The
University Student in a Reflexive Society: Consequences of Consumerism and
Competition[1]
Richard Wellen
Abstract:
In what follows I argue
that, with the transformation from elite to mass university systems, the
consumer role is ascendant, especially as higher education systems become more
institutionally diverse, complex, inclusive and expansive. In this environment,
students and their patrons (parents, governments, etc.) demand more responsive
and flexible institutional forms, which some sociologists have argued reflects
the advent of an increasingly ‘reflexive society.’ In the case of universities,
the result of social reflexivity is an inevitable blurring of some important
boundaries, especially those between the external and internal values of the
academic culture. In this context it is not surprising that students are more
directly and exclusively focused on the utilitarian value of education, and its
role as a gateway to occupational opportunities and social prestige. However, I
propose that student consumerism need not be a threat to academic communities,
especially in a public university system like that of Canada’s. In particular,
wise government policies concerning student financing and institutional
competition can help to avoid some of the crises emerging in market-oriented
systems like that of the United States.
Introduction: The Problem of Student Consumerism
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ortrayals of students as consumers provokes
some of the most disdainful reactions within academic cultures. Whether the
role is imposed or chosen, consumer-like students are said to be incapable of
genuine membership in academic communities.[2]
Rather than setting out to learn or change oneself, the student-consumer merely
sees higher education as a utilitarian means to gain grades and occupational
credentials. As education is commodified, plagiarism, apathy and narrow
customer orientation (Newson, 2004) become the norms in the higher education
arena. The resulting frustration on the part of teachers can often take the form
of arrogance and condescension. Other academics make concessions to
instrumentalism by adapting their instruction style and curriculum design in
ways that distort academic and intellectual values. This can range from trying
to score brownie points on student evaluation surveys to reducing knowledge to
marketable information (Readings, 1996). Of course, as higher education prices
increase many people fear that credentialism will reinforce many of these
consumer attitudes.
One of the most common ways
to critically address student consumerism is to try to use the distinction
between private and public goods. If a good is private, the argument goes, it
would be better for society to provide it through markets. In this way the
price system provides incentives for providing the right amount and kind of the
good to be produced. In the case of higher education the student would weigh
the benefits of the educational service he or she is purchasing against its
cost. Providers who are either less efficient or offer too little quality would
have to adjust their service accordingly, or go out of business. However, there
are good grounds for saying that higher education is at least partially a
public good, which means that the value and benefits realized by educational processes
are enjoyed by third parties, or society as a whole – or in ways that can’t
simply be measured by efficiency considerations. People who have received a
university education are probably more capable of independent thought,
analyzing problems, absorbing new ideas, all of which brings value to their
fellow citizens, employers and others who cannot be expected to pay for these
benefits. In this way higher education as we know it creates value and benefits
that cannot be readily be priced or captured by the market, and which will not
be fully realized if the choice and pursuit of higher education is treated like
a consumer transaction. Indeed, much of higher education itself involves
self-questioning and transformation, which calls into question whether, in the
path toward higher learning, one can ever posit a rational consumer with
pre-given preferences. Getting higher education “right” demands that we not
assume that the “customer is always right” (McMurtry, 2004).
Despite the obvious need to
regard higher education in terms other than that of the normal private market
good posited by economic theory, today’s trends are such that the consumer
model is becoming predominant. Take, for example, some of the following
discussion points of the consultation document published by the recent “Rae
Review” of Ontario’s post secondary education:
· More students view
themselves as active purchasers of academic services, and are calling for
stronger quality assurance standards and “valued” credentials.
· Institutions are faced with
more market pressures to differentiate/specialize in order to succeed as
competition for students and faculty grows.
·
[Should we] redirect additional public funding
from institutions to students and their families in order to make the
institutions more responsive to student needs? (Rae, 2004)
For many within the ‘ivory tower’, these
propositions only add to the growing unease about current directions in today’s
world of higher education and the ever-growing influence of market metaphors.
Indeed, governments are more willing to introduce social accountability
measures intended to shake-up the supposedly unresponsive and anachronistic
ivory tower. Of course, both students and academic institutions themselves have
already begun to internalize the new expectations (Newson, 2004). Financial pressures and new cultural norms
mean that students are perhaps less likely to appreciate the goals of critical
thought and the proud freedom from external power characteristic of liberal
arts missions, and they are likely to approve of government policies that
demand results measurable in market terms. For its part, the ivory tower has
been the victim of its own success. Growing participation rates in
postsecondary education, along with competing funding requirements such as
health care, old age pensions and international competitiveness have meant that
public universities have had to cope with declining per student grants and the
need to find a higher proportion of their revenue from private and community
patrons as well as their student clientele. As a result, sophisticated
institutional branding and competition for good students has become more
prevalent.
