison les différences sous-jacentes derrière les similarités
perçues entre les deux pays en empruntant et en adoptant des formes étrangères
d’enseignement supérieur. L’auteur
affirme que le Japon a suivit un approche bifocal à l’appropriation des idées
étrangères en relation au développement de son système d’enseignement
supérieur. Par contraste, la Chine a
décidé de faire «~cavalier seul~» puisqu’elle ne voulait pas ou était incapable
d’abandonner certaines de ses croyances traditionnelles fondamentales. L’auteur conclue donc que l’enseignement
supérieur au Japon a réussit à faire la distinction entre des innovations
importées et l’ethos original, alors que l’enseignement supérieur en Chine n’a
pas réussit à adapter des modèles étrangers innovateurs à ses caractéristiques
traditionnelles.
Introduction
T |
wo basic forces shaped the Japanese and Chinese higher education
systems. These include the impact of foreign influences on the basic academic
model, along with the indigenization of the universities as part of the
modernization process. The two countries share significant similarities in the
patterns and processes of adoption of foreign influences. Japan chose a variety
of external influences after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, among which the
German impact remained the greatest, until the United States tried to reshape
Japanese institutions after World War II (Altbach, 1979, p. 28). China was
subjected to significant foreign influences from Germany, France, Britain,
Japan and the United States in the early Republican period. It later came to
favor European modes, which were strongly dominated by the German articulation
of academic organization. This continued throughout the Republican and
Nationalist periods, as well as the 1950s when China carried out a total
reorganization of its higher education system in close imitation of the Soviet pattern which itself included German features[i]
(Hayhoe, 1989a, p. 20). The two countries, which both upheld the Confucian
tradition, were never formally colonized. It is therefore fair to say that they
used independent judgment in adopting foreign structures and models of higher
education.
However, these similar patterns and processes led to very different results for each country. Japan has become an advanced scientific power, with a highly developed university and research system. It is now one of the world’s most important academic systems, while China remains peripheral to global ‘centers of excellence’ in higher education. This essay takes a comparative approach towards understanding the underlying differences behind the perceived similarities between Japan and China in borrowing and adopting foreign higher education ideas. As it is impossible to fully explain the adoption of foreign models in both countries in this short essay, specific periods of time are chosen from each country to contribute to the discussion.
Foreign models of higher education were adopted in different modes in
Japan and China depending on the period of time under discussion. The first is
the ‘window-shopping’[ii]
mode in which complete freedom was retained on the part of the recipients,
Japan and China, in selecting any one of a number of foreign models. The second
is the ‘involvement’[iii]
mode in which a specific foreign model was appropriated by each of the two
countries, whether on a voluntary or involuntary basis. In the history of
Japanese and Chinese higher education, the first examples of the
‘window-shopping’ mode occurred respectively in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, within the periods of the Meiji Restoration in Japan and the early
Republican China. The ‘involvement’ mode would be best illustrated in the
post-World War II Occupation period in late 1940s in Japan and early
post-revolutionary period in 1950s in China. In the following section the
author uses as categories of comparison and analysis the ‘window-shopping’ mode
and ‘involvement’ mode on the basis of those periods of time concerned.
‘Window-Shopping’ by the Japanese Meiji Government and
by the Chinese Republican Modernizers and Nationalist Reformers
T |
he prototype of modern Japanese universities, the University of Tokyo, was
created in 1870s by the western-oriented Meiji Government. As an indispensable
sub-department of the then Japanese bureaucracy, the University of Tokyo,
essentially the model of the modern Japanese universities, traces its origin
back to ancient or medieval Chinese institutions, rather than to the medieval
prototype from which most Western universities originated (Nakayama, 1989, p.
98-99). The teaching and administrative staff of the university were actually
government employees of the Ministry of Education. As Nakayama explains, this
“often conflicted with the free and self-generating intellectual activity of faculty
members” (1989, p. 99). The University of Tokyo’s faculty-department structure
was “modeled after the departmental hierarchy of bureaucratic machinery,”
making interdepartmental mobility of both teachers and students extremely
difficult (Nakayama, 1989, p. 99). What is particularly fascinating is the fact
that these features of the modern Japanese university bureaucracy, derived from
the Chinese tradition, are in fact still problems facing current higher
education in China while they no longer plague Japanese higher education.