In what follows
I argue that, with the transformation from elite to mass university systems,
the consumer role is ascendant, especially as higher education systems become
more institutionally diverse, complex, inclusive and expansive. In this
environment, students and their patrons (parents, governments, etc.) demand
more responsive and flexible institutional forms, which some sociologists have
argued reflects the advent of an increasingly ‘reflexive society.’ In the case
of universities, the result of social reflexivity is an inevitable blurring of
some important boundaries, especially those between the external and internal
values of the academic culture. In this context it is not surprising that
students are more directly and exclusively focused on the utilitarian value of
education, and its role as a gateway to occupational opportunities and social
prestige. However, I propose that student consumerism need not be a threat to
academic communities, especially in a public university system like that of
Canada’s. In particular, wise government policies concerning student financing
and institutional competition can help to avoid some of the crises emerging in
market-oriented systems like that of the United States.
Social Reflexivity and Mass Higher Education
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art of my argument in this paper is that while on the one hand the rise of the ‘student as consumer’ model gives us grounds for concern, there is also a need to see this development as a response to social changes that cannot be fully captured by the usual laments about the marketization and corporatization of universities. In important respects student consumerism is merely one outgrowth of the increasing reflexivity of modern social relationships and practices, and also linked to the transition from an elite to a mass higher education system.
Social reflexivity refers to
the consequences of the de-traditionalization of social relationships and the
revisability of the “rules of the game” previously taken as constitutive of
social institutions. In a reflexive society we witness a changeability of
social practices as a result of new information and the availability of new,
more individualized channels for influencing and learning about one’s
opportunities relative to those practices (Giddens, 1990). Of course,
reflexivity and its individualizing tendency do not mean that workers,
citizens, students, and other social agents are somehow transported to a
utopian level of empowerment and autonomy vis-à-vis institutions. Rather, the
reflexive society is also a ‘riskier’ society for individuals in the sense that
conditions of membership within social relations, groups and organizations
cannot be taken for granted. The new rules for both service providers and
service recipients are less easy codified.
Higher education is a
perfect example of this dynamic of uncertainty and risk. On the one hand,
higher education can be regarded as a public good, since many of its benefits
are collectively, rather than privately, enjoyed. In many other ways the most
valuable and worthy qualities of higher learning require a distance from the
market which can only be achieved if consumerism and utilitarian motives are
not allowed to trump the autonomy of the process of questioning and discovery.
However, even if the state responds appropriately by subsidizing the higher
education enterprise, the mere fact that students and their patrons experience
higher education in a context of financial and career uncertainty, transforms
higher education into a private good. In a reflexive society fewer practices
and goods can be said to have natural or stable contexts. Boundaries such as
that between private and public or autonomy and instrumentalism are harder to
draw.
In a reflexive society there
is more emphasis on personalization and individualization as people realize
that satisfactory and enriching life-patterns are driven by active rather than
passive access to resources. Knowledge and information saturate social
environments and structures, as is shown by the social, political and economic
importance of recent developments like the Internet and more savvy culture
industries. There are still experts, trustees and intermediaries, but the need
to have the knowledge of how to use them is just as decisive as their
availability and reliability. According to Giddens (1994), experts and
professionals have to adapt in a reflexive society as individuals become more
clever and self-creative. For instance, we know what social reflexivity means
in politics: parties and politicians can no longer use the standard scripts to
compete for popular acclamation using the mass media, and must now contend with
citizens who are cynical consumers of media and the meaning of political
messages. What does reflexivity imply for universities? In the first place,
social reflexivity itself is matched very closely with the so-called “knowledge
society” in which intellectual capital is more widely diffused and can be used
and accumulated outside of institutions specialized in the production and
transmission of knowledge. In many ways research and scholarship is no longer
monopolized by universities or controlled by academic professionals. This is
implicitly accepted by many academics
themselves, especially those whose ‘postmodern’ theories of knowledge
recognize that scientific method itself cannot be divorced from politics or
economics. As Peter Scott (1995) has noted, it is not simply that research and
knowledge are directed and shaped by external and alien powers, but rather that
social, economic and political accountability is now something that is not so
much ‘external,’ but rather part of the university’s design.