Around 1870, the Meiji Government examined Western educational literature as a means of identifying and adopting the best elements of each model into its own system (Amano, 1979, p. 12-13). On the basis of these investigations, a crude plan for imitating Western educational systems was formulated, and in order for this to be implemented the Japanese government sent students to study abroad in a variety of western nations. In the 1870 draft rule for sending students abroad created by the Meiji Government, the following catalogue identifying the subjects that different countries excelled in was created:
Britain: machinery, geology and mining, steel
making, architecture, shipbuilding, cattle farming, commerce, poor-relief;
France:
zoology and botany, astronomy,
mathematics, physics, chemistry, architecture, law, international relations,
promotion of public welfare;
Germany:
physics, astronomy, geology and
mineralogy, chemistry, zoology and botany, medicine, pharmacology, educational
system, political science, economics;
Holland:
irrigation, architecture,
shipbuilding, political science, economics, poor-relief;
U.S.A.: industrial law, agriculture, cattle farming, mining, communications, commercial law (Nakayama, 1989, p. 100).
A reading of the history of
nineteenth century science indicates that the Meiji government’s assessment of
the intellectual expertise of the various countries was largely correct. This
is generally how western science was imported to Japan during the 1870s and
1880s. The influence of each country upon Japanese higher education
corresponded with the discipline in which that particular country excelled. The
German influence, for example, was seen in medical schools, and later in law
schools, the British in engineering education, and the French in the early law
schools (Amano, 1979, p. 12-13).
It became clear to the Japanese that
they needed to find an appropriate model of higher education in order to
rapidly develop a university system suitable specifically for their national
development. The Japanese government decided to draw from elements of the
German university since nineteenth century Germany was close to Japan in terms
of its goals for social and economic development (Altbach, 1979, p. 28). In
1881, the Meiji Government decided to transform its institutional model, which
was a mixture of influences from a variety of western countries, to a strictly
German model. This was not only because the German university was seen to be
one of the most innovative in all of Europe at the time, but also because the
Japanese government admired the modern German government bureaucracy, which was
dominated by law school graduates, and wished to copy it (Altbach, 1979: p.28;
Nakayama, 1989, p. 103-104). Thus it was ultimately primarily the German model
of higher education which impacted Japanese higher education during the time of
the Meiji government.
The German model continued to
dominate Japanese higher education until the end of World War I. Yet, while
this is true a closer inspection of Japanese higher education during this
period will show that the application of the German model to the Japanese
context reflects in many ways differences from the German model. In other
words, the Japanese system, because of its cultural context, was not an exact
replication of the German system. The basic structure of the Japanese
university in 1890, for example, consisted of six schools. They were law,
humanities, science, technology, medicine and agriculture (Nakayama, 1989, p.
102). While this arrangement was borrowed from the faculty structure of the
modern German university, a noteworthy difference is that in the Japanese
university science was independent of the humanities (philosophy). The subjects had not yet been separated in
nineteenth century Germany. In addition, the traditional vocational subjects of
the modern applied disciplines, such as technology and agriculture, were, in
contrast to the set up of western higher education at this time, elevated to
the university status. Some scholars argued that this was because the
utilitarian materialist Meiji Government had eventually incorporated American,
British, and even French models within a predominantly German prototype thereby
creating uniquely Japanese institutions (Nakayama, 1989, p. 104, Wu et al.,
1989, p. 164). Japan was thus able to build a particularly Meiji-type of
institutional paradigm, which was instrumental in Japan’s development as a
major power. This development also facilitated the training of a new generation of bureaucrats who gave
shape to Japan’s modernization.
In contrast to Japan’s active
approach, the ‘window-shopping’ mode occurred passively in twentieth century
China. The missionary movement introduced to China a variety of western
university models through the creation of missionary institutions. Examples of
American forms developed in the Tsinghua University,
the German Humboldtian pattern in the Peking University, the German Technische Hochschule format in the
Tongji University, and the French model in the Aurore University (Hayhoe, 1989a, p. 15). With the abolition of the
imperial examination system in 1905, the popularity of missionary higher
education among Chinese youth grew enormously, and with it the number of
missionary institutions. In 1917, missionary colleges
and universities accounted for 80% of the Chinese higher education institutions.
By 1921, China had only one national university (Peking
University), one provincial university, and 5 private universities. In
contrast, there were 16 missionary colleges and universities in all of the major
Chinese cities (Zhou, 1988, p. 93-94).