This explains the ambivalent
attitude that academic communities have toward social reflexivity. On the one
hand universities have incorporated and captured more social functions as they
have served broader constituencies, but at the same time universities appear to
be ‘captured’ more by forces that seem to threaten their autonomy (Scott,
2000). From the standpoint of students in a reflexive society higher education
is treated as an investment in their personal and individualized intellectual
capital (Robertson, 2000). In terms of academic life itself this does not mean
that students will always adopt the stance of active intellectual participants
rather than passive clients, but it does transform the academic experience into
an environment of heightened expectations with attendant problems of
accountability and responsibility. Interest in how to relate the internal goals
and external benefits of higher education remains high among students, even if
academic professionals are perhaps less uniquely qualified to help them draw the
lines between internal and external in a clear and legitimate fashion.
Students are also
reflexively aware of the stratification effects of higher education achievement
and opportunities. The increased private and public costs associated with the
transition from elite to mass higher education raises the ante of career
opportunities and choices, especially with respect to their potential economic
returns. Today’s participants in mass higher education are at least implicitly
aware that they need to develop the capacity to cope with increasing income
inequality and less stable and predictable economic returns to higher
education. They are also aware that career patterns are changing from stable
and linear to more flexible and fragmented. The person who is acquiring
intellectual capital can no longer afford to think in the old, pre-scripted
terms about jobs and positions within organizations and formal professional
groups. This is because the value of one’s intellectual capital is increasingly
realized only in more fluid and disaggregated social forms such as webs and
networks (Marginson, 2004). Indeed, students are aware that networks are not
only disaggregating the occupational world, but also the functions of
universities. They know, for example, that different programs and departments
within the same university may have different levels of prestige,
competitiveness and reputation relative to their fields. Those who want to be
successful must resist the temptation to tie their identity to the older model
of a “disciplinary and professional culture”(Scott 1995).While higher education
has always been a mechanism of social sorting, the nature and dimensions of
social sorting have become more complex and less understandable in terms of
simple linear hierarchies and fixed boundaries among occupational categories
and fields.
Mass Higher Education and Student Consumerism in Practice
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he notion of social reflexivity helps us understand
some of the sociological reasons for the ascendancy of consumer motivations and
identities among today’s university students. However, we can hardly afford to
ignore the important macroeconomic dimension as well. As I mentioned before, it
appears that one of the reasons for the rising price-tag of contemporary higher
education is the rising participation rate, which means that volume is
increasing faster than government revenues.[3]
When participation rates were lower student support in Canada came in the form
of government transfers to postsecondary institutions. The era of low tuitions
and highly subsidized prices was not an environment that encouraged rampant
consumerism since most money didn’t follow students (rather students followed
the money). Since this was an elite system, where under-funded students were
less plentiful, governments could offer means-tested grants to a reasonably
high proportion of qualified students in need. Today, by contrast, tuition
costs are higher, non-repayable government grants have declined and student
loans have taken their place (Junor and Usher, 2004). Government spending has
shifted more toward transferring tuition-offsetting aid – functioning largely
like education vouchers - to eligible (admitted) students. Increasingly,
therefore, universities find that money follows students, and institutions must
therefore compete for enrolments (Slaughter, 2001).
It
is arguable that the growing ‘voucherization’ of student support, as well as
the inevitable differentiation and increased choice characteristic of mass
higher education in a changing economy, has played a large role in casting
students in the role of consumers. Of course in many ways students remain
captive audiences of the academic professional who directs the learning
environment, the creation and use of learning
materials and the awarding of degrees. However, universities can no longer
support their traditional values by taking for granted their old function of
selecting and reproducing a singular cultural and socio-economic elite. In the
elite university system students did not consume higher education exclusively
as a platform for achieving career advancement. Rather, they were involved in
attaining membership in a community, and not merely receiving a service. They
were clients and apprentices first, consumers second.
With the decline of the
elite system and the rise of consumer motivations we find that academics
frequently complain about the decline of standards and critical thought as well
as the rise of efficiency criteria that induce flexible ‘supermarket’
approaches to learning and mass credentializing. They also rightly worry that
the concern to protect and serve narrow consumer interests can be used as a
reason to subject teachers to increasing amounts of state and administrative
discipline or other forms of auditing, each of which can often have perverse
results.