Under the crumbling republican and
warlord regimes prior to 1927, most of the missionary institutions were
chartered with American state governments and headed by American missionary
presidents (Hayhoe, 1989b, p. 34). From 1919 onward an Association for
Christian Colleges and Universities regulated academic standards for all of the
institutions. Eventually, most were funded on the American side by the United
Board for Christian Higher Education in China, which was based in New York City
(Lutz, 1971). This explains how the American liberal arts college became the
dominant model introduced by these mission institutions (Hayhoe, 1989b, p. 34).
In contrast, the Chinese modernizers of the late Qing and early republican
periods did not look to the missionary format of higher education for
inspiration for their reforms. Their own conception of change for higher
education consisted of a deep-rooted hostility toward western economic and
political domination, thus reflecting the political temperature of this time
period.
Out of the confidence that western
techniques could be absorbed into a revitalized Confucian empire, enabling it
to deal effectively with foreign incursions, the Chinese modeled their
educational reform legislation of 1902 and 1903 closely on the Japanese
education system of the time, which, influenced in turn by the German model,
seemed to offer a formula for modernization that allowed for the preservation of
Confucian values. Zhang Zhidong, an active scholar-bureaucrat at the time who
played an important role in drafting this legislation, is well known for the
slogan “Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for its usefulness”,
which guided the overall thinking behind this legislation (Ayers, 1971, p.
159-160, 253-254). The idea seems to have been that Western knowledge, which
was divided epistemologically into specific areas of expertise, should be
mastered and applied to specific purposes, while a Chinese essence should
remain at the core, directing the choice and orientation of those purposes. The
Imperial University, founded in 1898, was at this point modeled somewhat after
the University of Tokyo, closely linked to the Ministry of Education and supposed
to have a kind of supervisory role over all levels of the education system.
As with Japan during the Meiji era,
a growing number of Chinese students were being sent abroad to attend foreign
institutions of higher education. The first group consisted of 120 young boys
sent to the United States between 1872 and 1875, and continued with small
numbers being sent to European countries. It culminated in what was almost a
mass movement of study to Japan between 1900 and 1911. By 1906, there were
7,283 Chinese students and intellectuals in Japan pursuing various forms of
higher education, the majority preparing to be teachers in the modern
institutions that were formed after the legislation of 1902 and 1903 (Abe,
1987, p. 73-79, Chen & Tian, 1991, p. 686-689). The large number of
returnees from Japan was an important channel of influence. In this way, the
Japanese achievements and models had a dominant influence over practical
Chinese educational thinking. It also propelled the creation of a modern school
system during this period (Bastid, 1988, p. 44-50). Ultimately however, the
Japanese influences were abandoned when the threat of Japan’s imperialism
became more and more evident.
By 1910, there were only three
government universities in China. They were oriented towards studying classics
and technologies (Hayhoe, 1989b, p. 38). Most modern Chinese higher education
during this period was carried out in gentry-supported colleges, provincial
higher education institutions and missionary institutions. In this period of
political confusion, educators found themselves with the greater capacity to
participate in the decision making process. This led to the new educational
legislation of 1922 and 1924, in which a new set of standards, as opposed to
educational aims, was put forward. Such standards were developed following the
American university model. The characteristics of this type of higher education
involved adapting to the evolution of society, subscribing to the notion of
education for life, universalizing access to education and being flexible in
giving space to local initiatives. All higher education institutions of
adequate academic standards were to be called universities, whether their
curriculum was broadly academic or specifically professional. As a result, the
number of institutions calling themselves universities grew from 8 in 1917 to
35 in 1923 (Hayhoe, 1989b: pp.39-40). In spite of limited funding and chaotic
political conditions, this was a period when Chinese universities found a
modern identity, as faculty and students supported the kinds of scientific
study which would contribute to the needs of national development.
With the accession of the
Nationalist Party to power in 1927, the new government wished to see a
scholarly community which used its intellectual authority to support and
legitimize the political order in an uncritical way. It looked to Europe for
ideas about reform, and prepared for the greater integration of university
faculty into the bureaucracy. Thus in 1931, a League of Nations Mission of
Experts, which consisted completely of European experts, was invited by the
Nationalist Government to do a thorough review of all aspects of the Chinese
education system. They made the following recommendations for reform: the
establishment of academic chairs in place of the college and departmental
organization, clear national procedures for monitoring all academic
appointments, and a comprehensive examination at the end of each university
program to ensure a basic foundation in a discipline. In the legislation passed
between 1933 and 1936, many of these recommendations were adopted, resulting in
a greater measure of centralized governmental control over higher education.