Increased auditing and
measuring can easily lead to one-dimensional portrayals of the value of what is
measured and the ‘performance’ to be improved. It is not hard to see why. One
of the most well-known drivers of competition in the Canadian system is the
influence of major media publications like Maclean’s
which produce exhaustive rankings of universities in the manner of consumer
reports. These rankings are treated with great seriousness by nearly all
universities, and those institutions that score well never tire of citing their
results in university promotional material. An institution that is ranked lower
than its peers will complain bitterly about the flawed methodology and
blindspots of these consumer reports. Consequently, behind the scenes, many
universities are eager to alter and adapt their image and academic practices to
improve their scores. After receiving disappointing class size rankings the
University of British Columbia decided to re-program its enrolment system to
establish class size caps that would help it score higher on Macleans rankings (Shaker and
Doherty-Delorme, 2004). Macleans also
issues ‘reputational’ rankings, based on surveys of business and university
leaders as well as school counselors. Attention to admissions standards such as
grades cut-off points is high, and school counselors wield comprehensive
indexes ranking programs and institutions by their selectivity. It is hard to
see how such standards should receive higher attention than, say, the success of
a less selective university that brings a high level of improvement to its more
diverse student body. The American publication, U.S. News and World Report is perhaps even more influential in its
market. One of the standards used in its rankings is success in attracting
alumni donations, a standard that has prompted at least one university to
delete the names of non-contributing alumni from its records. Another
university succumbed to the pressure to omit SAT scores of economically
disadvantaged students it had admitted (Kirp 2003). In many cases universities
take great pains to boost their “peer assessment” ranking in U.S. News by sending each other
specialized promotional material (Mathews 2003). In a well-functioning market
rankings should help consumers become better informed so that they can make
judgments that ultimately force providers to offer better products and
services. If it is doubtful that consumer interests are well-served by such
publications, it is almost certain that the public interest is not, especially
since the most influential consumer ratings provide a highly selective and
sometimes distorted picture of universities’ goals as well as irresistible
incentives to recast their performance in opportunistic ways.
It is probably dangerous to
regard this increasing consumerism in isolation, that is, as an infestation of
petty marketing and materialism destroying the culture of the academy. After
all, we cannot ignore the fact that mass universities are playing a large role
in creating a society in which unthinking deference to science and the old
patterns of cultural elitism are increasingly out of place (Scott, 1995).
Students may be consumers, but they are not ignorant; as members of academic
communities they expect a good explanation of the value of higher education –
and especially liberal education – rather than having this value treated as
self-evident (Kirp, 2003). The rise of the so-called “practical arts” has been
one way in which universities have tried to respond to student consumerism, and
it is not clear that this development necessarily implies a narrow
instrumentalization or “dumbing down” of academic practices. More and more B.A.
programs are being re-packaged in a way that aligns with the criteria
associated with professional credentialing. More and more Arts and Science
faculties are offering new curriculum areas such as information technology,
practical ethics, professional writing and so-called ‘pre-professional’ streams
and programs. In many cases of curriculum repackaging it is hoped that the
declining market power of the liberal arts can be curtailed by such
innovations. For these programs academic credibility and legitimacy requires
students to be provided with a “respectable” liberal education, even if that is
not what they believed they were buying. They must satisfy the same general
education and breadth requirements, and liberal arts curriculum and faculty,
for example, will continue to be needed.
Interdisciplinary programs
perform the same function as practical arts programs. Newer fields such as
Global Studies, Law and Society, Women’s Studies and Communications Studies are
exceedingly popular at many universities. Virtually all such programs are
sustained by synergies and cross-appointments with traditional disciplinary specialties.
In some cases Ph.D. programs are spawned as a field develops and where journals
and academic societies exist as normal avenues for credentialing professors. In
either case, these post-disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields have become
vital, largely because they reflect the diversity and experience of the
membership of academic communities as well as the growing interpenetration of
society and the university (Axelrod, 2002).
However, the blend between
traditional disciplines with the more “marketable” orientations of thematic,
problem based or occupational studies is not without its problems and
challenges. Large departments that can spin-off occupational tracks have a
large advantage over smaller programs when it comes to retaining and strengthening
their identity (Kirp 2003). However, a new or hybrid discipline is in need of
borrowing the intellectual prestige of liberal arts fields that can more
readily produce their own journals and Ph.D.’s and lay claim to an area of
general and reflective inquiry, theoretical sophistication, and so on. Such
prestige is important to students as well since their ability to use their
degrees in gaining admissions to graduate and professional programs depends on
it. The largest practical arts programs may gain academic legitimacy and
autonomy by spawning their own mini-replica of a liberal arts curriculum. It is
increasingly common for smaller and ‘softer’ liberal arts disciplines to
downgrade themselves – often quite grudgingly - to offer service courses for business
and professionally oriented programs (Kirp, 2003). If a regime of internal
competition exists within institutions, and if revenue follows students, a
cut-throat dynamic can occur and more enterprising or elitist strands can
command greater resources at the expense of ghettoized sectors.
Credential
Inflation and Positional Arms Races in Higher Education
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he tensions caused by markets and consumer demands within universities are probably unavoidable. The question that remains, then, is whether the dynamic of competition and reform that seems to be emerging can be made to serve students and the public good. Some scholars, like Randall Collins, remain skeptical. Collins, a leading American sociological theorist, is famous for identifying credential inflation as the main source of tension and dysfunction in the American system of higher education (Collins, 1979, 2002). At the most basic level credential inflation means that the “social distinctiveness” of academic degrees declines as more opportunities in the job market are dependent on the possession of higher education credentials. According to Collins, where there are more open markets in education this can lead to a system-wide “compulsion of credentialing students for careers” (2002, p.26).
Collins argues that most
portrayals of the so-called “knowledge society” are based on a misunderstanding
of what is responsible for the drive to provide and acquire formal credentials.
In his view the rise of mass credentialing is more functional for the maintenance
of social, cultural, class and occupational hierarchy than it is for the
economy itself or the changing skill demands of work. This is because the
latent function of much of what goes on in the universe of higher education is
to justify the distinction between the credentialed and the non-credentialed.
The needs of the knowledge economy and the hope for democratic social mobility
merely provide a convenient ideological cover for the more fundamental reality
behind expanding higher education.
If Collins is right, one
reason why the collegial form and ivory tower model of higher education is
under strain is because of the way different constituencies respond to the
increasing social expense of the expanded role of credentializing. In Collins’
view a highly competitive market for mass higher education must consume a
higher proportion of public and/or private wealth in order to perform its
function of social and intellectual sorting. The pressure to increase
educational attainment adds a layer of cost for students, parents, taxpayers
and governments that cannot be fully offset by the resulting social and
economic benefits and returns. This inability to economize on “sorting” costs
creates strains in many directions, whether or not we agree with Collins’ dismissal
of the notion that expanded higher education is functional for democracy and
the knowledge society. Students are more sensitive than ever of the need to
channel themselves into the most practical and/or specialized programs, or in
some sectors, into the most prestigious program or institution. Their effort to
make their investment more productive creates conflicts with the collegial
model that university communities would otherwise like to sustain. At best, in
a public system, governments can try to rationalize their spending on a larger
and more diverse system by seeking ‘value for money’ through performance-based
funding, more intense monitoring and demands for specialization and
concentration of resources.
One of the most worrying
developments in this context is that universities must commit progressively
more resources toward competing for students, largely because the competition
for students is a competition for prestige and market power. In this
connection, several observers have noted that universities find themselves
locked into a “positional arms race” with each other (Frank, 2002; Winston
1999; Winston and Zimmerman, 2000). One obvious example of this phenomenon is
today’s intensified competition for “star” researchers, especially in the United
States, but also in Canada. Big name professors have an enormous impact on the
reputation of academic programs. What’s interesting about the compulsion to
spend large sums of money to attract big names is that it does not necessarily
lead to efficiencies in the same way as “normal’ processes of market
competition. The strategy of attracting famous professors offers the prospect
of acquiring more highly visible markers of prestige than one’s competitors,
and it can therefore force competing universities to pursue this strategy over
less visible alternative investments, such as improving the curriculum or
admitting more students (Kirp, 2003).
Of course those who support
competitive pricing will reply by saying that markets are doing their job,
rewarding the best and punishing the worst, so that consumers or society as a
whole benefit. But
the problem with prestige competition is that gains are normally offset by how
much one must spend to keep up with others. Once again, this is because
prestige is a positional good (the amount that exists can’t increase, only some
can have more than others), and, by
necessity, competing efforts tend to leave the group as a whole worse off
than if no competitor had spent resources on it in the first place. This is the
classic prisoner’s dilemma whereby each
competitor must respond to its counterpart’s success without the competition
itself benefiting society.[4]
In fact, because at an aggregate level all programs must ratchet up the amount
they spend on competing as compared to what they spend on improving their
academic performance, this positional arms race can become a race to the
bottom. Each
will have spent more on elite professors and each will have to offset that
expense by hiring more low-paid contract faculty and graduate students to teach
courses and sustain the curriculum. Moreover, the elite professor, or the elite
department, will have less interest in participating in and contributing to the
collegial life and resources of the institution (Kirp, 2003).