The European model, however, proved
to be a two edged sword in the hands of the Chinese government. While it
contributed to modern Chinese scholarly development by improving the quality of
science and scholarship, the European model also echoed, in certain ways,
aspects of the Confucian tradition, which the Nationalist Government wished to
use to its own political ends. The strict faculty appointment conditions, and
the regimentation of a standard examination at exit, enabled the government to
hide political repression under the guise of academic requirements. As
university intellectuals became more and more critical of the Chinese
government’s inadequate response to Japanese aggression, and its failure to
address fundamental problems of rural development, it responded with
increasingly repressive academic and administrative policies. The conflict of
the scholarly community with the Nationalist regime eventually constituted one
aspect of a set of conditions that favored the final victory of the Communist
Party.
‘Involvement’ with the
American Model in Post-War Japan and with the Soviet Model in
Post-Revolutionary China
E |
ven though the post-World War II Occupation Forces consisted of representatives of
several Allied powers, the occupation of Japan was administered almost
exclusively by the United States. Thus the model for post-War reform with
respect to a variety of public institutions was purely American. Extraordinary
pressure came from the Occupation Forces for replacement of the existing
Japanese higher education system with the American model. Following the
recommendations made by the American Educational Mission, the Occupation Forces
introduced a series of measures to the Japanese government to carry out an
educational reform, among which democracy, decentralization, general education
and lay control signified typical American style.
In pre-War Japan, college graduates
comprised fewer than 7 percent of the corresponding age cohort (Nakayama, 1989,
p. 106) and hence Japanese education was naturally elitist in nature. The
Americans strongly urged the Japanese to expand their higher
education sector to the extent that each of the 46 prefectures would have its
own university (Kitamura, 1979, p. 66-68). In spite of the economic hardship
that prevailed after Japan’s defeat in the War, a significant expansion of
expensive higher education was proposed by the Ministry of Education. Many senmongakko, junior professional
colleges, and normal schools took advantage of this opportunity and sought to
raise their status to university level. As a result, 201 universities and 149
junior colleges were created in place of the 45 universities and 177 colleges
that existed before the War. The admission rate to universities and junior
colleges increased to 17 percent of the appropriate age cohort by 1955
(Kitamura, 1979, p. 67, Arimoto et al.,
1993, p. 163).
It is probably fair to say that had
the elitism of pre-War Japanese universities still continued in the 1960s and
1970s, higher education would have become obsolete in the face of the rapid growth of the country’s economy at the time.
In addition, the student revolts of the late 1960s in western industrialized
countries were interpreted to a certain extent in Japan as being due to
overcrowding in universities. In this sense, Japan suffered less than its
European counterparts, because the expansion had started earlier and facilities
were more adequate.
The Occupation Forces were also
enthusiastic about introducing the American ideal of general education
(Nakayama, 1989, p. 108), in which the trinity of course
arrangement—humanities, social sciences and natural sciences—was adopted. This
innovation stood in contrast to the original Japanese set up whereby the
university curricula was designed for the education of specialists. With the
pressure from the Occupation Forces, the Japanese translated this ‘trinity’
ideal into practice, by creating a system whereby the first two years of
university consisted of a general education. This ideal was taken further later
on, when the University of Tokyo created a new faculty in the College of
General Education, where a new program of general education was designed and
experimental interdisciplinary subjects such as area studies were incorporated
(Nakayama, 1989, p. 110). The Americans viewed the Japanese pre-war educational
system as one that was too centralized, and thus proposed in 1947-48 to
delegate supervisory power of universities to local prefectural educational
commissions, like the state universities in the U.S. This move was met with
strong opposition from the Japanese policy makers as they felt that local
governments had neither the experience nor the resources to handle matters of
higher education (Nakayama, 1989, p. 107). In the face of this opposition, the
Occupation Forces gave up on this issue.