Of course, the same kind of
positional arms race occurs with respect to competition for the best students.
Universities have an interest in attracting the best students in order to
attain positional advantages over their competitors. By contrast to most
consumer markets, the customer is not just a recipient, but also a vital input
into the delivery of the service (Frank, 2000; Winston, 1999). In fact, the
quality of educational experience one can offer depends in large part on
creating these “peer externalities” whereby the value of the learning and
credentialing each student receives is improved by the presence of other good
students. This is why selective admissions standards signal high prestige as
well as a better product. In some ways this kind of sorting may add value,
creating advantageous groupings at all levels of the system, and perhaps
sharpening the focus of each institution. In the process, however, universities
compete extraordinarily hard to increase their relative share of ‘good’
students, of which there is a fixed amount within a given pool of applicants
applying to a group of competing institutions. Since one is always most
vulnerable to one’s nearest competitor in the prestige hierarchy, and since
that competitor might try to gain an edge through more aggressive recruiting,
the costs of competing are likely to rise far higher than any offsetting
benefits in terms of educational quality. Reciprocal and offsetting moves by
competitors lead the sector as a whole to assume higher average competition
costs – or average prestige-maintenance costs -without any corresponding
increase in the quality of the product or service they offer to students or
society at large.
One of the most socially
problematic forms of competition for students is the awarding of merit aid to
more qualified applicants (McPherson and Shapiro, 2002). Presently in Canada
most non-merit financial aid to students – except for regressive tax credits
and savings grants for parents - is awarded by government on the basis of need
to students who have already made an enrolment decision. This type of
assistance, whether through grants or subsidized loans, allows students from
different socio-economic backgrounds to pay different prices for higher
education. Clearly it is socially beneficial when prices are lowered for those
in need, not only because of social justice concerns, but also because price
incentives are less necessary to attract highly qualified students into the
system (due to the high correlation between high academic achievement and high
socio-economic status). Most importantly, because the government is the source
of this assistance there is no competition-based incentive to shift student aid
from needs-based aid to merit aid.[5]
Unlike individual institutions, government has no interest in boosting the
relative peer quality of any given university over another. Once again, since
prestige is a positional good, adding costs to the way the prestige orderings
are achieved and maintained makes little sense for governments, especially
since it will increase the overall demand for government funding. For this
reason, when the previous Conservative government in Ontario allowed
universities to increase tuitions, it also required those institutions to
recirculate a portion of those revenues as needs-based student assistance.
Although this was one of the few positive policies adopted by that government,
the Rae report recommends it be dropped.
These universities place a
far greater emphasis than that of their Canadian counterparts on competitive
tuition discounting, or merit assistance awarded directly from institutional
budgets, as well as other expensive practices such as direct marketing to
high-ability students and sophisticated individualized bidding for these high
ability students at the application stage (College Board, 2004). American
university admissions offices will go to great lengths to identify which
students they must attract with discounted tuition and which students will want
to pay a higher price to be grouped with high-ability peers (Geiger, 2002).
Because merit based price discrimination - and the credentialism that
corresponds to it - is so pervasive, American college-bound students are hiring
more university consultants (and spend far more on preparation for admission
tests) in order to achieve admission to more selective institutions or win
cheaper prices at somewhat less selective institutions. Universities have also
been spending more on expensive on-campus amenities, and those who refuse to
play this game pay a big price. (Kirp, Levine, Davies)
Practices like these have
been identified as one of the main reasons that American universities have
grown both more expensive and unaffordable to students from lower-income
families, who are losing more than ever before by their continued exclusion.
The average level of tuition discounting in the U.S. is 39% but, due to the
increase in merit aid, the proportion of tuition discounts going to
higher-income students has more than doubled since 1995 (Goral, 2003). Of
course, one might argue that competition for merit-based tuition discounts may
give greater incentives for students to improve their academic performance and
for universities to improve the quality of services they provide. However, the
practice has come under increasing criticism (Goral, 2004). The biggest impact
may be the widening segregation of institutions in the prestige hierarchy
(Reich, 2000). This is because
competitive pricing compels ‘high prestige’ universities to use a higher proportion
of their tuition revenue to attract better students and faculty, while low
prestige institutions must compete on the basis of low price.