In addition to the centralization of
the Japanese education system, the Americans viewed the internal governance
body in major Japanese universities, referred to as Faculty Conferences, as too
complacent and isolationist. Therefore, in 1950, the Americans proposed to
introduce the American style Board of Trustees as the governing body of
Japanese national universities (Nakayama, 1989:pp.107-108). This time an even
stronger opposition came from the Japanese, and finally the proposal to create
a board of trustees for the Japanese universities was withdrawn. Consequently,
the Japanese did not duplicate the American university system, but carefully
planned the indigenization of the American model,
adapting it to suit Japanese national needs and realities. After the withdrawal
of the Occupation Forces in 1952, the Ministry of Education gradually regained
control of higher education. Instead of returning to the old pre-War model,
which was established in the late nineteenth century and in need of a reform to
meet the new demands of the mid-twentieth century, it initiated the process of
internalization (in other words, domestication of the external American model)
to absorb useful elements from the American model and avoid those which were incompatible with the Japanese cultural
and social context (Kobayashi, 1979).
All of these
resulted in a Japanese higher education system that reflects some elements of
its nineteenth-century origins as well as
considerable qualities from American higher education. It is currently a very
large and diverse system, composed of both highly selective and mass oriented
universities. These many sectors do not simply exist side by side with a parity
of esteem. Rather, they are placed within a hierarchical ranking, that
originated in the nineteenth century with the government’s intention to train a
highly competent elite at the imperial universities (Arimoto et al., 1979).
This intention was institutionalized, and has persisted and conditioned the
rest of the system even as diverse sectors have emerged and the system has
swelled greatly. The Japanese degree of monopolization of elite placement by a
small peak of the hierarchy can be paralleled in the West only by the
Oxford-Cambridge top of the British system, which is still staffing the British
cabinet and the upper echelons of the civil service.
While post war-Japan, encouraged by
the Occupation Forces, reformulated American forms of higher education to suit
their own indigenous system, Chinese policy makers reacted in a different
manner to their new political circumstances. In China, when the Communist Party
achieved victory in 1949, the new leadership viewed higher education with a new
political vision. A decision was made in 1952 to reorganize Chinese higher
education in imitation of the Soviet model. Within this model, the Marxist-Leninist
ideology guaranteed training to individuals to serve the objectives of a
socialist state. The inherited educational system from the Nationalists was not
suitable to the new government as it was viewed as borrowed from Western
imperialists.
Between 1950 and 1960, a total of
1,269 Soviet educators were sent to China, among whom 654 worked as consultants
assisting in the organizational aspects of higher education reform. The
remainders served as faculty members teaching on Chinese campuses. At the same
time, about 7,324 Chinese scholars and students completed their study programs
with proper qualifications in the Soviet Union (Orleans, 1987: p.188). In the
light of the Soviet articulation of the socialist higher education
system, as Hayhoe explains, “a mixture of persisting features of European
academicism, most notable in the conception of a comprehensive university as an
institution devoted to pure science and arts disciplines only, and socialist
economic planning which decreed the close integration of all professional
training into the development plans of each major economic and bureaucratic
sector” (1989b, p. 45). China’s existing 207 higher institutions were
dismantled and all private and missionary universities were reabsorbed into 181
new institutions.
A newly established Ministry of
Higher Education directly administered 14 comprehensive universities. These
universities took up the basic arts and science departments of all the old
institutions to produce strong departments which were able to play a leading
role in advancing these disciplines. The ministry’s new innovations also
included 6 major teachers’ universities, which had both departments of
education and fine arts, in addition to basic arts and science departments,
plus about 10 most distinguished polytechnic universities and a small number of
foreign language, fine arts and physical education institutes. Another 28
engineering universities belonged to other central ministries such as
metallurgy and machine building, while 26 agricultural institutes, 29 medical
institutes, 4 institutes of political science and law, and 6 institutes of
finance and economics were administered by their respective central ministries.
In addition, there were some teachers’ colleges administered by the provincial higher
education bureaus.
The Ministry of Higher Education was
also responsible for making detailed and nationally standardized curricular
plans in support of the projected manpower needs for each sector and sub-sector
of the economy. It regulated the preparation of teaching plans for a set of
narrowly defined specializations which grew from 215 in 1952 to 323 in 1957, as
more and more specific definitions were given to manpower profiles (Orleans,
1987). The teaching plan for each specialization included the purpose of
formation, the organization of time, the structuring of all the required
courses and the arrangement of the teaching environment. It was supplemented by
detailed course outlines and standardized textbooks, which ensured high
academic and political standards throughout the country. Within each
institution it was the specialization, rather than the department, which was
the most important academic unit, and its entrants, programs and graduate job
assignments were all centrally regulated.
The reformed system was designed to
produce technical experts who would be slotted into appropriate lifelong posts
within the socialist governmental bureaucracy, and were expected to apply their
skills to socialist modernization, without being critical of the system. Its
structure and the organization of knowledge both contributed to and reflected a
sense of rigidity and was a reflection of the whole sociopolitical system. Not
only were classification and framing strong, but a hierarchical structure of
curricular knowledge, with the highest prestige going to pure fields, was also
present.
Some scholars argue that, on a
deeper level, this authoritarian regimentation of the higher education system
reflected the persistence of Confucian knowledge patterns. These patterns
exalted pure classical knowledge and made all other areas of knowledge in
applied scientific fields subordinate to it. In this case however,
Marxism-Leninism replaced the Confucian classics as the knowledge of the
highest prestige and all forms of learning subordinated to it (Hayhoe, 1989a,
p.20, Orleans, 1987, p.184-185). Nevertheless, the Soviet-inspired higher
education system played a major role in China’s rapid industrialization in the
1950s by producing a large number of technical personnel. On the other hand it
tended towards sterility. After the Sino-Soviet dispute, however, Soviet
patterns of higher education were viewed as elements of Soviet penetration, and
efforts were thus made first to modify the Soviet model and
then to develop a radical approach—the Cultural Revolution—to
detach completely from Soviet influences. This was done through the dismantling
of the existing intellectual system in hopes of creating truly independent
institutions. This proved ultimately unsuccessful and some would say disastrous.
Conclusion
A |
comparison
of the historical development of higher education in Japan and China
reveals how their different approaches to foreign models of higher education
have impacted their higher education and even their epistemological systems.
Japan followed a bifocal approach to borrowing foreign ideas and developing its
higher education system, looking both to the foreign models and to its own
earlier patterns of university development, while China adopted a ‘go it alone’
policy, unwilling or unable to abandon some of deeply held traditional beliefs.
Thus, Japanese higher education has followed a unique course of development by
adopting a variety of foreign models while establishing its own indigenous
organizational structure. In contrast, China was less successful with their
experimentation with a number of foreign models and a radical indigenous
approach. The Chinese have now returned to the ‘window-shopping’ approach with the West for ideas about academic development. In other words,
Japanese higher education succeeded in drawing a distinction between imported
innovations and original ethos, while the Chinese failed to adapt innovative
foreign models to their traditional patterns. Consequently, Japan was able to
borrow a number of higher education ideas from other countries and adapt them
to suit Japanese national needs, while China was exposed to and adopted a range
of foreign influences over time and that confusion, conflict, and, at times,
failure has been pervasive.
The German sociologist Max Weber
identified a lack of rationalization as the major obstacle to China’s
modernization (Weber, 1964). This can be applied to China’s higher education
development, in which the moral or political concern always made it impossible
to forma clearly unified policy for the direction of educational and scientific
development along with the adoption of foreign ideas. Within Weber’s framework,
the rationalization of the state, often resulted in a definitive separation of
the spheres of science, morality and culture. He argued that it created the
social conditions needed for the emergence of an impersonal and fully
calculable system of rational law. This in turn prevented social lag from
occurring when traditional beliefs hamper the introduction of new institutions
from outside the society. Following
this theory, Japan has followed a rational approach in achieving success, not
only in relation to higher education but also with respect
to various other aspects of society. China could blame
its resistance to the full rationalization of the state for the failure in its
modernization process, not only confined to
higher education.
As the Cultural Revolution in China
saw a strong revival of moral fervor, it is doubtful whether it really
dissolved Chinese Confucian traditions. Thus, while China now truly attends to
innovation in higher education without the emotional or political objection to
foreign influence in the semi-colonial period, more attention should be paid to
persisting patterns that might be antithetical to those foreign models and
innovations necessary for developing ‘centers of excellence’ in Chinese higher
education.
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About
the Author
Qiang Zha is a Ph.D.
candidate in Higher Education in the Department of Theory and Policy Studies in
Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University
of Toronto (OISE/UT).
E-mail: qzha@oise.utoronto.ca