Getting Competition Right?
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o a large degree consumerism and intensified
competition in higher education can be explained by increased social reflexivity
as well as the growth of the so-called “knowledge society,” which not only
requires expanded provision and differentiation of higher education, but also
raises the economic stakes of educational attainment and investment. Underlying
the dominant pattern of student consumerism in the U.S. is a problem of an
uncontrolled escalation of credential and competition costs in that country’s
rather pronounced prestige economy of higher education. In the U.S.
universities and students compete with greater ferocity than anywhere else over
being selected and being selective (Reich, 2000). This suggests that some forms
of higher education competition and consumerism have their origin in political
and market structures. Over the next decade or two, the contrast between the
Canadian and U.S. systems of higher education may provide an illuminating basis
for observing the impact of these changes. As Davies and Hammack (2005) point
out, there are many reasons why Canada’s system differs so markedly from the
American pattern of extreme prestige hierarchy and competition. For one thing,
Canadian universities are more closely linked to their distinctive regional
economies. Students therefore have a greater propensity to remain in their
local communities, a factor which explains less active competition among
institutions on a national scale. They argue that competition exists, but it
takes place among programs and levels of higher education rather than among
institutions themselves.
Until recently, there has
not been sufficient pressure toward U.S.-style competition to disturb Canada’s
tradition of institutional equality, although pressures toward deregulated
undergraduate fees have emerged. The twin dynamics of expansion (rising demand
and participation rates) and differentiation has placed an increasing burden on
both government budgets and institutional ambitions. This has led to increased
pressure to adopt policies of tuition deregulation and to allow institutions
and programs to differentiate themselves in the market. A recent submission by
the Council of Ontario Universities provides a hint of the conflicting
priorities and coming struggles. On the one hand, the COU document includes the
usual prodding of the provincial government to boost per-student funding and to
ensure the long-term operating and capital resources to accommodate higher
participation rates in the province.[6]
However, the COU also
asks the government to
introduce institutional
flexibility in the determination of tuition fees, allowing each university’s
governing board to exercise its authority to determine fees, program by
program, based on analysis of the value of programs in a competitive market,
the resources that are needed to provide a high quality learning experience for
students, and the capacity of the university to help ensure that no student is
denied access due to lack of financial means (COU, 2004).
In the end, the Rae report sided with the COU
proposal for establishing fee-setting autonomy for standard undergraduate
programs.[7]
The new policy would have some minor conditions attached. In particular, institutions charging premium
fees must agree to supplement standardized government fee rebates for the
(small number of) low-income students they would have to accept. Beyond this,
universities would be required to guarantee transparency and predictability of
fees and available assistance at the point of admission.
The problem with flexible or
variable tuition is that it encourages the positional arms races characteristic
of the American system and its counterproductive spending increases on
selectivity. It is undeniable that, until now, tuition regulation has been a
large part of the reason Canada’s universities are regarded as a “community of
equals,” all serving students across a sustainable range of quality programs
(Davies and Quirke, 2002). To be sure, both quality and accessibility is now
threatened by funding shortages. However, the pricing of higher education
according to “the value of programs in the competitive market” will compel
universities to use a higher proportion of their tuition revenue to attract
better students. This will, in turn, increase the rate of competition
expenditures thereby privileging those institutions that can cash in on their
selectivity by raising tuitions further or promising more exclusive benefits to
patrons and student-consumers. As Davies and Hammack have pointed out, it is
true that competition already exists in Canada where it is more conspicuously
manifest between fields, disciplines and programs rather than between heavily
ranked and branded institutions, as in the U.S. Of course, there is no
likelihood that selectivity and exclusivity could be eliminated as the currency
through which ‘consumers’ and ‘providers’ transact with one another in higher
education markets. However, the introduction of fee-setting autonomy for
institutions in Canada will obviously encourage more of the kind of competition
intended to boost the brand of the school, which, in turn, will lead to an
escalation of the positional arms races which characterize the U.S. system. As
an alternative, Canadian governments could introduce greater variation in
regulated fee bands by discipline, program and level of education. However, if
the Rae report is any indication, the current preference is to introduce market
pricing.[8]
One
way to avoid ‘bad’ consumerism and prestige competition in higher education is
for governments to design and operate smarter and more targeted student finance
schemes. The UK government has recently adopted such a plan, which I have
discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Wellen, 2004). The cornerstone of the
policy is to raise additional funding for both quality improvement and increased participation by modestly
increasing government funding and allowing universities to raise tuitions from
$2300 to a maximum of $6500, with little variation among programs. Most
students would have the choice to defer payment of both tuition and living
expenses by enrolling in government-run income-contingent loan scheme which
would only be repayable if and when the graduate’s income rises to the national
average (with repayments at a rate of 9% of income above that amount). In
addition, lower income students would have most or all of their tuition covered
by non-repayable student grants, and universities would be required to provide
enrolments and financially assistance for
disadvantaged students if they want the full funding available to them.
University funding would increase and fewer students will be deterred by high
sticker prices. This approach is favored by the Rae report itself, although it
appears to have taken a back seat to tuition deregulation.
The
advantages of this system of smart funding are many. In the first place, income
contingent loans are the best means by which government can insure the costs
and risks of students’ investments in their own intellectual capital. Although
total private costs will likely rise, a system of publicly insured student debt
would guarantee that this burden would only be assumed by financially successful
graduates. Secondly, it targets tuition discounts where they can do the most
good - on the basis of financial need - and even penalizes institutions that
pursue admissions policies that fail the test of socio-economic inclusion.
Finally, it imposes caps on tuitions so that they cannot vary a great deal
according to the presumed differential market value of programs. This helps to
curb practices of prestige pricing that force both students and universities to
narrowly focus their behavior on rankings and its exclusionary benefits.
Some may argue that any
system which boosts private costs will inevitably transform higher education
from a public good to a consumer good. This view is mistaken, especially when
we know that in a fully tax-financed system the expansion of higher education
beyond the levels of the old elite system is bound to be limited by the
politics of state budgeting. A system which fails to meet demands for expanded
participation will necessarily remain biased toward the participation of economically
advantaged groups who possess the required levels of cultural and intellectual
capital. The growth of private sector universities – or a more sharply tiered
system - will almost certainly develop to fill the gap. To avoid these
scenarios, we need a new kind of contract with postsecondary students, one
which combines an honest acknowledgement of their interests as consumers with
policies that seek to realize their potential to become citizens in a better,
more inclusive society.
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[1] I have benefited greatly from the helpful comments and criticisms offered by two anonymous reviewers of this article and from the participants at the conference on the Canadian Student Experience where the first version of this paper was delivered.
[2] The concerns outlined here are based on the distinction between the ‘consumer’ and the ‘member’ of a community. As a consumer, one’s interests can be viewed in terms of pre-given preferences in need of satisfaction. By contrast, when we refer to the interests of community members we are speaking about preferences that are subject to modification or development through dialogue, interaction, learning and deliberation. Since the mission of higher education institutions like universities is in some sense to form a community which promotes the transformation of the person whose interests are meant to be served, it can be seen as a distortion of the institution’s goals to speak of students as consumers.
[3] It is also important to note that Canadian participation rates vary considerably by province. Ontario has among the highest participation rates and the lowest per student funding rates of all provinces It is no surprise that, until recent events in Q in Quebec, Ontario students have been the most active and militant in opposing tuition increases
[4] My formulation of this problem is indebted not just to Frank and Winston, but also to Joseph Heath’s The Efficient Society.
[5] This is analogous to the advantage of Canada’s public, single-payer health care system over that private insurance plans. Private medical insurance is not only unfair to those who are uninsured; it is also fraught with inefficiency due to the costs of managing moral hazards, or competing for the best part of the risk pool. See Heath (2002).
[6] Since this article was written the Ontario provincial government has indeed introduced a budget which would increase total university operating budgets by 35% by 2009-2010.
[7] Such autonomy already exists for selected graduate programs and most professional programs in the province of Ontario.
[8] The Rae report advocates market pricing, yet it employs a rationale that would support differentiated government mandated tuition bands as found in England and Australia: “Greater tuition fee variation will promote institutional and programmatic differentiation, by accommodating the unique revenue needs associated with different approaches to program delivery, student services and quality enhancements” (Rae, 2005, p. 102). The report’s introduction claims that “the weight of evidence clearly points to the need to shift the locus of the tuition decision from central planning to the individual institution” (Rae, 2005, pp. 23-24). Unfortunately the remainder of the report does not offer any support or evidence for choosing market pricing over regulated tuition bands.